Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER ON PRETRIAL MOTIONS ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on the pretrial motions (Doc. Nos. 39 and 47) filed by Defendant Russell Christie, praying for various forms of relief. In the first motion (Doc. No. 39), filed by his counsel on his behalf, he makes four primary arguments. First, Christie seeks to dismiss several Counts of the Superseding Indictment. Second, Christie seeks to suppress both evidence seized during a search of his home, and statements allegedly made by him prior to his arrest. Third, Christie requests a hearing to determine whether there are additional bases for suppressing evidence or dismissing Counts. Fourth, and finally, Christie makes various discovery requests. In the second motion (Doc. No. 47), Mr. Christie, independent of his counsel, advances several arguments regarding the warrant, the warrant affidavit, and the Superseding Indictment. The Court has carefully reviewed the excellent briefing submitted on behalf of Christie and the Government. In addition, the Court held oral argument on this matter on Thursday, July 24, 2008, and heard additional argumentation by counsel. Furthermore, Mr. Christie made his own oral motions at the July 24 hearing, submitted briefing that day and subsequently, and the Court has considered those additional arguments as well. For the following reasons, Christie’s motion to dismiss Counts of the Superseding Indictment will be denied. In addition, Christie’s motion to suppress evidence will be denied, but the Court will reserve decision on the motion to suppress his statements. The Court declines to grant Christie’s request for a Franks hearing, and each discovery request is addressed below in appropriate detail. Finally, Mr. Christie’s independent oral motions will also be denied. I. Background The following background information includes many facts that have been alleged, but not proven. Accordingly, the Court provides this background summary with the strenuous caveat that Christie is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that most of the facts below are alleged, and not necessarily conceded or proven. In November 2005, Special Agent (“SA”) Douglas Macfarlane of the Federal Bureau of Investigation located in California learned that an individual named Jerrod Lochmiller wished to provide information to law enforcement through his attorney. At that time, Lochmiller was a fugitive in a federal fraud case in Los Angeles, and he also was the administrator of an Internet website designed to facilitate the exchange of videos, images, and stories, some or all of which concerned child pornography. The website, www.namgla.net (hereinafter “NAMGLA” or the “website”), was password-protected, which means that casual browsing on the Internet would not allow access to the website absent a password. NAMGLA is believed to be an acronym for “North American Man Girl Love Association.” Despite the FBI’s admission that Loch-miller wanted to provide information through his attorney, the FBI did not contact Lochmiller’s attorney until April 2006. In the interim, starting in November 2005, SA Macfarlane logged into the NAMGLA website in an undercover capacity using a screen name and password provided by Lochmiller. At that time, SA Macfarlane learned that NAMGLA operated as a message board where users posted messages that other users could view. These messages often included links to other websites, which stored picture and video files depicting what appeared to be child pornography. On one occasion in April 2006, SA Macfarlane observed a message posted by a user named “franklee,” whom the Government alleges is Russell Christie. In the message, Christie provided a link to a movie file that was nearly 19 minutes long, and included images of a prepubescent female lying nude on a bed. An adult male hand can be seen rubbing the child’s buttocks, and the camera zooms in and out of the child’s genitalia. There is also an adult female on the video, who is spreading open and posing the child’s legs. At another point in the video, an adult male’s erect penis is shown rubbing against the girl’s vagina until the male ejaculates onto the girl’s vagina. Later, the adult male can be seen inserting his penis into the girl’s mouth before pulling out and ejaculating into her mouth. Through its investigation, the FBI determined that the postings on NAMGLA by the user name “franklee” originated at 68A Phillips Road, Newton, New Jersey. A hardly insignificant fact is that at the time of his arrest, Christie, age 48, was employed as a school bus driver in the Andover district in Sussex County. The FBI learned that Russell Christie resides at both 68 and 68A Phillips Road. Green Valley Beach Campground is also located at 68 Phillips Road, and is owned by Janet Christie, Russell’s mother. The importance of the distinction between 68 and 68A will become obvious later, but suffice to say at this point that the FBI acquired information that placed Russell Christie at both addresses, which were allegedly indistinguishable from the outside. Ultimately, the FBI determined that Christie resided at 68 Phillips Road, not 68A, and thus the agents applied for a search warrant for that address. On July 24, 2006, Magistrate Judge Patty Shwartz signed the search warrant, and agents executed it the following morning at about 6:00 AM. Within twenty minutes, the agents determined that Christie resided at 68A, not 68, and so they immediately exited the dwelling, contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Newark, and ultimately decided to apply for a search warrant for 68A Phillips Road. An agent was dispatched back to Newark to draft and obtain the new affidavit, and thereafter it was presented to Magistrate Judge Shwartz for review and consideration. While the one agent was away to acquire the new search warrant, other agents remained outside the 68 Phillips Road address, after having secured and cleared the dwelling. The agents informed Christie and his mother that neither of them could enter the 68A address unaccompanied by agents, but that they were not under arrest, and neither were they under any obligation to remain with the agents outside the apartment. As a result, Christie’s mother went about her day, but Christie apparently stayed with the agents and made several statements. At approximately 1:15 PM, Magistrate Judge Shwartz signed the new search warrant for 68A, the agent returned to the address at about 2:00 PM, and the search of the apartment began. The agents seized a computer containing approximately 567 postings to NAMGLA, hundreds of videos of alleged child pornography, and thousands of images of alleged child pornography. At about 6:00 PM, the agents arrested Christie. On July 26, 2006, the Government charged Christie in a criminal Complaint alleging that Christie possessed child pornography. On April 20, 2007, a Grand Jury returned a two-count Indictment charging Christie with one count of receiving and distributing child pornography, and one count of possessing child pornography. Subsequently, on October 19, 2007, the Grand Jury returned this eight-count Superseding Indictment charging Christie with six counts of advertising and attempted advertising of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A), one count of receipt and attempted receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1), and one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The current motion by Christie involves multiple issues. First, Christie moves to dismiss Counts 2 through 6 (the advertising counts) as multiplicious of Count 1, which also charges advertising. Second, Christie moves to dismiss Counts 1 through 3 on the ground that they fail to allege “notice” as required by the statute. Third, Christie moves to suppress certain evidence seized at his home on the grounds that the affidavit used to acquire the search warrant was materially misleading, and also on the grounds that there was an unlawful execution of the search warrant. Fourth, Christie moves to suppress alleged statements made by him to law enforcement during the seven hours between the time when the one agent left to obtain a new warrant, and the return of that agent and execution of the new warrant. Fifth, Christie makes certain discovery requests for disclosure of: Brady material; Rule 404(b) evidence; tests, reports, and summaries by the Government’s experts; and Jencks Act material. Sixth, and finally, Mr. Christie makes several motions regarding the warrant affidavit, namely that it was stale, overbroad, vague, and lacking in particularity. The Court will address these issues seriatim. II. Motions to Dismiss A. Counts 2 through 6 are not multiplicious of Count 1. The Superseding Indictment sets forth, in its first nine paragraphs, the basic facts about NAMGLA and Christie’s connection to the website through the user name “franklee.” In the ninth paragraph, the Superseding Indictment charges that Christie did knowingly make, print, and publish ... a notice and advertisement seeking and offering to receive ... visual depictions ... of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, and the defendant knowing ... that such notice and advertisement would be transported across state lines by any means, including by computer, specifically the NAMGLA Website; and such notice and advertisement was transported across state lines ..., each [notice and advertisement] constituting a separate Count of this Superseding Indictment. (Superseding Indictment at ¶ 9.) The Superseding Indictment then lists each of six posts to NAMGLA allegedly made by Christie, the date of each post, and a brief description of the contents of the link included in each post. Each post constitutes a separate Count of the Superseding Indictment, and each Count constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A). Christie argues that only one of the first six counts is necessary because there is arguably only one criminal act. In other words, Christie contends that the Government “has divided what is a single alleged act of advertising child pornography into several criminal charges.” (Christie Br. at 6.) Christie insists that doing such is a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and he points to the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir.1978) as support. “Multiplicity [is] the charging of a single offense in different counts of an indictment.” Carter, 576 F.2d at 1064. “The basic inquiry in determining whether counts of an indictment are truly separate, and not multiplicious, is whether proof of one offense charged requires an additional fact that proof of the other offense does not necessitate.” Id. “Also of central importance is whether the legislature intended to make separately punishable the different types of conduct referred to in the various counts.” Id.; see also United States v. Stanfa, 685 F.2d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 1982) (“In practice ... we have usually found the second Carter inquiry [congressional intent] to be determinative of the multiplicity question.”). In Carter, the defendant was charged with two counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute 95 grams of heroin; and (2) distribution of 677 grams of heroin. The defendant argued that he should only have been charged with one count because he brought all of the heroin from Los Angeles to Newark, and thereafter turned it over to his co-conspirator, who set aside 95 grams for himself, and attempted to sell the 677 grams to undercover officers. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument, holding that Congress intended two distinct offenses, punishable by separate sentences, because the acts of possession and distribution involved discrete quantities of narcotics, and thus the facts required to prove the two offenses differed. Id. Carter is not a perfect analogy because it involves the question of whether possession with intent to distribute and distribution are duplicative, not whether multiple instances of distribution are multiplicious, but the case is nevertheless instructive. Indeed, Carter teaches that of “central importance is whether the legislature intended to make separately punishable the different types of conduct referred to in the various counts.” Carter, 576 F.2d at 1064. Here, § 2251(d)(1)(A) provides punishment for anyone who “knowingly ... publishes ... any notice or advertisement seeking or offering ... to distribute ... any visual depiction ... [that] involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” Thus, the actus reus that the legislature intended to punish is the publication of a notice or. advertisement regarding child pornography. The Superseding Indictment charges that Christie did so publish a notice or advertisement on six occasions on five different days between October 2005 and January 2006. It is sensible to punish each publication separately because it is the advertisement that invites the metastasizing of child pornography in our society. By further crude analogy, attempts at prohibiting the oldest profession demonstrate that prohibiting prostitutes from “advertising” their wares on the street corner can have a dramatic effect on the quantity of business transacted. Likewise here, Congress intended to punish the knowing publication of an advertisement that contributes to the proliferation of child pornography. Accordingly, each individual post to a website can be the, basis for a separate charge because each post is intended to increase the quantity and availability of child pornography. The Third Circuit has not addressed this precise issue, but this Court’s conclusion in this regard is buttressed by cases from other circuits. For example, in United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2007), law enforcement searched the defendant’s home and found “a desktop computer, laptop computer, and 223 computer diskettes.... The desktop computer contained 88 videos and still child-pornography photographs; the laptop computer, four still photographs; and the diskettes, thousands of images. In total, [the defendant’s] computer data contained approximately 5,000 child-pornography images.” Id. at 502. The defendant was subsequently charged with three counts of possession of child pornography. Consequently, the defendant “moved to dismiss two of the possession counts on multiplicity grounds, contending he was being prosecuted three times for the same possession-of-child-pornography act.” Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s multiplicity argument, holding that “[f]or the possession statute ..., the actus reus is the possession of child pornography.... Through different transactions, [the defendant] possessed child pornography in three separate places-a laptop and desktop computer and diskettes-and, therefore, committed three separate crimes. The counts are not multiplicitous.” Id. In reaching its holding, the Planck court analogized to receipt/distribution statutes addressing child pornography. The court explained that in those circumstances, “each separate receipt of child pornography violates the statute” and “each separate use of the mail to transport or ship child pornography should constitute a separate crime.” Id. (citing United States v. Buchanan, 485 F.3d 274, 279-82 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Gallardo, 915 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir.1990)). Similar to the defendant in Planck, Christie is charged with advertising child pornography on six separate occasions. Each of Counts 1 through 6 charge that Christie advertised five different videos and one series of images in six discrete postings spread across four months. Christie provides no logical basis upon which to conclude that any posting could be considered duplicative of any other posting, much less that Counts 2 through 6 constitute a multiplicious charge of Count 1. Christie’s argument that he should only be charged once for advertising because he was only charged once for possession of thousands of images of child pornography is unpersuasive. The possession statute prohibits the possession of “any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). In other words, it is illegal to possess an object containing an image of child pornography, regardless of how many images are contained within that object. As Planck held, one can be separately charged for the possession of each object — book, magazine, computer disk — that contains even one image of child pornography, but if that object contains thousands of images, a defendant can still be charged with only one count of violating the statute. By contrast, the advertising statute makes it illegal to commit the act of advertising, regardless of how many images are included in each advertisement. Accordingly, each act of advertising can result in a separate charge. This holding is supported by Third Circuit caselaw. In United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.1989), our Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that he could not be charged for both sending child pornography through the mails and for carrying those same materials across state lines. Id. at 121 n. 5. The Villard court found that the defendant could be charged separately “because the government must prove different facts in order to achieve convictions in each of [the separate counts].” Id. Similarly, here the Government must prove different facts for each of Counts 1 through 6, namely that Christie made each post and that each post contained a notice and advertisement of child pornography. For the foregoing reasons, Christie’s motion to dismiss Counts 2 through 6 as multiplicious will be denied. B. The Government sufficiently alleged “notice” as to Counts 1 through 3. In a single paragraph, Christie contends that the Government failed to plead an essential element of the offense in Counts 1 through 3. Those Counts reference postings allegedly made by Christie, each of which simply contain a link to a video, without any description of what the link or corresponding video contains. These Counts differ from Counts 4 through 6, each of which contains a description of the contents of the video of alleged child pornography. Accordingly, Christie contends that “nowhere in [Counts 1 through 3] is there a notice, advertisement or any indication whatsoever, of what the link contains.” (Christie Br. at 7.) In other words, Christie argues that the posts containing only links do not satisfy the notice or advertisement requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A). Christie then declares that the “Third Circuit has not addressed this specific issue.” (Id.) Christie’s argument is unpersuasive. To adopt his interpretation of what notice and advertisement means in the statute would be to hold that the statute cannot reach an individual who disseminates child pornography without a written description of the contents of that child pornography. Such an interpretation would carve a hole in the statute big enough to render the statute non-existent because purveyors of child pornography would quickly learn that they can operate with impunity so long as they do not provide words to accompany their illegal pictures. That would completely negate the primary intent of Congress: to eliminate the exchange of child pornography. While it is true that the Third Circuit has not addressed the question of what constitutes “notice and advertisement,” the Government points to a Second Circuit case to counter Christie’s argument. In United States v. Rowe, 414 F.3d 271 (2d Cir.2005), the court of appeals addressed a situation in which the defendant had posted, in an Internet chat room, the following: “[v2.3b] Fserve Trigger: !tun Ratio 1:1 Offering: Pre boys/girl pics. Read the rules. [1 of 2 slots in use].” Id. at 273. This seemingly incomprehensible jargon was understood by users of the chat room “preteenOO” to be information on how to access the defendant’s home computer, download, and upload photographs of underage children. See id. The defendant later argued that this post was beyond the scope of the advertising statute because it “does not by its very terms indicate it is seeking or offering material of a pornographic nature.” Id. at 276. The Rowe court rejected that argument, explaining that “there is no requirement that an advertisement must specifically state that it offers or seeks a visual depiction to violate [the statute].” Id. at 277 (quoting United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 255 F.Supp.2d 200, 218 (S.D.N.Y.2003)) (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the court further noted that “no particular magic words or phrases need to be included” to satisfy the notice and advertisement requirement of the statute. See id. Importantly, the Rowe court found it significant that the chat room contained queries such as “anybody with baby sex pics for trade?,” and the court noted that offering pictures of children in a chat room containing such queries or comments was sufficient to constitute notice and advertisement within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 276. In other words, the court deemed context important in answering the question of whether a facially vague post constitutes notice and advertisement. Here, the NAMGLA website was primarily dedicated to the exchange of alleged child pornography. Thus, a user of the password-protected website could reasonably understand that a post containing a link would not lead the user to pictures of unicorns and butterflies, but instead would yield images or video of children in a sexually explicit manner. But it is actually irrelevant whether an individual would accurately predict that a given link posted on the Internet would yield child pornography. The question is whether the posting of the link itself constitutes a notice and advertisement. In that regard, Rowe is instructive inasmuch as it held that the purported advertisement need not expressly declare, “I have child-pornographic images for trade.” Rowe, 414 F.3d at 277. Indeed, “Congress did