Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge. Plaintiff Dilian Castro Medina (hereinafter “Plaintiff’ or “Castro”) filed this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 (“ADA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against her employer, The Procter & Gamble Commercial Company (“P & G”, “Defendant” or “the Company”), alleging discrimination and harassment on the basis of a protected disability. See Docket No. 1. As part of her discrimination claim, Plaintiff alleges that P & G failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, and wrongfully terminated and retaliated against her for engaging in protected conduct. She also alleges the Defendant retaliated against her and interfered with the exercise of her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq. Id. Finally, Plaintiff includes supplemental state law claims based upon Puerto Rico’s wrongful termination, retaliation, disability and general negligence statutes. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 501, et seq.; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185, et seq.; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194, et seq.; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5142. P & G moved for summary judgment requesting the dismissal of the claims brought forth by Plaintiff on the grounds that Castro is unable to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination. The Defendant argues that Castro is not disabled within the definition of the ADA and was not qualified for the job. The Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is unable to prove her failure-to-accommodate and harassment claims. Finally, the Defendant proffers that its actions were not motivated by Plaintiffs alleged condition or for having taken FMLA leave. The Company also argues that it did not retaliate against Plaintiff for having filed a charge with the Anti-Discrimination Unit (“ADU”) and the present claim. On the contrary, the Defendant claims that its actions were based on legitimate grounds. See Dockets No. 40-42. Plaintiffs opposition, Defendant’s reply, and Plaintiffs sur-reply thereto have also been submitted for our consideration. See Dockets No. 50-51, 60-61, 76. Also before the Court is the Defendant’s motion to strike certain materials supporting Plaintiffs opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Docket No. 62. Therein, P & G challenges the admissibility of: (1) a reporting letter from rheuma-tologist Dr. Jorge Mundo, Plaintiffs treating physician; (2) Plaintiffs medical file with another physician, Dr. Jose Roman, along with a typewritten note; (3) Castro’s medical file with a family physician, Dr. Raymond Tasch; and (4) an expert witness report by psychiatrist Dr. Jose Villanueva. See Docket No. 62. Also before the Court is Plaintiffs opposition to Defendant’s motion to strike, and a reply and sur-reply thereto. See Dockets No. 65, 75 & 77. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the motion to strike are related, and thus, the Court has determined to address the objections advanced in the latter on a point-by-point basis to the extent necessary in deciding the dispositive motion. After a close examination of all the evidence on record and a careful review of the applicable statutory and case law, the Court GRANTS IN PART P & G’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART P & G’s motion to strike for the reasons explained below. I. FACTUAL FINDINGS The following relevant facts are undisputed . Plaintiff 1. During Plaintiff Dilian Castro-Medina’s employment at P & G, she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia, depression and other lesions (herniated disks, severe cervico-lumbar trauma, and others) stemming out of an automobile accident that occurred in August of 2002. Due to these conditions, Castro was required to take leaves of absence. See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 6, ¶¶ 7, 10, 12; Amended Answer, Docket No. 11, ¶¶ 7, 10,12. The Company 2. P & G sells and distributes consumer products, and through a special arrangement assists an affiliated entity, PG Pharmaceuticals, in the marketing and sale of pharmaceutical products in Puer-to Rico. See Docket No. 42, ¶ 1. 3. P & G maintains an express written policy prohibiting any type of discrimination, including disability discrimination and/or harassment in the workplace. This policy is shared with all employees, including Plaintiff, upon enrollment. Id. at ¶ 47. 4. The policy is published in the personnel manual and policy statements as well as P & G’s intranet. Id. at ¶ 48. 5. P & G’s anti-harassment policy prohibits such conduct and provides an internal grievance procedure to report any type of complaint for investigation and resolution. Id. at ¶ 49. Plaintiff’s Employment 6. Plaintiff Dilian Castro was an employee of the Company from February of 1998 until March 4, 2005, when her employment was terminated. Id. at ¶ 2. 7. Plaintiff began work as a Secretary in PG Commercial’s Customer Business Development Department, with a salary of $21,000. Id. at ¶ 7. On April 1, 2000, she was promoted to a managerial position (Medical Account Manager) in the Pharmaceutical Group. Her yearly salary increased from $24,200 to $45,200. Id. at ¶ 7. 8. 9. On March 2, 2004, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident and took a leave of absence to seek medical treatment with the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund (“SIF”). The Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs employment terminated on March 4, 2005 upon lapse of a twelvemonth leave of absence for treatment with the SIF. Id. at ¶ 16. Medical Account Manayer Position 10. As a manager, Plaintiff was not subject to a fixed “9 to 5” work schedule. Id. at ¶ 7. 11. P & G’s Medical Account Managers are expected to visit at least 9 physicians a day (9 “calls” a day); educate them on the assigned products; and, distribute samples of the products (medications) to those targeted physicians. Their overall objective is to increase the products’ market share by incrementing prescription volume in Puerto Rico. Id. at ¶ 34. 12. Plaintiff failed to meet the position’s objectives. During the time that she actually worked (discounting her leaves of absence), her call average was as follows: Period Compliance Percentage July-December 2000 48% January-June 2001 61% July-December 2001 14% January-June 2002 38% July-December 2002 70% January-June 2003 6% July-December 2003 53% Id. at ¶ 35. 13. Plaintiff was advised of these deficiencies in her 2003 evaluation (“Work and Development Plan”), through a “Performance Improvement Discussion” on February 18, 2003, and on a follow up note on September 2, 2003. Id. at ¶ 36. 