Full opinion text
OPINION ORLOFSKY, District Judge. TABLE OF CONTENTS I.INTRODUCTION. OS ' II.FACTUAL BACKGROUND. T — t y-i III. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. T — J IV. DISCUSSION. t-J — ) A. Count One: Student Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim. í — i B. Counts Two and Eleven: Student Plaintiffs’Free Exercise and Separation of Church and State Claims . 03 1. Lee v. Weisman. 2. The Lemon Test. a. Secular Purpose 25 b. Endorsement. 25 c. Excessive Entanglement. 26 3. Qualified Immunity. 26 C. Count Three: Student Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim. 26 D. Count Four: Todd Evans’s Emotional Distress Claim. 28 E. Count Five: Parent Plaintiffs’ Emotional Distress Claim. 29 F. Count Six: Elizabeth Carlino’s Retaliation Claim. 30 1. First Amendment Claim. 30 a. Protected Activity. 31 b. Motivating Factor. 32 c. Would the Same Action Have Been Taken in the Absence of Protected Conduct? . 33 d. Qualified Immunity. 33 2. Conscientious Employee Protection Act Claim. 35 G. Counts Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten: Fictitious Defendants 36 V. V. RULE 11 SANCTIONS . 36 VI. VI. CONCLUSION. 39 1. INTRODUCTION The Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to protect the rights secured to our citizens by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as § 1983, was “enacted for the express purpose of ‘en-forc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting 17 Stat. 13 (1871)). It has served as a bulwark of liberty against persons who act “under color of state law” to deprive individuals of our most cherished constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this case, a lawyer, who should have known better, has trivialized the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the constitutional rights it was designed to vindicate, by filing a lawsuit that is both silly and foolish. He has invoked the Constitution and laws of the United States to protect the “rights” of unruly high school seniors who became drunk and disorderly on a Senior Class Trip, and were subsequently punished by exclusion from their high school graduation ceremony, although they were allowed to graduate and receive their diplomas. One would have thought that the students and their parents would have been too embarrassed to seek the protection of a federal court over this tempest in a teapot. Instead, they have shamelessly proceeded in this Court as if the fate of our Republic were at stake. I have no authority to discipline these errant teenagers, and apparently their parents have chosen to litigate, rather than “parent.” I can, however, discipline their attorney, Samuel A. Malat, Esq., for his conduct in filing this action. Based upon my review of the record and the law underlying the claims asserted in this case, I am led, inexorably, to the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ counsel, Samuel A. Malat, Esq., has violated his obligation under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to perform a reasonable 'investigation before filing an otherwise frivolous claim. Accordingly, I will impose sanctions upon Mr. Malat, pursuant to Rule 11, by requiring him to attend two continuing legal education courses, one addressing professionalism and the rules of professional conduct, and a second course in federal civil practice and procedure. Mr. Malat shall attend and complete these continuing legal education courses within 18 months and file an affidavit with this Court stating that he has successfully completed both courses. In addition, Mr. Ma-lat shall pay a fine of $500 to the Clerk of the Court within 30 days from the entry of the order filed concurrently with this Opinion. Plaintiffs, Joseph Carlino, Jr., Kyle Rossell, Elwood Wrigley, Steven Burk-hardt (“Student Plaintiffs”), who are former Gloucester City High School students, and their parents, Joseph Carlino, Sr., Elizabeth Carlino, Cheryl Rossell, Joanne Wrigley, and Kathleen Burkhardt (“Parent Plaintiffs”), have filed a complaint, alleging that the School Board and various school officials violated the students’ constitutional rights by denying them the opportunity to participate in graduation exercises as a punishment for consuming alcohol during their senior class field trip to Busch Gardens, in Williamsburg, Virginia. Parent Plaintiffs allege that they suffered emotional distress as a result of their inability to attend their children’s high school graduation. Additionally, Plaintiff, Todd Evans (“Evans”), another former Gloucester City High School student, alleges that he suffered emotional distress when he was accidentally left behind at Busch Gardens and, as a result, he was forced to take a taxicab back to the hotel where the students were staying. Plaintiff, Elizabeth Carlino, the mother of Joseph Carlino, Jr., also alleges that her rights under the First Amendment and under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3, were violated when she lost her position as freshman field hockey coach as a result of her criticism of the high school principal following these events. Defendant, Dr. Ronald Pritchett (“Dr.Pritchett”), the principal of Gloucester City High School, has moved for summary judgment on all claims. Defendants, Gloucester City High School (“GCHS”), Gloucester City Board of Education, James Hetherington (“Superintendent Hetherington”), who is the Superintendent of Gloucester City Public Schools, Shirley Cleary, who is the Attendance Officer of GCHS, Susan Allgeier, who is Dr. Pritch-ett’s secretary, Leroy (Lee) Kramer, who is a guidance counselor at GCHS, Stanley Booth, who is a teacher and the senior class advisor at Gloucester, Barbara Stout, who is a GCHS teacher, and Gloucester City Board of Education and its members, Edward C. Hubbs, Louisa W. Llewellyn, Sandra Lynch Cowgill, William F. Fisher, III, J. Hagan, Danny O’Brien, Jr., Edward L. Hutchinson, Margery Wade, Chris Connelly (collectively, the “GCHS Defendants”), have cross-moved for summary judgment on all counts. This Court, on its own motion, issued an Order to Show Cause, filed February 2, 1999, requiring Plaintiffs “to show cause why counts 1, 3-5, and 7-10 of the Amended Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and why sanctions should not be imposed against Samuel A. Malat, Esq., pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court’s inherent powers.” Order, filed Feb. 2, 1999, at 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367, because Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as pendant state law claims. For the reasons set forth below, I hold that the two claims for emotional distress and the claim under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act are statutorily barred- and, therefore, frivolous. As a result, I will dismiss Count Four, containing Todd Evans’s claim for