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OPINION WILLIAM J. MARTINI, District Judge. Table op Contents I. BACKGROUND 650 II. Procedural History 653 III. Discussion. Oí en 4^ A. Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Proposed Testimonies of Plaintiffs’ Experts.../. Oí en ^ 1. Standard for Admissibility of Expert Testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 702 . d 2. Application of Rule 702 to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Experts.. or i.) Relevant Medical and Scientific Studies and Literature. oí a) Studies . Oí b) Animal Studies.•. Oí c) Laboratory Studies . oí d) Studies regarding the Incubation Period. os ii.) Dr. Suzanne Parisian. oí iii.) Dr. John Kowalski. —3 iv.) Dr. Andrew Klein. v.) Dr. Cosme Manzarbeitia. “-3 3. Conclusion on the Admissibility of Plaintiffs’. Expert Testimonies. oo B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. oo 1. Standard of Review. oo 2. Uncontested Facts. oo 3. Unprocessed Bone Tissue Stored at Room Temperature for More than Thirty Days... i.) Syphilis . ii.) Cancer. iii.) HIV . HBV&HCV.. 4. Transmission of Prion Diseases. 5. Bone Paste . 6. Incubation Period of HIV, HBV, HCV, and Syphilis. i.) HIV . ii.) HBV&HCV... 7. Appropriateness of Summary Judgment. 8. Conclusion on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. C. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Exclude Certain of Defendants’ Expert Testimonies. T-l Oí IV. ConClusion. .691 This multidistrict litigation arises from a criminal enterprise by Biomedical Tissue Services, Ltd. (“BTS”) and its principal Michael Mastromarino to harvest tissue from human corpses without obtaining proper consents and following appropriate regulations. The plaintiffs in this litigation include the recipients of processed tissue supplied by BTS as well as those relatives of the deceased donors. The defendants in this litigation include the principals in the criminal operation, the funeral homes that provided BTS access to the corpses, the companies who processed tissue recovered from cadavers by BTS into various medical products, the distributors of the processed tissue products, and the hospitals and medical personnel who transplanted the processed tissue product. Certain of these defendants have jointly moved for summary judgment on the issue of general causation for the various tort claims asserted by the recipient plaintiffs, who allegedly suffered harm from the processed tissue product. The recipient plaintiffs have opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Additionally, the parties have sought to exclude the proposed testimonies of their respective experts on the issue of general causation. For the reasons articulated below, the defendants’ motion to exclude the proposed testimony of four of recipient plaintiffs’ experts and motion for summary judgment are GRANTED IN PART and the recipient plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the proposed testimony of six of defendants’ experts and cross-motion for summary judgment are RESERVED. I. BACKGROUND The product at issue in this products liability litigation involve human allografts. Human allografts are comprised of tissue recovered from a cadaver for use in surgical procedures. Under federal law, tissue recovery agencies may procure human organs and tissue from deceased human donors after meeting applicable regulations, including obtaining proper donor consent and screening donors for certain infectious diseases. The tissue recovery agency sends the tissue to processing companies regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). These processing companies manufacture allografts from the recovered tissue by disinfecting, sterilizing, or both and then package the allo-grafts for distribution to hospitals for use in surgical procedures. The allografts are transplanted into patients for the treatment of various medical conditions. For example, bone allografts are processed pieces of bone that are transplanted into and incorporated by a recipient and are used for procedures such as spinal fusion surgery. All of the tissue at issue in this litigation was recovered by the now-defunct recovery agency, BTS. Pursuant to various agreements with tissue processors, BTS was responsible for obtaining valid donor consents, screening donors, providing samples of donors’ blood for testing, and adhering to all federal and state regulations governing tissue recovery. The tissue processors manufactured and packaged allografts from the tissue recovered by BTS. These allografts were then distributed to various hospitals and surgical centers by a distributor such as Spinal-Graft Technologies, LLC. Thereafter, the allografts were used during surgery and implanted into recipients. BTS’s criminal scheme was discovered in 2005. In September and October 2005, tissue processors announced a voluntary market withdrawal and recall of allograft recovered by BTS. On October 26, 2005, the FDA issued an announcement that identified tissue recovered by BTS as having originated “from human donors who may not have met FDA donor eligibility requirements and who may not have been properly screened for certain infectious diseases.” (Bense Decl. Ex. 63, Oct. 16, 2007.) Thus, the FDA advised testing for certain infectious diseases and stated, “because of the potential lack of proper screening of the tissue donors, some recipients of the tissues may be at increased risk of infections that could potentially be transmitted through tissues.” (Bense Decl. Ex. 63, Oct. 16, 2007.) Furthermore, FDA and Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) suggested, that implanting physicians inform their patients that they may have received tissue from a donor for whom an adequate donor eligibility determination was not performed. While the overall infectious risk is likely low, FDA and CDC recommend that physicians offer to provide patients access to appropriate infectious disease testing. The relevant communicable diseases for which a tissue donor is required to be tested are HIV-1 and 2 (the viruses that cause AIDS), hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C virus, and syphilis. (Bense Decl. Ex. 63, Oct. 16, 2007.) In response to the concern regarding the potential for the transmission of blood-borne diseases through BTS-recovered tissue, Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. offered free blood tests for those patients who received allografts subject to the FDA recall and distributed by Spinal-Graft Technologies, Inc. on November 8, 2005. (Initial Submission of Defs. Med-tronic, Inc., Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., SpinalGraft Technologies, LLC, and Regeneration Technologies, Inc. 17-18.) The FDA subsequently ordered the cessation of BTS operations and recalled all tissue products recovered by BTS. Several individuals involved in the BTS operation were indicted on February 22, 2006, and certain of those individuals have since pled guilty to crimes related to the unauthorized recovery of tissue and falsification of donor records. Civil litigation followed the discovery of the criminal scheme. The lead case in this litigation, Sechtin v. Regeneration Technologies, Inc., Civ. No. 06-0135, was filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on January 9, 2006. On June 21, 2006, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the cases arising out of BTS’s illegal scheme as In re Human Tissue Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1763, and