Full opinion text
ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MATTERS FOR UNITED STATES PATENT NUMBERS 4,439,759; 4,763,356; 4,958,226; AND 5,347,295; INCLUDING: (1) MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, NEW TRIAL, OR REMITTITUR; AND (2) RULINGS ON EQUITABLE MATTERS TRIED TO THE COURT MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge. This order addresses the remaining post-trial questions in this case, including motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), motions for new trial, and rulings on equitable matters tried to the Court. The trial involved four United States Patents: 4,439,759 (“Fleming '759” or “'759”); 4,763,356 (“Day '356” or “'356”); 4,958,226 (“Haskell '226” or “'226”); 5,347,295 (“Agulnick '295” or “'295”). Lucent Technologies, Inc. (“Lu-cent”) asserted the '356 and '295 patents against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and Dell Inc. (“Dell” and collectively with Microsoft “Defendants”). Lucent asserted the '759 patent against Microsoft only. Multimedia Patent Trust (“MPT”), a Delaware trust with Lucent as the primary beneficiary, asserted the '226 patent against Microsoft only. The parties filed their initial briefs on these post-trial matters on May 5, 2008. MPT moved for JMOL, new trial, and entry of judgment on equitable matters related to the '226 patent. (Doc. No. 759.) Lucent moved for JMOL and new trial on the '759 and '356 patents. (Doc. No. 760.) Microsoft moved for JMOL, new trial, or remittitur on various issues related to the '356, '295, and '226 patents. (Doc. No. 770.) Dell joined in sections of Microsoft’s motions applicable to it. (Doc. No. 792.) Microsoft also moved for entry of judgment on the equitable matters related to the '226 patent yet to be decided by the Court. (Doc. No. 772.) The parties filed their responsive briefing on May 19, 2008. Dell filed an opposition to Lucent’s motion regarding the '759 and '356 patents. (Doc. No. 804.) Microsoft filed an opposition to MPT’s motion regarding the '226 patent. (Doc. No. 805.) MPT opposed Microsoft’s combined motion to the extent that it addressed the '226 patent. (Doc. No. 808.) Lucent opposed Microsoft’s combined motion to the extent that it addressed the '356 and '295 patents. (Doc. No. 809.) MPT filed an opposition to Microsoft’s motion for entry of judgment on the bench trial issues. (Doc. No. 810.) The parties filed their reply briefs on May 27, 2008. Microsoft filed replies in support of its post-trial motions and motion for entry of judgment on bench trial issues. (Doc. Nos. 826-28.) Lucent filed a reply in support of its motion regarding the '759 and '356 patents. (Doc. No. 830.) MPT filed a reply in support of its motion regarding the '226 patent. (Doc. No. 831.) The Court held a hearing on these matters on June 13, 2008. Robert Appleby, Paul Bondor, John Desmarais, Jeanne Heffernan, James Marina, and Michael Stadnick appeared for Lucent and MPT. John Gartman, Juanita Brooks, and Roger Denning appeared for Microsoft. Joseph Micallef appeared for Dell. Background I. Overview of Infringement Liability The underlying trial concerned the alleged infringement of four patents asserted by Lucent and MPT against Microsoft and Dell. On April 4, 2008, the jury returned a special verdict for all four patents, including advisory verdicts on certain equitable issues to be decided by the Court. (Doc. No. 735.) The jury found that Microsoft infringed the '356 patent, and that both Microsoft and Dell infringed the '295 patent. The jury found no infringement of either the '226 or '759 patents. The jury found Microsoft liable to Lucent for $357,693,056.18 based on infringement of the '356 patent. For infringement of the '295 patent, the jury found Microsoft liable to Lucent for $10,350,000 and Dell hable for $51,000. II. Day'356 The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued the '356 patent, entitled “Touch Screen Form Entry System,” on August 9, 1988, based on an application filed December 11, 1986. Only method claims 19 and 21 were at issue in this trial. Claim 19 is an independent claim, and claim 21 is a related dependent claim. Claim 19 states: A method for use in a computer having a display comprising the steps of displaying on said display a plurality of information fields, identifying for each field a kind of information to be inserted therein, indicating a particular one of said information fields into which information is to be inserted and for concurrently displaying a predefined tool associated with said one of said fields, said predefined tool being operable to supply information of the kind identified for said one fields said tool being selected from a group of predefined tools including a tool adapted to supply an individual entry from a menu of alternatives and at least a tool adapted to allow said user to compose said information, and inserting in said one field information that is derived as a result of said user operating said displayed tool. Claim 21 further limits the step of “displaying said pattern” to include “the step of displaying one or more of said information fields as a bit-mapped-graphics field.” For this patent, Lucent submitted evidence of indirect infringement. Lucent asserted claim 19 against Microsoft and Dell based on versions of Microsoft Money, Microsoft Outlook, and Windows Mobile. Lucent also asserted claim 19 against Dell only, based on sales of Quicken versions 2000 through 2006. Lucent asserted claim 21 against Microsoft and Dell based only on the various versions of Windows Mobile. The jury found Microsoft liable on claim 19 as to all three products and on claim 21 as to Windows Mobile, and it returned a finding of no infringement by Dell. The verdict did not distinguish between inducing and contributory infringement. The jury awarded a single lump sum against Microsoft for all products involved. Defendants presented affirmative defenses of anticipation and obviousness. The jury found for Lucent on both. III. Haskell'226 The PTO issued the '226 patent, entitled “Conditional Motion Compensated Interpolation of Digital Motion Video,” on September 18, 1990, based on an application filed September 27, 1989. At trial, Lucent only asserted claim 12, a means-plus-function apparatus claim which states: A circuit responsive to coded video signals where the video signals comprise successive frames and each frame includes a plurality of blocks and where the coded video signals comprise codes that describe deviations from approximated blocks and codes that describe deviations from interpolated-blocks, comprising: means for developing block approximations from said codes that describe deviations from approximated blocks; and means responsive to said block approximations and to said codes that describe deviations from interpolated blocks to develop said interpolated blocks. MPT introduced evidence of both direct and indirect infringement by Microsoft. The accused products included Microsoft software and hardware containing an MPEG-1, MPEG-2, or VC-1 video decoder, referring to industry standards for video compression and playback used for various products including DVDs and [¶] DVDs. Specifically, MPT accused Microsoft based on Windows operating system versions 