emotional distress, Count Five, containing Parent Plaintiffs’ claim for emotional distress, and part of Count Six, containing Elizabeth Carlino’s claim under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act. Further, I find that Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence supporting their equal protection claim (Count One), their free exercise claim (part of Count Two), and their due process claim (Count Three) and, as a result, in the absence of a genuine material issue of disputed fact, I will grant the motions for summary judgment of Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants on those claims. In addition, I find that the individual GCHS Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Elizabeth Carli-no’s claim for retaliation under the First Amendment. Thus, I will grant the motion for summary judgment of the GCHS Defendants’ on Count Six, as it is asserted against the individual GCHS Defendants. Pursuant to the Order to Show Cause, filed by this Court on February 2, 1999, I will also dismiss Counts Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, for failure to state a claim, because these claims do not even satisfy the minimal pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result of these holdings, only the following two claims remain: (1) Student Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim asserted against Dr. Pritchett, Superintendent Hetherington, and the Gloucester City Board of Education and its members; and (2) Elizabeth Carlino’s First Amendment retaliation claim asserted against the Gloucester City Board of Education. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, Joseph Carlino, Jr., Steven Burkhardt, Elwood William Wrigley, Kyle Rossell, and Todd Evans, then seniors at Gloucester City High School, all attended the Senior Class Trip to Busch Gardens, located in Williamsburg, Virginia. Every student planning to go on the trip had to sign and obtain a parent’s signature on an authorization form, which stated, in relevant part: Possession, distribution, purchase, and|7]or consumption of alcoholic beverages, prescriptive [sic] drugs not registered with the school nurse or illegal drugs are prohibited and will be cause for terminating the trip for the person(s) involved. The parents and/or student(s) will assume all legal and financial expenses for the trip home. Students found guilty of any of the above infractions will also be subject, upon return to school, to further disciplinary action determined by the Administration, and/or Board of Education. Specifically, seniors will lose their privilege to participate in Commencement Exercises with their class on June 17 if found guilty of drugs or alcohol related infractions. These students may have to forfeit all rights as members of their class. See Brief on Behalf of Defendant, Dr. Ronald Pritchett, for Summary Judgment (“Pritchett’s Brief’), dated Jan. 18, 1999, Ex. A (completed authorization form for all four Student Plaintiffs, except Todd Evans). The seniors attending the trip and their chaperones left on Wednesday, May 28, 1997. See id. The group lodged at the Fort Magruder Inn, located in Williams-burg, Virginia, from Wednesday night through the morning of Friday, May 30. See id. On May 29, 1997, the students spent the day at Busch Gardens. See Amended Complaint ¶ 63. At the end of the day, all of the students on the trip, except Todd Evans, returned to the Fort Magruder Inn as a group on the bus. Evans had mistakenly been “marked present upon the groups’ departure from” Busch Gardens, “although he had asked [and had received] permission to enjoy one (1) more ride.” Id. ¶ 64. As a result, Evans took a taxicab from the park, back to the hotel. See Pritchett’s Brief, Ex. B. Dr. Pritchett reimbursed Evans for the taxicab fare. See id. Nonetheless, Evans claims that he “has been emotionally damaged” by this experience. Amended Complaint ¶ 68. The students spent the evening of May 29, 1997, at the Fort McGruder Inn. The Student Plaintiffs interpreted this free time as a license to party. One of the boys, Elwood William Wrigley (“Wrigley”), described that night as follows: After dinner we decided to take a swim which didn’t last long because the pool was closing, so we went back to our room and we tried to find something to do and I guess the only thing on our minds was to find some beer so Steve, Joe, and I decided to go to the Mobil [gas station] down the street to get some beer but before we went we went to the other rooms to see if they wanted to put up some money so they could get some beer too.... [Next] we went to our room and Kelly Ridell came and said she wanted some beer, so she gave us the money and we went out the front entrance of the hotel. It was Joe, Steve, and me. We went down to the Mobil and Steve got served and he got 14 bottle[s] of 40 oz. Colt 45 Double Malt. We decided to walk down the tracks so that no cops or any teacher could see us back on our way to the hotel. We climbed [sic] the beer up the balcony and then walked back around so everything looked normal and we actually got away with it and it’s a good thing we snuck [sic] the beer up because Mr. Kramer and Mrs. Cleary were out in the hallway. They were out there because it was almost time for curfew anyway. When we got back in the room there were about ten or eleven people in the room[, including] Steve, Kyle, Joe, myself, Danielle, Aja, Dana, Nicole, Kelly, Tina and I’m pretty sure there was another person too. We all started drinking. We were passing around two bottles so that the beer wouldn’t last too long and we could get rid of the bottles[. R]ight after they were done[,] I went out on the balcony and Mrs. Cleary was out there on the next balcony over and we were just talking!. T]hen Joe comes walking out with the two empty bottles in his hands[.] Right away Joe tried to hide the bottles but it was to[o] late, Mrs. Cleary had seen them and she walked around the door and started knocking right away. We were panicking and started hiding all the beer bottles all over the room. When we finally let her in it was her and Mr. Kramer and they took the empty beer bottles and another one we had started on and they sat us down and told us that they would forget about the whole thing. After they left we were still a little shook up so we didn’t start drinking again right away, but we thought everything was cool again so we [sic] ... Oh yeah, when Mrs. Cleary and Mr. Kramer came into the room every one I mentioned before was still in the room and when they were leaving they told everyone to go back to there [sic] rooms. So they saw that all of those people were in the room with all of the beer at the time and later they just forgot about all those other people in the room. But we thought we were fine again so we decided to go to someone else’s room and see if they wanted to