assigned the litigation to this Court for pretrial proceedings. There are now approximately 353 federal cases consolidated before this Court, and additional cases are pending in numerous state courts. These complaints have been brought by both individual plaintiffs and by representatives of putative class actions. Although the complaints contain a range of claims, the complaints can be categorized generally as: (1) tort claims, such as battery, negligence, product liability, breaches of express and implied warranties, emotional distress, and medical monitoring, by those plaintiffs who allege that they have either contracted a disease, or are in fear of contracting a disease, from transplantation of BTS-recovered allografts; and (2) tort claims, predominately alleging emotional distress, by those relatives of decedents whose tissue was recovered by BTS. The pending motions deal with the former category of plaintiffs — those who claim that they have contracted, or are in fear of contracting, infectious diseases from BTS-recovered allografts (hereinafter, “Plaintiffs”). .Defendants have argued generally that BTS-recovered allografts are incapable of infecting recipients with certain diseases due to the methods employed by the processing companies to disinfect and sterilize the allografts. (Defs. Regeneration Technologies, Inc., Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., and SpinalGraft Technologies, LLC, Mot. to Dismiss All Pis.’ Claims Because RTI’s Sterilized Tissue Allografts are Incapable of Transmitting Disease 3.) For example, Regeneration Technologies, Inc. (“RTI”), a tissue processing company, applies the following sequence of processing for bone allografts: tissue debridement and quality evaluation, bone processing, BioCleanse processing, lyophilization (“freeze-drying”), packaging and labeling, and gamma irradiation and sterrad. (Bense Decl. Ex. I, Oct. 16, 2007.) Thus, Defendants argue, even if the recovery agency failed to properly screen donors to minimize the risk of disease transmission, no virus could survive the sterilization process and storage at room temperature for a prolonged period of time. (Defs.’ Initial Submission 24-25; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 3.) Pursuant to the Court’s duty as the transferee court in this multidistrict litigation, the Court undertook active case management at the outset of this litigation and sought to identify common issues of fact and law in consultation with the parties. After numerous pretrial orders and conferences, Defendants jointly moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaints for failure to state a claim on October 20, 2006 (“Science First Motion”). Orders by Magistrate Judge Ronald Hedges refined the subject of the Science First Motion, and the motion was fully briefed on February 16, 2007. Oral arguments were held by the Court on March 28, 2007, and at that time, the Court reserved on the Science First Motion and indicated its inclination to convert the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion on the issue of causation. The Court, therefore, invited the parties to propose questions to be addressed by further briefing and with the benefit of limited discovery. A continuation of the March 28th hearing was held on April 11, 2007, and after considerable input from the parties, the Court settled upon elements of causation as an initial subject for pretrial disposition. The parties were directed to address the following questions: (1) Assume bone tissue from a cadaver that has been infected with hepatitis B, hepatitis C, HIV, syphilis, cancer (all types), and prions, and has not undergone any processing, is stored at a temperature of [blank] for [blank] days, can the bone tissue still transmit one of these viruses/diseases to a donee? (2) What is the incubation period for hepatitis B, hepatitis C, HIV, syphilis, cancer (all types), and prions? (Pis.’ Letter to the Ct., June 29, 2007.) The Court invited the parties to supplement their initial Science First Motion submissions with additional expert discovery in response to the Court’s two proposed questions. The parties conducted limited discovery, including expert depositions, and submitted supplemental affidavits and supporting documents from their respective experts to the Court. On August 2, 2007, the Court set a briefing schedule for the converted summary judgment motions and motions to exclude the proposed testimony of experts pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The two discrete questions of science before the Court focus upon certain common elements of causation in this litigation. These questions do not take into consideration any of the sterilization processes that the tissue processing companies allege were employed in manufacturing the bone allografts prior to distribution. The sterilization procedures would arguably be additional steps in ensuring that the bone allografts do not infect recipients with infectious diseases. Therefore, the Court is mindful that the present motions only assess the potential for the transmission of diseases short of sterilization. At this juncture, the Court is not assessing whether the tissue processing companies’ sterilization procedures prevent the transmission of infectious diseases. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Presently, there are several motions pending before the Court on the identified issues of causation. Defendants jointly filed a motion for summary judgment on October 16, 2007. Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ motion and submitted a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on November 21, 2007. As of December 14, 2007, both summary judgment motions were fully briefed. In addition, Defendants moved jointly to exclude the proposed testimony of four of Plaintiffs’ experts, Suzanne Parisian, M.D., John Kowalski, Ph.D., Andrew Klein, M.D., and Cosme Manzarbeitia, M.D., on October 17, 2007. (Docket No. 433.) Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ motion to exclude. Plaintiffs also submitted a motion to exclude the proposed testimony of six of Defendants’ experts, Douglas Rich-man, M.D., Margaret Koziel, M.D., Marion Kainer, M.B., M.P.H., William Rutala, Ph. D., William Jarvis, M.D., and Daniel Kur-itzkes, M.D., on December 17, 2007. (Docket No. 542.) Defendants opposed the motion. Both motions to exclude were briefed by January 28, 2008. On February 27, 2008, the parties informed the Court of their intention to pursue formal mediation pursuant to L. Civ. R. 301.1. Therefore, this Court ordered a stay on all motions pending mediation on March 3, 2008. On June 5, 2008, the Court was informed that the mediation was unsuccessful, and the stay was subsequently lifted. On September 4, 2008, the Court conducted a day of oral arguments on both parties’ motions for summary judgment as well as their respective motions to exclude the proposed testimonies of various experts. Without objection from any of the parties in this litigation, the Court determined that an evidentiary hearing, including additional testimony from the experts, on the motions to exclude was unnecessary as the parties had submitted all relevant evidence in support of their motions. The parties’ motions are now properly before the Court. III. DISCUSSION A. Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Proposed Testimonies of Plaintiffs’ Experts In concert with the issues raised in Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Defendants moved to exclude the proposed testimonies of Drs. Parisian, Kowalski, Klein, and Manzarbeitia regarding the transmission of HBV, HCV, HIV, syphilis, cancer or prion disease through the transplantation of unprocessed human cadaveric bone tissue stored at room temperature for a given period of time. Defendants also moved to exclude the proposed testimonies of Drs. Klein and Manzarbeitia regarding the length of the incubation period, or the time between exposure to and detection of an infection, for HBV and HCV. Defendants argued generally that the proposed testimonies of these experts failed to meet the standards for the admission of expert evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and argued that their experts’ opinions satisfied the evidentiary standards for the admission of expert testimony. The motion has been fully briefed along with all supporting documentation. After conducting a searching review of the parties’ submissions and thoroughly considering all of the motions, it is clear to the Court that the central conflict among the parties involves time, not capacity. For the purposes of these motions, there is no genuine conflict among the parties that unprocessed bone tissue stored at room temperature can transmit HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, and cancer. Rather, the real issue before this Court is for what period of time can such bone tissue transmit these diseases — is it a matter of hours, days, months, or years? The parties agree that unprocessed bone tissue stored at room temperature is capable of transmitting these diseases for some initial period of time. The parties diverge, however, on the issue of transmission after thirty days. Defendants contend that the transmission of disease cannot occur after thirty days, and Plaintiffs have sought to extend the period of transmission beyond thirty days. Similarly, with respect to the incubation period for hepatitis and HIY, Defendants contend that HBY, HCV, and HIV infections can be detected within six months, while Plaintiffs argue that the detection of HBV and HCV infection can take up to two years and HIV between six to eight months. Defendants’ motion to exclude challenges whether Plaintiffs’ experts have reliably concluded that the diseases at issue can be transmitted beyond thirty days and that the incubation periods for HBV, HCV, and HIV are beyond six months. Thus, the question that the Court is addressing in the present motion is whether Plaintiffs’ expert opinions, extending the transmission and incubation periods of these diseases, is based upon reliable scientific and medical knowledge or whether they are based upon subjective belief and unsupported speculation. 1. Standard for Admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 702 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper in ensuring the relevance and reliability of all expert testimony. See Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir.2008). Fed.R.Evid. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony, and it provides that: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Rule 702 articulates three fundamental requirements: (1) the expert must be qualified to render his or her opinion; (2) the scientific process or methodology employed by the expert in rendering his opinion must be reliable; and (3) the expert’s testimony must assist the trier of fact. See Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244. In short, an expert’s conclusion must meet the “trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification, reliability and fit.” Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir.2003). The party offering the proposed expert testimony bears the burden of establishing the admissibility of the testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. See Padillas, 186 F.3d at 417-18. Experts are qualified to render an opinion when he or she “possesses specialized expertise.” Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (quoting Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404). This qualification requirement is interpreted liberally, and formal education as well as a “broad range of knowledge, skills, and training” may provide the necessary qualifications. Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741(3d Cir. 1994)). Consistent with this liberal policy of admissibility, courts have been cautioned not to exclude expert testimony merely because the court feels that the expert is not the best qualified or that the expert does not possess the most appropriate specialization. Id. (citing Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1996)). The second prong of admissibility under Rule 702 requires a determination of the reliability, or inquiry into the underlying substance, of the expert’s opinion. Expert testimony is “admissible so long as the process or technique used in formulating the opinion is rehable,” and the principles and methods employed by the expert are applied reliably to the facts of the case. Id. at 247 (citing Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742); Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note. An “expert’s opinions must be based on the methods and procedures of science, rather than on subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Thus, “the expert must have ‘good grounds’ for his or her belief.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786). These good grounds must support each step of the analysis and “any step that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.” Id. at 745. In determining the reliability of expert testimony, trial courts have been directed to consider the following Daubert-related factors: (1) whether the scientific method or theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the method or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; (5) whether the method or theory is generally accepted in the scientific community; (6) the relationship of the technique or theory to methods or theories which have been established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology or theory; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method or theory has been put. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 234-35 (3d Cir.2004) (listing factors under Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786, and United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1238 (3d Cir.1985)). These factors, however, are neither dispositive nor exclusive. See Pineda, 520 F.3d at 248. Courts are entrusted to examine the reliability of the proffered expert testimony in a flexible manner. Although the Court’s inquiry into reliability is focused primarily “on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate,” the Supreme Court has recognized that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.” General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). A court cannot shy away from at least a limited review of an expert’s conclusions “in order to determine whether they could reliably flow from the facts known to the expert and the methodology used.” Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir.1999); see also In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 682 (3d Cir.1999) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an expert’s conclusion based upon a logical analysis of the expert’s testimony). If “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered,” the Court may properly exclude the expert’s testimony as “nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. 