95B through Vista, the Microsoft Xbox 360 video game system, and Windows Media Player versions 9 through 11. The jury found that none of Microsoft’s accused products had infringed claim 12. The jury also found that claim 12 was invalid for obviousness, though not invalid for anticipation. Furthermore, the Court asked the jury to return advisory verdicts on Microsoft’s defenses of laches and inequitable conduct regarding the '226 patent. The jury recommended that Lucent be barred from obtaining pre-suit damages due to laches, but found no inequitable conduct. IV. Agulnick '295 The PTO issued the '295 patent, entitled “Control of a Computer Through a Position-Sensed Stylus,” on September 13, 1994, based on an application filed October 31, 1990. At trial, Lucent only asserted claim 1, a means-plus-function apparatus claim which states: An apparatus for controlling a computer system, the computer system comprising a screen for displaying information and a stylus having a tip for inputting information into the computer, including: first detecting means coupled to said computer for detecting a stroke of the stylus tip in contact with the screen; second detecting means coupled to said computer for detecting a departure of the stylus tip from the screen; means coupled to said computer for defining termination of a gesture comprising at least one stroke in response to said departure of the stylus tip; means coupled to said computer for recognizing a plurality of said gestures, said recognizing means including means for comparing each said gesture to at least one predefined shape; means coupled to said computer for implementing each said recognized gesture, said implementing means including means for performing a predetermined action associated with each said predefined shape, said predetermined action being determined by the context in which said gesture was used, including a first context in which said action is executed upon an operating system level object and a second context in which said action is executed upon an application level object. Lucent introduced evidence of direct and indirect infringement by Dell, and evidence of indirect infringement by Microsoft. The accused products were Tablet PC Computers installed with the Windows XP Tablet PC Edition operating system. Lucent based its accusations against Microsoft on all sales of Windows XP Tablet PC Edition, while its accusations against Dell were limited to Dell’s sales of Windows XP Tablet PCs. The jury returned a finding that both Microsoft and Dell had infringed claim 1. The jury awarded Lucent damages of $10,350,000 from Microsoft and $51,000 from Dell. Defendants presented affirmative defenses of anticipation and obviousness. The jury found for Lucent on both. V. Fleming '759 The PTO issued the '759 patent, entitled “Terminal Independent Color Memory for a Digital Image Display System,” on March 27, 1984, based on an application filed May 19, 1981. At trial, Lucent only asserted claim 1, a means-plus-function apparatus claim which states: In a digital image display system: a memory for storing color data values; processing means responsive to a predetermined command and data sequence comprising at least one command, the processing means decoding the predetermined command and data sequence the predetermined command and data sequence selecting one of a plurality of modes of access to color data values, the modes comprising: a first mode of access wherein an in-use foreground color is directly specified as a color data value; a second mode of access wherein the in-use foreground color is specified as an index into the color memory; and a third mode of access wherein the in-use foreground color and an in-use background color are specified as indexes into the color memory; and display means responsive to the processing means, the display means displaying the colors associated with the color data values accessed by the selected mode. Lucent introduced evidence of both direct and indirect infringement by Dell. The accused products covered all computer systems sold by Dell between October 20, 1998, and May 19, 2001, that included a version of the Windows operating system. Lucent based its accusations on the presence of the Windows graphics device interface (“GDI”) in these products. The jury found that Lucent failed to prove that it had provided Dell with pre-suit notice of infringement for this patent. Significantly, the jury also returned a finding of no infringement. Dell asserted affirmative defenses of anticipation and obviousness, and the jury found for Lucent on both. Furthermore, the Court asked the jury to return advisory verdicts on Microsoft’s defenses of laches and inequitable conduct regarding the '759 patent. The jury recommended that Dell should not prevail on either equitable defense. Discussion I. Standards for JMOL, New Trial, and Remittitur In patent cases, the standards on motions for judgment as a matter of law or new trial are questions of regional circuit law. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, 523 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed.Cir.2008). Judgment as a matter of law is available where “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). A party may renew the motion when not granted at trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). A court must uphold the jury’s verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir.2007). “Substantial evidence is evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir.2001)). Substantial evidence requires only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1576 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir.1985)). The court must not weigh the evidence and must “disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Wallace, 479 F.3d at 624. Furthermore, the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if, once the court has applied this standard, it concludes that the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion that is contrary to the jury’s verdict. Id. A party may also move for a new trial when requesting judgment as a matter of law following a jury trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), 59. Whether to grant a new trial is a matter of the trial court’s discretion. City Solutions, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, 365 F.3d 835, 843 (9th Cir.2004). The court may grant a new trial if “the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial court, a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1452 (9th Cir.1988)). To make a “clear weight of the evidence” determination, the court weighs the evidence as the court saw it. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir.1990)). If a court concludes that a new trial is appropriate due to excessive damages, the court may exercise its discretion to grant a new trial either without qualification, or conditioned on the winner’s refusal to accept a reduction in damages, known as remittitur. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). II. Day '356 A. Validity 1. Anticipation Defendants seek judgment as a matter of law that a system known as the Foreign Exchange Front End (“FXFE”) anticipated claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) or 102(g). Under section 102(b), patent protection may be unavailable where the invention was “in public use ... more than one year prior to the date of the application .... ” Under section 102(g), patent protection may be unavailable where “before ... invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.” An anticipating public use or prior invention must include every limitation of the patented invention. Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed.Cir.2002); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1379 (Fed.Cir.1986). Anticipation, like other invalidity defenses, requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Netscape Communications Corp. 295 F.3d at 1320. The application for the '356 patent was filed on December 11, 1986. In January 1984, Datamation magazine published an article describing a prototype touch-screen system used by Chemical Bank, through which currency traders could fill out forms electronically. (DX AOD (Datamation article); AOE (enlargement of Datamation article’s photograph).) The system was known as the Foreign Exchange Front End. The Datamation article included a single photograph of the FXFE display, with limited detail. Judgment as a matter of law or new trial is not appropriate because the jury could have reasonably rejected the credibility of Defendants’ witnesses, found that the FXFE did not include all elements of the method in claim 19, or found that the FXFE was not prior art under section 102. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the FXFE did not include “indicating a particular one of said information fields into which information is to be inserted.” The Datamation article did not describe this capability. (See DX AOD.) Defendants argue that a single FXFE photograph, of limited clarity, shows that a particular on-screen button is highlighted. (See DX AOE.) The jury could have concluded that this was not a “field” into which information could be entered. Furthermore, applying the appropriate standards for these proceedings, there is a limited showing of whether the FXFE even involved “information fields” into which information was “inserted,” within the meaning of the patent. The available image is limited in detail, and the text merely refers to entering information into “the system.” (See, e.g., DX AOD at 148 (“For instance, when the user hits the ‘broker’ cell on the right, a list of brokers appears on the left; the trader then hits the name of the broker ... and that information is entered into the system.”); DX AOE.) Particularly given the standard of clear and convincing evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendants failed to meet their burden on these elements as well. Lucent also argued that the FXFE did not have “graphical” tools or “concurrently display” a tool with an information field, though the Court concludes that there are ample other grounds to support the jury’s finding of no anticipation. The jury also could have concluded that the FXFE did not meet the requirements of section 102(b) or 102(g) prior art. Viewed under the applicable standards, the evidence indicates that the FXFE was developed mostly or entirely outside the United States, and still in a developmental or prototype form. Furthermore, the nature and circumstances of the demonstration are unclear in many respects. The jury could have reasonably concluded that the use was not sufficiently public or that any prior invention was abandoned. Public use is determined under the totality of the circumstances, and the Court concludes that this demonstration does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of public use as a matter of law. Cf. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 815 F.2d 1478, 1480-81 (Fed.Cir.1986) (demonstration to reporter was sufficiently public use where evidence included “clear indication of ... commercial motive,” and indication that device operated “flawlessly”). The jury could draw many inferences against Defendants sufficient to conclude that the use was not public. For example, even if made to a reporter, it is unclear to what extent the demonstration was completely functional. Also, there is no dispute that the touchscreen FXFE, as demonstrated, was not commercialized. “[A] first inventor may seek to avoid a determination of abandonment by showing that he or she marketed or sold a commercial embodiment of the invention or described the invention in a publicly disseminated document.” Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756, 762 (Fed.Cir.1995). The ambiguities surrounding the FXFE demonstration, however, cast serious doubt on whether it preserved sufficient information about the system in the public domain to avoid a finding of abandonment. See id. (citing Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1387 (C.C.P.A.1973), for the proposition that “to negate a finding of suppression or concealment, the public must have gained knowledge of the invention which will insure its preservation in the public domain”). In summary, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s determination of no anticipation. Furthermore, the Court concludes that the jury’s finding is not against the clear weight of the evidence. 2. Obviousness Defendants challenge the jury’s finding that the '356 patent was not obvious. As prior art, they assert both the Datamation article and the FXFE system described above, along with J.K. Lasser’s Your Money Manager software (“YMM”) and the Windows 1.01 calculator. The obviousness defense requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd, 492 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2007) “The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1745, 167 L.Ed.2d 705 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966)). While courts therefore need not give deference to the jury’s ultimate legal determination, courts still give deference to the jury’s underlying findings of fact. See Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“[T]his court reviews a jury’s conclusions on obviousness, a question of law, without deference, and the underlying findings of fact, whether explicit or implicit within the verdict, for substantial evidence.”) (quoting Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2007)). These underlying findings include “the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art ....’’Id. at 1338-39. When determining obviousness, “neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee controls.” KSR Int’l Co., 127 S.Ct. at 1741-42. Instead, courts should determine whether the “objective reach of the claim” encompasses obvious subject matter. Id. at 1742. This may include “noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.” Id. “[T]he results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.” Id. at 1746. However, courts must avoid “falling prey to hindsight bias,” “ex post reasoning,” and “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense.” Id. at 1742-43. Furthermore, “when the prior art teaches away from combining certain known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.” Id. at 1740. “A patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR Int’l Co., 127 S.Ct. at 1741. A combination is likely nonobvious if the elements work together “in an unexpected and fruitful manner.” Id. at 1740. In contrast, a patent is likely to be obvious if it merely yields a predictable result by substituting one element for another known in the field. Id. On this record, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendants failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the '356 patent is invalid for obviousness. First, there are factual problems with treating the FXFE as prior art. There were factual questions with whether the FXFE constitutes a prior public use or prior invention under sections 102(b) or 102(g). In this context the scope of prior art for obviousness purposes implicates the same considerations as section 102 prior art. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 537 F.Supp.2d 1095, 1110 n. 4 (S.D.Cal.2008). Therefore, the jury was not required to accept the FXFE as prior art for the obviousness analysis. Also, with regard to the Datamation article, there were substantial uncertainties about the capabilities of the system described. The jury could have reasonably taken a narrow view of the descriptions offered by the article and its single photograph, which lacked any fine detail or portrayal of the FXFE interface at different steps in the process. Regarding the YMM software, Lucent argued that it does-not involve “graphical” tools, since its display is composed of text and symbols. It also argued that YMM does not permit “pointing” to the display keys of any tool, since the user controls Your Money Manager only using the keyboard, without aid of a mouse, touch pad, or similar device. Around the time of the Day '356 patent, the personal computer industry was undergoing a change from text-based, keyboard-only operation to operation using a keyboard and mouse to control graphical user interfaces. Based on the evidence, the jury could have concluded that there was insufficient evidence of obviousness. The Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the jury finding of no obviousness. Lucent introduced evidence, including its expert’s opinion and testimony from the designer of YMM, that adapting YMM to a mouse-driven graphical interface would not have been an obvious or trivial undertaking. For example, the designer of YMM stated that “from a technical and business standpoint, it made no sense to even consider” this adaptation to an interface like Windows 1.01. (Trial Tr. XII 215:13-216:16.) The jury could reasonably have accepted this testimony, and the corresponding opinion of Lucent’s technical expert, while rejecting that of Defendants’ expert. The patented technology is more than 20 years old, the patent term having expired in 2006. While users of today’s computers may find many graphical interfaces intuitive, and hardware advances have eased the implementation of more sophisticated controls, the obviousness analysis must avoid hindsight bias, as the jury did here. Neither JMOL or a new trial is appropriate on the jury’s finding that the '356 patent is not invalid for obviousness. B. Infringement 1. The Jury’s Finding of Infringement by Microsoft a. Whether Outlook Contains a Composition Tool A finding of infringement requires that every limitation of a claim be present, either literally or by the doctrine of equivalents. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1268 (Fed.Cir.1999). “A determination of non-infringement, either literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact.” Miken Composites, L.L.C. v. Wilson Sporting Goods, Co., 515 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2008). Microsoft challenges the jury’s finding of infringement for Microsoft Outlook (“Outlook”), contending that Outlook does not contain a “composition tool,” within the meaning of the claims. A composition tool is one limitation in the third step of method claim 19, which requires: indicating a particular one of said information fields into which information is to be inserted and for concurrently displaying a predefined tool associated with said one of said fields, said predefined tool being operable to supply information of the kind identified for said one field said tool being selected from a group of predefined tools including a tool adapted to supply an individual entry from a menu of alternatives and at least a tool adapted to allow said user to compose said information. The Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Outlook infringes claim 19. Outlook is a software product that provides the user with a number of services including e-mail, calendar and appointment management, and management of contact information. Microsoft’s documentation describes form entry as a central aspect of Outlook’s user interface. (See, e.g., PX 1138B (Outlook help file stating that “Every Outlook item ... is based on a form.”).) Outlook includes a calendar tool to assist the user in entering dates on its form for specifying appointment information. The tool displays a monthly calendar as a grid of numbered dates, along with graphical controls that allow the user to scroll to adjacent months or skip directly to a different month and year. Within the currently displayed month, the user can select a particular date. Once the user defines a date with this tool, the software enters the numerical day, month, and year into the corresponding field in the appointments form. (See, e.g., PX 697 (screenshot); Trial Tr. VI 117:11-118:12 (testimony accompanying video demonstration).) Much like the number pad tool shown in the patent, the calendar tool in Outlook allows the user to select a series of numbers, corresponding to the day, month, and year, using graphical controls. (Cf. '356 4:18-21 (“The number entry tool ... operates similar to a standard hand-held calculator in which the user composes a string of numbers by touching individual ones of the displayed buttons .... ”).) Both competing experts testified that the normal definition of “composition” includes combining or putting together different parts. (See Trial Tr. VI 111:5-112:11 (Mr. Tog-nazzini, for Lucent); Trial Tr. XII 174:18-175:9 (Mr. Buscaino, for Microsoft).) The jury rejected Microsoft’s argument that the Outlook calendar tool is instead a “menu of alternatives.” The number of possible dates in the Outlook calendar exceeds one million. (Trial Tr. V 135:17-136:6.) The patent states that, with a menu of alternatives, “all that the user needs to do is point to one of the entries .... ” (’356 3:55-56.) With the calendar tool, however, the user may change the various elements of the date before settling on a final entry. The user cannot reach all options without making multiple selections. The Court concludes that there was substantial evidence permitting the jury to conclude that the Outlook calendar tool allowed the user to compose the date. Viewing all the evidence from the trial, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the calendar tool allowed the separate selection and combination of day, month, and year, thus making it a composition tool. b. Whether Windows Mobile Contains a Composition Tool Microsoft also argues that there can be no infringement of Windows Mobile because the Windows Mobile keyboard is not a composition tool that is “a