sneek [sic] back out over to our room because we had a lot of beer left. So we snuck [sic] down the balcony and went over to Nadine Hoover’s room. They said they would come out [to our room] ... We were all talking, drinking and just having a good time. That went on for a while[.] Then they wanted to go to bed so they left and we decided to go back out and look for different people so we climbed back down the balcony and headed over towards Aja’s room. When we got there Kyle and I climbed up the balcony to knoek[.] When we did[,] Mrs. Stout opened the curtain and saw Kyle ... We all took, off back to our room[.] When we got back the teachers were already knocking on the door ... [W]e opened the door and it was Dr. Pritchett right there with Mrs. Cleary, Mr. Kramer, Mr[s]. Stout and the rest of the teachers. Brief on Behalf of Defendants, Gloucester City High School and Gloucester City Board of Education, in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“GCHS Brief’), filed Feb. 1, 1999, Ex. F (Written Statement of Elwood William Wrigley). None of the Student Plaintiffs has denied that they consumed alcohol that night. See, e.g., id., Exs. C-E (Transcripts of Interviews with Steven Burkhardt, Kyle Rossell, and Elwood William Wrigley, in which all three admit that they drank alcohol the night of May 29, 1997). Further, “[d]uring the routine room inspection and check-out at the Fort Magruder Inn, there was evidence that” the four Student Plaintiffs had consumed the alcohol contained in “the Hospitality Refreshment Center” in their room. See Pritchett’s Brief, Ex. C (Letters from Dr. Ronald Pritchett to Parent Plaintiffs, dated June 2,1997). As Wrigley’s statement reveals, and as the Amended Complaint confirms, Student Plaintiffs allege that other students had been drinking that evening. See Amended Complaint ¶40. Specifically, they allege that “numerous other students participated in drinking, opening liquor cabinets and the violation of curfew and the Defendant Chaperons ha[d] full knowledge of these other violations.” Id. Wrigley wrote “when Mrs. Clearly and Mr. Kramer came into the room ... there were about ten or eleven people in the room[, including] Steve, Kyle, Joe, myself, Danielle, Aja, Dana, Nicole, Kelly, Tina and I’m pretty sure there was another person too.” GCHS, Ex. F. In response to a questionnaire about the incident, Dr. Pritchett, Susan Allgeier, his secretary, and Barbara Stout, one of the teachers chaperoning the trip, all reported that they were not “aware of any student, other than the four, who used alcohol on the Williamsburg trip.” See Pritchett’s Brief, Ex. B (questionnaires, dated June 17, 1997). Further, in his letter to the Parent Plaintiffs, Superintendent Hether-ington stated: “If you want to make accusations against some other child or chaperone you should do so in writing and I will start an investigation.” Id., Ex. E. There is no evidence in the summary judgment record that any of the Parent Plaintiffs, or Student Plaintiffs, came forward with the names of other students who participated in the drinking during the Senior Class Trip. On the morning of Friday, May 30,1997, Dr. Pritchett discovered empty bottles of alcohol in the trash and bottles missing from the “Hospitality Refreshment Center” in the hotel room that the four boys had shared. See id., Ex. B. In response to his discovery, Dr. Pritchett questioned the four Student Plaintiffs, none of whom denied drinking the previous night. See id. On the following Monday, June 2, 1997, Dr. Pritchett sent a letter to the Parent Plaintiffs, explaining: I regret the necessity in corresponding to you regarding an incident on the Senior Class Trip, specifically, Friday May 30, 1997. During the routine room inspection and check-out at Fort Magru-der Inn, there was evidence that the Hospitality Refreshment Center was opened in [your son’s] room and items missing from the inventory. I personally summoned the hospitality supervisor of the hotel assistance. Hotel management assured me each Hospitality Refreshment Center was inventoried and securely locked and sealed.' Only a special key, obtained at the front desk, would be available to open the hospitality center, and provisions were made that no student had access to this room service. I have enclosed a list of the itemized inventory of missing food and beverages. Unfortunately, some included alcohol. I have no direct evidence of what person^) in the room consumed the food and/or beverages. I am asking you to discuss this matter with your son. All expenses for the missing items were paid by the students (to the hotel) before our departure. I am anticipating a review of this matter by the Gloucester City Board of Education on Thursday evening, June 5, at which time any disciplinary action may or may not be determined: Id., Ex. C. At the June 5, 1997, Gloucester City Board of Education meeting, “Dr. Priteh-ett[] reported on the Senior Class trip concerning late night student activities and the consumption of alcohol.” Id., Ex. D. In particular, Dr. Pritchett informed the Board of Education that the Student Plaintiffs “left the hotel[,] purchased beer,” and “broke[ ] into” the “hospitality refreshment centers” to consume the “alcohol and chips” contained in them. Id. “Dr. Pritch-ett reported that [the Student Plaintiffs] received [two-]day suspensions and [he] recommended that they not participate in graduation exercises.” Id. The “[s]tudent representative” in attendance at the meeting “commented that if students are not punished now, future students would feel they could get away with misbehaving in later years.” Id. Parent Plaintiffs, Joseph Carlino, Sr., Joanne Wrigley, Cheryl Rossell, and Kathy Burkhardt, also attended the meeting and had the opportunity to respond to Dr. Pritchett’s report and recommendation. Joseph Carlino, Sr., “expressed his concern that liquor cabinets were in the room[ ] that students were allowed to be in and their [sic] were two exits.” Id. He also said “that his main concern was that he did not graduate with his class and woi'ked hard to see that his son did not make the same mistakes as him [sic].” Id. Cheryl Rossell “[a]sked if [the] students could do something to earn the right to walk with their class in graduation.” Id. Kathy Burkhardt requested that the Gloucester City Board of Education permit “the students [to] leave on a positive note.” Id. None of the Parent Plaintiffs denied that their children consumed alcohol during the trip, in violation of the rules and regulations stated on the authorization form. On June 11, 1997, six days after the Gloucester City Board of Education meeting, Superintendent Hetherington sent a letter to the Parent Plaintiffs, informing them that: The Board of Education upheld the decision not to let [your son] participate in Graduation. Your son can participate in Baccalaureate by requesting permission from the City Ministerium. If you want to make accusations against some other child or chaperone you should do so in writing and I will start an investigation. If you would like to appeal the Board’s decision you should obtain an attorney and appeal to the Commission of Education for “An Emergent Relief Hearing” before an administrative law judge. Id., Ex. E. None of the Student or Parent Plaintiffs appealed this decision. Instead, the Carlino family protested by posting a sign on the front of their house, which read, in substance: “The Perfect Role Model, Not GHS Principal” — suggesting that Dr. Pritchett was a poor role model for the students of GCHS. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant, Pritchett’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Issues (“Plaintiffs’ First Opposition”), dated Jan. 22, 1999, Ex. D (undated newspaper article from the Courier-Post ). The Carlino family believed that Dr. Pritchett was not a good role model, because Student Plaintiffs had observed Dr. Pritchett drinking during the senior class field trip. See GCHS Brief, Ex. F (Written Statement of Elwood William Wrigley); see also Amended Complaint ¶ 11. Thus, rather than challenging the decision to exclude Joseph Carlino, Jr., from the graduation céremony, the Carlino family posted a sign in front of their house questioning Dr. Pritchett’s fitness to punish students for drinking alcohol when he himself had done so during the trip. In response to this sign, at its July 8, 1997, meeting, the Gloucester City Board of Education “rescinded [Elizabeth Carli-no’s] appointment as Freshmen Field Hockey Coach for the 1997-98 school year.” Plaintiffs First Opposition, Ex. E (Letter from James H. Hetherington to Elizabeth Carlino, dated July 9, 1997). The President of the Gloucester City Board of Education, Edward Hubbs, “cited ‘problems’ as a reason for the decision.” Id. (copy of an excerpt of an unlabeled, undated, newspaper article). On January 13, 1998, the Gloucester City Board of Education paid Elizabeth Carlino $1,897, the “Freshmen Hockey coach stipend of [the] Teachers’ Agreement [for] 1997-1998 ... to settle a grievance.” Pritchett’s Brief, Ex. H (Gloucester City Board of Education, Minutes of January 13, 1998, Meeting). In addition to his family’s front-lawn protest, Joseph Carlino, Jr., attempted to attend the Baccalaureate Service held the Friday before graduation. This ceremony was, at least nominally, sponsored by the “City Ministerium.” Id., Ex. I (Letter from Ronald J. Pritchett to Reverend Jane Verstoep of the Trinity United Methodist Church, dated Apr. 9, 1997). Indeed, Dr. Pritchett had written to Reverend Jane Verstoep, of the Trinity United Methodist Church, “requesting the assistance of the Gloucester City Minis-terium in assigning and inviting clergy for the ... Baccalaureate Services.” Id. In his letter, Dr. Pritchett wrote: You are aware that the Supreme Court has ruled that public schools may not sponsor Baccalaureate Services. Our senior class has voted overwhelmingly to have one. Would the Gloucester City Ministerium wish to continue to sponsor the Baccalaureate Services? If it does, we will need an official request for the use of the high school auditorium by the ministerium for the Service on Friday evening, June 13 at 7:00 p.m. The assignments for the Baccalaureate Service are as follows: two clergy, one for the Responsive Reading & Prayer and one for the Sermon, Invocation, and Benediction. I will need to know the clergy assignments for the Baccalaureate Service by Friday, May 30 to enable us to meet and finalize plans for the Service. Id. As part of the punishment imposed by the Board of Education, Superintendent Hetherington required each Student Plaintiff to obtain “permission from the City Ministerium.” Id., Ex. E. Joseph Carlino, Jr., obtained such permission from Rev. Harry J. Jordan, of St. Mary’s Church, however, when Joseph Carlino, Jr., attempted to attend the Baccalaureate Service, he was told by Dr. Pritchett that he should leave the school premises. See Amended Complaint ¶ 99. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on June 15, 1998, and their Amended Complaint on November 23, 1998. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs essentially allege six causes of action: (1) an equal protection claim on behalf of the Student Plaintiffs; (2) a religious freedom claim on behalf of the Student Plaintiffs; (3) a due process claim on behalf of the Student Plaintiffs; (4) an emotional distress claim on behalf of Todd Evans; (5) an emotional distress claim on behalf of the Parent Plaintiffs; and (6) a retaliation claim on behalf of Elizabeth Carlino. Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment. Additionally, on February 2, 1999, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause why Plaintiffs’ equal protection, due process, emotional distress, and fictitious defendant claims should not be dismissed. I will now address both motions for summary judgment, as well as the issues raised by the Order to Show Cause. III. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Because all of the claims contained in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint have been fully briefed as part of the Defendants’ two motions for summary judgment, I will apply the legal standard governing motions for summary judgment to the issues raised by the Order to Show Cause, as well as to the two motions for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (permitting the court to convert a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted into a motion for summary judgment where all parties have been “given [a] reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56”). A party seeking summary judgment must “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 56(c); see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir.1997); Hersh v. Allen Prod. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir.1986). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the Court must view the underlying facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.1995); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 231 (3d Cir.1987). Under the rule, a movant must be awarded summary judgment on all properly supported issues identified in its motion, except those for which the non-moving party has provided evidence to show that a question of material fact remains. Once the moving party has properly supported its showing of no triable issue of fact and of an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion ...; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”) (emphasis in original). What the non-moving party must do is “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (“The object of [Rule 56(e) ] is not to replace conclusory allegations of the First Amended Complaint ... with conclu-sory allegations of an affidavit.”); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992) (“[T]o raise a genuine issue of material fact ... the [non-moving party] need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant,” but rather must exceed the “‘mere scintilla’ threshold.”