Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction, filed August 11, 2008 (Doc. 14). The Court held hearings on August 19, 2008, and on August 29, 2008. The primary issue is whether the Plaintiffs have shown that they are entitled to an injunction prohibiting the state of New Mexico from enforcing its voter-registration laws. The analysis of that issue largely turns on these four sub-issues: (i) whether New Mexico’s regulation of third-party voter-registration efforts is unconstitutional as a violation of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights; (ii) whether the New Mexico voter-registration laws are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; (iii) whether New Mexico voter-registration laws violate the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973gg-10; and (iv) whether the New Mexico laws violate the New Mexico Constitution. Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of any of their claims, and because the Plaintiffs have not show that they meet the other requirements for extending relief, the Court will deny the request for a preliminary injunction. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Plaintiffs are four organizations that regularly participate in voter-registration activities in the nation and, for some of the Plaintiffs, in the State of New Mexico. In 2005, the New Mexico Legislature enacted legislation that restricted the voter-registration activities of third-party organizations. As a result of New Mexico’s laws, the Plaintiffs have allegedly severely curtailed their voter registration activities in New Mexico, although other third-party organizations have continued to register voters in impressive numbers. 1. The Plaintiffs. Each of the four Plaintiffs seeks, as part of its mission, to assist individuals in New Mexico and elsewhere to register to vote. They rely upon voter-registration drives not only to promote participation in American democracy and to enhance the political power of their members and the communities that they serve, but also to recruit new members who support the issues and causes in which they believe. The Plaintiffs rely principally on volunteers to conduct voter registration. In connection with prior elections, the Plaintiffs have registered substantial numbers of citizens to vote in New Mexico and elsewhere. a. American Association of People With Disabilities. According to United States Census data, there are over 300,000 voting-age people with disabilities residing in New Mexico. Only 37.9% of those individuals voted in 2000. See Affidavit of James Dickson ¶ 29, at 10 (executed June 10, 2008) (Dickson Aff.); Declaration of Neal A. Potischman in Support of Plaintiffs’ August 2008 Application for a Preliminary Injunction, ¶ 7, at 2 (filed August 11, 2008) (“Potischman Decl”) (Doc. 15-2). The American Association of People With Disabilities (“AAPD”) is a nonpartisan advocacy organization dedicated to ensuring the economic self-sufficiency and increasing the political power of the more than fifty-six million Americans with disabilities. See Dickson Aff. ¶ 3, at 1. AAPD has approximately 86,500 active and inactive individual members nationwide, including in New Mexico. See Dickson Aff. ¶ 4, at 1. AAPD registers its members to vote by communicating with them directly. See id. ¶ 9. at 3. In addition, AAPD runs large-scale voter-registration programs through coalitions with state-based disability organizations. See id. AAPD encourages its members and coalition member groups to focus their voter-registration message on political issues that are central to that particular group’s constituency, such as lobbying for accessible housing or audible traffic lights for the blind. See id. ¶¶ 5, 15-16 & 20, at 1, 4-6. It is unclear whether AAPD has registered voters in New Mexico. At least, the Plaintiffs were not able cite a specific instance of AAPD registering voters in New Mexico. See Transcript of August 29, 2008 Hearing (“Aug. 29 Tr.”) at 26:6-21 (Urias) (Doc. 47). b. Federation of Women’s Clubs Overseas, Inc. The Federation of Women’s Clubs Overseas, Inc. (“FAWCO”) is an international network of seventy-eight independent American women’s organizations located in thirty-nine countries. See Affidavit of Lucy Stensland Laederich ¶ 6, at 1 (executed June 24, 2008); Potischman Decl. ¶ 8, at 2. FAWCO serves as an informational resource for its member organizations, providing support for American women abroad. See id. ¶ 9, at 2. FAWCO assists its member organizations in registering their own members to vote and in conducting voter-registration drives. See id. ¶¶ 10-11, at 2-3. The members of FAWCO’s constituent organizations typically assist Americans abroad to vote by volunteering to help them to fill out the Federal Postcard Application Card (“FPAC”), which states must accept pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”). See id. ¶ 12, at 4. FAWCO frequently addresses issues of importance to the expatriate community while conducting voter-registration drives at locations that Americans living abroad are known to frequent. See id. ¶¶ 11, 18, at 3, 6. Before the Legislature enacted New Mexico’s voter-registration law, FAWCO helped to register voters from all fifty states, including from New Mexico. See id. II20, at 7. c. New Mexico Public Research Group Education Fund. The New Mexico Public Interest Research Group Educational Fund (“NMPIRG Education Fund”) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that seeks to provide a voice on behalf of the New Mexico public interest, as opposed to special interests. See Affidavit of Katryn E. Fraher ¶¶2, 5, at 1-2 (executed June 26, 2008)(“Fraher Aff.”); Potischman Decl. ¶ 3, at 2. The NMPIRG Education Fund and its sister organization, the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group (“NMPIRG”), both conduct a series of issue-oriented campaigns in which students at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, New Mexico participate. See Fraher Aff. ¶ 2, at 1. One of the campaigns conducted by the NMPIRG Education Fund is the New Mexico Voters Project, a nonpartisan voter-registration campaign organized by the Student PIRGs, a national federation of the Student PIRG organizations in various states. See id. ¶ 11, at 4. The Plaintiffs have represented that since 2004, Students for NMPIRG is the sole organization that has conducted voter registration for the NMPIRG Education Fund. See id. ¶ 4, at 1; Affidavit of Jami-son Tessneer ¶ 6, at 2 (executed June 30, 2008)(“Tessneer Aff.”); Potischman Decl. ¶ 4, at 2. They have also represented that as part of the New Voters Project, Students for NMPIRG runs voter-registration drives that student volunteers conduct. See Fraher Aff. ¶¶ 9, 11, at 3-4. Students for NMPIRG explain facts about the voting process and why it is important to vote. See id. ¶¶ 7-8, 12-14, at 2-5. Students for NMPIRG also tells prospective voters about their various issue-oriented campaigns to get them to volunteer for, and to join the organization. See id. At the hearing on