predefined tool associated with said one of said fields.” The Court disagrees. First, contrary to Microsoft’s argument, the keyboard tool was not the only alleged composition tool offered by Lucent for Windows Mobile. The passage of Lucent’s expert testimony cited by Microsoft for this supposed limitation clearly asserts that the expert “found several tools that allow you to compose information,” not just the keyboard tool. (See Trial Tr. V 155:24-156:4.) Lucent also introduced evidence of both a Windows Mobile calendar tool, similar to that already discussed for Microsoft Outlook, and a Windows Mobile number pad tool. (See, e.g., PX 832A (screenshots of Windows Mobile tools).) Microsoft further argues that the keyboard tool is not “associated with said one of said fields,” as required by claim 19, because it is an operating system level tool that may be used by a variety of applications. Though the jury could have relied on one of the other asserted composition tools, the Court also concludes that there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the keyboard tool was a composition tool “associated with said one of said fields.” Microsoft does not dispute that the keyboard tool may be used by various applications running on a Windows Mobile system. (See, e.g., Microsoft’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Combined Mot. JMOL, New Trial, Remittitur, at 17 (“[Windows Mobile keyboard] is provided at the operating system level for use across many different applications .... ”).) Lucent introduced substantial evidence that the keyboard tool is used by these applications to input information directly into active fields, sufficient for the jury to conclude that it is “associated with said one of said fields.” (See, e.g., Trial Tr. V 154:20-156:4, XVII 107:18-108:23.) Finally, Microsoft challenges the credibility of Lucent’s expert, Mr. Tognazzini, regarding the keyboard tool. The jury also assessed his credibility and rendered its verdict. Viewed under the standards for post-trial motions, there is substantial evidence to support Mr. Tognazzini’s testimony. c. Proof of Specific Acts of Infringement Microsoft seeks judgment as a matter of law based on Lucent’s purported failure to introduce evidence of specific acts of direct infringement. Proof of indirect infringement by inducement requires, in part, that the plaintiff prove there has been direct infringement. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1292 (Fed.Cir.2008). Since the asserted claims are method claims, proof of direct infringement requires a showing that the claimed process was performed, not merely that defendant sold an apparatus capable of infringement. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2006). A plaintiff may prove direct infringement using circumstantial evidence. In Symantec Corp., the Federal Circuit vacated a summary judgment of non-infringement on an inducement claim, observing that “[the patentee] has produced sufficient circumstantial evidence of direct infringement ... even though [it] has not produced evidence that any particular customer has directly infringed the ... patent. Direct evidence of infringement, as opposed to circumstantial evidence, is not necessary.” Symantec Corp., 522 F.3d at 1292-93; see Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2006) (concluding that patentee could rely on circumstantial evidence, including instruction sheets provided with product, to prove direct infringement); Arthrocare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 406 F.3d 1365, 1375-77 (Fed.Cir.2005) (affirming denial of judgment as a matter of law of no indirect infringement based, in part, on “strong circumstantial evidence” of direct infringement, including literature accompanying the product involved); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed.Cir.1986) (upholding district court’s determination that patentee demonstrated direct infringement, as part of inducement claim, using circumstantial evidence including extensive sales and instructions distributed with the product); cf. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 473 F.3d 1213, 1222-23 (Fed.Cir.2007) (affirming summary judgment of no infringement under the approach of Moleculon, observing that product manuals in question, at best, only taught method steps in isolation). Lucent introduced sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that Microsoft customers actually used the software to carry out the method steps of the '356 patent. Lucent provided evidence in the form of instruction and encouragement offered via tutorials, help files, web pages, manuals, promotional materials, the testimony of those familiar with these materials, and other sources. {See, e.g., PX 742 (excerpts of Microsoft Money user’s guides); PX 1139B (excerpt from Microsoft Outlook help files); PX 651 (user’s guide for Microsoft Windows Mobile product).) A reasonable jury could have reviewed this extensive record and concluded, based on the circumstantial evidence, that there was direct infringement. The cases cited by Microsoft do not require a different result. In ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007), the court stated, in the context of an inducement claim, that “[i]n order to prove direct infringement, a patentee must either point to specific instances of direct infringement or show that the accused device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.” Unlike the present case and others cited above, however, the court in ACCO Brands, Inc. concluded that there was no evidence in the record that the alleged infringer distributed materials encouraging the infringing method of operation. See id. Microsoft also cites E-Pass for the proposition that the accused infringer must expressly instruct the user regarding every step together, in the required order. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 473 F.3d at 1222. The relevant portion of E-Pass concerned the requirement that a the patentee must show that all steps were actually performed, in order. See id. at 1222. The court concluded that the product manual evidence in that case showed “at best, that the Palm defendants taught their customers each step of the claimed method in isolation. Nowhere do the manual excerpts teach all of the steps of the claimed method together, much less in the required order.” Id. It also concluded that “the accused PDAs are general-purpose computing devices that can be used for a variety of purposes and in a variety of ways.” Id. Here, the accused products are executable software, with their particular capabilities, not general-purpose computing devices. Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably concluded that only minimal instruction was needed to encourage a user to cause the accused software to carry out all of the steps involved. Viewing the evidence favorably to Lucent, a user of the accused software only needs to open a form and enter information in an appropriate field to trigger all steps of claim 19. d. Contributory Infringement Liability for contributory infringement derives from 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), which states: Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. Microsoft argues that there can be no finding of contributory infringement since all three products in question are capable of substantial noninfringing uses. It further argues that the Court’s instructions failed to focus analysis on “the thing sold,” and that it should therefore receive a new trial. Microsoft also points to a statement in Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 833 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1987), that “the thing sold must not be a ‘staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’ ” Id. (quoting with approval P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New [1952] Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. at 53 (1952)). First, the Court notes that the jury verdict was not necessarily premised on contributory infringement. The special verdict only stated that the jury found liability by either inducement or contributory infringement. Nevertheless, even if contributory infringement was the basis for liability, the Court concludes that Microsoft’s challenges to Lucent’s contributory infringement theories do not support judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. In Hodosh, the accused infringer argued that its toothpaste product, which admittedly resulted in infringement of a patented method when used by customers, should escape liability because it contained an ingredient that was a “staple article or commodity capable of substantial nonin-fringing use.” See id. at 1576-77. When quoting the Federico commentary in this context, the Federal Circuit was explaining why the accused infringer could not avoid liability for its overall product by including a staple ingredient. See id. at 1578. The present situation is, in many respects, the opposite of that in Hodosh. Microsoft attempts to avoid liability for the “ingredient,” here a tool included in its software, by arguing that the entire software product has other noninfringing uses. Hodosh prevented a proposed erosion of protection available under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). See id. (“The drafters of the section explicitly recognized that without protection from contributory infringers, owners of method patents, like the owner here, would have no effective protection.”) Extending it to these circumstances would have the opposite effect by allowing potential infringers to escape liability merely by packaging an infringing component for sale with some other staple article. See Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 411 F.Supp.2d 470, 476 (D.Del.2006) (“[I]t would indeed violate the ‘logic of the patent laws’ to allow a potential infringer to avoid liability for contributory infringement by simply adding a noninfringing function to a device that practices a patented method.”). Lucent introduced evidence sufficient for the jury to conclude that Microsoft’s tools did not have substantial nonin-fringing uses immunizing it from liability for contributory infringement. Microsoft argued, for example, that a user could bypass its graphical tools by keyboard entry, as with the Outlook calendar tool, or by downloading relevant data directly, as with the Microsoft Money transaction form. The jury could have reasonably concluded that typical users rarely, if ever, bypass the graphical tools by using these methods. Microsoft also argues that its software cannot be an infringing component for purposes of section 271(c), citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, -, 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1755, 167 L.Ed.2d 737 (2007). The Microsoft Corp. opinion was not so broad. There, the Supreme Court held that software, in the abstract, could not be a component, for purposes of infringement of an apparatus patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). Section 271(f) creates infringement liability in certain circumstances where a supplier in the United States sends a component abroad for purposes of combining it into an infringing product. Id. at 1752. The Supreme Court’s opinion did not reach contributory infringement under section 271(c), and it expressly left open the question of whether software, even in the abstract, may be a component of a method claim for section 271(f) purposes. Id. at 1756 n. 13 (“If an intangible method or process, for instance, qualifies as a ‘patented invention’ under § 271(f) (a question as to which we express no opinion), the combinable components of that invention might be intangible as well.”) Furthermore, while the Supreme Court concluded that software “in the abstract” was not a component in the relevant context, it did not extend its holding to tangible copies of software. See id. at 1755 (distinguishing the abstract software code at issue from computer-readable copies, such as those “inserted into a CD-ROM drive or downloaded from the Internet”). The Court therefore declines to extend Microsoft Corp. in order to limit the application of section 271(c) here. The dispute over the '356 patent involves method claims and commercial sales of software copies, not apparatus claims and foreign distribution of software “in the abstract.” e. Inducement Microsoft seeks judgment as a matter of law, arguing that there is insufficient evidence of intent to support a finding of indirect infringement by inducement. It also seeks a new trial based on a purported error in the Court’s instructions, which required that the accused infringer have “an intent to cause the encouraged acts.” (Jury Instruction 21, Doc. No. 738.) Microsoft asserts that Lucent must further prove that it had the specific intent to cause infringement, not merely acts constituting infringement. The Court’s instructions, however, also required the jury to find that the accused infringer “is aware of the patent, and knows or should have known that encouraged acts constitute infringement of the patent.” (Id.) First, as with contributory infringement, the Court notes that the jury’s verdict was not necessarily premised on inducement. The jury may have based its verdict on contributory infringement alone, inducement alone, or both. Nevertheless, even if inducement was the basis for liability, the Court concludes that these arguments do not support judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed.Cir.2006) (en banc in relevant part), the court stated that “the inducer must have an affirmative intent to cause direct infringement.” “[Inducement requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities.” Id. In keeping with this directive, the Court required the jury to find more than mere intent to cause the acts constituting direct infringement. The Court also required the jury to find that the accused infringer “is aware of the patent, and knows or should have known that encouraged acts constitute infringement of the patent.” (Jury Instruction 21, Doc. No. 738.) DSU Medical Corp. approved of the following formulation of the required state of mind: It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement. The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements. DSU Medical Corp., 471 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed.Cir.1990), and observing that Supreme Court precedent had validated this approach). The Court’s instructions followed that approach. The Court concludes that Lucent introduced substantial evidence to support a jury verdict of inducement. The extensive record in this case, including the various manuals, help files, web pages, and other sources, is adequate for a jury to conclude that Microsoft intended customers to use the tools in an infringing manner. Lucent also introduced substantial evidence that Microsoft was aware of the '356 patent as early as April, 2002. {See, e.g., PX 367 (e-mail from Dell notifying Microsoft, for indemnification purposes, of Lucent’s assertion of the '356 patent).) 