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ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE REBUTTAL DECLARATION AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., District Judge. On October 4, 2007, the Court approved a Consent Decree between the Animal Protection Institute and the state of Maine in which the state agreed to impose restrictions on trapping in order to avoid incidental takes of Canada lynx, a threatened species, and to apply for an incidental take permit from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The Plaintiffs have filed suit claiming that the restrictions in the Consent Decree have failed to prevent continued incidental takes of lynx and asking the Court to further enjoin trapping in the state of Maine to prevent such takes. The recent take of a lynx in a Conibear trap has revealed an acknowledged gap in the state’s regulatory scheme, which the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife has promised to amend by the next trapping season. However, as the regulatory gap presents an immediate risk to lynx during the current trapping season and the state has proffered no reason the regulations cannot be amended on an emergency basis, the Court grants the Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction in part to require the state to take immediate action. Because the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of equities favors the status quo as regards the remaining claims for relief, the Court denies the remaining demands for relief in the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Procedural History On August 11, 2008, the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) and the Wildlife Alliance of Maine (WAM) filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that Roland D. Martin, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (Commissioner) (DIFW) was violating the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., by authorizing and allowing trapping activities that “take” Canada lynx, a threatened species. Compl. (Docket # 1). On September 23, 2008, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Defendant from authorizing trapping activity during the upcoming trapping season, Pis.’ Mot. for Injunctive Relief (Docket # 7) {Pis. ’ Mot.), and on October 3, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which added new factual allegations. First Am. Compl. (Docket # 9). On October 10, 2008, the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation, Maine Trappers Association, Fur Takers of America, National Trappers’ Association, Dana Johnson, Sr., Donald Dudley, and Carl Guay (Trappers) filed an unopposed motion to intervene, which the Court granted on October 14, 2008. Unopposed Mot. to Intervene (Docket # 12); Order Granting Without Ob. Mot. to Intewene (Docket # 18). On October 14, 2008, the Commissioner responded in opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction. Def’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Injunction (Docket # 15) {Def’s Opp’n). On October 15, 2008, the Trappers also responded in opposition. Def-Intervenors’ Opp’n to Pis.’ Mot. for Prelim. Injunction (Docket # 23) {Trappers’ Opp’n). On October 27, 2008, the Plaintiffs replied. Pis.’ Consolidated Reply to Def.’s and Def-Intervenors’ Opp’n to Mot. for Injunctive Relief (Docket # 29) {Pis. ’ Reply). B. The Parties According to the amended complaint, AWI is “a national, non-profit charitable organization headquartered in Washington^] D.C. and founded in 1951 to reduce the sum total of pain and fear inflicted on animals by humans.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5. AWI has “tens of thousands of members and constituents living throughout the United States, including approximately 174 members and constituents who live in Maine.” Id. WAM is “a non-profit, 501(c)(3) organization with offices located at 96 Harlow St., Suite 355, Bangor, Maine, 04401” Id. ¶ 6. It is “an all volunteer organization dedicated to advocacy for wildlife and representing non-consumptive interests of wildlife in Maine.” Id. It has “over 700 members living, working and recreating in Maine as full time residents.” Id. As Commissioner of the DIFW, Mr. Martin is responsible for all department actions, “including the promulgation of Maine’s trapping regulations and ensuring compliance with federal laws, such as the ESA.” Id. ¶ 10. The Intervenors are organizations and individuals who are concerned with or who engage in trapping in Maine. Unopposed Mot. to Intervene at 2-4. C. The Canada Lynx In the lower forty-eight states, Canada lynx (Lynx canadinsis) inhabit both boreal forests and subalpine coniferous forest or northern hardwoods. Pis. ’ Mot. Attach. 2, Camilla Fox Aff. ¶20 (Docket #7-3) (Fox Aff). The historical range of the species in the contiguous states encompassed the northeastern states, including New York and Pennsylvania, the Great Lakes states, the Rocky Mountains, including Montana, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, and Colorado, and the Cascade Range of Washington and Oregon. Id. As a result of habitat degradation and overexploitation, lynx populations have declined dramatically over the last century and have disappeared completely from portions of their former range. Id. ¶ 23. Lynx are highly dependent on the snowshoe hare as their primary prey and their populations generally fluctuate with the ten-year hare population cycle. Id. ¶ 22. As of March 24, 2000, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) listed the lynx as a threatened species. 65 Fed.Reg. 16052 (March 24, 2000) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11). The Canada lynx has existed in the state of Maine since at least 1833 and was distributed widely within the entire state up to 1912. Fox Aff. ¶ 49. Though no longer found in southern Maine, lynx continue to exist in northern Maine. Id. The parties dispute the number of Canada lynx within the state of Maine and whether the lynx population is increasing or decreasing. The DIFW estimates that there are currently more than 500 lynx in the state of Maine and claims the lynx population appears to be increasing. Aff. of Dr. Kenneth Elowe ¶¶ 4, 5 (Docket # 16) (Elowe Aff.). The Plaintiffs say that the DIFW estimated 200 to 500 lynx in 2006 and that USFWS has predicted that the lynx population will decline, because there has been a marked decline in the snowshoe hare population over the last two years. Fox 4£¶50. When the USFWS proposed adding the Canada lynx as a threatened species, it observed that lynx behavior makes them susceptible to trapping and that lynx are easy to trap. Fox Aff. ¶ 29 (quoting 63 Fed.Reg. 37003). Also, the USFWS concluded that trapping mortality for lynx has been shown to be entirely additive, that is in addition to natural mortality, rather than compensatory, that is taking the place of natural mortality. Id. D. The Maine Trapping Program Since 1967, Maine law has made it illegal to intentionally hunt or trap lynx. Elowe Aff. ¶ 14. There is no claim here that the state of Maine has authorized or that the Intervenors have engaged in purposeful takes of lynx. The issue is whether lynx have been subject to incidental takes. The regulations define “incidental take” as “any taking otherwise prohibited, if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. The incidental takes in this case are incidental to Maine’s lawful trapping seasons. Maine, through the DIFW, allows the trapping of the following species of fur-bearing animals: beaver, bobcat, coyote, fisher, fox, marten, mink, muskrat, opossum, otter, raccoon, red squirrel, skunk, and weasel. Elowe Aff. ¶ 11. For most of these animals, the trapping season is permitted from the beginning of November to the end of December. Id. ¶ 15. Early trapping, beginning about two weeks before the regular trapping season, is allowed for fox and coyote, and in certain areas, muskrats may be trapped for one week prior to the regular trapping season. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Maine prohibits all types of traps except ordinary foothold traps, duffer-type foothold traps, killer-type body-gripping traps, cage-type traps, colony-type traps, and snares. Id. ¶ 19. The state of Maine is divided into twenty-nine Wildlife Management Districts (WMD). Id. ¶ 3. Some DIFW regulations are geographically-based, allowing certain types of trapping in some WMDs and not in others. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. The primary lynx range in Maine is in WMDs one through six and eight through eleven. Id. ¶ 9. E. The 2007 Consent Decree — Animal Protection Institute v. Martin In 2006, a group called the Animal Protection Institute (API) filed a similar complaint in this Court. Animal Prot. Inst. v. Martin, No. 06-128-B-W (D.Me. Oct. 12, 2006) (API). API’s Complaint was resolved by the issuance of a detailed Consent Decree on October 4, 2007. API, Consent Decree and Order (Docket # 134) (Consent Decree). The Decree required the Commissioner to impose restrictions on trapping in WMDs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Id. ¶ 5. The Decree prohibited the use of all leghold traps “that have an inside jaw spread of more than 5 3/8 inches, except that such traps with an inside jaw spread of more than 5 3/8 inches may be used if they are set so as to be fully or partially covered by water at all times.” Id. ¶ 5(a). It also required that all leghold traps must be equipped with “at least one chain swivel.” Id. The Decree prohibited the use of cage traps “which have an opening of more than 13 inches in width or more than 13 inches in height.” Id. ¶ 5(b). The Decree required the Commissioner to recommend to trappers that they not use “ground foothold traps with an inside jaw spread of more than 5 inches” unless they are equipped with offset jaws. M ¶ 5(g). The Decree prohibits: the setting, placing and tending of any killer-type trap unless set completely underwater or at least 4 feet above the ground or snow level ... except that killer-type traps with an inside jaw spread not to exceed 5 inches may be permitted under the following conditions: (1) when set so as to be partially covered by water at all times, or (2) when set under overhanging stream banks, or (3) when used as blind sets. Id. ¶ 5(d). The Commissioner may permit killer-type traps “set at least four feet above ground or snow level.” Id. ¶ 5(e). The Commissioner “shall not permit the use of snares for any purpose other than to catch beaver and bear unless and until the [DIFW] obtains an Incidental Take Permit [ (ITP) ] explicitly authorizing additional uses of snares.” Id. ¶ 5(f). In addition to mandating that the Commissioner maintain a telephone hotline during trapping season, the Decree requires the Commissioner to rehabilitate any lynx injured by incidental trapping, establish a network of qualified veterinarians and animal reha-bilitators to provide care for injured lynx, and investigate and report on each incidental trapping of lynx. Id. ¶ 6. The Consent Decree is still in effect and there has been no allegation that the Commissioner has violated its terms. F. Events Following the Consent Decree 1. The Plaintiffs’ View The parties present different versions of what has happened to lynx in Maine following the October 4, 2007 Consent Decree. The Plaintiffs say that during the 2007 trapping season, even after the Consent Decree was issued, eight lynx were reported trapped in the state of Maine in the twenty-nine day period from October 15 through November 13, 2007. Fox Ajf. ¶ 53. This is equivalent to one lynx trapped every four days during the trapping season. Id. ¶53. Two lynx were trapped in WMDs not covered by the Consent Decree, WMDs 7 and 18. Id. ¶ 54. The Plaintiffs emphasize that these figures include “reported” takes of lynx and that the DIFW has acknowledged unreported takes of lynx occur and that the numbers may be significant. Id. ¶ 52. The Plaintiffs point out that lynx do not observe DIFW WMD boundaries and contend that the trapping of two lynx outside protected districts bolsters their demand for an extension of the provisions of the Consent Decree to additional WMDs. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. All eight lynx trapped in 2007 were caught in leghold traps. Id. ¶ 58. Despite the restrictions on the size of leghold traps in the Consent Decree, leghold traps with a jaw spread of 5 3/8 inches or less, including sizes 1.75 and 2, remain legal in the restricted WMD areas and are commonly used to trap coyotes, fox, bobcat, fisher, and marten. Id. ¶ 57. Six of the eight lynx reported trapped in 2007 were caught in leghold traps with jaw spreads of 5 3/8 inches or less. Id. ¶ 58. At least three of the eight trapped lynx were trapped in leghold traps using drags, which can lead to significant injuries. Id. ¶ 59. Camilla H. Fox, the Plaintiffs’ primary expert, opined that “leghold traps pose a significant hazard to Canada lynx, particularly in land and elevated sets, and should be prohibited — at least within areas of known lynx occurrence. Padded leghold traps with a jaw spread of 4" or less could be allowed outside of these areas, although such traps still pose a hazard to lynx....” Id. ¶ 61. Focusing on the period after the consent decree, the evidence reveals that no lynx were reported caught in Conibear traps in 2007, and one was killed by a Conibear trap in 2008. Id. ¶¶ 63-65; Taub Letter. Ms. Fox opined that “kill traps such as Conibears, regardless of size and whether set on land or elevated sets, have, and will continue to, incidentally capture, injure and/or kill lynx. They pose a significant hazard to Canada lynx and should be prohibited throughout the lynx’s range to protect the species.” Id. ¶ 65. The Plaintiffs contend that DIFW regulations are inadequate to protect the lynx, even after the Consent Decree, and that the DIFW has failed to properly enforce the laws and regulations that do exist, resulting in the continued incidental take of lynx at rates higher than existed before the Consent Decree. Id. ¶¶ 80-86. 2. The Commissioner’s Response The Commissioner starts with a different perception of what the Consent Decree was intended to achieve. Dr. Elowe, the DIFW Director of Resource Management, states that they “were not sure whether these restrictions would reduce the incidence of accidental lynx captures, [but they] expected that the restrictions would reduce the incidence of injuries to lynx that were captured.” Elowe Aff. ¶ 27. He observes that after the Consent Decree issued, the DIFW promulgated an emergency and then a permanent rule restricting the use of foothold and cage traps in lynx range. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Further, he details DIFW efforts to comply with the letter and spirit of the Consent Decree. Id. ¶¶ 30-35. In fact, the DIFW has occasionally gone beyond what the Consent Decree mandates. Id. ¶¶ 46-47, 50. In five of the eight cases in which lynx were accidentally trapped, a DIFW biologist was able to travel to the capture site, chemically immobilize the animal, and carefully examine it for possible injury. Id. ¶ 34. Two lynx were uninjured and were immediately released. Id. ¶ 37. Of the remaining three, one had a “minor shallow skin laceration less than an eighth of an inch that did not prevent its immediate release. Another lynx had a tiny drop of blood at the bottom of its foot. A third lynx had a small shallow laceration (the size of a pea) on the top of its foot. In all three cases, the lynx were immediately released.” Id. ¶ 35. One lynx had a “very slight limp that likely would have gone unnoticed had someone not known that it was a trapped animal.” Id. ¶ 36 (emphasis in original incident report). After reviewing state records of trapped lynx, which were released, and their survival rate, Dr. Elowe concluded that “even when caught accidentally by private trappers, the impact caused by the trapping does not appear to affect post-capture survival.” Id. ¶ 65. Dr. Elowe vigorously disputed the Plaintiffs’ contention that incidental trapping of lynx could adversely affect the lynx population in Maine. Id. ¶87. He explained that “[t]he analysis [DIFW] performed for our ITP application, using modeling techniques reviewed and approved by USFWS, shows that this is simply not true. For the most part, lynx caught in foothold traps are released without significant injuries, so the trapping event has no effect on the population.” Id. ¶ 87. Finally, he states that “[s]ince 1999, only two lynx have been killed by traps, and both were killed in 2005 by killer-type traps. Given the new restrictions on killer-type traps, it is unlikely that lynx will be caught in the future by such traps.” Id. ¶ 88. 3. The Trappers’ Response The Trappers presented the views of Craig McLaughlin, Ph.D., who holds a doctorate in Wildlife Ecology and is employed as Wildlife Program Chief for the state of Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, and Dana R. Johnson, Sr., President of the Maine Trappers Association. Decl. of Dana Johnson (Docket #22) {Johnson Decl.)) Decl. of Craig McLaughlin (Docket # 24) {McLaughlin Decl.) Mr. Johnson states that to limit leghold traps, as the Plaintiffs propose, in WMD 1-11 and 18 “would eliminate much of the land-based trapping in Northern and Central Maine,” and to restrict Conibear traps to four inches or less “would eliminate almost all of the remaining land-based trapping.” Johnson Decl. ¶ 4. The current maximum jaw spread for leghold traps of 5 3/8 inches is “at or just above the minimum width that will allow for the trapping of coyote in foothold traps.” Id. ¶ 5. As regards other species, some were previously trapped by using baited Coni-bear traps set on the ground, but the Consent Decree prohibited this practice, and trappers must now rely primarily on leghold traps to trap weasels, fox, and raccoons. Id. ¶ 6. The Consent Decree authorizes the use of Conibear traps off the ground on poles, which allows the trapping of fisher and marten. Id. ¶ 8. However, if Conibear traps are further restricted by the four inch maximum proposed by the Plaintiffs, Mr. Johnson says “they cannot be used effectively to catch fisher and marten ... [and] [f|ew if any species (perhaps squirrel) could be caught in conibear traps that are 4 inches or less across.” Id. Mr. Johnson predicts “a huge adverse impact on farmers and other property owners” if the Plaintiffs’ proposals are enforced, since trapping reduces species, such as coyotes, fox, mink, fisher, skunks, and raccoons, that prey on livestock, poultry, and small domestic animals, and species, such as raccoons, skunks, porcupines, and woodchucks, that destroy crops. Id. ¶ 9. Among other adverse impacts, he predicts that the loss of revenue to the trappers “will exceed a quarter of a million dollars.” Id. ¶ 11. Dr. McLaughlin explains that the Consent Decree restrictions effectively reduce the likelihood that leghold traps will accidentally take lynx. Dr. McLaughlin is familiar with the terms of the Consent Decree and observed that the restriction against leghold traps with a jaw spread greater than 5 3/8 inches makes it less likely that lynx will become trapped, because lynx have relatively large feet, although he acknowledges it is possible for lynx to be trapped in the smaller leghold traps. Id. ¶ 6. He also noted that the additional requirements regarding Coni-bear traps are designed to limit their accessibility and attractiveness to lynx. Id. ¶ 7. Under the Consent Decree, Conibear traps must be located on a narrow leaning pole at least four feet above ground or snow level (lynx will not climb the pole), or placed without bait on the ground (lynx will not be attracted to the trap without bait), or in stream banks near water (lynx are unlikely to venture near stream beds). Id. Second, Dr. McLaughlin explores the adverse consequences to the lynx if the Plaintiffs’ proposals are ordered. Dr. McLaughlin points out that leghold traps of 5 3/8 inch are “just big enough to permit trapping for coyote, and also permitf] trapping of bobcat, fisher, and other predators such as marten and red fox. There [are] no effective alternative trap types to catch coyote, bobcat or most other predators that [are] legally allowed in Maine.” Id. ¶ 8. Regarding the Conibear traps, he states that if the proposed four inch maximum jaw spread is adopted, they will be too small to catch fisher. Id. Currently, trappers help control the population of these predators generally and specifically when competition for the snowshoe hare is most acute. Id. ¶ 11. Dr. McLaughlin observed that “[o]ne of the remarkable characteristics of lynx is their extremely high dependence on snowshoe hare, which constitutes the vast majority of the lynx diet.” Id. ¶ 12. Lynx, coyotes, bobcat, and fisher all compete for the same snowshoe hares. Id. ¶¶ 13, lb-16. Finally, fisher, and to a lesser extent coyote, prey on lynx. Id. ¶ 18. A decrease in trapping these predators, in Dr. McLaughlin’s opinion, would harm the lynx by increasing competition for their sole food source and increasing the numbers of animals for whom the lynx itself is a food source. Id. ¶20. Balancing the benefits and detriment to the lynx from the imposition of the additional restrictions proposed by the Plaintiffs results, in Dr. McLaughlin’s view, in a net detriment to the lynx. Id. ¶ 23. 4. The Plaintiffs’ Reply In their reply, after disputing the legal grounds for the posited defenses, Plaintiffs reassert that the balancing analysis favors the injunctive relief they are seeking, accuse the DIFW and the Trappers of manipulating statistics and contradicting their own data, and diminish the claimed economic impact of enhanced restrictions by saying that trapping in Maine is “a recreational activity that is not economically viable.” Pis. ’ Reply at 16-21. 5. Trappers’ Motion for Leave to Submit Rebuttal and Supplemental Declarations On Friday, November 7, 2008, one business day prior to oral argument in this matter, the Trappers filed a motion for leave to file rebuttal and supplemental declarations. Def.-Intervenors’ Expedited Mot. for Leave to Submit Rebuttal Decl. and Supplemental Decl. in Opp’n to Pis. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Docket # 36) (Trappers’ Mot. for Leave). The Plaintiffs objected. Pis’Resp. to Def.-Intervenors’Ex-pedited Mot. for Leave to File Rebuttal Decl. and Supplemental Decl. in Opp’n to Pis’ Mot for Prelim. Inj. (Docket # 39). The Trappers’ seek to introduce two new declarations, from Gerald Lavigne and Craig McLaughlin. Trappers’ Mot. for Leave at 2. Mr. Lavigne is the author of an article discussed by Plaintiffs’ witness Camilla Fox in her second declaration. Id. The stated purpose of his declaration is to allow Mr. Lavigne to “explain that[] Ms. Fox is misreading the article and reaching the wrong conclusion.” Id. Dr. McLaughlin already provided a declaration in connection with the Trappers’ response to Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. McLaughlin Decl. Now, the Trappers seek to introduce a second declaration from Dr. McLaughlin in which he adds “citations and quotations to the professional literature in Maine to the citations he offers in his original declaration.” Trappers’ Mot. for Leave at 2. The Trappers’ readily acknowledge that “[n]o new points are raised.” Id. Although the Trappers’ do not identify it as such, their motion is in effect a request to file a surreply. A surreply is appropriate where a party has not had the opportunity to contest matters introduced for the first time in the opposing party’s reply. See United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 270, 276-77 (D.D.C.2002) (“The standard for granting leave to file a surreply is whether the party making the motion would be unable to contest matters presented to the court for the first time in the opposing party’s reply. The matter must be truly new.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)). Here, the Trappers’ make no claim that the Plaintiffs’ raised new matters in their reply, nor that they have lacked the opportunity to address Plaintiffs’ arguments. Accordingly, the Court will not consider the Trapper’s rebuttal and supplemental declarations in ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. G. The November 17, 2008 Conibear Trap Take On November 18, 2008, the DIFW, through its attorney, informed the Court that, although he had represented at oral argument that two additional lynx had been caught by trappers during the 2008 season, a third lynx had been caught in a Conibear trap and had died: On November 17, 2008, a trapper advised the [DIFW] that he had captured a lynx. State and federal officials responded to the scene and are currently investigating the matter, and I have only limited details at this time. It is my understanding though, that the lynx was captured in a Number 160 Conibear trap in [WMD] 2. The trapper discovered the lynx when he tended the trap on November 17. He had last tended the trap five days previously. Accordingly, the lynx was captured and died sometime within that five day period. Taub Letter. Following receipt of the letter, the Court held a telephone conference of counsel on November 20, 2008. The status of the governmental investigations was discussed, and the Court was advised that the state investigation was complete and the federal investigation, though not complete, might be completed by the end of the week. If not, the state would likely be aware by then what the federal investigation revealed. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the state file a final investigative report by noon on Monday, November 24, 2008 .and allowed the parties one hour to file any objections to its contents. Minute Entry (Docket # 44). On November 24, 2008, the Court received a flurry of filings. The state filed a second affidavit from Dr. Elowe together with a lynx capture report, which was supplemented by additional attachments. Second Aff. of Dr. Kenneth D. Elowe (Docket # 45) {Second Elowe Ajf.); Lynx Incidental Captttre Report Ex. A (Docket # 45-2) {Lynx Report); Attacks. To Ex. A. to Second Ajf. (Docket #47). The Trappers filed a supplemental memorandum, an affidavit from Dana Johnson, the President of the Maine Trappers’ Association, and an additional attachment. Supplemental Mem. Regarding Def.-Interve-nors’ Opp’n to Pis.’ Mot. for Preliminary Injunction (Docket # 46) (Trappers’ Supplemental Mem.)] Second Decl. of Dana Johnson (Docket #49) (Second Johnson Decl.)-, Additional Attach. (Docket # 51). The Plaintiffs filed a response. Resp. to Def’s Supplemental Aff. (Docket #50) (Pis. ’ Supplemental Resp.). The report of the lynx trapping on November 17, 2008 reveals that the trapper called in a report of a dead lynx on November 17. Lynx Report at 1. He had last tended the trap on November 12. Taub Letter. The trap was set four feet nine inches from the ground on a tree that measured three and one-half inches. Lynx Report at 1. The tree had a “natural bend and ranged from 25 degrees at ground level to 78 degrees at the trap location.” Id. The trap was set less than six inches from two large diameter cedars and less than four inches from a down tree that ran beneath the trap. Id. at 1-2. The DIFW concluded that the trap was set in technical violation of the regulations, because the tree on which the trap had been placed did not reach the requisite forty-five degree angle until twenty-five inches from the ground or thirty-six inches from the base of the tree. Id. at 2. The DIFW further concluded, however, that the trapper demonstrated no intent to violate the rule and determined not to issue a citation. Id. The report contains a highly disturbing photograph of the dead lynx. The photograph shows the lynx standing on its hind legs, fully stretched and facing a large cedar with its right front paw raised straight up over its head and caught in a trap. The photograph suggests that the lynx climbed either the smaller tree where the trap was located or the cedar, caught its paw in the trap, and fell to the ground trying to escape. Though not mentioned in the report, presumably the lynx died either of starvation or exposure between November 12 when the trap was last checked, and November 17, when the animal was found dead. Dr. Elowe opined that the Conibear trap in this case was set in violation of current Maine regulations, because “the tree or pole on which the trap is affixed must be at an angle of at least 45 degrees to the ground at all points between the ground and the point at which the trap is affixed.” Second Elowe Aff. ¶ 7. He said that it is “impossible to determine with certainty whether the lynx accessed the trap by climbing up the tree on which the trap is affixed, or by climbing up the large cedar tree immediately adjacent to the trap and then reaching across approximately five inches into the trap.” Id. ¶ 8. He thought that “[biased on all available evidence, we believe it is more likely that the lynx accessed the trap via the large cedar tree adjacent to the trap, and not by climbing the tree on which the trap is affixed.” Id. ¶ 9. Dr. Elowe said that based on the recent incident, the rule needs to be modified in two respects: (I) “the rule needs to be clarified to explicitly state that the tree or pole on which the trap is affixed must be at an angle of at least 45 degrees to the ground at all points between the ground and the point at which the trap is affixed;” and, (2) “the rule needs to be amended to address not only the types of trees and poles on which killer-type traps may be set, but also must address the extent to which traps may be set adjacent to trees and other objects which might allow a lynx to access the trap.