August 19, 2008, however, the Plaintiffs clarified that there is no formal organization called “Students for NMPIRG.” See Tr. 206: 22-207: 14. (Boyd). Students participate in PIRG voter registration activity, but not through any organization called “Students for NMPIRG.” See id. (Boyd). d. Southwest Organizing Project. Southwest Organizing Project (“SWOP”) is a nonpartisan organization dedicated to empowering disenfranchised communities in New Mexico — primarily Latinos and other people of color, low-income communities, and young people — to realize racial and gender equality and social and economic justice. See Affidavit of Robert Rodriguez ¶ 4, at 1 (executed June 20, 2008)(“Rodriguez Aff.”); Potischman Decl. ¶ 2, at 2. SWOP has approximately 600 members across New Mexico. See Rodriguez Aff. ¶ 3, at 1. As part of its mission, SWOP undertakes large-scale volunteer-driven efforts to register New Mexico voters and has registered 80,000 New Mexico voters since 1983. See id. ¶¶ 4, 7-10, at 1-3. As part of past voter-registration efforts, SWOP employees and volunteers distributed nonpartisan educational materials, discussed the importance of voting, discussed SWOP’s views on controversies at issue in the election, and enlisted new SWOP members. See id. ¶¶ 14-19, at 3-5. In advance of the 2004 presidential election, SWOP registered approximately 5,000 people to vote in New Mexico. See id. ¶ 9, at 2. SWOP had difficulty obtaining forms in 2004, the year before the Legislature passed § 1-4-49. See Rodriguez Aff. ¶ 33, at 10. 2. Voter and Voter Registration Fraud. The desire to make a positive impact on the civil and political landscape usually motivates the efforts of third-party voter registration agents such as the Plaintiffs. When organizations such as the Plaintiffs fail in their goal of increasing voter participation, that failure often has a deleterious impact on participatory democracy. Unfortunately, the recent past demonstrates that those beneficent motivations are either too frequently thwarted or sometimes entirely absent. As a result, third-party voter registration has at times become a vehicle for voter fraud and voter registration fraud. New Mexico is, unfortunately, not immune from voter fraud and voter registration fraud. In 1999, members of the Libertarian Party fraudulently registered eight hundred already registered voters as Libertarians. See Affidavit of Denise Lamb ¶¶ 4, 5, at 1-2 (executed August 13, 2008)(“Lamb Aff.”); Declaration of Scott Fuqua in Opposition to Plaintiffs August 2008 Application for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 2, at 2 (filed August 15, 2008)(“Fu-qua Decl.”)(Doc. 23-2). After the 2000 general election, members of the Democratic Party in New Mexico discovered approximately two hundred completed voter registration forms that members of the party had gathered but never submitted to the appropriate election official. See id. ¶ 6, at 2. On past occasions, New Mexico citizens, believing that they have been registered to vote by the actions of a third-party voter registration agent, have been turned away at the polls because that agent failed to submit the voter’s completed registration form. In the 2004 election, the failure of a third-party registration organization to submit completed voter registration forms resulted in sixty or seventy young voters being turned away at the polls. See Lamb Aff. ¶ 7, at 2. Also in 2004, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (“ACORN”) allegedly registered a fourteen-year old boy to vote in Bernalillo County. See id. ¶ 8, at 2-3. Such developments pose a serious threat to democratic processes in the state and have motivated the New Mexico Legislature to seek ways to protect the eminently important integrity of voting and voter registration. The process by which the laws challenged in this case came into being is illustrative of the attention that the New Mexico Legislature has given these issues, a. Legislative Action. During the 2005 regular legislative session, Sen. Linda Lopez introduced Senate Bill 678 (SB 678). The Senate Rules Committee combined SB 678 with SB 680, SB 718, and SB 735, and SB 678 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Section 17 of SB 678, later codified as N.M. Stat. § 1-4-49, detailed the rights and responsibilities of third-party registration agents in registering voters throughout the state. The Senate Judiciary Committee did not make any amendments to § 17 of the bill, but after making substantial changes to other portions, the Senate Judiciary Committee substituted its own bill for the Senate Rules Committee’s bill. The Senate passed the Senate Judiciary Committee’s version of SB 678 and sent it to the House for consideration. The House Voters and Election Committee (“HVEC”) made additional amendments to the bill that had the effect of softening some of its consequences. HVEC’s changes included the addition of provisions that made conviction of third-party registration agents who violated the registration laws more difficult and the criminal penalties for such violations less severe. See House Voters and Election Committee Rep. at 1 (March 17, 2005)(available at http://legis.state.nm.us/Sessions/05Regular/ bills/senate/SB0678VEl.pdf). Specifically, the HVEC required that a person “willfully” violate the third-party registration law to be guilty of violating registration laws and reduced the penalty for such violation from a fourth degree felony to a petty misdemeanor. See HVEC Rep. at 1. The HVEC amendments to SB 678 passed the committee by an 8 to 5 party-line vote. See HVEC Rep. at 4. Thus, in March 2005, in that form, and after passing through the Senate Judiciary Committee and the HVEC, SB 678 passed the Senate by a 24-17 vote and the House by a 39-26 vote. SB 678 came as part of an attempt at election reform that included amendments to laws regarding voter registration, voter identification, and paper records of voter’s ballots. See New Mexico Legislative website: http://Legis.state.nm. us/les/_session.asp?chamber=S&type= + + &number=678&Submit=Seareh& year=05. The statute is intended to curb voter registration fraud through three principal mechanisms that make it more difficult to register new voters, and to communicate and associate with would-be voters. Section 1-4-49 — and the rules promulgated thereunder — provide various protections against voter registration fraud. The entire challenged law — consisting of N.M.S.A. 1978, § 1-4^9 (2008), the regulations implementing the statute, 1.10.25.7-10 N.M.A.C. (2008), and the requirements that the New Mexico officials have imposed pursuant to the statute and the regulation — restricts voter-registration activity in several ways besides the three explicit ways mandated by the statute. b. Election Reform Task Force. Between the First and Second Session of the Forty-Seventh Legislature, the thirty-four member Election Reform Task Force was created to address the changes made to election laws as a result of the passage of SB 678. Because of the complex nature of the changes, the election reform task force was created to review the provisions and implementation of the new law, review the Election Code to ensure that any obsolete language that conflicts with federal law was adequately addressed and, if necessary, recommend legislation for the 2006 legislative session to address any implementation problems or other unintended consequences of the new law. New Mexico Legislative Council Service, Election Reform Task Force, 2005 Interim Final Report at 2 (March 2006)(available at http://legis.state.nm.us//lcs/fileExists/ interimReports/2005interrreports/ERT05. pdf) (“Interim Final Report”). During its second meeting, the Election Reform Task Force discussed third-party registration and potential issues with the new laws. Ultimately, the Task Force’s sole recommendation relating to third-party registration was to amend N.M.Stat. § 1^-49 to “require third-party registration organizations to provide the names and address of their officers and provide for penalties for violations of the registration process.” 