Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JUDITH M. BARZILAY, District Judge . I. Background. cn o CD A. Procedural History cu o CD II. Legal Background .510 III. Discussion . H i-H lO A. The Technology Described in the Patents . H i — i uo B. The '877 Patent. (M t-H io 1. “Managing one or more floor brokers” CO t — I uo 2. “Current-status information”. lO ^ — 1 uo 3. “Current-status information” in the Transmitting, Calculating, and Displaying Steps. 4. The Calculating Step CR l — 1 00 5. The Displaying Step. CR tO O 6. The Selecting Step .. CR to CO 7. “Transmitting” and “Transmitting ... from [one device] to [another device]”. CR to C. The '002 Patent. CR to 1. “Data packet”. CR to 2. “Data structure”. CR co 3. “Each of said data packets containing said information”. CR co 4. “Volley code”. CR co 5. “A data structure stored in each of said [first and second] computer-readable memories”. CR CO D. The '981 Patent. CR CO 1. The Transmitting Step. CR CO 2. “Whereby a cross trade is executed” CR CO 3. “Execution”. CR ^ I. Background This is an action for patent infringement brought by Plaintiff Papyrus Technology Corp. (“Papyrus”) against Defendant New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (“NYSE”). The parties appear before the court following NYSE’s January 2005 request for a Markman Hearing. On December 18 and 19, 2007, the court held a Markman Hearing when the parties each gave a technology demonstration and presented their proposed constructions of the claim elements at issue. The court now construes disputed terms in Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,774,877, Claims 1 and 8 of U.S. Patent No. 5,797,002, and Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,768,981. See U.S. Patent No. 5,774,-877 (issued June 30, 1998) (“the '877 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 5,797,002 (issued Aug. 18, 1998) (“the '002 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 6,768,981 (issued July 27, 2004) (“the '981 Patent”). A. Procedural History Papyrus filed suit against NYSE in January 2004, alleging infringement of the '877 Patent, the '002 Patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,915,245, and U.S. Patent No. 6,539,-362 B2. See U.S. Patent No. 5,915,245 (issued June 22, 1999) (“the '245 Patent”); U.S. Patent No. 6,539,362 B2 (issued Mar. 25, 2003) (“the '362 Patent”). In March 2004, NYSE denied Papyrus’s allegation and counterclaimed for a judgment of invalidity, non-infringement, and unenforce-ability of the '877, '002, '245, and '362 Patents, as well as for a declaration that there had been no breach of contract. Papyrus filed a supplemental complaint in September 2004 alleging infringement of the '981 Patent. Following the conclusion of fact discovery in January 2005 and expert discovery in March 2005, the parties stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of all claims relating to the '245 and '362 patents. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, Papyrus Tech. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., No. 04 CV 00625 (S.D.N.Y. argued Dec. 18, 2007) (No. 68). At issue are the remaining three patents. While conducting discovery, NYSE requested a Markman Hearing in January 2005. To determine whether a Markman Hearing would be necessary, the court ordered the parties to brief the claim-construction issues, which they completed in May 2005. The court held a two-day Markman Hearing in December 2007 regarding the disputed claim terms in the '877, '002, and '981 Patents. This order follows. II. Legal Background In a patent infringement action, the court applies a two-step process to determine whether infringement has occurred. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996)). The court must (1) determine the meaning and scope of the disputed patent claims, and (2) compare the properly construed claims to the accused device to determine whether there is infringement. Id. at 1115. “[T]he construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996); see Aqua Prod., Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., No. 06 CV 1746, 2007 WL 1686518, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007). The court may utilize intrinsic and extrinsic evidence for guidance when construing a claim. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83 (Fed.Cir.1996). The court must “look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Id. at 1582; Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. Intrinsic evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language,” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582, because the patentee has chosen that language “to particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116 (quotations omitted). In general, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, i.e., the “meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question ... as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. A “person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. After the court considers the meaning of the claim terms, it must then review the specification to determine whether the patentee has used the terms in a manner inconsistent with their customary meaning. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification is usually disposi-tive and “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582; see Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315-16. Although the specification is crucial to claim construction, the court must not read claims restrictively “unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’ ” Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1117. Patentees may limit the scope of their claims, as they are free to use new terms or old terms with a different meaning than they ordinarily have in the particular art. See id. at 1116-17. However, any new or special definition given to a word must be clearly defined or implied somewhere in the specification so that anyone of ordinary skill in the art would know of the change from the original meaning of the term. See id. at 1117; Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Finally, the court may also consider the patent’s prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. The prosecution history is an important piece of intrinsic evidence in claim construction as its represents the public record of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). See id.; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. The prosecution history “consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. It demonstrates how the inventor and the PTO understood the meaning of the patent at the time of the proceedings. See id. However, as the prosecution history “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant,” and not the final product of the negotiation, “it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. Nevertheless, the prosecution history often narrows the claim scope by “demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution ....” Id. In claim construction, courts are also authorized to utilize extrinsic evidence, which includes any evidence that is outside of the particular patent and its prosecution history, such as expert testimony, treatises and dictionaries. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Although the court may relay on these sources to guide the claim construction, it must evaluate them within the context of the more authoritative intrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319. As a result, where “the public record unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583. Moreover, because the public is entitled to rely on the public record, the court may not allow it to be altered by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial. See id.; Markman, 52 F.3d at 980-81; Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1995). Extrinsic evidence, therefore, “may be used only to help the court come to the proper understanding of the claims [and] may not be used to vary or contradict the claim language.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1584. III. Discussion A. The Technology Described in the Patents Although three individual patents are at issue in the current litigation, the '877, '002 and '981, they all share the same drawings and similar specifications. The specifications of the patents-in-suit describe a wireless system capable of processing the basic instructions handled by brokers on the floor of the exchange, including “quotation requests and quotations,” “orders and executions, including a series of partial executions against a common, larger order,” and “memos between the floor broker and a booth clerk or another floor broker.” '877 Patent col.6 11.34-37; see Pl. Tech. Demonstration (“TD”) at 26. Papyrus’s invention sets out a system which not only allowed communication between any booth clerk’s computer and any broker’s hand held device (HHD), but also allowed inter-HHD communication between brokers or a broker and a specialist, thereby bypassing the booth clerk’s computer entirely. See Pl. TD at 28. More specifically, the invention allows the booth clerk to view the computer screen and monitor the progress of the brokers on the floor by “reviewing status information about the various stages of the quotes and orders and the leaves quantity for each order.” Pl. TD at 37. The computer displays some information identifying the progression of a communication, thereby allowing the booth clerk “to know whether the broker has received and is working [on] the quote request or order.” Pl. TD at 39. Additionally, the display contains status information “concerning the number of shares still needed to fill an order,” which helps the clerk “assess a broker’s workload by understanding how close the broker is to filling the pending orders.” Pl. TD at 40. Both the '002 and the '981 Patents explain methods which work in conjunction with the invention taught by the '877 Patent. In the '002 Patent, Papyrus explained the organizational arrangement known as a “data structure” that the device uses to process and keep track of the data packets comprising instructions. In particular, the preferred embodiment provides a pseudocode which defines the data structure and includes fields such as sequence number, transaction type, communication stage, stock being traded, buy or sell designation, quantity, and execution sequence number. Pl. TD at 63-64. The '981 Patent in turn discloses a method for executing a cross-trade in which the broker selects compatible orders- — which are sorted and displayed so that the possible cross can be seen easily — and crosses them using the execution entry screen. Pl. TD at 55-59. At issue in this case are Claim 1 of the '877 Patent, Claims 1 and 8 of the '002 Patent, and Claim 1 of the '981 Patent. The court will address the disputed language of each claim in turn. B. The '877 Patent Papyrus and NYSE contest the meaning of seven terms or elements in Claim 1 of the '877 Patent, which teaches “a method of managing the activities of one or more floor brokers situated on the floor of an exchange-” '877 Patent Abstract. The method uses “a programmed computer to compare a relative number of instructions having a pending status that have been delegated to the floor brokers and find the floor broker having comparatively few pending instructions.” Id. In its entirety, Claim 1 recites: 1. A method for managing one or more floor brokers situated on the floor of an exchange, comprising the steps of: providing each floor broker with a two-way communications device; transmitting an instruction from a programmed computer operated by an operator to the two-way communications device provided to a floor broker, the instruction being selected from the group consisting of quotations requests, quotations, orders, partial executions, and executions; transmitting from each two-way communication device to the programmed computer current-status information concerning any transmitting instructions; calculating at the programmed computer a remaining quantity of unfilled orders to fill using current-status information transmitted to the programmed computer; automatically and simultaneously displaying at the programmed computer in real time the current status information of at least a portion of the delegated instructions received from each two-way communication device; and selecting a floor broker to whom a further instruction is to be transmitted. '877 Patent col.32 11.25-48. 1. “Managing one or more floor brokers” The first disputed element is the phrase “managing one or more floor brokers,” which appears in the preamble of Claim 1. '877 Patent col.32 1.25. In general, a preamble is an introductory statement which precedes, and does not limit, the body of the claim. See Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2002). “[I]f the body of the claim sets out the complete invention, and the preamble is not necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to the claim, then the preamble is of no significance to claim construction because it cannot be said to constitute or explain a claim limitation.” Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2003). Furthermore, a preamble is not limiting “where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.” Poly-Am., L.P. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir.2004) (quotations & citation omitted). Alternately, “the preamble is regarded as limiting if it recites essential structure that is important to the invention or necessary to give meaning to the claim.” Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed.Cir.2006). As a result, “when the limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.” Id., 441 F.3d at 952 (quotations & citation omitted). In determining whether the preamble constitutes a claim limitation, the court reviews the entire patent “to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim.” Poly-Am., L.P., 383 F.3d at 1309. Papyrus contends that the preamble does not constitute a claim limitation because (a) the preamble does not recite essential structure or give life to the claim, (b) the six steps in the body of the claim define a fully operational method, and (c) deletion of the phrase would have no effect on the subsequent steps. PI. Reply Br. 2-3. In the alternative, Papyrus asks the court to construe the phrase as “exercising care in assigning instructions to floor brokers.” PI. Proposed Claim Const. Order (“PCCO”) 2. Specifically, Papyrus argues that the method enables the operator to determine which broker has the capacity to carry out the next order. Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 1 at 79, Papyrus Tech. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., No. 04 Civ. 00625 (S.D.N.Y. argued Dec. 18, 2007) (“Mark-man Hr’g Tr.”). Further, Papyrus emphasizes that the calculating and displaying steps are the essential components of the claim, as they determine the information used by the booth clerk and make the information viewable at the programmed computer. Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 1 at 84; PI. Markman Hr’g Slide Presentation (“MHSP”) vol. 1 at 8. Without this information, the booth clerk is unable to exercise his or her “judgment and discretion” in distributing new orders and quote requests. See '877 Patent col.9 11.27-33. Crucially, the booth clerk does not direct or control how a floor broker handles a new order or quote request. PL MHSP vol. 1 at 16. In contrast, NYSE argues that the preamble constitutes a claim limitation and should be construed as “monitoring floor brokers’ activities on the trading floor, and directing or controlling their workload.” Def. POCO 1-2. According to NYSE, the preamble limits the claim because Papyrus explicitly relied upon it during the patent prosecution. Def. Reply Br. 4; see In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art may indicate that the preamble is a claim limitation ....”). NYSE alleges that the April 23, 1997 patent amendment demonstrates Papyrus’s reliance on the preamble to differentiate the invention from the Sisley et al. (“Sisley”) patent during prosecution. See Amendment in Application Señal No. 08/809,377 (Apr. 23, 1997), PLApp. Ex. 8 at 176, '178-79. NYSE also suggests that because the claims in the '877 Patent “are nothing more than lists of apparently unrelated activities” without the “managing” requirement of the preamble, the preamble is a fundamental characteristic of the invention and must therefore be treated as a claim limitation. Def. Reply Br. 4-5. The court does not agree. During prosecution of the patent, Papyrus explained that “Claim [1] leaves the decision of who shall receive a further instruction in the discretion of the. operator by ‘enabling the operator to select a floor broker to whom a further instruction is to be delegated.’” See Pl.App. Ex. 8 at 183. Furthermore, that the April 1997 amendment repeatedly uses the terms “managing” or “management” does not necessarily constitute reliance on the preamble to differentiate the invention from the Sisley patent. See PLApp. Ex. 8 at 176. Rather, taken as a whole, the amendment demonstrates Papyrus’s efforts to rely on the claimed step of “receiving transmissions.” Pl. MHSP vol. 1 at 11. Indeed, the amendment specifically states that [bjecause the field service technicians lack such communications devices, the management system of the [Sisley] patent does not teach or suggest the claimed step of “receiving transmissions from the two-way communication devices including status information concerning any instructions that have been delegated to the floor brokers.” PLApp. Ex. 8 at 178 (emphasis added). Papyrus again emphasized the claim’s difference from the prior art, stating that the invention “includes steps that are not disclosed or suggested in either [Sisley] or the APAA. Specifically, the claimed method calls for ... the step of receiving transmissions from the two-way communication devices which include status information concerning any instructions that have been delegated to the floor brokers.” Id. at 181 (emphasis added). Finally, the court does not agree that the preamble is a fundamental characteristic of the claim. Because omission of the management phrase would affect neither the cohesiveness of the claim nor its ability to adequately describe the invention, the court finds that the preamble does not recite a central step, but rather, “sets the stage” for the invention. See Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 1 at 87. Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, the court finds that the preamble is not a claim limitation. 2. “Current-status information” The parties ask the court to construe the phrase “current-status information,” which appears multiple times in Claim 1 of the patent, including in the transmitting, calculating, and displaying steps. See '877 Patent col.32 11.36, 39-40, 42-43. Papyrus alleges that it acted as lexicographer by providing the following definition in the specification: As used herein, “status” refers to the stage of the transaction, that is, whether a quotation has been received in response to a quotation request and whether an order has been completely filled. If the quotation has yet to be received, or an order remains unfilled, or only partially filled, the status is “pending.” '877 Patent col.9 11.33-38. Based on this language, Papyrus suggests that “current-status information” means “information indicting whether an instruction is pending.” PI. PCCO 2; PI. Br. 14. According to Papyrus, the written description provides that several types of information may qualify as current status information: (1) volley codes indicating the order’s stage; (2) a leaves quantity indicating the pending status of an order, and (3) volley codes indicating the request’s stage. See '877 Patent col.9 11.33-38, col.10 11.17-21, col.18 11.16-53, col.23 1.16-col.25 1.49. Further, Figure 1 in the '877 Patent illustrates several types of current-status information for quotation requests (symbols “Q,” “A,” “R,” “S,” and “U”), for orders (symbols “ * ” and “r”), and for leaves quantities (numeric values). '877 Patent Fig. 1. Although NYSE also relies on the language of the specification, NYSE concludes that “current-status information” means “characters or digital means conveying the stage of a transaction.” Def. PCCO 4; Def. MHSP 99. Specifically, NYSE relies on language stating that “ ‘status’ refers to the stage of the transaction” and that the “system utilizes volley codes to define the present stage of the transaction or instruction.” '877 Patent col.911.33-34, col.18 11.17-18 (emphasis added). When construing terms, the court generally “begin[s] with the presumption that the same terms appearing in different portions of the claims should be given the same meaning unless it is clear from the specification and prosecution history that the terms have different meanings at different portions of the claims.” Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed.Cir.2001). Furthermore, “a claim term should be construed consistently with its appearance in other places in the same claim or in other claims of the same patent.