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. He expected that the “two amendments to the killer-type trap rule will be adopted and will take effect prior to the start of next year’s trapping season.” Id. ¶ 13. The Trappers agree that this recent incident has “revealed that the regulation is not as tight and specific as it is intended to be and that a change is appropriate to prevent a recurrence of another similar incident.” Trappers’ Supplemental Mem. at 1. The Trappers nevertheless “urge the Court to afford the State the opportunity to further modify and tighten its regulations rather than issue the preliminary injunction sought by Plaintiffs.” Id. The Trappers also submitted an affidavit from Dana Johnson. Mr. Johnson confirmed that lynx are able to climb large trees, but not “narrow objects that are at a 45-degree angle or steeper.” Second Johnson Decl. ¶ 2. He said that although we will never know exactly what happened, it “is almost a certainty that the lynx climbed the wide tree, reached across to the small, narrow tree and was caught by the foot in the conibear trap.” Id. ¶ 3. Mr. Johnson proposed that the rule be amended to “require that there be no trees, poles, or other objects greater than 4 inches in diameter within lynx reaching distance of the tree or pole in which the trap is set” and suggested “a minimum distance of four feet.” Id. ¶ 6. The Plaintiffs point out that the state’s proposal to alter the current regulations will not take effect until next trapping season, which is in their view “not adequate to protect lynx during this trapping season.” Pis. ’ Supplemental Resp. ¶ 1. They note that neither the state nor the Trappers mentioned the trapper check time of five days, which though legal under current regulations, the Plaintiffs have argued was too long “for trappers to find and release non-target animals alive.” Id. ¶ 2. Finally, they point out a discrepancy between Dr. Elowe’s affidavit and the incident report about whether the lynx accessed the trap by climbing the smaller tree where the trap was located or the larger nearby cedar. Id. ¶ 3. H. The Legal Positions I. The Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction The Plaintiffs claim that (1) Canada lynx “have been, and will continue to be, trapped in leghold traps as well as within [WMDs] that are not covered by the consent decree”; (2) the number of lynx trapped in leghold traps “rose subsequent to, and in spite of, the consent decree”; and, (3) “[mjore trapped lynx were reported in the one month period after the consent decree was entered into and trap restrictions were put in place than during the entire trapping seasons over the previous two years.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 2. The Plaintiffs say that the Commissioner has been and is violating the ESA and they request an order enjoining “these ongoing violations of federal law.” Id. Though the lawsuit itself is broadly phrased, the Plaintiffs’ demand for a preliminary injunction seeks a specific set of remedies: 1. Require the state of Maine to submit a completed habitat conservation plan to the USFWS for application of an ITP; 2. Prohibit the use of leghold traps used on land (both ground and elevated sets) in the identified lynx WMDs (1-6 and 8-11) as well as the two WMDs where lynx were trapped in 2007 (7 and 18); and, 3. In the same WMDs, prohibit the use of killer-type traps with an opening of more than four inches in both ground and elevated sets. Pis.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. for Injunc-tive Relief at 27 (Docket # 7-2) (Pis. ’ Mem.). 2.The Commissioner’s Defense The Commissioner responds variously. He observes that the state of Maine has filed an application with the USFWS for an ITP and he urges the Court to stay this action until the USFWS has acted on the state’s application. Def.’s Opp’n at 7-8. Next, he urges the Court to deny the motion because (1) the Plaintiffs delayed seeking relief; (2) the Plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits because of the doctrine of claim preclusion and the absence of any state violation of the ESA; and, (3) any relief should be limited to an order requiring continuing compliance with the Consent Decree. Id. at 8-27. 3. The Trappers’ Input “Words cannot describe the frustration felt by the trappers in making substantial concessions to API to obtain a consent decree settlement, only to see two organizations spearheaded by the same underlying individuals (Camilla Fox and Daryl De[J]oy) file an essentially identical lawsuit trying to bypass that settlement.” Trappers’ Opp’n at 2. In addition to supporting the state of Maine’s positions in defense of this lawsuit, the Trappers dispute the need for any regulations more stringent than those in the Consent Decree and contend that banning foothold trapping and effectively banning Conibear trapping in northern and central Maine would hurt, not help the lynx, because it would increase their natural competitors, such as coyote, bobcat, and fisher. Id. at 2-3. They also propose that trapping provides significant public and private benefits, including income to trappers, fur for clothing, and protection for livestock and property. Id. at 3. 4. The Plaintiffs’ Reply The Plaintiffs reply by contending that the filing of a draft ITP application is not enough to support a stay, that a stay would be contrary to congressional intent, and that the Commissioner has failed to demonstrate hardship justifying the stay. Pis. ’ Reply at 1-3. Second, they say that laches should not bar their claim, because laches must be invoked sparingly in environmental actions and the Commissioner has not met the essential elements for laches. Id. at 3-8. Further, they argue that the Commissioner has unclean hands. Id. at 4-6. The Plaintiffs object to the application of the claim preclusion, emphasizing that they were not parties to the earlier litigation, and the case does not fit within any exceptions to this requirement. Id. at 9-14. They reassert that the Commissioner has violated the ESA. Id. at 14-16. Finally, turning to the requirements for injunctive relief, they say they have demonstrated irreparable harm, the balance of harm weighs in their favor, and the Tenth Amendment does not prohibit such an injunction. Id. at 16-22. I. The Minnesota Lynx Case: Animal Protection Institute v. Hol-sten In the hiatus between the Consent Decree and the initiation of this lawsuit, a remarkably similar cause of action has been pending in the United States District Court in Minnesota. In Animal Protection Institute v. Holsten, the API along with a separate co-plaintiff sued the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, alleging that the state had violated § 9 of the ESA “by authorizing and allowing trapping and snaring activities that ‘take’ Canada Lynx, which is listed as protected under the ESA.” 541 F.Supp.2d at 1075. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. As in Maine, the state of Minnesota had promised to file an application for an ITP with the USFWS. Id. at 1076. On March 28, 2008, rejecting the state’s arguments, United States District Judge Davis granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and found the Commissioner “has violated and remains in violation of Section 9 of the [ESA] by authorizing trapping and snaring within the range of Canada Lynx in Minnesota.” Id. at 1081. He granted the motion for injunctive relief and ordered the state to promptly take all action necessary to insure no further taking of threatened Canada Lynx by trapping or snaring activities within the core Canada Lynx ranges, including, but not limited to: applying for an incidental take permit for Canada Lynx on or before April 30, 2008 ..., and developing and preparing a proposal ... to restrict, modify or eliminate ... the incidental taking of Canada Lynx through trapping activities in the core Canada Lynx ranges. Id. Following the Order, the state submitted a proposal to restrict, modify, or eliminate the incidental take of Canada lynx by, inter alia, restricting the use of Conibear and leghold traps, limiting the size of snares, and banning the use of certain types of bait. Def.’s Opp’n Attach. 12, Proposal of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources to Restrict, Modify, or Eliminate the Incidental Take of Canada Lynx at 4-6 (Minn. Proposal). The proposal imposed no size restrictions on foothold traps. Id. After considering an objection to the state’s proposal, the Court approved its terms with minor modification and ordered them to remain in effect until the USFWS issues an ITP, the USFWS promulgates a § 4(d) Rule, the Canada lynx is removed from protection under the ESA, or further order of the Court. Animal Prot. Inst. v. Holsten, Civil No. 06-3776 (MJD/RLE), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53396, at *3-4 (D.Minn. July 14, 2008) (Minn. Order). II. DISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction The Plaintiffs initiated this cause of action under the ESA, alleging that “by authorizing and allowing trapping activities that ‘take’ ... Canada lynx,” the state of Maine is violating the Act. Compl. ¶4. Congress granted jurisdiction to the “several district courts of the United States” ... “over any actions arising under [the ESA].” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(c). The ESA further allows “any person” to “commence a civil suit on his own behalf ... to enjoin any person, including ... any ... governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this Act or regulation issued under the authority thereof.” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). B. Criteria for Injunctive Relief The Court analyzes a request for a preliminary injunction through application of the following four well-established factors: ‘(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm [to the movant] if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no injunction issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the ruling on the public interest.’ Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir.2004)). The party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that these factors weigh in its favor. Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir.2003). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 365, 366, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). A judge should exercise the authority to grant such injunctive relief “sparingly”. Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def. Agency & Office of Emergency Preparedness, 649 F.2d 71, 76 n. 7 (1st Cir.1981). C. The ESA The Endangered Species Act of 1973 “represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (TVA). The stated purposes of the Act were “ ‘to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,’ and ‘to provide a program for the conservation of such ... species....’” Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)). Congress found that “various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation,” while other species “have been so depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) — (2); Maine v. Norton, 257 F.Supp.2d 357, 362 (D.Me.2003). The Supreme Court has observed that “the seriousness with which Congress viewed this issue” is reflected in the ESA’s provisions: “Virtually all dealings with endangered species, including taking, possession, transportation, and sale, were prohibited, except in extremely narrow circumstances.” TVA, 437 U.S. at 180, 98 S.Ct. 2279 (citations omitted). In TVA, the Supreme Court also noted that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” Id. at 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279. D. Claim Preclusion The DIFW and the Trappers are frustrated and suspicious. They have observed the striking similarity between the Plaintiff and individuals involved in the 2006 litigation, which led to the issuance of the Consent Decree, and the Plaintiffs and individuals involved in this litigation. They protest that in entering into the Consent Decree in 2007, the DIFW and the Trappers made substantial concessions in good faith and thought they had an agreement that would bridge the interval until the USFWS acted on the anticipated application for an ITP. Yet, with the application filed and awaiting action by the USFWS, they are now required to defend a new action, which raises the same issues under the same legal theories in the same forum with the same principal defendant and similar Plaintiffs. The DIFW and the Trappers cry foul and urge this Court to dismiss the lawsuit under the doctrine of claim preclusion, arguing that the pending lawsuit is barred by the Consent Decree in the prior API lawsuit. 1. The Prime Movers of the Lawsuits The Plaintiff in the 2006 lawsuit was Animal Protection Institute. API, Compl. at 1 (Docket # 1). In the Complaint, API described itself as follows: The Plaintiff, Animal Protection Institute ..., is a California corporation, with its principal place of business located at 1122 S Street in Sacramento, California. API is a national, non-profit organization dedicated to advocating for the protection of animals from cruelty and exploitation. API brings this action on behalf of itself and its adversely-affected members. API has tens of thousands of members and supporters living throughout the country. Approximately 248 of API’s members live in Maine. Id. ¶ 2. The Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are Animal Welfare Institute and Wildlife Alliance of Maine. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. AWI describes itself as follows: Plaintiff, ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE ... is a national, non-profit charitable organization headquartered in Washington[,] D.C. and founded in 1951 to reduce the sum total of pain and fear inflicted on animals by humans. AWI brings this action on behalf of itself, its board of directors, and its adversely affected members. AWI has tens of thousands of members and constituents living throughout the United States, including approximately 174 members and constituents who live in Maine. First Am. Compl. ¶ 5. WAM describes itself as follows: Plaintiff, Wildlife Alliance of Maine ... is a non-profit, 501(c)(3) organization with offices located at 96 Harlow St., Suite 355, Bangor, Maine 04401. WAM is an all volunteer organization dedicated to advocacy for wildlife and representing non-consumptive interests of wildlife in Maine. WAM brings this action on behalf of itself and its adversely-affected members. WAM has over 700 members living, working and recreating in Maine as full time residents. Id. ¶ 6. Behind these three entities, the DIFW and the Trappers see many of the same people, but in particular they focus on two people as the prime movers: Daryl DeJoy and Camilla Fox. Trappers’ Opp’n at 2 (stating “two organizations spearheaded by the same underlying individuals (Camilla Fox and Daryl Dejoy) file an essentially identical lawsuit trying to bypass that settlement”); Def.’s Opp’n at 13 (stating “the two individuals who apparently spearheaded the API lawsuit are spearheading this one”). The DIFW notes that while at API, Ms. Fox was involved in the decision to initiate the 2006 litigation. Def.’s Opp’n Attach. 