2005 Interim Final Report at 47. 3. The Challenged Law. As discussed above, in 2005 the New Mexico Legislature responded to various well-publicized incidents of voter registration fraud by passing N.M.S.A. 1978, § 1-4-49, which was later supplemented by certain administrative regulations and other de facto requirements. The entire challenged law — consisting of N.M.S.A. 1978, § 1-4^19 (2008), the regulations implementing the statute, 1.10.25.7-10 N.M.A.C. (2008), and the requirements that the New Mexico officials have imposed pursuant to the statute and the regulation — restricts third party voter registration in various ways, and places affirmative requirements upon parties wishing to engage in third party voter registration. These restrictions and requirements apply to all individuals and organizations except state or federal agencies. Accordingly, political parties acting as third-party registration agents must comply with the same requirements as other groups. See N.M.S.A. 1978, § 1-4-49(A). The main provisions that the Plaintiffs have challenged in this case include: (i) a requirement that registration agents complete a pre-registration process and provide personal information; (ii) a limitation on the number of registration forms an organization or individual may receive; (iii) a requirement that third-party registration agents return completed registration forms to the county clerk or Secretary of State within forty-eight hours; and (iv) criminal and civil penalties for parties who do not comply with third-party registration laws. These provisions, among others, are the aspects of the law that the Plaintiffs challenge in this case. a. Pre-Registration, Disclosure, and Training Requirements. First, an organization that employs registration agents who register third parties to vote must pre-register with the Secretary of State and must provide the Secretary of State with certain information. See N.M.S.A. 1978, § 1-4-49. Specifically, the statute requires that organizations or individuals who intend to assist others in registering to vote must first themselves register as third-party voter registration agents with the New Mexico Secretary of State. In that registration process, the third-party agent provides identifying information to the Secretary of State and receives a registration number. That registration number is to be placed on each completed voter registration card that the agent submits to the proper election official. See N.M.S.A. 1978, § l-4-49(A). Specifically, the statutes states: “Registration agents who either register or assist persons to register to vote” on behalf of non-governmental organizations must themselves pre-register with the Secretary of State. N.M.S.A. 1978, § 1 — 4—49(A). Neither the statute nor any of the regulations implementing it define what it means to “assist persons to register to vote,” and it is therefore not clear from the statute whether assistance encompasses (i) mere distribution of voter-registration forms; (ii) distribution and collection of such forms; (iii) distribution and collection, plus help in completing forms; or (iv) some other combination of these activities. This pre-registration requirement is designed to aid the State in holding accountable third-party registration agents who engage in fraudulent conduct by providing a means of tracing a fraudulent registration care to the person or organization that submitted it. Section 1.10.25.8 of the New Mexico Administrative Code requires that individuals complete the required pre-registration process before registering any individual to vote. See id. § 1.10.25.8 N.M.A.C. An individual’s pre-registration form must identify the name and address of the organization for which he or she is working, as well as the individual’s own name, address, date of birth, and Social Security number. See id. §§ 1.10.25.9(A)-(G). The form must also include a signed, sworn statement by the individual that he or she will obey all state laws and rules regarding the registration of voters. See id. § 1.10.25.9(1). Except for the date of birth and Social Security number, the registration form is a public record. See id. 1.10.25.9(K). The statute does not on its face require the disclosure of the registration agent’s Social Security number, but the regulations and the registration form require this information. See 1.10.25.9(G) NMAC; New Mexico “Voter Registration Agent Identification Form,” Potischman Decl. ¶ 6, at 1. In addition to the pre-registration process described above, certain New Mexico County Clerks have advised registration agents that they must participate in a mandatory, state-run training class before they can complete the pre-registration process. Many County Clerks require third-party registration agents to attend a short training session before being certified to register others to vote. Although the training requirement does not appear on the face of the statute or the regulations, see N.M.S.A. 1978, § 1-4-39; §§ 1.10.25.8 to 1.10.25.10 NMAC, training is a de facto requirement in many parts of the state, including in Albuquerque, see Rodriguez Aff. ¶ 31, at 9; Fraher Aff. ¶ 18, at 7-8; Tessneer Aff. ¶ 9, at 2-3. In Bernalillo County, the Clerk has set aside afternoon hours on Tuesday and Thursday of each week for such training sessions. See Affidavit of Mary Toulouse Oliver ¶ 5, at 1 (executed August 13, 2008) (“Oliver Aff.”); Fuqua Decl. ¶3, at 2. Training is not, however limited to those hours. The Bernalillo and Santa Fe County Clerks, and the Secretary of State’s Office, are available for training sessions after hours, including weekends, and at locations other than the Clerks’ offices. See Lamb Aff. ¶ 11, at 4; Oliver Aff. ¶ 5, at 1-2; Affidavit of Larry Dominguez ¶ 5, at 1 (executed August 13, 2008) (“Dominguez Aff.”); Fuqua Deck ¶ 3, at 2. Arranging a training session at a mutually agreeable time and place requires only a call to the appropriate County Clerk or to the Secretary of State. One Plaintiff organization