Full opinion text
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT URSULA UNGARO, District Judge. THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment As to Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses Regarding the Motor Carrier Exemption, Statute of Limitations and Liquidated Damages, filed April 17, 2008. (D.E.68.) Defendant filed its Response on May 5, 2008, (D.E.104), to which Plaintiffs replied on May 15, 2008. (D.E.125.) Also before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 18, 2008. (D.E.73.) Plaintiffs filed their Response on May 2, 2008, (D.E.100), to which Defendant replied on May 12, 2008. (D.E.121.) The matters are ripe for disposition. THE COURT has considered the motions and the pertinent portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. BACKGROUND AND FACTS Defendant is a motor carrier that provides for-hire ground transportation of passengers. (Def.’s Statement of Material Facts (Def.’s SMF) ¶ 1; Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of their Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (Pls.’ SMF) ¶ 1.) Defendant has been in operation since September 2003. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs are or were bus drivers for Defendant. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 2; Pis.’ SMF ¶2.) Defendant pays its drivers using a variety of different methods but does not pay any of them at overtime wage rates. (Pls.’ SMF ¶1.) Defendant holds itself out as an “interstate” motor carrier, advertises interstate services, is licensed with the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), and holds all of the authorizations required of interstate motor carriers of passengers issued by the agency within the USDOT that regulates such carriers, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). (Def.’s SMF ¶¶3 & 5; Pls.’ SMF ¶ 1.) Defendant holds operating authority from the FMCSA in the form of an interstate motor common carrier certifí-cate, which gives Defendant authority “to engage in transportation as a common carrier of passengers in charter and special operations, by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce.” (Def.’s SMF ¶ 4.) Defendant has been issued a USDOT number by the FMCSA evidencing its right to engage in interstate commerce subject to the FMCSA’s safety regulations. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 3.) Defendant requires that its drivers become qualified to drive all types of vehicles used by it for passenger transportation and Defendant maintains a “driver qualification file” for each driver as required by 49 C.F.R. § 391.51(a). (Def.’s SMF ¶ 6.) Defendant is required to comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), including the hours of service regulations governing drivers of vehicles used in interstate commerce at 49 C.F.R. Part 395, and to maintain required USDOT records evidencing such compliance. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 3.) Logs and other records are maintained in accordance with the requirements of those rules. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 6.) Defendant’s drivers are subject to random drug alcohol testing required by the FMCSR. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 6.) Defendant provides transportation service between Florida and other states, as well as single-state carriage of persons, including to and from the local seaports and airports, and to and from the seaports to local hotels. (Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 5 & 10; Pis.’ SMF ¶21 n. 2.) Defendant does not keep records of the number of trips that it makes during a given time frame, ie., on a daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly basis. (Brittenum Dep. 67 & 116, Dec. 20, 2007; Brittenum Dep. 41, Jan. 14, 2008.) Defendant has provided an estimate that on a given day it may have 100 buses on the road, and that annually it makes approximately 10,000 trips, including to and from airports and seaports, university shuttle routes, and charters. (Brittenum Dep. 67, Dec. 20, 2007; Brittenum Dep. 41, Jan. 14, 2008.) From August 2004 through December 2007, Defendant made 148 trips across the State line, many of which lasted several weeks and some of which lasted between thirty-five and ninety days. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 7.) These trips across the State line produced over $1.7 million, or 4% of Defendant’s total revenues for the period from August 2004 through December 2007. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 7; Pis.’ SMF ¶ 12.) Seventy-four different drivers out of the 393 drivers employed by Defendant during the period from August 2004 through December 2007 (approximately 18%) made trips across the State line. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 7; Pis.’ SMF ¶ 13.) Of those drivers eight have driven across the State line between five and fifteen times, and the remainder average one or two trips each across the State line. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 13.) According to Defendant, of the sixty-three Plaintiffs in this action, eleven (approximately 17%) have driven across the State line while employed by Defendant, and have spent a total of 286 days on such trips across the State line. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 8; Kelly Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. B.) Plaintiffs have provided evidence that at least two of the eleven Plaintiffs counted by Defendant never traveled out of the State while employed by Defendant, so the calculation would be adjusted, such that, of the sixty-three Plaintiffs in this action, nine (approximately 14%) have driven across the State line while employed by Defendant, and have spent fewer than 286 days on such trips across the State line. (Pis.’ SMF II ¶¶ 6-7; Kelly Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. B; Burns Aff. ¶¶ 2-3; Smith Aff. ¶¶2-3.) Of the twenty-three Plaintiffs who were employed by Defendant for one year or more during the period from August 2004 through December 2007, six Plaintiffs (26%) drove across the State line while employed .by Defendant. (Kelly Decl. ¶ 9 & Exs. B & C; Burns Aff. ¶¶ 2-3.) Of the Plaintiffs who have driven across the State line while employed by Defendant, there is evidence that four of these Plaintiffs drove empty buses across the State line and did not transport passengers on these trips (Zellner Aff. ¶ 3; Chambers Aff. ¶ 3; Pedrozo Aff. ¶ 3; Sheffield Aff. ¶ 3); two of these Plaintiffs either drove an empty bus across the State line or flew out-of-state, and then remained at their out-of-state destination to drive passengers within that State (Jefferson Aff. ¶ 3; Saunders Aff. ¶ 3); and one of these Plaintiff drivers took two trips across the State line while employed by Defendant, transporting passengers across the State line on one of those trips, and driving an empty bus across the State line on the other trip, remaining there for a few days to drive passengers within that State (Price Aff. ¶ 3). Defendant was audited by the USDOT, FMSCA on October 18, 2004. (2d Supplemental Brittenum Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A.) Defendant also was audited in May 2007 by the FMSCA and the Florida Department of Transportation (FLDOT) to determine compliance with the FMSCR and State regulations. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 3.) Defendant was cited by the FLDOT for violations of both federal and State regulations, including ninety-five violations regarding drivers’ hours of service. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 39.) The violations were found in only a sampling of Defendant’s drivers’ logbooks. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 39.) During the course of the audit, Sergeant Michael Roberts of the FLDOT determined, based on information provided by Defendant including thousands of randomly sampled driver logbooks, that the majority of Defendant’s trips were within the State, and that Defendant conducted a limited number of trips across the State line. (Pis.’ SMF ¶¶ 40-42.) During the course of the May 2007 audit, Roberts learned that sixty-seven of Defendant’s then-employed drivers did not make any trips across the State line while employed by Defendant, and out of thousands of logbook entries, there were a total of nine trips across the State fine during the six-month period preceding the May 2007 audit. (Pis.’SMF ¶ 44.) On September 1, 2006, Defendant entered into a written contract (the “Transportation Services Agreement”) with Royal Carribean Cruise Lines (RCCL) to provide ground transportation services to RCCL cruise line passengers. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 17; Pis.’ SMF ¶ 19.) According to Defendant, it began providing ground transportation services to RCCL cruise line passengers in April 2006, approximately five months pri- or to the September 1, 2006 effective date of the written contract. (Brittenum Decl. ¶ 18(a); Brittenum Supplemental Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. A.) During the period from April 2006 to December 2007, Defendant has transported more than 500,000 RCCL cruise passengers, yielding revenues in excess of $4.4 million. (Brittenum Decl. ¶ 18(a).) However, according to Plaintiffs, RCCL did not use Defendant for ground transportation services until the Transportation Services Agreement became effective on September 1, 2006. (Trescastro Dep. 7:3-13; 45:1-4, Mar. 6, 2008.) Defendant is the sole provider of airport-to-seaport and seaport-to-airport ground transportation services for RCCL’s passengers during the day; another company provides RCCL’s ground transportation services at night. (Brittenum Dep. 191:23-192:11, Jan. 14,2008; Trescastro Dep. 6:10-23.) Under the Transportation Services Agreement between Defendant and RCCL, Defendant provides airport-to-seaport and seaport-to-airport ground transportation for RCCL cruise line passengers to and from Miami and Fort Lauderdale airports to and from the Port of Miami and Port Everglades in Fort Lauderdale. (Pls.’ SMF ¶ 21.) The distance between these airports and seaports does not exceed a twenty-five mile radius “as the crow flies,” although the distance by road between these airports and seaports is longer than twenty-five miles. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 21; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ SMF ¶ 21.) Defendant also provides ground transportation for RCCL cruise line passengers to and from the seaports to local hotels. (Pls.’ SMF ¶ 21 n. 22.) Under the Transportation Services Agreement between Defendant and RCCL, Defendant provides RCCL cruise line passengers ground transportation booked through travel agents or through packages sold by RCCL, which include airfare and ground transportation. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 22.) RCCL also sells hotel packages, which include ground transportation. (Trescastro Dep. 11:17-20.) Approximately 85% of RCCL’s bookings are sold through travel agents, and the remaining 15% are sold directly through RCCL. (Pis.’ SMF ¶22.) If an RCCL cruise line passenger has not pre-booked ground transportation from seaport to airport, passengers can purchase shuttle service vouchers before disembarking. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 23.) Likewise, if an RCCL cruise line passenger has not pre-booked ground transportation from airport to seaport, passengers can, upon arrival at the airport, request shuttle service from an RCCL representative, and the ground transportation will be charged to the passenger’s RCCL customer account. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 23.) RCCL sends its cruise line passengers a booklet of “guest vacation documents” describing the cruise itinerary and providing a checklist, information on what to expect on the cruise, the availability of shore excursions, and other information, along with “vouchers” for hotel stays and ground transportation that the passenger has purchased. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 24.) Under the Transportation Services Agreement, RCCL provides Defendant with weekly shuttle manifests indicating the date and time of the requested shuttle services, the number of passengers to be shuttled, and the flight and vessel information. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 26.) The manifests are provided to Defendant one week in advance of the requested transport. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 26.) When RCCL cruise line passengers arrive at the airport, they are greeted by RCCL representatives, who have a manifest indicating the names of the RCCL cruise line passengers to be transported by Defendant’s drivers. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 27.) Once the RCCL representative has gathered all of the arriving RCCL cruise line passengers upon their arrival at the airport, the RCCL representative contacts Defendant and requests a bus, providing Defendant with the number of RCCL cruise line passengers and the terminal pick-ups. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 28.) Defendant and its drivers are not provided with the RCCL cruise line passenger manifests or with the identity of the passengers it transports. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 26.) At the airport, RCCL representatives collect ground transportation vouchers from the cruise line passengers and discard the vouchers. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 29.) Defendant does not receive the ground transportation vouchers; instead, RCCL provides Defendant with a “load slip” with a passenger head count. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 29.) Based on the load slip head count, Defendant invoices RCCL at a specific rate for each RCCL cruise line passenger it transports to and from the airport to and from the seaport (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 30.) Under their Transportation Services Agreement, RCCL may pay Defendant at either a per-passenger or a per-bus rate. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 30.) The price RCCL charges its guests for ground transportation is unrelated to the price RCCL pays Defendant for its services. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 31.) There is no price indicated on the RCCL cruise line passengers’ ground transportation vouchers; RCCL cruise line passengers are charged a bundled rate, with no line item prices as to the cruise, air transportation, and ground transportation. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 31.) RCCL cruise line passengers’ ground transportation vouchers are nonrefundable if not used, but passengers may receive an on-board credit for shore excursions. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 32.) If an RCCL cruise line passenger who has booked and paid for a cruise, air transportation and ground transportation cannot make his or her sailing date, Defendant does not receive any of the revenue RCCL collects from such a passenger; rather under their agreement, Defendant only receives payment from RCCL when Defendant actually transports a passenger, despite the fact that the passenger has paid for ground transportation as part of his or her cruise package. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 32.) In February 2008, Defendant and RCCL amended their Transportation Services Agreement, providing that RCCL would guarantee Defendant a minimum number of passengers it would be transporting, and would pay Defendant at a rate of one-half of the per-passenger price for the number of passengers short of the guaranteed minimum. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 33.) Under their Transportation Services Agreement, RCCL retained the right to terminate the agreement with one month’s notice to Defendant if, in its “sole and absolute opinion” RCCL found Defendant’s ground transportation services unsatisfactory. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 35.) Where an RCCL cruise line passenger books a cruise, air and ground transportation far in advance, there is no assurance that the passenger’s transportation will be provided by Defendant, as there is no guarantee that the agreement between RCCL and Defendant will be in force at that time. (Pis.’ SMF ¶ 35.) During 2003, 2004, and 2006, Defendant also had arrangements with Costa Cruises and Princess Cruises to provide ground transportation services to Costa Cruises and Princess Cruises passengers who purchased such services. (Brittenum Decl. ¶¶ 18(b)-(c) & Exs. F-G.) No written agreement was entered between Defendant and Costa Cruises or between Defendant and Princess Cruises. (Brittenum Decl. ¶¶ 18(b)-(e).) According to Defendant, its revenues from the arrangement with Costa Cruises exceeded $500,000, and its revenues from the arrangement with Princess Cruises exceeded $200,000. (Brittenum Deck ¶¶ 18(b)-(c).) During 2006 and continuing through the present, Defendant also has had arrangements with several independent ground agents to provide ground transportation services to Costa Cruises passengers, Prince Cruise VIP groups, Cunard Cruises passengers, and Crystal Cruises passengers who purchase ground transportation services. (Brittenum Deck ¶¶ 18(d)-(f) & Exs. H-J.) Defendant did not enter into written agreements with any of these independent ground agents. (Brittenum Deck ¶¶ 18(d)-(f).) In addition, Defendant has arrangements with tour operators, travel agents, and other entities that charter buses, pursuant to which Defendant’s drivers transport passengers to and from the local airports to and from local hotels or other destinations. (Kelly Deck ¶ 12 & Ex. A.) There is no evidence in the record indicating that Defendant entered into a written agreement with any of these tour operators, travel agents, or other entities. Generally, Defendant’s drivers are assigned to jobs on a rotating basis, and Defendant calls on its drivers to do all different types of work. (Brittenum Dep. 63:1-4, Jan. 14, 2008.) However, Defendant also maintains a seniority list for all its drivers, and drivers with seniority usually get first pick as to the types of jobs they will be assigned. Where a driver with seniority prefers to stay local, he can choose to work a local route. (Pis.’ SMF ¶¶ 15-16; Riley Dep. 19:7-10:7.) In an October 24, 2006 memorandum to all Defendant’s drivers from Bret Brittenum, Defendant’s Vice President and General Manager, Defendant explained its seniority policy as follows: “Seniority will be used for granting time-off, vacations, positioning of coaches at debark, some work and vehicle assignments, route assignments on fixed routes, and for other to be determined uses. Work is assigned on a rotation basis so that everyone has a chance to work.” (Pis.’ SMF, Ex. 15.) Defendant’s “Hiring Standards” form effective October 7, 2003, states that drivers must “Be Able To Work Various Jobs, Hours And Shifts (Local & Out of Town).” (Pis.’ SMF, Ex. 16.) Defendant’s “Hiring Standards” form effective October 7, 2003, was revised sometime in 2006 and states that drivers must “Be able to work various jobs, hours, shifts (local & out of town) and be willing and able to drive interstate routes.” (Brittenum Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. C.) Each driver must sign Defendant’s Hiring Standards form before they can perform any driving jobs for Defendant. (Britte-num Decl. ¶ 11.) If a driver refuses to perform an assignment without good cause, the refusal is grounds for automatic termination. (Brittenum Decl. ¶ 20; Arditi Decl. ¶ 4; Brittenum Dep. 63:13-16, Jan. 14, 2008; Arditi Dep. 76.) The affirmations of twenty-three of the Plaintiff drivers in this action demonstrate that it was common knowledge among the drivers that they would be fired for refusing a job assignment. (Pl.’s SMF in Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 12.) Defendant has approximately thirty-five to forty drivers who currently drive routes for shuttle services Defendant provides for the University of Miami. (Brittenum Dep. 10:6-11:13, Jan. 14, 2008.) It is not unusual for drivers driving the University shuttle routes to work more than sixty hours per week. (Brittenum Dep. 57-58, Jan. 14, 2008.) According to Defendant, it does not have drivers that exclusively drive University shuttle routes. (Brittenum Dep. 10:4-17, Jan. 14, 2008.) Rather, the bus drivers that drive shuttle routes for the University of Miami, Florida International University, and Barry University are considered a part of Defendant’s “regular drivers pool.” (Rivera Dep. 47:1-18.) However, according to Plaintiffs, based on the deposition testimony of Defendant’s Assistant Director of Operations, Priscilla Rivera, Defendants have drivers that “mainly work” the University shuttle routes (the “University shuttle bus drivers”). (Rivera Dep. 34-35; 47-49; 54-55.) The University shuttle bus drivers may be asked to do general charter work, including trips across the State line or airport-to-seaport runs, but these drivers are not required to do such work. (Rivera Dep. 34-35; 47-49; 54-55; Harper Aff. ¶¶ 3-4.) For example, according to Dwayne Harper, the supervisor of Defendant’s University of Miami shuttle bus drivers, typically towards the end of each week Harper receives a phone call “from someone from [Defendant’s] main terminal, asking that [he] try to find a certain few [University of Miami] drivers who would be willing to drive on the upcoming weekend.” (Harper Aff. ¶ 3.) Harper “then ask[s] around to see if anyone would like to work the weekend job(s) to earn some extra money.” (Harper Aff. ¶ 3.) According to Harper, he “offer[s] these jobs to [his] drivers, [but he] do[es] not force them to work the weekend jobs and they are free to turn them down.” (Harper Aff. ¶ 4.) The majority of Plaintiffs in this action have, during the course of their employment by Defendant, driven passengers to and from local airports to and from local seaports, and to and from the seaports to and from local hotels. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 11.) Of the sixty-three Plaintiffs in mis case, forty-eight, (76%), have driven some type of airport or airport-seaport transfer during the period from August 2004 through December 2007. (Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 11 & 16.) Those Plaintiffs have received a total of more than 1,000 such assignments, each of which represents multiple trips to and from the airports and seaports. (Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 11 & 16.) The majority of the Plaintiffs who have not actually driven passengers to and from seaports and airports were employed by Defendant for a short period of time. (Def.’s SMF ¶ 11.) LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is authorized only when the moving party meets its burden of demonstrating that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. When determining whether the moving party has met this burden, the court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (11th Cir.2002). The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; after the moving party has met its burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997); Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989). If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Envntl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir.1981). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts then the court should deny summary judgment. Impossible Elec. Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir.1982); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“[T]he dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine/... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ”). Moreover, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not respond to it with evidence unless and until the movant has properly supported the motion with sufficient evidence. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598. The moving party must demonstrate that the facts underlying all the relevant legal questions raised by the pleadings or otherwise are not in dispute, or else summary judgment will be denied notwithstanding that the non-moving party has introduced no evidence whatsoever. Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir.1967). The Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. MOTOR CARRIER EXEMPTION Under the FLSA, an employer must compensate employees for hours worked in excess of forty per week “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are exempt under the motor carrier exemption, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), and therefore not entitled to overtime compensation. “The question of how [Plaintiffs spent their time working for Defendants] is a question of fact. The question whether their particular activities excluded them from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question of law.” Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, 89 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986); see also Morrison v. Quality Transp. Servs., Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1308 (S.D.Fla.2007) (citing Icicle Seafoods, 475 U.S. at 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527). The employer has the burden of proving the applicability of the FLSA exemption. Klinedinst v. Swift Inv., Inc., 260 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir.2001); see also Morrison, 474 F.Supp.2d at 1308 (citing Klinedinst, 260 F.3d at 1254). Exemptions to the FLSA “are to be narrowly construed against the employer who asserts them.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir.1995); Nicholson v. World Bus. Network, Inc., 105 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.1997) (recognizing that the FLSA’s exemptions must be narrowly construed, “giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory language and the interest of Congress,” and also recognizing that “ ‘[t]o extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people’ ” (quoting A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945))). Under § 213(b)(1) of the FLSA, the provisions of § 207 “shall not apply with respect to [ ] any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). Section 31502(a)(1) limits the application of § 31502 to transportation “described in section[ ] 13501” of Title 49. 49 U.S.C. § 31502(a)(1). As relevant to this action, § 13501 of Title 49 gives the Secretary of Transportation jurisdiction over transportation by motor carriers to the extent that passengers, property, or both are transported by motor carrier between a place in a State and a place in another State; a State and another place in the same State through another State; or the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States. 49 U.S.C. § 13501. The applicable regulations explain that the “exemption of an employee from the hours provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ... depends both on the class to which his employer belongs and on the class of work involved in the employee’s job.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2. More specifically, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to establish maximum hours and qualifications of service for employees, and thereby trigger application of the motor carrier exemption, if two requirements are met: (1) an employee plaintiff must “be employed by carriers whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction” under the Motor Carrier Act; and (2) an employee plaintiff must “engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2. As the court in Morrison observed, “[t]he Department of Labor’s jurisdiction under the FLSA and the Department of Transportation’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act are mutually exclusive and there is no overlapping jurisdiction.” Morrison, 474 F.Supp.2d at 1309 n. 2 (citing Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 437-38, 68 S.Ct. 131, 92 L.Ed. 44 (1947)). “In order to avoid any conflicts between these Acts, Congress decided that the Secretary of Transportation need not actually exercise his or her power to regulate under the Motor Carrier Act and that the FLSA’s § 213(b)(1) exemption applies so long as the Secretary has the authority to regulate over a particular category of employees.” Id. (citing Spires v. Ben Hill County, 980 F.2d 683, 686 (11th Cir.1993)). A. Whether Defendant Is A Carrier Whose Transportation of Passengers is Subject to the Secreta'ry’s Jurisdiction Under the Motor Carrier Act First, the Court must determine whether, as a matter of law, Defendant is a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act, or whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude such a determination by the Court at this stage in the litigation. In Baez v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant, which held a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), was a “contract carrier,” and as such, subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act. 938 F.2d 180, 182 (11th Cir.1991) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1060, 112 S.Ct. 941, 117 L.Ed.2d 111 (1992). In making this finding, the Baez court stated: “In fact, the permit issued by the ICC indicates that jurisdiction has already been exercised.” Id. (citing Brennan v. Schwerman Trucking Co. of Virginia, Inc., 540 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1976)). Therefore, the Baez court concluded, “it [was] clear that [the defendant] [was] a motor carrier subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Morrison v. Quality Transports Services, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1309 (S.D.Fla.2007) (finding that the defendant demonstrated that it was a motor carrier