Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER MARCIA S. KRIEGER, District Judge. In August 2008, the Democratic National Convention will be held in Denver, Colorado. This matter concerns claims that the security restrictions imposed during the Convention will violate the Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech and assembly under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. Convention activities will be hosted at two venues. Activities on the first three days of the Convention will be held at the Pepsi Center; the activities on the final night of the Convention will be held at Invesco Field at Mile High Stadium. Because issues concerning security restrictions at Invesco Field have not been framed or tried, this opinion addresses only restrictions associated with events at the Pepsi Center. The Plaintiffs have specifically identified four facets of the security restrictions that they contend infringe upon their First Amendment rights: • The location and configuration of the Public Demonstration Zone on the Pepsi Center grounds, being outside “sight and sound” of delegates and the Pepsi Center building itself, renders it an inadequate alternative to offset the closure of some public streets to First Amendment uses; • The terminus of the approved route for parades scheduled during the Convention, on Monday, August 25, through Wednesday, August 27, is not within “sight and sound” of the Pepsi Center; • The route for parades scheduled before the Convention begins, on Sunday, August 24, does not travel over Chopper Circle; and • The City of Denver denied a permit to Plaintiff Recreate 68 for an afternoon parade on Monday, August 25 through downtown Denver, citing traffic and staffing concerns. The Court has considered the factual stipulations of the parties (# 104, 110); the testimony of nine witnesses in a trial to the Court on July 29, 2008 (# 116, 117); the exhibits received as evidence at that trial; and the written (# 105, 108, 109, 118) and oral arguments (# 121) of counsel. As set forth more fully herein, the Court finds that the restrictions inhibit the Plaintiffs’ ability to engage in some forms of expressive conduct. However, the Court also finds that the restrictions are justified by important governmental interests, are narrowly tailored to meet those interests, and the Plaintiffs have a wide variety of alternative means of expression that will allow them to effectively communicate their messages. Thus, although these restrictions impact the Plaintiffs’ ability to assemble and express their views as they desire, the Court concludes that they do not unconstitutionally impair the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. I. PROCEDURAL CONTEXT AND JURISDICTION This action has evolved and the issues have been narrowed through consistent, good faith negotiation among the parties and the professionalism and skill of their counsel. Heeding the admonition of courts that have previously addressed similar claims on the eve of a national political convention, this action was initiated on May 1, 2008, before details of the Convention’s security restrictions had been announced. The original Complaint (# 1) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (# 2) sought to compel production of information about the intended restrictions, so as to then allow the Plaintiffs to mount a substantive challenge to the restrictions that would be revealed. Through diligent negotiation, the parties were able to resolve issues related to the production of the security information (#46). Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (# 48), leveling the substantive First Amendment challenges presented herein. (The Plaintiffs have withdrawn other claims grounded in Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution.) The Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss (# 70, 72) some of the claims, but the parties have been able to resolve the issues raised in those motions, rendering them moot. The Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides for suits to vindicate violations by state actors of rights and privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. As to all claims, the Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In addition, because the United States, through the Secret Service, is a Defendant, the Court also has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). II. GENERAL FACTS The facts pertinent to all of the challenged restrictions are summarized below. Those facts which are uniquely important to a particular restriction will be addressed in greater detail in the analytical discussion. The Convention The 2008 Democratic National Convention will be held in Denver, Colorado from Monday, August 25, through Thursday, August 28, 2008. The activities on the first three days/nights of the Convention will be held at the Pepsi Center; the final night of the Convention will be held at Invesco Field at Mile High Stadium. The Convention is expected to bring as many as 50,000 attendees to Denver, including 6,000 delegates, 14,000 Democratic Party officials and guests, and 15,000 members of the domestic and international media. In addition, it is expected that the Convention will attract tens (some witnesses believe hundreds) of thousands of people who desire to publieally express their views on various subjects through speeches, leaflets, demonstrations, and protests. The Plaintiffs are organizations and individuals who do not necessarily share the same agenda or viewpoint, but who all desire to communicate a message to the delegates, the media, and the general public prior to and during the Convention. The Pepsi Center Although Convention-related activities will take place in a variety of arenas around the city throughout the day, the main events of the Convention will occur on afternoons and evenings inside the Pepsi Center. The Pepsi Center is a privately owned sports arena located on the edge of downtown Denver. Its grounds are bordered on the northeast by Speer Boulevard, a heavily-used, divided, multi-lane thoroughfare into downtown Denver; on the southeast by Auraria Parkway, another prominent, divided, multi-lane street; and on the southwest and northwest sides by railroad tracks, the Elitch Gardens amusement park, and eventually, the South Platte River. Both Speer Boulevard and Auraria Parkway offer entrances to/exits from Interstate 25, a major traffic artery that passes between the Pepsi Center and Invesco Field. (For aid in understanding the area in question, Trial Exhibit 43 is reproduced on the following page.) The Pepsi Center grounds consist of several large parking lots, a handful of small commercial buildings, and the Pepsi Center itself, a large, circular enclosed arena. Although the Pepsi Center grounds are privately-owned property, a number of public city streets, notably 7th Street, 9th Street, and Chopper Circle enter into the grounds. During times when Convention activities are taking place, as many as 26,000 people may be inside the Pepsi Center itself, and another 30,000-40,000 people, including media, law enforcement personnel, Pepsi Center workers, and others may be present on the Pepsi Center grounds. Security plans Planning for the Convention began more than 18 months ago. In April 2007, the Department of Homeland Security designated the