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2001). Where “a patentee defines a claim term, the patentee’s definition governs, even if it is contrary to the conventional meaning of the term.” Honeywell Int’l., Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir.2007). Indeed, “the specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term, and ... acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (quotations & citation omitted). In light of the case law and language in the specification, there are several issues that the court must balance in construing the term “current-status information.” First, the court must adopt a construction consistent with the definition in the specification because Papyrus demonstrated an intent to act as lexicographer by defining the term “status.” Second, the court is reluctant to adopt a construction, like that suggested by NYSE, which does not reflect the definition in its entirety. Crucially, the specification explains that “status” is more than just the “stage of the transaction.” The specification clearly states that instructions are either pending or not pending, ie., either a broker has not received a quotation or not completely filled an order, or the broker has carried out the instruction in its entirety. See '877 Patent eol.9 11.33-38. Third, because multiple types of information may denote the “status” of an instruction, e.g., volley codes and leaves, the court must avoid a construction that overlaps the respective meanings of several terms or which uses terms to define each other. Fourth, because the specification uses “stage” to explain the meanings of the terms “status” and “volley codes,” confusion may arise from a construction that employs the term “stage.” '877 Patent eol.9 11.33-34, col.18 11.17-18. Any construction of “status” must therefore make clear the subtle but important difference between “stage of the transaction” and the “stage” of an instruction as denoted by volley codes, such as whether an instruction has been sent, received, or cancelled. '877 Patent col.18 11.16-53, eol.23 ll.16-col.251.49. Thus, the court finds that “current-status information” means “information indicating whether an instruction is pending or not pending.” 3. “Current-status information” in the Transmitting, Calculating, and Displaying Steps The court now turns to the patent’s use of the phrase “current-status information” as it appears in the transmitting, calculating and displaying steps. See '877 Patent col.3211.36, 39-40, 42^3. Papyrus asks the court to adopt a construction consistent with its argument that “the claim does not require that all transmitted current-status information be displayed at the programmed computer,” but rather, that “the calculating step involves using some current-status information for calculating, and the displaying step, like the immediately preceding calculating step, involves using some current-status information.” PL PCCO 2 (emphasis added). Papyrus’s argument is two-fold. First, it contends that the specification language “do[es] not require that all transmitted current status information be displayed at the program[med] computer.” Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 1 at 136. Second, Papyrus argues that its construction encompasses the meaning of the term as used in each of the three steps. PL Reply Br. 7 (alleging that NYSE’s construction, unlike Papyrus’s, “would render the phrase ‘to fill’ superfluous.”); see Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that interpretations assigned to a term should encompass all uses of the word “because the same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently.”). Alternately, NYSE contends that “the same ‘current status information’ indicating the stage of a transaction is both transmitted to the programmed computer and then displayed at the programmed computer.” Def. PCCO 2 (emphasis added). In so claiming, NYSE alleges that the use of the word “the” preceding “current-status information in the displaying step means that the claim is referring back to the same current-status information mentioned in the transmitting step.” Def. Reply Br. 9; see Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed.Cir.1999) (for proposition that identical language in separate clauses indicates same meaning); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2173.05(e) (8th ed.2007) (for proposition that claim terms are indefinite unless they have an antecedent basis). In addition, at the Markman Hearing NYSE cited the April 1997 amendment during oral argument, where Papyrus stated that “[t]he operator’s selection is informed by current-status information concerning any delegated instructions which is transmitted to the programmed computer by virtue of the ‘transmitting’ step and automatically displayed by virtue.of the ‘displaying’ step.” Def. MHSP 103 (emphasis added); see PI. App. Ex. 8 at 183. Further, NYSE conceded during oral argument that the claim “only requires some of the information to be on both screens simultaneously .... ” Markman Hr’g Tn vol. 1 at 141^2. To construe this claim element, the court must determine the extent to which the current-status information displayed oh the programmed computer is the same as that displayed on the hand-held device (“HHD”), ie., whether the programmed computer displays all or only some of the current-status information sent from the HHD. The court must look to the specification for guidance on this question. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315-16. There are several ways in which the preferred embodiment, which, although not limiting, is instructive on this issue. See '877 Patent Figs. 1, 7. First, a comparison of steps 324 and 328 of Figure 1 (the programmed computer) and steps 424 and 430 of Figure 7 (the HHD) shows that the booth clerk may view a greater amount of information in the “Quotes,” “Orders,” and “Reports” fields than is displayed on the floor broker’s HHD. Specifically, the booth clerk may see sent, unsolicited, and archived orders (step 324) as well as information on any partial or cross-executions that fill a particular order (step 328). See id. at Fig. 1. Second, and crucially, following the calculating step, the programmed computer displays the leaves quantity in step 328 — information which the HHD does not necessarily display. See id.; id. col.15 11.49-51 (stating that the HHD display screen includes “a display button 438 for selectively hiding and displaying the unfilled portion (leaves) of an orders [sic] in box 430”). Third, in the preferred embodiment, the programmed computer displays only the current-status information of the broker actively selected in step 318. Even if the programmed computer displayed the same information in the “Quotes,” “Orders,” and “Reports” fields, the programmed computer as shown cannot simultaneously display the information of all the floor brokers. Id. As a result, NYSE’s proposed construction would be correct (a) only as between the programmed computer and the HHD of the selected broker (according to the preferred embodiment), or (b) if the invention’s programming language provided for the programmed computer to simultaneously display the current-status information of multiple brokers. NYSE’s proposed construction is therefore too narrow to adequately describe the possible information displayed on the programmed computer. Def. PCCO 2. For the aforementioned reasons, the court adopts Papyrus’s construction and finds that (a) the claim does not require the programmed computer to display all the transmitted current-status information and (b) the calculating and displaying steps need only use some current-status information to carry out the patented method. 