has arranged such sessions with the Ber-nalillo County Clerk. See Fraher Aff. ¶ 19, at 8-9. The training sessions run from fifteen minutes to an hour, depending on the size of the group being trained and the number of questions posed to the state and county official providing the training. See Lamb Aff. ¶ 11, at 4; Oliver Aff. ¶ 6, at 2. Trainees are given informational pamphlets and a list of telephone numbers they can call if they have additional questions. See Lamb Aff. ¶ 11, at 4. b. Fifty-Certificate Limit. In addition, the challenged law limits access to voter-registration forms, and vests discretion with the Secretary of State and local officials regarding exceptions to the access limits. The applicable limit is fifty forms. The reason for the fifty-form limit is principally financial: the State must pay the printing costs for voter registration forms and thus cannot afford to provide them in unlimited number to anyone making such a request. Moreover, election officials must ensure that they keep a supply of registration forms sufficient to meet demand. The fifty-form limit is not statutory. Rather, sections 1.10.25.8(C) and 1.10.25.10(B) of the New Mexico Administrative Code provide that registration forms are to be distributed in quantities of fifty per organization or individual. See §§ 1.10.25.8(C), 1.10.25.10(B) NMAC. These two regulations thus limit to fifty the number of blank voter registration forms an organization or individual may obtain at any one time. A traceable number accompanies the New Mexico voter-registration forms distributed to each organization or individual so that election officials may retain a record of each form. See id. § 1.10.25.8(C); State of New Mexico Voter Registration Application; Po-tischman Deck ¶ 5, at 1. Despite the form limit that the regulations impose, both the Secretary of State and each of the County Clerks have regulatory discretion to deviate upward from the fifty-form limit. See §§ 1.10.25.8(C); 1.10.25.10(B) N.M.A.C. Specifically, the County Clerk and the Secretary of State retain “discretion to increase these quantities for special events or circumstances.” See §§ 1.10.25.8(C); 1.10.25.10(B) N.M.A.C. Beyond the reference to “special events or circumstances,” neither the statute nor the implementing regulations otherwise specifies the criteria that the County Clerk or the Secretary of State should apply in determining whether to exercise such discretion. See N.M.S.A. 1978 § 1-4-49(A); 1.10.25.8(C); 1.10.25.10(B) N.M.A.C. c. Forty-Eight Hour Return Requirement. Next, the statute requires third-party registration agents to either mail or personally deliver to the appropriate election official a completed voter registration form within forty-eight hours of completion. See NMSA 1978, § l-4-49(B). Specifically, § l-4-^9(B) provides: Organizations employing registration agents or using volunteer registration agents shall deliver or mail a certificate of registration to the Secretary of State or County Clerk within forty-eight hours of its completion by the person registering to vote or deliver it the next business day if the appropriate office is closed for that forty-eight hour period. Id. § l-4-49(B). The statute supplies no exception for exigent or other special circumstances that might make return of a form within forty-eight hours impracticable or for organizations that receive forms from applicants more than forty-eight hours after completion. See id. Moreover, the challenged law also provides an unforgiving deadline that can fall months before the deadline for registering to vote in an election, also known as the “book closing date.” This year, New Mexico’s book-closing date is October 7, 2008. The forty-eight hour requirement helps ensure that the voter registration cards collected by the third-party registration agent are submitted to the appropriate election official and the voter is placed on the voting rolls. d. Criminal and Civil Penalties. Finally, the statute provides for its enforcement with fines and criminal penalties. See N.M.S.A. 1978, § l-4-49(E). The criminal and civil penalties for noncompliance include imprisonment and fines up to $5,000.00, both on individuals and on organizations that sponsor registration efforts. An individual who intentionally violates the provisions of § 1-4-49 may be fined $250.00 for each violation, up to a total fine no greater than $5,000.00. Section 1-4-49(D) of the New Mexico Statutes provides that “[a] person who intentionally violates the provisions [of the challenged statute] is guilty of a petty misdemeanor,” and shall have his or her status as a third-party registration agent revoked. N.M.S.A. 1978, § l-4-49(D). The statute does not specify what constitutes an “intentional” violation, nor does it carve out any defense based on good-faith conduct. Id. § 1-4-49(D). The violation is subject to prosecution as a petty misdemeanor, the lowest level of criminal culpability in the New Mexico criminal system. The penalties for a petty misdemeanor include imprisonment for up to six months and fines up to $500.00. See id. § 31-19-1. The statute also provides for an assessment of civil penalties, including fines of “[$250.00] for each violation, not to exceed [$5,000.00].” Id. § l-4-49(E). If the Secretary of State “reasonably believes” that an individual or organization has “committed a violation of the provisions [of the challenged statute],” then the Secretary of State refers the matter to the Attorney General or a district attorney, “who may institute a civil action in district court for a violation of the provisions of this section or to prevent a violation of the provisions of this section.” Id. § l-4-49(E). Moreover, if the individual who has intentionally violated § 1-4-49 is either a director of a third-party registration organization, or has decision-making authority in the organization’s voter registration activities, the organization may also be held accountable for the violation. For example, if a person who violates the statute is “an employee of an organization and has decision-making authority regarding the organization’s voter registration activities or is an officer of the organization,” then the organization itself is liable for civil penalties. See id. § 1^-49(D). 