Full opinion text
ORDER KATHLEEN CARDONE, District Judge. On this day, the Court considered Plaintiff R.R.’s “Motion for Summary Judgment,” (“Motion”), Defendant El Paso Independent School District’s “Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Response”), and Plaintiff R.R.’s “Reply to E.P.I.S.D[.]’s Opposition to Summary Judgment” (“Reply”). Having reviewed these submissions, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff R.R.’s Motion should be GRANTED in its entirety. I. BACKGROUND The instant Motion arises from two distinct lawsuits. Initially, Defendant El Paso Independent School District (“EP-ISD”) brought suit against Richard R., as next friend of R.R. (“RR”), and Plaintiffs attorney, Mark Berry (“Berry”), pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (“IDEA”). Soon thereafter, RR filed his own IDEA suit, within which he named EPISD as Defendant. The Court draws the following facts from the various pleadings submitted by both RR and EPISD. On September 26, 2006, RR, through his attorney, Berry, requested a due process hearing from the Texas Education Agency pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). Def. RR’s Mot. to Dismiss 1-2. At the time of the request, RR was a 14-year-old student attending EPISD and suffering from Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“AD/HD”). PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 2. RR requested a hearing because EPISD allegedly violated the IDEA by: (1) failing to timely evaluate RR for special education services; (2) failing to provide RR with IDEA procedural safeguards; (3) failing to provide written notice of refusal to provide a special education referral; and (4) failing to comply with the “Child Find” provisions of the IDEA. Def. Berry’s Mot. to Dismiss 9. On October 11, 2006, during a resolution session, EPISD offered to: (1) conduct a full individual evaluation within sixty (60) days of the parents’ consent to evaluate; (2) convene an Admission, Review, and Dismissal (“ARD”) Committee meeting within thirty (30) calendar days from the completion of the evaluation; (3) continue to comply with the applicable federal and state laws regarding the provision of prior written notice to parents; (4) continue to comply with the applicable federal and state laws regarding the provision of procedural safeguards to the parents; and (5) pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,000.00. PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 2-3. RR and Berry refused this offer. Id. Furthermore, in September 2006, EPISD set up a Student Teacher Assessment Team (“STAT”) committee meeting to address RR’s request for an evaluation. Administrative Record (“AR”) Vol. I, 4. RR cancelled the meeting and sought instead to have the case decided by a Special Education Hearing Officer (“SEHO”). PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 3. On January 19, 2007, a SEHO for the State of Texas returned a decision in favor of RR on three of the four allegations. Id. at 4. The SEHO found that: (1) EPISD failed in its obligation to conduct a timely evaluation; (2) EPISD should have provided RR with a copy of the procedural safeguards as required by federal regulation; (3) EPISD failed to send RR the required written notification of its refusal to provide a special education referral; and (4) EPISD met its Child Find obligation. Def. Berry’s Mot. to Dismiss 14. On April 19, 2007, EPISD filed a complaint appealing the SEHO’s decision and alleged that it was the prevailing party. PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 1. EP-ISD also alleged that the Court should grant EPISD attorney fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II) and (III) because RR and Berry’s suit was frivolous and brought for an improper purpose. Id. Conversely, on April 19, 2007, RR filed a complaint alleging that he was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney’s fees. PI. RR’s Original Compl. 4. On May 30, 2007, this Court consolidated both actions. Doc. No. 12. On July 24, 2007, this Court granted RR and Berry’s Motions to Dismiss as they related to EPISD’s claim of attorney fees against them. Doc. No. 22. In so doing, the Court dismissed all claims against Berry as a Defendant. Id.; see PL EPISD’s First Original Compl. 7-8. The Court did not, however, grant RR and Berry’s Motions to Dismiss as to the right of EPISD to appeal. Court Order, Sept. 24, 2007. As a result, EPISD’s appeal of the SEHO’s decision remains active. PI. EP-ISD’s First Original Compl. 1. Following a dispute over supplementing the administrative record for purposes of proceedings before this Court, RR filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. Within the Motion, RR requests that the Court “render a judgment for plaintiff for all the relief set forth in [RR’s] Original Complaint.” PI. RR’s Mot. for Summ. J. 1. Fundamentally, RR argues that he “is entitled to summary judgment based on the administrative record on file herein and on the declaration as to attorney’s fees that are submitted herewith.” Id. at 2. Soon after RR entered his Motion, EP-ISD filed its Response, wherein EPISD articulates multiple theories opposing RR’s Motion. Subsequent to this Response, RR also filed a Reply to these arguments. The Court will now address the various argument of the parties in turn. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard This case arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Congress enacted the IDEA “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). To achieve this aim, the IDEA compels those states receiving federal funding to educate children with disabilities “to the maximum extent appropriate .... with children who are not disabled,” and to do so “in the least restrictive environment consistent with their needs.” Teague Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 207 n. 23 (5th Cir.1992) (explaining that least restrictive environment connotes “not only freedom from restraint, but the freedom of the child to associate with his or her family and able-bodied peers”)). Although the FAPE that the IDEA demands of the states “need not be the best possible one, nor one that will maximize the child’s educational potential,” it must “be an education that is specifically designed to meet the child’s unique needs, supported by services that will permit him ‘to benefit’ from the instruction.” Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir.1997) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)). Because the State of Texas receives federal education funding, all school districts within its borders must comply with the IDEA. See Michael F., 118 F.3d at 247. To meet these strictures, the various school districts must provide each disabled student on their rolls with a FAPE. Id. The FAPE provided must be tailored to each disabled child’s needs through an “individual educational program” (“IEP”), which is a written statement prepared at a meeting attended by a “qualified” and “knowledgeable” school district representative, a teacher, the child’s parents or guardians, and, when appropriate, the child himself. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). In Texas, the committee responsible for preparing an IEP is known as an Admissions, Review, and Dismissal Committee (“ARD Committee”). 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1050; see Michael F., 118 F.3d at 247. The IDEA further provides a “comprehensive system of procedural safeguards” designed to promote compliance with its mandates. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (explaining the “elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in § 1415” of the IDEA); 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (outlining a series of detailed procedural safeguards). Among these safeguards, the parents of the disabled child must be provided with “[a]n opportunity to present a complaint .... with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The IDEA also provides as follows: Whenever a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(6) .... of this section, the parents or the local educational agency involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). When a state allows for these hearings to be conducted by a local educational agency, the IDEA permits “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing” to appeal to the state’s educational agency, which must then conduct an “impartial review of such decision” and “make an independent decision upon completion of such review.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g). After exhausting state administrative remedies, an aggrieved party under the IDEA accrues “the right to bring a civil action .... in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Moreover, a party claiming entitlement to attorney fees under the IDEA may also file a claim in district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). Nevertheless, these avenues to federal court are not without limitations. Indeed, Congress has limited the role of the judiciary under the IDEA, leaving the choice of educational policies and methods in the hands of state and local school officials. See R.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:06cv352, 2008 WL 906289, at *2 (E.D.Tex. Mar.31, 2008) (citing White ex. rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir.2003); Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Katherine M., 91 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir.1996)). The United States Supreme Court has stated as much, holding as follows: In assuring that the requirements of the [IDEA] have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs, was left by the [IDEA] to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child. The [IDEA] expressly charges States with the responsibility of “acquiring and disseminating to teachers and administrators of programs for handicapped children significant information derived from educational research, demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopting, where appropriate, promising educational practices and materials.” § 1413(a)(3). In the face of such a clear statutory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State’s choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2). Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The Fifth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court’s guidance, stating unequivocally that the judiciary’s “role under the IDEA is purposefully limited.” White, 343 F.3d at 377. Therefore, while a federal district court’s review of a SEHO’s decision is “virtually de novo,” this by no means represents an invitation to “the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Instead, the district court should accord “due weight” to the SEHO’s findings. Adam J. ex. rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808 (5th Cir.2003) (quoting Teag ue, 999 F.2d at 131). Operationally, the “due weight” standard calls upon the district court to receive the record of the administrative proceedings, to take additional evidence at the request of any party, and ultimately, to reach an independent decision based on a preponderance of the evidence. See Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.2000); Michael F., 118 F.3d at 252. In reaching its independent decision, a district court’s inquiry is twofold. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. First, the reviewing court must determine where the state has complied with the procedures as set forth in the IDEA. Id. Second, the district court must determine if the IEP developed through the IDEA’S procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Id. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Where these requirements have been met, Supreme Court precedent holds that “the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.” Id. In the instant case, the Court has denied EPISD’s efforts to submit additional evidence. Consequently, with nothing new presented to the Court, RR’s Motion for Summary Judgment simply becomes “the procedural vehicle for asking [this Court] to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.” Heather S. v. State of Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.1994)); see also R.H., 2008 WL 906289, at *3 (citations omitted) (holding that where “the parties concur that [there] is no need for additional evidence or discovery .... the Court will determine the merits of the case based on the administrative record”); Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Robert M., 168 F.Supp.2d 635, 638 (W.D.Tex.2001) (finding that where “no party to this proceeding .... requested the Court to hear additional evidence, a motion for summary judgment is simply a procedural vehicle for asking the Court to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record”). Despite being termed summary judgment, the district court must reach its decision based on the preponderance of the evidence. Hunger, 15 F.3d at 669. Procedurally, however, the text of the IDEA remains silent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion. Schaffer ex. rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005). Thus, to offer guidance to the district courts, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise .... the burden of persuasion [in an IDEA case] lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.” Id. at 57-58, 126 S.Ct. 528. Nonetheless, because the Motion presently before the Court seeks to determine the rights of two separate, consolidated suits, wherein both parties seek separate relief, the issue of where the burden of persuasion should fall presents an issue of first impression. 