Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM BUCKWALTER, Senior District Judge. Currently pending before the Court are (1) Defendant GlaxoSmithKline’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action, (2) the Response of Plaintiffs Harold L. Garrison, Jr., individually, and Marion Knipe, individually and as administratrix and administratrix ad pro-sequendum of the Estate of Harold Stanley Jake Garrison, and (3) Defendant’s Reply Brief. In addition, the Court jointly considers Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Evidence Submitted by GSK in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Causes of Action) and Defendant’s Response thereto. This motion is the second of its kind in this case. The litigation commenced on July 10, 2006, when Plaintiffs sued Defendant for the wrongful death of sixteen-year old Harold Stanley Jake Garrison (“Jake” or “Jake Garrison”), who committed suicide after taking Paxil, an antidepressant medication manufactured and sold by GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”). Plaintiffs’ claims allege that GSK breached its state law duty to warn of the increased risk of suicide in pediatric users of the drug. Defendant originally moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ state tort claims were preempted by federal law, ie. the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., and its implementing regulations. On August 28, 2008, the Court denied that motion in its entirety. Defendant again seeks summary judgment, this time alleging that each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action fails as a matter of law. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. 1. BACKGROUND AND UNDISPUTED FACTS A. Jake Garrison’s Paxil Use and Suicide In February 2001, deceased Plaintiff Jake Garrison was referred to dermatologist Booth Durham, M.D. for treatment of his acne. (Pls.’ Ex. 153, Booth Durham Dep. (“Durham Dep.”) 11:8-17:8, Sep. 5, 2007.) Originally, Dr. Durham treated Jake with Accutane. (Id. at 15:2-16.) In light of the drug’s labeling, the doctor informed Jake and his mother that the drug could cause suicidal behavior, and required them to sign a consent form. (Id. at 15:17-17:12; Pls.’ Ex. 154, Marion Knipe Dep. (“Knipe Dep.”) 123:11-124:16, Jan. 11, 2007.) The Accutane course of treatment was completed in August or September 2001. (Durham Dep. 21:13-22:2.) On January 10, 2002, Jake, who was fifteen years old at the time, returned to Dr. Durham. (Id. at 22:3-23:12.) Jake had been complaining of nausea and redness on his face, and had been refusing to go to school. (Knipe Dep. 110:8-21; 132:4-133:6.) At the time, however, Dr. Durham observed no signs of suicidal ideation. (Durham Dep. 52:23-53:7.) As a result of Jake’s self-consciousness, Dr. Durham diagnosed Jake with body dys-morphic disorder, for which he prescribed a fifteen-day supply of Paxil. (Id. at 23:12-25:21.) The dosage was to increase to twenty milligrams after two weeks. (Id. at 25:16-25:21.) This was not the first time Dr. Durham had prescribed Paxil for a patient. (Id. at 27:1-27:9.) Upon prescribing Paxil to Jake, Dr. Durham claims to have told Marion Knipe, Jake’s mother, that body dysmorphic disorder could worsen depression, cause further withdrawal, inhibit sleeping, increase hostile behavior, and lead to suicidal ideation. (Id. at 25:6-26:25.) Ms. Knipe testified that she could not recall Dr. Durham saying anything about suicide or suicidal ideation, particularly with respect to Jake’s use of Paxil. (Knipe Dep. 125:5-19, 134:18-135:11.) Jake refilled a thirty-day prescription for Paxil twenty milligrams, on January 27, 2002. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts on Causes of Action Motion (“DSUF Causes of Action”) ¶31, Ex. L.) During Jake’s February 7, 2002, follow up visit, Dr. Durham remarked that Jake was tolerating Paxil well, was not having any side effects, and “[felt] good about himself.” (Durham Dep. 41:18-25; DSUF Causes of Action ¶ 24, Ex. M.). He was to continue Paxil twenty milligrams daily. (DSUF Causes of Action, ¶ 36, Ex. M.) Jake refilled another thirty-day supply for Paxil twenty milligrams on April 8, 2002. (Id. ¶ 38, Exs. J, L.) For reasons unknown to Plaintiff Knipe, Jake stopped taking Paxil sometime in April or May. (Id. ¶ 38, Ex. O, Daneen Spitaletto Dep. (“Spitaletto Dep.”) 90:2-7, Jan 10, 2008; Knipe Dep. 146:2-7:18.) Jake next returned to Dr. Durham on August 21, 2002, at which time the doctor noted that Jake’s acne was starting to flair and that Jake had “not needed” Paxil for a few months. (Durham Dep. 32:19-25.) Dr. Durham remarked that Jake seemed fine that day and had no notation about the redness that seemed to be the original basis of the body dys-morphic disorder. (Id. at 35:16-36:3.) On September 11, 2002, the first day of Jake’s junior year of high school, Jake vomited at school. (DSUF Causes of Action ¶ 45, Ex. Q; Knipe Dep. at 159:11— 160:4.) According to investigative reports, Jake had told his mother that kids were teasing him due to his face turning red. (DSUF Causes of Action ¶ 46, Exs. Q and R, Lona Ecker Dep. (“Ecker Dep.”) 33:4-21, Apr. 1, 2008.) Jake refilled another Paxil twenty milligram prescription that day, without contacting Dr. Durham, and took the medicine for three days. (DSUF Causes of Action ¶ 47-48, Ex. J; Durham Dep. 34:18-21.) On September 14, 2002, Jake committed suicide by gunshot. (DSUF Causes of Action ¶ 49.) At the time of the prescriptions and refills described above, the label for Paxil contained the following statement in the “PRECAUTIONS” section: Suicide: The possibility of a suicide attempt is inherent in depression and may persist until significant remission occurs. Close supervision of high-risk patients should accompany initial drug therapy. Precautions for Paxil should be written for the smallest quantity of tablets consistent with good patient management, in order to reduce the risk of overdose. (Pls’ Ex. 35 at 1610.) The 2002 label also included, in a section entitled “Other Events Observed During the Premarket-ing Evaluation of Paxil” (under the subheading “Nervous System”), the adverse reaction of “emotional lability,” which was identified as a “frequent event.” (Id. at 1614.) Under the section entitled “Pediatric Use,” the label stated, “Safety and effectiveness in the pediatric population have not been established.” (Id. at 1611.) Dr. Durham knew that Paxil had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for use by pediatric patients at the time he prescribed it to Jake, but nonetheless gave it to him “[b]e-cause [he] was comfortable with that medication. And [he] had had good results in other pediatric patients with body dys-morphic disorder with it.” (Durham Dep. 37:24-38:14.) As a result of the FDA’s addition of the black box warning on pediatric use, however, Dr. Durham no longer prescribes Paxil for pediatric patients since, according to his understanding, “it may give them enough energy to actually commit suicide.” (Id. at 57:16-57:23.) Dr. Durham testified that he had seen an advertisement for Paxil or Paxil CR in journals, but not on television. (Id. at 75:9-13.) He had never, however, seen any brochures or patient information that was left in his department or office from GSK pertaining to Paxil, nor had he ever met with a representative from GSK regarding Paxil. (Id. at 75:18-76:16.) Nonetheless, Dr. Durham explained that he reads the Physician’s Desk Reference (“PDR”) several times a week to obtain information about medications. (Id. at 72:10-73:12.) In addition, his other sources of information for his prescribing practices include journals, conferences, tapes, and lectures. (Id. at 73:13-18.) He is also aware of Medical Letters, wherein manufacturers announce their changes in medications. (Id. at 73:19-25.) Although Marion Knipe never saw advertisements for Paxil (Knipe Dep. 30:13-15), Jake’s father, Harold Garrison had seen “quite a lot” of television commercials for Paxil prior to Jake taking Paxil. (Garrison Dep. 15:17-17:5.) B. GSK’s Regulatory Efforts to Obtain FDA Approval of a Pediatric Indication for Paxil Paxil is generally classified as a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (“SSRI”), currently approved on a prescription basis only for the treatment of depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder, social anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and premenstrual dysphoric disorder in adult patients. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts for Federal Preemption Motion (“DSUF Preemption”), Ex. A, Arning Decl. (“Arning Decl.”) ¶ 5.) On November 20, 1989, SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (“SB”) filed a new drug application (“NDA”) for paroxetine (“Pax-il”) seeking FDA approval for the treatment of depression in adults. (Arning Decl. ¶ 19.) In support of this application, SB submitted data to the FDA, including toxicology data, animal studies and clinical studies in humans, as well as data on suicides, suicide attempts and suicidal behavior. (Id. ¶ 21.) After extensive study, the FDA issued an approval letter for Paxil on December 29, 1992, making clear that approval was conditioned on the use of the FDA-approved prescribing information accompanying the letter. (Id.) The original FDA-approved labeling did not include any warning or other statement regarding an increased risk of suicide or suicidality from using Paxil. (Id. ¶ 28, Exs. 5 and 6.) Indeed, the only references to “suicide” or “suicide attempt” appeared in the description of “a major depressive episode” and a precaution that suicide is “an inherent risk in depressed patients.” (Id. ¶ 28, Ex. 5.) In the approval letter, however, the FDA stated, “[pjlease consider conducting post-approval studies with [Paxil] in depressed children and adolescents. Depression is common in these populations and it is likely that [Paxil] will be used in children and adolescents, despite the absence of any relevant data. Consequently, we feel it would be useful for you to obtain data pertinent to the safety and efficacy of [Paxil] in these groups.” (Id.) On April 11, 2002, GSK filed a supplemental NDA to the FDA “proposing the use of Paxil to treat children and adolescents with major depressive disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder.” (Pis.’ Exs. 36, 37.) In connection with its application, GSK submitted Study 329 and Study 377, both of which had been completed in 1998, and Study 701, which was completed in January 2001. (Id.) On October 7, 2002, Dr. Andrew Mosholder, the FDA reviewer of the pediatric Supplemental NDA for Paxil completed his review. In the section of his report regarding efficacy, he stated: For Study 377: “This trial did not provide any evidence that paroxetine is active in the treatment of adolescent MDD [major depressive disorder].” For Study 701: “This trial did not provide any evidence that paroxetine is effective in the treatment of pediatric MDD.” For Study 329: “[T]his trial should be considered a failed trial, in that neither active treatment group showed superiority over placebo by a statistically significant margin.” (Pis.’ Ex. 39.) In his report regarding safety, Dr. Mosholder stated: The most prominent adverse reactions not seen in corresponding adult trials appear to involve behavioral effects; these events were coded with terms such as hostility and emotional lability. As previously noted, the sponsor’s method of coding these events was potentially confusing, and thus additional information will be helpful for the purpose of definitively assessing the potential behavioral toxicity for paroxetine in pediatric patients.... Further assessment of the safety profile will have to await the sponsor’s reply to requests for additional information. (Id.) Accordingly, on October 21, 2002, the FDA issued a letter to GSK requesting additional information and clarification, including “an expanded version of [a table of adverse events coded under the terms hostility, emotional lability or agitation], in-eluding all psychiatric and behavioral adverse events, and also those that occurred among placebo patients” and GSK’s “rationale for coding suicide attempts and other forms of self-injurious behavior under the ... term ‘emotional lability.’ ” (Pls.’ Ex. 40.) In May of 2003, seven months after the FDA’s request for clarification as to GSK’s study results, GSK submitted a supplement in partial response to the FDA’s October 10, 2002, letter. In response to this submission, the FDA drafted a “Request for Consultation” memo, dated June 5, 2003, noting that GSK’s re-analyzed data, clarifying what events were included under the term “emotional lability,” suggested an excess risk of suicidality in patients taking Paxil compared to those taking the placebo. (Pls.’ Ex. 48.) At that time, GSK had not proposed labeling changes. (Pls.’ Ex. 47.) On June 19, 2003, the FDA issued a Talk Paper reporting that it was “reviewing reports of a possible increased risk of suicidal thinking and suicide attempts in children and adolescents under the age of 18 treated with the drug Paxil for major depressive disorder.” (Arning Decl. ¶42, Ex. 23.) The advisory stated, “[ajlthough the FDA had not completed its evaluation of the new safety data, FDA is recommending that Paxil not be used in children and adolescents for the treatment of MDD, and Paxil is currently not approved for use in children and adolescents.” (Id.) On July 22, 2003, the FDA requested adverse event data from the manufacturers of all “modern drugs” used to treat major depressive disorder, in order to further assess suicidality in pediatric patients enrolled in clinical studies. (Pis.’ Ex. 55.) The FDA then issued a Public Health Advisory and corresponding Talk Paper, on October 27, 2003, stating that the “data do not clearly establish an association between the use of these drugs and increased suicidal thoughts or actions by pediatric patients,” but it was “not possible at this point to rule out an increased risk of [increased suicidal thoughts or actions] for any of these drugs, including Paxil.” (Pis.’ Ex. 58.) In February 2004, the FDA advisory committee convened and recommended that the FDA issue an immediate warning concerning the potential risk of suicidality in pediatric patients and agreed that the data should be analyzed further. (Pis.’ Ex. 62.) On March 22, 2004, the FDA issued a Public Health Advisory warning of the need to closely monitor adults and children being treated with antidepressants to determine whether there is a worsening of depression. (Arning Decl. ¶ 49, Ex. 30.) It also noted that, after initial reports and studies with Paxil, and subsequent reports on studies of other drugs, there appeared to be “an increased risk of suicidal thoughts and actions in the children given antidepressants.” (Id.) In May of 2004, GSK sent a “Dear Healthcare Professional” letter to doctors in the United States alerting them to the FDA’s Public Health Advisory. (Pis.’ Ex. 64.) The FDA advisory committee met again in September 2004, and concluded that the data, in the aggregate, reflected an increased risk of suicidality in pediatric patients, and recommended that the FDA consider new class labeling changes. (Pis.’ Ex. 69.) On October 15, 2004, a new Public Health Advisory and letter from the FDA directed manufacturers to add a “black box” warning and expanded warning statements to the labeling of all antidepressant medications, describing the increased risk of suicidality in children and adolescents being treated with antidepressants, and including information about the results of pediatric studies. (Pis.’ Ex. 74; Arning Decl. ¶ 55, Ex. 34.) On November 12, 2004, GSK filed labeling supplements to Paxil and Paxil CR NDA’s to include the labeling changes requested by the FDA. (Arning Decl. ¶ 56.) On January 26, 2005, the FDA notified GSK that it decided to “modify the new PI [package insert] slightly so that the language in the ‘Warnings Section’ of the PI more precisely mirrors the language set forth in the black box warning.” (Pis.’Ex. 76.) The FDA approved the labeling supplements for Paxil and other antidepressants, on January 26, 2005, and required the following “black box” warning: Suicidality in Children and Adolescents Antidepressants increased the risk of suicidal thinking and behavior (suicidality) in short-term studies in children and adolescents with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and other psychiatric disorders. Anyone considering the use of [insert established name] or any other antidepressant in a child or adolescent must balance this risk with the clinical need. Patients who are started on therapy should be observed closely for clinical worsening, suicidality, or other unusual changes in behavior. Families and caregivers should be advised of the need for close observation and communication with the prescriber. [Insert established name] is not approved for use in pediatric patients. (See Warnings and Precautions: Pediatric Use) Pooled analyses of short-term (4 to 16 weeks) placebo-controlled trials of 9 antidepressant drugs (SSRIs and others) in children and adolescents with major depressive disorder (MDD), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), or other psychiatric disorders (a total of 24 trials involving over 4400 patients) have revealed a greater risk of adverse events representing suicidal thinking or behavior (suicidality) during the first few months of treatment in those receiving antidepressants. The average risk of such events on drug was 4%, twice the placebo risk of 2%. No suicides occurred in these trials. (Arning Decl. ¶ 59, Ex. 76.) II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For an issue to be “genuine,” a reasonable fact-finder must be able to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id. On summary judgment, it is not the court’s role to weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more probative, or to make credibility determinations. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co. Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.1993)). Rather, the court must consider the evidence, and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Tigg Corp. v. Dow Coming Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir.1987). If a conflict arises between the evidence presented by both sides, the court must accept as true the allegations of the non-moving party, and “all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Although the moving party bears the initial burden of showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it need not “support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It can meet its burden by “pointing out ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has carried its initial burden, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “There must ... be sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party; if the evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment should be granted.” Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds, Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 190 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.1999). III. DISCUSSION As discussed above, this case involves a products liability action in which Plaintiffs allege that decedent Jake Garrison was injured by his ingestion of the prescription drug Paxil, manufactured by Defendant GSK. Plaintiffs claim that GSK carelessly and negligently researched, manufactured, sold, merchandised, advertised, promoted, labeled, analyzed, tested, distributed and marketed Paxil, and failed to warn of known dangers in use by pediatric patients. (Comply 38.) Based on these allegations of harm, Plaintiffs set forth claims for compensatory and punitive damages. A. Applicable Law At the outset of the Court’s analysis, we must first decide the applicable law. Defendant avers that, notwithstanding the pendency of this action within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, New Jersey law should apply to the substantive claims. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that Pennsylvania has the most significant contacts and, thus, should control the Court’s analysis of the various causes of action. In resolving this dispute, this Court must, pursuant to our diversity jurisdiction, apply the forum’s choice of law rules. Chin v. Chrysler, LLC, 538 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir.2008); Shuder v. McDonald’s Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir.1988). Pennsylvania’s choice of law approach adopts a “ ‘flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.’ ” Coram Healthcare Corp. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 94 F.Supp.2d 589, 594 (E.D.Pa.1999) (quoting Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 805 (1964)). It entails three steps. First, the court must determine whether a real conflict exists, that is, whether these states would actually treat this issue any differently. Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 229-30 (3d Cir.2007). If there is no substantive difference between the laws of the competing states, no real conflict exists and forum law applies. Id. at 230; Air Prods, and Chems. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., 272 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 n. 9 (E.D.Pa.2003). Where a real conflict exists, the court moves to the second step and examines the governmental policies underlying each law in order to classify the conflict as true, false or an unprovided for situation. Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 230. A false conflict occurs where only one state’s interests would be impaired, and the law of the interested state applies. LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1071 (3d Cir.1996). Where, on the other hand, each jurisdiction has a governmental policy or interest that would be impaired by the application of the other state’s law, a true conflict exists. Id. In the case of a true conflict, the court turns to the third step to “determine which state has the ‘greater interest in the application of its law.’ ” Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 231 (quoting Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)). This determination demands that a court weigh the contacts each jurisdiction has with the dispute on a qualitative scale according to the extent they implicate the policies and interests underlying the particular dispute before the court. Id. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, a real conflict clearly exists between the product liability laws of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania courts allow claims of negligence and breach of implied warranty to be brought in conjunction with a products liability claim. Torres v. Lucca’s Bakery, 487 F.Supp.2d 507, 513 (D.N.J.2007). On the other hand, New Jersey’s Products Liability Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:58C-1, et seq., subsumes common law products liability claims into one statutory cause of action for strict liability; it does not permit negligence and breach of warranty as separate claims for injuries caused by the defective products. Torres, 487 F.Supp.2d at 513. “When dealing with liability based on negligence, strict liability, products liability or the like, differing rules as to liability or damages generally represent genuine conflicts since the laws covering these issues take into account both the needs of the injured plaintiffs and the economic viability of the defendants.” Id. (quoting Boyes v. Greenwich Boat Works, Inc., 27 F.Supp.2d 543, 548 (D.N.J.1998)); see also Borelli v. Everland, Civ. A. No. 00-5721, 2006 WL 435730, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Feb.21, 2006) (recognizing the existence of a real conflict between New Jersey and Pennsylvania products liability laws and citing cases). Turning to the second step, the Court also finds that a true conflict exists. As noted above, both Pennsylvania and New Jersey seek to “compensate people injured by defective products and regulate the conduct of manufacturers and distributors (i.e., ensure production of safe products) within the state.” Torres, 487 F.Supp.2d at 513-14. Each of their respective interests would be impaired by the application of the other state’s law. This determination leads to the third inquiry: which state has the most significant contacts with the litigation. “In making this determination, this Court must look to an array of factors: (i) the place where the injury occurred; (ii) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (iii) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (iv) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” Henderson v. Merck & Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 04-5987, 2005 WL 2600220, at *7 (E.D.Pa. Oct.11, 2005) (citing Restatement (Seoond) of Conflicts § 145). These contacts, however, must only be considered to the extent they relate to the “policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.” Cipolla, 267 A.2d at 856 (quotations omitted). The focus of the analysis, therefore, must be on the qualitative, rather than the quantitative, weight of the contacts. Id. In Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 F.R.D. 179, 181, 193 (E.D.Pa.2007), the court undertook a conflict of laws analysis in a putative products liability action by parents of children who committed suicide while under influence of antidepressant Paxil. The court analyzed almost the identical contacts present in this case — a defendant domiciled in and making decisions regarding Paxil in Pennsylvania, compared with the plaintiffs domiciled, purchasing Paxil, ingesting Paxil, and being injured in other states. Id. at 193. The court concluded that There is no way to apply Pennsylvania law to part of the liability determination, as proposed by the plaintiffs, without disregarding the comity afforded the other states whose interests are in protecting their citizens from tortious harm caused within their boundaries. A state’s interest in fixing liability for tor-tious harm caused within its boundaries goes to its interests in protecting its citizens and regulating conduct there. Of course, Pennsylvania has an interest in regulating its citizens’ labeling practices. When that conduct reaches and has consequences beyond the state’s borders, it affects citizens of other states. When it does, the foreign state’s interest in protecting its citizens outweighs Pennsylvania’s regulatory concerns. Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). Likewise, in Henderson v. Merck & Co., Civ. A. No. 04-5987, 2005 WL 2600220 (E.D.Pa. Oct.11, 2005), a case alleging injuries sustained by the ingestion of a prescription drug, the court, applying Pennsylvania’s choice of law rules, considered which state’s law applied to the parties’ dispute. It noted that the plaintiff had purchased the drugs in Michigan, a physician in Michigan prescribed the drugs at issue, plaintiffs reliance on defendant’s representations concerning the drug occurred in Michigan and, most importantly, plaintiffs injuries occurred in Michigan. Id. at *7. By contrast, New York and New Jersey’s only contacts involved the defendants’ incorporation and transaction of business in those states. Id. The court determined that the importance of New York and New Jersey’s contacts was “diluted by the fact that the remaining relevant events took place in Michigan.” Id. at *8. “Indeed, because plaintiff is a Michigan resident, because plaintiff purchased, was prescribed, and ingested Bextra within Michigan’s borders, and because plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries in Michigan, the interests of [the other states] in applying their product liability laws to such extraterritorial conduct lose vigor.” Id. Finally, in Bearden v. Wyeth, 482 F.Supp.2d 614 (E.D.Pa.2006), the court faced a choice of law question in a case where the plaintiffs’ decedent committed suicide after ingesting antidepressant medication manufactured by defendant. Arkansas was the state in which the decedent lived and maintained his residency prior to his death, received all medical care associated with his depression, purchased the antidepressant, received any representations, express warranties or warnings concerning the drug, experienced any reactions to the drug, and committed suicide. Id. at 620. By contrast, defendant was a Delaware corporation, contained its divisional headquarters in Pennsylvania, made all representations and express warranties and warnings from its business in Pennsylvania, and employed personnel responsible for the antidepressant in Pennsylvania. Id. The court recognized that although Pennsylvania had an interest in regulating the activities of the defendant, who maintained a principal place of business there and conducted many activities concerning the subject drug there, “Arkansas ha[d] a greater interest in applying its laws to protect and provide redress for a citizen who was prescribed a drug, received any relevant representations or warnings about it, purchased it, ingested it, and was injured by it — all within his home state of Arkansas.” Id. at 621. Guided by this jurisprudence, this Court finds that New Jersey unequivocally maintains substantively greater contacts with the dispute at bar. Plaintiffs and Jake Garrison resided in New Jersey at all times during the events relevant to this lawsuit. Jake went to a New Jersey physician, Dr. Booth Durham, for medical care. Dr. Durham wrote the Paxil prescription, which Plaintiffs’ subsequently filled in New Jersey pharmacies. Any purported representations or warnings to Dr. Durham, Plaintiffs and Jake by Defendant regarding Paxil were received in New Jersey. Finally, Jake suffered all alleged side effects from Paxil and ultimately committed suicide in New Jersey. The sole contact Pennsylvania maintains with this litigation is as the situs of Defendant’s headquarters and principal place of business. Although Plaintiffs attempt to expand the importance of this contact by asserting that all decisions regarding the marketing, testing, proposed labeling and distribution of Paxil were made in Pennsylvania, this argument is unavailing and, as noted above, has been repeatedly rejected by courts within this district. The jurisdiction in which the drug was prescribed and ingested clearly maintains the strongest interest in applying its applicable law to regulate the sale, prescription and ingestion of pharmaceuticals within its borders. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, Civ. A. No. 98-20626, 1999 WL 673066, at *15 (E.D.Pa. Aug.26, 1999) (recognizing place of injury as crucial in choice of law analysis). The mere fact that defendant resides in Pennsylvania and conducts some business there simply does not outweigh New Jersey’s dual interests of protecting its citizens and regulating business conduct occurring within its borders. Accordingly, the Court finds that New Jersey law applies to the substantive claims at issue. B. Substantive Claims As noted above, Plaintiffs allege claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, negligent pharmaco-vigilance, strict liability and breach of express warranty, all resulting from Jake Garrison’s ingestion of Paxil and subsequent suicide. Defendant moves for summary judgment on each of these counts, as well as Plaintiffs’ allegations of off-label promotion and claim for punitive damages. The Court addresses each argument individually. 1. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Defendant initially argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation fail, as a matter of law, on two grounds. First, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims are subsumed by New Jersey’s Product Liability Act (“PLA”) and, thus, are not separately cognizable. Second, Defendant contends that, even if such claims are cognizable, Plaintiffs cannot produce any evidence demonstrating reasonable or justifiable reliance sufficient to sustain either of these causes of action. a. Whether the Fraud and Misrepresentation Claims Are Subsumed by the New Jersey Product Liability Act New Jersey’s Products Liability Act was passed as “remedial legislation to establish clear rules [in] ... actions for damages for harm caused by products.” N.J. Stat. ANN. 2A:58C-1. “It imposes a duty on manufacturers to produce a defect-free product, regardless of fault.” Ebenhoech v. Koppers Indus., Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 455, 472 (D.N.J.2002). “To prevail on a products liability action, plaintiff must show: (1) that defendant is a manufacturer, (2) that the product was defective, (3) that the defect existed when the product left defendant’s control, (4) that a reasonably foreseeable user was injured, and (5) that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.” Id. A product is “deemed to be defective if it is not reasonably fit, suitable, or safe for the ordinary and foreseeable purpose for which it is sold.” Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 723 A.2d 45, 52 (1999). The PLA defines the term “product liability action” as “any claim or action ... for harm caused by a product, irrespective of the theory underlying the claim, except actions for harm caused by breach of an express warranty.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-l(b)(3). Section 2, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-2, “established] the sole method to prosecute a ‘product liability action.’ ” Estate of Edward W. Knoster v. Ford Motor Co., 200 Fed.Appx. 106, 115 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting Tirrell v. Navistar Int% Inc., 248 N.J.Super. 390, 591 A.2d 643 (App.Div.1991)). Thus, under New Jersey products liability law, negligence and implied breach of warranty are no longer viable as separate claims for harm caused by a defective product. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1; Reiff v. Convergent Techs., 957 F.Supp. 573, 583 (D.N.J.1997). Because the PLA generally subsumes common-law product liability claims, “the Third Circuit, the New Jersey District Court, and New Jersey State courts consistently have dismissed product liability claims based on common-law theories when those theories allege ‘harm caused by a product.’ ” Brown ex. rel. Estate of Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 506, 516 (D.N.J.2002) (citing cases). New Jersey federal and state courts have, on several occasions, determined that negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims are among the claims subsumed by the FDA. For example, in Walus v. Pfizer, 812 F.Supp. 41, 42 (D.N.J.1993), the recipient of a prosthetic heart valve sued the valve manufacturer and pharmaceutical company, asserting theories of negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, fraud, misrepresentation, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that “New Jersey treats all product liability actions the same, regardless of the theory asserted.” Id. at 45. Accordingly, it determined that notwithstanding plaintiffs attempt to recast his claim in terms of fraud, he was still bound by the elements of the PLA. Id. More recently, in Lopienski v. Centocor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 07-4519, 2008 WL 2565065, at *1 (D.N.J. June 25, 2008), the plaintiff alleged injury as a result of her use of the prescription drug medication Remicade. In her complaint, she claimed that defendants “designed, created, manufactured, packaged, labeled, distributed, marketed, sold, promoted and/or advertised Remicade, and/or controlled such processes.” Id. Based on these allegations of harm, Plaintiff asserted claims for compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to strict liability, negligence, fraud and consumer fraud law. Id. The Court found that “the NJPLA subsumes all causes of action for physical injury caused by a product.” Id. at *1 n. 2. Accordingly, the Court concluded that plaintiffs claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, consumer fraud pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and fraud by concealment fell within the PLA’s ambit. Id.; see also Brown, 228 F.Supp.2d at 517 (plaintiff asserted a fraud claim based on the allegation that plaintiff contracted cancer from smoking cigarettes; the court found that such claims essentially recasted the product liability claims, and thus fell within the ambit of the PLA.) In the face of this jurisprudence, the Court likewise finds that, to the extent that Plaintiffs assert fraud and negligent misrepresentation based on the allegation that Paxil was not reasonably fit for its intended use because of inadequate warnings, such claims are subsumed by the PLA. N.J. Stat. Aun. 2A:58C-2(b). In turn, they are not separately cognizable and must be dismissed. Our analysis of these two causes of action, however, does not end at