4. The Impact of New Mexico’s Voter-Registration Law on Each Plaintiff and the Alleged Irreparable Harm. The Plaintiffs contend that the challenged law’s requirements have devastated them, because those requirements allegedly render impossible the kinds of community-based voter-registration drives that these organizations previously conducted and would like to conduct this year. In advance of the 2008 general election, each of the Plaintiffs either has suspended voter-registration activities in New Mexico altogether or has substantially reduced those activities, registering many fewer New Mexico voters than they otherwise could absent the burden that the challenged law imposes. On the other hand, the statute and the regulations, either on their face or in their application, do not appear to have effected other third-party organizations’ voter-registration efforts. a.American Association of People With Disabilities. As a result of the challenged law, AAPD has decided not to establish a voter-registration coalition of disability organizations in New Mexico in 2008. See Dickson Aff. ¶ 21, at 6. AAPD officers do not want to run the risk of legal liability for AAPD volunteers, nor do they wish to expose affiliated disability-rights organizations and their volunteers to risk for civil and criminal penalties for any mistakes made in the course of registering individuals to vote. See id. ¶ 22, at 7. AAPD believes that the risk of making errors under the law while trying to register disabled voters is particularly acute because of the disabilities of some of the registrants involved. See id.; id. ¶ 14, at 14. Moreover, because of the lack of adequate transportation for many disabled citizens, AAPD believes that it is impracticable for all of its potential affiliated registration volunteers to attend in-person training and ensure that each and every completed voter-registration form is submitted within forty-eight hours of completion. See id. ¶¶ 23-24, at 7-8. Finally, AAPD maintains that the reality that the challenged law treats as public records the certifying information of third-party registrants — including their names and organizational affiliations, § 1.10.25.9(E) NMAC — is particularly burdensome for AAPD and its coalition groups, because many volunteers do not wish to be identified as disabled or to publicly associate with a disability-rights organization. See id. ¶ 25, at 8. b.Federation of Women’s Clubs Overseas, Inc. Upon learning of New Mexico’s third-party registration statute, FAWCO sent out an e-mail alert advising its volunteers not to assist any New Mexico residents to register to vote because of potential liability under the challenged law. See Laede-rich Aff. ¶ 21, at 7. Many of the members of FAWCO’s member organizations have thus declined to register any New Mexico voters and will not do so unless the law is changed. See id. ¶ 22, at 7. The principal problem for FAWCO’s members is that it is impossible for FAWCO volunteers living abroad to travel to New Mexico to be trained and certified to register New Mexico voters. See id. ¶ 23, at 8. FAWCO is unwilling to subject its volunteers to potential civil and criminal penalties for helping to register New Mexico voters abroad. See id. ¶¶23, 25, 27-28, at 8-9. FAWCO is aware of no exception to the New Mexico law that would permit uncertified persons operating abroad to help register New Mexico voters using the FPAC. See id. ¶ 23, at 8. c.New Mexico Public Interest Research Group Education Fund. The Plaintiffs maintain that the challenged law has caused Students for NMPIRG and the NMPIRG Education Fund to engage in less voter-registration activity and to register fewer voters than they otherwise would have. See Fraher Aff. ¶ 15, at 5; Tessneer Aff. ¶¶ 7-8, at 2. The Plaintiffs contend that the most significant burden is that the law’s pre-registration and training requirements make it difficult to use the casual volunteers upon which they would otherwise rely for voter-registration drives. See Fraher Aff. ¶ 16, at 6; Tessneer Aff. ¶ 11, at 3-4. Moreover, fear of the civil and criminal penalties associated with the failure to return registration forms within forty-eight hours has reduced the number of volunteers willing to participate in voter-registration drives. See Fraher Aff. ¶ 25-26, at 11; Tessneer Aff. ¶¶ 17-19, at 6. The Plaintiffs assert that, apart from the number of volunteers, the time and resources that volunteers devote to meeting the forty-eight hour return requirement, and complying with the fifty-form limit, significantly detract from time and energy that could be focused on communicating with, associating with, and registering more voters. See Fraher Aff. ¶¶ 21-24, at 9-10; Tessneer Aff. ¶¶ 14-16, at 5. The County Clerk’s office has told NMPIRG not to use the federal voter-registration form as a substitute for the restricted New Mexico voter-registration forms. See Fraher Aff. ¶ 21, at 9-10; Tessneer Aff. ¶ 15, at 5. d. Southwest Organizing Project. Since the New Mexico Legislature enacted New Mexico’s voter-registration law, SWOP has significantly reduced its volunteer-based voter-registration activity. See Rodriguez Aff. ¶ 23, at 6. SWOP did not undertake any organized voter-registration drives in 2005, and registered less than 100 people in 2006, a substantial reduction from the 5,000 people that SWOP registered in 2004, before the Legislature enacted the legislation. See id. ¶¶ 24-25, at 6-7. SWOP has no plans to undertake a full-scale voter-registration drive in New Mexico in 2008. See id. ¶¶ 26-27, at 7. The Plaintiffs contend that, but for the requirements and penalties that the challenged law imposes, SWOP would be undertaking large-scale efforts to register voters — and simultaneously broadcasting its organizational message — in New Mexico in 2008. See id. ¶¶ 39-40, at 11-12. The Plaintiffs state that the principal reasons that SWOP has cut back on its registration activities are: (i) without volunteers, it is impossible for SWOP to undertake an organized voter-registration effort, see id. ¶ 28, at 8; (ii) the challenged law’s training requirement is inconvenient and intimidating for volunteers and inhibits spontaneous registration, see id. ¶¶ 25, 30 & 32, at 6-9; (iii) the penalties associated with the law reduce the willingness of volunteers to participate in voter-registration drives, see id. ¶¶ 28, 32, at 8-9; (iv) the restricted availability of voter-registration forms has made volunteer-driven registration drives vastly more complicated; and (v) the requirement that forms be returned within forty-eight hours would force SWOP to direct additional resources to ensure quality control within a compressed time period, see id. ¶37, at 11. SWOP Executive Director Robert Rodriguez was told during his training session that SWOP could not use the federal form to register voters. See id. ¶ 34, at 10. Rodriguez does not feel comfortable encouraging SWOP workers or volunteers to register voters, because of what he perceives to be an unreasonable amount of risk involved, both for those individuals and for the organization. See id. ¶ 29, at 8. e. Overall Impact and Impact on Other Organizations. Third-party registration agents, including many of the Plaintiffs’ organizations, have continuously operated since the New Mexico Legislature passed § 1-4-49 in 2005. Other third-party registration agents have also concluded successful voter registration drives. For example, ACORN registered its 65,000th voter of the 2008 election cycle on August 12, 2008. See Oliver Aff. ¶ 8, at 2. The 65,000 voters registered by ACORN represents a number thirteen times greater than the highest aspirational number any of the Plaintiff organizations hope to register in this election cycle. See Fraher Aff. ¶ 15(c), at 6. The Bernalillo County Clerk, recognizing the scale of ACORN’s effort in the 2008 election cycle, has a standing agreement with ACORN to provide its registration agents with one hundred forms at a time. See Oliver Aff. ¶ 7, at 2. The Defendant is not aware of any County Clerk to date rejecting a reasonable request to exceed the fifty-form limit. See Lamb Aff. ¶ 10, at 10; Dominguez Aff. ¶ 7, at 2. There have been no civil or criminal actions instituted under § 1-4-49 since its passage in 2005. See Rodriguez Aff. ¶¶ 25, 26, at 7; Fraher Aff. ¶¶ 15(a), (b), at 5-6. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Plaintiffs brought this action in the Second Judicial District Court of Bernalillo County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Subsequently, the Defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See Notice of Removal ¶ 1, at 1 (filed July 29, 2008)(Doe. 1). The Plaintiffs move the Court, pursuant to rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a preliminary injunction preventing the Defendant from enforcing the New Mexico law regulating voter-registration efforts, NMSA 1978, § 1-4-49, the administrative regulations implementing this legislation, see § 1.10.25.7-10 NMAC, and other de facto requirements that New Mexico officials have put in place with respect to voter registration. In support of their Application, the Plaintiffs submitted the Declaration of Neal A. Potischman, to which they attached various affidavits and an expert report. The Plaintiffs requested oral argument on this Application. The Court held hearings on the Application for Preliminary Injunction on August 19, 2008 and August 29, 2008. The parties did not call live witnesses at either hearing. At the all-day hearing on August 19, 2008, both .sides urged the Court to rule quickly, because the book-closing deadline for voter registration was on October 7, 2008. The book-closing deadline is the last day on which voters may register and be eligible to vote in the next election. Also, both sides indicated that they might appeal the Court’s adverse ruling. The Plaintiffs argued that the modified standard for granting a preliminary injunction should apply, under which a moving party’s burden of demonstrating a likelihood of prevailing on the merits might be less demanding because the first, third, and fourth factors of the four required showings needed to obtain a preliminary injunction, weigh strongly in favor of granting the injunction. See Transcript of August 19, 2008 Hearing (“Aug. 19 Tr.”) at 42: 18-43: 3 (Boyd); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 354-55 (10th Cir.1986)(explaining that a “preliminary injunction is appropriate when (1) the mov-ant will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction issues; (2) there is a substantial likelihood the movant ultimately will prevail on the merits; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction would not be contrary to the public interest.”)- The parties also addressed the merits, devoting most of their time to the First Amendment and NVRA preemption issues. During the hearing on August 19, 2008, the parties made various concessions. First, the Plaintiffs agreed that the United States Constitution does not compel a State to allow third-party registration, although the Plaintiffs contended that, once a State has allowed for third-party voter registration, it cannot arbitrarily restrict that activity. See id., at 55: 1-58: 4 (Boyd). The Plaintiffs also agreed that the State has a compelling interest in assuring that completed voter-registration forms are completed, and that the individuals on those forms become registered. See id., at 178: 9-13 (Boyd) (“[W]e agree with Mr. Fuqua that it is — the State has a compelling interest in making sure that completed registration forms are turned in, and that the people who are on those forms ... do in fact become registered.”). At the same time, the Defendant conceded that the First Amendment provides protection to the speech related to voter registration. See id., at 67:22-24 (Fuqua). The Defendant also conceded that, to the extent that this case implicates First Amendment rights, rational-basis review is not the appropriate standard for deciding this case. See id., at 93:10-13 (Fuqua). Moreover, the Defendant conceded that, if any First Amendment rights are implicated by the voter-registration law, the standard from Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), applies. See Aug. 19 Tr. at 97: 17 (Fuqua). Finally, the Defendant agreed that the fifty-form limit would not prevent a number of people from getting the forms and giving them to one person to actually do the registering. See Aug. 19 Tr. at 147: 1. With respect to the scope of activity that § 1-4-49 regulates, the Defendant conceded at oral argument that a third-party agent could intentionally he, deceive, or provide fraudulent information, and the law would not in anyway penalize the third-party agent for that speech. See Aug. 19 Tr. at 73-74 (Fuqua). After the August 19, 2008, hearing, both sides filed supplemental briefs. In their supplemental memorandum, the Plaintiffs reiterated their contentions at the hearing that § 1-4^19 reaches not only conduct, but speech. See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 3 (filed August 28, 2008) (Doc. 42) (“Supplemental Memo.”). The Plaintiffs also argued that the New Mexico law impacts First Amendment rights of free speech and association. In her supplemental brief, the Defendant argued that § 1-4-49 impacts only conduct and does not affect rights of free speech or association. See Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2-10 (filed August 28, 2008) (Doc. 43) (“Supplemental Response”). On August 29, 2008, the Court held a second hearing on the Application for Preliminary Injunction. At that hearing, the parties argued about the applicability of Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980), and Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988). The parties also argued whether the NVRA preempts the New Mexico voter-registration law. Moreover, the Plaintiffs discussed which of the Plaintiffs had attempted to register voters and appeared unsure whether AAPD had conducted voter-registration activity in New Mexico. See Aug. 29 Tr. at 25: 11. LAW REGARDING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS The Supreme Court of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit have explained that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). See Keirnan v. Utah Transit Auth., 339 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2003) (“Tn issuing a preliminary injunction, a court is primarily attempting to preserve the power to render a meaningful decision on the merits.’ ”) (quoting TriState Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir.1986)). The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that “ ‘a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and thus the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.’ ” Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 460 F.3d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Schrier v. Univ. Of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.2005)) (brackets omitted). A plaintiff must make four required showings to obtain a preliminary injunction: A preliminary injunction is appropriate when (1) the movant will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction issues; (2) there is a substantial likelihood the movant ultimately will prevail on the merits; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction would not be contrary to the public interest. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d at 354-55. See Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 443 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir.1998)); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.1999). If the moving party demonstrates that the first, third, and fourth factors “tip strongly in his favor, the test is modified,” and the moving party “may meet the requirement for showing success on the merits by showing that questions going to the merits are so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.” Okla. ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Int’l Registration Plan, Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation marks omitted). There are, however, three types of specifically disfavored preliminary injunctions [for which] a movant must “satisfy an even heavier burden of showing that the four [preliminary injunction] factors ... weigh heavily and compellingly in movant’s favor before such an injunction may be issued”: (1) preliminary injunctions that alter the status quo; (2) mandatory preliminary injunctions; and (3) preliminary injunctions that afford the movant all the relief that it could recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc), aff'd 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). Courts in the Tenth Circuit “must recognize that any preliminary injunction fitting within one of the disfavored categories must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in the normal course.” Id. “[M]ov-ants seeking such an injunction are not entitled to rely on this Circuit’s modified-likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits standard. Instead, a party seeking such an injunction must make a strong showing both with regard to the likelihood of sue-cess on the merits and with regard to the balance of harms....” Id. at 976. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal statutory remedy for state violations of the United States Constitution. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating two elements: (i) the plaintiff was deprived of a right that federal law protects; and (ii) the defendant of deprived of that right did so under color of state law. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (1988) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). “Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’ ” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982)). RELEVANT LAW REGARDING THE RIGHT TO VOTE The elective franchise is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the American system of government. Voting rights are necessary for the “preservation of other basic civil and political rights.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See Ripon Soc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 548, 559 (D.C.Cir.1975). Concomitantly, “[a]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (holding “that States may, inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election-and-campaign-related disorder”). In the district court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the United States Court for the District Court for the District of Indiana upheld an Indiana voter-identification requirement that required voters to produce valid photographic identification at the polls before being allowed to vote, finding there was a “compelling interest in ascertaining an individual’s identity before allowing the person to vote ... [and] in preventing voter fraud.” Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F.Supp.2d 775, 825 (S.D.Ind.2006). The Supreme Court also considered the Indiana law and upheld the law, identifying powerful state interests supporting it that were “unquestionably relevant to the State’s interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.” Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 170 L.Ed.2d 574(2008). The Supreme Court acknowledged the “legitimacy [and] importance of the State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters,” id. at 1619, and also the interest in protecting public confidence in the electoral system. Regarding the latter, the Supreme Court noted that “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has independent significance, because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.” Id. at 1620. The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. also applied the test from Anderson v. Celebrezze. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. at 1616. A fractured Supreme Court upheld the law. In his opinion for three Justices announcing the decision of the Court, Justice Stevens applied the Anderson v. Celebrezze test and called it a balancing test. Id. at 1616 (“In later election cases we have followed Anderson’s balancing approach.”)(emphasis added). Justice Stevens also spoke to the government’s legitimate interest in taking measures to avoid voter fraud: There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters. Moreover, the interest in orderly administration and accurate record-keeping provides a sufficient justification for carefully identifying all voters participating in the election process. While the most effective method of preventing election fraud may well be debatable, the propriety of doing so is perfectly clear. Id. In sum, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., as the most recent Supreme Court opinion on election laws, applied the test in Anderson v. Celebrezze and recognized the legitimacy of a state taking measures preventing voter fraud. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, filed a separate concurrence in which he argued that Anderson v. Celebrezze is not a balancing test. See id. at 1624 (Scalia, J. concurring). Instead, Justice Scalia contended that later Supreme Court decisions had clarified that the Anderson test calls for a “two-track approach.” Id. Under that approach, a Court should first determine the severity of the burden that an election law places on First Amendment rights. If the burden is severe, the Court will apply strict-scrutiny. Id. On the other hand, for non-severe, non-discriminatory burdens, a Court will apply a “deferential ‘important regulatory interests’ standard”. Id. RELEVANT LAW REGARDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT The federal courts have not had a great number of opportunities in which to pass on the constitutionality of state voter-registration laws. Accordingly, the federal courts have not had frequent opportunities to decide what the standard of scrutiny for such laws appropriately should be. The Court’s first task is thus to determine the appropriate standard of scrutiny under the First Amendment. 