1. Standard for a consolidated IDEA case The present action involves two separate claims under the IDEA. EPISD has exercised its right to district court review of the SEHO’s decision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (A). RR has invoked the right to seek attorney fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). Now, having consolidated both these causes of action into the same case, RR seeks a summary adjudication of his entitlement to attorney fees, which necessarily involves a finding by this Court as to whether he is a prevailing party under the IDEA. Plainly stated, RR’s entitlement to attorney fees remains contingent on a favorable review of the SEHO’s decision. The Court finds that the only logical way to dispose of these countervailing claims is to first complete its review of the SEHO’s decision. Under normal conditions, a district court may grant summary judgment where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2008); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2006). The statutory framework of the IDEA, however, narrows the district court’s ability to take on evidence from the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits” allowed by Rule 56(c) down to “the records of the administrative proceedings” and “additional evidence at the request of a party.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). In addition, the weight of extant case law acts to limit the IDEA’S additional evidence provision and place the entry of additional evidence within the discretion of the district court. Therefore, when the district court has disallowed additional evidence, as it has in the instant case, the case most resembles a traditional review of an administrative decision, wherein “[i]t is a bedrock principle of judicial review that a court reviewing an agency decision should not go outside of the administrative record.” Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 391 n. 15 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985)). For the purposes of the instant administrative review, EPISD has contested the SEHO’s decision. Thus, while granting due weight to the SEHO’s decision, Supreme Court precedent also directs this Court to place the burden of persuasion upon EPISD as the challenging party. Following this “virtually de novo” review, the Court can then turn to the issue of who, as a prevailing party, may make a claim for attorney fees under the IDEA. B. Analysis Combining EPISD’s First Original Complaint and its Response to RR’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court discerns five direct challenges to the SEHO’s decision. First, EPISD argues that the SEHO “erred as a matter of law in allowing [RR] to proceed with [his] request for a due process hearing and refusing to dismiss the complaint based on ripeness, standing and mootness.” PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 6. Second, EPISD avers that the SEHO should have dismissed RR’s action due to RR’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Id.; Def. EPISD’s Resp. 8-10. Third, it posits that a limitations bar precludes RR’s claims before September 26, 2005. Def. EPISD’s Resp. 10-14. Fourth, EPISD postulates that the SEHO’s “determination and factual findings that [EPISD] never provided notice of its refusal to evaluate [RR], nor provided a copy of the procedural safeguards to the parents is legally erroneous.” PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 6. Fifth, it argues that the SEHO’s “determination and factual findings that [EPISD] violated .... its Child Find obligations by failing to identify [RR] or provide for an evaluation in 2005 is legally erroneous, contradictory, and unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Although EPISD also presents several challenges to the award of attorney fees to RR, the Court reiterates that such arguments have a “defined point of entry in the pleading time line of the Western District of Texas, which this Court will not deviate from.” Court Order, Jan. 29, 2008, 536 F.Supp.2d at 710. In keeping with this time line, the Court will do no more at this juncture with attorney fees than determine a prevailing party. Recognizing these limitations, the Court will limit the present order to a review of the merits of the SEHO’s decision. To that end, the Court will address each of EPISD’s direct objections in turn. 1. The SEHO did not err as a matter of law by refusing to dismiss RR’s complaint based on the doctrines of ripeness, standing, and mootness In its Complaint, EPISD asks this Court to overturn the SEHO’s decision based on the doctrines of ripeness, standing, and mootness. PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 6. These arguments, however, did not originate before this Court. Rather, EPISD formulated and introduced these arguments before the SEHO to no avail. AR Vol. I, 178-83. Now, facing RR’s Motion for Summary Judgment, EPISD has chosen only to support its position on the issue of mootness. Because EPISD has not substantiated its arguments concerning standing and ripeness, this Court would be within its discretion to disregard these two challenges altogether. See Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir.2003) (holding “that ‘when evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court’ ”)); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, in the interests of adjudicating all claims in this case, the Court will address all three challenges, while only scrutinizing the challenge premised upon the doctrine of mootness. a. Standing Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that standing consists of three “irreducible constitutional minimum[s].” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351. To wit, “a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.” Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). As follows in this Order, the Court finds that RR suffered an actual, particularized injury traceable to EPISD, and that this Order, in fact, redresses that injury. Thus, EPISD’s argument that RR lacked standing fails. b. Ripeness As to ripeness, the Supreme Court has explained that whether a controversy is “ripe” for judicial resolution has a “twofold aspect, requiring [a court] to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 814, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). The fundamental premise behind the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements,” when those “disagreements” are premised on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 72, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 380-581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985)). There is no abstraction or contingency to determining whether EPISD violated its obligations under the IDEA in this case. Federal statutes and case law make the adjudication of this matter quite concrete. Moreover, delaying judicial review of this matter could affect RR’s ability to receive a FAPE. Hence, the Court cannot agree with EP-ISD’s contention that RR’s claims are not ripe for determination. c. Mootness Additionally, EPISD contends that the SEHO “erred in refusing to dismiss Plaintiffs request as moot.” Def. EPISD’s Resp. 6. Further, EPISD argues that “the doctrine of mootness deprived [both] the [SEHO] and this Court of jurisdiction.” Id. To bolster this argument, EPISD highlights that the SEHO’s findings of fact, which RR “expressly adopted, conclusively establish that EPISD was ready, willing, and able to provide the relief Plaintiff requested .... prior to Plaintiffs request for a due process hearing.