4. The Calculating Step The “calculating step” of Claim 1 states: “calculating at the programmed computer a remaining quantity of unfilled orders to fill using current-status information transmitted to the programmed computer.” '877 Patent col.32 11.38^10. Papyrus argues that in this step “the programmed computer uses some current-status information to mathematically determine the remaining quantity for each order that still needs to be filled, i.e., the leaves quantity.” PI. PCCO 2. According to Papyrus, under its construction, “the calculating step provides information about the progress of each unfilled or pending order by determining the leaves quantity for each order.” PL MHSP vol. 1 at 52. The focus of Papyrus’s construction, therefore, is the unfilled portion within each individual order. As support, Papyrus relies on the plain meaning of the phrase, the specification, and dictionary definitions. PI. Br. 15-16. It first asserts that because the term “fill” modifies the phrase “a remaining quantity,” the calculating step concerns a remaining quantity to fill for each of the unfilled orders. PI. MHSP vol. 1 at 54. In addition, Papyrus contends that the phrase “calculating ... a remaining quantity of unfilled orders to fill” does not refer to the calculation of a single quantity, but rather, the calculation of the number of shares needed to fill each pending order. '877 Patent col.32 11.38-40 (emphasis added); PI. MHSP vol. 1 at 57-58; see KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2000) (construing the indefinite article “a” to mean “one or more”). With regard to the specification itself, Papyrus notes that the written description teaches that “the invention provides continuous information as to the handling of the transmitted instruction, that is, partial executions against orders, cancellations, and the like” resulting in the “clerk, manager, or investor [having] complete knowledge of the status of an order or quote request through the trading day.” '877 Patent eol.6 11.55-61. Further, the preferred embodiment explains that the computer program processes incoming data packets by updating the record to indicate a new stage or status for the corresponding instruction. Id. col.29 11.37-52. Once the programmed computer receives the data, the base station computer then uses the current-status information to mathematically determine the number of shares needed to fill each pending order. See '877 Patent col.10 11.17-21, Fig. 1 step 328; PL MHSP vol. 1 at 58. Indeed, the specification notes that the leaves quantity is calculated for each execution or partial execution. See '877 Patent col.29 11.43-44 (“the leaves must be amended to reflect the execution”), col.30 11.54-57 (“the remaining quantity or leaves that must be traded to fill the order is calculated at step 860.”), Fig. 17 at step 860. Turning to extrinsic evidentiary support, Papyrus defines the term “calculating” according to its ordinary meaning of “to determine by mathematical processes.” PI. Br. 15; see Webster’s Neto Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed.1988), Pl.App. Ex. 48 at 456; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.2002), Pl.App. Ex. 49 at 480. Alternately, NYSE construes the calculating step as “mathematically processing the current-status information to expressly determine a number of unfilled orders.” Def. PCCO 2. In so proposing, NYSE argues that leaves are the number of shares remaining to be executed in a single order, while Claim 1 specifies calculating the remaining quantity of unfilled orders in the plural. Def. MHSP 113. NYSE contends that the only calculation the patent describes making before selecting a broker is the number of pending instructions. Def. MHSP 108. Specifically, it cites language in the specification stating that [t]he determination of who among several floor brokers is best able to handle a further instruction may be made, for example, by comparing the relative number of instructions having a pending status that have been delegated to the floor brokers, and finding the floor broker with a comparatively few number of such instructions. '877 Patent col.9 11.55-60 (emphasis added). The Abstract and Summary of the Invention recite a similar description. See id. at Abstract (“the method uses a programmed computer to compare a relative number of instructions having a pending status ... and find the floor broker having comparatively few pending instructions.”); id. col.6 11.64-col.7 1.4 (“[t]he method includes the steps of ... determining the one of the one or more floor brokers who is best able to handle a further instruction by comparing the relative number of reviewed delegated instructions having a pending status .... ”). NYSE also relies on the prosecution history, where Papyrus’s amendment to Claim 1 allegedly “changed the claim from one directed to calculating leaves to one directed to calculating the number of unfilled orders.” Def. MHSP 112. While the calculating step in the original text states “calculating at the programmed computer the remaining quantity that must be traded to fill a particular order using the current-status information transmitted to the programmed computer concerning the particular order,” the amended step states “calculating at the programmed computer a remaining quantity of unfilled orders to fill using the current-status information transmitted to the programmed computer.” PLApp. Ex. 11 at 202 (emphasis added). Papyrus’s own amendment also describes that the “calculation” of the number of open orders assigned to each broker sets up the “selecting step.” The amendment states that the management method compares a relative number of previously delegated instructions to the floor brokers which have a pending status so that the floor broker having comparatively few pending instructions can be found. The method then selects or suggests that the found floor broker be the one to whom a further instruction is delegated. PLApp. Ex. 8 at 176 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court finds that neither party’s proposed construction fully encompasses the meaning of the calculating step. On one hand, the specification makes clear that the booth clerk frequently receives current-status information, including leaves quantities. See '877 Patent col.10 11.17-21, col.29 11.40-44, col.30 11.54-57 & Fig. 1 step 328. Moreover, the specification clearly defines “leaves” as “the unfilled portion (leaves) of an orders [sic],” and as a quantity “which advises the broker of the quantity of stock required to be traded to fill the order.” '877 Patent col.15 11.50-51, col.16 11.55-57. On the other hand, the specification and prosecution history contain language suggesting that the calculating step involves a comparison of unfilled orders. See '877 Patent Abstract, col.6 11.64 — col.7 1.4, col.9 11.55-60; PLApp. Ex. 8 at 176, Ex. 11 at 202. During the Markman Hearing, Papyrus conceded that the clerk can compare the relative number of pending instructions through visual observation. Pl. MHSP vol. 1 at 64. Furthermore, in its discussion of the selecting step, Papyrus again stated that: “[t]he specification explains that a clerk may compare the relative number of pending instructions just by looking at lists of pending instructions for different brokers.” PL MHSP vol. 1 at 73; see '877 Patent col.9 11.24-27. The court must therefore settle on a construction of the calculating step that encompasses both leaves and the relative number of unfilled orders. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“[a] claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”). Accordingly, the court construes the calculating step to mean “mathematically processing the current-status information to expressly determine a number of unfilled orders to be completed.” 