Full opinion text
ORDER IN THE MATTER OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RAYMOND L. ACOSTA, District Judge. Defendants SAN JUAN MARRIOTT RESORT AND STELLARIS CASINO and MARRIOTT P.R. MANAGEMENT CORP. (“MARRIOTT”) have moved the court to enter summary judgment on their behalf and to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. The court having reviewed the memoranda filed by the parties as well as the documents submitted in support thereof hereby rules as follows. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff instituted this action alleging sex discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Additionally, plaintiff seeks relief under Puerto Rico Act No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq. (2002) and Puerto Rico Act No. 69 of July 6, 1985, Laws of P.R. Ann. tit. 29, §§ 1321 et seq. (2002), two local discrimination statutes. In essence, plaintiff claims that she was not selected for a “Pit Boss” position at the MARRIOTT’S Casino in March 2004 based on sex discrimination. Plaintiff further avers that MARRIOTT subsequently retaliated against her for having complained of the aforementioned rejection for promotion. We shall initially address two preliminary issues raised by the defendants which bear upon the evidence which will be available to plaintiff to prove her claims which are, her previous non-selection to Pit Boss positions in 1996, 1997 and 1999 and plaintiffs pattern or practice claim. II. PREVIOUS NON-SELECTION TO PIT BOSS POSITIONS Defendants contend that plaintiffs non-selection for the Pit Boss positions during the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 constitute alleged discrete acts of discrimination which are time-barred inasmuch as she failed to timely exhaust the corresponding administrative remedies as mandated by Title VII. Plaintiff amended her complaint on April 3, 2006 (docket No. 23) to include allegations of a systemic discriminatory practice. Specifically, the amended pleading avers that “[pjlaintiff, as well as other female employees have not been promoted as part of a de facto policy of denial of Pit Boss promotions to female employees.” Amended Complaint ¶ 15 (emphasis in original). Further, plaintiff charges that “[djefendant’s general practice regarding the hiring and promotion of employees from the Pit Boss position have been ongoing and can be described as a systemic violation of Plaintiffs rights.” Amended Complaint ¶ 25 (italics in original). Plaintiff concludes by alleging that “Defendant’s de facto policy denying Pit Boss promotions to female employees constitutes a systemic and/or serial violation of Plaintiffs rights. An employer’s continued and consistent discrimination, coupled with his refusal to correct a discriminatory practice, present a systemic violation which has resulted in reiterated unlawful refusals to grant promotions.” Amended Complaint ¶ 30. Prior to resorting to the courts for relief, plaintiffs must present their discrimination claims under Title VII to the appropriate agency. Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 564 (1st Cir.2005); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 85 (1st Cir.2005); Lebron-Rios v. U.S. Marshal Service, 341 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir.2003); Dressier v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75, 78 (1st Cir.2003); Clockedile v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 245 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2001). “[A] claimant who seeks to recover for an asserted violation of ... Title VII, first must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC, or alternatively, with an appropriate state or local agency, within the prescribed time limits.... This omission, if unexcused, bars the courthouse door, as courts long have recognized that Title VIPs charge-filing requirement is a prerequisite to the commencement of suit.” Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir.1999). The purpose behind the exhaustion requirement is to give the employer timely notice of the events as well as provide an opportunity for an early amicable resolution of the controversy. “That purpose would be frustrated ... if the employee were permitted to allege one thing in the administrative charge and later allege something entirely different in a subsequent civil action.” Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir.1996). In Puerto Rico an aggrieved employee has 300 days from the occurrence of the employment action complained of to file an administrative charge in instances where the local Department of Labor is empowered to provide relief, i.e., in instances of “deferral” jurisdiction. Lebron-Rios, 341 F.3d at 11 n. 5; Bonilla, 194 F.3d at 278 n. 4. Otherwise, the applicable period is 180 days. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). In Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) the Supreme Court redefined the factors to be used by the courts in examining allegations of continuing violations in suits brought by individual claimants and did away with the “systemic” or “serial” dichotomy previously used for extending the limitations period. “Morgan eliminates the need for juries to determine whether there was a systemic or serial violation in order to invoke the continuing violations doctrine”. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 410 (1st Cir.2002). The Supreme Court distinguished instead between “discrete discriminatory acts” and “hostile work environment claims” for purposes of determining the timeliness of Title VII actions brought by individual plaintiffs. According to the Supreme Court, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The Supreme Court went on to list specific events which it concluded constituted distinctive actionable claims which marked the term for the limitations period to run. Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable “unlawful employment practice.” Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (emphasis ours). On the other hand, “[h]ostile environmental claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct ... The ‘unlawful employment practice’ therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.” Id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. “As long as the employer has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable hostile environment claim, an unlawful employment practice has ‘occurred,’ even if it is still occurring. Subsequent events, however, may still be part of the one hostile work environment claim and a charge may be filed at a later date and still encompass the whole.” Id. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Illustrating the underlying difference between hostile work environment claims and other discrimination claims, the Court of Appeals in Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2003) stated that the limitations period for an alleged discriminatory change in retirement benefits plan began to run upon plaintiff being advised of the decision. Likewise, following the Morgan precedent in Rivera v. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewers Auth., 331 F.3d 183 (1st Cir.2003), the court rejected plaintiffs notion that two employment transfers were part of a continuing violation for purposes of the [Title VII] limitations period under a hostile work environment scheme. Rather, the court specifically determined that each such transfer constituted “ ‘a separate and actionable unlawful employment practice.’ ” Id. at 188-89 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061). See also, Dressler v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75 (1st Cir.2003) (two separate claims with individual limitations period accruing from the denial of prospective employment and termination from employment); Miller v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 296 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir.2002) (distinguishing “a discrete act of discrimination— as opposed to a pattern of harassing conduct that, taken as a whole, constitutes a hostile work environment [and falls within the continuing violations exception to the limitations period].”) Accord, Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.2002) finding hostile work environment claims timely under the Morgan premise. Based on the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that the three specific instances of plaintiffs non-selection to the Pit Boss positions in 1996, 1997 and 1999 fall squarely within the discrete acts of discrimination as defined in Morgan. Hence, plaintiff was required to file individual administrative charges with respect to each one of these alleged discriminatory events within 300 days thereafter. It is undisputed that plaintiff in this case failed to do so for which reason any claims based on these non-selections have become stale. Accordingly, defendants’ request for dismissal of plaintiffs discrimination claim based on her non-selection to the Pit Boss positions in the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 is GRANTED and it is hereby DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY. III. PATTERN OR PRACTICE In response to defendant’s untimeliness arguments regarding alleged past discriminatory events, plaintiff further adduces the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination. In her memoranda plaintiff argues that defendant “presents a distorted view of the evidentiary requirement for establishing patterns and practices that constitute sytematic [sic] violations.” Plaintiffs Sur-Reply (docket No. 120) p. 27. At the outset, it is important to note that pattern or practice discrimination does not constitute an independent cause of action but rather an additional procedural vehicle available for establishing disparate discriminatory treatment. “A pattern or practice case is not a separate and freestanding cause of action ... but is really merely another method by which disparate treatment can be shown.” Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella S.A., 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir.2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) the United States Supreme Court described the mechanics of pattern or practice. Referring to the legislative history of Title VII, the court cited the explanation proffered by Senator Hubert Humphrey as to the meaning of the “pattern or practice” language in the statute as follows: [A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of rights consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but it is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature. There would be a pattern or practice if, for example, a number of companies or persons in the same industry or line of business discriminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants practiced racial discrimination throughout all or a significant part of its system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by the statute. The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice.... Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 1843 The pattern or practice suit is prosecuted in two phases. Plaintiff must initially prove a pattern or practice of discrimination exists which raises a presumption that all protected class members are affected thereby. The burden then shifts to the employer to establish that decisions regarding particular class members were not based on impermissible discriminatory criteria. Pattern-or-practice cases are typically tried in two or more stages. During the first stage of trial, the plaintiffs’ burden is to demonstrate that an unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers. Thus, at the initial liability stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the plaintiffs are not required to offer evidence that each person for whom they will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s discriminatory policy. Instead, plaintiffs’ burden is to establish that such a policy existed. The burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the plaintiffs’ prima fa-cie case, the finder of fact can conclude that a violation has occurred and the trial court can award prospective equitable relief. If the plaintiffs also seek individual relief for the victims of the discriminatory practice, the case moves into the second or subsequent stages. In these additional proceedings, it must be determined whether each individual plaintiff was a victim of the discriminatory practices. Importantly, by having prevailed in the first stage of trial, the individual plaintiffs reap a significant advantage for purposes of the second stage: they are entitled to a presumption that the employer had discriminated against them. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir.2001) (citations, brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff in a pattern-or-practice action is the Government, and its initial burden is to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers. At the initial ‘liability’ stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s discriminatory policy. Its burden is to establish a pri-ma facie case that such a policy existed. The burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or practice by demonstrating that the Government’s proof is either inaccurate or insignificant.... If an employer fails to rebut the inference that arises from the Government’s prima facie case, a trial court may then conclude that a violation has occurred and determine the appropriate remedy. Without any further evidence from the Government, a court’s finding of a pattern or practice justifies an award of prospective relief. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360-61, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (internal citation omitted). “[I]n determining pattern or practice liability, the government is not required to prove that any particular employee was a victim of the pattern or practice; it need only establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed.” E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1287 (11th Cir.2000). Once this pattern or practice is established, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the government’s showing of a pattern or practice of discrimination is either inaccurate or insignificant. If the employer fails to rebut the government’s prima facie case, the resulting finding of a discriminatory pattern or practice may give rise to an inference that all persons subject to the policy were its victims and are entitled to appropriate remedies ... [Ojnee a pattern and practice of discrimination is established, a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was discriminated against because of her sex is entitled to recovery obtains. The employer may overcome this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence that job decisions made when the discriminatory policy was in force were not made in pursuit of that policy. Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1287 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As previously noted, awards which are to be tailored to the damages of the individual protected members will be determined at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. “When the Government seeks individual relief for the victims of the discriminatory practice, a district court must usually conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of individual relief ... [A]s is typical of Title VII pattern-or-practice suits, the question of individual relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination. The force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage of the trial.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843. “The second stage of a pattern and practice claim is essentially a series of individual lawsuits, except that there is a shift of the burden of proof in the plaintiffs favor.” Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1106 n. 7 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is clear that the evidentiary approach used in pattern or practice cases varies substantially from that applied to individual suits. Pattern-or-practice cases differ significantly from the far more common cases involving one or more claims of individualized discrimination. In a case involving individual claims of discrimination, the focus is on the reason(s) for the particular employment decisions at issue ... In contrast, the initial focus in a pattern-or-practice case is not on individual employment decisions but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmak-ing. Thus, the order and allocation of proof, as well as the overall nature of the trial proceedings, in a pattern-or-practice case differ dramatically from a case involving only individual claims of discrimination. Id. at 1106 (citations, brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “The typical pattern or practice discrimination case is brought either by the government or as a class action to establish that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers.” Celestine, 266 F.3d at 355 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In such cases, the focus, at least initially, is upon a pattern of discriminatory decision-making, i.e., the company’s standard operating procedure, rather than upon individual employment decisions.” Herendeen v. Michigan State Police, 39 F.Supp.2d 899, 905 (D.Mich.1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The crucial difference between an individual’s claim of discrimination and a class action alleging general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest. The inquiry regarding an individual’s claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while at the liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory deci-sionmaking.” Celestine, 266 F.3d at 355. The Supreme Court has yet to extend the pattern or practice approach to private, non-class suits. However, because of its particular nature we find application of this evidentiary method to actions brought by individual plaintiffs seeking personal relief in individual claims of disparate treatment unsuitable. Multiple courts have similarly concluded. See, i.e., Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir.2004) (“We therefore hold that the pattern-or-practice method of proving discrimination is not available to individual plaintiffs. We subscribe to the rationale that a pattern-or-practice claim is focused on establishing a policy of discrimination; because it does not address individual hiring decisions, it is inappropriate as a vehicle for proving discrimination in an individual case”); Celestine, 266 F.3d at 356 (“As the plaintiffs are before us in their individual capacities ... the Teamsters method is not available to them”); Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1106 n. 8 (“If the plaintiffs do not prevail during the first stage of a pattern- or-practice trial, they are nevertheless entitled to proceed on their individual claims of discrimination ... Naturally, however, they are left to proceed under the normal McDonnell Douglas framework, rather than benefiting from a presumption of discrimination”); Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 711 (2nd Cir.1998) (“[I]t is evident that the Court in Teamsters was not laying down rules for private, non-class actions. Of the cases cited by the Court for the proposition that non-applicants can recover, none were private non-class actions” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir.1998) (“because the Supreme Court has never applied the Teamsters method of proof in a private, non-class action for employment discrimination, and because the nature of the proof and remedies in class and government pattern or practice actions differs vis-a-vis private, non-class actions, we decline to give individual plaintiffs a pattern or practice cause of action or allow them to use the Teamsters method of proof’); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866 n. 6 (7th Cir.1985) (“Plaintiffs’ use of ‘pattern-or-practice’ language also seems to be misplaced, since such suits by their very nature, involve claims of classwide discrimination and the five plaintiffs, while attacking policies that would have affected all of [defendant’s] women employees as a class, have stated only their individual claims, not a class action” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Murphy v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 357 F.Supp.2d 230, 246 (D.D.C.2004) (“[Defendant’] first challenge to the plaintiffs’ ‘pattern and practice’ claim is that they may not proceed on this theory in an individual action for discrimination. The Court agrees”); Herendeen, 39 F.Supp.2d at 906 (declining to apply pattern or practice evidentiary proof method to individual discrimination claims). See also, Jones v. U.P.S., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1188 n.5 (10th Cir.2007) (declining to “decide whether the pattern- or-practice method of proof is available to individual plaintiffs” but acknowledging “that other circuits have held that this method of proof is not available in a private, non-class suit.”) We therefore hold that plaintiff in this action does not have available the pattern or practice vehicle to prove her individual discrimination claim. Accordingly, plaintiffs discrimination claim based on pattern or practice is hereby DISMISSED. IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P., which sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions, in pertinent part provides that they shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st Cir.2000); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1999). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995). “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view ‘the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.’ ” Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 361 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995)). “In marshaling the facts for this purpose we must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. That does not mean, however, that we ought to draw unreasonable inferences or credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, rank conjecture, or vitriolic invective.” Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted italics in original). Credibility issues fall outside the scope of summary judgment. “ ‘Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). See also, Dominguez-Cruz v. Subtle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st Cir.2000) (“court should not engage in credibility assessments.”); Simas v. First Citizens’ Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.1999) (“credibility determinations are for the factfinder at trial, not for the court at summary judgment.”); Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.1998) (credibility issues not proper on summary judgment); Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers, Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 108, 113 (D.P.R.2002). “There is no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, and no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood. In fact, only if the record, viewed in this manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment.” Cruz-Baez v. Negrortr-Irizarry, 360 F.Supp.2d 326, 332 (D.P.R.2005) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted). In cases where the non-movant party bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite and competent evidence to rebut a motion for summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202; Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.2001); Grant’s Dairy v. Comm’r of Maine Dep’t of Agric., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2000), and cannot rely upon “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation”. Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir.2000); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990). Y. LOCAL RULE 56(c) Motions for summary judgment must comport with the provisions of Local Rule 56(c) which, in pertinent part, reads: A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain in a separate section additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a record citation as required by subsection (e) of this rule. This provision specifically requires that in its own statement of material fact respondent either admit, deny, or qualify each of movant’s proffered uncontested facts and for each denied or qualified statement cite the specific part of the record which supports its denial or qualification. Respondent must prepare its separate statement much in the same manner as when answering the complaint. The purpose behind the local rule is to allow the court to examine each of the movant’s proposed uncontested facts and ascertain whether or not there is adequate evidence to render it uncontested. “This ‘anti-ferret’ rule aims to make the parties organize the evidence rather than leaving the burden upon the district judge.” Alsina-Ortiz v. Laboy, 400 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.2005). “The purpose of this ‘anti-ferret rule’ is to require the parties to focus the district court’s attention on what is, and what is not, genuinely controverted. Otherwise, the parties would improperly shift the burden of organizing the evidence presented in a given case to the district court.” Mariani-Colon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted). See also, Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir.2001) (summary judgment should not “impose [upon the court] the daunting burden of seeking a needle in a haystack”); Leon v. Sanchez-Bermudez, 332 F.Supp.2d 407, 415 (D.P.R.2004). “When complied with, they serve to dispel the smokescreen behind which litigants with marginal or unwinnable cases often seek to hide and greatly reduce the possibility that the district would will fall victim to an ambush.” Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 7 (citation, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Apart from the fact that Local Rule 56(e) itself provides that “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted” in discussing Local Rule 311.12, its predecessor, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stressed the importance of compliance by stating that the parties who ignore its strictures run the risk of the court deeming the facts presented in the mov-ant’s statement of fact admitted. “Given the vital purpose that such rules serve, litigants ignore them at their peril. In the event that a party opposing summary judgment fails to act in accordance with the rigors that such a rule imposes, a district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party’s facts as stated.” Id. See also, Alsina-Ortiz, 400 F.3d at 80 (“Where the party opposing summary judgment fails to comply, the rule permits the district court to treat the moving party’s statement of facts as uncontested”); Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.2004) (“uncontested” facts pleaded by mov-ant deemed admitted due to respondent’s failure to properly submit statement of contested facts.) “[AJbsent such rules, summary judgment practice could too easily become a game of cat-and-mouse, giving rise to the ‘specter of district court judgment being unfairly sandbagged by unadvertised factual issues.’ ” Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 931 (1st Cir.1983)). Providing an alternative statement of facts without addressing the movant’s factual proposals individually does not conform to the Local Rule’s mandate and will cause defendant’s proffered facts to be deemed uncontested. Mariani-Colon, 511 F.3d at 219. Further, denials without more are ineffective. Rather, the opposing party “must offer specific facts to counter those set out by [defendant]. [N]onmovant’s facts must demonstrate the existence of definite competent evidence fortifying plaintiffs version of the truth. This is the case even where motive and intent are at issue. [Plaintiff] may not meet his burden by citing an inequity and tacking on the self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory animus.” Arroyo-Audifred v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 527 F.3d 215, 219-20 (1st Cir.2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A party’s failure to abide by the strictures of Local Rule 56(c), however, does not automatically entitle movant to summary judgment as requested. “It mainly means that the district judge can accept the moving party’s allegedly uncontested facts as true, but whether or not this justifies summary judgment for the moving party depends upon the legal and factual configuration that results.” Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 8. In the case before us, plaintiff only-raised objections as to part of MARRIOTT’S Statement of Uncontested Facts. Accordingly, we shall consider those facts not objected to as uncontested. Further, we shall also deem as uncontested those facts adequately proffered by defendants which were not properly objected to by plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff failed to submit her own proffered uncontested facts. Rather, in her response plaintiff included a section entitled “Additional Material Facts” which reads as follows: The Plaintiff does hereby incorporate and makes a part hereof her entire Sworn Statement under Penalty of Perjury pursuant to 28 USC Section 1746, hereto included as Exhibit 9, as additional facts supported by her testimony as facts material to her opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant’s Statement of Purported Uncontested Material Facts (docket No. 92) p. 7 (emphasis ours). In other words, rather than itemizing each proffered fact separately with reference to its particular evidentiary source as the Local Rule requires which would then allow defendant the opportunity to address them individually, plaintiff would have us extrapolate material facts to the controversy at hand from her sworn statement. This is precisely what this provision seeks to avoid. Accordingly, we need not consider plaintiffs declaration as a substitute for the Local Rule 56(c) requirements. VI. PLAINTIFF’S UNSWORN STATEMENT MARRIOTT has sought to exclude plaintiffs Unsworn Statement arguing that it is self-serving and contradicts prior deposition testimony and was never previously disclosed as part of the discovery process. According to MARRIOTT, plaintiffs “attempt to contradict and supplement her own deposition testimony with a self-serving and recently created Unsworn Statement which is wholly inadmissible, inasmuch as it was not produced to defendant during the course of discovery, contradicts her prior deposition testimony, and states plaintiffs opinions without evidentiary support.” Reply to Plaintiffs Motion (docket No. 105) p. 6. Initially, we must note that the information contained in plaintiffs Unsworn Statement at ¶¶22 to 37 pertains to her retaliation claim. Inasmuch as defendants’ proffered facts regarding the retaliation claim were deemed uncontested due to plaintiffs failure to address them in accordance with the provisions of Local Rule 56(c), we shall disregard this part of the Unsworn Statement. A. Discovery Movants contend that plaintiffs failure to furnish copy of her statement during the discovery process contravenes Rule 26(a) Fed.R.Civ.P. However, this provision is limited to the initial disclosures of “individuals] likely to have discoverable information ... that the disclosing party may use to support its claims”, documents in its possession which may be used to support its claims, computation of damages and insurance agreements. The Unsworn Statement is nothing more than plaintiffs relation of her educational background, work experience, efforts to get promoted to the Pit Boss position and her eventual resignation interspersed by her subjective appreciation of the events which she alleges were motivated by discriminatory animus. Accordingly, we find no information therein which would have been subject to the Rule 26(a) mandate. B. Recanting “It is settled that ‘[w]hen an interested witness has given clear answers to unambiguous questions, he cannot create a conflict and resist summary judgment with an affidavit that is clearly contradictory, but does not give a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony is changed.’ ” Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1994)); Sailor Inc. F/V v. City of Rockland, 824 F.Supp.2d 197, 202 (D.Me.2004). “[A] party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party’s earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity.” Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999). The timing of the recanting, i.e., in response to a summary judgment request, has been held crucial as well as whether or not a satisfactory explanation for the change in testimony has been provided. Orta-Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Quimica P.R., Inc., 447 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir.2006); Colantuoni, 44 F.3d at 5. See, i.e., Torres, 219 F.3d at 20-21 (“post-summary judgment affidavit ... does not indicate that there was any confusion at the time of [affiant’s] deposition testimony ... nor does it allege that the prior testimony was in error.”) With regard to MARRIOTT’s recanting argument, defendants have failed to identify any specific questions posed during discovery with the answers provided by plaintiff in order for the court to ascertain whether indeed they are contrary to her statement. In other words, MARRIOTT has not identified the “clear answers to unambiguous questions” asked by defendants during plaintiffs deposition which she is now reneging in order to create an issue of fact. Absent this information, we cannot accept defendants’ argument. C. Conclusory Statements On the other hand, any testimony used in support of discriminatory motive in a motion for summary judgment setting must be admissible in evidence, i.e., based on personal knowledge and otherwise not contravening evidentiary principles. Rule 56(e) specifically mandates that affidavits submitted in conjunction with the summary judgment mechanism must “be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affi-ant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Hoffman v. Applicators Sales and Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.2006); Nieves-Luciano v. Hernandez-Torres, 397 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2005); Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir.2000). See also, Quiñones v. Houser Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir.2006) (affidavit inadmissible given plaintiffs failure to cite “supporting evidence to which he could testify in court”). Additionally, the document “must concern facts as opposed to conclusions, assumptions, or surmise”, Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 316 (1st Cir.2001), not conclusory allegations Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d at 414. “To the extent that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment merely reiterate allegations made in the complaint, without providing specific factual information made on the basis of personal knowledge, they are insufficient. However, a party’s own affidavit, containing relevant information of which he has firsthand knowledge, may be self-serving, but it is nonetheless competent to support or defeat