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 1262, 122 L.Ed.2d 659 (1993). If the non-moving party fails to oppose the motion by written objection, memorandum, affidavits and other evidence, the Court “will accept as true all material facts set forth by the moving party with appropriate record support.” Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1989)). Even where the non-moving party has failed to establish a triable issue of fact, summary judgment will not be granted unless “appropriate.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Anchorage Assocs., 922 F.2d at 175. Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the case be evaluated on its merits, with summary judgment being granted for the movant only if it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Anchorage Assocs., 922 F.2d at 175. IV. DISCUSSION A. Count One: Student Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim In the Amended Complaint, Student Plaintiffs allege that they “have been discriminated against by Defendants in that the treatment afforded them differed from that of other such students in the same situation.” Amended Complaint ¶ 41. “The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ ” Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297, 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). It is well-established equal protection law that “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). “Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1872, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Of course every activity, even scratching one’s head, can be called a ‘constitutional right’ if one means by that term nothing more than the fact that the activity is covered (as all are) by the Equal Protection Clause, so that those who engage in it cannot be singled out without [a] ‘rational basis.’ ”) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Student Plaintiffs do not contend that they are members of a suspect class or that the ability to attend one’s high school graduation ceremony involves a fundamental right. See Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir.1989) (“Since participation in extra-curricular activities is not a fundamental right under the Constitution and since Palmer’s suspension was not based on a suspect classification, ... we must examine Palmer’s [equal protection claim] under the ‘rational relationship test.’ ”) (citation omitted). Instead, Student Plaintiffs argue that, “[although members of a ‘discrete class’ are entitled to a higher level of scrutiny, [Student] Plaintiffs have not included themselves in any such class simply because it is plain that the treatment afforded them was different from the treatment of other students in the same situation.” Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Court’s Order to Show Cause (“Plaintiffs’ Response”), dated Feb. 23, 1999, at 5-6; see also Plaintiffs Opposition at 6-7. In other words, Student Plaintiffs claim that they have been the victims of selective enforcement. “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement ‘based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)). Student Plaintiffs do not claim that the Moving Defendants punished them as a result of their race or religion. In the absence of an animus-based motive, I must consider Student Plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim under the “rational basis” test. Student Plaintiffs argue that “there was no rational basis for the severity of punishment that was delivered to these particular students ... [w]hen other students who did the same, or worse” were not punished at all. Plaintiffs’ Response at 6. There is evidence in the summary judgment record that another student, Chris Johnson, purchased beer with a fake military identification card. See Plaintiffs’ Second Opposition, Ex. A (Affidavits of Steven Burkhardt and Elwood William Wrigley, dated Jan. 28, 1999, stating that Chris Johnson purchased beer with a fake military identification card). There is no evidence, however, that Dr. Pritchett or any of the GCHS Defendants had any knowledge that any student other than the four Student Plaintiffs purchased beer. Indeed, Dr. Pritchett, his secretary, Susan Allgeier, and one of the teachers chaperoning the trip, Barbara Stout, all stated that they were not “aware of any student, other than the four, who used alcohol on the Williamsburg trip.” Pritchett’s Brief, Ex. ington informed the Parent Plaintiffs: “If you want make accusations against some other child or chaperone you should do so in writing and I will start an investigation.” GCHS Brief, Ex. G (Letters from James H. Hetherington, to Parent Plaintiffs, dated June 11, 1997). None of the parents came forth with any evidence. It was completely rational for the Moving Defendants to punish only those students for whom the school officials had proof that the student in question had consumed and purchased alcohol on the Senior Class Trip. Furthermore, Wrigley’s written statement indicates that the Student Plaintiffs continued to drink after being caught by the chaperones, who warned them to stop. See GCHS Brief, Ex. F. Thus, even assuming that other students did consume alcohol during the trip, the Moving Defendants may have believed that the conduct of the Student Plaintiffs was more egregious and, therefore, merited punishment, whereas the conduct of the other students who consumed alcohol did not demand punishment. “Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for [the Defendants’] action, [my] inquiry is at an end.” See United States R.R. Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) (holding that, in the court’s analysis of a governmental decision under the rational basis standard, “it is, of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay [a governmental] decision”). Finally, even if the Moving Defendants incorrectly determined that only the Student Plaintiffs purchased and consumed alcohol on the Senior Class Trip, or that only the conduct of these four students warranted punishment, the GCHS Defendants correctly observe that they “are entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to federal law.” Brief on Behalf of Hetherington, Cleary, Allgeier, Kramer, Stout, Hubbs, Llewelyn, Lynch, Cowgull, Fisher, Hagan, Hutchinson, O’Brien, Wade, Booth, Connelly and GCHS (“GCHS Immunity Brief’), dated Jan. 21, 1999, at 4. In Wood v. Strickland, the Supreme Court held that school board members are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, because “[e]ommon-law tradition ... and strong public-policy reasons [require] a construction of § 1983 [that] extend[s] a qualified good-faith immunity to school board members from liability for damages under the section.