512. Courts, however, should not exclude an opinion merely because there is an absence of literature on the precise issue as long as other factors demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s opinion. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 154 (a medical expert need not “always cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular object caused a particular illness” so long as there are good grounds, such as differential diagnosis, for the conclusion). Thus, other courts have found that the lack of scientific studies either proving or disproving the hypothesis of causality is not necessarily fatal to an expert’s opinion. See, e.g., In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig., 393 F.Supp.2d 181, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y.2005). Nevertheless, there must be good grounds for the experts’ conclusions, and any gaps between the science and the conclusion must be bridged by scientific or medical knowledge. See id. at 189 (“Analogy, inference and extrapolation can be sufficiently reliable” when the proposed expert’s conclusion is the “kind that a reasonable scientist or physician would make in a decision of importance arising in the exercise of his profession outside the context of litigation.”) The final prong of admissibility is the helpfulness, or fit. “Fit” in the context of Rule 702 refers to the helpfulness of the expert’s testimony in assisting the trier of fact. This helpfulness requires a “valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The fit of an expert’s opinion to the facts before a court “is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily validity for other unrelated purposes.” In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 670 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786). The fit requirement also bears upon the reliability of the expert’s opinions. For example, in order for animal studies to be admissible to prove causation in humans, there must be good grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans, just as the methodology of the studies must constitute good grounds to reach conclusions about the animals themselves. Thus, the requirement of reliability, or “good grounds,” extends to each step in an expert’s analysis all the way through the step that connects the work of the expert to the particular case. Paoli 35 F.3d at 742-43. Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-47, 118 S.Ct. 512, the Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of discretion when the district court excluded the testimony of experts who concluded that exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) caused lung cancer in a plaintiff. The experts relied upon animal studies involving the exposure of high levels of PCBs to infant mice. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly discounted their opinions as unreliable, because these animal studies “were so dissimilar to the facts presented in [the] litigation.” Id. at 144-45, 118 S.Ct. 512. The issue of fit “is one of relevance and expert evidence which does not relate to an issue in the case is not helpful.” Id. The standard for fitness is “not that high” but is “higher than bare relevance.” Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745. In the context of toxic tort and products liability litigation, plaintiffs often require the admission of expert testimony to evidence causation. Where there is little direct evidence proving an expert’s conclusions or in a developing area of medicine and science, courts' face particular challenges in determining whether the expert testimony is sufficiently reliable based upon the scientific and medical information presented to. the court. Courts have noted that requiring experts to always “cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular object caused a particular illness” would “doom” all cases where the research on that subject was in its infancy. Heller, 167 F.3d at 155. Plaintiffs’ experts must nevertheless demonstrate “good grounds” for all aspects of their proposed testimony, including “the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s opinion, the link between the facts and the conclusion.” Id. (citing Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743-45). With these legal standards in mind, the Court turns to examining whether Plaintiffs have proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, the admissibility of their experts’ conclusions that: (1) unprocessed human cadaveric bone is capable of transmitting HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, cancer, and prion diseases when stored at room temperature for thirty days or more; and (2) the respective incubation periods for HIV, HBV, and HCV are longer than six months. Plaintiffs have argued in their written and oral submissions to the Court that their evidence would support such a conclusion. Defendants have challenged the admissibility of Plaintiffs’ experts and argued that the conclusions of Plaintiffs’ experts are not warranted from the available medical and scientific information. After a full consideration of all of the evidence and arguments submitted by Plaintiffs and Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their burden under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert. 2. Application of Rule 702 to Plaintiffs’ Proposed Experts In conformity with active case management practices of federal district courts assigned to multidistrict litigations, the Court directed the parties to focus on two issues of general causation: (1) the transmission of HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, cancer, and prions; and (2) the incubation period for these diseases. Thus, the experts focused their testimony in answering these causation questions. As discussed earlier, the essence of the disagreement among parties’ experts is not whether unprocessed bone tissue stored at room temperature can transmit certain diseases, but rather, the length of time that such bone tissue can continue to transmit the diseases at issue. Plaintiffs’ experts suggest that transmission of disease can occur for a prolonged period of time; and Defendants’ experts suggest that such bone can transmit diseases, if at all, for a relatively short period of time. Therefore, Defendants have moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert opinions to the extent that they propose to opine that: (1) unprocessed bone tissue .kept at room temperature for thirty days or longer can transmit HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, or cancer; (2) unprocessed bone tissue can transmit prion diseases; and (3) the incubation periods of HBV, HCV, and HIV are longer than six months. (Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude Proposed Test, of Drs. Parisian, Kowalski, Klein, and Man-zarbeitia 1-2.) After a full consideration of the submissions, the Court finds that only certain portions of the proposed testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts are sufficiently reliable and helpful. Although Defendants have challenged the admissibility of the experts’ proposed testimonies on grounds of all three criteria — qualifications, reliability, and fit, the Court focused its attention on the substance of the proffered testimonies. Specifically, the Court examined whether the methodologies by which the experts have reached their conclusions are reliable, and whether those conclusions will assist the trier in resolving issues of fact in this case by a preponderance of the evidence. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ proposed expert testimony is stricken where they seek to opine that: (1) unprocessed bone tissue kept at room temperature for thirty days or longer can transmit HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, or cancer; (2) unprocessed bone tissue is a transmitter of prion diseases; and (3) the incubation periods of hepatitis and HIV are longer than six months. i.) Relevant Medical and Scientific Literature Before delving into a specific analysis of the experts’ opinions, it is instructive to review the medical and scientific literature upon which the challenged Plaintiffs’ experts primarily rely. The Court will examine each individual experts’ reliance upon these studies in greater detail in the following sections. There are several initial observations regarding the relied upon literature. The Court first notes that an absence of definitive published studies on the issue of general causation need not per se disqualify an expert’s opinions on general causation so long as there are other factors supporting the reliability of the opinion. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 154. Second, the parties agree that there is no study— whether epidemiological, cohort, or case-controlled — which addresses the specific question of whether unprocessed human bone tissue stored at room temperature for thirty days or more is capable of transmitting infectious diseases to a human recipient. (Hr’g Tr. 69, Sept. 4, 2008.) Thus, if general causation is to be established in this litigation, it may only be established through methodologies, other than medical and scientific literature review, or reliance upon other, less pertinent medical and scientific studies and literature requiring extrapolation from the experts. The corollary to a lack of literature which addresses general causation is that the core Daubert factors are not as helpful to the Court in assessing the reliability of the experts’ theories. The extrapolations of Plaintiffs’ experts, to the extent they suggest that unprocessed bone stored at room temperature for thirty days or longer is capable of transmitting the diseases at issue based upon the existing literature and professional experience, have not been tested, peer-reviewed, published, or widely-accepted. Instead, the Court must consider other factors of reliability, such as the medical and scientific relationship between the expert’s opinion to theories and literature that have been established to be reliable, the qualifications of the expert witness, and the non-judicial uses to which the opinion has been rendered. In this litigation, Plaintiffs’ experts have based their conclusions primarily upon a literature review and have supplemented their literature-based opinions with their professional experiences. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude 2.) They have not conducted any independent analysis of data from this litigation nor conducted animal or laboratory studies on the issues before the Court. There is also no indication that they treated or performed diagnostic tests on any of the plaintiffs in this litigation. (Parisian Dep. 23-24, 29, 42; Kowalski Dep. 19-24; Klein Dep. 9; Manzarbeitia 187-89, 203-08.) Thus, the Court must discern whether - each expert opinion has been adequately supported “at every step” of the analysis by either cited medical literature or from the experts’ experiences. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745. On the issue of transmission, the challenged Plaintiffs’ experts have generally focused on a set of studies that can be grouped for the purposes of the Court’s summary into three types: epidemiological studies, animal studies, and laboratory studies. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel devoted much of their oral argument dissecting and evaluating these studies. The Court notes that these studies cannot directly prove general causation, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ experts must provide good grounds for extrapolating the results of the studies or incorporating the findings of the literature into their conclusion regarding general causation. In providing good grounds, Plaintiffs’ experts must overcome several hurdles for the appropriate use of the summarized literature in support of their opinions that unprocessed, room temperature bone tissue can transmit HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, and prions after a certain period of time. a) Epidemiological Studies There have been relatively few epidemiological studies on the subject of disease transmission through bone tissue. Epidemiological studies examine the pattern of disease among groups of people and can be an important tool in assessing general causation in a mass products liability litigation. Due to ethical considerations and the dearth of natural experiments, however, epidemiological studies relevant to this litigation are lacking. There are a limited number of naturally occurring and inadvertent studies of disease transmission through bone tissue implantation. Two studies have been cited by several of the parties’ experts: (1) a 1992 study by R.J. Simonds, et al. entitled, “Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 from a Seronegative Organ and Tissue Donor,” published in the New England Journal of Medicine (“Simonds Study”); and (2) a 2005 study by Barna Tugwell, et al. entitled, “Transmission of Hepatitis C Virus to Several Organ and Tissue Recipients from an Antibody-Negative Donor,” published in the Annals of Internal Medicine (“Tugwell Study”). The Simonds Study examined HIV transmission through organ, soft tissue, and unprocessed fresh-frozen bone transplants from an HIV infected, but seronega-tive, donor in 1985. Thirty-five individuals received these organs and tissues. The study observed that all four organ recipients became infected with HIV after transplantation. Three of the four recipients of fresh-frozen bone became infected with HIV, and the one recipient of fresh-frozen bone that tested negative for HIV was the only recipient of bone marrow-excavated, fresh-frozen bone. Thirty-three recipients of lyophilized soft tissue, lyophilized and ethanol-treated bone, or lyophilized and irradiated dura matter tested negative for HIV. The study noted that “recipients of tissues that were avascular or processed by lyophilization, ethanol, extraction, irradiation, or the mechanical removal of blood and hematogenous elements did not acquire HIV infection.” After explaining that the lack of transmission could have been due to either processing or the fact that the tissues were relatively avascular, the study concluded that its “investigation cannot quantitate the risk of acquiring HIV-1 from these processed and avascular tissues, although it suggests that transmission is uncommon.” The Tugwell Study examined HCV transmission from an HCV infected and HCV RNA positive, but HCV antibody negative, donor who had died in October 2000. The study traced thirty transplant recipients. All three of the organ recipients were found to be HCV-infected. Of the twenty-seven tissue recipients, five were found to be infected with HCV. The five infected recipients had received cryopreserved vein, cryopreserved tendon, and fresh-frozen