this juncture. In Wendling v. Pfizer, 2008 WL 833549 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. Mar.31, 2008), the New Jersey Superior Court recognized a distinct exception to the general principle of subsumption. In that case, the owners of a horse, which allegedly died as a result of a tapeworm infestation, brought an action against the manufacturer of a veterinary product for common law negligent misrepresentation and violation of Consumer Fraud Act, alleging that the advertisement for the product was false and misleading. Id. at *1-2. The plaintiffs did not claim that the drug was not reasonably fit for its intended use because it failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions. Id. at *8. “Instead, they alleged that there was a misleading, false or materially deficient product advertisement. In other words, it was not the product itself that caused the harm, but allegedly its misleading promotion.” Id. Under such circumstances, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim was not subsumed by the PLA. Id. In the case at bar, the Complaint clearly alleges, in addition to the adequate warning claim, that Defendant “negligently and carelessly promoted Paxil as safe and effective for use with pediatric patients when, in fact, it was neither safe nor effective.” (ComplJ 38(f).) In other words, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant improperly marketed Paxil for off-label pediatric use without disclosing — and actually concealing — the negative effects. Such claims, like those in Wendling, do not allege injury by Paxil itself, such that the PLA would encompass the claims. Rather, they claim injury by the allegedly faulty advertising campaign for Paxil. These claims, according to reigning New Jersey jurisprudence, are not subsumed by the PLA and, thus, warrant consideration here. b. Whether Plaintiffs’ Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Fail as a Matter of Law Perhaps in recognition of this exception, Defendant alternatively argues that the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims fail because Plaintiffs have no proof of reliance by either themselves or the prescribing physician, Dr. Booth Durham. Upon consideration of the record, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists. To establish a prima facie case of common law fraud, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.” Gennari v. Weichert Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 691 A.2d 350, 367-68 (1997). “Every fraud in its most general and fundamental conception consists of the obtaining of an undue advantage by means of some act or omission that is unconscientious or a violation of good faith.” Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (1981); Port Liberte Homeowmers Ass’n, Inc. v. Sordoni Const. Co., 393 N.J.Super. 492, 924 A.2d 592, 601 (App.Div.2007) (quoting Jewish Ctr., 432 A.2d at 524). To establish a claim of negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove that an incorrect statement was negligently made and justifiably relied upon to recover damages for economic loss or injury sustained as a consequence of that reliance. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138, 142-43 (1983); Gross v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck, Consumer Pharms. Co. 303 N.J.Super. 336, 696 A.2d 793, 797 (Law Div.1997). Defendant, for purposes of only this claim, does not contest Plaintiffs’ argument that GSK engaged in “aggressive promotional activities” representing that Paxil was safe and effective. (ComplJ 70.) Instead, Defendant limits its argument to the reliance prong of the fraud and negligent misrepresentation tests, contending that “Plaintiffs cannot produce any evidence demonstrating that GSK made any representation to them or Dr. Durham upon which either relied.” (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 8.) Specifically, it points to Plaintiff Harold Garrison’s admission that he never attended any of Jake’s doctor visits. (Garrison Dep. 58:1-2.) Likewise, Plaintiff Marion Knipe was unable to recall anything she learned about Paxil from Durham and, in fact, stated that Dr. Durham told her nothing about Paxil. (Knipe Dep. 121:21-122:23; 125:5-127:14.) Moreover, Defendant cites the following deposition testimony of Dr. Durham to establish that he did not rely on any promotional activities by GSK in making his decision to prescribe Paxil to Jake Garrison: Q. Have you ever had a sales representative from GlaxoSmithKline come talk to you about Paxil? A. I do not believe so. I’ve had Glax-oSmithKline reps with their topical products, but ... Q. So to the best of your knowledge, you don’t think you’ve ever discussed Paxil with any GlaxoSmithK-line sales rep? * * * A. It’s possible but I don’t believe so. (Durham Dep. 31:9-20.) Q. Have you ever seen an advertisement for Paxil or Paxil CR? A. I believe so, in the journals. I don’t know if they advertise on television. But yes. Q. And have you ever seen an advertisement for any SSRI— A. Yes. Q. —antidepressant? Have you ever seen any brochures or patient information that was left in your department or your office from GSK? A. Not pertaining to Paxil. Q. But my question was from GSK, generally. A. Yeah. We got a new cream called Altabax, yeah. It’s an ointment for treatment of impetigo. Q. And that’s manufactured by GSK? A. Yes. * * * Q. Now you mentioned earlier that you didn’t have any brochures or pam-plets regarding to Paxil specifically. Were you ever visited or met with a reprsentative from GSK regarding Paxil specifically? A. No. I do not recall that, no. Q. Are you aware whether or not GSK was aware of your prescribing Paxil to your patients? A. I’m not aware of that. The reps I see for their topical products don’t. I do not believe they handle Paxil. So, no, I’m not aware. Q. Do you know if you’ve ever had any discussions with anyone that works for GSK regarding Paxil? A. Not with any reps that come in the office. I’ve never made any phone call to GSK. I’m unaware of that. (Id. at 75:9-77:4.) Q. At the time you prescribed Paxil for Jake, did you know that Paxil had not been approved for use by pediatric patients by the FDA? A. Yes. Q. Knowing that, why did you prescribe Paxil for Jake? A. Because I was comfortable with that medication. And I had good results in other pediatric patients with body dysmorphic disorder with it. I felt I had pretty darn good results when he came back in a month from it. (Id. at 37:24-38:17.) Reading such testimony cumulatively, Defendant asserts that since neither Plaintiffs nor Dr. Durham experienced any promotion of Paxil, let alone off-label promotion, Plaintiffs cannot viably allege reliance. Defendant’s arguments, however, offer a myopic view of the record and misconstrue the relevant jurisprudence. It is well-established that a plaintiff need not hear the misrepresentation from the defendant directly for there to be actionable fraud: “where false representations are made to one person with the intent that they be communicated to others for the purpose of inducing the others to rely upon them, they may form the basis of an action for fraud by those others.” Port Liberte, 924 A.2d at 601 (quoting Metric Inv., Inc. v. Patterson, 101 N.J.Super. 301, 244 A.2d 311 (App.Div.1968)). Under this principle of “indirect reliance,” although a plaintiff must actually hear and consider the misrepresentation, the communication of it may be by “means however attenuated.” Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 506, 519 (D.N.J.2002) (quoting Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 754 A.2d 1188, 1197 (2000)). In Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996), a heart valve recipient, who had the valve removed and replaced after learning of problems with it through both media sources and her doctor, brought an action against the manufacturer for negligent manufacture and design, strict products liability, breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose, breach of express warranty, and fraud. The Third Circuit recognized that the maker of a medical product who markets or promotes that product to a physician has reason to expect that patients and recipients of that product “would be affected by the information it published and distributed to doctors.” Id. at 1335. Although there was no direct evidence that the prescribing doctors had read any specific promotional materials about the valve, the court noted that the facts of (1) the nationwide distribution of the promotional materials and (2) the doctors’ statements that they read standard journals in which the defendant’s advertisements appeared in order to stay current with developments in their field, suggested that the defendant’s promotional materials likely affected the doctors’ choice to implant the heart valve in the plaintiff. Id. at 1336. Similarly, in McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc., 401 N.J.Super. 10, 949 A.2d 223 (App. Div.2008), defendants appealed several evi-dentiary rulings made during the trial of a products liability action alleging inadequate warnings on the prescription drug Vioxx. In particular, defendant challenged the court’s admission of evidence regarding its marketing practices that did not target plaintiffs or their physicians. Id. at 266. The court deemed the defendant’s marketing practices to be relevant and, thus, admissible since the patient’s treating physician testified that he read product literature, package inserts and “Dear Doctor” letters. Id. at 268-69. Further, the doctor testified that had he known of the risks of the drug, he would not have prescribed the drug. Id. at 269. Reading the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs in this case, this Court also finds that they have made a sufficient showing of reliance to withstand summary judgment. First, Dr. Durham testified that he was, in fact, influenced by the medical community in his decision to prescribe Paxil. Q. How did you determine that Paxil was the right medication for Jake based on your diagnosis of body dysmorphic syndrome? A. First of all, the SSRIs in general are the ones recommended for the treatment of this disorder. I had ordered Paxil for several patients prior to this time. And the guru of psychocutaneous medicine happened to be my former partner. She wrote the book — Caroylyn Koblen-zer, M.D. — on psychocutaneous medication. And so I have taken a real interest in these disorders in that dermatologists quite frequently deal with depressed, anxious, panic-attacky obsessive/compulsive patients. In fact, she wrote the whole book on the condition. And she was a frequent user of Paxil. (Durham Dep. 59:24-60:18.) Moreover, Dr. Durham testified that his prescribing practices were generally guided by information from many other sources. (Id. at 65:18-25.) Primarily, he indicated that he had seen Paxil advertisements in medical journals. (Id. at 75:9-13.) Further, he indicated as follows: Q. Doctor, do you know what the Physician Desk Reference is? A. Yes. Q. And what is it? A. It’s a compendium of all medications, and it states their indication and their side effects and their interactions and their dosing and, you know, all the information pertaining to that medication. Q. Do you use the PDR to obtain information about medications? A. Daily. Well, several times a week, let’s say. Q. And what information about medications do you find in the PDR? A. Frequently, with pediatric dosing— I mean, I know most of the medications, but now and then you need to find out a per-weight dosing of certain medications. And in this day and age drug interactions are frequently looked up. Of course, I see a lot of drug reactions, so I like to look up and see what’s been reported for that medication. Q. Do you use the PDR to educate yourself on the risks and benefits of particular medications when you prescribe it? A. Yes, I have. Q. Do you use any other sources of information for your prescribing practices? A. Journals, conferences, tapes, lectures. Q. Is that it? A. Yes. (Id. at 72:10-73:18.) Finally, Dr. Durham stated that, in light of the black box warning currently on the Paxil label, he no longer prescribes the drug to adolescent patients: Q. Now, you mentioned that you don’t prescribe Paxil for pediatric patients, child or adolescents anymore. Why is that? A. Well, the black box warning is such that I’ve been led to believe that people in the depths of depression and they get on an SSRI, perhaps it may give them enough energy to actually commit suicide. (Id. at 59:16-23.) Taken as a whole, such evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Durham was influenced, albeit indirectly, by GSK’s allegedly fraudulent or misleading promotion of Paxil as safe and effective for use in adolescents. Although the deposition testimony cited by Defendant reveals that Dr. Durham never directly received any promotional materials about Paxil in his office and never spoke with a GSK representative regarding Paxil, these statements far from equate to a showing that Dr. Durham did not rely on any of GSK’s alleged misrepresentations about Paxil from any other sources. Indeed, Dr. Durham expressly indicated that he (a) relied on the knowledge of his former partner, who in turn may have considered Paxil promotional materials; (b) read journals, some of which contained Paxil advertisements; (c) attended lectures; and (d) read the Physicians Desk Reference. Any of these sources — not simply the brochures and GSK sales representative meetings referenced by Defendant — could have resulted in him relying upon, in some attenuated fashion, the substance of GSK’s alleged misrepresentation regarding Paxil. Nothing in the record supports Defendant’s unsubstantiated suggestion that Dr. Durham relied solely on his own medical intuition about the safety and efficacy of the drug. Any challenges by Defendant to Dr. Durham’s lack of specificity regarding the sources of his information about Paxil are ultimately questions for the jury. 2. Claims of GSK’s Off-Label Promotion of Paxil In its next argument, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ Complaint repeatedly accuses GSK of promoting off-label use of Paxil, yet Plaintiffs have not identified any evidence of GSK’s promotion of off-label pediatric use. Moreover, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs have not shown that any such promotion had any impact on Dr. Durham’s decision to prescribe Paxil to Jake Garrison. In the absence of such evidence, Defendant argues that summary judgment must be granted with respect to any such allegations in the Complaint. Such a contention fails on several grounds. First, to the extent Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot tie any off-label promotion of Paxil to Dr. Durham’s decision to prescribe Paxil to Jake, the Court has already fully discussed and rejected that claim. Second, Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff has produced no evidence of off-label promotion is unfounded. Indeed, Plaintiff has referenced several public representations by GSK or by researchers, seemingly connected with GSK, which could possibly form the basis of the claimed “off-label” promotion. For example, in an October 1998 internal memorandum, GSK noted that only “[pjostive data” from Study 329 would be presented at an upcoming conference in Paris. (Pis.’ Ex. 18.) Further, a 1998 poster authored by thirteen psychiatrists entitled “Safety of paroxetine in the treatment of adolescent depression” was presented at the New Clinical Drug Evaluation Unit Annual Meeting in Boca Raton, and claimed that Study 329 demonstrated “the safety of pa-roxetine in the treatment of adolescent depression,” and that any side effects were modest. (Pis.’ Ex. 22.) On December 9, 1999, Karen Wagner, one of the clinical investigators of Study 329, spoke to Neuroscience Consultants and stated that Pax-il was one of the few pharmaceuticals that had safety and efficacy data to support its use in the adolescent population. (Pis.’ Ex. 24.) Between 1999 and 2001, Dr. Neal Ryan, another of the clinical investigators of Study 329, gave Power Point presentations to audiences of doctors stating that “Paroxetine [Paxil] is an effective treatment for MDD in adolescent outpatients” and “Safety: Paxil was well tolerated.” (Pis.’ Ex. 25.) In a July 2001 article published in the Journal for the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, GSK claimed that “Paroxetine was generally well tolerated in this adolescent population, and most adverse effects were not serious. The most common adverse effects reported during paroxetine therapy were headache, nausea, dizziness, dry mouth, and somnolence.” (Pis.’ Ex. 31.) Similarly, in an article entitled, “Adolescent Depression: Efficacy of Paroxetine,” GSK affirmed that “Paroxetine provides effective treatment for major depression in adolescents.” (Pis.’ Ex. 27.) Although Defendant refers to alternative evidence in an effort to rebut any showing of off-label promotion, such contrary evidence simply emphasizes the existence of a currently unresolvable jury question. In short, the Court finds no basis for granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ allegations of off-label promotion. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether GSK engaged in such promotion and whether Plaintiffs, through their physician Dr. Durham, relied on the statements made in such promotion. Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment on this argument. 3. Breach of Express Warranty Claim Defendant next contends that Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty is deficient and cannot survive summary judgment. Again, the Court must reject this argument. Express warranties in New Jersey are governed by Article 2 of the state’s Uniform Commercial Code. N.J. Stat. Ann. 12A:2-101 et seq. Section 2-313(1) of the Code recognizes express warranties that arise from, among other things: (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. (b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. Id.; Brady v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., Civ. A. No. 90-2321, 1993 WL 424238, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct.14, 1993). The UCC makes clear that an express warranty is created when a seller makes a promise to a buyer related to a good or promises that a good will conform to a specific description. Elias v. Ungar’s Food Prods., Inc., 252 F.R.D. 233, 250-51 (D.N.J.2008). This express warranty provision makes clear that no formality or magic words are required to create an express warranty. Id. “The seller may be liable if its representation regarding the goods takes the form of newspaper, magazine, radio or television advertisements.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 574-75 (3d Cir.1990), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). Further, a representation is presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain “once the buyer has become aware of the affirmation of fact or promise.” Elias, 252 F.R.D. at 250 (quotations omitted). “To establish a breach of an express warranty under N.J.S.A.12A:2-101, the plaintiff need not prove privity or traditional reliance.” Id. Specifically, “[i]n New Jersey, privity is not required for plaintiffs to prevail against remote sellers in the chain of distribution.” Arons v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4641-03, 2005 WL 975462, at *22 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law.Div. Mar. 23, 2005). Under the Uniform Commercial Code, as construed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, “the absence of privity no longer bars a buyer from reaching through the chain of distribution to the manufacturer.” Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 149 N.J. 620, 695 A.2d 264, 275 (1997). Further, “[a]s a rule, no proof of the buyer’s reliance on the warranty is necessary other than that the seller’s statements were of a kind which naturally would induce the purchase. The warranty need not be the sole inducement.” Elias, 252 F.R.D. at 239 (quoting Bregman Screen & Lumber Co. v. Bechefsky, 16 N.J.Super. 35, 83 A.2d 804 (App.Div.1951)). In light of such principles, the Court cannot dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty on summary judgment. As detailed above, Plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence that GSK made various representations or affirmations of fact, within the meaning of N.J.S.A. § 12A:2-313(l)(a), regarding the safety and efficacy of Paxil in children. These representations were made in various articles, conferences, and journals presented to the medical community. Plaintiffs further provide proof that Paxil did not conform with these representations, since pediatric use of Paxil has been directly linked with an increased risk of suicidality. Defendant’s contrary arguments that none of the alleged statements were directed to either Plaintiffs or Dr. Durham, and that Dr. Durham did not rely on any statements, are of no avail. New Jersey law is clear that privity is not required; thus, statements made by GSK to Dr. Durham, and in turn to Plaintiffs, could constitute affirmations of fact upon which the bargain was made. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ showing that Defendant’s statements were of a kind which would naturally induce the purchase is sufficient to establish breach of express warranty; no particular reliance is necessary. In short, a jury could conclude, from such evidence, that these various representations to Durham and communicated indirectly to Plaintiffs were the basis of the bargain for Plaintiffs’ purchase and use of Paxil. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 1487, 1497 (D.N.J.1988) (whether such affirmations, once made, are part of the bargain is a question of fact for the jury) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-313(l)(a)). 4. Failure to Wain Claim Under the PLA Defendant also challenges the viability of Plaintiffs’ negligence and strict liability claims alleging failure to warn — both of which are subsumed by the PLA. Broum, 228 F.Supp.2d at 5