not intend its bar on advertising for child pornography to be so easily evaded.” Id. A notice and advertisement need not be explicit itself, for to hold such would be to encourage the proliferation of child pornography so long as it is done in a “subtle” manner by merely posting on a password-protected website dedicated to child pornography a direct link to a prohibited video. Accordingly, this Court holds that a non-descriptive link to an image or video of child pornography satisfies the notice and advertisement element of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. In that regard, Christie’s motion to dismiss Counts 1 through 3 will be denied. III. Motions to Suppress Evidence A. The warrantless seizure of Christie’s home pending the supplemental search warrant was not unreasonable. Christie next moves to suppress the evidence seized at his home on the grounds that the seizure of his home was unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As previously mentioned, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant for 68 Phillips Road, but quickly realized that Christie resided at 68A, an attached apartment to 68. Realizing this, the officers exited 68 and dispatched an agent back to Newark to obtain a new warrant for 68A. While the agent was obtaining the new warrant, other agents stayed at the scene and informed Christie that was he not permitted to go back into his apartment at 68A unaccompanied by law enforcement, but that he was free to go anywhere else. The agent designated to obtain the new search warrant returned approximately seven hours later. Christie contends that the seven-hour seizure of his home was unreasonable because the officers did not act diligently in obtaining a search warrant. In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a situation similar to this case. There, police officers accompanied a wife to her marital home, where her husband was present, so that she could remove her belongings in peace. As she left the dwelling, she told the officers that her husband had drugs in the house. The officers asked the husband if they could search his home, but the husband declined them entry. The officers then dispatched another officer to obtain a search warrant. During the interim, the officers told the husband that he was not permitted to re-enter the home without being accompanied by an officer. After about two hours, the officer returned with a search warrant, and the officers found drugs. The husband was arrested, charged and later convicted. The defendant in McArthur argued that the warrantless seizure of his home while the officers obtained a search warrant was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court began with the text of the Fourth Amendment, noted that the Court has often required a warrant for seizures, but then noted that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, namely exigent circumstances. The McArthur Court ultimately held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of the defendant’s home, especially in light of the appropriately balanced privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns. The Court based its holding on the combination of four circumstances: (1) probable cause to believe the defendant’s home contained evidence of a crime or contraband; (2) good reason to believe that the defendant, unless restrained, would destroy the evidence; (3) reasonable efforts to reconcile law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy; and (4) limited period of time for the restraint’s imposition. Id. at 331-32,121 S.Ct. 946. Here, Christie concedes that the Government had probable cause to believe he had evidence of a crime or contraband. He also concedes that the Government had good reason to believe that he would destroy evidence if he had not been restrained. And Christie concedes that the Government took reasonable efforts to reconcile the need to prevent evidence destruction with the demands of Christie’s personal privacy. In other words, Christie concedes that the Government satisfies the McArthur test on the first three of four factors. It is the fourth factor — limited period of time — that Christie insists is not met in his case. That is, Christie argues that the officers “did not exercise diligence in obtaining a search warrant for the premises.” (Christie Br. at 11.) Christie points to McArthur, which found that the two-hour warrantless seizure was reasonable, to support his argument “that a time period longer than ‘reasonably necessary’ to obtain a warrant would make the temporary seizure unreasonable and therefore unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.” (Christie Br. at 11.) Christie’s somewhat circular argument is no doubt true: It is unreasonable for a seizure to last longer than is reasonably necessary. But that simply begs the question of what is reasonable. In that regard, Christie contends that the seven to eight hours that were spent waiting for the FBI to return with a new search warrant “was clearly unnecessary and should be deemed unreasonable.” (Id. at 12.) Christie then observes that the drive between Newark and Newton should take “just under an hour,” and thus “it remains a mystery as to why the FBI did not return until 2:00 p.m.” (Id.) Christie concludes by arguing that “[ejither it reasonably and legitimately took more than five hours to prepare and obtain the supplemental warrant, or the FBI was not diligent in so obtaining the affidavit.” (Id.) Thus, it appears that Christie concedes that all but about five hours of the warrantless seizure were reasonably necessary. Even then, Christie appears to implicitly acknowledge that the FBI could “reasonably and legitimately” take five hours to obtain a supplemental warrant. The question then is whether the officers did in fact act diligently. The Government argues that “the several hours it took agents to secure a search warrant for 68A Phillips Road is explained by the warrant process, which is circumspect by design.” (Gov’t Br. at 9.) Specifically, the Government explains that it “had to dispatch an FBI agent to Newark during [morning] rush hour, draft the application, search warrant, and attendant documents, present those documents to Judge Shwartz for consideration, have the judge review and comment upon those documents, and make any changes requested by the judge.” (Id.) In other words, the Government contends that “[e]ven with diligence, it was a lengthy process.” (Id.) In support of its argument that the officers acted with diligence, the Government points to a couple of cases. Most persuasively for the Government’s argument, the district court in United States v. Nguyen, No. 07-10050, 2008 WL 346114 (D.Mass. Feb.7, 2008) denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized after a warrantless seizure of his residence for a little more than seven hours pending the receipt of a search warrant. Id. at *3. The facts of Nguyen remarkably parallel the facts in this case. For example, there the officers restricted the defendant and other occupants of the house from entering the house without a police escort. In addition, the length of the warrantless seizure was almost exactly the same as the length in this case: seven hours. Similarly, in United States v. Legette, 260 Fed.Appx. 247 (11th Cir.2008), the court of appeals upheld a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress where officers detained an individual in his house for three to four hours pending a search warrant. In addition, McArthur itself relied on Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), which found that the Fourth Amendment was not violated where officers unlawfully entered an apartment and occupied it for 19 hours while waiting for a search warrant that could not be obtained until the next day. Id. at 798, 104 S.Ct. 3380 (“Specifically, we hold that where officers, having probable cause, ... arrest the occupants ... and take them into custody and, for no more than the period here involved, [19 hours], secure the premises from within to preserve the status quo while others, in good faith, are in the process of obtaining a warrant, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable seizures.”); see also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970) (cited favorably in McArthur for its holding that a 29-hour detention of a mailed package was reasonable given the unavoidable delay in obtaining a warrant). At bottom, this Court concludes that the agents in this case had probable cause to believe that Christie’s home contained contraband, which was evidence of a crime. They reasonably believed that Christie, if left free of any restraint, would destroy that evidence. They imposed a restraint that was both limited and reasonably tailored to secure law enforcement needs while protecting privacy interests. And the agents acted diligently in obtaining the supplemental search warrant in as timely a manner as reasonably possible. Accordingly, the restraint met the demands of the Fourth Amendment, and Christie’s motion to suppress the evidence seized will be denied. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 337, 121 S.Ct. 946. B. Decision is reserved as to the suppression of any statements made by Christie. Christie also moves to suppress “any statements or recordings taken without the presence of an attorney and without first informing Mr. Christie of his rights.” (Christie Br. at 21.) But Christie has not identified any particular statement that meets either of these criteria. Moreover, mere lack of an attorney’s presence or lack of informing Christie of his rights does not, by itself, require suppression of such statements. Indeed, as Christie hints, the appropriate question is one of voluntariness. As the Supreme Court held .in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), “the test of voluntariness [asks whether] the confession [is] the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Id. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. If yes, then “it may be used against him,” but “if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.” Id. at 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041; see also United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 108 (3d Cir.2005) (“Statements made to a law enforcement officer are inadmissable into evidence if the statements are ‘involuntary.’ ”) (citing Bustamonte). This Court is well aware of the voluntariness test, and will apply it to any challenged statement at the appropriate time. But because there is no specific statement challenged at this point, the Court will defer decision until such challenge with some degree of specificity is made. Indeed, Christie’s counsel informed the Court at oral argument that the defense was in receipt of a letter from the Government setting forth a number of statements allegedly made by Mr. Christie. (See Tr. 24:7-16.) Despite the disclosure by the Government, Christie has not attempted to argue that he was in custody and had not received his Miranda warnings, nor has he argued that his will was overborne by the agents on his porch. To the extent that Christie desires a hearing to address each of the statements, the Court concludes that such a separate hearing is unnecessary. Instead, the Court will, at trial, address any objection to a proposed statement being offered by the Government by requesting a proffer, hearing arguments from all parties, and then ruling on the admissibility of the statement. IV. Requests for a hearing A. A Franks hearing is not mandated in this case. In addition to the foregoing motions to dismiss the Superseding Indictment, and suppress evidence, Christie also requests a hearing, in accordance with Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), to determine whether the evidence should be suppressed for various alleged errors on the part of the Government. The Court will address each issue in turn. Christie contends that the affidavit submitted by the FBI agent to obtain the search warrant “was prepared in a deliberately misleading manner,” and therefore a “Franks hearing is necessary to determine whether the statements in the Affidavit were either recklessly or intentionally untruthful or misleading [such that] the seized evidence in this case needs to be suppressed.” (Christie Br. at 9.) In Franks, the Supreme Court announced a new rule and rejected the decisions of the courts below that held that a defendant may never challenge the veracity of an affidavit used to obtain a warrant. In rejecting such a categorical ban on the challenge to an affidavit, the Franks Court declared that “the rule announced today has a limited scope, both in regard to when exclusion of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a hearing on allegations of misstatements must be accorded.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 167, 98 S.Ct. 2674. Indeed, the Supreme Court took great pains to identify just how limited is the scope of the rule allowing a hearing: There is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise rehable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. ... Finally, if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required. Id. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674. The lengthy quotation above can be summarized in a few points. First, the affidavit used to obtain a search warrant is presumed valid. Second, a defendant must allege deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Third, there must be an offer of proof to support such allegations, and an affidavit should accompany it. Fourth, and finally, even if all of the above are met, a hearing may be denied if there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause. See id. As previously mentioned, Christie seeks a hearing “to determine whether the statements in the Affidavit were either recklessly or intentionally untruthful or misleading.” (Christie Br. at 9.) But that is precisely what Christie must allege, with sufficient supporting affidavits or other proof, to even get to a hearing. Instead, Christie seeks a hearing based upon an allegedly misleading omission. See Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir.1997) (declining a mechanistic application of Franks, and instead holding that “a court, when confronted with a false affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, must remove a falsehood created by an omission by supplying the omitted information to the original affidavit”) (emphases added) (citing United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1486-87 n. 1 (9th Cir.1985)). Nevertheless, Christie fails to allege a material omission amounting to a deliberate falsehood. On the contrary, Christie merely maligns the fact that “while the Affidavit is careful to state that SA Macfarlane accessed the website in the six-month period preceding the FBI’s contact with Mr. Lochmiller’s lawyer, it does so almost in passing.” (Christie Br. at 8.) Thus, there is no allegation of an omission because Christie acknowledges that the FBI included in the affidavit the fact that it accessed the website prior to contacting Lochmiller’s attorney. Such is hardly sufficient to come within the narrow scope of Franks such that a hearing is mandated here. Indeed, a Franks hearing is not mandated simply because the defendant would prefer certain facts to have greater prominence in the warrant affidavit. Later, Christie argues that the “passing” reference was deliberately placed out of chronological order for sinister reasons: “The placement of the paragraph detailing the FBI agent’s meeting with Mr. Loch-miller’s attorney first, and then slipping in the next paragraph that SA Macfarlane had logged onto NAMGLA well before that meeting, creates the impression that the FBI’s monitoring of the site began only after the meeting with Mr. Lochmiller’s attorney.” (Christie Br. at 8-9.) But Christie then acknowledges that the facts become clear, but “[o]nly after carefully scrutinizing the Affidavit.” (Id. at 9.) In other words, Christie argues that he is entitled to a Franks hearing because the affidavit, “although accurate, [had a] paragraph structure [that] was not to [Christie’s] liking.” (See Gov’t Br. at 6.) But Christie points to no case concluding that a hearing is required simply because an affidavit’s events fail to follow a strict chronology- Christie is apparently even more concerned with the lack of detail regarding the “nature and scope of SA Macfarlane’s contact or involvement with, or direction of, Mr. Lochmiller in that initial six-month period.” (Christie Br. at 8.) Christie’s concern stems from a belief that NAMGLA’s start date “nearly coincides” with Lochmiller’s contact with the FBI, such that “the timing raises serious questions about how the activities of SA Macfarlane were portrayed to [Magistrate Judge Shwartz].” (Id.) Similarly, Christie speculates that the Government’s close relationship with Loch-miller also “raises questions about whether his activity violated the Electronic Wiretapping and Surveillance Act.” (Id.) Again, a Franks hearing is not required simply because a defendant has suspicions about the Government’s activities in investigating him. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (holding that a hearing is not mandated where the defendant has a “mere desire to cross-examine”). Were a criminal defendant’s conjecture that the Government is “out to get him” sufficient to mandate a Franks hearing, the rule announced in Franks would cease to have the “limited scope” expressly intended by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, Christie’s argument that “it is possible that SA Macfarlane was utilizing Mr. Lochmiller’s monitoring equipment” is insufficient to mandate a Franks hearing. Christie suggests that SA Macfarlane might have viewed the private messages of Christie without having first obtained a judicial order authorizing the interception of an electronic communication, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518. But Christie is forced to acknowledge that the affidavit submitted by SA Jacqueline Cristiano of the FBI in Newark expressly declares that she did not review any of the private messages captured by Lochmiller “nor has any of their content been used or relied upon for any part of this affidavit.” (Christie Br. at 9 (quoting Aff. at 9 n. 2).) Thus, Christie is left to speculate that another agent of the Government might have violated § 2518. (See Tr. 7:21-25) (“[W]e have grave concerns [that] there was a potential that the FBI were monitoring personal communications on this NAMGLA website without the authorized warrant that is necessary.”); see id. at 8:11-14 (“[T]here is a really real possibility that the agents may have been viewing communications on a computer without the proper wiretape warrant that is required.”). This is plainly insufficient to mandate a Franks hearing. Regardless, as the Government persuasively argues, even if the warrant affidavit was lacking in some facts, the warrant was still supported by probable cause. In other words, even if the affidavit were drafted the way Christie seems to propose, including the alleged omission that the Government illegally viewed private communications, there were sufficient facts attested to that would permit a probable cause finding. Even if the FBI had a heavy hand in directing the rules of the NAMGLA website, “it would remain unchanged that Russell Christie posted child pornography from IP addresses tied to his home computer.” {See Gov’t Br. at 7.) Indeed, as the Government pointed out at oral argument, the twenty-six page warrant affidavit explains that the FBI “saw in the public posting section of the NAMGLA [website], not the private posting section, but the public posting section, there were two images and videos posted by Russell Christie.” (Tr. 13:9-11.) While any improper activity by the FBI might be the basis for an entrapment defense, that potential affirmative defense does not change the fact that Christie made such postings from his computer in New Jersey, which is sufficient on its face for a finding of probable cause to issue a warrant. Finally, Christie also requests a Franks hearing on the grounds that the FBI “acted with reckless disregard on their execution of the search warrant” because they had received information from various sources stating that Christie resided at 68A Phillips Road, instead of 68, the address for which the FBI sought the initial search warrant. But the Franks Court expressly declared that a hearing is not mandated where the defendant makes allegations of “negligence or innocent mistake.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674. There is nothing to suggest that the agents committed an offense any greater than innocent mistake. Indeed, they obviously wanted to search Christie’s residence, so it remains a mystery why Christie believes that the agents acted with “reckless disregard” by mistakenly requesting to search his mother’s house. In that regard, if Christie is asserting that the agents should not have sought to search his mother’s house, he lacks standing. If, however, he is arguing that the agents acted with reckless disregard because they had information that he lived at 68A, that argument is unavailing because the agents also had information that he lived at 68. For example, the FBI checked the public database AutoTrack, which indicated that Christie resided at both 68 and 68A Phillips Road. (Aff. at ¶ 28.) In addition, a telephone number subscribed to by Christie had a billing address of 68. While it is true that the FBI had more indications that Christie lived at 68A than 68, the warrant affidavit declares that the “FBI agents could locate no structure with the number ’68A’ affixed to it.... Accordingly, agents believe that ’68A’ is an alternative mailing address employed by Russell Christie.” (Id. at ¶ 34.) Christie’s submission to this Court of a photograph of a door with “68A” in letters no more than two inches tall simply suggests that the agents made a mistake in their calculation that 68 and 68A were one residence. As the Government elaborated at oral argument, the building is a single residential structure, and the door to 68A is on the side of the building, accessed from the porch. Notably, “the door was marked not with actual letters of any permanency, but marked in black marker ... so it is certainly not something that would be observable from the street” by the FBI when they conducted physical surveillance in advance of applying for the search warrant. (Tr. 20:23 to 21:11.) There is nothing to suggest that the agents acted with reckless disregard. Indeed, their actions belie any such suggestion because as soon as they entered 68 and realized that 68A was an arguably distinct residence that did not come within the ambit of the search warrant, the agents immediately exited 68 and dispatched an agent to obtain a corrected search warrant. These actions by the FBI demonstrate the exact opposite of reckless disregard on the execution of the search warrant. Therefore, Christie’s request for a Franks hearing will be denied because he has not satisfied the requirements of Franks to mandate a hearing, especially given this Court’s conclusion that the affidavit would have been sufficient to support a finding of probable cause even if any alleged material omissions had been included. See United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 677-78 (3d Cir.1993) (affirming district court’s denial of a Franks hearing for failure to make a “substantial preliminary showing of the affiant’s untruthfulness” even though defendant had proffered his own affidavit, the affidavit of a private investigator, and evidence showing several inaccuracies in the warrant affidavit). B. A hearing to determine whether the Government engaged in “outrageous conduct” is denied. In addition to the foregoing requests for a Franks hearing, Christie also seeks a hearing, outside of the Franks context, to determine whether evidence should be suppressed or even the Superseding Indictment dismissed “based upon the [G]overnment[’]s outrageous conduct.” (Christie Br. at 14.) “It is the law of this circuit that a criminal defendant may raise a due process challenge to an indictment against her based on a claim that the government employed outrageous law enforcement investigative techniques.” United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). But the Third Circuit, “[w]hile continuing to recognize, in theory, the outrageousness defense,” has “nonetheless observed that, because of the extraordinary nature of the doctrine, the judiciary has been ‘extremely hesitant’ to uphold claims that law enforcement conduct violates the Due Process clause.” Id. at 230 (citing First Circuit case as declaring the defense “moribund” because “[t]he banner of outrageous misconduct is often raised but seldom saluted”); see also United States v. Diaz, 189 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir.1999) (recognizing severe limitations of defense and acknowledging suggestion that the “court should ... reject the outrageous government conduct defense as a chimera or unicorn — -often hunted but never taken into captivity”). Indeed, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 378 (3d Cir.1978), found that the government’s investigatory misconduct was so egregious that the due process clause demanded dismissal of the indictment against him, but the Nolarir-Cooper court, twenty years later, observed that the Third Circuit had “not found another set of facts that satisfy the rigorous requirements” of the outrageous misconduct defense. Nolarir-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 224. Nevertheless, Christie points to Twigg and a prior case, United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.1975), to support his argument that a hearing should be held “to determine the timing and extent of the agents’ actions ... and whether it amounts to outrageous governmental conduct.” (Christie Br. at 14-15.) But none of the Government conduct that Christie suggests qualifies as outrageous conduct even comes close to the activities of law enforcement in the cases cited by Christie. In Twigg, the government directed a convicted felon striving to reduce the severity of his sentence to create a drug lab. The government further encouraged the lab’s creation by providing a farmhouse as a secure location, twenty percent of the glassware needed, and, importantly, the indispensable chemical ingredient necessary to make the methamphetamine. It was only after all of this government involvement that the defendants in Twigg became tangential players in the drug-making scheme at the behest of the felon working as an agent for the government. In other words, “Twigg ... involved a quite egregious case of government overinvolvement in which the government’s undercover operative essentially concocted and conducted the entire illicit scheme.” Nolarir-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 230. Here, Christie does not allege that he was contacted by Lochmiller or an agent of the FBI, nor does he allege that they encouraged him to engage in the possession, receipt, or advertising of child pornography. At most, Christie alleges that the rules of NAMGLA required the website users to make at least one post every month in order to retain access to the website. Thus, Christie implicitly contends that if the FBI was involved in the creation of these rules, then arguably it encouraged the exchange of child pornography. But Christie neglects to mention that access to forums on the website appears to have been predicated on making an initial post of child pornography. (See Aff. ¶ 21(b).) That is, Christie could not obtain access to the website, or at least certain portions of it, without first committing an unlawful act of advertising child pornography. This can hardly be considered analogous to Twigg where the government essentially created the illegal product, had its undercover operative give the illegal product to the unwitting defendant, and then arrested the defendant after receiving a call from the operative that the defendant had the illegal product in his possession. There is no suggestion that the FBI created the child pornography or gave it to Christie to post on NAMGLA so that he could be charged with advertising, receipt, or possession. On the contrary, there is a strong suggestion that any child pornography that Christie posted on NAMGLA came into Christie’s possession via his own perusal of the Internet because there is no suggestion that Christie created any of the videos or images that he is charged with advertising or possessing. In other words, Christie’s case is not analogous to Twigg because Christie came by the illegal product and advertised it of his own accord, irrespective of any Government wrongdoing alleged by Christie. Christie points to another case, West, as further support for his argument that the Government engaged in outrageous conduct. But West is no better an analogue than Twigg. In West, a drug dealer working with the government approached an old Mend of his who was a City of Philadelphia truck driver who had never had any involvement with narcotics. The drug dealer proposed a scheme to the truck driver whereby they would sell fake or “over-cut” heroin. The drug dealer proposed that he would supply the heroin and that the truck driver need only pose as the seller. As it turned out, the drug dealer had planned this scheme with an undercover police officer, who was going to pose as the buyer from the truck driver seller. In other words, West involved “a confederation of two government agents, one an informer who ... actually supplied the narcotics in question and the other an undercover officer who, as prearranged with the informer, bought this contraband from the accused third person whom the informer had persuaded to join with him in a selling venture.” West, 511 F.2d at 1085. Again, just as in Twigg, the facts in West hardly compare to the facts in Christie’s case. There is nothing to suggest that Lochmiller and the FBI conspired to produce or distribute child pornography, and then placed such illicit material in Christie’s hands so as to catch and charge him with a crime. On the contrary, it appears that Christie independently sought out NAMGLA and actively participated in the exchange of child pornography through that website. It further appears as though the FBI simply sat, figuratively, in the corner of the room and observed Christie engage in illegal activity of his own free will. Moreover, the Third Circuit has, since Twigg, rejected the outrageous conduct defense in a context that appeared much more egregious than anything Christie has alleged here. In Nolan-Cooper, an undercover IRS agent posed as a wealthy drug dealer so as to catch a Philadelphia lawyer engaged in a money-laundering scheme. In the course of the agent’s undercover operation, he purported to develop a romantic relationship, and ultimately had sex with the female lawyer. Nevertheless, our Court of Appeals found these circumstances insufficient to come within the outrageous conduct defense. Given the facts of Nolcm-Cooper, Christie’s allegations pale in comparison. Therefore, the Court will deny Christie’s request for a hearing on this matter given the paucity of allegations amounting to anything remotely egregious. Should more information come to light that more appropriately fits within the TwiggfWest/Nolcm-Cooper framework, this Court will address such revelations at the appropriate time. V. Discovery Motions In addition to the foregoing motions, Christie also has moved for certain discovery. But, as the Government notes, many of Christie’s requests are addressed in this Court’s standing discovery Order (“SDO”) dated May 22, 2007. For example, Christie’s request for evidence favorable to him, and unfavorable to the prosecution, i.e., Brady evidence, is addressed in SDO ¶ 1(f) and (g). To the extent that Christie seeks early disclosure of Brady or Giglio material, the Third Circuit has held that ordering disclosure on the day the -witness is to testify satisfies the requirements of due process. See United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir.1983). In addition, Christie’s request for Rule 404(b) evidence is addressed in SDO ¶ 3, and such evidence is to be turned over to Christie within 10 days of trial. Accordingly, Christie’s request for Rule 404(b) evidence is not only redundant, but premature given that we are still weeks away from trial. As for Christie’s request for discovery of all scientific and expert reports, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E), that too is addressed in SDO ¶ 1(d) and (e). Furthermore, Christie’s request for Jencks Act material is addressed in SDO ¶4. To the extent that Christie requests “early disclosure” of such material, the Government has declared that it “will voluntarily produce Jencks material three days before the testimony of each witness.” (Gov’t Br. at 17.) Notably, the express statutory language of the Jencks Act declares that the defendant is not entitled to such material until the Government’s witness has testified. Thus, Christie’s request for disclosure earlier than the Government’s voluntary disclosure three days in advance will be denied. See United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 773 (3d Cir.1978) (“[T]he Jencks Act flatly states that disclosure of prior statements by government witnesses may not be compelled ‘until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.’ ”). As for Christie’s request for information regarding any lost or destroyed evidence, the Government has advised the Court that it is unaware of any such evidence, and Christie acknowledges that he too is unaware of any such evidence. Accordingly, this request is moot until such time as the status quo changes. In addition, Christie requests a hearing on the admissibility of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609. “The Government does not oppose this request.” (Gov’t Br. at 19.) Thus, unanimity reigns, and the Court will oblige the parties’ request for a hearing at the propitious time on the admissibility of prior convictions of any witness, not just Christie. VI. Christie’s Independent Motions As previously indicated, Christie’s attorneys, at the outset of oral argument, noted that Christie was unhappy with the pretrial motions that they filed on his behalf. This Court permitted Mr. Christie to orally submit a motion independent of that briefed on his behalf by his counsel, the Office of the Federal Public Defender. The Court entertained Mr. Christie’s oral submission, and at that time received his six-page handwritten brief in connection with that motion. Subsequently, Mr. Christie mailed to the Court a thirteen-page continuation brief, with three attached exhibits. Specifically, Mr. Christie “attack[s] the affidavit, warrant application, search warrant and superceding indictment dated 10-19-07 for vagueness, overbrea[d]th, particularity and staleness.” (Christie Supp. Br. at 1.) The Court has carefully read Mr. Christie’s written submissions, which articulate his challenges to the affidavit and warrant. The Court will attempt to synthesize his arguments so as to give full consideration to each. A. The search warrant affidavit did not contain stale information, and it provides an adequate nexus between the articles to be searched and Mr. Christie’s residence such that the warrant was supported by probable cause. Part I of Mr. Christie’s submission contends that the FBI agent’s affidavit in support of the search warrant does not (1) “provide a nex[u]s between the articles to be searched and seized and the residence on Phillips Road”; (2) “provide [probable] cause to believe said articles would be found in residence on Phillips Road”; and (3) “establish an ongoing criminal activity* thus rendering 30 day old information stale — *(as opposed to an isolated incident).” (Christie Supp. Br. at 4.) Mr. Christie provided the Court with a string citation of 37 cases in support of his argument, but he focuses the Court’s attention on a handful that he apparently believes are especially important. Notably, the crux of Mr. Christie’s written analysis is found in points one and two quoted above, i.e., nexus and probable cause. Mr. Christie does not devote any analysis, in Part I of his brief, to the issue of staleness. Accordingly, the Court will address the heart of his argument regarding nexus and probable cause, but will also endeavor to give appropriate treatment to the issue of staleness. Mr. Christie first cites United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360 (3d Cir.1999), which involved an individual who pled guilty, after his motion to suppress was denied, to knowingly receiving child pornography through the mails and knowingly posse