1. The First-Amendment Right. The Plaintiffs concede that a third party (non-governmental agency or official) does not have a constitutional right— under the First Amendment or otherwise' — to register voters. See Aug. 19 Tr. at 55: 1-58: 4 (Boyd). In other words, the Constitution does not compel a state to provide for third-party registration. See id. at 55. As a matter of logic, it would appear that, if New Mexico could constitutionally require all citizens to register only with a government official — thus eliminating entirely all the incidental political speech that occurs contemporaneous with third-party registration — a state could impose whatever restrictions on the third-party registration it wants. In other words, the greater power — to eliminate all third-party registration — includes the lesser power — to regulate extensively third-party registration. That a state can, consistent with the First Amendment, eliminate all third-party registration implies the lesser power to regulate is further supported by the fact that the New Mexico statute does not regulate, abridge, limit, or penalize speech in any way. For example, New Mexico does not require a third-party registrar to say anything to a prospective voter. It does not mandate any particular speech or statement or information. On the flip side, the New Mexico statute does not preclude any speech. Indeed, the State conceded at oral argument that a third-party agent could intentionally lie, deceive, or provide fraudulent information, and the law would not in anyway penalize the third-party agent for that speech. See Aug. 19 Tr. at 73-74 (Fuqua). The New Mexico law is not only content-neutral regulation, but it is totally unconcerned with content. New Mexico does not care what third-party agents say while they are engaged in registering voters. Thus, New Mexico’s statute does not directly impair or regulate speech. Again, the fact that New Mexico could, consistent with the First Amendment, eliminate all third-party regulation, and the fact that New Mexico does not care what is said during a third-party registration suggest that the First Amendment is not invoked at all and that there is no unconstitutional abridgment of speech. The Plaintiffs contend that the request to register invariably leads to core political speech. The State does not dispute that the incidental speech is likely core political speech and protected. While the parties have not explicitly argued the First-Amendment forum cases, the Plaintiffs’ argument is essentially that the State must provide third-parties the forum of voter registration so that there is a possibility of political dialogue. The Court does not believe that the cases have gone that far, but there is some language in the cases that suggest that the First Amendment may cover this incidental speech. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the majority opinion stated: We have recognized that, “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and is some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects — at least to some degree— the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (emphasis added). Thus, while it may not be entirely logical to find that there is no constitutional right to third-party registration, and that the registration law does not regulate speech at all, but then find that the registration law must be scrutinized through First Amendment lens, Anderson v. Celebrezze's broad language suggests that a district court— this district court — must use the Anderson test to review New Mexico’s voter registration laws. Accordingly, the Court will use the Anderson test in this case to review New Mexico’s third-party voter registration law. 2. Level of Scrutiny. While the Court believes that it is bound to apply the standard in Anderson v. Celebrezze, that conclusion does not dictate precisely what that standard and its application will look like in a particular case. Before examining the standards in Anderson v. Celebrezze, it is important to place it in the spectrum of constitutional standards. Briefly, under strict scrutiny, the government must assert a significant and compelling government interest, and the court must decide whether the legislation is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). Under intermediate scrutiny, the government need articulate only an important or substantial governmental interest, and the court must determine if the means chosen to enforce that interest is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). Finally, under rational-basis review, legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). New statutes survive strict scrutiny. Most statutes survive rational-basis review. Intermediate review turns on how the individual justice or judge balances the competing intents and burdens. As a general matter, state election laws that burden First Amendment rights are subject to the balancing test first laid out in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-90, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). While Crawford v. Marion County Election Board dealt with the right to franchise, not the First Amendment, the Supreme Court arguably reaffirmed the Anderson test in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. The Supreme Court seems to be using a similar lens to examine the constitutionality of all election laws, whether the challenge is made under the First Amendment or under some other constitutional provision. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S.Ct. at 1616 (“In later election cases we have followed Anderson’s balancing approach.”). In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for evaluating constitutional challenges to state-election laws and, specifically, for deciding whether a state-election law violates the First Amendment: Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws therefore cannot be resolved by any “litmus-paper test” that will separate valid from invalid restrictions. Instead, a court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court gave some guidance whether its Anderson v. Celebrezze test was closer to strict scrutiny or to rational-basis scrutiny. The Supreme Court stated: “[T]he State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminating restrictions.” Id. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court included a footnote after the statement, noting: “We have upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.” Id. at 788 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564. The Supreme Court eschewed any litmus test or standard — such as strict scrutiny or rational basis — that automatically dictated the result in the case. “Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws therefore cannot be resolved by any ‘litmus-paper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.” Anderso