and Allowash-treated tendon with bone. The remaining tissue recipients were HCV negative at least six months post-transplantation including those that received iodine-soaked cornea, cryopreserved skin, or lyophilized, Allo-wash-treated, and irradiated bone. The study noted that the “investigation suggests that not all tissues carry the same risk for transmission.” b) Animal Studies There are three animal studies discussed by Plaintiffs’ experts: (1) a 1995 in vivo study published in Spine entitled, “Simian Immunodeficiency Virus (Human HIV-II) Transmission in Allograft Bone Procedures,” by Stephen Cook, et al. (“Cook Study”); (2) a 1995 in vivo study published in Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research entitled, “Retroviral Transmission in Bone Allotransplantation” by Jean Nemzek, et al. (“Nemzek Study”); and (3) a 2004 in vitro study published in The American Journal of Sports Medicine entitled, “Lyophilization Does Not Inactivate Infectious Retrovirus in Systemically Infected Bone and Tendon Allografts,” by Matthew Crawford, et al. (“Crawford Study”). As these studies all involved animal subjects, the experts must extrapolate the results of these studies, and explain why these studies can reliably demonstrate the capacity of bone tissue to transmit disease in humans. The Cook Study examined the potential for viral transmission through certain types of bone allografts in monkeys. The study found that monkeys receiving fresh bone allografts or allograft bone that was subject to single or double freeze-thaw cycles became infected with the simian version of HIV. Monkeys who received bone allografts that were subject to a double freeze-thaw cycle and then decontaminated with ethanol, however, were disease free after twenty-six weeks. The study concluded from these results that “SIV (HIV-II) can be transmitted in bone allo-graft procedures” and that “freeze-thaw cycles and lavaging to remove blood elements may reduce the infectivity of a bone allograft, [but] these methods should not be relied upon to render an allograft safe for transplantation.” Furthermore, the study found that bone allografts exposed to ethanol decontamination and a double freeze-thaw cycle “were incapable of transmitting SIV and did not harbor live virus.” The study noted its own limitation in extrapolating the results from the study into the human context as “Simian immuniode-ficiency virus is known to be very aggressive with virus titers that are much higher than HIV in humans.” The Nemzek Study examined the transmission of the feline leukemia virus (FeLV) through the transplantation of processed feline bone allografts. The long bones of four previously infected donor cats were harvested. These bones were then subjected to three different forms of freezing treatments prior to transplantation: (1) single freeze-thaw cycle; (2) double freeze-thaw cycle; or (3) double freeze-thaw cycle with water flush to remove bone marrow. In the double frefeze-thaw cycles, the bones were allowed to thaw for no longer than four hours and were thereafter refrozen. Two weeks after the transplant, the cats were tested for FeLV weekly for six weeks post-transplant. All of the cats implanted with the bone allografts tested positive for FeLV. Thus, the authors concluded that bone allografts subjected to freezing may have the ability to transmit disease. The study explained that due to similarities with HIV, FeLV “has served as a safe and effective model for” HIV studies, and that the authors believed that the “study provide[d] an appropriately rigid standard for preliminary studies of allograft processing.” The study also noted, however, “despite their biologic similarities, a direct comparison of the infectivity of the 2 viruses is not possible and such a comparison can only be inferred” because the viral burden for FeLV in cats is greater than HIV in humans. As a follow-up to the Nemzek Study, the Crawford Study examined through a controlled laboratory study whether lyophili-zation inactivated a retrovirus in systemically infected bone and tendon. This in vitro study tested the presence of FeLV in feline bone and tendon that had been freeze-dried according to the American Association of Tissue Banks (“AATB”) guidelines and stored at room temperature. As a control, fresh-frozen bones were also tested at the same intervals as the freeze-dried bone. The study did not describe the time interval between freeze-drying and testing. Employing extremely sensitive detection methods, no statistically significant difference was found between the freeze-dried and fresh-frozen bone when tested for FeLV. FeLV was used as a surrogate for HIV because FeLV has “a structure and replication cycle similar to that of HIV.” The study concluded that “freeze-drying (performed to AATB recommended standards) alone is ineffective in inactivating retrovirus in systemically infected connective tissues.” It noted that specific drying and storage temperatures are not provided in the AATB standards and that viral transmissions may be affected by variations in freeze-drying technique. Furthermore, it was noted that the “effect of freeze-drying on viral load was not directly measured,” but the study concluded that “it is unlikely that the freeze-drying technique used in the current study (<2% residual moisture content) had any appreciable effect on reducing viral load in the tissues examined.” c) Laboratory Studies In vitro studies involve the examination of disease “within an artificial environment, such as a test tube.” Michael D. Green, et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC Evidence 439, 444 (Fed.Jud.Ctr., 2d ed.2000). These studies are not as helpful as either epidemiological or animal studies because they are conducted outside of a biological environment, and the conclusions of these studies will always remain one step removed from directly proving causation. Nevertheless, they can provide a reliable basis for medical and scientific opinions as long as their extrapolations are warranted. A number of in vitro studies have been discussed by Plaintiffs’ experts: (1) a 1990 study published in Clinical Orthopedics and Related Research entitled, “Human Immunodeficiency Virus Cultured from Bone” by B.E. Buck, et al. (“Buck Study”); (2) a 1994 study in the Journal of Clinical Microbiology entitled, “Survival of Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Suspension and Dried onto Surfaces,” by J. Van Bueren, et al. (“Van Bueren Study”); and (3) a 2005 study published in Bioma-terials entitled, “Effects of lyophilization on the infectivity of enveloped and non-enveloped viruses in bone tissue,” by Christine Uhlenhaut, et al. (“Uhlenhaut Study”). The Buck Study explored whether HIV could be recovered by culture from cadav-eric bone and tendon tissue recovered from persons with AIDS. The authors found that 60% of bone samples from the AIDS-afflicted donors tested positive for HIV after being frozen for four to seventeen weeks, and even 33% of frozen bone, that was later freeze-dried, cultured positive for HIV. The authors concluded that “these experiments demonstrate that HIV resides in bone and, in some cases, is inactivated by freezing. If it can still be cultured after freezing, it is not inactivated by other usual procedures (washing and freeze-drying) employed in tissue banking.” The study, however, does not address the loss of infectivity after the passage of time. The Van Bueren Study examined the survival of HIV cultures