5. The Displaying Step The “displaying step” of Claim 1 provides as follows: “automatically and simultaneously displaying at the programmed computer in real time the current status information of at least a portion of the delegated instructions received from each two-way communication device.” '877 Patent col.32 11.41-45. Papyrus suggests that the court construe the step as meaning “the simultaneous display at the programmed computer of some current-status information for one instruction and some current-status information for another instruction.” PI. PCCO 2. In effect, Papyrus focuses on the content of the information displayed on the programmed computer and relies primarily on the language in the specification. PL MHSP vol. 1 at 25-28. For example, although the claim language itself expressly references the programmed computer as the display location of the current-status information, it makes no reference to displaying on the floor broker’s HHD. See '877 Patent col.32 11.41-45. In addition, the Abstract also discusses displaying current-status information at the programmed computer. '877 Patent Abstract (“A related method enables an operator to delegate instructions ... by receiving at the operator’s computer current-status information on any delegated instructions and automatically displaying that information at the computer.” (emphasis added)). In addition, Papyrus contends that the displaying step requires only the “simultaneous display of current-status information for at least two instructions at the programmed computer.” PL MHSP vol. 1 at 25. NYSE, however, asks the court to define this step to mean “the current-status information is displayed both on the programmed computer and the two-way communication device at the same time.” Def. PCCO 2. Despite Papyrus’s argument that the claim language does not make any reference to a display on the HHD, NYSE asserts that the current-status information is displayed simultaneously on the broker’s device and the programmed computer. Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 1 at 123-124. Relying on the prosecution history, NYSE argues that the Interview Summary, memorializing the September 3, 1997 interview between Papyrus and the examiner, is evidence of Papyrus’s “deal to induce the examiner to issue the patent.” Def. MHSP 91; see PLApp. Ex. 11 at 201. In stating that the “[proposed claim so differs over prior art in the ‘automatically [and] simultaneously displaying’ of information in real time both on the floor broker’s display and the booth operator's] display, ” the Interview Summary allegedly “[leaves] no doubt as to what it [is] that [is] being ‘simultaneously’ displayed.” Pl. App. Ex. 11 at 201 (emphasis added); Def. Br. 16. NYSE also cites the Notice of Allowability, where the examiner stated that “[independent claim 50 has been amended to clearly recite the features of ‘automatically and simultaneously displaying’ information in real-time both on the floor broker’s display and the booth operator’s] display, which features were not apparent in the prior art of record.” Notice of Allowability in Application Serial No. 08/309,337 (Sep. 19, 1997), PLApp. Ex. 14 at 212 (emphasis added). At the Mark-man Hearing, NYSE again emphasized the importance of the Interview Summary, claiming that the “examiner acts as a scrivner [at the interview], but [the parties] decide together what to put in the form and a personal copy is given to the applicant right then and there, so this is not a unilateral action of the patent examiner. This is the agreement that was reached between the applicant and the examiner.” Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 1 at 125. Therefore, NYSE argues that the phrase requires simultaneous display on both the HHD and the programmed computer. Def. Reply Br. 17. To construe the displaying step, the court must therefore determine whether the examiner’s statements reflect express representations made by Papyrus, or whether the statements are evidence of unilateral action on the part of the examiner. Although the prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that aids the court in claim construction, it “cannot enlarge, diminish, or vary the limitations in the claims.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (quotations omitted). The prosecution history includes “all express representations made by or on behalf of the applicant to the examiner to induce a patent grant,” as well as amendments to the claims and arguments made to convince the examiner. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed.Cir.1985). “Arguments made during the prosecution of a patent application are given the same weight as claim amendments,” and both give rise to prosecution history estoppel. ElkayMfg. Co. v. EBCO Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed.Cir.1999). Although “an examiner’s reasoning and findings are highly relevant to the validity inquiry ... they are not beyond challenge and they do not in every case automatically preclude the existence of a dispute of material fact.” TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2003). Because the Federal Circuit “has recognized that an Examiner’s Statement of Reasons for Allowance ‘will not necessarily limit a claim’,” an applicant’s “silence regarding statements made by the examiner during prosecution, without more, cannot amount to a ‘clear and unmistakable disavowal’ of claim scope.” Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1373-74 (Fed.Cir.2003)). Consequently, “the applicant has no obligation to respond to an examiner’s statement of Reasons for Allowance, and the statement of an examiner will not necessarily limit a claim.” Eolas Tech. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1337-38 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quotations omitted); see ACCO Brands, Inc. v. Micro Sec. Devices, Inc., 346 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed.Cir.2003). Nevertheless, an applicant or patent owner may commit to a particular meaning for a patent term “through statements made during prosecution” which are then “binding in litigation.” CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1158 (Fed.Cir.1997). Further, “the public is entitled to equate an inventor’s acquiescence to the examiner’s narrow view of patentable subject matter with abandonment of the rest. Such acquiescence may be found where the patentee narrows his or her claims by amendment.” TorPharm, Inc., 336 F.3d at 1330 (emphasis added). Here, Papyrus contends that (a) the examiner miseharacterized the displaying step in both the interview summary and the Statement of Reasons for Allowance, and (b) the “automatic and simultaneous display” language was all that was needed to circumvent the prior art. PL Reply Br., 5. The court agrees. The record shows no evidence that Papyrus sought to limit the claim in such a way. Neither the proposed Claim 50 (now Claim 1) language attached to the Interview Summary nor the proposed language in the September 8, 1997 amendment contains any reference to information being simultaneously displayed on both the HHD and the programmed computer. See PL App. Ex. 11 at 202; Pl.App. Ex. 12 at 206. Indeed, the phrase “both on the floor broker’s display [and] the booth operator’s] display” appears only in documents issued by the examiner. PLApp. Ex. 11 at 201; see PLApp. 