whose transportation of property or passengers was subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act based on evidence that (1) the defendant held a USDOT license; (2) the defendant operated vehicles whose weight or passenger capacity fell within the authority of the FMSCA; and (3) the defendant was subject to regulation by the FMSCA including regular inspections by the USDOT). Relying on Baez and Morrison, Defendant argues that, based on the following undisputed evidence in the record, it has met its burden of establishing that it is a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act: (1) Defendant is licensed by the USDOT, and holds all of the authorizations required of interstate motor carriers of passengers issued by the FMCSA; (2) Defendant has been issued a USDOT number by the FMSCA evidencing its right to engage in interstate commerce subject to the FMSCA’s safety regulations; (3) Defendant makes extensive efforts to comply with federal requirements for interstate drivers; (4) Defendant’s drivers are required to become qualified to drive all types of vehicles used by Defendant for passenger transportation and Defendant maintains a “driver qualification file” for each driver as required by 49 C.F.R. § 391.51(a); (5) Defendant is required to comply with the FMCSR, including hours of service regulations governing drivers of vehicles used in interstate commerce at 49 C.F.R. Part 395 and to maintain required USDOT records evidencing such compliance; (6) Defendant’s drivers are subject to random drug alcohol testing required by the FMSCR; and (7) Defendant has been audited by the US-DOT. Applying Baez and Morrison, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence in the record is sufficient to establish that Defendant is a motor carrier whose transportation of property or passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act. The Court also notes that Defendant undisputably holds itself out as an interstate motor carrier and advertises interstate services. See Chao v. First Class Coach Co., 214 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1271 (M.D.Fla.2001) (“Merely holding itself out as an interstate commerce carrier, which [the defendant] unquestionably did, may have been enough to determine its status as an interstate motor carrier.”) (citing Brennan, 540 F.2d at 1204); see also Rossi v. Associated Limousine Servs., Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1361 (S.D.Fla.2006) (“[D]ecisions under the FLSA hold that the Secretary of Transportation has the power to set maximum hours for drivers if the company engages in more than de minimi interstate commerce which includes a company that holds itself out as a interstate company and solicits that business even though its prospect of obtaining such business is poor and some of its drivers never drive in interstate commerce.” (citing Reich v. Am. Driver Serv., Inc., 33 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.1994); Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 68 S.Ct. 131, 92 L.Ed. 44 (1947))). In reaching its determination that Defendant has met its burden of establishing that it is a motor carrier whose transportation of property or passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act, the Court has considered Plaintiffs’ arguments that despite the foregoing evidence in the record, Defendant has not met — or cannot meet — its burden because, according to Plaintiffs, the “true test” to determine whether Defendant is within the Secretary’s jurisdiction for purposes of the motor carrier exemption is whether Defendant engages in more than de minimus interstate operations, and, based on the percentage of trips Defendant made across the State line out of the total number of trips it made during the period from August 2004 through December 2007, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant cannot show that it engages in more than de minimus interstate operations. However, for the following reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ arguments unavailing. Plaintiffs rely on Mason v. Quality Transport Services, Inc., No. 04-61009-CIV-ALTONAGA/Turnoff, 2005 WL 5395338, at *1 (S.D.Fla. Aug.29, 2005). However Mason actually supports a finding that Defendant is a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act. In Mason, (1) the defendant was a corporation that provided bus service locally and nationwide, including long and short distance charter service, shuttle service, and transfer service; (2) interstate service was a significant component of the defendant’s gross sales; and (3) the defendant had a certificate from the ICC authorizing it to operate in interstate and foreign commerce as a motor vehicle common motor carrier. Id. at *1. The Mason court observed that the “Secretary’s power to set maximum hours for drivers is contingent upon the company engaging in more than de minimus interstate commerce,” but that “[e]ven then, the Secretary does not have automatic jurisdiction over all drivers of an interstate carrier,” and that jurisdiction “extends only to drivers who reasonably could be expected to make one of the carrier’s interstate runs, and that means more than a remote possibility.” Id. at *2. The Mason court denied summary judgment, finding that the evidence in the record “plainly introduced genuine issues of material fact concerning [the second prong of the test for determining the applicability of the motor carrier exemption,] whether [the plaintiff] could reasonably be expected to drive one of [the defendant’s] interstate routes.” Id. at *3. Applying Mason, the Court can easily conclude that Defendant has met its burden of establishing that it is a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act based on the following undisputed evidence in the record: (1) Defendant is a corporation that provides bus service locally and nationwide, including long and short distance charter service, shuttle service, and transfer service; (2) Defendant is licensed by the USDOT, and holds all of the authorizations required of interstate motor carriers of passengers issued by the FMCSA; and (3) Defendant’s trips across the State line during the period from August 2004 through December 2007 were a significant component of Defendant’s business in that they produced over $1.7 million, or 4% of Defendant’s total revenues for that time period. Plaintiffs also rely on Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 68 S.Ct. 131, 92 L.Ed. 44 (1947), in which the Court considered the percentage of “total trips” in determining that the defendant was a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act, and on Garcia v. Fleetwood Limousine, 511 F.Supp.2d 1233 (M.D.Fla.2007), in which the court considered “the employer’s overall business, including the number of interstate trips made and the percentage of revenue from interstate trips,” and “whether the carrier holds itself out to the public as providing interstate transportation through advertising, marketing, or otherwise” as “relevant factors” in the determination of whether the defendant is a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act. See also Lieberman v. Corporate Connection Lines, Inc., No. 03-CIV-22814, 2005 WL 5501491, at *1-2 (S.D.Fla. Apr.21, 2005) (“A carrier’s involvement in interstate commerce must be established by some concrete evidence such as an actual trip in interstate commerce or proof that interstate business was