Convention a “National Special Security Event.” This designation authorized the United States Secret Service as the lead agency to design and implement, in conjunction with the City of Denver and Convention organizers, security measures for the Convention. In developing the security plan, Denver formed a number of committees to work with the Secret Service and Convention organizers, and met representatives of other state and federal agencies, some of the Plaintiff organizations, and others to discuss various security concerns and decisions. After consideration of a wide range of the anticipated needs, resources, expectations, and contingencies, a consolidated Convention security plan was designed. The plan has the objectives of providing security to convention attendees and those at the convention site, keeping downtown Denver open and functioning, ensuring a functioning transportation network, and providing for public safety. Details of the plan are discussed in greater detail below. It is sufficient at this point to note that the central feature of the security plan is the creation of a “security perimeter” that encloses the entirety of the Pepsi Center grounds, as well as those portions of Auraria Parkway and Speer Boulevard adjacent to the Pepsi Center grounds. The security perimeter will become effective on Friday, August 22, and will remain enforced through the conclusion of Convention activities on Wednesday, August 27. Only those persons holding credentials issued by the Convention Committee will be permitted to pass through the security perimeter, only at designated entrance checkpoints and only after having undergone a magnetometer-based security screening. City streets that fall within the security perimeter, such as Chopper Circle and portions of 7th Street and 9th Street, will effectively be closed to the public during this period. In addition, nearly all of Au-raria Parkway will fall within the security perimeter and be closed to public use, with the exception of authorized parades on Sunday, August 24. Similarly, with the exception of inbound rush hour traffic between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. each weekday, Speer Boulevard will be closed to public use from Interstate 25 to Larimer Street for the duration of the Convention. As discussed below, the security plan at the Pepsi Center is designed to protect Convention attendees, the public, and physical assets against attacks involving explosives and weapons; secure the Convention against unlawful disruption or violent protests; ensure unobstructed emergency access into and out of the Pepsi Center grounds, and to preserve orderly traffic flow into and around downtown Denver. Public/Demonstration Zone Ordinarily, public streets are considered traditional public fora where individuals can freely exercise their First Amendment rights. In recognition of the fact that the security perimeter compromises the public’s ability to engage in First Amendment activities on the closed streets, the Defendants have designated a portion of Parking Lot A on the Pepsi Center grounds as a “Public/Demonstration Zone.” The Public/Demonstration Zone (sometimes “the Zone”) will be located in the southernmost portion of Parking Lot A. The boundaries of the Zone are Auraria Parkway on the southeast, 7th Street on the Southwest, and a large “media pavilion” tent that stands to the northeast and shares the remainder of Parking Lot A. The northwest boundary of the Zone is not defined by any specific geographical or topographical features. Rather, it will be established by a set of barriers placed roughly halfway along the northwest/southeast axis of the parking lot. The Zone will cover approximately 47,000 square feet. Because of street closures— particularly, the closure of Auraria Parkway — the only access to the Zone will be from the south, along 7th Street, or from the southeast from Larimer Street and crossing over parking lots on the Auraria Campus. (Trial Exhibit 46, showing the orientation and features of the Public/Demonstration Zone, is reproduced on the following page.) The Zone will be enclosed on three sides by two rings of concrete “Jersey barriers,” topped with chain-link fencing. These two rings will be located 8 feet apart, thereby creating a “buffer zone,” which will allow law enforcement officers an opportunity to intercept any person who evades the inner ring of barriers. The fourth side of the Zone, along Auraria Parkway, will not be enclosed, but to access the northwestern edge of the Zone, visitors will be required to pass through an array of low concrete barriers. The top of the Zone will be open. Water stations and sanitary facilities will be provided,within the Zone. In addition, the City of Denver will provide an amplification system within the Zone, with speakers directed both internally into the Zone, as well as externally, facing the path that delegates are expected to walk. Short of enforcement of generally applicable laws, there will be no government control exercised over the sound system; users are expected to regulate its use. In addition, anyone entering the Zone may bring a bullhorn, other sound amplification device, or any other items that are not otherwise prohibited under established city ordinances. Individuals entering the Zone will not be subjected to searches, except insofar as a search would otherwise be permissible under existing constitutional law (ie. upon probable cause). The Zone is located and designed to allow those inside to be seen and heard by Convention delegates. It is anticipated that most delegates will be transported by Convention-supplied bus transportation to the Pepsi Center and that delegates will be dropped off at a screening location somewhere west of 7th Street and the Zone. After being screened, delegates will walk along a tree-lined sidewalk through the middle of the grounds to the Pepsi Center entrances. The sidewalk passes parallel to the northwest face of the Public/Demonstration Zone. During that portion of their walk, the delegates will be approximately 200 feet away from persons standing at the northwest edge of the Zone. There will be no obstructions between the delegates’ sidewalk and the Zone itself. Thus, any delegate wishing to approach the demonstrators may leave the sidewalk and walk directly to the edge of the buffer zone. This would place the delegate within 8 feet of those in the Public/Demonstration Zone. The fencing and buffer zone will effectively prohibit the passage of leaflets or other material to the delegates. To address this, the City has agreed to collect leaflets from any organization or member of the public who wishes to provide them. The collected leaflets will be placed on tables along the delegates’ sidewalk, such that delegates can take and peruse them. Persons in the Public/Demonstration Zone can watch and encourage delegates to take specific leaflets. The leaflets supplied by individuals and organizations will be “screened for security purposes” by the Secret Service in the same manner as other material entering the Pepsi Center grounds, but it does not appear that the material will be reviewed by the City of Denver or the Secret Service for its content or for any other purpose. Although Convention planners anticipate that most delegates will rely on bus transportation to get to the