when suspended in various liquid serum and when dried on a glass coverslip. The authors tested the survival of both cell-associated (“CAV”) and cell-free (“CFV”) HIV cultures suspended in both a standard tissue culture medium containing 10% serum and in 100% serum. The study found that HIV remained infectious suspended in a standard tissue culture medium containing 10% serum at room temperature (20° to 29° C) for several weeks. For 100% serum, the stability of CAV increased, “demonstrating the protective effect of protein.” HIV dried onto a glass coverslip “remained infectious for several days,” although CAV lost infectivity more than CFV. Although alerting readers that their results “must be interpreted with caution because virus survival can be affected by many factors,” the authors stated that the results of the study can be extrapolated to the in vivo situation. They concluded that “under our test conditions” loss of infectivity would be around four to eight weeks. They further concluded that HIV “present in many clinical specimens and pillages may lose infec-tivity within a few days.” The Uhlenhaut Study considered the effect of lyophilization on an enveloped virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus (VSV), and two non-enveloped viruses Maus Elberfeld virus (MEV) and Porcine parvovirus (PPV). The study found that freeze-drying native bone matrix suspensions spiked with these viruses reduced the infectivity of VSV and MEV, but did not reduce the infectivity of PPV. Therefore, the authors concluded that “freeze-drying could have a reducing effect on the infectivity of some viruses, but these findings can not be generalized.” The study further determined that “freeze-drying does not inactivate retrovirus infec-tivity completely.” The authors, therefore, concluded that “lyophilization is not sufficient as the sole inactivation method regarding virus safety of musculoskeletal transplants” however “reduction of infec-tivity through lyophilization could be used with other methods ... [and] could provide relatively high virus safety.” d) Studies regarding the Incubation Period On the issue of the incubation period for hepatitis and HIV, the challenged Plaintiffs’ experts rely primarily upon three epidemiological studies involving discrete populations. Two of the three studies peripherally involve the delayed detection of HBV using certain antibody tests in liver transplant recipients. The third study involves delayed HCV antibody detection in a small population of injecting drug users. These studies all suffer from similar leaps in extrapolating the conclusions of these studies to the population at issue in this litigation, recipients of bone allografts and bone paste. First, a 1997 study, “Transmission of Hepatitis B by Transplantation of Livers from Donors Positive for Antibody to Hepatitis B Core Antigen,” by Rolland Dickson, et al. (“Dickson Study”) was published in Gastroenterology. The study investigated cases of HBV transmission in liver transplants. The study found that posttransplant HBV infection “occurs at a high rate in recipients of donors with anti-HBc” and noted a delayed detection of the HBV antibody (between two to thirty-seven months) in a limited number of liver transplant recipients. Second, a 1999 epidemiological study in the medical journal Blood, “Low Levels of Hepatitis C Virus RNA in Serum, Plasma, and Peripheral Blood Mononuclear Cells of Injecting Drug Users During Long Antibody-Undetectable Periods before Sero-conversion” by Marcel Beld, et al. (“Beld Article”), examined the accuracy of HCV antibody testing among nineteen injecting drug users. The authors first noted that the time period between HCV RNA detection and HCV antibody detection in the HCV-infected general population was five to six weeks, but in these rare cases, this “seroconversion” period may be extended up to six to nine months. This study found a delayed antibody response to HCV infection experienced by this specific population. Five of these individuals were HIV-infected before seroconversion, and seven of the twelve non-HIV-infected individuals were antibody detectable within two to ten months. The remaining five non-HIV-infected individuals were HCV antibody negative for thirteen to ninety-four months. It appears, however, that these injecting drug users had “transiently low detectable levels of HCV RNA” prior to detectable HCV antibodies. The authors cautioned that whether their “data can be extrapolated to rarely exposed populations such as blood donor remains unanswered,” and therefore, “more studies are needed in subjects other than [injecting drug users] to extrapolate these findings to the general population.” Third, a 2001 epidemiological study, “De Novo Hepatitis B After Liver Transplantation from Hepatitis B Core Antibody-Positive Donors in an Area with High Prevalence of Anti-HBc Positivity in the Donor Population,” authored by Martin Prieto et al. (“Prieto Study”) and published in Liver Transplantation examined the transmission of HBV through liver transplants. The primary purposes of the study were to assess the risk of HBV infection among liver transplant recipients from a population of donors with a high prevalence of antiHBc positivity and analyze the risk factors for acquisition of HBV infection from anti-HBc+ donors. In addition to the primary conclusions of the study, the authors noted that “[i]nterestingly, although HBY infection was diagnosed in the majority of recipients within the first year posttransplantation, HBsAg appeared in 2 individuals 2 years after transplantation.” ii.) Dr. Suzanne Parisian Dr. Suzanne Parisian is a medical doctor with a specialization in pathology. She received her M.D. from the University of South Florida in 1978 and became board certified in pathology in 1989. (Parisian Dep. 10, 18.) Dr. Parisian was employed at the FDA in the medical device evaluation office for approximately four years. During her time at the FDA and in addition to her general duties, she consulted as a forensic pathologist on an incident involving the admittance of a shipment of skin from Russia through customs. (Parisian Dep. 46-47.) She has expertise in FDA policy and has written a book about the FDA, which includes a chapter on the FDA’s oversight of human tissue. (Parisian Dep. 44, 52.) Dr. Parisian has been the President of Medical Device Assistance since 1995, and she has also performed legal consulting for approximately ten years. (Parisian Aff. App. 1, May 31, 2007; Parisian Dep. 54.) Plaintiffs proposed to have Dr. Parisian testify on the issue of transmission of viruses, cancer, and prions. Her expert affidavit discusses the evolution of the tissue banking industry, the history, nature, and concern of periodontal and orthopedic allografts, and the risk of viral, cancer, and prion transmissions. Specifically, Dr. Parisian would offer the following conclusions: (1) to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, viral and bacterial infections can be transmitted through frozen bone and tissue allografts stored for a prolonged period of time; (2) to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, infections can also be transmitted from “freeze-dried and stored bone/tissue;” (3) freeze-drying according to AATB recommendations does not inactivate retroviruses, including HIV; (4) despite the lack of studies on the risk of cancer transfer to recipients of allografts, there is a risk that transplanted bone/tissue may trigger