solicited.... Furthermore, the [defendant's involvement in interstate commerce must be real and actual, not merely hypothetical or conjectural. If the employer or employee’s involvement In [sic] interstate commerce could be characterized as de minimus, they may not be subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction at all, and thus are not covered by the Motor Carrier Act.”); Rossi, 438 F.Supp.2d at 1361-62 (finding that the defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing that it was engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the motor carrier exemption where the defendant did not present any evidence showing an actual trip in interstate commerce or proof that interstate business was solicited). None of the decisions upon which Plaintiffs rely militate against a finding by the Court that Defendant has met its burden of establishing that it is a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act based on the undisputed evidence in the record. B. Whether Plaintiffs Engaged, in Activities, of a Character Directly Affecting the Safety of Operation of Motor Vehicles in Interstate or Foreign Commerce Within the Meaning of the Motor Carrier Act Having determined that Defendant is a carrier whose transportation of passengers is subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act, the Court must next determine whether as a matter of law Plaintiffs engage in or have engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act, or whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude such a determination by the Court at this stage in the litigation. It is not disputed that Plaintiffs engaged in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles; thus, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs were engaged in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. Defendant argues that it has met its burden of establishing that Plaintiffs engaged in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that all of its drivers could reasonably be expected to drive routes within the State that may be considered movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act because they are part of a “practical continuity of movement” across State lines from the point of origin to the point of destination; and (2) by presenting evidence that it regularly makes trips across the State line and that each of its drivers could reasonably be expected to make such trips. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that — with the exception of its University shuttle bus drivers — -Defendant has met its burden of establishing that all of its drivers could reasonably be expected to drive routes within the State that are movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. It is therefore unnecessary for the Court to make a determination as to whether all of Defendant’s drivers could reasonably be expected to make trips across the State line. As to Defendant’s University shuttle bus drivers, there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether these drivers could reasonably be expected to make trips out of State or to drive routes within the State that are movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are exempt under the motor carrier exemption because (1) Defendant’s transportation of passengers to and from the local airports to and from the local seaports pursuant to contractual arrangements with one or more cruise lines and independent ground agents is movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act because it is part of a “practical continuity of movement” across State lines from the point of origin to the point of destination; and (2) all of Defendant’s drivers could reasonably be expected to drive passengers on airport-to-seaport and seaport-to-airport runs pursuant to these arrangements during the relevant time period. 1. Defendant’s Seaportr-to-Airport and Aitporh-to-Seaport Routes Are Movement in Interstate Commerce Within the Meaning of the Motor Cartier Act Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s transportation of passengers to and from the local airports to and from the local seaports pursuant to contractual arrangements with one or more cruise lines and independent ground agents is not movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act. The applicable regulations explain that “[w]hat constitutes ... transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, sufficient to bring ... an employee within the regulatory power of the Secretary of Transportation ..., is determined by definitions contained in the Motor Carrier Act itself,” but that “[t]hese definitions are ... not identical with the definitions in the Fair Labor Standards Act which determine whether an employee is within the general coverage of the wage and hours provisions as an employee ‘engaged in (interstate or foreign) commerce’ ” 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(a). Thus, while “transportation within a single State is in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act where it forms a part of a ‘practical continuity of movement’ across State lines from the point of origin to the point of destination .... such transportation may or may not be considered also a movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) (citing Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943)). The regulations explain that although “[d]ecisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission prior to 1966 seemingly have limited the scope of the Motor Carrier Act more narrowly than the courts have construed the Fair Labor Standards Act It is deemed necessary, [ ]as an enforcement policy only ... to assume that such a movement in interstate commerce under the Fair Labor Standards Act is also a movement in interstate commerce under the Motor Carrier Act, except in those situations where the Commission has held or the Secretary of Transportation or the courts hold otherwise.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1). “[WJhere ... it has been authoritatively held that transportation of a particular character within a single State is not in interstate commerce as defined in the Motor Carrier Act ..., there is no basis for an exemption under section 13(b)(1), even though the facts may establish a ‘practical continuity of movement’ from out-of-State sources.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1). Based on a prior decision of this Court, Cartun v. Carey International, Inc., No. 0421074-CIV-UNGARO-BENAGES, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30346 (S.D.Fla. Dec. 9, 2004), Plaintiff argues that Defendant cannot bring its drivers under the motor carrier exemption because it cannot demonstrate that it has a valid through ticketing or common arrangement with an air carrier. However, in Cartun, this Court found that the defendant, an intrastate limousine service providing transportation between the local airport and seaport had failed to establish that it was within the Secretary’s jurisdiction (and outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor) where it had failed to produce evidence of a through ticketing or common arrangement with an air carrier. Likewise, in In re Kimball, 131 M.C.C. 908 (1980), on which Plaintiff also relies, the issue was the Secretary’s jurisdiction over the petitioner’s entirely local bus service. In contrast, in this case Defendant has clearly demonstrated that it is engaged in interstate commerce and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the USDOT. Thus, in this case the relevant question is different from that presented in Cartun and Kimball; it is not whether Defendant is subject to the USDOT’s jurisdiction, but whether Plaintiffs are engaged in interstate commerce and, as a result, within the motor carrier exemption. In contrast to the scenario before the Court in Cartun, there does not appear to be an ICC or STB decision in which it has been authoritatively held that where a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the USDOT provides ground transportation between local airports and seaports for passengers, immediately prior to and subsequent to the passengers’ interstate flights and international cruise voyages, such movement is not within interstate commerce as defined in the Motor Carrier Act. Therefore, if such movement is in interstate commerce under the FLSA, the Court must assume that such movement is also in interstate commerce under the Motor Carrier Act. 