14. Her peers were similarly advised as follows: Ms. Dolyssa Campos (“Performance Improvement Discussion,” 2000); Mr. Mario Anglada (“Work and Development Plan,” 2000, 2002, 2003); Mr. Joaquin Ortiz (“Work and Development Plan,” 2000, 2004); Mr. Israel Ro-sado (“Work and Development Plan,” 2002, 2003); Mr. Onofre Rivera (‘Work and Development Plan,” 2003); and Mr. Carlos Velez (Work and Development Plan,” 2003, 2004). Ms. Campos was terminated for failure to reach her call objectives, among other expense report issues. Id. at ¶ 35. Expense Reports 15. As part of her duties, Castro was expected to prepare expense reports during downtime and off-hours. Instructions on how to fill these expense reports are posted in the Company’s intranet. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 21. 16. As a Medical Account Manager, Castro was required to submit expense reports to her supervisor. Initially, the reports were to be submitted on a monthly basis. Afterwards, every two weeks. These reports are critical for P & G’s internal controls and the proper utilization of Company funds. They are used to make sure employees receive reimbursement for business expenses they have incurred. Id. at ¶ 21. 17. During Plaintiffs employment with the Company, she failed to comply with the Company’s expense report procedures. Plaintiff admits that sometimes she did not submit the expense reports for months. Id. at ¶ 21. 18. On February 18, 2003, by means of a written Work and Development Plan” and a “Performance Improvement Discussion,” the Company warned Plaintiff to correct this problem. Id. at ¶ 23. 19. On February 16, 2005, while Plaintiff was on her medical leave with the SIF, she was once again warned of the need to submit timely expense reports. It stems from Plaintiffs admissions during her deposition that when Plaintiff reported to the SIF on March 2, 2004, she had not submitted the required expense reports since December of 2003, and did not prepare them until March 23, 2005. See id. at ¶ 24; Docket No. 42, Exhibit C, pgs. 81-82. 20. Plaintiff, a Manager, attributes her failure to submit timely expense reports to her lack of understanding on how to prepare them. She wanted the Company to give her: (1) extra coaching on expense report preparation; (2) time off work to prepare them, and; (3) that her peers should assist her on preparing her reports. Id. at ¶ 25. 21. P & G also warned other Medical Account Managers (Ms. Dolyssa Campos, Mr. Joaquin Ortiz) of the need to comply with the established expense report procedures. Id. at ¶ 26. Corporate Credit Card 22. As a Medical Account Manager, Plaintiff was required to have an American Express corporate credit card to cover business-related expenses. Id. at ¶ 27. 23. Plaintiff applied for an American Express corporate credit card but American Express denied her application because of her poor credit rating. Nevertheless, Mr. Edwin Piazza (“Piazza”), Plaintiffs immediate supervisor, approved and recommended Castro’s request that P & G guarantee the issuance of an American Express corporate credit card for her. P & G guarantees accounts as an exception. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. 24. As part of the guarantee, Plaintiff had to abide by P & G’s card usage policies and procedures. Thus, if American Express cancelled or suspended her corporate-guaranteed credit card, she risked disciplinary action, including termination. Id. at ¶ 30. 25. Plaintiffs failure to submit her expense reports led to several warnings regarding corporate card suspension. Plaintiff did not heed these warnings. Instead, American Express suspended Plaintiffs corporate card on several occasions. Id. at ¶ 31. 26. On February 18, 2003, Plaintiff was advised of this problem through a “Work and Development Plan” and “Work Improvement Discussion” with her supervisor (see Factual Finding No. 18). On February 16, 2005 (while on leave with the SIF), the Company again warned her of these problems in writing. P & G sent Castro a letter informing her that her failure to “submit a single expense report after 12/15/03 led to the accumulation of overdue amounts and delinquency charges to [her] Corporate AMEX Card,” and thus, to its cancellation. Because Castro’s Corporate AMEX Card was guaranteed by the Company, P & G was legally required to liquidate the balance on her account, including delinquency charges in the total amount of $1,192.03. Id. at ¶32. 27. Plaintiffs peers (Mr. Joaquin Ortiz, Mr. Mario Anglada) have also been warned, and even sanctioned, for issues related to their American Express corporate card accounts. Id. at ¶ 33. Territory Assignments 28. During Plaintiffs employment with P & G, the Company divided Puerto Rico into territories, and assigned Medical Account Managers to cover the territories. The territories were arranged into two big groups, RED and BLUE. The RED group had two representatives, each of which covered half of Puerto Rico (East and West). The BLUE team had two territories within each RED zone, for a total of four BLUE territories and two RED territories. Id. at ¶ 37. 29. With her appointment as Medical Account Manager, Plaintiff requested her supervisor to assign her the RED east territory (covering an area extending from the San Juan metropolitan area to Juana Diaz; and through Caguas, to Humacao, Fajardo and Carolina). She explained that since she took her children to school in Rio Piedras in the mornings, it would make her route easier. Her supervisor granted her request. Id. at ¶ 38. 30. On January 22, 2002, while on leave of absence (due to her fibromyalgia), Plaintiff requested to be assigned to either the BLUE metropolitan area territory or the BLUE Bayamon territory. These BLUE territories opened due to the transfer of Ms. Luisa Febres, previously assigned to the BLUE metropolitan area territory. The Defendant denied Plaintiffs request on January 24, 2002. Id. at ¶ 39 & Exhibit R. 31. Instead, P & G assigned Mr. Mario Anglada, who had been working in the BLUE Bayamon territory, to the BLUE metropolitan area territory. Mr. Angla-da, hired on October 27, 1997, had more company seniority and experience than Plaintiff as Medical Account Manager. Id. at ¶ 40. 32. The BLUE Bayamon territory was not assigned to Castro either. In the alternative, it was assigned to Mr. Israel Rosado, a new hire with seven (7) years of experience in similar positions with competing pharmaceuticals, such as Schering Plough. Most of his experience was attending physicians in the Bayamon area. Id. at ¶ 41. 33. At that time, Plaintiff expressed to her supervisor, Mr. Piazza, that she felt penalized for being sick. She also stated that, although she was happy with her territory, she would prefer the change because the territories she applied for were geographically less extensive. Id. at ¶ 42. 34. In response, the supervisor explained to Plaintiff that she already covered part of the metropolitan area within her territory; and authorized her to target physicians by importance instead of geography. With this arrangement, Plaintiff spent approximately 90.73% of her time in the metropolitan area. Id. at ¶ 43. 35. In December 2003, Plaintiff and Mr. Israel Rosado requested a transfer to the BLUE metropolitan area territory, which would be vacant as a result of Mr. Mario Anglada’s transfer to another position. Id. at ¶ 44. 