9, Dep. of Camilla Fox at 198:9-19. She was a proposed expert witness in the 2006 litigation and is serving as an expert witness in this litigation. Def.’s Opp’n at 13. Mr. DeJoy submitted declarations in the API case and attended a deposition, and he is the Executive Director of WAM, the eo-Plaintiff in this litigation. Def.’s Opp’n Attach. 3, 4, 10. The Trappers thought the two were married. Trappers’ Opp’n at 2. 2. The Plaintiffs’ Response Mr. DeJoy and Ms. Fox acknowledge much of what the DIFW and the Trappers contend is true about their involvement with the two lawsuits. Mr. DeJoy is Executive Director and founder of WAM and filed a declaration in support of API’s 2006 litigation. Pis.’ Reply Attach 4, Decl. of Daryl DeJoy ¶¶ 1, 5 (DeJoy Decl.). Ms. Fox served in various positions at API, including National Campaign Director and Director of Wildlife Programs, from November 1996 through November 2006. Pis. ’ Reply Attach 1, Second Decl. of Camilla Fox ¶ 2 (Second Fox Decl.). While at API, she was involved in API's decision to initiate the 2006 lawsuit. She served as an expert witness in the API case and is serving as an expert in this case. Id. ¶ 7. Though not married, Mr. DeJoy and Ms. Fox are partners. Id. ¶ 16. But, the Plaintiffs present other evidence that supports their claim that API and the current Plaintiffs are independent organizations, which made separate and independent decisions about these lawsuits. API was founded in 1968 and is based in Sacramento, California; its “primary campaign areas currently include animals used in entertainment, captive exotic animals, trapping & fur, and the international wildlife trade.” Second Fox Decl. ¶ 2. AWI was founded in 1951 and is based in Washington, D.C.; its general mission is to “reduce the sum total of pain and fear inflicted on animals by humans” and, more specifically, one of its major efforts is “to end the torture inflicted on furbearing animals by steel jaw leghold traps and wire snares....” Id. ¶ 8. Although the Plaintiffs did not provide further detail about WAM, the Amended Complaint alleges that it is a non-profit, 501(c)(3) organization with offices headquartered in Bangor, Maine; its general mission is “advocacy for wildlife and representing non-consumptive interests of wildlife in Maine.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 6; see DeJoy Decl. ¶ 2. Regarding Ms. Fox’s involvement in these three organizations, her Second Declaration clarifies that, although she was working for API when the 2006 lawsuit was initiated and participated in the decision to initiate the lawsuit, she left employment with API in November 2006. Second Fox Decl. ¶ 4. In April 2007, she was contacted by Attorney Jay Tuchton, the Director of the University of Denver Environmental Law Clinic at the time, who was lead counsel for API in the 2006 case, and he asked her to serve as an expert witness in the case. Id. ¶ 7. She agreed and was deposed on June 12, 2007. Id. However, she was not in charge of the case. Id. Ms. Fox now serves as a wildlife consultant for AWI and has agreed to serve as an expert witness in this case. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. She says that AWI decided to join WAM in this lawsuit because (1) eight lynx were trapped during the 2007 season in Maine after the Consent Decree was issued; (2) an October 23, 2007 letter from USFWS to DIFW rejected its incidental take permit application and recommended a number of regulations to further protect the lynx; (3) it became evident that the DIFW was not going to file a compliant ITP application with USFWS; and, (4) the Minnesota district court had decided Animal Protection Institute v. Holsten. Id. ¶¶ 11-15. Mr. DeJoy clarified that, although he is a member of a number of environmental organizations, he is no longer a member of API. DeJoy Decl. ¶ 3. He states he was asked to be a declarant in API’s 2006 case, but he “was not asked, and did not, represent WAM in the previous ease and API did not believe it was representing WAM.” Id. ¶ 5. He says that he “did not spearhead the previous litigation, was not in charge of the lawsuit and had no say whatsoever in any decision-making nor any control or say in the final Consent Decree.” Id. The reasons WAM elected to initiate this lawsuit essentially echo the reasons Ms. Fox gave for AWI’s decision to do the same. Id. ¶¶ 6-10. 3. The Consent Decree and Claim Preclusion The premise of the Defendants’ claim preclusion argument is that API would be barred under the terms of the Consent Decree from initiating this cause of action, since if API is not precluded from initiating this cause of action, subsequent parties like AWI and WAM would certainly not be precluded. The Court is dubious. The Consent Decree contains the following provision: VI. ENFORCEMENT 11. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this case under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) until the termination of the Decree in order to enforce the terms and conditions of the Decree, to modify or terminate the Decree for good cause shown, and to resolve any disputes arising hereunder. Consent Decree ¶ 11. The statutory reference in this paragraph is to the provision of the ESA that authorizes the initiation of citizen suits and provides for a range of remedies, including injunction. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). From the Court’s perspective, API would not be barred under the Consent Decree from moving to modify the Decree, alleging that the continued takes of lynx both in areas covered and not covered by the Decree, constitute “good cause” for the modification. In fact, there is nothing in the Consent Decree that would prevent API from initiating a separate cause of action, alleging what is being alleged here: developments subsequent to the Consent Decree require new restrictions. While such a lawsuit may have run contrary to the spirit of the Consent Decree, it would not be prohibited by its provisions. This being the case, the Defendants’ complaints about collusion among API, AWI, and WAM ring hollow. 4. Legal Standard Nevertheless, the Court will explore whether — assuming, as the parties have, that API could not bring this cause of action — AWI and WAM would be es-topped from doing do so under the doctrine of claim preclusion. Just this year in Taylor v. Sturgell, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008), the United States Supreme Court extensively addressed claim preclusion. Taylor noted that “[t]he preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.’” 128 S.Ct. at 2171. “Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses ‘successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.’ ” Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001)). “The essential elements of claim preclusion are: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) an identity of the cause of action in both suits.” Grella v. Salem Five Cent Sav. Bank, 42 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.1994). Precluding parties from relitigating matters “protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple suits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). A consent decree is generally given the same effect for claim preclusion purposes as a litigated judgment. See In re Medomak Canning, 922 F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir.1990); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (noting that consent decrees are “subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees”). “Claim preclusion, like issue preclusion, is an affirmative defense.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. at 2179. “[I]t is incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove such a defense.” Id. at 2179-80. The Plaintiffs concede that the first element — a final judgment on the merits in Animal Protection Institute v. Martin — is satisfied. Pis.’ Reply at 9 (stating that “[c]ontrary to defendant’s assertion, neither the second or third elements are met”). 5. Identity of Parties or Privies a. Taylor Exceptions, the API Lawsuit, and the Instant Case In general, “one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party.” Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940). There are, however, several exceptions to this rule. Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2172. In Taylor, the Supreme Court grouped these exceptions into six categories: (1) where a person agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between others; (2) where there exists a pre-existing substantive legal relationship between the party to be bound and a party to the judgment; (3) in certain limited circumstances where a nonparty was adequately represented by someone with the same interests who was a party to the suit; (4) where a nonparty assumed control over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered; (5) where the nonparty is acting as a proxy for a party to the first lawsuit; or (6) where a special statutory scheme expressly forecloses successive litigation by nonlit-igants. Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2172-73. Defendants concede that AWI and WAM were not parties to the API case, instead arguing that one or more of the Taylor exceptions may apply to bar Plaintiffs’ suit. Def.’s Opp’n at 12. Specifically, Defendants contend that the second, third, fourth, or fifth exceptions may apply. Id. In support of their contentions, Defendants identify four aspects of the relationship among API, AWI, and WAM, the substance of which do not appear to be contested by Plaintiffs. Def.’s Opp’n at 13-14; PI. ’s Reply at 10-15. First, API, AWI, and WAM are each dedicated to animal protection. Def.’s Opp’n at 13. Second, the organizations have members in common. Id. For example, Defendants allege that Daryl DeJoy, Dena Winslow, and William Randall are (or were) members of both WAM and API, and each submitted declarations in the API case. Id. Third, as earlier described, Camilla Fox and Daryl DeJoy have been involved in both suits. Id. at 13-14. Fourth, AWI and API have been co-plaintiffs in a number of cases. Id. The Court first addresses the second, fourth, and fifth Taylor exceptions, concluding that they are unlikely to apply here. The third exception, adequate representation by party to a prior suit, is a closer call and is addressed last. i. Pre-existing Substantive Legal Relationship Under the second Taylor exception, “nonparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety of pre-existing substantive legal relationships between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2172 (internal quotation and alterations omitted). Founded upon principles of property law, qualifying relationships under this exception “include, but are not limited to, preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor.” Id. Here, Defendants contend that “AWI, API, and WAM appear to have some sort of relationship,” but concede that “whether it is sufficient to satisfy the privity requirement is difficult to say.” Def.’s Opp’n at 14. Without more, the Court cannot conclude that the type of pre-existing substantive legal relationship envisioned under the second Taylor exception exists here, ii. Assumption of Control over Prior Litigation and Relitigation Through Proxy In this case, the analysis of the fourth and fifth Taylor exceptions is the same. Under the fourth Taylor exception, “a non-party is bound by a judgment if she assumed control over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered” on the basis that such party has “had [her] day in court.” Id. at 2173 (internal quotation and alterations omitted). Defendants argue this exception may apply because “[t]he fact that only API filed the first lawsuit may have been some sort of litigation strategy agreed upon by API, AWI, and WAM.” Def.’s Opp’n at 14. Acknowledging that “technically neither Ms. Fox nor Mr. DeJoy are the parties” to the present suit, Defendants contend “they appear to have controlled the litigation the last time around, and are doing so again.” Id. Under the fifth Taylor exception, “a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive force by relitigating through a proxy.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173. This exception applies where “a person who did not participate in a litigation later brings suit as the designated representative of a person who was a party to the prior adjudication” and is likely “appropriate when a nonparty later brings suit as an agent for a party who is bound by a judgment.” Id. To this end, Defendants note that “API may be unhappy with the bargain it struck in the first case, and, realizing that it would be precluded from relitigating the matter, has convinced AWI and WAM to bring this case” Def.’s Opp’n at 14-15. Each of these Taylor arguments is grounded on suspicions, but these suspicions have not hardened into evidence, and for purposes of the motion for preliminary injunction, have been effectively rebutted by the Fox and DeJoy declarations. The Court declines to apply either the fourth or fifth Taylor exceptions. iii. Adequate Representation The third Taylor■ exception is the most relevant. By its terms, “in certain limited circumstances,” a nonparty may be precluded from bringing suit where that non-party was “adequately represented by someone with the same interests who was a party” to the prior suit. Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2172 (internal quotation and alterations omitted). The Taylor Court identified “Representative suits” under this exception to “include properly conducted class actions ... and suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.” Id. at 2172-73. The Court established a test: A party’s representation of a nonparty is “adequate” for preclusion purposes only if, at a minimum: (1) the interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned, and (2) either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the non-party. In addition, adequate representation sometimes requires (3) notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been represented. Id. at 2176 (internal citations omitted). As with the fourth exception, Defendants offer limited argument, opining about the possibility of “some s