Convention, some delegates may choose to walk or use some other form of transportation. Delegates who arrive at the Convention by other means may avail themselves of alternative entrances to the security perimeter and might not pass along the sidewalk near the Public/Demonstration Zone. Nevertheless, the geography of the Pepsi Center grounds, along with the closure of Speer Boulevard and Auraria Parkway, effectively ensure that any delegate attempting to enter the security perimeter by any means will do so by travelling through or close to an area where the public is free to assemble and speak. The Defendants have stated that the Public/Demonstration Zone was situated to allow for communication opportunities with the delegates. (The Defendants explain that persons in the Public/Demonstration Zone will be the “welcoming committee” for delegates, as the Zone will be the first thing delegates encounter after getting off buses and being screened.) However, the Zone was not designed to provide unobstructed views of the Pepsi Center building itself. The sightline to the Pepsi Center is significantly blocked by the adjacent media pavilion tent to the northeast, and, from many vantage points in the Zone, only the roof of the Pepsi Center will be visible. However, as noted in more detail herein, there are several other locations open to the public that allow for partially- and fully-unobstructed views of the building itself. Parade routes In its February 2008 Emergency Event Declaration, the City of Denver designated an “approved parade route” that would be made available for public marches during the Convention. As many as five parades per day are scheduled on the approved parade route, occurring almost continually from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. each day of the Convention. All told, a dozen or more organizations will be formally represented in the various parades. The parties anticipate that each parade might involve as many as 10,000 participants, as well as numerous vehicles. Some of the Plaintiffs here will be represented in parades on each day of the Convention. The approved parade route begins in Civic Center Park, proceeds west along Colfax Avenue, turns north onto Speer Boulevard, and ends at the intersection of Speer Boulevard and Larimer Street. At that point, vehicles will exit the parade route in an unspecified direction. Marchers may elect to travel northwest on Lar-imer Street into downtown Denver, to double back by heading south along Speer Boulevard, or may proceed southwest along a fixed route on Larimer Street that will pass through the University of Colorado’s Auraria Campus and eventually deposit pedestrians near the Public/Demonstration Zone at 7th Street. Because of the closure of Speer Boulevard and Aura-ria Parkway, pedestrians cannot travel northwest towards the Pepsi Center on Speer Boulevard from the parade terminus. Although the record is not clear, the evidence suggests that some or all of 9th and 12th Streets between Auraria Parkway and Larimer Street will be closed to pedestrian traffic as well. (Trial Exhibit 6-1, showing street closures, the approved parade route, and an approximation of the path marchers may take from the parade terminus to the Public/Demonstration Zone, is reproduced on the following page. The Court notes that the map is somewhat inaccurate, insofar as what appears to be the Public/Demonstration Zone (the orange rhombus) and the route leading thereto (shown by the red line) are incorrectly shown at the intersection of 9th Street and Auraria Parkway. In actuality, the Zone will be located at the next intersection to the southwest, at 7th Street and Auraria Parkway, and the route leading there should head roughly west-northwest 0ie. diagonally) from the indicated turn at Larimer and 9th Streets.) The formal terminus of the approved parade route, at the corner of Larimer Street and Speer Boulevard, is approximately 1,800 feet from the Pepsi Center itself, mostly across parking lots and athletic fields. The Plaintiffs offered into evidence several photographs of the parade terminus to show the extent to which the Pepsi Center can be seen in the background. As much as most of the upper half of the Pepsi Center can be seen from the parade terminus, and as little as a small sliver of the building is visible, depending on the viewing angle. Another parade route has been authorized for Sunday, August 24, 2008, the day before the Convention begins (“the Sunday parades”). Plaintiffs Tent State University and Recreate 68 have each been granted a permit to conduct a Sunday parade, each of which is expected to draw 20,000 or more marchers. The Sunday parades will follow the approved parade route, but instead of ending at Larimer Street, will proceed down Speer Boulevard to Auraria Parkway and turn southwest along Auraria Parkway, ending at a terminus at or near the Public/Demonstration Zone. According to the Plaintiffs’ calculations, the Sunday parades will pass as close as 450 feet to the Pepsi Center (near the intersection of Auraria Parkway and 9th Street). Neither party offered photographs showing sight lines along the Sunday parade route, but overhead photographs and maps of the Pepsi Center grounds suggest that the marchers in the Sunday parades will have several opportunities for unobstructed (or minimally obstructed) lines of sight to the Pepsi Center building. Downtown parade permit denial In addition to its Sunday and daily parades during the Convention, Recreate 68 requested a permit to conduct a parade involving 10,000-20,000 marchers to take place at noon on Monday, August 25, through downtown Denver and ending at a federal courthouse (the “Downtown parade”). The requested route would begin at Civic Center Park, travel to and along the 16th Street pedestrian mall to Champa Street, then turn north on Champa Street to its destination. The City denied the requested permit because it would “substantially interfere with traffic in the area” because “there are not sufficient city resources [ie. police officers] to mitigate the disruption,” and because the requested route “would limit accessibility of the [16th Street Mall] shuttle buses as well as severely impact the light rail system.” Denver’s Manager of Public Works, Guillermo Vidal, testified that a march northeast along the 16th Street pedestrian mall would cross seven perpendicular streets that carry typically large amounts of downtown traffic and which will already be overburdened by vehicles seeking to avoid street closures incident to the approved parade route and security perimeter. In addition, the march would cross over two sets of light rail tracks, slowing or effectively stopping several train routes through downtown for the duration of the parade, and potentially obstructing shuttle buses that run the length of the 16th Street mall. The Plaintiffs concede that the denial of the permit does not prevent Recreate 68 from using public sidewalks to conduct a march, so long as marchers obey all traffic laws and signals, nor does it prevent the public from assembling at the destination courthouse. Additional avenues for communication Although the Convention will require the closure of some streets in and around the Pepsi Center, the remainder of traditional public fora in the city will remain open and available to those wishing to express themselves. Commonly used public fora such as Speer Boulevard south of Larimer Street, the 16th Street pedestrian mall, and all downtown sidewalks will remain available for First Amendment expression, subject only to generally applicable state laws and city ordinances. In addition, the City of Denver has issued scores of permits to groups — including some of the Plaintiffs — who seek to conduct rallies, demonstrations, and events in various city parks during the Convention. These events and gatherings are expected to involve thousands to tens of thousands of participants and, one may reasonably assume, will attract significant media attention. Convention delegates, guests, and other Convention attendees will be staying at 27 different properties around the metro Denver area. Mr. Battista testified that there are no restrictions that will significantly curtail the rights of persons to engage in speech, assembly, leafletting, or other forms of First Amendment activity at and around these hotels. III. ISSUES PRESENTED At the request of the Court, the parties filed statements (# 106, 107) of the issues they intended to try. As sharpened by colloquy at the Final Pretrial Conference (# 114) the Court understands that the Plaintiffs identified four specific decisions that they contend operate to violate their First Amendment rights: 1. The Public/Demonstration Zone’s location and configuration prevents “visual and acoustic proximity” to the Pepsi Center; 2. The “approved parade route” fails to pass within “sight and sound” of the Pepsi Center; 3. The Sunday parade route fails to allow access to Chopper Circle; 4. The City denied Plaintiff Recreate 68’s request to conduct the Downtown parade. For each of these alleged infringements, the Plaintiffs request relief in the form of a permanent injunction mandating that the Defendants change the security restrictions to correct the deficiency. Because an essential element of entitlement to a permanent injunction is a showing of actual success on the merits of the claims, the Court first assesses the substantive merit of the Plaintiffs’ claims that the identified practices violate the First Amendment. IV. ANALYSIS The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Although the First Amendment expressly speaks to a limitation on “Congress,” it is well-settled that its prohibition on undue abridgement of speech and assembly applies with equal force to state action. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996). The First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” and the protection of speech on public issues is one of “central importance.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (internal quotes omitted). The freedoms of speech and assembly protected by the First Amendment are perhaps the most cherished of all Constitutional protections, and actions which abridge them should necessarily be viewed with concern. “Traditional public fora” — namely, public streets, sidewalks, and parks— have long been recognized as places in which assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussion of public issues should be welcomed. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157. Such places “occupy a special position in terms of First Amendment protection,” and the government’s ability to restrict expressive activity in such public fora is “very limited.” Id. A. Time, place, and manner restrictions on public expression Despite their importance, the rights conferred by the First Amendment are not absolute. Even in a traditional public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Such restrictions are constitutional if: (i) they are justified without regard to the content of the speech; (ii) they are narrowly-tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (iii) there are ample alternative channels for communication of the desired message. Id. The party asserting the First Amendment violation has the burden to prove that the restrictions affect protected expression in a traditional public forum. Once that burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the government to establish the three elements described in Ward. See e.g. U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) (“[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions”). 1. Content neutrality The level of scrutiny applied to a governmental burden on First Amendment rights depends on whether or not the regulation affecting speech is content-neutral. The government may not regulate speech either because it favors or disagrees with the message the speech conveys. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). A regulation on speech that discriminates against speakers based upon the content of their speech is subject to the highly exacting strict scrutiny review. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). That is, the government must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and must be the least-restrictive means available to serve that purpose. Id. However, regulations that are justified for reasons independent of the content of the speech they affect are subject to less stringent review that is more deferential to the government. This is because “[c]ontent-neutral regulations do not pose the same inherent dangers to free expression that content-based regulations do.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F. C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 213, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (internal quotes and cites omitted). Thus, the government is granted more latitude in designing a regulatory solution to perceived problems. Id. In determining whether a restriction is content-neutral, a court focuses upon the government’s purpose in imposing the restriction, not the effect that the restriction has upon a given speaker. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. If the justification for the restriction does not pertain to the content of the regulated speech, then the restriction is considered content-neutral. Id. A content-neutral regulation is permissible, even though it may operate to affect only certain speakers but not others. Id., citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (regulation of only those movie theaters that specialized in adult films was content-neutral; even though regulation was defined by the content of the theater-owners’ speech, the justification for the regulation was the “secondary effects”—increased crime and reduction of property values— that flowed from such speech); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (conduct-based injunction that tended to affect people with a particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction content-or viewpoint-based); cf. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320-21, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (regulation prohibiting display of signs critical of foreign governments near embassies was content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny). 2. Significant governmental interest/narrow tailoring To be constitutional, a content-neutral restriction on speech must also be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 109 S.Ct. 2746. To determine whether a restriction is narrowly tailored, courts focus on two components: whether there is a governmental interest that is “significant” and whether the restriction is “narrowly tailored” to serve that interest. Courts have recognized a variety of sufficiently significant governmental interests that justify limitations on public speech. These have included protecting public fora such as city streets and parks from excessive noise (see Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-97, 109 S.Ct. 2746, citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949)), maintaining public spaces in an attractive and available condition for the enjoyment of the general population (see Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 296, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)), and preserving order and public safety, such as by ensuring the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks (see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 375-76, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997)). More recently, cases involving restrictions attendant to political conventions and meetings of world leaders have uniformly found that maintaining physical security of persons and property involved in a high-profile event is a governmental interest of “the highest order.” Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir.2007). To be “narrowly tailored” to serve a particular governmental interest, the restriction must not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further” the stated interest. Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 214, 117 S.Ct. 1174 (internal quotes omitted). The essence of such narrow tailoring is that the regulation “focuses on the source of the evils the [government] seeks to eliminate,” without significantly restricting a substantial quantity of expressive conduct that does not create the same evils. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2746. The court looks to see if the regulation is a sufficient “fit” to the problem that it is intended to prevent, and then the court determines whether the regulation burdens more speech than is necessary to achieve that fit. In this analysis, courts are not free to speculate as to what other means a government might use to accomplish its objective. An otherwise content-neutral regulation is not rendered invalid “simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.” Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 217, 117 S.Ct. 1174. The test of content-neutral restrictions is not whether the government’s interest could be adequately served by another marginally less-restrictive alternative or what the court might perceive to be a more appropriate method of satisfying that interest, but instead whether the restriction is substantially broader than is necessary to achieve its purpose. Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 217-18, 117 S.Ct. 1174; Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746. 3. Ample alternatives for communication For a content-neutral, narrowly tailored restriction on public speech to be constitutional, the restriction must also allow ample alternatives for the speaker to communicate his or her ideas. Because Supreme Court precedent has not addressed this requirement in detail, the Court turns to decisions of other courts that interpret and apply this requirement. In Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir.2008), the court identified several considerations that may bear on whether alternatives for communication are ample and adequate: (i) whether the alternative permits the speaker to reach his or her intended audience; (ii) whether the location of the expressive activity is part of the expressive message, such that engaging in the activity in another location would dilute the speaker’s message; (iii) whether the alternative forum is susceptible to spontaneous outpourings of expression, or whether the resort to the alternative forum requires advance notice, registration, or some other burden to spontaneous speech or assembly; and (iv) the cost and convenience of the alternatives. Id., citing, inter alia, N.A.A. C.P. v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1356 (9th Cir.1984) (20-day advance notice requirement for parade permit impermissibly burdened opportunities for spontaneous assembly in response to current events). The 8th Circuit viewed the adequacy of alternatives more narrowly in Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 488 (8th Cir.2007). It suggested that the speaker’s access to a particular, desired audience is an important component in the alternatives analysis. In Phelps-Roper, the court upheld a preliminary injunction blocking a law against protesting at funerals. In addressing the speaker’s likelihood of success on the element of whether the regulation presented adequate alternative channels for communication, the court noted that “plaintiffs wish to express an opinion about an individual to that individual and others, and they wish to direct their message at that individual.” Therefore, allowing them to picket in the town square or even the next block does not satisfy the second Ward requirement of “[alternative avenues for communication].” Id., quoting Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 662 (8th Cir.1996). The court noted the importance of allowing the speaker to direct his or her “intended message to the intended recipients.” Id. From these cases, the Court discerns that the “ample alternatives” element is a multi-factor, fact-intensive inquiry. While it must give some deference to the speaker’s desire to reach a particular audience or speak at a particular place, it does not require that the speaker have the ability to engage in precisely the same means of expression in precisely the same location, nor does it require that the speaker have the ability to communicate in the same manner as he or she wishes. Berger v. City of Seattle, 512 F.3d 582, 598 (9th Cir.2008). For example, adequate alternatives may exist, even though the alternative channels do not necessarily permit the same quantity of speech, prohibit the preferred method of communication, or reduce the size of the potential audience. Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 44 (1st Cir.2007) (finding ample alternatives existed to parade permitting process that adversely affected indigents). Ultimately, the alternatives analysis focuses on whether the speaker retains other reasonable opportunities to meaningfully communicate his or her message. Berger, 512 F.3d at 597; Sullivan, 511 F.3d at 44. B. Illustrative cases With these basic principles in mind, the Court turns its attention to several cases in which high-profile political conventions or gatherings of world leaders have generated First Amendment challenges similar to those raised by the Plaintiffs. 