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Court concluded that: As with executive officers faced with instances of civil disorder, school officials, confronted with student behavior causing or threatening disruption, also have an “obvious need for prompt action, and decisions must be made in rebanee on factual information supplied by others.” [Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).] Liability for damages for every action which is found subsequently to have been violative of a student’s constitutional rights and to have caused compensa-ble injury would unfairly impose upon the school decisionmaker the burden of mistakes made in good faith in the course of exercising his discretion within the scope of his official duties. School board members, among other duties, must judge whether there have been violations of school regulations and, if so, the appropriate sanctions for the violations. Denying any measure of immunity in these circumstances “would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.” Pierson v. Ray, [386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967)]. Id. at 319, 95 S.Ct. 992. In order to use the shield of qualified immunity, the Moving Defendants “must show that their conduct did ‘not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Stoneking v. Bradford, Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir.1989) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 840, 107 L.Ed.2d 835 (1990). “Under the test announced in Harlow, reasonableness is measured by an objective standard; arguments that the defendants desired to handle or subjectively believed that they had handled the incidents properly are irrelevant.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Thus, the Moving Defendants “are entitled to qualified immunity if reasonable officials in the [D]e-fendants’ position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that their conduct comported with established legal standards.” Id. As I concluded above, the conduct of Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants did comport with clearly established equal protection jurisprudence. Thus, I am compelled to conclude that any reasonable official acting in the same capacity as any of the Moving Defendants would have believed that the Moving Defendants did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants had a rational basis upon which to impose punishment only on the Student Plaintiffs. To the extent that this decision resulted from reliance upon incorrect factual information supplied by others, see Wood, 420 U.S. at 319, 95 S.Ct. 992, Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants are protected by qualified immunity, because their reliance on such information was reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, I will grant the motions of the Moving Defendants for summary judgment on Count One of the Amended Complaint, which alleges a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. B. Counts Two and Eleven: Student Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise and Separation of Church and State Claims Student Plaintiffs allege that the Moving Defendants have violated their First Amendment religious freedom rights by prohibiting them from attending the Baccalaureate Service, which is a religious ceremony. See Amended Complaint, Counts Two & Eleven. In response, Dr. Pritchett argues that “this baccalaureate mass [was] provided by an outside organization, [and Dr. Pritchett] did not prohibit the students from attending the same.” Pritchett’s Brief at 9. The GCHS Defendants contend that they are protected by qualified immunity. See GCHS Immunity Brief at 4. None of the Moving Defendants dispute that the Baccalaureate Service was religious in nature. The First Amendment “command[s] that there should be 'no law respecting an establishment of religion[, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.]’ ” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (quoting U.S. Const., amend. I, § 1). The First Amendment “has been made applicable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). “The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship[,] ... but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (citation omitted). “[T]he Establishment Clause ... mean[s] that [the] government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate among persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate a governmental power to a religious institution, and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution’s affairs.” County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (footnotes omitted). The Establishment Clause forbids “[a] state-created orthodoxyf, because such orthodoxy] puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 592, 112 S.Ct. 2649. “[I]f citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people.” Id. 1. Lee v. Weisman In Lee v. Weisman, Deborah Weisman and her father challenged the decision of her middle school principal, Robert E. Lee, to invite “a rabbi to deliver prayers at the graduation exercises for Deborah’s class.” Id. at 581, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Principal Lee invited Rabbi Leslie Gutterman, who accepted, and provided Rabbi Gutter-man “with a pamphlet entitled ‘Guidelines for Civic Occasions,’ prepared by the National Conference of Christians and Jews.” Id. The Guidelines, as well as Principal Lee, recommended that Rabbi Gutterman offer a nonsectarian invocation and benediction. See id. In summarizing the legal question posed by Weisman’s challenge, the Supreme Court determined that it had to consider the constitutionality of the conduct of “[a s]tate official [who] direct[s] the performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary schools.” Id. at 586, 112 S.Ct. 2649. The Court observed that “there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.” Id. at 592, 112 S.Ct. 2649. The Court also noted that “[e]ven for those students who object to the religious exercise, their attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt of the diploma.” Id. at 586, 112 S.Ct. 2649. As a result, the Court concluded that prayer during a graduation ceremony “bore the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable position,” by forcing the student to choose between religious conformity and missing graduation. Id. at 590, 112 S.Ct. 2649. The Court explained: What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy. ... The undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group, or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the Invocation and Benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any over compulsion[, because] for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the rabbi’s prayer. Id. at 592-93, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Thus, “for the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow,” prayer during a graduation ceremony compels religious participation, which is “forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.” Id. at 593, 599, 112 S.Ct. 2649. In the aftermath of Lee, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered the attempt of one school to hold a graduation ceremony that included a prayer without offending the First Amendment, as interpreted in Lee. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir.1996). In Black Horse Pike, the Board of Education had adopted a policy that “allowed the senior class to determine whether seniors wanted ‘prayer, a moment of reflection, or nothing at all’ to be included in their graduation ceremony.” Id. at 1475. The Third Circuit determined that, under Lee, the Court had to “examine (1) the state’s control of the graduation ceremony, and (2) the students’ coerced participation in the ceremony.” Id. at 1479. Upon consideration of these two factors, the Third Circuit held that this policy violated the First Amendment, because “[a]n impermissible practice [cannot] be transformed into a constitutionally acceptable one by putting a democratic process to an improper use.” Id. at 1477. The Third Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s holding in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), and observed: The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s ... fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1478 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638, 63 S.Ct. 1178). Based on this notion, the Third Circuit concluded that it could not “ ‘allow the school district’s delegate to make decisions that the school district [could not] make. When the senior class is given plenary power over a state-sponsored, state-controlled event such as [a] high school graduation, it is just as constrained by the Constitution as the state would be.’ ” Id. at 1483 (quoting Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir.1994)). In this case, Dr. Pritchett contends that the Baccalaureate Service was not “state-sponsored,” see id., claiming that the “Gloucester City Ministerium sponsored] the baccalaureate services.” Pritchett’s Brief at 9. In his letter to Reverend Verstoep, Dr. Pritchett wrote: “You are aware that the Supreme Court has ruled that public schools may not sponsor Baccalaureate Services. Our senior class has voted overwhelmingly to have one. Would the Gloucester City Ministeri-um wish to continue to sponsor the Baccalaureate Services?” Id., Ex. I. Merely asking the City Ministerium to sponsor the Baccalaureate, however, does not satisfy the prohibition against state-sponsored religious events. Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants “cannot sanction coerced participation in a religious observance merely by disclaiming responsibility for the content of the ceremony.” See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1482. Nor can Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants rely upon the vote of the senior class to satisfy the requirements of the Establishment Clause. “ ‘[S]chool officials cannot divest themselves of constitutional responsibility by allowing the students to make crucial decisions.' ” Id. (quoting Harris, 41 F.3d at 455). A religious activity is “state-sponsored” under the Establishment Clause if “an objective observer in the position of a secondary school student will perceive official school support for such religious [activity].” Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-50, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990); see also County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 593, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (holding that the a state official may not engage in conduct that “convey[s] or attemptfs] to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred’ ”) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). The law applies an “objective observer” standard, because this standard determines whether the state action at issue “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O’Con-nor, J., concurring). In this case, the evidence in the summary judgment record suggests that Dr. Pritchett, in particular, and the GCHS Defendants, through Superintendent Heth-erington, appeared to exercise control and had actual control over the Baccalaureate Service. First, in his letter to Reverend Verstoep, Dr. Pritchett set the date, time, and format of the service. See id., Ex. I. Second, Dr. Pritchett told Reverend Ver-stoep that he wanted “to meet and finalize plans for the Service,” indicating that Dr. Pritchett had a role in organizing the service. Id.; see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 629-30, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that a group of students “may even organize a privately sponsored baccalaureate if they desire the company of like-minded students[, b]ecause they accordingly have no need for the machinery of the State” to organize that religious event). Third, Dr. Pritchett noted that the “senior class has voted overwhelmingly to have” a baccalaureate service. Pritchett’s Brief, Ex. I. A GCHS senior who had the opportunity to vote in school about whether or not to participate in such a service might well assume that the school had sponsored the event. Fourth, Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants required the Student Plaintiffs to obtain “permission from the City Ministerium” in order to attend the Baccalaureate Service. Id., Ex. E. Student Plaintiffs also allege that Dr. Pritch-ett personally prohibited Joseph Carlino, Jr., from attending the Baccalaureate Service when on the evening of the event. Their ability to control a student’s access to the service strongly suggests to an objective observer that Dr. Pritchett and the GCHS Defendants had control over the Baccalaureate Service. Finally, “a ceremony to honor a public high school’s graduates is vulnerable to carrying with it an aura of school affiliation.” Verbena United Methodist Church v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 765 F.Supp. 704, 712 (M.D.Ala.1991). In this case, the ceremony was only two days before graduation and held at the school. Further, Superintendent Hetherington referred to the Baccalaureate Service in the sentence after he informed Parent Plaintiffs that their sons could not “participate in Graduation,” Pritchett’s Brief, Ex. E, suggesting that the two events were both considered part of commencement exercises. “[A] commencement exercise is customarily a school-wide event within the province of school officials.” Verbena United Methodist Church, 765 F.Supp. at 712. Considering that a baccalaureate service is generally considered “within the province of school officials,” id., Hether-ington’s requirement that the Student Plaintiffs obtain permission to attend the Baccalaureate Service and Dr. Pritchett’s alleged conduct in prohibiting Joseph Car-lino, Jr., from attending the service strongly suggest to an objective observer that there was official support for this religious activity. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249-50, 110 S.Ct. 2356. Thus, I find that there is a genuine material issue of disputed fact with respect to whether or not the Baccalaureate Service was sponsored by the Moving Defendants. This conclusion appears even more clear in comparison to the court’s holding in Verbena United Methodist Church. In that case, the court considered the free exercise claim of a church, pastor, and high school student who had been denied access to the high school auditorium to conduct a privately-organized baccalaureate service. See Verbena United Methodist Church, 765 F.Supp. at 705. The court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the Board of Education to permit the church to hold a baccalaureate service, however, the Establishment Clause imposed upon "the Board the [heavy] duty to take all ... measures reasonably necessary to disassociate itself from the [service]." Id. at 713. Specifically, the court "require[d] the Board [of Education] and Verbena High School to take steps to disclaim any official connection to the [baccalaureate service] in their communications with students, parents, school employees, and other members of the community." Id. at 713-14. In addition, "[t]he Board [had to] ensure that no other school officials promote, lead, or participate in the service." Id. In this case, school officials made no effort to disassociate themselves from the Baccalaureate Service. Instead, Dr. Pritchett, Superintendent Hetherington, and the Gloucester City Board of Education engaged in conduct suggesting to an objective observer that they did have control over the service. Nonetheless, all of the evidence in the summary judgment record and all of the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint with respect to Student Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim relate to the conduct of Superintendent Hetherington, Dr. Pritchett, and the Gloucester City Board of Education and its members. Consequently, I find that there is no genuine material issue of disputed fact that any other defendant violated the Student Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Accordingly, I will grant the motion for summary judgment of the GCHS Defendants on Student Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim asserted against Defendants, Shirley Cleary, Susan Allgeier, Leroy (Lee) Kramer, Stanley Booth, and Barbara Stout. I will, however, permit the Establishment Clause claim to proceed with respect to Dr. Pritchett, Superintendent Hetherington, and the Gloucester City Board of Education and its members. The fact that the Student Plaintiffs were allegedly prohibited from attending, rather than coerced into participating in, a religious event does not eliminate potential liability in this case. A state may no more prohibit the practice of a state-endorsed religion than coerce it, because, quite simply, a state may not endorse religious practice. As Justice Blackmun explained in his concurrence in Lee, "it is not enough that the government restrain from cçmpelhng religious practices: It must not engage in them either," Lee, 505 U.S. at 604, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor). Blackmun continued: "The mixing of government and religion can be a threat to free government, even if no one is forced to participate. When the government puts its imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the favored beliefs." Id. at 606-07, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Indeed, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, wrote a separate concurrence in Lee to emphasize that government endorsement of religion, in the absence of coerced participation, still violates the Establishment Clause. See Id. at 618-27, 112 S.Ct. 2649. Thus, "`a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.'" Id. at 621, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963)). Furthermore, the absence of coerced participation in this case does not deprive the Student Plaintiffs of standing to sue under the Establishment Clause. "[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560. Students who are "directly affected" by the alleged endorsement of religion have standing to challenge that endorsement. See id. The absence of any coerced participation, however, does bar Student Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim. See Amended Complaint ¶ 48. A government action “that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). The evidence in the summary judgment record clearly reveals that Superintendent Hetherington’s letter, which required the Student Plaintiffs to obtain permission to attend the Baccalaureate Service, was intended to punish the Student Plaintiffs’ conduct on the Senior Class Trip and not to limit their religious practice. Moreover, the Student Plaintiffs do not suggest that Superintendent Hetherington’s decision “discriminate[d] against some or all religious beliefs or regulate[d] or prohibited] conduct because it [was] undertaken for religious reasons.” See id. at 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The conduct punished was drinking on the Senior Class Trip; the alleged burden that this punishment placed on the Student Plaintiffs’ free exercise of their religious beliefs was merely the incidental effect of an otherwise neutral and generally applicable decision made by Dr. Pritch-ett, Superintendent Hetherington, and the Gloucester City Board of Education. Accordingly, I will grant the motion for summary judgment of Dr. Pritchett and that of the GCHS Defendants with respect to the Student Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim. 2. The Lemon Test In Black Horse Pike, the Third Circuit considered both the analysis performed in Lee as well as the Establishment Clause test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1478, 1483. The Third Circuit observed that while “[t]he Lemon test has been the subject of critical debate in recent years, and its continuing vitality has been called into question by members of the Supreme Court, ... [nevertheless, [it] remains the law of the land, and we are obligated to consider it until instructed otherwise by a majority of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 1484. “Under Lemon, a government practice regarding religion will not offend the Establishment Clause if: (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary