Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER OF COURT KIM R. GIBSON, District Judge. SYNOPSIS This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Michael George (“Judge George”) (Document No. 25), the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants William Higgins (“Higgins”), Brian Clark (“Clark”), Keith Bowser (“Bowser”), Paul Wypijew-ski (‘Wypijewski”), and the Bedford County Prison Board (“Board”) (Document No. 28), and the Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Bradley E. Hershey (“Hershey”) and Kenneth Benton (“Benton”) (Document No. 30). For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Hershey and Benton (Document No. 30) will be granted, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Higgins, Clark, Bowser, Wypijewski and the Board (Document No. 28) will be granted in part and denied in part, and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Judge George will be denied without prejudice, pending the filing of a more definite statement by Goldhaber. ■ BACKGROUND The Plaintiff, Douglas Goldhaber (“Gold-haber”), commenced this action against the Defendants on June 7, 2006. (Document No. 1). The Defendants responded to Goldhaber’s lawsuit by moving for the dismissal of the Complaint. (Document Nos. 12, 14 & 19). On August 22, 2006, Gold-haber filed an Amended Complaint against the Defendants. (Document No. 24). Thereafter, the Defendants filed the instant Motions to Dismiss. (Document Nos. 25, 28 & 30). Judge George filed a Motion for a Protective Order on February 7, 2007, seeking a stay of all discovery with respect to himself pending a determination by the Court as to whether he is entitled to judicial immunity. (Document No. 36). The Court issued a memorandum opinion on February 22, 2007, granting Judge George’s Motion for a Protective Order. (Document No. 39). Discovery was stayed not only with respect to Judge George, but with respect to all of the Defendants. (Document No. 39). The Court reasoned that the litigation would be structured more efficiently if all of the Defendants were subject to any needed discovery according to the same timetable. {Id., p. 3). On March 15, 2007, the Court dismissed the original Motions to Dismiss filed by the Defendants, explaining that the arguments raised by the Defendants would be addressed within the context of the new Motions to Dismiss, which were filed after Goldhaber filed his Amended Complaint. (Document No. 40). These Motions to Dismiss have been extensively briefed and, therefore, are the subject of this memorandum opinion. Since the matter comes before the Court in this context, the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint are assumed to be true. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 1994, 164 L.Ed.2d 720, 726 (2006); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2143, 144 L.Ed.2d 450, 458 (1999). This is a civil rights action brought by an attorney who alleges that he was the victim of a conspiracy to retaliate against him for seeking legal redress, to prevent him from benefitting from a work-release program during his incarceration, and to extend his incarceration beyond the minimum sentence that he expected to serve. (Document No. 24, pp. 1-3, ¶ 1). Gold-haber was arrested on April 9, 2004, and charged with the offense of driving after imbibing, which is a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802. {Id., p. 4, ¶ 6). During the previous nine and a half years, Goldhaber had worked as a criminal defense attorney in Bedford County, Pennsylvania. {Id., ¶ 7). He spent approximately half of this time working for the Office of the Public Defender for Bedford County, serving as First Assistant Public Defender and as Chief Public Defender. Id. At some point during the end of 1999 or the beginning of 2000, Higgins was hired as an Assistant District Attorney in Bedford County. {Id., ¶ 8). Following the commencement of Higgins’ employment with the District Attorney’s Office, he and Goldhaber began to socialize on a regular basis. {Id., ¶ 9). Goldhaber alleges that Higgins confided in him with respect to business dealings outside of the workplace. Id. According to Goldhaber’s allegations, Higgins bragged about how he had convinced two elderly individuals, one of whom was male and one of whom was female, to transfer title to their homes to his name, his wife’s name, and the name of a friend. {Id., p. 5, ¶ 10). He indicated to Goldhaber that he would borrow money against these homes, use some of the money to make repairs, sell the homes, and then keep the balance of the money. (Id., ¶ 11). Higgins bragged about moving these two elderly individuals to The Bedford County, receiving their social security payments, and attempting to have their social security payments deposited directly into his personal bank account. (Id., ¶ 12). Higgins told Goldhaber that he had placed the woman in the Everett Christian Home, even though she was Jewish, and that he had made the decision to have her cremated after her death (which violates Jewish customs) to decrease the funeral expenses and ensure a monetary windfall for himself. (Id., ¶ 13). Goldhaber also learned, from Higgins, about romantic encounters that Higgins was supposedly having with women other than his wife. (Id., pp. 5-6, ¶ 14). In November 2003, Higgins was elected District Attorney of Bedford County. (Id., p. 6, ¶ 15). Shortly thereafter, the relationship between Higgins and Goldhaber began to deteriorate. (Id., ¶ 16). Gold-haber alleges that Higgins was uncomfortable with Goldhaber’s knowledge of his alleged unethical conduct, and that Higgins would utter profanities at Goldhaber in the courtroom while court was not in session. (Id.). When Higgins took office, Goldhaber was representing the defendant in Commonwealth v. Barnes (No. 535 for the year 2003) in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County. (Id., pp. 6-7, ¶ 17). Goldhaber had successfully negotiated a resolution of the case with Higgins’ predecessor, but this resolution had not been presented to the court prior to Higgins’ assumption of his duties as the District Attorney. Id. Higgins refused to honor the agreement, and a jury trial was held on March 9, 2004. Id. During one of the recesses, Higgins allegedly told Gold-haber that President Judge Daniel Lee Howsare of the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County was engaged in inappropriate ex parte conduct in the Barnes case. Id. Judge Howsare was presiding over that case. Id. These accusations were made by Higgins in the presence of Gold-haber, the defendant, a police officer, a court clerk, a stenographer, and spectators who were attending the trial. Id. After Goldhaber brought these accusations to the attention of Judge Howsare, Higgins denied making them. Id. Nevertheless, Higgins admitted to making the accusations after Goldhaber pointed out that others present in the courtroom had heard Higgins’ comments, and Judge Howsare proceeded to chastise Higgins for his unprofessional conduct. Id. As a result of this incident, as well as other incidents, Higgins harbored a great deal of animosity toward Goldhaber. (Id., p. 7, ¶ 18). The animosity between Higgins and Goldhaber apparently has a long history. Goldhaber alleges that Higgins had given false information about a police report concerning an arson case. (Id, pp. 7-8, ¶ 19). Higgins allegedly stated in court that a police report had indicated that the fire at issue in the case had been set by human hands, while the police report had not actually stated such a conclusion. Id. Judge Howsare allegedly chastised Higgins for this misrepresentation. Id. Hershey is a police officer employed by the Pennsylvania State Police. (Id., p. 1, ¶ 1). During the course of their professional dealings, Higgins told Goldhaber that he and Hershey had a social relationship (i.e., they got together to watch football games, drink beer, and sit in a hot tub). (Id., p. 8, ¶ 21). They harbored a great deal of animosity toward Goldhaber. (Id., p. 9, ¶ 22). Goldhaber alleges that Higgins and Hershey conspired to remove him from the court system in retaliation for his representation of criminal defendants in Bedford County. (Id., ¶ 23). Goldhaber further alleges that Higgins wanted to discredit him because of the information that he had about Higgins’ dealings outside of the workplace, and that Higgins feared that Goldhaber would someday reveal information about those dealings. (Id., ¶ 24). Goldhaber was arrested on April 9, 2004, and charged with the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id., p. 4, ¶ 6). Because the District Attorney’s Office had a conflict of interest, the prosecution was taken over by the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. (Id., p. 9, ¶ 25). At a preliminary hearing on July 19, 2004, the charges against Goldhaber were bound over to the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County. (Id., ¶ 26). Judge Howsare recused himself from any further proceedings involving Goldhaber’s case, and Judge Kevin A. Hess, a member of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, was appointed to preside over the case. (Id., p. 10, ¶ 27). On January 25, 2005, Judge Howsare entered an order terminating Judge Hess’ involvement with the case and appointing Judge George, a member of the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County, to preside. (Id., ¶ 28). No explanation was given for this order. Id. Prior to the trial, Higgins sought to testify on behalf of the Commonwealth. (Id., ¶29). His testimony was excluded because it was “questionable and suspect.” Id. On March 2, 2005, after a jury trial, Goldhaber was found guilty of the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id., p. 10, ¶ 30). Judge George scheduled Goldhaber’s sentencing for April 22, 2005. Id. On that date, Judge George sentenced Goldhaber to a term of incarceration of no less than ninety (90) days nor more than one (1) day less than five (5) years at the Bedford County Correctional Institution. (Id., pp. 10-11, ¶ 31). Work release was permitted. Id. Goldhaber alleges that, after the imposition of this sentence, Higgins “misappropriated the resources of Bedford Borough, Bedford County, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to stalk and harass” him. (Id, p. 11, ¶ 32). On August 5, 2005, Judge George entered an order revoking Goldhaber’s bail because his attorney failed to file an appeal. (Id, ¶ 33). Goldhaber did not learn of Judge George’s order until the late afternoon of August 8, 2005. (Id, ¶34). The order required him to surrender himself to the Bedford County Jail no later than 6:00 P.M. on August 9, 2005. Id Although Higgins was not supposed to be involved with the case because of a conflict of interest, he obtained a copy of Judge George’s order and tried to personally file it in the Office of the Clerk of Courts for Bedford County. (Id, pp. 11-12, ¶35). Higgins allegedly directed police officers to hunt down Goldhaber on August 8, 2005, even though Goldhaber did not have to report to jail until the next day. Id. Higgins also contacted a reporter for the Bedford Gazette in order to ensure that somebody from the newspaper was prepared to photograph Goldhaber when he surrendered himself. Id. On August 9, 2005, Gold-haber’s conviction was appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. (Id, p. 12, ¶ 36). When Goldhaber reported to the Bed-ford County Jail, he was immediately transported to the Clinton County Correctional Facility, where he was housed in a maximum security federal block. (Id., ¶ 37). Clark was the warden of the Bed-ford County Jail, and Bowser was the chief probation officer for Bedford County. (Id., p. 1, ¶ 1). By the time Goldhaber had reported to the Bedford County Jail, a decision had been made by Higgins, Clark, Bowser and the Bedford County Prison Board to detain him outside of Bedford County. (Id., p. 12, ¶ 38). Goldhaber alleges that there was “no rational basis” for housing him outside of Bedford County. Id. Clark made statements to the media indicating that Goldhaber was moved out of the Bedford County Jail because it was thought that his presence there would cause an uproar among the inmates. (Id., ¶ 39). After Goldhaber surrendered himself, his attorney filed a petition seeking the reinstatement of bail, the reinstatement of Goldhaber’s appellate rights, and the return of Goldhaber to the Bedford County Jail. (Id., p. 13, ¶ 40). On August 11, 2005, Judge George entered an order stating that the Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to extend the time period for Goldhaber to seek appellate review of his conviction, that the Court of Common Pleas lacked the authority to direct a warden of a county prison to house Goldhaber at a specific facility, and that Clark’s correspondence to the Court of Common Pleas regarding the reasons for Gold-haber’s confinement elsewhere reflected “rational security concerns.” (Id., pp. 13-14, ¶¶ 41-44). Goldhaber’s request for work release was granted subject to “the rules and regulations of the facility in which he [was] incarcerated.” (Id., p. 13, ¶ 43). Subsequent to this order, Clark agreed to have Goldhaber, who was then being held at the Clinton County Jail, returned to the Bedford County Jail, provided that Goldhaber agreed to sign a waiver to protect the Bedford County Jail from liability in the event that he sustained an injury. (Id., p. 14, ¶ 45). Once Clark became aware of the fact that Goldhaber had agreed to this arrangement, and that Gold-haber was eligible to participate in the work release program, he refused to let Goldhaber be housed in the Bedford County Jail. (Id., ¶ 45). During the 105 days of his incarceration, Goldhaber was housed at four different correctional facilities. (Id., p. 14, ¶ 46). Any reasonable possibility of Goldhaber participating in the work release program was eliminated by his incarceration at the Clinton County Correctional Facility, which is located 125 miles away from his law office. Id. Higgins and Clark were both members of the Bedford County Prison Board. (Id., ¶ 47). The Board was fully aware of Clark’s actions. Id. Gold-haber alleges that the Board intentionally deprived him of his federal and state constitutional rights by permitting him to be housed in Adams County, at Bedford County’s expense, and by deviating from a customary policy of allowing individuals in Goldhaber’s position to be released to probation after completing the minimum sentence. (Id., p. 15, ¶ 48). Bedford County Commissioner Steven Howsare, who was the chairman of the Board, told Goldhaber’s wife that he knew nothing about how to run a jail, and that decisions related to the Bedford County Jail -were generally made by Clark. (Id., ¶ 49). With the assistance of Goldhaber’s attorney, Goldhaber’s wife contacted the Cambria County Prison, which agreed to house Goldhaber. (Id., ¶ 50). The Cam-bria County Prison was in close proximity to Goldhaber’s office. Id. Judge George, Clark, Bowser and the Board were all aware of Goldhaber’s reason for wanting to move to the Cambria County Prison. (Id., ¶ 51). Goldhaber prepaid Cambria County for the costs associated with housing him, thereby making it unnecessary for Bedford County to bear those costs. {Id., p. 16, ¶ 52). On September 1, 2005, Goldhaber was transported from Clinton County to the Cambria County Jail at his own expense. {Id., ¶ 53). Clark expressly agreed to this transfer, and he accepted money from Goldhaber’s wife to finance it. Id. Goldhaber did not try to hide his reasons from any of the Defendants for wanting to be moved. {Id., ¶ 54). On or around September 9, 2005, Goldhaber had obtained an order from Judge Gerard Long, the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, permitting him to participate in Cambria County’s work release program and to serve his sentence under house arrest. (Document No. 1, pp. 5-8). Goldhaber alleges that after he was moved to the Cambria County Jail, Higgins had him moved to the Bedford County Jail. (Document No. 24, pp. 16-17, ¶ 55). This allegedly occurred as a result of a conspiracy between Higgins, Judge George, Bowser, Clark and the Board. Id. Goldhaber was removed from the Cambria County Prison, and taken to the Bedford County Jail, on September 13, 2005. Id. While he was at the Bedford County Jail, Goldhaber was often left alone with several other inmates for extended periods of time. Id. He apparently views this as being inconsistent with Clark’s earlier indications that his housing in the Bedford County Jail would cause an uproar among the other inmates. Id. While Goldhaber was at the Bedford County Jail, he spoke directly with Clark. {Id., p. 17, ¶ 56). Clark allegedly informed Goldhaber that he would be kept in solitary confinement for an indefinite period of time. Id. When Goldhaber asked why he had been moved to and from several different facilities, Clark responded by saying that he did not agree to let Gold-haber participate in the work release program. Id. Clark further stated that any complaints by Goldhaber about the situation would result in him being shipped to a state correctional facility. Id. Goldhaber alleges that Judge George was in contact with Higgins, Clark and Bowser. {Id., ¶ 57). These four individuals allegedly conspired to ensure that Goldhaber was unable to participate in the work release program. Id. Goldhaber apparently believes that he was moved from the Cambria County Jail to the Bedford County Jail precisely because Judge George, Higgins, Clark and Bowser wanted to preclude his participation in the work release that would have been available to him had he remained in Cambria County. Id. Higgins allegedly gave statements to the media indicating that he had been in contact with Judge George, and that Judge George was responsible for moving Gold-haber from prison to prison. {Id., ¶ 58). Goldhaber was later moved from the Bedford County Jail to the Adams County Adult Correctional Complex in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. {Id., pp. 17-18, ¶ 59). Judge George served as a member of the Adams County Prison Board, and his service in that capacity began before his service on the bench. Id. Judge George has had previous dealings with Clark, since Clark once worked as an officer at the Adams County Adult Correctional Complex. Id. Judge George moved Goldhaber without conducting any hearings or issuing additional orders. {Id., p. 18, ¶ 60). Gold-haber alleges that this was done in retaliation for his motion before the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. Id. Although he had a conflict of interest, Higgins participated in the decision to move Goldhaber. {Id., ¶ 61). The Bedford County Prison Board supported the decision to move Goldhaber from place to place, which is evidenced by the fact that Bedford County was responsible for the costs of Goldhaber’s incarceration. (Id., f 62). Goldhaber alleges that Judge George intended to have him housed in Adams County because the distance between the Adams County Adult Correctional Complex and Bedford County was too far to give Goldhaber a meaningful opportunity to participate in the work release program. (Id., pp. 18-19, ¶¶ 63-65). Higgins and Clark allegedly gave statements to the media about how Judge George had been complicit in their efforts to move Goldhaber from prison to prison. (Id., p. 19, ¶ 68). They described how Judge George had directed the form and substance of Goldhaber’s sentence. (Id., ¶ 69). All of the communications between Judge George, Higgins, Clark, Bowser and the Bedford County Prison Board concerning Goldhaber were conducted on an ex parte basis and in the absence of hearings or orders. (Id, pp. 19-20, ¶ 70). Goldhaber alleges that he remained incarcerated for 15 days beyond his minimum sentence in retaliation for the motion that he filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. (Id., p. 20, ¶ 71). He alleges that Bowser told his wife that it was questionable whether Judge George would let him out of jail at the end of the minimum sentence of 90 days because of the “trick” that he had pulled in Cambria County. (Id., p. 22, ¶ 80). On November 4, 2005, Bowser arrived at the Adams County Adult Correctional Complex to have Goldhaber sign release papers. (Id., ¶ 82). Bowser indicated that he would immediately have the papers faxed to Judge George for the purpose of ensuring that Goldhaber would be released at the end of the 90-day minimum sentence. Id. Gold-haber alleges that Bowser purposefully delayed the processing of this paperwork in order to extend his incarceration, and that Bowser never explained why Judge George’s permission was necessary in order for Goldhaber to be released. Id. While incarcerated at the Adams County Adult Correctional Complex, Goldhaber was placed in solitary confinement by Wy-pijewski, who was the deputy warden. (Id., p. 20, ¶ 72). Even though Goldhaber had not violated any prison rules, Higgins and Clark allegedly instructed the Adams County Adult Correctional Complex to keep him in solitary confinement, thereby allowing him out of his cell only for one fifteen-minute phone call and one fifteen-minute shower each day. (Id., ¶ 73). Goldhaber was forced to sign a liability waiver in order to escape from solitary confinement. (Id., ¶ 74). While under Wypijewski’s supervision, Goldhaber was prohibited from meeting with his attorney. (Id., pp. 20-21, ¶ 75). Although Gold-haber’s attorney was sent to a conference room to meet with Goldhaber, she was later told that she could not meet with him, and that she had to leave. Id. During his incarceration in Adams County, Goldhaber submitted multiple inmate request slips seeking redress for improper actions by Adams County Adult Correctional Complex personnel. (Id., p. 21, ¶ 76). After requesting an inmate grievance form, he was told that grievances had to be dealt with informally. Id. His complaints were not addressed. On one occasion, a birthday card from Gold-haber’s 3-year-old daughter was confiscated on the ground that it was a security threat. Id. Goldhaber claims that, in Bedford County, it is a standard custom for persons incarcerated for driving under the influence (i.e., “DUI offenses”) to participate in the work release program while incarcerated and to be released after the expiration of the minimum sentence. (Id., p. 23, ¶¶ 83-84). Having been the stenographer for the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County, Gold-haber’s wife was familiar with the process for obtaining transcripts. {Id., ¶ 86). When Goldhaber hired a new attorney, his wife requested transcripts related to his case from the Bedford County Court Administrator, asking that they be sent to Goldhaber’s new attorney. Id. After learning of this request, Judge George allegedly sent a threatening letter to Gold-haber’s wife. Id. In May 2006, Benton, a member of the Pennsylvania State Police, allegedly began an investigation of Goldhaber for the purpose of finding him in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. {Id., p. 24, ¶ 88). This investigation allegedly began at the behest of Higgins. Id. Goldhaber alleges that Benton, Higgins and Bowser are attempting to initiate bogus criminal proceedings against him on the basis of improper conduct by one of his former employees. {Id., pp. 24-25, ¶ 90). Benton allegedly told Carol Rose, an attorney, that he intends to charge Goldhaber with some kind of wrongdoing because Goldhaber refuses to speak with him. Id. Goldhaber alleges that he has never refused to talk to Benton, and that Benton knows that Goldhaber has no legal obligation to engage in such conversation in any event. {Id., p. 25, ¶ 91). Benton allegedly knows that the act of charging Goldhaber with a crime would result in the revocation of his probation, thereby facilitating his return to prison. {Id., ¶ 92). Benton has allegedly indicated that he will file charges against Goldhaber, and that Higgins would then proceed to hold a public press conference at which the general public would be invited to share information about Goldhaber. {Id., ¶ 93). Goldhaber contends that this pattern of activity by the Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. {Id., pp. 24-28, ¶¶ 95-101). He brings this action against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. {Id., p. 27, ¶ 100). Although he is not specific as to what sort of theory or theories he relies upon, Goldhaber also appears to allege that the Defendants engaged in tortious conduct that is actionable under Pennsylvania law. {Id., ¶ 100). A. Judge George’s Judicial Immunity Judge George has moved for dismissal of Mr. Goldhaber’s claims against him on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. (Document No. 25). The Court’s analysis begins with the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute itself affords no personal immunities. The United States Supreme Court assumes, however, that Congress would have expressly abolished common law immunities within the language of § 1983 if it had intended to do so. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 295 (1967). For this reason, the judicial immunity that was available at common law is available to judicial defendants sued under § 1983. At common law, it was “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [had to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646, 649 (1872). The question before the Court is whether Judge George is entitled to this form of immunity under the circumstances of this case. Judicial immunity is immunity from suit itself, not merely immunity from the ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9, 14 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). In general, determination of immunity must be made with reference to the functions that the immunity serves rather than to the person claiming an entitlement to immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 544, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 565 (1988) (first emphasis in original). This functional approach ensures that an official’s absolute immunity extends only to those acts performed as a part of his or her official duties. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 693-695, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1644, 137 L.Ed.2d 945, 960-961 (1997). Hence, judicial immunity extends only to a judge’s judicial acts and does not encompass purely administrative actions, even if they “may be essential to the very function of the courts.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-230, 108 S.Ct. at 544-546, 98 L.Ed.2d at 565-567. Selecting a jury pool; promulgating an attorney code of conduct; enforcing such a code; and hiring and firing persons under the judge’s supervision have all been held to be administrative acts and hence without judicial immunity. Id. at 228-29, 108 S.Ct. at 544-45, 98 L.Ed.2d at 565-67. The leading Supreme Court precedent regarding the application of absolute judicial immunity within the context of a § 1983 action is Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). In Stump, the Court explained that “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106, 55 L.Ed.2d at 341. Judicial immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. at 288, 116 L.Ed.2d at 14 (citation omitted). Indeed, judicial immunity can be overcome in “only two sets of circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted). First, a judge is not immune from suit for his or her nonjudicial acts. Id. “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12, 112 S.Ct. at 288, 116 L.Ed.2d at 14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In determining whether the actions allegedly taken by Judge George were judicial acts, the Court must consider two factors. It must consider the nature of the acts themselves — whether they are functions “normally performed by judges.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d at 342. In addition, the Court must consider the acts in relation to the expectations of the parties to the case before the judge — whether the parties “dealt with the judge in his [or her] judicial capacity.” Id. For purposes of this inquiry, whether the actions taken by Judge George were performed in accordance with typical legal formalities is not dispositive. Stump, 435 U.S. at 359-363, 98 S.Ct. at 1106-1108, 55 L.Ed.2d at 341-343 (holding that a judge had engaged in judicial acts when he granted a petition for sterilization of a minor child where the case had no docket number; was not filed with the clerk’s office; the proceeding was ex parte and without notice to the minor child; there was no hearing; and no guardian ad litem had been appointed). Moreover, while the presence or lack of formal proceedings may inform the inquiry as to the expectations of the parties, a judicial act may not be deemed nonjudicial merely because it is done in an informal setting. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544, 98 L.Ed.2d at 565 (explaining that “the informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction was deprived of its judicial character”). On the other hand, an act is not necessarily a judicial act merely because it occurs in a judge’s chambers. Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir.1996) (explaining that the act of committing a sexual assault does not constitute a judicial act under any set of circumstances). A judge’s jurisdiction must be viewed broadly for purposes of judicial immunity analysis. If the actions allegedly taken by Judge George were judicial acts, his absolute immunity cannot be overcome merely upon a showing that he lacked jurisdiction to take those actions. Instead, Mr. Goldhaber must demonstrate that Judge George acted “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12, 112 S.Ct. at 288, 116 L.Ed.2d at 14 (emphasis added). This legal principle can be traced back to the language in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872), in which the Supreme Court explained: A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-352, 20 L.Ed. at 651. Thus, a probate judge who tried parties “for public offenses” would be without immunity for such “exercise of ... usurped authority,” while a judge of a criminal court, even if he tried parties for non-existent crimes and imposed sentences above the statutory maximum, would retain immunity though his actions exceeded his actual jurisdiction. See id. at 352, 20 L.Ed. at 651. Accordingly, it is clear that a judicial act may be afforded immunity even if taken in the absence of actual adjudicatory jurisdiction. Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 771 (3d Cir.2000) (explaining that “a judge does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when the judge enters an order at least eolorably within the jurisdiction of her court even though a court rule or other procedural constraint required another judge to act in the matter”). Plaintiffs pleadings do not afford this Court sufficient information to allow it to resolve the issue of Judge George’s judicial immunity. Plaintiff alleges George’s “collusion and conspiracy” with other defendants to remove Plaintiff from Cambria County Prison to Bedford County Jail, Document 24 ¶ 55, and then to Adams County Prison, Id. ¶ 63, and that “Defendant George moved the plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 60. Mr. Goldhaber does not, however, explain how Judge George accomplished these transfers, and that information is essential to the instant inquiry. If Judge George, acting as a judge, somehow caused Plaintiffs transfers among the four facilities in which he was incarcerated, judicial immunity likely obtains. “Where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1112 (6th Cir.1997)) (emphasis added); see also Gallas v. Supreme Count of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 770(3d Cir.2000) (holding that defeat of a claim of judicial immunity for lack of jurisdiction requires “the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). Although the Courts in Pennsylvania “have no authority to order the transfer of prisoners,” Black v. Superintendent, State Corr. Inst. Graterford, 293 Pa.Super. 442, 439 A.2d 193, 195 (Pa.Super.Ct.1981) (citations omitted), and although Judge George was well aware of that fact, citing Black in his order of August 11, 2005 denying Mr. Goldhaber’s “Motion to Return the Defendant [Goldhaber] to the Bedford County Prison,” Document Nos. 12, p. 13; 28, p. 14; 32, p. 18, the transfer of prisoners is nonetheless within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Pleas. Black, 439 A.2d at 194-95 (holding that the Court of Common Pleas for the county in which a prisoner is held must give its consent to any transfer of the prisoner). Judge George heard Goldhaber’s case in Bedford County. Document 24 ¶¶ 26, 28, 30-31. Two of the three transfers of which Goldhaber complains were from Bedford County. Id. ¶¶ 37, 59. The subject matter of Goldhaber’s transfers was, at least broadly, before the judge. If the judge merely reviewed Mr. Gold-haber’s transfers from the Bedford County facility his actions would have been within his proper jurisdiction. They would also have been judicial in nature, as transfers proposed by prison administrators must be reviewed by the Court for abuse of discretion. See Black, 439 A.2d at 194-95. Such a review is certainly one “normally performed by a judge,” and one where the parties, in this case the prison administrators, would have “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768-69 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d at 342). If the judge, as judge, actually ordered transfers, he would have exceeded his jurisdiction, but nonetheless remained within the broad subject matter of prisoner transfers affecting Mr. Goldhaber. The issuance of orders is of course a singularly judicial action. In light of the above, if Judge George was acting in his capacity as judge, it is immaterial whether he erred, even if he ordered transfers that were in excess of his judicial authority. Figueroa, 208 F.3d at 445. Once the twin prongs of judicial action and minimal subject matter jurisdiction have been satisfied, absolute judicial immunity will not be disturbed. Id. Plaintiffs various allegations of improper motives notwithstanding, Judge George’s reasons for any actions he may have taken are irrelevant to the determination of judicial immunity. Indeed, “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. at 288, 116 L.Ed.2d at 14. Judicial immunity protects judges from more than just liability for mistakes; it protects them from liability for willful wrongs as well. As the Supreme Court noted in Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), “[jjudicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge acted not only mistakenly but with malice and corruption.” Dennis, 449 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 188, 66 L.Ed.2d at 191-192 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs imputations of improper motives to Judge George’s unnamed acts simply have no place in the present analysis. However, the question of whether Judge George’s alleged actions were judicial in nature remains unresolved. Mr. Gold-haber claims that Judge George served on the Adams County Prison Board. (Document No. 24, pp. 17-18, ¶ 59). The judge’s service on the Prison Board raises questions about the capacity in which he allegedly acted in this case. There is “an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544, 98 L.Ed.2d at 565. Whether an act is judicial is determined by the character of the act itself rather than by the character of the person performing that act. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348, 25 L.Ed. 676, 680 (1880). Actions taken by Judge George in his capacity as a member of the Adams County Prison Board are not judicial acts. Padgett v. Stein, 406 F.Supp. 287, 305 (M.D.Pa.1975) (“In the performance of their duties on the prison board, the county judges are not acting within the scope of their judicial jurisdiction. They are not involved in a judicial function and they are not exercising judicial power.”) (emphasis in original). This is so even if the actions taken by the judge as a member of the Prison Board are “essential to the very functioning of the courts.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228, 108 S.Ct. at 544, 98 L.Ed.2d at 565. Mr. Goldhaber is not specific regarding Judge George’s alleged acts. Although Mr. Goldhaber claims that Judge George was involved in an illegal conspiracy, he does not explain precisely the judge’s role. (Document No. 24, pp. 19-20, ¶¶ 65-71). Mr. Goldhaber argues that Judge George’s actions were administrative rather than judicial. (Id, p. 19, ¶ 67). While the factual assertions in the Amended Complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of Judge George’s Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Goldhaber’s allegation that Judge George was acting in an administrative capacity is a legal conclusion, and the Court is not required to credit it. Morse v. Lower Merlon School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (“[A] court need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to dismiss.”). Thus, Mr. Goldhaber’s characterization of Judge George’s alleged conduct is not dispositive. Judge George insists that he was acting in his judicial capacity. (Document No. 27, p. 6). He relies on Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir.2000), in which the Court explained that the act of ordering one to prison is a “paradigm judicial act,” and that such an act does not become “nonjudicial” merely because it is wrong. However, this “paradigm judicial act” only afforded the judge in that case judicial immunity because Mr. Figueroa was before the judge and “dealing” with the judge “in her judicial capacity.” Id. (emphasis added). If Judge George was in fact acting as a member of the Adams County Prison Board, for example, he was not acting judicially, and judicial immunity would not attach to his actions. There is another possible scenario to consider. Judge George’s order of August 11, 2005, expressly granted Mr. Gold-haber’s request for work release, subject to “the rules and regulations of the facility in which he [was] incarcerated.” (Document No. 28, p. 14). Mr. Goldhaber does not allege that Judge George amended this order, or that this order was somehow superseded by a later judicial action. Instead, he alleges that Judge George conspired with the other Defendants for the purpose of ensuring that “the rules and regulations” referenced in the order did not allow Mr. Goldhaber to do precisely what the order, which remained in effect, allowed him to do. (Document No. 24, p. 22, 1179). Notably, the allegations against Judge George concerning retaliation for Goldhaber’s application for work release in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County implicate the order of another judge. (Document 1, p. 8 ¶ 9; Document 24, pp. 16-17, ¶ 55). It is far from clear that a judge who conspires to subvert a ruling made by another judge, without issuing an order of his own, engages in a judicial act. As suggested above, Judge George’s reliance on Figueroa is misplaced. In Stump, the Supreme Court made it clear that the informal nature of an act, without more, does not suffice to make that act non-judicial. Stump, 435 U.S. at 360-363, 98 S.Ct. at 1106-1108, 55 L.Ed.2d at 341-343. Nonetheless, in that case, the judge had approved a specific petition, albeit in an extremely informal way. Stump, 435 U.S. at 351, 98 S.Ct. at 1102, 55 L.Ed.2d at 336, n. 1. Goldhaber does not allege that Judge George approved any order modifying the terms of his sentence or granted any sort of petition and the Court does not understand Judge George to argue otherwise. Judge George’s participation in this alleged conspiracy certainly would not have constituted a judicial act if he had not presided over Mr. Goldhaber’s criminal trial, but merely having presided over a person’s trial does not automatically render all the judge’s actions affecting that person judicial. An act that is administrative or otherwise non-judicial does not become judicial merely because the person performing that act happens to be the judge assigned to a particular individual’s case. Put another way, although jurisdiction is to be viewed broadly within the context of a judicial immunity analysis, it does not follow that an act is inherently judicial merely because it involves the interaction between a judge and someone over whom the judge possesses jurisdiction. Judicial immunity, like other forms of official immunity, is grounded in the nature of the function performed" rather than in the identity of the individual who performed that function. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 694-695, 117 S.Ct. at 1644, 137 L.Ed.2d at 960-961. By way of illustration, consider a case where a judge presides at a murder trial and upon the defendant’s conviction sentences him to death. Even though the judge’s actions up to that point are undis-putably judicial, and even though the defendant is clearly within the judge’s jurisdiction, if the judge then shoots and kills the defendant himself the judge’s act would be an undisputably non-judicial action from whose consequences the judge would certainly not be immune. Regarding the instant motion, while a conspiracy to corruptly amend the prior sentencing order would clearly fall within the scope of judicial immunity, it is not clear that a conspiracy to subvert that order (while leaving it in effect) would do so as well. As the Supreme Court observed in For-rester, “[djifficulties have arisen primarily in attempting to draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544, 98 L.Ed.2d at 565. That line is particularly hard to draw in this case, since Judge George apparently served as both the judge who sentenced Mr. Goldhaber and as a member of the board for one of the prisons in which Mr. Goldhaber was confined. The problem with making a precise determination in this case is that Mr. Gold-haber simply alleges, in general terms, that Judge George “moved” him, without issuing a new order, “because [Goldhaber] made lawful motions before the Cambria County courts, and because he defended himself in court.” (Document No. 24, p. 18, ¶ 60). Exactly what Mr. Goldhaber means by the word “moved” is not clear. In Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 299 (3d Cir.2006), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that “there is an inherent tension between federal qualified immunity jurisprudence and the concept of notice pleading.” In this case, there is a similar tension between absolute immunity and notice pleading. While the judicial immunity determination must be made at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, Goldhaber had no duty to tailor his pleadings to an anticipated absolute immunity defense. Thomas, 463 F.3d at 299-300. Although an absolute immunity inquiry does not entail a fact-specific examination of whether the actions taken by the person raising the immunity defense were in violation of clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known, this case illustrates that the Supreme Court’s functional approach to absolute immunity requires a degree of particularity as to the function performed by a defendant such as Judge George. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 694-695, 117 S.Ct. at 1644, 137 L.Ed.2d at 961. Goldhaber’s Amended Complaint is simply too vague on this point to allow for a meaningful resolution of the immunity issue. Thus, it cannot be said that his allegations are clearly sufficient to overcome Judge George’s absolute immunity. On the other hand, since this matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss, the Amended Complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to Mr. Goldhaber, and the Court must determine whether he may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the Amended Complaint. Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374, n. 7 (3d Cir.2002). Since it is not clear what Mr. Goldhaber alleges that Judge George actually did, the Court cannot conduct a meaningful functional immunity analysis at this point. The Court recognizes that Mr. Gold-haber has already amended his allegations in response to the Defendants’ original motions to dismiss. (Document No. 24). Nevertheless, he did so prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Thomas. Moreover, the Amended Complaint “does not lend itself to an early resolution of the [absolute] immunity issue[.]” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301. For this reason, Mr. Gold-haber will be ordered to file a more definite statement, in which he is to spell out the allegations against Judge George with greater precision. Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301 (“Even when a defendant has not formally expressed the need for a definite statement, the district court has the discretion to order a more definite statement, in observance of the Supreme Court’s mandate to facilitate an early resolution of the qualified immunity issue and in order to avoid a waste of judicial resources.”). Discovery in this case has already been stayed. (Document No. 39). If Mr. Gold-haber’s specific allegations against Judge George indicate that the judge was acting in his capacity as a member of the Adams County Prison Board or otherwise non-judicially, or if they show action wholly outside of the judge’s subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Goldhaber’s case, as may be the case with what Mr. Goldhaber terms the “threatening letter,” Mr. Gold-haber may be entitled to some discovery with respect to his allegations against Judge George. Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301 (“If the plaintiffs action survives these hurdles, the plaintiff ordinarily will be entitled to some discovery, but the district court may limit the timing, sequence, frequency, and extent of that discovery under Rule 26.”). Resolution of Judge George’s Motion to Dismiss must await a more definite statement from Mr. Goldhaber. After Mr. Goldhaber files a more definite statement, Judge George will, of course, have an opportunity to supplement his arguments for the purpose of addressing the specific allegations contained therein. The burden of pleading absolute immunity lies with Judge George. Thomas, 463 F.3d at 293-294. This Court cannot determine whether Judge George’s alleged actions were judicial in nature without knowing the nature of the actions themselves. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 288, 116 L.Ed.2d at 15 (“Accordingly, as the language in Stump indicates, the relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the act, not the ‘act itself.’ ”). For the same reason that the factual allegations against Judge George are not precise enough to enable the Court to determine whether he is entitled to absolute immunity, the .Court cannot determine, at this stage, whether he is entitled to qualified immunity, assuming arguendo that he is not entitled to absolute immunity. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230, 108 S.Ct. at 546, 98 L.Ed.2d at 567. B. The Claims Against the Board, Higgins, Clark, Bowser and Wypijewski Goldhaber alleges violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Document No. 24, pp. 26-27, ¶¶ 96-99). In support of their Motion to Dismiss, the Board, Higgins, Clark, Bowser and Wypi-jewski brief a total of nine issues. (Document No. 29, pp. 2-3). The Court will address them in the order that it deems appropriate, rather than in the order that the Defendants have briefed them, in order to avoid duplicative analyses and excessive redundancies. At the outset, a few preliminary matters must be addressed. Higgins, Clark, Bowser and Wypijewski apparently believe that Goldhaber has sued them only in their official capacities. (Document No. 29, pp. 19, 21). This reading of the Amended Complaint makes no sense, since Goldhaber unambiguously states that they are being sued in their individual capacities. (Document No. 24, p. 3, ¶4) (“Punitive damages are demanded of the seven non-entity defendants, who are being sued in their individual capacities, because their misconduct was particularly egregious.”). The Court does not see how the Amended Complaint can be read to state claims against these individuals only in their official capacities. The Defendants apparently misunderstand the difference between official capacity suits and personal capacity suits. (Document No. 29, p. 19) (“Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations against Defendants, Higgins, Clark, Bowser and Wypijewski in their personal or individual capacity.”). Indeed, they fundamentally misunderstand the very precedent upon which they rely. In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), the Supreme Court held that state officials may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their personal capacities for constitutional or statutory violations committed during the course of their official duties. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27-31, 112 S.Ct. at 362-363, 116 L.Ed.2d at 311-313. The Supreme Court did not hold that suits against such officials for damages inflicted during the course of their official duties are suits against them in their official capacities. When an official sued in his or her official capacity leaves office, his or her role in the litigation is automatically assumed by his or her successor. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25, 112 S.Ct. at 361, 116 L.Ed.2d at 309. The capacity of a suit turns on whether relief is sought against the individual or against the individual’s office. It does not turn on whether the injury complained of was inflicted pursuant to the defendant’s official duties. 502 U.S. at 27, 112 S.Ct. at 363, 116 L.Ed.2d at 311. Even though the alleged actions of Higgins, Clark, Bowser and Wy-pijewski were taken pursuant to their official duties, they can be held personally liable under § 1983 for violating Gold-haber’s rights under federal law. Any belief by the Defendants to the contrary is in error. In order to sue an individual under § 1983, of course, a plaintiff must allege that the individual was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988). “[A] civil rights complaint is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.2005). Having examined the Amended Complaint in great detail, the Court is convinced that Goldhaber alleges sufficient personal involvement on the part of Higgins, Clark, Bowser and Wypijewski to satisfy this requirement. (Document No. 24, pp. 12, ¶ 39, 16-17, ¶¶ 55-58, 20-21, ¶¶ 72-76). The Defendants’ argument with respect to the capacity in which these four individuals have been sued is clearly lacking in merit. Moreover, since the Defendants’ argument with respect to the unavailability of punitive damages from Higgins, Clark, Bowser and Wypijewski is based on the mistaken assumption that they have only been sued in their official capacities, that argument is also meritless. (Document No. 29, p. 21). Clark, Bowser and Wypijewski contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Document No. 29, pp. 19-20). The qualified immunity inquiry, however, cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Before considering the question of whether these three individuals are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must make a “threshold” determination as to whether the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, taken in the light most favorable to Goldhaber, allege a violation of the Constitution. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272, 281 (2001). If no constitutional right would be violated under the allegations, there is no need for the Court to make further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d at 281. Consequently, the Court will begin the inquiry by deciding whether Goldhaber properly alleges violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments that are actionable under § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive legal rights. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2574, 65 L.Ed.2d 653, 661, n. 11 (1980). For this reason, Goldhaber cannot prevail in a § 1983 action without establishing an underlying violation of federal law. Section 1983 “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664, 88 L.Ed.2d 662, 667 (1986). Therefore, the only state-of-mind requirements applicable to the Amended Complaint are those necessary to properly establish underlying constitutional violations. As in any case brought under § 1983, the Court must begin the analysis by identifying “the exact contours of the underlying rightfs] said to have been violated.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043, 1055, n. 5 (1998). Goldhaber alleges that the Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment by retaliating against him for filing a motion before the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. (Document No. 24, p. 26, ¶ 96). The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST, amend. I. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. The Petition Clause of the First Amendment is applicable to the States because of its incorporation within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tarpley v. Keistler, 188 F.3d 788, 794, n. 4 (7th Cir.1999). Thus, the prohibitions of the Petition Clause were applicable to the Defendants in this case. Although a prisoner’s right of access to the courts rests to some extent on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment is implicated in cases in which prisoners allege that they have suffered adverse actions in retaliation for filing lawsuits. Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1036 (3d Cir.1988); Cook v. Boyd, 881 F.Supp. 171, 176, n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1995). Indeed, courts have consistently identified the Petition Clause as a source of a prisoner’s right to access to the courts. Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 288-289 (6th Cir.1983); Etheridge v. Evers, 326 F.Supp.2d 818, 825 (E.D.Mich.2004); Buhrman v. Wilkinson, 257 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1120 (S.D.Ohio 2003). “Penalizing a prisoner’s exercise of the constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances is a constitutional tort.” Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 305 (7th Cir.2006). Retaliation for the exercise of this constitutional right is actionable under § 1983 even if the retaliatory act itself would not otherwise violate the Constitution. Thomas v. Hill, 963 F.Supp. 753, 756 (N.D.Ind.1997). An individual’s rights under the Petition Clause, of course, extend to matters other than the filing of lawsuits. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 612, 30 L.Ed.2d 642, 646 (1972) (“The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 235-37 (3d Cir.2007) (explaining that petitioning activity can be either formal or informal, consisting of anything from lawsuits to letters). Within the prison setting, however, it is difficult to imagine a more important application of the Petition Clause than in the case of a prisoner seeking access to a judicial tribunal for the purpose of challenging the conditions of his or her confinement. Nevertheless, one’s right to petition the government is qualified in certain respects. First of all, while prisoners have the right to file grievances and lawsuits, they may sometimes be held accountable for the specific statements or allegations that they make. Hale v. Scott, 252 F.Supp.2d 728, 731-735 (C.D.Ill.2003); Curry v. Hall, 839 F.Supp. 1437, 1440 (D.Or.1993). Secondly, the Petition Clause does not provide a right to bring lawsuits based on intentional falsehoods or claims known to be frivolous. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 2791, 86 L.Ed.2d 384, 389 (1985); Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 2170, 76 L.Ed.2d 277, 289 (1983). Suits lacking a reasonable basis constitute sham litigation and are, consequently, outside of the ambit of constitutional protection. Herr v. Pequea Township, 274 F.3d 109, 115-117 (3d Cir.2001); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 437 (3d Cir.1994). The Supreme Court has recognized that rights under the Petition Clause, like other First Amendment rights, need “breathing space” in order to have their intended effect. BE & K Construction Company v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 530-533, 122 S.Ct.