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Put another way, EPISD argues that “[b]ut for Plaintiffs refusal to accept the very relief requested, there was no live controversy for the [SEHO] to preside over in a due process hearing.” Id. at 7. As a consequence, EPISD urges the Court to deny RR’s Motion for Summary Judgment and to overturn the SEHO’s conclusions of law and findings of fact. PL EPISD’s First Original Compl. 8. In response, RR questions what EPISD claims could have mooted the case. Specifically, RR states that the settlement proposed by EPISD lacked force in either state or federal court. PI. RR’s Reply 2. According to RR, private settlements entered into as a resolution to claims filed under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) generally “do not confer prevailing party status on the parent and thus the federal court has no continuing jurisdiction to enforce such settlement.” Id. (citing T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that “[t]he settlement agreement in this case does not bear any of the marks of a consent decree .... [t]here must be some official judicial approval of the settlement and some level of continuing judicial oversight”)). As outlined by RR, the only exceptions to this lack of force in federal court arise when a settlement is reached either through the statutory mediation process or at a resolution session between the parents and the IEP team. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(2)(F), 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii)). With regard to Texas law, RR describes the impotence of private agreements by citing to Texas Supreme Court precedent holding that the immunity of the State and its political subdivisions “is waived only by clear and unambiguous language.” Id. (citing Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 328-29 (Tex.2006)); see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (stating that “[i]n order to preserve the legislature’s interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language”)- Based upon this precedent and RR’s claim that EPISD’s settlement offer “states that there was no agreement at the resolution session and there is no mediation alleged,” RR postulates that EPISD’s settlement offer, “had it been accepted, was unenforceable.” PL RR’s Reply 2. Under the doctrine of mootness, “[a] controversy becomes moot where, as a result of intervening circumstances, there are no longer adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Traillour Oil Co., 987 F.2d 1138, 1153 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1859)). Or, plainly stated, “a moot case presents no Article III case or controversy, and a court has no constitutional jurisdiction to resolve the issues it presents.” Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 718 (5th Cir.1999). Thus, to ascertain whether the doctrine of mootness has acted to deprive either the SEHO or this Court of jurisdiction, the Court must determine whether the controversy between RR and EPISD remained live at the time RR requested a due process hearing. Were this Court to find that the controversy between the parties had been mooted, EPISD correctly asserts that the Court would neither possess the jurisdiction to “make a determination on the merits or order a consent decree that could render a part a ‘prevailing party’ for purposes of an award of attorney fees.” District of Columbia v. Jeppsen ex rel. M.J., 468 F.Supp.2d 107, 113 (D.D.C.2006) (citations omitted). Based upon the evidence presented, however, the Court finds no grounds to make such a finding. To the contrary, the Court finds that a live controversy did and does exist between the parties to this suit. The Court reaches this conclusion for two reasons. First, regardless of EPISD’s attempt to resolve the parties’ dispute prior to the due process hearing, the record clearly demonstrates that EPISD offered nothing more than “a private settlement” to RR. Def. EPISD’s Resp. Ex A at 1. As such, RR would not qualify as a prevailing party under the statutory framework of the IDEA, nor would he be statutorily entitled to attorney fees. i. Prevailing party status The Fifth Circuit has ruled definitively on the subject of prevailing party status. In Walker v. City of Mesquite, Texas, the Fifth Circuit analyzed Supreme Court precedent on prevailing party status under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and explained as follows: To qualify as a prevailing party, the plaintiff must (1) obtain actual relief, such as an enforceable judgment or a consent decree; (2) that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties; and (3) modifies the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff at the time of the judgment or settlement. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). Most recently, in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the Court reaffirmed that both judgments on the merits and settlement agreements enforced through consent decrees were sufficient to create a prevailing party. 532 U.S. 598, 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). Again, the Court stated that the awarded relief for which fees were sought must materially alter the “legal relationship of the parties.” Id. (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)). Walker v. City of Mesquite, Tex., 313 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir.2002) (citations altered for clarity). Other circuits have echoed this reading of Buckhannon in the IDEA context. The Seventh Circuit summarized the meaning and effect of Buckhannon as follows: In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court limited the meaning of the term ‘prevailing party,’ by rejecting the catalyst theory as a method of attaining prevailing-party status under the Americans With Disabilities Act (‘ADA’) and Fair Housing Amendments Act (‘FHAA’). Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Under the catalyst theory, which had been accepted by many courts before Buckhannon, a plaintiff could prevail, if the plaintiffs suit was a catalyst that prompted the change that the plaintiff sought. Buckhannon, however, held that a party could not be a prevailing party without receiving some sort of ‘judicial imprimatur’ on the charge. Id. Central to the Court’s conclusion was its finding that the term ‘prevailing party’ was ‘a legal term of art,’ which signified that the party that had been granted relief by a court. Id. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835. As examples of the type of relief necessary to attain ‘prevailing party’ status, the court cited a judgment on the merits and a consent decree. Id. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835. T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 474 (7th Cir.2003) (citations altered for clarity). Similarly, the Third Circuit has reasoned that “[ajlthough a party benefiting [sic] from a settlement agreement could be a prevailing party, the change in the legal relationship must be in some way judicially sanctioned.” John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835). The Third Circuit went on to find judicial imprimatur where a stipulated settlement “(1) contained mandatory language; (2) was entitled ‘Order;’ (3) bore the signature of the District Court judge; and (4) provided for judicial enforcement.” Id. at 558. Thus, under the holding of Buckhan-non and the developing case law of the circuit courts, no litigant may claim prevailing party status without securing a decree or settlement bearing “judicial imprimatur.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The private settlement extended by EP-ISD to RR fails to meet this criterion. The face of the settlement plainly states that EPISD was willing only to offer a “private settlement,” and moreover, that EPISD was not willing to negotiate an agreed or consent order. Def. EPISD’s Resp. Ex A at 1. Consequently, RR would have been denied prevailing party status and the entitlement to attorney fees which this status confers. Standing alone, the preclusion of prevailing party status and attorney fees to RR would not serve to maintain a live case or controversy between the parties. Indeed, EPISD aptly references Supreme Court precedent that an “interest in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70-71, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986)). Were RR’s only continuing interest that of attorney fees, the doctrine of mootness would estop both the SEHO’s decision and review by this Court. In this case, however, RR pressed forward with litigation to achieve not only attorney fees, but more importantly, enforceability of a settlement award. By proceeding in this fashion, RR followed the weight of current case law, which holds that the private settlement offered by EP-ISD would have lacked force in either federal or state court. ii. RR’s interest in a pathway to the federal courts Along with defining the contours of “prevailing party” status, the Buckhan-non decision also directs this Court as to when a federal court may enforce a settlement award. The Buckhannon Court spoke directly to the subject, holding first that “[p]rivate settlements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Because private settlements lack the judicial imprimatur required for enforcement, the Court held that “federal jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.” Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding that neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor any law provides for jurisdiction of a federal court over disputes arising out of an agreement that produces a stipulation, and further, that enforcement of a settlement requires its own basis for jurisdiction)). Therefore, without incorporation into an order of dismissal, a party seeking to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement would have to produce an independent jurisdictional basis to return to the same federal court that originally heard the case. Here, EPISD admits that it rejected any negotiation of an agreed or consent order. Def. EPISD’s Resp. Ex. A. Moreover, the private agreement that EPISD did offer to RR would have neither entered the record nor borne the judicial imprimatur necessary to enforce the award in federal court. For EPISD to then allege, as it does, that this private agreement somehow mooted the dispute between the parties is to propound the argument that RR harbored no interest in the enforceability of the settlement agreement. Yet, to do so ignores the value of the IDEA’S pathway to the federal courts. Generally, the State of Texas and its political subdivisions possess immunity from being haled into federal court by suits authorized by federal law. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County, Ga., 547 U.S. 189, 193, 126 S.Ct. 1689, 164 L.Ed.2d 367 (2006). That immunity, however, is not absolute. First, Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity from suit when it acts under section five of the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir.2005) (en banc) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”)). Second, a state may consent to suit in federal court. Id. Congress made specific provision within the IDEA to condition “a state’s receipt of federal IDEA funds on its consent to suit under that Act.” Id. at 280. Thus, under the IDEA, an individual may hale a school district, as a subdivision of the state, into federal court. Id. at 289. Clearly, then, the IDEA offers individuals recourse to sue a state in federal court. The private agreement proposed by EP-ISD, however, would have done the opposite. In fact, by signing the agreement, RR would have surrendered his pathway to the federal courts and relied entirely on EPISD’s faithful execution of the agreement. Had a breach occurred, the agreement would have left RR bereft of any recourse to hale EPISD into federal court. iii. RR’s interest in the enforceability of an agreement in Texas state court The plain language of the Texas statutes and Texas Supreme Court precedent would have stripped RR of the ability to enforce EPISD’s private agreement in the state court system as well. Under Texas law, sovereign immunity exists to “protect the State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008). This immunity, although often referred to under the umbrella term of “sovereign immunity,” actually consists of the distinct concepts of “sovereign immunity” and “governmental immunity.” Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n. 3 (Tex.2003). The term “sovereign immunity” refers to a state’s immunity from suit and liability. Id. Sovereign immunity extends not only to the state, but also to the varying divisions of state government, including agencies, boards, hospitals, and universities. Id. (citing Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976)). “Governmental immunity” protects political subdivisions of the state, including municipalities and school districts. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.2004). Both sovereign and governmental immunity deprive the Texas courts of subject matter jurisdiction. See Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.2006); Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.2003). Governmental immunity, such as that which protects EPISD, has two components: immunity from liability and immunity from suit. Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332. Immunity from suit bars suit against the entity altogether. Id. Immunity from suit takes on particular relevance when a governmental entity enters into a contract, because that entity waives immunity from liability and voluntarily binds itself, just as any other party would, to the terms of the contract. Id. Nevertheless, that entity does not thereby waive immunity from suit. Id. For there to be a waiver of immunity from suit in the contract-claim context, the Texas legislature must have waived immunity from suit as to the claim in question by clear and unambiguous language. Id. at 332-33 (requiring clear and unambiguous language to waive governmental immunity); see Tex. Gov’t Code ANN. § 311.034 (Vernon 2007) (“In order to preserve the legislature’s interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”). The Texas Local Government Code (“TLGC”) enumerates which entities can be considered “local government entities” for purposes of Texas law. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.151 (Vernon 2005). In addition, the TLGC articulates when those local government entities-including school districts — waive their governmental immunity from suit. See id. § 271.152. By a 2005 amendment, the Texas legislature announced that local governmental entities would be amenable to contract-related claims in the following situation: A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter. Id. A contract, within the meaning of this subchapter, is defined as “a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” Id. § 271.151(2). Thus, to determine whether the legislature has waived a local governmental entity’s immunity from suit, Texas courts have focused on whether goods or services are being provided to the local government entity. In those cases where immunity has been waived, the courts have concluded that the contract between the parties called for some receipt of goods or services by the local governmental entity. See Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Subdivisions/Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 327 (Tex.2006) (holding that the state’s self-insurance fund was amenable to suit because it received services from the school districts, which helped elect the members of its board); Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 256 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.App.2008) (finding that an agreement to hire third parties to build streets, roads, and bridges for a local government entity constituted sufficient provision of services to waive immunity). Conversely, the Texas courts have refused to waive immunity when the local government entity has not received goods and services. See Somerset Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Casias, No. 04-07-00829-CV, 2008 WL 1805533, at *2 (Tex.App. Apr. 23, 2008) (finding that a breach of contract claim filed under section 271.152 did not waive school district’s immunity, because the earnest money contract at issue related to the sale of land rather than goods or services); City of San Antonio v. Reed S. Lehman Grain, Ltd., No. 04-04-00930-CV, 2007 WL 752197, at *2 (Tex.App. Mar.14, 2007) (noting that an easement dedication contract conveyed only an interest in real property, and as such, is not an agreement for providing goods and services that would waive immunity). Hence, to divest a school district of its immunity from suit, a party seeking to file suit would have to show that they had provided some good or service to the district. RR could make no such showing. In essence, therefore, EPISD offered RR an agreement without the concomitant right to enforce it. This Court finds that the interest in that enforceability constitutes an interest sufficient, for the purposes of litigation, to create a live ease or controversy. Furthermore, because the private settlement extended by EPISD simultaneously (1) denied RR prevailing party status under the IDEA and (2) precluded RR’s ability to enforce the agreement in either the federal or state courts, the Court finds that a live case or controversy did and does exist between the parties to this suit. 2. Because RR properly exhausted his administrative remedies, both the SEHO and this Court possess jurisdiction Next, EPISD argues that neither the SEHO nor this Court possess jurisdiction over this matter, as RR failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. PI. EPISD’s First Original Compl. 6; Def. EPISD’s Resp. 8-10. EPISD insists that the SEHO’s findings of fact “conclusively establish that the [SEHO] lacked jurisdiction to permit [RR] to proceed with a due process hearing.” Def. EPISD’s Resp. 8-9 (citing AR Vol. I, 7). EPISD recounts the SEHO’s finding that “before [RR] requested a due process hearing, [EPISD] was prepared to begin the evaluation process and had scheduled a STAT meeting to address the parent’s request for a [Full Individual Evaluation (“FIE”) ] and obtain the parent’s consent for the initial evaluation.” Id. at 9. Nonetheless, EPISD highlights that RR’s parents failed to provide consent. Id. Additionally, RR’s parents later cancelled the STAT meeting. Id. As a consequence, EPISD argues that if RR had participated in the STAT meeting, rather than cancelling and filing for a due process hearing, “there would have been nothing left for the [SEHO] to do since the relief [granted by the SEHO] .... was the precise conduct the STAT committee was prepared to undertake.” Id. RR fails to address the argument in his Reply. Based upon the argument submitted by EPISD, the question the Court must determine is whether RR failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he cancelled the STAT meeting provided by EPISD in favor of submitting his claims to the state-level SEHO. The IDEA secures to every student in the State of Texas the right to a FAPE, which must be tailored to each disabled child’s needs through an IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). These IEPs, in turn, are to be crafted, in writing, at a meeting attended by a “qualified” and “knowledgeable” school district representative, a teacher, the child’s parents or guardians, and, when appropriate, the child himself. Id. Whenever parents have complaints about the FAPE provided by a school district, the IDEA provides that they “shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). Procedurally, parents must first address their concerns about a child’s FAPE to the local school district, but if the school district has not resolved the complaint “to the satisfaction of the parents” within thirty (30) days, then the “due process hearing may occur.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(l)(B)(ii). Although the IDEA provides that the states may elect to administer due process hearings at either the state or local level, the State of Texas has charged the Texas Education Agency (“TEA”) with responsibility for implementing “a one-tier system of due process hearings under the IDEA.