36. Instead, the Company selected Ms. Vanessa Peréz, a new hire, for the territory. Ms. Peréz had over ten (10) years of experience at a competing pharmaceutical company (Eli Lilly) working the metropolitan territory. Id. at ¶ 45. 37. Although during Plaintiffs tenure as Medical Account Manager she sought treatment with, at least, seven (7) different doctors, none gave her a written recommendation indicating that any condition she may have had required a change in territory. Id. at ¶ 46. Leaves of Absence 38. In the initial evaluation corresponding to her first 17 months of employment (prior to her promotion to Medical Account Manager), signed by Plaintiff on November 2, 1999, her supervisors observed that Castro needed to improve on her absenteeism because it could infringe upon the team’s ability to achieve its objectives and speed to market. Her supervisor noted that although there are instances when one cannot control being out due to health and personal issues, Plaintiff was absent quite often. See id. at ¶ 8, Exhibit G. 39. Thereafter, Plaintiff was absent on the following dates: Dates: AsseHed Reason: 8/6/2001-2/4/2002 (6 months) Fibromyalgia 8/8/2002-8/18/2002 (7 days) Fibromyalgia 8/19/2002-1/13/2003 (5 months) Auto accident 2/24/2003-6/30/2003 (5 months) Back 8/25/2003-8/27/2003 (3 days) Back 10/30/2003-11/3/2003 (3 days) Depression 11/4/2003-12/1/2003 (1 month) Depression 1/8/2004-1/21/2004 (10 days) Chicken pox 3/2/2004-3/4/2005 (12 months) Auto accident Id. at ¶ 9. 40. In her 2003 evaluation (“Work and Development Plan”), through a “Performance Improvement Discussion” on February 18, 2003, Plaintiff was also advised that if she improved her absenteeism, she would be able to meet and surpass the job expectations. See id., Exhibit B-3. 41. From August 2001 through her termination on March 4, 2005, a time span of three (3) years and seven (7) months, she was absent for approximately 878 days (the equivalent of 2 years and 5 months or 67% of the time). Id. at ¶ 9. 42. During Plaintiffs June 2003 leave of absence, P & G hired an independent consultant for the purpose of making recommendations as to what reasonable measures could be taken in order to assist Plaintiff in meeting her job responsibilities. Id. at ¶ 13, Exhibit I. 43. To that end, the consultant suggested that Plaintiff carry a portable scale to weigh her work materials; that she use a lightweight briefcase; and that bins be purchased to organize the work materials in the trunk of the Company car. Id. at ¶ 14. 44. The Defendant followed the consultant’s recommendations, paying for a portable weight scale for Plaintiffs Company car’s trunk; a light briefcase of her choice to carry her materials; and, special containers to organize materials in the trunk of Plaintiffs assigned car. Id. at ¶ 15. 45. Upon return to work from the various leaves of absence she took (except the 3/2/2004-3/4/2005 leave of absence), Plaintiff returned to her position and responsibilities, enjoying the same salary and benefits. Her supervisor indicated that Plaintiff needed to concentrate her work building relationships and visiting those physicians. Id. at ¶ 10. 46. During her leaves of absence (except for her final twelve-month leave), Plaintiff enjoyed full supplementary payment (100%) of her salary, paid in part by P & G and the Company’s insurance carrier, Met Life. Id. at ¶ 11. 47. During her leaves of absence, P & G allowed Plaintiff to use the Company car, the Company computer, and Internet access (except during her last leave), and paid for the use of these items. These benefits were given to Plaintiff for work purposes. The car’s expenses included gasoline, maintenance, repairs and car rental when repairs were required. Id. at ¶ 12. 48. During these absences, most of the physicians in Plaintiffs assigned territory remained unattended. Id. at ¶ 9. Salary Increases 49. During Plaintiffs employment, the Company granted her various salary increases: Year Increase 1998 $1,680.00 1999 $1,832.00 2000 $1,992.00 2001 $3,616.00 2002 $3,856.00 2003 $3,856.00 2004-2005 $4,272.67 Id. at ¶ 53. Plaintiff’s Complaints 50. After Plaintiffs supervisor followed up with her in September of 2003 about her persistent expense report and call objective problems, Plaintiff sent him an email on October 3, 2003 claiming that she was disabled and that he was discriminating against her. The day before her e-mail, on October 2, 2003, she had filed an administrative claim with the Anti-discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources. Id. at ¶ 50; Docket No. 51, Exhibit 15. 51. Prior to receiving notice of the charge, on November 10, 2003, P & G warned Plaintiff in writing that she had been absent on certain dates and failed to provide a medical certificate for the absences. Hence, the Company instructed Plaintiff to provide proper documentation regarding the absences or otherwise, her employment would be terminated. See Docket No. 42, ¶ 51. 52. To authorize leaves of absence, P & G requires its employees to justify the leave by providing the necessary medical certificates to the Company’s medical group. The certificates have to contain sufficient information for the Company to evaluate and approve the requested leave. Id. at ¶ 52. 53. Castro submits that she was unable to send the medical certificate because the Company fax was not working. Notwithstanding, after receiving the Company’s warning, she complied. See Docket No. 51, Exhibit 25. 54. Thereafter, Plaintiff amended the discrimination charge to allege that P & G was retaliating against her. Id. at ¶ 52. Termination 55. Plaintiff contacted the Company on February of 2005, and informed them that her next appointment with the SIF was on March 30, 2005, and that she did not feel like she could return to work. See Docket No. 51, Exhibit 4, page 30. 56. Upon lapse of a twelve-month leave of absence for treatment with the SIF, in a letter dated March 8, 2005, P & G informed Plaintiff that her employment was being terminated because of her failure to return from a twelve-month leave of absence with the SIF. At the time of termination, Plaintiff had not been cleared to work by the SIF, or provided an expected release date. See Docket No. 42, Exhibit A-6, Exhibit C, 32: 13-19. 57. On March 14, 2005, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Defendant stating her disagreement with the Company’s decision to terminate her employment. In her letter. Plaintiff also asserted that the Company knew that her next appointment was not until March 30, 2005, and thus, it would not be until then that she would know whether or not she would be released to work. See Docket No. 42, Exhibit A-7. 58. Plaintiff failed to attend the off-boarding session, initially scheduled for March 11, 2005, on several occasions because of illness, and submitted a medical certificate to that effect. She further postponed the session until March 23, 2005. Id. at ¶ 52. 59. On April 4, 2005, a month after her employment had finalized, P & G received via fax a letter from Plaintiff stating that the SIF had released her to work on March 30, 2005. She suggested that the Company reconsider her termination, and requested immediate reinstatement. See Docket No. 61, Exhibit A. 60. Plaintiffs letter was the first and only time in the preceding thirteen (13) month period that she sought reinstatement or gave any indication that she was able to return to work. See Docket No. 42, ¶ 20; Docket No. 51, ¶ 20.2. 