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) (“Under this enforcement policy it will ordinarily be assumed by the Administrator that the interstate commerce requirements of the section 13(b)(1) exemption are satisfied where it appears that a motor carrier employee is engaged as a driver ... in transportation by motor vehicle which, although confined to a single State, is a part of an interstate movement of the goods or persons being thus transported so as to constitute interstate commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This policy does not extend to drivers ... whose transportation activities are ‘in commerce’... within the meaning of the act but are not a part of an interstate movement of the goods or persons carried”) (citing Wirtz v. Crystal Lake Crushed Stone Co., 327 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.1964)). 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1). In determining whether an employee is engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, the courts have been “guided by practical considerations.” Marshall v. Victoria Transp. Co., 603 F.2d 1122, 1123 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 63 S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656, (1943) (quoting Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460 (1943))). In making this determination, the courts looks to see if an employee’s work “is actually in commerce or is so closely related to the movement of commerce that it is for practical purposes a part of it rather than an isolated local activity.” Id. (citing Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 75 S.Ct. 860, 99 L.Ed. 1196 (1955)). In Marshall, the Fifth Circuit considered the issue of whether two city bus operators’ employee drivers were transporting passengers “in commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA where the drivers were engaged in the transportation of persons traveling between Texas and Mexico. Id. The Marshall court observed that reliance on United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010 (1947) was problematic because Yellow Cab “is an anti-trust suit in which the broader [FLSA] coverage precedents are not applicable,” and because the taxi service at issue in Yellow Cab was found to be “only casual and incidental” to its passengers’ travel to and from a railroad terminal, whereas in Marshall, “every bus route ... carrie[d] a substantial percentage of international travelers every day.” Id. at 1124. Instead, the Fifth Circuit found that the “correct rule” in the situation presented in Marshall derived from United States v. Capital Transit Co., 338 U.S. 286, 70 S.Ct. 115, 94 L.Ed. 93 (1949), in which the Court held that a transit company’s provision of transportation wholly within the District of Columbia for passengers bound to and from nearby Virginia establishments was part of a continuous stream of interstate transportation. Marshall, 603 F.2d at 1125 (quoting Capital Transit Co., 338 U.S. at 290, 70 S.Ct. 115 (explaining that Yellow Cab did not conflict with its holding)). In Marshall, the defendant bus operators “maintained downtown terminals a short distance from the International Bridge that crosses the Rio Grande,” and operated regular' fare paying routes within the city of Brownsville, Texas. Id. at 1124. In addition, “[u]nder contractual arrangements with merchants and shopping center operators, each defendant also operate[d] a route providing free bus service to the vicinity of [a nearby] shopping center.” Id. All the intrastate routes were within walking distance of the bridge connecting Texas to Mexico, and between fourteen and eighteen “percent of all fare paying passengers on [the defendants’] buses either originate[d] or terminate[d] their journeys in Mexico.” Based on this evidence, the Marshall court found that “although [the] defendants’ employees [did] not cross into Mexico, a substantial, regular and recurring part of their work consisted] of transporting persons that [were] making international journeys.” Id. “Because their work was entwined with a continuous stream of international travel, they were engaged in commerce within the meaning of the [FLSA].” Id. at 1125. Applying the Capital Transit rule followed by the Fifth Circuit in Marshall, the evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that the transportation of passengers on the airport-to-seaport and seaport-to-airport routes by Defendant’s employee drivers is in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. As to Defendant’s agreement with RCCL, Defendant has provided the Court with a copy of the Transportation Services Agreement entered into by Defendant and RCCL, pursuant to which Defendant provides ground transportation services between the South Florida seaports and airports to RCCL’s cruise passengers who purchase such services through travel agents or directly through RCCL. Under the Transportation Services Agreement between Defendant and RCCL, Defendant provides motor transportation of passengers between seaports and airports either immediately prior or immediately subsequent to the passengers’ international cruise voyages from or to the seaport, and immediately prior or immediately subsequent to the passengers’ air travel. As to Defendant’s arrangements with Costa Cruises and Princess Cruises, and with independent ground agents, tour operators, travel agents, and other entities that charter buses, no written agreements have been supplied as evidence. However, Defendant has provided the undisputed testimony of Vice President and General Manager Brett Brittenum that Defendant’s drivers regularly have transported and continue to transport passengers between South Florida airports and seaports under various oral “contracts or other arrangements that [Defendant] has with numerous cruise lines or their ground agents,” and that pursuant to these agreements: (1) the cruise lines’ passengers “purchased a pre-arranged single ticket or package of tickets from a cruise line or ground agent that includes airfare, ground transportation, in some eases a hotel, and an international cruise”; (2) Defendant’s drivers “transport these passengers, the vast majority of whom have traveled from out of state, in buses, from local airports ... to local hotels, and then to local seaports ... or directly from the airports to the seaports”; (3) “[w]hen the passengers return from their cruises, [Defendant’s] drivers