14 at Ex. 212. Moreover, the text of the amendment, which represents the arguments that Papyrus made to convince the examiner and induce the patent grant, makes no reference to the displaying of current-status information on the HHD. Papyrus therefore did not seek to induce a patent grant based on the content displayed on the HHD, as NYSE alleges. See Standard Oil Co., 774 F.2d at 452. _ In discussing the real-time nature of the invention in connection with the current-status information, Papyrus specifically stated that “[i]nsofar as the Examiner indicated in the Interview Summary that the automatic and simultaneous display of information in real-time differs over the art of record, the inclusion of the calculating step should not negate allowability.” PLApp. Ex. 12 at 207. Addressing the prior art, the amendment also states that “[t]he [Sisley] patent does not teach the provision of two-way devices nor does it teach the use of, or access to, current-status information as called for in the pending claims. These features provide the operator of the programmed computer with a distinct advantage over prior art schemes PLApp. Ex. 12 at 208 (emphasis added); see Method and Resource Assignment and Scheduling, U.S. Patent No. 5,467,268 Abstract (issued Nov. 14, 1995), PLApp. Ex. 71 at 917. Because the record evidence shows that Papyrus repeatedly proposed consistent language which made no reference to the HHD display, the examiner’s statements were unilateral and therefore do not limit the claim. See Salazar, 414 F.3d at 1345-46. Furthermore, that Papyrus did not respond to the examiner’s statements does not indicate acquiescence to the examiner’s interpretation, particularly since the language of the September 8, 1997 amendment does not support the examiner’s written statements. See Eolas Tech. Inc., 399 F.3d at 1337-38. For these reasons, the court construes the displaying step as meaning “the current status information for one instruction and some current-status information for another instruction may be simultaneously displayed.” 6. The Selecting Step For the purposes of claim construction, the “selecting step” is defined as: “selecting a floor broker to whom a further instruction is to be transmitted.” '877 Patent col.32 11.46-47. Papyrus suggests that the selecting step means “choosing a floor broker to whom another instruction will be sent.” Pl. PCCO 2. Papyrus argues- that the selecting step does not require that the choice of floor broker be based on current-status information or on the number of unfilled orders, and thus, no such limitation should be read into the claim. PI. Br. 19. Rather, the booth clerk’s selection could be based on either the calculating step, the displaying step, or both. PI. MHSP vol. 1 at 69. Because the invention provides that the programmed computer display the broker status and that the booth clerk “can monitor the progress of one or more of the floor brokers,” the clerk’s review of the status information may occur as a result of the displaying step, but not necessarily so. '877 Patent col.10 11.2-5; see id. col.9 11.24-27. In addition, Papyrus also cites dictionary definitions to support its construction, noting that “select” means “to take preference from a number or group: to pick out: choose.” PI. Br. 19; see PLApp. Ex. 48 at 478; PLApp. 49 at 497. On the other hand, NYSE proposes the following definition for the step: “the operator selects, based on the displayed current status information and number of unfilled orders calculated above using current status information, the identity of a floor broker to whom a further instruction is to be transmitted.” Def. PCCO 2. NYSE relies on the patent specification to argue that broker selection depends on the current-status information and the quantity of pending instructions. For example, the Abstract explains that “the method uses a programmed computer to compare a relative number of instructions having a pending status ... and find the floor broker having comparatively few pending instructions.” '877 Patent Abstract (emphasis added). Similarly, the body of the specification explains that [t]he determination of who among several floor brokers is best able to handle a further instruction may be made, for example, by comparing the relative number of instructions having a pending status that have been delegated to the floor brokers, and finding the floor broker with a comparatively few number of such instructions. Id. col.9 11.55-60 (emphasis added). In addition to the patent language, NYSE also relies on the prosecution history to buttress its argument. Specifically, NYSE argues that Papyrus overcame the prior art by emphasizing a selection process in which brokers with a comparatively smaller number of pending instructions were selected based on status information received at the programmed computer. Def. Br. 23; Def. MHSP 117. The April 23, 1997 amendment states that “[t]he operator’s selection is informed by current-status information concerning any delegated instructions which is transmitted to the programmed computer by virtue of the ‘transmitting’ step and automatically displayed by virtue of the ‘displaying’ step.” PLApp. Ex. 8 at 183. Further, the September 8, 1997 amendment emphasized that “[t]he real time nature of the claimed invention was stressed [by Papyrus] in the record in connection with the claimed ‘current-status’ information, as informing the operator’s selection of a floor broker to whom a further instruction is to be transmitted.” PLApp. Ex. 12 at 207. Finally, NYSE notes that inventor Mr. L. Thomas Patterson answered affirmatively when asked during his deposition whether “[the person] managing the floor brokers, [is] making the selection based on the display that is recited in the previous step [i.e., the displaying step].” L. Thomas Patterson Dep., Murray Decl. Ex. 18 at 155; Def. MHSP 118. In light of this evidence, the court disagrees with Papyrus’s contention that the selecting step need not be based on current-status information. The intrinsic evidence stands in sharp contrast to Papyrus’s proposed construction, and clearly explains that operator’s selection is informed by the current-status information. The court therefore construes the selecting step as “the operator selects, based on the displayed current status information and number of unfilled orders calculated above using current status information, the identity of a floor broker to whom a further instruction is to be transmitted.” 7. “Transmitting” and “Transmitting ... from [one device] to [another device]” The final element of Claim 1 that the court must construe is the transmitting step, which states: “transmitting from each two-way communication device to the programmed computer current-status information concerning any transmitted instructions.” '877 Patent col.32 11.35-37. Papyrus proposes that the term “transmitting” means “sending from one place to another,” and that the phrase “transmitting ... from [one device] to [another device]” means “sending from one device to another device.” PI. PCCO 3. Papyrus argues that transmissions from the han-dheld devices do not travel directly to the base-station computer, but instead require some “intermediate storage or processing” within the network bridge. PL Reply Br. 12. In so claiming, Papyrus notes that the specification discloses various radios, bridges, and routers to provide a wireless communication link to the programmed computer. PI. Reply Br. 11; Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 2 at 5. For example, the patent states that “the wireless transmission occurs within the four walls of the exchange to one or more of the radio bridges that are connected to the backbone [Local Area Network] ....” '877 Patent col.25 11.61-63. The patent also states that “Proxim RangeLan 1 and 2 Spread Spectrum radios are connected to these machines and to Proxim Access Point Wireless Ethernet Bridges to provide the wireless communication link” and that “Cisco Routers are used to tie the inventive system into the network of the stock market exchange.” '887 Patent col.8 11.34-39; Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 2 at 5. Papyrus also cites extrinsic evidence, noting that the word “transmit” means “to send or convey from one person or place to another” and “to send out (a signal) either by radio waves or over a wire.” Pl.App. Ex. 48 at 475; PLApp. Ex. 49 at 500. Based on the dictionary definitions, Papyrus alleges that there is no requirement for direct transmission without intermediate processing or storage, as commonly understood. PI. MHSP vol. 1 at 81. NYSE, however, contends that the specification contains no disclosure regarding the sending of signals to some intermediate device between the first device and the second device. Def. Br. 24. As a result, NYSE ask the court to construe the term and phrase as meaning “directly sending between the identified devices without use of an intermediate network.” Def. PCCO 3. Specifically, NYSE seeks to distinguish between transmission from the HHD to the programmed computer and communication from the programmed computer to the network system. According to NYSE, when the patent refers to a router and a network, it describes the connection between the booth clerk back into the network system, and the router is only involved when there is communication with entities other than the booth clerk and the floor brokers. See Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 2 at 14-15. In contrast, NYSE alleges that phrase “direct transmission” refers to “data paeket[s] fly[ing] directly from one computer to the other.” Id. at 17. Moreover, in direct transmission, the data packet does not go back into the network through the router. Id. To support its position, NYSE relies on both the patent language and the prosecution history. In citing the specification, NYSE repeatedly emphasizes the phrase “from a first device to a second device.” See '877 Patent col.6 11.42-43. The specification also states that “[a]ll data packets that are to be transmitted, either from the [base station] or the HHD, are handled by the routine illustrated in Fig. 15.” Id. col.28 11.2-4. Because the data packet is “placed in [the] outbound queue” in step 740 and is transmitted in step 742, NYSE alleges that there is no discussion of indirect transmission in the preferred embodiment. Def. Br. 25. With regard to the prosecution history, NYSE argues that Papyrus defined the “transmitting” term and phrase during prosecution of the '362 Patent, which issued from the same initial application as the '877 Patent. Def. Br. 25; Def. MHSP 121. NYSE also alleges that “Papyrus amended its claims to expressly recite direct transmission ... [by] addfing] language that called for transmitting a data packed from a first individual to a second floor broker.” Markman Hr’g Tr. vol. 2 at 18. Further, the prosecution history would lead a competitor to reasonably believe that Papyrus had disavowed indirect data transmissions, and therefore function as a disclaimer. Def. Br. 27; see Omega Eng’g, Inc., v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“As a basic principle of claim interpretation, prosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.”). “ ‘When multiple patents derive from the same initial application, the prosecution history regarding a claim limitation in any patent that has issued applies with equal force to subsequently issued patents that contain the same claim limitation.’ ” Biovail Corp. Int'l. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir.2001) (quoting Elkay Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d at 980). In addition, “a statement made by the patentee during prosecution history of a patent in the same family as the patent-in-suit can operate as a disclaimer.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir.2007). In this case, during the prosecution of the '362 Patent, Papyrus specifically explained the process of direct transmission in order to overcome prior art. See PI. App. Ex. 32 at 314. Following the June 7, 2001 amendment, the PTO examiner rejected the application because “the features upon which applicant relies (ie., direct transmissions from one floor broker to another) are not recited in the rejected claim(s).” Office Action in Application Serial No. 09/668,181 (Aug. 27, 2001), PL App. Ex. 34 at 325. Papyrus again amended the patent application to expressly recite direct transmission. See Amendment in Application Serial No. 09/668,184. (Feb. 21, 2002), Pl.App. Ex. 35 at 328 (“transmitting the data packet from the first device to the assigned network address of the second handheld device”). To explain its proposed changes, Papyrus stated that “[t]he amendments to [C]laim 7 directly address the arguments in Applicants’ prior Amendment since the amended [claim] expressly recites direct transmissions from one individual to another.” PLApp. Ex. 35 at 331. The examiner subsequently concluded that the closest prior art discloses a method of order management which fails to anticipate or render obvious the direct transmission from HHD to HHD. PLApp. Ex. 37 at 340-41. Although NYSE is correct in noting that the '362 Patent used “transmitting” to mean direct communication between HHDs, the prosecution of the '362 Patent Claim 7 does not limit the '887 Patent Claim 1 because the two claims use different language. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Lab., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1184 (Fed.Cir.2006) (suggesting that statements made by inventor during continued prosecution of related patent application should not limit claim scope where patent-in-suit includes different claim language than later-prosecuted claim). The latter does not require direct transmission between two HHDs, but rather, transmission from a programmed computer to a HHD and from a HHD back to the programmed computer. See '877 Patent col.32 11.29-31, 11.35-36. Given the different language in the claims, it would be inconsistent to apply the same construction1 to the term “transmitting” as it appears in the two patents. Moreover, because the claim language does not require direct transmission and because the specification calls for the use of radios and ethernet bridges, the court may not adopt a construction that builds in or precludes direct transmission. See '887 Patent col.8 11.34-39; Fuji Photo Film Co., 386 F.3d at 1106. Accordingly, the court finds that both the term “transmitting” and the transmitting step mean “sending from one place to an