pre-malignant and malignant changes in transplanted bone/tissue and cancer in recipients; and (5) adequate donor screening is the most fundamental and well-regarded safety control for tissue banks. (Parisian Aff. ¶¶ 37-39, May 31, 2007.) Her opinions were based upon a survey of medical and scientific literature as well as her familiarity with the field of pathology and the FDA. Without rejecting the substance of Dr. Parisian’s opinion wholesale, Defendants argue that Dr. Parisian’s proposed testimony regarding the transmission of disease by room temperature bone is unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. Specifically, Defendants move to exclude her opinion by arguing that: (1) her lack of qualifications on disease transmission by bone tissue impairs the reliability of her opinion; (2) her theory regarding the transmission of disease fails the Daubert standard; and (3) her extrapolation of the existing medical and scientific literature in support of her conclusion is not reliable and does not fit the facts of this litigation. The Court agrees in part. Dr. Parisian conducted a literature survey and relied upon the following literature in arriving at her opinion regarding the transmission of disease in bone: (1) a 1991 laboratory study published in the Journal of Medical Virology by E. Tjotta, et al. (“Tjotta Study”) concluding that at an optimum pH solution, the half-life of HIV ranged from approximately twenty-four hours at 37 C° to no significant survival loss over six months at -75 C°; (2) Van Bueren Study; (3) Cook Study; (4) Crawford Study; (5) a 2000 study by Philippe Hernigou, et al. published in Acta Orthop Scand (“Hernigou Study”) that assessed the effects of heat and radiation on the survival of HIV in allograft bone; (6) a 2006 study by Carol Bienek, et al. published in Cell Tissue Banking (“Bienek Study”) that examined the efficacy of gamma irradiation and ethylene oxide gas sterilization on bone allografts; (7) a 2003 case report by James Trotter in the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery (“Trotter Study”) that identified a case of HCV transmission from an allograft bone transplant where the bone had been soaked in antibiotic alcohol and detergent prior to freezing; and (8) the Uhlenhaut Study. As described in Section (i), these studies alone cannot support Dr. Parisian’s conclusion regarding the transmission of disease in unprocessed, room temperature bone that has been stored for thirty days or more without extrapolations. Although these studies support certain of Dr. Parisian’s opinions, the studies universally fail to address the specific question of general causation before the Court, the effect of the passage of time on the infectivity of unprocessed, room temperature bone tissue. Dr. Parisian’s conclusion, to the extent that she purports to opine that HIV, HBV, HCV, and syphilis are capable of being transmitted by unprocessed, cadaveric bone tissue that has stored at room temperature for more than thirty days, is woefully deficit. At no point during either her affidavit or deposition did Dr. Parisian adequately explain how her conclusions could be extrapolated from the results or conclusions of any of the studies. Dr. Parisian stated during her deposition that although there was no one single report upon which she most relied, “I think the one article that’s supportive that we talked about is the Trotter, but its not the article, the pivotal article that says, yes, the risk.” (Parisian Dep. 231.) In explaining the Trotter Study, Dr. Parisian stated that whether the case report involved bone allo-grafts that had been frozen or freeze-dried was uncertain. (Parisian Dep. 164.) Thus, the report that she pointed to as most supportive of her opinion involved a speculative assumption that the case report involved freeze-dried, not frozen bone. Her explanations of the other referenced studies were similarly unhelpful. With regards to the Cook Study of frozen simian bone and Crawford Study of feline cat bone, she merely noted that SIV and FeLV have been used in other studies as a model or suitable surrogate marker for HIV, without explaining why the results in these studies would be sufficient for extrapolation into the human context. (Parisian Dep. 135, 144.) Further undermining the Court’s confidence in her extrapolation from these studies, the authors of the studies expressly note the difficulties in applying the results of these animal studies to humans without further study. Dr. Parisian’s discussion of the Tjotta Study (examining the preservation and loss of infectivity of HIV in serum within a laboratory setting), Van Bueren Study (examining the infeetivity of HIV suspended in serum and dried on a cover-slip within a laboratory setting), Hernigou Study(examining the effects of heat and radiation on the survival of HIV in allo-graft bone), Bienek Study (examining the efficacy of gamma irradiation and ethylene oxide as sterilizers), and Uhlen-haut Study (examining the effect of lyo-philization on VSV, MEV, and PPV infec-tivity) merely articulated conclusions not currently in dispute by Defendants, that freeze-drying alone is insufficient to inactivate viruses entirely, and, absent further explanation from Dr. Parisian, they do not fit the facts of this litigation and are insufficient basis for Dr. Parisian’s conclusions. To be clear, the Court does not question the reliability of the underlying studies, but rather the Court finds Dr. Parisian’s extrapolations from those studies to her ultimate conclusion lack the factors of reliability. Her extrapolations from these studies were not tested, were not subject to peer review, and had no known rate of error. Her theory that these studies suggest the existence of general causation as framed in this litigation has not been generally accepted. Furthermore, she has not explained the basis for her extrapolations from in vitro studies involving various serum, epidemiological studies involving the transmission of disease in frozen bone, animal studies involving different viruses and whose own authors cautioned further studies for the extrapolation of their results in humans, and studies evaluating other methods of sterilization such as radiation, heat, and oxide gas. At best, her opinion from these studies is nothing more than pure speculation. Plaintiffs’ efforts to salvage her proposed testimony is ineffective. First, the arguments and extrapolations of counsel alone are not sufficient to prove the reliability of the experts’ conclusions. If Dr. Parisian was unable to explain why these studies help inform her conclusion regarding the ability of bone allografts to transmit disease, Plaintiffs’ counsel cannot fill in the gaps. Second, even if the Court were to accept the Plaintiffs’ summaries of the literature cited by Dr. Parisian, they nevertheless fail to link these studies in a way that would suggest Dr. Parisian’s conclusion. (Pis.’ Mem. in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude 8-11.) Thus, Plaintiffs have not bridged the analytical gaps between the medical and scientific evidence and Dr. Parisian’s conclusions. Dr. Parisian discounts the importance of the available medical and scientific literature in the formation of her opinion, and explains that: It’s actually just knowing some of the limitations of manufacturing and looking at the FDA’s documents and the CDC. Really that’s more compelling than any one of those particular articles.... It has to be all these factors, manuf