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(b) (emphasis added). Thus, in those instances where a school district fails to resolve a parent’s complaint within thirty (30) days, parents have a direct and exclusive pathway to a due process hearing administered by the Texas Education Agency. Additionally, should the parents remain dissatisfied following the due process hearing officer’s decision, they may file a civil action in state or federal district court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). A complaint brought before a federal district court based on the IDEA is not a justiciable controversy until Plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies under the IDEA or proved that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate. Gardner v. Sch. Bd. Caddo Parish, 958 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir.1992); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). To exhaust administrative remedies in the State of Texas, the IDEA and Texas Administrative Code demand only that a plaintiff undergo a due process hearing administered by the TEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(b). The relevant law contemplates neither a hearing preceding a plaintiffs path to the TEA due process hearing, nor any hearing between the TEA and a plaintiffs access to the federal courts. Based upon the plain language of the IDEA and the Texas Administrative Code, the Court finds that RR properly exhausted all necessary administrative remedies. Although EPISD would have this Court interpret the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute as imposing new procedural requirements upon RR, the unique facts of Ellenberg mitigate against this Court transposing that expansive holding into the case at bar. See generally Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute, 478 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.2007). a. The Ellenberg decision In Ellenberg, plaintiffs claimed that New Mexico Military Institute (“NMMI”) violated the IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act by denying their disabled child entrance to the school. Id. at 1273. Although both parents initiated the cause as plaintiffs, the case began when Mr. Ellen-berg brought his daughter, S.E., from Ms. Ellenberg’s home in Florida to live with him in New Mexico. Id. at 1271. Shortly after the move, in 2000, Mr. Ellenberg enrolled his daughter in Los Alamos High School. Id. After two years of substantial behavioral problems, the Taos Municipal School District (“TMSD”) prepared an IEP for S.E. stating that she required a small, structured .learning environment and careful monitoring. Id. at 1272. The IEP developed by TMSD was to be reviewed one year from the date it was created or at the time of her discharge, whichever occurred first. Id. The following year, rather than reapplying to TMSD for a renewal or review of her IEP, plaintiffs submitted S.E.’s application directly to NMMI, a military school outside TMSD’s borders. Id. Owing in no small part to plaintiffs’ disclosure of S.E.’s history of disciplinary problems, participation in a residential treatment program in Taos, and her diagnosis and related medication for Oppositional Defiance Disorder, NMMI denied her admission for the fall semester. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs petitioned the State of New Mexico for a due process hearing against NMMI, claiming that NMMI’s refusal to provide S.E. with a FAPE violated her rights under the IDEA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1273. At the due process hearing, the hearing officer ultimately concluded that NMMI had no obligation to provide S.E. with a FAPE under the IDEA or the Rehabilitation Act, because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that S.E. was otherwise qualified to attend NMMI. Id. Both sides eventually appealed the ruling, leading to a decision by the appellate hearing officer that NMMI was not a public school for purposes of the IDEA, and that plaintiffs’ IDEA claim “ ‘bordered on being wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’ ” Id. (citations omitted in original). Having exhausted the administrative hearing process, plaintiffs filed a civil action in federal court against NMMI asserting claims under the IDEA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the ADA. Id. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ IDEA claim. Specifically, the district court held that nothing in the IDEA “support[s] the theory that special education is merely a service that must be provided wherever the student chooses to attend school.” Id. (citations omitted). The district court also granted summary judgment to NMMI on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, holding that “if the state satisfied its obligations under the IDEA it was not required to do more under the ADA or the [Rehabilitation Act].” Id. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, a three-judge panel found that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Id. at 1279. The court made this finding based on what it considered two fundamental circumscriptions of the IDEA’S state focus. First, the Ellenberg court chided the plaintiffs for not obtaining an IEP from either of S.E.’s local educational agencies for the 2003-2004 school year. Id. at 1276. By the Ellenberg court’s reasoning, the plaintiffs disregarded this requirement in favor of unilaterally determining that NMMI was their child’s least restrictive learning environment. Id. Second, plaintiffs made no request to alter the IEP fashioned by TMSD the previous year before again deciding unilaterally that NMMI would represent their child’s least restrictive learning environment. Id. Because the plaintiffs had neither sought out a current IEP for the school year nor requested an alteration to the previous IEP, the Tenth Circuit opined that they “had no way of deciding whether a military-style education is appropriate for S.E.,” and moreover, that “neither this court nor a district court has a factual record adequate to determine if NMMI is appropriate for S.E.” Id. at 1276-77. The Tenth Circuit arrived at this holding by noting that “[a]lthough the [plaintiffs] characterize the relief they seek as S.E.’s admission to NMMI, their only legally cognizable injury under the IDEA is the state’s failure to provide their child with a FAPE in the least restrictive environment.” Id. at 1276. Where the issue presents itself thus, with a plaintiff claiming that the state has not provided a child with a FAPE in the least restrictive environment, the Tenth Circuit held that “the need for an IEP is especially great.” Id. Correspondingly, to obtain the required IEP, the Ellenberg court reasoned that the “IDEA’S requirements that students receive an education in the [least restrictive environment] do not preclude a state from initially assigning students to local school districts and requiring them to seek an IEP from that school district.” Id. at 1278. Recognizing the primacy of the state in the IDEA construct, the court concluded that “[i]t is to the states, not students, that Congress delegated authority to implement the IDEA.” Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034). b. The Ellenberg decision does not persuade this Court that RR failed to exhaust his administrative remedies The facts of the instant case militate against applying the broad holding of the Ellenberg court. Fundamentally, the El-lenberg court dealt with the ability of parents to exercise their right to district court review. Id. at 1273. In the case before this Court, only EPISD appeals the findings of the due process hearing provided by the State of Texas. Thus, the Tenth Circuit’s concern that students might supplant the state’s authority under the IDEA does not translate. To the contrary, RR’s local educational agency now seeks to overturn the state’s findings through the federal courts. Additionally, the Ellenberg court sought to correct what it saw as a student trying to bypass the IDEA. See Ellenberg, 478 F.3d at 1278. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit felt that the plaintiffs’ refusal to seek a current IEP or modify their child’s previous IEP prevented any federal court from making a determination as to what constituted the child’s least restrictive learning environment. Id. at 1276-77. In the instant case, however, RR exercised his statutorily guaranteed right to a due process hearing, not to contravene the state’s authority to draft his IEP, but rather, to petition the State of Texas to compel his local educational agency, EPISD, to grant him an IEP. See Def. Berry’s Mot. to Dismiss 9. For its part, EPISD avers that the process of developing RR’s IEP was slated to begin at the STAT committee meeting can-celled by RR on September 24, 2006. Def. EPISD’s Resp. 9. RR’s history with EP-ISD’s STAT committee, however, calls the potential value of that meeting into question. The words of the SEHO presiding over RR’s due process hearing state as much: I find that [EPISD] violated the time lines for an initial evaluation because the matter was repeatedly referred to the STAT committee. It’s clear that the STAT committee was set up to provide a student support and intervention before a special education referral is made. However, in practice, the [c]ommittee is merely an obstacle to parents who want to access the special education referrals .... [the IDEA] gives the parent a right to seek an evaluation and overrides local district policy concerning intervening procedures. AR Vol. I, 8. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that the STAT committee reviewed RR’s case on numerous occasions from 2001 to 2005, and only once did the STAT committee bother to undertake the evaluation for special education to which the IDEA guaranteed RR access. AR Vol. I, 5-7. Thus, while the plaintiffs in Ellenberg were attempting to circumnavigate the state’s role in providing special education services under the IDEA, RR employed the State of Texas’s due process hearing procedures to command EPISD to begin crafting his IEP. In so doing, RR called upon the authority delegated to the State of Texas by the IDEA, which the Ellenberg court extolled as the proper avenue for following the mandates of the IDEA. See Ellenberg, 478 F.3d at 1278 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034). Stated plainly, the plaintiffs in Ellenberg sought to make their own rules for educating their child. In the case before this Court, RR petitioned the State of Texas to compel EP-ISD to follow the rules. Such action clearly comports with the spirit of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Ellenberg. Additionally, the Court finds no compelling justification for importing the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Ellenberg into the Western District of Texas. Under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, a plaintiff may file an IDEA claim in federal court once all administrative remedies have been exhausted or exhaustion has been proven to be futile or inadequate. See Gardner, 958 F.2d at 112; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The relevant administrative remedies in Texas derive from the text of the IDEA and the Texas Administrative Code. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f)(1)(A), (i)(2)(A); 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(b). Notably, the text of the IDEA states that when parents have complaints about the FAPE provided by their local school district, they “shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing,” and that this hearing “shall be conducted .... as determined by State law.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The affirmative rights granted by this statute make no mention of parents necessarily obtaining an IEP before pursuing their due process hearing rights. Moreover, to rule that parents must obtain an IEP before exercising their due process hearing rights ignores the possibility of a local educational agency abridging a child’s right to an IEP through intervening bodies like EPISD’s STAT committee. Accordingly, this Court finds that RR properly exhausted his administrative remedies. Neither the IDEA nor Texas law require parental participation in EPISD’s STAT committee whatsoever. Consequently, both the SEHO and this Court have jurisdiction to decide RR’s case. 3. An exception to the IDEA statute of limitations allows RR to pursue some of his claims which occurred before September 26, 2005 As its third challenge to the SEHO’s decision, EPISD argues that a limitations bar precludes RR’s claims which occurred before September 26, 2005. Def. EPISD’s Resp. 10-14. EP-ISD bases this argument on the text of the IDEA, which provides as follows: A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law allows. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). EPISD explains that the State of Texas has exercised its authority under the IDEA to implement its own time limitation for due process hearings. Def. EPISD’s Resp. 11. Specifically, the Texas Administrative Code allows that “[a]- parent or public education agency must request a due process hearing within one year of the date the complainant knew or should have known about the alleged action that serves as the basis for the hearing request.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(c). EPISD also argues that plaintiffs bear the burden to establish an exception to this one-year statute of limitations. Def. EPISD’s Resp. 11 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(e) (reiterating the general two-year statute of limitations that states may choose to supercede)). a. Exceptions to the IDEA statute of limitations The IDEA does allow a narrow set of exceptions to its time limitations. First, the statute of limitations shall not apply if a parent was prevented from requesting a due process hearing due to “specific misrepresentations by the local education agency that it had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i); see 34 C.F.R § 300.511(f)(1). In addition, the statute of limitations shall not apply where a parent failed to exercise their right to a due process hearing on account of “the local educational agency’s withholding of information from the parent that was required under this subchapter to be provided to the parent.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(ii); see 34 C.F.R § 300.511(f)(2). This second exception addresses the IDEA requirement that school districts provide parents with “a copy of procedural safe