summary judgment.” Santiago v. Centennial, 217 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2000) (internal citations and quotation max’ks omitted). Hence, with regard to ¶¶ 1 through 21, only those facts personally known to plaintiff as to which she could testify in court may be relied upon. However, those portions of plaintiffs statement which merely embellish facts and provide her subjective characterization of the circumstances leading to her employment with MARRIOTT and her perception of the alleged discriminatory reasons purportedly forcing her resignation are inappropriate under the confines of Rule 56(e). VII. TITLE VII — DISCRIMINATION “When ... direct evidence is lacking to support a discrimination claim, the plaintiff must rely on establishing a prima facie case through the familiar steps of the [McDonnell Douglas] burden-shifting framework.” Moron-Barradas v. Dep’t of Educ., 488 F.3d 472, 480 (1st Cir.2007). “[T]he burden for establishing a prima fa-cie case is not onerous.” Douglas v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 474 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.2007). “Disparate treatment cases ordinarily proceed under the three-step, burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). First, the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff makes out this prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions. Third, if the defendant carries this burden of production, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance that the defendant’s explanation is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Mariani-Colon, 511 F.3d at 221 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Douglas, 474 F.3d at 14. “Generally, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: 1) he is a member of a protected class, 2) he is qualified for the job, 3) the employer took an adverse employment action against him, and 4) the position remained open, or was filled by a person with similar qualifications. This burden is not onerous, as only a small showing is required.” Mariani-Colon, 511 F.3d at 221-22 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Douglas, 474 F.3d at 13-14. See also, Morona-Barradas, 488 F.3d at 481 (prima facie case established by presenting evidence that (1) plaintiff was “a member of a protected class, (2) she applied and was qualified for the ... position, and ... (3) was rejected ... and (4) [defendant] hired someone with similar or lesser qualifications”). Once plaintiff has complied with this initial prima facie burden the defendant must “articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged conduct at which time presumption of discrimination fades and the burden then falls back on plaintiff who must then demonstrate that the proffered reason was a “pretext” and that the decision at issue was instead motivated by discriminatory animus. Rivera-Aponte v. Rest. Metropol # 3, Inc., 338 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir.2003); Gu v. Boston Police Dept., 312 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir.2002); Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002); Zapata-Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 44-45 (1st Cir.2002); Feliciano v. El Conquistador, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2000); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir.2000). “At this third step in the burden-shifting analysis, the McDonnell Douglas framework falls by the wayside because the plaintiffs burden of producing evidence to rebut the employer’s stated reason for its employment action merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 6 (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Defendant’s “burden is one of production, not persuasion” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, and “[a]t all times, the plaintiff bears the ‘ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.’ ” Gu v. Boston Police Dept., 312 F.3d at 11 (citing Texas Dept., of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089). See also, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097. “Upon the emergence of such an explanation, it falls to the plaintiff to show both that the employer’s proffered reasons is a sham, and that discriminatory animus sparked its actions.” Cruz-Ramos v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 202 F.3d 381, 384 (1st Cir.2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The plaintiff must then show, without resort to the presumption created by the prima facie case, that the employer’s explanation is a pretext for ... discrimination.” Rivera-Aponte v. Rest. Metropol # 3, Inc., 338 F.3d at 11. Thus, in a summary judgment context the court must determine “whether plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence that he was discriminated against due to his [age] to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Zapata-Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d at 45; Rivas Rosado v. Radio Shack, Inc., 312 F.3d 532, 534 (1st Cir.2002). Summary judgment will be denied if once the court has reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the plaintiff it finds there is sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the reasons adduced for the charged conduct are pretextual and that the true motive was discriminatory. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial, 217 F.3d at 57; Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir.1999). Strict adherence to the McDonnell Douglas procedural paradigm is not imperative when ruling on a summary judgment. “ ‘[A] court may often dispense with strict attention to the burden-shifting framework, focusing instead on whether the evidence as a whole is sufficient to make out a question for a factfinder as to pretext and discriminatory animus.’ ” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535-36 (1st Cir.1996)). However, in the context of a summary judgment “ ‘the need to order the presentation of proof is largely obviated, and a court may often dispense with strict attention to the burden-shifting framework, focusing instead on whether the evidence as a whole is sufficient to make out a question for a factfinder as to pretext and discriminatory animus.’ ” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d at 26 (citing Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d at 535). “Proof of more than [plaintiffs] subjective belief that he was the target of discrimination however, is required. In order to establish a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must show that others similarly-situated to him in all relevant respects were treated differently by the employer.” Mariani-Colon, 511 F.3d at 222 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a discrimination claim, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to two points: 1) the employers’ articulated reasons for its adverse actions were pretextual, and 2) the real reason for the employers’ actions was discriminatory animus based on a protected category.” Id. at 223. “At the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, the ultimate burden is on the plaintiff to persuade the trier of fact that she has been treated differently because of her [sex].” Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 56 (1st Cir.1999). “Plaintiff may use the same evidence to support both conclusions [pretext and discriminatory animus], provided that the evidence is adequate to enable a rational factfinder reasonably to infer that unlawful discrimination was a determinative factor in the adverse employment action.” Thomas, 183 F.3d at 57 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A. Proffered Facts Relevant to the Selection Process We find the following facts, proffered by defendants in their Statement of Uncontested Facts (docket No. 82-2) and which are relevant to the selection process for the Pit Boss position in March 2004, are uncontested. 1. Background The following individuals, currently employed by MARRIOTT, were somehow connected to the allegations charged in the complaint: STUART LEVENE — Casino Director since 2003. CARLOS OTERO — Casino Manager since mid 1998. NESTOR DEL VALLE — Manager, Casino Slots Department since 2001-2002. HECTOR MALDONADO — Casino Slots Department Assistant Manager since 2003-2004. LUIS MARIA ACUÑA — Human Resources Director since July 2002. ELIZABETH ARVELO — Director of Personnel Services since 2004. PEDRO RIVERA — Area Director of Loss Prevention and Casino Surveillance for Latin-America and the Caribbean since 1999. GLADYS RODRIGUEZ — Casino Floor Supervisor. VENTURA ACOSTA, MIGUEL MALDONADO FONTAN, LUIS GUEVARA, JULIO VAZQUEZ and NORBERTO SANTIAGO have been Pit Bosses at the MARRIOTT’S Casino since at least March 2004. Plaintiff, MARIA VELEZ, commenced working at Marriott on December 6, 1994, as a Casino Floor Supervisor. From 1995 to 1999 she applied on three separate occasions to a Pit Boss position in the Casino but was never selected. In March 2004 plaintiff again applied for a Pit Boss vacant position but WILFREDO GUZMAN was chosen instead. 2. March 2004 Pit Boss Vacancy Late 2003 Casino management decided to open its table games operation twenty four hours a day starting in December 2003, for a trial period of three months. As a result thereof, the need arose for a new Pit Boss to work the newly-created shift, from 4:00 a.m. until 12:00 noon. The selection for the position was made by a committee composed by the five Pit Bosses, the Casino Director and the Casino Manager. GLADYS RODRIGUEZ, Casino Floor Supervisor, was also present during the selection meeting, but did not take part in the decision. The selection process consisted of individual evaluations by each of the Pit Bosses, the Casino Manager and the Casino Director, using a form which contained the names of the candidates under consideration and the attributes required for the position. The individual committee members scored each candidate on each category. Thereafter, the decision makers conferred and reached a consensus as to the selected candidate. The Pit Boss selected for the new shift would be responsible for the entire Casino operation during that shift. Therefore, the Casino management decided to give the opportunity to three supervisors to perform the duties of a Pit Boss during one month each, to see if one of them demonstrated the qualifications as the right candidate for the permanent position. LUZ MEDINA, EDWIN CABRERA and LUIS FUENTES were chosen for this trial opportunity. However, none of them performed as expected and in March 2004 an opening for the Pit boss position was again published to consider additional candidates. This time the decision makers considered plaintiff and WILFREDO GUZMAN as the two top candidates. GUZMAN was eventually selected over plaintiff. B. Additional Facts We find the following additional facts relevant to the selection process uncontro-verted for purposes of the summary judgment now before us based on the evidence on record. 1. The Selection Process LEVENE’s role during the selection meeting was that of a facilitator. “I’m listening. I’m sort of facilitating the meeting. I’m not passing judgment on anyone, because I did not or never had an opportunity to work very closely with any of them. But I’m just facilitating the process to try to make sure that, you know, that people are being candid and fair.” LEVENE Depo. Tr. 46 (docket No. 82-17). Each member would be handed a scoring sheet to fill out and the individual results for each candidate would be added up. LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 61 (docket No. 82-19); CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 48 (docket No. 82-18). “[EJverybody was given an opportunity to rank, or rate, or somehow figure out how they stacked-up against each other, and that was done individually. So everyone went to a cubicle or an office and filled out the form.” LEVENE Depo. Tr. 42 (docket No. 82-17). After each committee member had assessed the individual applicants independently of each other using the form they had been provided for this purpose, they met to discuss the candidates. “[Everybody stood up and vocalized their thoughts, and we discussed the candidates.” LEVENE Depo. Tr. 44 (docket No. 82-17). Once the scores were added up, the “weaknesses and strengths of each [candidate], aside from the ones that were there as guidelines [were discussed].” NORBERTO SANTIAGO Depo. Tr. 50 (docket No. 100-3). “Later on, we got together in a group, to discuss what each one had ... stated as opinion.” CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 48 (docket No. 82-18). However, according to the decision makers, getting the highest scores in the individual evaluation forms was not conclusive. “[It] does not mean that automatically he is going to be chosen.” NORBERTO SANTIAGO Depo. Tr. 48 (docket No. 100-3). The decision makers considered plaintiff and WILFREDO GUZMAN as the two top candidates for the position. WILFREDO GUZMAN was eventually selected over plaintiff. “Wilfredo Guzman and Maria ... were the top two (2) candidates.” LEVENE Depo. Tr. 45 (docket No. 82-17). The results for Wilfredo Guzman, Maria Velez and Luis Fuentes were “close”. CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 53-54 (docket No. 82-18). “[T]he first candidates were Wilfredo Guzman, Maria Velez and I don’t recall who was third, because it was practically the two of them who had the most points, Wilfredo Guzman and Maria Velez.” CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 54 (docket No. 82-18). WILFREDO and MARIA VELEZ were the final candidates. LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 63 (docket No. 82-19). Because the two finalists were so close the committee went on to discuss the strong points and weaknesses of each one of them. CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 57 (docket No. 100-9). “It was an open discussion, they were verifying who were [sic] going to be rejected ... in accordance to the ones who were closer or had a higher score ... they began to talk about strong points and weaknesses that each one of them had.” CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 54 (docket No. 82-18). After the two final candidates were chosen, “[t]here was discussion as to what is the person they were looking for, what was being looked for ... in a pit boss; and they discussed problems that had ... that had arisen; they discussed ... well, the pros and the cons of each one.” LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 63 (docket No. 82-19). According to LEVENE, “Wilfredo was selected because of the five (5) candidates we thought that he was the most qualified.” LEVENE Depo. Tr. 42 (docket No. 82-17). “[T]here were several considerations ... table games knowledge ... work experience ... attitude, associate relations, customer relations, team work.” LEVENE Depo. Tr. 42 (docket No. 82-17). When inquired regarding the reasons for having selected WILFREDO over plaintiff, LEVENE responded: “I think a lot of positive things were said about both candidates. I think that they were both good ... And I believe that Wilfredo may have inched-out Maria on the basis of team work and team chemistry and customer relations and associate relations.” LE-VENE Depo. Tr. 45 (docket No. 82-17). However, LEVENE could not “recall the specifics” regarding the committee members’ concerns in these areas. LEVENE Depo. Tr. 46 (docket No. 82-17). WILFREDO GUZMAN’s strong points were: “[h]e had knowledge of the game ... he had good rapport with the associates. He had good teamwork, and he treated clients very well.” CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 55 (docket No. 82-18). “[H]e was a person who had very good relations with all the associates, including supervisors, including coworkers, associates and superiors. That he is a person who also gets along excellently with the players, with the clients; that, as far as I am concerned, is an area that was one of the most important ones.” LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 67 (docket No. 82-19). As to his weaknesses, “he worked more in the work shift during the daytime, and maybe did not have the ... in other words, that there as [sic] many games going on at night as such ... In other words, maybe he was not accustomed to so many games.” CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 55 (docket No. 82-18). Additionally, he did not know the roulette game. LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 66 (docket No. 82-19). The issue of a “warning” issued to WILFREDO GUZMAN a year before due to the untimely renewal of his licence also came up but the warning had expired. LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 66 (docket No. 100-7). WILFREDO GUZMAN was given a warning by JULIO VAZQUEZ for having failed to timely renew his “croupier’s” licence because of problems with ASUME. WILFREDO GUZMAN Depo. Tr. 48-51 (docket No. 100-4). As to MARIA, “[h]er strong points [were], knowledge of the games, knowledge of the slot machine area ... and experience, those were her strong points.” CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 55 (docket No. 82-18). “[S]he knew all the games ... had more experience ... than Wilfredo Guzman.” LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 66-67 (docket No. 82-19). “[She] knew the games, she had experience”. JULIO VAZQUEZ Depo. Tr. 42 (docket No. 82-20). Regarding plaintiffs weak points as a candidate, LEVENE indicated that “[he] didn’t have any team work issues with any of [the candidates] but the people who knew them best, obviously, had some concerns”. LEVENE Depo. Tr. 46 (docket No. 82-17). “Her weaknesses turn out to be teamwork, how to deal with the clients ...” CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 55 (docket No. 82-18). “I always remember that there had been two or three clients who had complained about [plaintiff], because [plaintiff] was not ... she was very rough, rough with them, in other words, very explosive.” JULIO VAZQUEZ Depo. Tr. 46 (docket No. 82-20). Q. Okay. Any other negative instance of Maria that was discussed? A. [I]t was basically her attitude, her attitude as a supervisor toward ... towards the associates, which was a bit ... it ... it was an attitude, well ... how could I say it ... rough, or maybe, on occasions it could border on”. LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 65 (docket No. 82-19). The committee members were also allegedly worried about “some incidents with some female employees who had accused [plaintiff] of ... of her having threatened them because of talking to [plaintiff] partner.” JULIO VAZQUEZ Depo. Tr. 42 (docket No. 82-20). Specifically, JULIO VAZQUEZ indicated that a Pit Clerk by the name of JUDITH had complained that plaintiff had threatened her because plaintiff did not like her talking to MARIO CRUZ and that plaintiff had called JUDITH’S husband to tell him that JUDITH was trying to seduce MARIO. JULIO VAZQUEZ Depo. Tr. 43-44 (docket No. 82-20); LUIS GUEVARA Depo. Tr. 64-65 (docket No. 82-19). Supposedly another Pit Clerk named JANESA indicated that plaintiff had also called her husband. JULIO VAZQUEZ Depo. Tr. 47 (docket No. 82-20). Additionally, plaintiff had procured a protective order against MARIO CRUZ, a coworker. JULIO VAZQUEZ Depo. Tr. 44 (docket No. 82-20). “[T]he entire conversation revolved around Mario and Maria’s problem at work.” JULIO VAZQUEZ Depo. Tr. 45 (docket No. 82-20). Another factor discussed was the fact that plaintiff would be supervising her partner if promoted to the pit boss position. Someone present raised the matter during the discussion. LEVENE Depo. Tr. 48 (docket No. 82-17). This factor, although did not “disqualify her, but [] was given weight” in the selection process. LEVENE Depo. Tr. 48 (docket No. 82-17). According to the committee members, this was a matter of concern due to a recent incident involving a theft at the casino by a couple working together. CARLOS OTERO Depo. Tr. 81 (docket No. 82-18). Well, there was a situation that is rather sort of bizarre and unique unto itself that happened Tuesday. That’s for sure, I remember exactly when it happened, and all hell broke loose. There was a little bit of a scam that involved the collusion between two (2) people: one was the Auditor and the other was the slot supervisor. And somehow they absconded with about a hundred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000.00) And the Auditor was really the safety net that was supposed to be double checking the paper work and that was being erroneously processed. And we discovered it, and eventually recovered the funds, but it just scared the ... You know, this was something that was so significant the auditors got involved; the regional team got involved; everybody had an opinion on everything from our procedures, to relationships, to whatever, and that was a difficult time. LEVENE Depo. Tr. 47-48 (docket No. 82-17). However, no measures were taken with regard to the couples who were already working at the Casino. GLADYS RODRIGUEZ Depo. Tr. 49 (docket No. 82-21). 2. Non-discriminatory Reasons Proffered Plaintiffs initial prima facie burden is easily met in this suit and defendants have so conceded. “In this case Marriott is not contesting