1. Citizens for Peace In Space v. City of Colorado Springs In the Tenth Circuit, the most recent case addressing similar issues is Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, CO, 477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir.2007). In it, the court considered restrictions attendant to a meeting of NATO representatives in Colorado Springs. The Court found that the establishment of a security zone extending in a radius of several blocks around the site of the meeting did not burden the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. As here, the security zone excluded non-credentialed members of the general public, effectively preventing the plaintiffs from staging a protest within direct visual range of the site of the meeting. Id. at 1217-19. Instead, the plaintiffs were forced to conduct their expressive activities at the edge of the security zone, hundreds of yards away, visible to meeting attendees only as their bus passed by the plaintiffs protest. Id. at 1218. The plaintiffs conceded that the security zone restrictions were content-neutral, and the 10th Circuit found that the city’s proffered justifications for the restrictions on public access to the site — securing the meeting site against both explosives and “disorderly and violent protestors” — were not only significant but “of the highest order.” Id. at 1220. The court extensively discussed its assessment that the city’s restrictions were narrowly tailored to meet the identified security interest. It noted that “[i]t is not enough that the City justify its restrictions based broadly on ‘security’,” but observed that the importance of the government interest “bears an inverse relationship to the rigor of the narrowly tailored analysis,” and repeated its finding that the security concerns stated by the city were of “the highest order.” Id. at 1221. The court found that the city’s security zone advanced that interest because it limited access to the meeting site to identified and screened individuals and because it allowed the city to devote its available police to maintaining the security perimeter, rather than screening protestors and monitoring protests within the zone. Id. at 1223. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that small protests could have been accommodated on a permit-only basis, observing, among other things, that alternatives urged by the plaintiffs could not have been implemented without additional logistical burdens and drains on security personnel. Id. at 1224-25. After finding that the security zone restriction was narrowly tailored, the court also found that there were adequate alternative channels of communication that remained for the plaintiffs. It observed that the plaintiffs were “sufficiently able to communicate their message even though they had no close, physical interaction with their intended audience.” Id. at 1225. The court explained that the First Amendment “does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Rather, the sufficiency of available alternatives is a fact-dependent analysis, considering things such as the nature of the security threat involved, the geography of the area regulated, the type of speech desired, and the nature of alternative means by which the speakers can disseminate their message. Id. at 1226. It found that although limiting the plaintiffs to protesting outside the checkpoint may not have been “the best alternative, nor even the most prudent,” it was nevertheless sufficient, in light of the circumstances, given that attendees and media were able to view the protest as they passed by, that the protesters were later interviewed by several local media and that they could have also protested at the off-site staging area where meeting attendees and media members boarded buses to enter the security zone. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs were able to present their views to their intended audience and were not so cut off from that audience that one could say that no ample alternatives to a protest within the security zone existed. Id. Citizens for Peace In Space is instructive in several respects. First, and perhaps most importantly, it recognizes that the creation of a geographically large security zone to protect a high-profile political gathering against threats of terrorist attacks and violent protests can withstand a First Amendment challenge from those whose ability to engage in speech activities inside the security zone is compromised. It confirms the importance of a reasonably specific security-based justification for the closure of traditional public fora and instructs that the more important the governmental interest, the less exacting is the court’s narrow-tailoring analysis. The case is also illustrative of the types of alternatives that might be deemed adequate to replace an in-person protest immediately outside a gathering. As is discussed in more detail below, the alternatives available here allow many of the same (and in some respects, more) opportunities for communication as Citizens for Peace In Space: the ability to speak to attendees when they board buses, an (enhanced) opportunity to communicate to attendees as they travel towards the meeting site, the opportunity for any attendee wanting more information to return to the speakers, and the ability of speakers to reach the attendees and the public through other media channels such as television and print. 2. Menotti v. City of Seattle Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.2005), involved regulation of protest speech at the 1999 World Trade Organization (“WTO”) meeting in Seattle, Washington. Three weeks before the meeting began, a number of unknown individuals damaged retail stores and headquarters of timber companies and obstructed a Thanksgiving Day parade. Id. at 1120. On the day before the meeting began, protest activity, both peaceful and otherwise, increased. This included van-dalization of property, protesters throwing rocks at police, and threats of harm to persons. Id. at 1120-21. On the day the meeting began, vandalism and looting of stores continued, protesters formed human chains so as to block access to intersections and buildings, threw bottles, rocks, and urine at police, lit fires, and assaulted innocent citizens. Id. at 1121-22. Late that evening, the Mayor of Seattle issued “Emergency Order No. 3,” which declared a state of emergency and imposed a “curfew,” effectively creating a security zone in downtown Seattle that excluded all but WTO delegates, employees of businesses within the zone, members of the press, and public safety personnel. Id. at 1124-25. Vehicles and pedestrians would be permitted into the zone “if they have a reasonable purpose,” such as to work or shop at a particular location within the zone. Id. at 1125. However, it was admitted that the security zone would effectively prevent protestors from marching or demonstrating within the zone. The 9th Circuit found that the Emergency Order was content-neutral, in that it prohibited essentially all public speech within the security zone, even though it acknowledged that the effect of the Order was predominantly felt by anti-WTO protesters. Id. at 1129. It rejected arguments by the plaintiff that the Order was content-based because it did not prevent activity by shoppers and workers in the security zone, stating that “these exemptions did not enable the City to discriminate against ideas it disfavored.” Id. at 1130. The court found that “[n]o one could seriously dispute that the government has a significant interest in maintaining public order.” Id. at 1131. As to the narrowness of the fit between the closing off of a large swath of downtown and the city’s significant security interests, the court observed that “large numbers of non-violent protesters prevented police from curbing effectively the activities of the violent protesters” by “buffering] smaller pockets of protesters engaged