transport them back to a hotel, and then to the airport, or directly to the airport”; the “charges for this transportation are pre-fixed, i.e., they are set by the ... arrangement between [Defendant] and the cruise lines or their agents”; and (4) “the vehicle is exclusively dedicated to use by cruise passengers on these trips and the itinerary is specified in advance.” (Britte-num Decl. ¶ 18.) Defendant has presented no specific evidence regarding the terms of its arrangements with Princess Cruises and Costa Cruises, or with independent ground agents, tour operators, travel agents, and other entities that charter buses, but Defendant has provided evidence of its cash receipts and revenues derived from its transportation of Princess Cruises and Costa Cruises passengers, as well as Prince Cruise VIP passengers, Cunard Cruise passengers, and Crystal Cruise passengers. (Brittenum Decl. ¶ 18 & Exs. H-J.) Thus, as in Marshall, the Court finds that although Defendant’s drivers do not cross the State line while driving the airport-to-seaport and seaport-to-airport routes, a substantial, regular and recurring part of their work in driving such routes consists of transporting persons that are making interstate and international trips. Likewise, as in Marshall, because their work is entwined with a continuous stream of interstate and international travel, the Court finds that Defendant’s drivers transporting passengers on the airport-to-seaport and seaport-to-airport routes are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. See Marshall, 603 F.2d at 1125. Therefore, the Court must assume that such movement is also in interstate commerce under the Motor Carrier Act. 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1). 2. With the Exception of Defendant’s University Shuttle Bust Drivers, There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact Concerning Whether All of Defendant’s Drivers Could Reasonably Be Expected to Drive Passengers on Airporh-to-Seaport and Seaport-to-Airport Runs Purine the Relevant Time Period Having determined that Defendant’s transportation of passengers to and from the local airports to and from the local seaports pursuant to contractual arrangements with one or more cruise lines and independent ground agents is movement in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act, the Court next addresses Defendant’s argument that all Plaintiffs are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements because all of Defendant’s drivers could reasonably be expected to drive passengers on airport-to-seaport and seaport-to-airport runs pursuant these arrangements during the relevant time period. “[E]ven a minor involvement in interstate commerce as a regular part of an employee’s duties can subject that employee to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction.” Reich, 33 F.3d at 1155 (citations omitted). However, “an employee’s minor involvement in interstate commerce does not necessarily subject that employee to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction for an unlimited period of time.” Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, “if the employee’s minor involvement can be characterized as de minimus, that employee may not be subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction at all.” Id. at 1156 (citations omitted). On the other hand, Plaintiffs may be subject to the motor carrier’s exemption, and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s maximum hours and overtime requirements if the carrier has engaged in interstate commerce and Plaintiffs could reasonably be expected as a regular part of their duties to drive one of Defendant’s interstate routes. A reasonable expectation means that there is more than a remote possibility. See Garcia v. Pace Suburban Bus Serv., 955 F.Supp. 75, 77 (N.D.Ill.1996) (“Pursuant to a notice of interpretation, 46 Fed.Reg. 37,902, 37,903 (1981) ... jurisdiction extends only to drivers who reasonably could be expected to make one of the carrier’s interstate runs, and that means more than a remote possibility.”) (citing Reich, 33 F.3d at 1156 & n. 4); see also Chao, 214 F.Supp.2d at 1274-75 (quoting Garcia, 955 F.Supp. at 77); Reich, 33 F.3d at 1156 (“If jurisdiction is claimed over a driver who has not driven in interstate commerce, evidence must be presented that the carrier has engaged in interstate commerce and that the driver could reasonably have been expected to make one of the carrier’s interstate runs.”) (quoting 46 Fed.Reg. 37,902, 37,903 (1981)); see also Fleetwood Limousine, 511 F.Supp.2d at 1240; Morrison, 474 F.Supp.2d at 1309-10; Lieberman, 2005 WL 5501491, at *2; Mason, 2005 WL 5395338, at *2. In determining the applicability of the motor carrier exemption where the defendant was a carrier whose transportation of passengers was subject to the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act, but the plaintiff had “not been called upon to drive interstate routes in the past,” the court in Garcia v. Pace considered that factor alone to “weigh[] against the enforcement of the exemption,” but also considered the following additional factors, which, altogether weighed in favor of a determination that the exemption applied: (1) the employer was engaged in interstate commerce; (2) upon hiring, the employer required the employee to sign a form acknowledging that he or she may be called upon to drive for the company’s interstate charter service; (3) the employer required its drivers to comply with the FMSCR and maintain USDOT forms; (4) the employer maintained vehicles in accordance with ICC regulations; and (5) the FHA regularly conducted audits in which it determined that all of the employer’s drivers are subject to federal safety requirements. Garcia, 955 F.Supp. at 77-78 (noting that all of the defendant’s drivers conformed to the FMCSR and maintained all required USDOT forms, and that all of the defendant’s vehicles were maintained in accordance with ICC regulations, and that, “[mjore importantly, the Federal Highway Administration regularly performed audits in which it had determined that all the drivers were subject to federal safety requirements,” and explaining: “By that we take it to mean that the Secretary of Transportation has determined that all drivers are within the Secretary’s jurisdiction”) (citing Dole v. Circle “A” Construction, Inc., 738 F.Supp. 1313, 1322-23 (D.Idaho 1990)); see also Chao, 214 F.Supp.2d at 1275 (discussing and applying the Garcia factors). In Chao v. First Class Coach, the court found that all of the defendant’s drivers were exempt from the FLSA’s maximum hours and overtime requirements based on the following evidence: (1) an oral agreement between the defendant and its drivers at the time they were hired that they were expected to be able and available to drive all routes offered by the company; (2) drivers were “sometimes first assigned smaller vehicles driving local routes,” but they “routinely move[d] into larger vehicles driving longer routes as part of a typical progression within the company,” and “most drivers rotate[d] the types of routes they [drove]”; and (3) the defendant made efforts to comply with federal requirements for interstate drivers, including requiring its drivers to become qualified to drive all types of vehicles used by the company for passenger transportation, maintaining a “driver qualification file” for each driver as required by 49 C.F.R. § 391.51(a),