61. On April 8, 2005, P & G responded to Plaintiffs letter as follows: Dear Dilian: This acknowledges receipt of your letter dated March 31, 2005, received via fax on April 4, 2005. In that letter, you ask us to immediately reinstate you to work despite the following: This is the first time you seek reinstatement after being absent from work for more than thirteen (13) months, that is, since March 2, 2004. This is the first time that you provide a certificate for the purpose of considering you authorized to work since you went on leave more than thirteen (13) months ago. You seek reinstatement for the first time more than a month following the conclusion of your one-year medical leave, and the termination of your employment. We reserved your employment for more than a year, from your last day of work on March 2, 2004, through March 4, 2005. During that period of time you were neither given permission to work on “CT” status nor released from treatment by the State Insurance Fund. It was not until a month following the conclusion of your one-year medical leave that the State Insurance Fund released you from treatment. Further, during that period of time you never requested reinstatement to work. You never gave any indication that you would return to work. In fact, when you notified us in early February 2005 that you had a regular follow up visit at the State Insurance Fund on March 30th (which is a requirement under our benefits policies to continue receiving pay during a medical leave) you specifically mentioned that you were still feeling ill, and believed it was unlikely that you would be able to return to work. In addition, upon receipt of the termination letter, you asked to reschedule your off-boarding session several times between March 8th and March 23d because you continued to feel ill. Consequently, we reiterate our March 8, 2005 communication, which notified you of the termination of your employment effective March 4, 2005. Regards, Maria Isabel Ortiz. See Docket No. 42, ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s Daily Routine 62.As per Plaintiffs own admissions in her deposition, Plaintiff starts her daily routine at 5:30-6:00 a.m. She wakes up; gets out of bed; uses the bathroom; brushes her teeth; bathes; gets dressed; fixes her hair and makeup; almost always cooks; takes her daughter to school; goes back to her house and does whatever she can if it is possible to do anything in the house; picks up her daughter; watches TV; works with her plants; and sometimes reads. She also smokes one pack of cigarettes daily. Id. at ¶ 55. 63. Plaintiff has a driver’s license. She has been an authorized driver since she was 18 or 19 years old (she was born on August 27, 1961). Sometimes she goes grocery shopping and visits shopping centers. Id. at ¶ 56. 64. Plaintiff goes to and enjoys attending her children’s activities. She has friends and attends social activities. Id. at ¶ 57. 65. During 2005, she traveled to Cincinnati for two weeks to assist her brother with home chores, such as cooking and cleaning (he was having surgery). She also took care of one of his two minor children. She did not need assistance to travel. Id. at ¶ 57. 66. Plaintiff takes medication without assistance. She usually makes her monthly mortgage and car loan payments herself. Id. at ¶ 58. For the purpose of clarity, what follows is a timeline of the most relevant events that took place during Plaintiffs employment with the Defendant: _DATE_EVENT_ 2/1998_Plaintiff began employment with the Company._ 11/2/1999 Initial evaluation. Plaintiff warned of need to improve _absenteeism._ 4/1/2000_Promoted to Medical Account Manager_ 8/6/2001-2/4/2002 (6 months) Absences due to fibromyalgia_ January 24. 2002_Request for transfer denied_ 8/8/2002-8/18/2002 (7 days)_Absences due to fibromyalgia_ 8/19/2002-1/13/2003 (5 months) Absences due to auto accident_ 2/18/2003 Warning (failed to meet the position’s objectives; failure to _file timely expense reports)_ 2/24/2003-6/30/2003 (5 months) Absences due to back condition 6/2003 Independent Consultant hired to assess reasonable _measures to assist Plaintiff with back condition_ 8/25/2003-8/27/2003 (3 days) Absences due to back condition_ 9/2/2003_Warning (failed to meet the position’s objectives)_ 10/2/2003 Castro filed administrative claim with Anti-discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human _Resources._ 10/3/2003 Plaintiff sent e-mail to supervisor claiming that she was _disabled and that he was discriminating against her._ 10/30/2003-11/3/2003 (3 days) Absences due to depression_ 11/4/2003-12/1/2003 (1 month) Absences due to depression_ 11/10/2003 P & G warned Plaintiff in writing of the need to provide proper documentation regarding absences or, otherwise, _employment would be terminated._ 12/2003_Request for transfer denied_ 1/8/2004-1/21/2004 (10 days) Absences due to chicken pox_ 3/2/2004_Plaintiffs suffered car accident and reported to SIF._ 2/16/2005 Warning (failure to file timely expense reports since _December 2003)_ 3/4/2005_Termination_ 3/30/2005_Plaintiff was released to work by the SIF. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows disposition of a case if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660 (1st Cir.2000). A factual dispute is “genuine” if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). To be successful in its attempt, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome-determinative fact in the record, DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997), through definite and competent evidence. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case, the burden shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted). If the non-movant generates uncertainty as to the true state of any material fact, the movant’s efforts should be deemed unavailing. Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000). Nonetheless, the mere existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At the summary judgment juncture, the Court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, indulging that party with all possible inferences to be derived from the facts. See Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002). The Court must review the record “taken as a whole,” and “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). This is so, because credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id. III. DISCUSSION A. Prima Facie Case of Disability Discrimination under ADA In her complaint, Castro alleges she was discriminated against because of her disability, and was the victim of adverse employment actions on the part of her employer, namely, negative performance reviews and denied requests for transfers and changes in route. See Docket No. 6, ¶ 13. The Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs disability discrimination claim arguing that Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability as defined by the ADA. See Docket No. 41. “The ADA provides ‘a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’ ” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.2008) (citing Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.1996)). Specifically, the ADA prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, like in the case at hand, courts apply the burden-shifting framework first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 29-30 (1st Cir.2002) (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir.1999) (approving use of McDonnell Douglas framework in connection with ADA claims of disability discrimination)). Under that framework, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA by proving by a preponderance of the evidence: (a) that she was “disabled” within the meaning of the Act; (b) that she was able to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, the essential functions of her job; and (c) that she was discharged or adversely affected, in whole or in part, because of her disability. “If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision and to produce credible evidence to show that the reason advanced was the real reason.’ ” Freadman v. Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 99 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir.2005)). “If the defendant offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the initial inference of discrimination evaporates, ..., and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to proffer evidence to establish that [the defendant’s] non-discriminatory justification is mere pretext, cloaking discriminatory animus.” Freadman, 484 F.3d at 99 (internal citations omitted). See also Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir.1998) (“Plaintiff must muster proof that enables a factfinder rationally to conclude that the stated reason behind the adverse employment decision is not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the proscribed type of discrimination.”). Notwithstanding, “[t]he ultimate burden of proving unlawful discrimination rests at all times with [Plaintiff].” Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir.2005). 1. “Disability” under ADA “[T]he sine qua non requirement for ADA protection, is whether the individual has a ‘disability* as defined by the ADA.” Corujo-Marti v. Triple-S, Inc., 519 F.Supp.2d 201, 212 (D.P.R.2007). Under the ADA, the term “disability” is defined as either: “(A) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). A plaintiff must at least satisfy one of the three alternative definitions. See Corujo-Marti, 519 F.Supp.2d at 212. a. Actual Disability When considering statutory disability under subsection § 12102(2)(A), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has established a three-part analysis consisting of the following inquiries: (1) if the plaintiff suffered a physical or mental impairment; (2) if the “life activity” limited by the impairment qualify as “major”; and (3) if the impairment, in fact, substantially limits the plaintiffs identified major life activity. See Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 238 (1st Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). “The burden is on the plaintiff to establish these three elements.” Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20 (internal citations omitted). In the case at hand, Plaintiff contends that she suffered from several physical and mental conditions that “substantially [limit] her in one or more of her daily living activities ...,” see Docket No. 6, ¶ 7, namely: fibromyalgia, depression and other lesions (herniated disks, severe cer-vico-lumbar trauma, and others) stemming out of an automobile accident that occurred in August of 2002. In the motion for summary judgment now before the Court, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of ADA. Athough Defendant does not challenge the fact that Castro suffered from physical and mental impairments during the relevant period, the Defendant argues that her impairments did not substantially limit any major life activity. Accordingly, the analysis that follows will focus on the last two of the three required inquiries: whether the impairments limit a major life activity and whether the limitation is substantial. The United States Supreme Court has determined that the phrase “major life activities” refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). The EEOC has defined the term to mean “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. The First Circuit has also recognized lifting, sleeping, eating, thinking and concentrating as major life activities, and has assumed without deciding that work may constitute a major life activity. See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 21; Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir.2004); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir.2002). With regards to the term “substantially limits,” the EEOC regulations define it as follows: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). In applying this standard, a court must consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its expected duration, and its permanent or long-term impact. See Gillen, 283 F.3d at 21 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)). When attempting to apply the foregoing standards to the case before the Court, we note that Castro has failed to specifically identify in her complaint what major life activities, if any, are substantially limited by her impairments. See Docket No. 6, ¶ 7. In her opposition, and for the first time in the proceedings, Castro identified the following “major life activities” as being substantially limited by her impairments: loss of concentration, cannot complete task, stiffness, difficult to interact, sexual disturbance, poor response to relations, among others. See Docket No. 50 at page 6. In support of her proposition, Castro attached a letter report by rheumatologist Dr. Jorge Mundo (“Dr. Mundo”) as an exhibit to her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Exhibit 1, Docket No. 51. Plaintiff also relies on the report prepared by P & G’s independent consultant to establish that lifting, pushing, pulling, and carrying any weight over 15 pounds were major life activities that were substantially limited by her impairment. See Docket No. 50 at page 7. Defendant moves to strike Dr. Mundo’s report on several grounds. Dr. Mundo’s letter report, dated June 14, 2005, is addressed “to whom it may concern” and states that, on September 14, 2001, Plaintiff Castro went to his office with a history of urinary incontinence, partial thyroidectomy, cervical pain, general fatigue and hand pain. Dr. Mundo lists the following as his diagnosis: cervical myosi-tis, fibromyositis, hypothyroidism, major depression with anxiety, and psoriasis, among other conditions. Dr. Mundo concludes in his report that Plaintiff has a “poor prognosis” and that her limitations include: stiffness, difficulty to interact, sexual disturbance, poor response to relations, loss of concentration, and inability to complete tasks. The report further states that “when you compare this limitation with the average population the quality of life is lost.” See Exhibit 1, Docket No. 51. Finally, according to Dr. Mundo, she was prescribed the following medications: Paxil (anti-depressant), Norflex (muscle relaxant), Viox (osteoarthritis), and Elavil. In its motion to strike, the Defendant first argues that the report does not state whether Dr. Mundo is her treating physician or if his conclusions simply stem from Plaintiffs only visit on September 14, 2001. Second, the Company proffers that the report is not a part of Plaintiffs medical record, and thus, is outside the scope of the type of testimony allowed for a non-expert treating physician. In addition, the Defendant attacks the probative value of the report arguing that it is devoid of any analytical foundation for the classifications, symptoms, and conclusions rendered. Accordingly, the Company requests that this report be stricken from the record. See Docket No. 62. Plaintiff opposed the Defendant’s request stating that Dr. Mundo is Castro’s treating physician, that is, the rheumatologist called upon to treat her fibromyalgia, and that his views are founded on his treatment of Plaintiff. In support of her contention, Plaintiff attached to her opposition to the motion to strike a sworn statement from Dr. Mundo in which he asserts that Castro is his patient and that he has “treated Mrs. Castro in the usual course of [his] medical practice.” See Exhibit No. 2, Docket No. 65. Therein, he affirms that the content of the report stems from his interventions with Castro. Plaintiff also argues that pursuant to Zarecki v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 914 F.Supp. 1566 (N.D.Ill.1996), a treating physician is not required to submit an expert report, if testifying as to his/her care and treatment of patient. In addition, because Dr. Mundo’s testimony establishes that Plaintiff has a “record of’ her conditions, the report establishes “this alternate definitional prong under the ADA.” See Docket No. 65. Let’s see. Regarding the role of treating physicians as witnesses, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a treating physician is the sort of witness who may have specialized knowledge, yet need not be considered an expert for the purpose of submitting a report as part of pretrial discovery. Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103, 113 (1st Cir.2003). “[A] treating physician, testifying as to his consultation with or treatment of a patient, is not an expert witness for purposes of Rule 26 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].” Id. Additionally, in Gonzalez v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 73, 78 (D.P.R.2006) (Pieras, J.), this District held that “[b]ecause treating physicians are generally presented to provide testimony arising from their roles as actors in the events giving rise to the litigation, they are treated as fact witnesses and are not subject to the more stringent requirements that Rule 26 creates for expert witnesses.... ” Gonzalez, 236 F.R.D. at 78. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this District also held in Gonzalez that the difference between a fact witness and an expert “lies in the nature of the witness’s involvement in the case and the nature of the testimony the parties intend for the witness to proffer.” Gonzalez, 236 F.R.D. at 78. This predicament requires close analysis, id. at 81, the essential point of which is the essence of the proffered testimony, id. at 78 (citing Gomez, 344 F.3d at 113). Therefore, for a treating physician not to be bound by the expert witness requirements of Rule 26, the physician’s testimony must be closely constrained to the facts of the treatment administered and discussed in his notes taken at the time of his examination. Gonzalez, 236 F.R.D. at 78. Citing the analysis utilized by a sister court, the Gonzalez Court held that: [t]o the extent that the treating physician testifies only as to the care and treatment of his/her patient, the physician is not to be considered a specially retained expert notwithstanding that the witness may offer opinion testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 and 705. However, when the physician’s proposed opinion testimony extends beyond the facts made known to him during the course of the care and treatment of the patient and the witness is specially retained to develop specific opinion testimony, he becomes subject to the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). The determinative issue is the scope of the proposed testimony. Id. (citing Wreath v. U.S., 161 F.R.D. 448, 450 (D.Kan.1995)). Based on the preceding discussion, Senior District Judge for this District, Hon. Jaime Pieras, concluded that two reports written by the plaintiffs treating physicians had to be stricken from the record. Judge Pieras noted that these reports were written after the filing of the complaint, were written in letter form (addressed “To Whom It May Concern”), and were not a proper part of the plaintiffs medical record. Instead, they appeared to have been composed for the purposes of the litigation, “which place[d] them outside the scope of testimony arising from the treatment of the Plaintiff.” Gonzalez, 236 F.R.D. at 82. Having been prepared as part of the litigation, the Court found that they had nothing to do with the treatment of the plaintiff in Gonzalez, and instead, “[gave] rise to the impression that they [were] after thought notes from the treating physician and the therapist.” Id. at 83. Finally, the Court concluded that “the proper vehicle for the disclosure of that information [was] through interrogatories and depositions.... ” Id. Per the foregoing, the contents of the reports were found to be “outside the scope of their treatment of the [p]laintiff.” Id. Much like in Gonzalez, the letter report attached to Castro’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment is addressed “to whom it may concern,” is dated after the filing of the above-captioned claim, and is certainly not a part of her medical record. Therefore, in the absence of contrary binding authority, and in light of the similarity between the evidentiary issues presented herein and in Gonzalez, the undersigned finds it appropriate to defer to Hon. Judge Piera’s opinion on the matter. In addition, we share the opinion of several sister courts that a treating physician not identified as an expert shall not “be allowed to testify about plaintiffs current condition, prognosis, causation or permanency, and any other such forward-looking speculation, or other conclusion reached with the benefit of hindsight and after the underlying events that gave rise to [the] lawsuit.” Bynum v. MVM, Inc., 241 F.R.D. 52, 54 (D.D.C.2007). See also Calhoun v. Klingensmith Healthcare, Inc., No. 07-86, 2007 WL 4205818 (W.D.Pa. November 27, 2007). That is exactly what Dr. Mundo’s report purports to do, and it will not be allowed. Finally, to the foregoing analysis, this Court must add that in her opposition to the motion to strike, Plaintiff cites Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 2001 WL 631258, at *5 (D.Me., June 07, 2001), which stands for the proposition that an affidavit of a treating physician stating that “[throughout the time that I have treated [plaintiff], her [disease] has rendered her substantially limited in her ability to walk and run. She has been significantly limited in her ability to walk and run if compared to an adult who does not have [the disease] with otherwise similar attributes to [plaintiff],” meets a plaintiffs prima facie burden of establishing that the existence of a disability. Unfortunately for Plaintiff in this case, her treating physician’s report and affidavit fall short of this standard. Dr. Mundo simply proffers that, when compared with the average population, her “quality of life is lost.” See Exhibit 1, Docket No. 51. As far as this Court is concerned, quality of life is not a major life activity. Thus, in light of all the above, the undersigned finds that Castro’s treating physician report is outside the scope of his treatment of Plaintiff, and thus, Defendant’s request to strike Dr. Mundo’s letter report is hereby GRANTED. Now, moving on to the analysis of whether Plaintiff suffers from an actual disability, “[i]t is well established that the determination of whether a plaintiff has a disability must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20 (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)). “It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status ... to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.” Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681. Rather, those seeking the Act’s protection must “prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience ... is substantial.” Id. (citing Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999)). Moreover, “[a]n individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is particularly necessary when the impairment is one whose symptoms vary widely from person to person.” Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 199, 122 S.Ct. 681. This individualized assessment is particularly necessary in the case at hand in light of Plaintiffs fibromyalgia and depression diagnoses. See Labrecque v. Sodexho USA, Inc., 287 F.Supp.2d 100 (D.Mass.2003) (holding that the legal analysis under ADA is rendered complex by the fact that fibro-myalgia is highly individualized in its manifestations); Cassimy v. Board of Educ. of Rockford Public Schools, 461 F.3d 932 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that whether depression gives rise to a substantial limitation on a major life activity for purposes of ADA depends on its severity). In the case at hand, Plaintiff argues that her status as a disabled individual is conclusively evidenced by the reports prepared by her physicians and the Company’s independent consultant. Her reliance, as previously stated, is misguided. And although Plaintiff asserts that she has some difficulty sitting and driving for extended periods, lifting heavy objects, and getting out of bed sometimes, the record also reveals — as per Plaintiffs own admissions in her deposition — that she is able to drive, go grocery shopping, visit shopping centers, take care of herself, clean herself, cook, garden, occasionally dance, do house chores, smoke a pack of cigarettes daily, and attend her children’s activities and other social events. She was even able to travel without assistance to Cincinnati for two weeks to help her brother with home chores, such as cooking and cleaning, and taking care of his children, while he recuperated from surgery. See Findings of Fact, Section I, infra, ¶¶ 62-66. In light of the record of this case, we find that Castro has made “little effort ... to establish that [her] impairment [s] substantially [limit] one or more of [her] major life activities.” Rolland v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2007). “[I]n general, unsupported self-serving statements by the plaintiff regarding the severity of a disability are insufficient to carry the day against a motion for summary judgment in an ADA case.” Labreeque, 287 F.Supp.2d at 109. And although “Plaintiff has presented limited evidence that [she] cannot lift heavy objects, ..., this alone is insufficient. [She] has not brought forth any other medical documentation that established [her] limitations to lift, to wit, the maximum weight [she] can lift.” Velez Del Valle v. Paints, 349 F.Supp.2d 219, 227-228 (D.P.R.2004) (finding that case law holding that restrictions on heavy lifting, by themselves, are not indicative of a disability is extensive). In sum, Castro’s testimony fails to identify, in terms of her own experience, any major life activity in which she is substantially limited. “She therefore has failed to demonstrate that she is disabled within the meaning of the [statute].” See Robbins v. American Preferred Management Co., Inc., No. 5:05-CV-182, 2007 WL 2728746, at *8 (W.D.Mich. September 17, 2007) (plaintiffs own deposition testimony fails to establish disability under ADA). See also Corujo-Marti, 519 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.P.R.2007). Finally, this Court notes that additional grounds exist to support our conclusion that Castor has not established that her medical conditions substantially limited a major life activity: Castro’s failure to identify in her complaint a specific major life activity which was substantially limited by her impairments. An ADA claimant must specify which major life activity has been limited and only those grounds specifically raised will be considered by this court. See Martin v. Discount Smoke Shop, Inc., 448 F.Supp.2d 981 (C.D.Ill.2006) (citing Sinkler v. Midwest Property Management Ltd. Partnership, 209 F.3d 678, 688 (7th Cir.2000)). It is one matter that the Court must analyze the factual scenario in this case construing the facts, the record, and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.... Another is to allow the Plaintiff to bring forth new never raised allegations, and previously unmentioned major life activities that have been allegedly affected. The Court is not obliged to search the record, where Plaintiff failed to request to amend the complaint, in order to set forth those new allegations, and theories. See Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 144, 152 (D.P.R.2003) (internal omissions omitted). See also Rivera-Mercado v. Scotiabank De Puerto Rico-Intern., No. 06-1018(JAG), 571 F.Supp.2d 279, 2008 WL 660088 (D.P.R. March 06, 2008); Corujo-Marti, 519 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.P.R.2007); Pagan-Duran v. Ramirez-Rangel, No. 041668(ADC), 2007 WL 1056719 (D.P.R.2007); Davila Rivera v. Caribbean Refrescos, Inc., No. 02-2499(DRD), 2004 WL 1925477, at *8 (D.P.R. May 26, 2004) (holding that plaintiffs attempt to amend her allegations through opposition would not be allowed inasmuch as complaint did not identify any major life activity that had been jeopardized due to her alleged mental impairment). In our view, Plaintiffs omission is fatal to her claim of disability, and thus, this Court will not allow Plaintiff to attempt to amend her allegations through her opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. b. “Record of’ a disability The second category of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) covers those having a record of a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). To have a record of such an impairment, a plaintiff must have a history of, or been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). “[T]he recorded impairment must be one that substantially limited a major life activity.” Santiago Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Sorensen v. University of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir.1999); Hilburn v. Murata Elec. North Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999)). See also Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162 (1st Cir.2002) (“A record or history of an impairment is not sufficient to show disability; the record must be of an impairment [that] substantially limited a major life activity.”); Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir.2001) (“[N]ot only must [Plaintiff] demonstrate that she has a record of an injury or impairment, but the evidence must show that her impairment limited a major life activity.”). “Furthermore, to successfully establish an ADA claim the employer, in making the employment decision, must rely on the record indicating that the plaintiff has or had a substantially limiting impairment.” Rivera-Mercado v. Scotiabank De Puerto Rico-Intern., Civil No. 06-1018(JAG), 571 F.Supp.2d 279, 287, 2008 WL 660088, at *5 (D.P.R. March 06, 2008) (internal citations omitted). In its motion for summary judgment, P & G argues that Plaintiff has failed to make out a claim of discrimination under the “record of’ prong of the definition of disability because no such record of an impairment that substantially limited any of Plaintiffs major life activity exists. See Docket No. 41 at page 8. In her opposition, Castro simply states that she satisfies the “record of’ prong of the covered disability definition under the ADA because she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia, and she has been under treatment for this condition. See Docket No. 50 at page 8. Although the record shows that the Defendant was aware of Castro’s impairments, Plaintiff does not adduce to any record that indicates whether or how these conditions substantially limited any major life activity. “Mere knowledge of an impairment does not create a record of an impairment.” Rivera-Mercado, 571 F.Supp.2d at 287, 2008 WL 660088 at *6 (citing Taylor v. Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir.2000)). Accordingly, Castro has not advanced sufficient evidence to satisfy subpart (B) of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and thus. Plaintiffs evidence cannot create a genuine dispute of fact on this issue. c. “Regarded as” having a disability Castro alleges in her complaint that P & G regarded her as disabled pursuant to subpart (C) of § 12102(2), which provides that having a disability includes being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The “regarded as” prong of the Act “exists to cover those cases in which myths, fears and stereotypes affect the employer’s treatment of an individual, because Congress has recognized that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” Ruiz Rivera, 521 F.3d at 82-83. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), the Supreme Court observed that: [t]here are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misper-ceptions about the individual — it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. These misperceptions often resul[t] from ster-eotypic assumptions not truly indicative of ... individual ability. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139. “A plaintiff claiming that [she] is ‘regarded’ as disabled cannot merely show that [her] employer perceived [her] as somehow disabled; rather, [she] must prove that the employer regarded [her] as disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169 (citing Giordano v. City of N.Y., 274 F.3d 740, 748 (2d Cir.2001)). In addition, “[u]nder the ADA, the mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee’s impairment is insufficient to demonstrate either that the employer regarded the employee as disabled or that the perception caused the adverse employment action.” Rivera-Mercado, 571 F.Supp.2d at 287, 2008 WL 660088 at *6. In her complaint, Castro asserts, without more, that her former employer regarded her as being substantially limited in a major life activity, see Docket No. 6 at ¶ 7, but to her detriment, failed to identify which major life activity her employer perceived her as being substantially limited to perform. The Supreme Court in Sutton “has implied that regarded as claims under the ADA require an even greater level of specificity than other claims.” Ruiz Rivera, 521 F.3d at 84 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-91, 119 S.Ct. 2139). “In order to allege an actionable regarded as claim, a plaintiff must select and identify the major life activity that she will attempt to prove the employer regarded as being substantially limited by her impairment.” Ruiz Rivera, 521 F.3d at 84. “It simply will not do for a plaintiff to fail to plead with adequate specificity facts to support a regarded as claim, all-the-while hoping to play that card if her initial hand [her actual disability claim] is a dud.” Id. at 85 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, “with no facts alleged to explain any false perception on [defendant’s] part, and no facts alluding to any non-limiting impairment which [defendant] mistakenly believed to be substantially limiting, this allusion falls far short of the mark.” Id. at 84. Regardless of Plaintiffs failure to properly allege her “regarded as” disability claim, we also find that Plaintiffs contention to that effect lacks merit. In her opposition. Plaintiff points to the following to substantiate her claim that the Defendant regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limited major life activities: (1) P & G’s indication in her performance reviews that absences due to her disability had impacted the outcome of the evaluations; (2) the hiring of an independent consultant on reasonable accommodation to deal with Castro’s restrictions; and, (3) the fact that Defendant granted and recognized numerous leave of absences without questioning them. See Docket No. 50 at page 10. We disagree. First of all, Castro’s performance evaluation reveal that the Defendant was aware of her health problems, and while the Defendant may have perceived that Plaintiffs health problems were adversely affecting her job performance, there is no evidence that P & G regarded Castro as being unable to care for herself or to perform all of the duties of her job. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876 (6t