in significant criminal acts.” Id. at 1132. The court noted that the security zone was designed to encompass all of the buildings officially involved in the WTO meeting but to cover “only enough territory for the WTO delegates ... to move safely from their hotels to the convention and [to last] only during the conference.” Id. at 1133— 34. Viewed in light of the entire circumstances, the court found that “it would not have been practical to require police, on a continuing basis, to make an accurate determination of each protestor as violent or not-violent,” such that a more nuanced security arrangement could be crafted. Id. at 1135. Finally, the court turned to the availability of alternative channels of communication. As did the court in Citizens for Peace In Space, the Menotti court noted that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired” but acknowledged that “an alternative mode of communication may be constitutionally inadequate if the speaker’s ability to communicate effectively is threatened.” Id. at 1138 (internal quotes and citations omitted). The court characterized this as a “difficult question” insofar as the restricted zone “carved out a portion of the downtown area where protestors could not deliver their message .directly to delegates.” Id. at 1138. On the other hand, it noted that protestors could express their views outside the zone, including directly across the street from locations where the WTO meeting was taking place. Id. It found that “[t]hese available communications ... were perhaps not ideal for protestors who wanted to present views in the face of delegates, but neither did they wholly exclude protestors from the delegates’ purview.” Id. at 1141. Thus, it found that there were adequate alternative avenues for communication and upheld the constitutionality of the Order. Menotti provides additional enlightenment on several issues. Most significantly, it describes, in both a factual and legal sense, a security justification hinted at but not particularly developed in Citizens for Peace In Space: the threat posed by violent or unlawfully-disruptive protestors. Menotti both supplies a factual predicate for concerns that similar conduct could occur at the Convention here, as well as demonstrates that preventing such conduct by creating a large, sterile security zone that curtails some First Amendment opportunities can nevertheless survive constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, Menotti is significant in its rejection of an argument that the Plaintiffs raise here and the Court discusses in more detail below — that allowing- persons eligible to enter the security zone to engage in expressive activity therein is a form of content discrimination prompting strict scrutiny. Although it does not appear that the issue was presented as squarely in Menotti as it is here, the Menotti court clearly focused not on whether some individuals enjoyed more expressive opportunities than others but on whether the restriction “enable[d] the City to discriminate against ideas it disfavored.” Id. at 1130. Finally, Menotti appears to contemplate an even more limited set of alternative communication channels as being sufficient than did Citizens for Peace In Space: so long as protestors had a reasonable ability to communicate with attendees at a distance, the lack of face-to-face opportunities did not warrant relief. 3. Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.2004), involved an anticipatory First Amendment challenge to regulations imposed on protestors at the Democratic National Convention in Boston, Massachusetts in 2004. The United States Secret Service created a security plan similar to the one at issue here, including a security zone around the convention site which only delegates, staff, press, and other eredentialed individuals were allowed to enter. Id. at 10. The city established a fenced, fabric-draped “demonstration zone” on the edge of the security perimeter, creating a space that would permit some opportunity to communicate messages to the delegates. Id. at 11. The plaintiffs brought an anticipatory First Amendment challenge, seeking a preliminary injunction that would modify the demonstration zone in various respects. Hearing the plaintiffs appeal from the denial of the plaintiffs requested preliminary injunction, the First Circuit summarily concluded that the restrictions were content-neutral and that the city’s professed interests in security were significant, leaving for discussion only the questions of narrow tailoring and adequate alternatives. Id. at 12-13. The court noted that the security measures “dramatically limited” opportunities for some forms of communication between the plaintiffs and the delegates, including leafletting, the use of visual media such as signs, and one-on-one discussions. Id. at 13. The court found that generalized justifications of “security” were insufficient to justify such restrictions, and that the narrow tailoring analysis must involve the particular harms that the security measures were designed to address. Id. The city offered specific justifications for each decision regarding the design and configuration of the demonstration zone based on particular problems that had arisen at prior political conventions. For example, it justified a double ring of barriers and fences to prevent protestors from attempting to break through a single security perimeter; the fabric mesh was designed to protect delegates from being sprayed with liquids, as delegates at prior conventions had been. Id. The court acknowledged that there was no evidence of specific intelligence that suggested that the Boston demonstrators would attempt to engage in similar conduct and cautioned that while the city should be mindful of experiences at past conventions, it should not impose “harsh” burdens on speech as a result of “isolated past events.” Id. at 14. Nevertheless, the court found that the stated security concerns were properly “weighted] in the balance” by the district court and that the significant weight afforded that factor by the district court was not an abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that the security measures, “though extreme, were nonetheless narrowly tailored.” Id. Finally, the court turned to the question of whether adequate alternative channels of communication remained. It noted that the city permitted “informal demonstrations” of less than 20 people to take place near the edges of the security zone and that “[s]everal other public spaces throughout Boston remained available for demonstrations.” Id. The court rejected the plaintiffs arguments that these alternatives were insufficient because they were not “within sight and sound of the delegates.” Id. It noted that the demonstration zone gave them that ability, albeit imperfectly,;and that “there is no constitutional requirement” that demonstrators be granted the opportunity to interact directly with the delegates by, for example, moving among them and distributing literature. Id. The court also noted the availability of reaching the delegates through means other than “first-hand sight,” including “television, radio, the press, the internet, and other outlets.” Id. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that adequate alternative channels of communication remained available. Although it acknowledged that “this is a close and difficult case,” the First Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. Id. At one point during this litigation, Bl(a)ck Tea Society may have seemed to be of critical analytical importance. One focus of the Plaintiffs’ initial papers was the design and composition of the security measures around the Public/Demonstration Zone, presumably in an attempt to determine whether the Secret Service would attempt to recreate the highly-confining zone used in Boston on the more expansive grounds of Denver. However, once it became clear that Denver’s Public/Demonstration Zone would adopt only a handful of Boston’s features (and leave behind some of the most objectionable, including the sight-obstructing “liquid-dispersion fabric” and razor-wire topped fencing), the parties’ focus shifted elsewhere, limiting some of Bl(a)ck Tea Society’s importance. Nevertheless there are lessons to be derived from the case. Like Citizens for Peace In Space, it emphasizes that the generic boogeyman of “security” is insufficient to survive a narrow-tailoring review and that problems encountered in past events can inform security plans but will not, of themselves, justify extensive burdens on expressive opportunities. Finally, it demonstrates that adequate alternative means of communication can include the opportunity to engage in expressive activity in other locations around the area, even when such opportunities are not within “sight and sound of the delegates,” and through the media and other electronic dissemination. 4. Coalition to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul Finally, the Court notes that in the last month, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota addressed some of the same issues presented here as they relate to the 2008 Republican National Convention to be held in St. Paul, Minnesota. In Coalition to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F.Supp.2d 1014 (D.Minn.2008), the court addressed a challenge to restrictions on a parade that the plaintiff wished to conduct during the convention. There, the plaintiff sought to conduct a 30,000-50,000 person parade on the evening of the opening day of the convention. The route requested by the plaintiff would take the march from the State Capitol, encircle the grounds of the Xcel Energy Center where the convention would be taking place, and then return to the Capitol. Id. at 1016-18. The city denied the plaintiffs request for a parade permit as it related to the requested route and time but issued a permit that allowed the march to take place in the early afternoon (before the commencement of convention activities) along a route that would not encircle the Xcel Energy Center but which would pass within 84 feet of one of the Center’s main entrances and within 40-60 feet of “media work spaces.” Id. at 1018. The plaintiff then sued, seeking a preliminary injunction directing the issuance of a permit for its preferred route and time. The court began by noting that “the Supreme Court has emphatically rejected the notion that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.” Id. at 1021, quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). It then proceeded to analyze the established parade route under the same time, place, and manner analysis discussed above. The court first rejected the plaintiffs argument, largely on factual grounds, that the city’s process for granting parade permits was not content-neutral. Id. at 1022-24. The court found that the city’s concerns about security presented a significant governmental interest. It noted that “[t]he concentration of high-ranking government officials and a substantial number of people presents daunting security challenges.” Id. at 1025. In addition to typical concerns regarding the potential of various types of terrorist attacks and assassination attempts, the court also observed that “many groups have endorsed a call to shut down the RNC by blockading the convention site, immobilizing delegates’ transportation, and blocking bridges.” Id. It found that the city “plainly ha[s] a substantial interest in securing the area immediately surrounding the convention site.” Id. The court also found that the city’s denial of the plaintiffs requested route “directly served” the city’s interest in maintaining security. Id. It observed that prohibiting the plaintiffs plan to encircle the Xcel Energy Center “minimizes the potential for a blockade, preserves a secured zone around the convention site that mitigates the threat posed by a variety of weapons, provides a secure space in case an evacuation of the arena is necessary, provides for the delegates’ safe and orderly arrival at and entrance into the arena, and [ ] allows emergency vehicles to access the arena.” Id. The court also addressed the issue of the timing of the approved parade, finding that restricting the parade to the early afternoon ensured that emergency vehicles would have unimpeded access to the nearby interstate highway during times when the convention was scheduled to be in session. Id. at 1027-28. Although it did not engage in any particular analysis of the governmental interest involved, it appeared to find a “substantial government interest in access to and from one of the two interstates in the area for emergency vehicles” and implicitly found that the restriction on the parade’s timing was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 1027-28. Finally, the court turned to the question of whether ample alternative means of communication existed. The court took particular notice of Bl(a)ck Tea Society’s observation that access to the delegates through television, radio, etc., enhanced the available alternative means of communication and that the parade would pass within a few feet of space set aside for the media. Id. at 1028-29. At the hearing, the city also described plans to create a “public viewing area” within sight and sound of the convention site, a site that the court compared favorably to “demonstration zones” created for other political conventions. Id. at 1029-30. Finally, the court found that the plaintiff was not limited to exercising. its First Amendment rights at the Xcel Energy Center but had access to “public spaces throughout the Twin Cities to communicate its message.” Id. at 1030-31. The court separately considered whether the parade’s timing offered adequate alternative means of communication and found that because the parade would last several hours, starting it a few hours earlier than the plaintiff had wanted nevertheless afforded ample alternatives for communication. Id. The court inferred from the plaintiffs argument that its real reason for wanting a later start time was to ensure that paraders would have the ability to confront delegates arriving for the evening’s activities. Noting that the plaintiff “has no constitutional right to physical access to the delegates,” citing Citizens for Peace In Space, 477 F.3d at 1225, and Bl(a)ck Tea Society, 378 F.3d at 14, it nevertheless noted that delegates already present on the convention grounds would be able to view the earlier parade and that media coverage of the parade was likely to be substantial in any event. Id. at 1030-32. “[T]he precise time of the march,” the court found, “will not materially affect the [plaintiffs] ability to communicat