2. The Jury’s Finding of No Infringement by Dell Lucent moves for judgment as a matter of law that Dell infringed the '356 patent, or for a new trial. As with its allegations against Microsoft, Lucent asserted claims 19 and 21 against Dell based on theories of inducement and contributory infringement. Dell argues, and the Court agrees, that there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Dell lacked the culpable mental state required for indirect infringement. See, e.g., DSU Medical Corp., 471 F.3d at 1306 (discussing required state of mind). As with Microsoft, Lucent introduced evidence of alleged intent in the form of tutorials, help files, web pages, manuals, promotional materials, the testimony of those familiar with these materials, and other sources. Not all of the documents and evidence necessarily implicated Dell, however, and the jury could reasonably disregard Microsoft documents as they relate to Dell’s mental state. Dell is a reseller of the accused Microsoft software, while Microsoft is the designer and programmer. For judgment as a matter of law, the Court must “disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that they jury is not required to believe.” Wallace, 479 F.3d at 624. Furthermore, the Court concludes that the clear weight of the evidence is not against the jury’s verdict. Though the parties’ post-trial briefing focused on the Microsoft products, the Court also reaches an equivalent conclusion for Quicken, asserted only against Dell. Much like Microsoft, Dell also argued that there was no proof of direct infringement by Dell’s customers, similarly citing ACCO Brands, Inc. and E-Pass Techs., Inc. Dell resells Microsoft’s software to consumers, often packaged with a computer system. As the Court noted with Microsoft’s motion, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that there were acts of direct infringement by users of the software. Since many of the end users in question overlap between Dell and Microsoft, the Court does not rely on this part of Dell’s argument in upholding the jury’s verdict on the Microsoft products. Similarly, the Court does not rely on Dell’s argument that substantial non-infringing uses precluded a finding of infringement for the Microsoft products. The Court rejects this argument for the same reasons discussed above in regards to the infringement finding against Microsoft. 3. Consistency of the Verdicts for Microsoft and Dell Microsoft moves for a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict is facially inconsistent. Whether to grant a new trial is a matter within the Court’s discretion, and it is only required for an inconsistent verdict when “it is impossible under a fair reading to harmonize the [jury’s] answers.” See Magnussen v. YAK, Inc., 73 F.3d 245, 246 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.1987)). First, the special verdict is not facially inconsistent. Nothing in the special verdict form or the jury instructions required the jury to reach the same conclusion as to Microsoft and Dell on this issue. Furthermore, it is possible to harmonize the jury’s answers for Microsoft and Dell. The Court has reviewed the record and concludes that the jury could have reached different conclusions as to whether Microsoft and Dell had the required culpable mental state. 4. Claim Construction Microsoft challenges the Court’s construction of “concurrently displaying” as “displaying at the same time, as by a window overlaying the form.” It argues that the definition of concurrently should also include “automatically.” The Court declined to include this limitation, both following its original Markman hearings and after subsequent briefing. (See Claim Construction Order Clarifying and Su-perceding Order of March 1, 2004, Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 1552.) The Court continues to conclude that, in this context, “concurrently displaying” does not require “automatically displaying.” The preferred embodiments described in the patent do not always require that a predefined tool be automatically displayed. {See, e.g., '356 Fig. 15, 13:46-53 (indicating that, under certain settings, the sample application may await user input before displaying a specific tool).) C. Damages 1. Damages Verdict by Lump-Sum Royalty A patent holder is entitled to “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer .... ” 35 U.S.C. § 284. The trial court has discretion to determine the method of calculating damages. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1108 (Fed.Cir.1996). One common method for calculating damages, applied by the experts for both sides in this case, is a hypothetical negotiation. Under this approach, a reasonable royalty is the amount that the patentee and accused in-fringer would have agreed upon in a hypothetical negotiation at the time of the first infringement, on the assumption that the patent is valid and would be infringed. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554-55 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc); Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1108-1110; Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 869-70 (Fed.Cir.1993). “[W]hat an infringer would prefer to pay is not the test for damages.” Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1555. The Court also instructed the jury that it may consider factors including, but not limited to, commonly applied Georgia-Pacific factors. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.1970). Lucent’s expert advocated an 8% royalty on actual sales of the software products. Using this amount, Lucent asked the jury to award $561.9 million based on Microsoft’s total sales of the accused products during the applicable time period. Microsoft’s expert countered that damages, if any, should be limited to a lump-sum royalty of $6.5 million for all three products. He argued that a lump-sum payment covering the entire period in question would be appropriate for several reasons, including the uncertainty and cost involved in monitoring and enforcing running royalty payments based on actual sales. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XVI 180:22-185:8 (explaining benefits of lump-sum payment in context of the '295 patent), 206:6-20 (incorporating same reasons in discussion of the '356 patent).) The jury awarded a lump-sum royalty of approximately $358 million for infringement of the '356 patent. There is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Microsoft argues that the jury’s verdict violates the entire market value rule, requiring judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. The entire market value rule considers whether a patentee may recover damages based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several features, not all covered by the patent. In this case, Lucent advocated a reasonable royalty at trial, and the experts disagreed as to the amount of the royalty. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed.Cir.1995). The Federal Circuit has allowed recovery based on the value of an “entire apparatus containing several features when the patent-related feature is the ‘basis for customer demand.’ ” Id. (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1989)). The patented and unpat-ented components “must function together ... in some manner so as to produce a desired end product or result.” Id. at 1550. The components “must be analogous to components of a single assembly or be parts of a complete machine, or they must constitute a functional unit.” Id. The Federal Circuit has applied this rule where a patentee seeks to recover based on the entire value of a product used to practice a claimed method. See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552-53 (Fed.Cir.1997) (applying entire market value rule to damages sought based on value of MRI machines where claims involved method for improved use of the machines). The Court instructed the jury on the entire market value rule. (See Jury Instruction 46, Doc. No. 738.) The jury did not adopt either side’s approach outright. By examining the hypothetical scenario from the parties’ standpoint at the time infringement began, the jury may have considered a wide variety of factors, not merely the actual product revenue. Therefore, the award does not reflect an entire market value calculation on its face. Furthermore, the Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, whether or not the entire market value rule applies. 2. Substantial Evidence The jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Lucent introduced examples of actual lump-sum royalty licenses from the computer industry with payments ranging as high as $290 million. (See, e.g., PX 5142, 5150, 5151, 5152.) Lucent also introduced sample license agreements to support its expert’s theory that a reasonably royalty would be 8% of the retail selling price. (See, e.g., PX 5140, 5141, 5172.) Lucent introduced evidence, including its experts’ testimony, that the patented technology was an important part of Microsoft’s products and that these products were highly profitable and commercially successful. Microsoft sold tens of millions of copies of the accused software during the relevant period. The jury could have reasonably accepted that, in a hypothetical negotiation, the success of these products would have been foreseeable. The law allows a jury to settle on a royalty rate or lump-sum different than those offered by the parties’ experts. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2005). Furthermore, by considering the hypothetical negotiation’s assumption that the patent is valid and would be infringed, the jury could reach an amount higher than those in actual licenses. In a real-world negotiation, validity and infringement may carry uncertainty that limits the strength of the patentee’s negotiating position. By assuming validity and infringement, the patentee’s position may be stronger in the hypothetical negotiation. Having viewed the testimony and reviewed the trial record, the Court concludes that the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence, is not excessive, and does not reflect mere speculation. The Court also notes that, even if the entire market value rule applied, there was substantial evidence for the jury to rely on the whole value of the software. Lucent introduced substantial evidence, such as marketing material, product documentation, and expert testimony, that the accused features were important to the success of Microsoft’s products and were promoted by Microsoft. (See, e.g., PX 651, 742 1139B.) The jury could have reasonably accepted this evidence and concluded that, without the user interface benefits provided by the patented method, the products would have suffered commercially by not meeting consumer expectations. See Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Michigan Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed.Cir.1999) (upholding award based on the entire value of radiator and condenser assemblies, where patents involved the manufacture of properly balanced fans without which the assemblies would not have met customer requirements). Additionally, viewing the record as a whole and considering the credibility of the witnesses, the Court concludes that the damages award is not against the clear weight of the evidence. 3. Other Considerations Microsoft argues in the alternative that, if the jury did not use an entire market value calculation, its verdict must be rejected as purely speculative. The Court disagrees. Substantial evidence supports the verdict. Indeed, Lucent’s experts testified to an award of more than $500 million based on actual licenses and industry-practice. Microsoft’s own expert testified that Microsoft would negotiate a one-time lump sum payment for the life of the patent, rather than a running royalty. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XVI 180:22-185:8, 206:6-20.) Furthermore, nothing on the face of the verdict indicates mere speculation. If the precision of the jury’s “down-to-the-penny” calculation shows anything, it is that the jury used some form of numerical derivation from values in the evidence. This is not a case where the jury’s award should be reduced because it was based on an expert’s speculative testimony. Cf. Co Medical Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264, 1274 (Fed.Cir.2006) (affirming reduction in jury’s award of trademark royalty based on expert’s testimony that offered no rationale for selecting the particular values used); Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1361-64 (Fed.Cir.2001) (vacating jury’s award of future lost profits for patent infringement where it was based on an expert opinion that used speculative assumptions). Lucent’s expert supported his theories with evidence including license agreements from contexts that the jury could accept as comparable to the present situation. Microsoft also argues that the damages award is unwarranted due to a lack of evidence that the claimed method was actually used. The Court concludes that there was adequate circumstantial evidence to support a finding of direct infringement. Similarly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the acts of direct infringement were sufficiently prevalent to support its award. As a whole, the evidence is sufficient to support the damages awarded by the jury. D. Summary for Day '356 As to the '356 patent, the Court DENIES all motions for judgment as a matter of law and all motions for a new trial or remittitur. III. Haskell'226 A. Validity 1. Obviousness MPT moves for judgment as a matter of law that claim 12 of the '226 patent is not invalid for obviousness. The Court agrees that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of obviousness by clear and convincing evidence. See Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd., 492 F.3d at 1355 (burden for obvious