Full opinion text
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, District Judge. The instant motions for summary judgment present another chapter in the litigation over Connecticut’s recently-enacted campaign finance reform law. In those motions, the government and intervenor-defendants (collectively “the government” or “the state”) seek summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims that the campaign contribution and solicitation bans for certain lobbyists, state contractors, and their immediate family members violate their First Amendment rights of speech and association. The plaintiffs have filed two cross-motions for summary judgment, arguing that those contribution and solicitation prohibitions depart from clearly established Supreme Court precedent and have no support in fact or law. Although the challenged law imposes an outright prohibition on plaintiffs’ ability to make and solicit campaign contributions for candidates seeking state elected office, because the burden of the statute falls on marginal speech and associational rights lying closer to the edge than the core of First Amendment protections, I conclude that the Act’s contribution and solicitation bans are subject to less exacting “closely drawn” scrutiny. In light of Connecticut’s recent history of corruption scandals involving high-ranking state politicians, I conclude that the legislature had a constitutional, sufficiently important interest in combating actual and perceived corruption by eliminating contributions from individuals with the means and motive to exercise undue influence over elected officials. Because the law does not materially undermine the plaintiffs’ core First Amendment rights to engage in meaningful expressions of political belief and support or to freely associate with candidates and political parties, the bans are narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. Therefore, because the challenged provisions are closely drawn to the state’s sufficiently important state interest of preventing actual and perceived corruption, the government’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the plaintiffs’ cross-motions for summary judgment are denied. 1. Background As noted in previous decisions in this case, several Connecticut politicians have been implicated in major corruption scandals, or pled guilty to criminal charges related to public corruption. It cannot be seriously disputed that the scandals have substantially undermined public confidence in Connecticut state government. Partly in response to those scandals, the Connecticut General Assembly passed the Campaign Finance Reform Act (“CFRA” or the “Act”). A. The Bans To restore the public’s confidence in Connecticut’s elected officials, the General Assembly included two provisions in the CFRA that are the subject of the instant motions. First, the Act principally bans communicator lobbyists (hereinafter, “lobbyists”), and their immediate family members, from contributing to, and soliciting donations on behalf of, candidates for state office. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-610(g)-(h). Second, the Act bans principals of contractors or prospective contractors with state contracts (hereinafter, “state contractors”) from contributing to, or soliciting contributions on behalf of, candidates for state office. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9 — 612(g)(2). The definition of “solicitation” is central to the issues presented here. The Act defines “solicit” as: (A) requesting that a contribution be made, (B) participating in any fund-raising activities for a candidate committee, exploratory committee, political committee or party committee, including, but not limited to, forwarding tickets to potential contributors, receiving contributions for transmission to any such committee or bundling contributions, (C) serving as chairperson, treasurer or deputy treasurer of any such committee, or (D) establishing a political committee for the sole purpose of soliciting or receiving contributions for any committee. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-601(26). Notably, “solicit” does not include: “(i) making a contribution that is otherwise permitted under this chapter, (ii) informing any person of a position taken by a candidate for public office or a public official, (iii) notifying the person of any activities of, or contact information for, any candidate for public office, or (iv) serving as a member in any party committee or as an officer of such committee that is not otherwise prohibited in this subdivision.” Id. On November 15, 2006, the State Elections Enforcement Commission (“SEEC”) — the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the CFRA— issued a declaratory ruling interpreting the scope and terms of the contribution and solicitation bans. SEEC Declaratory Ruling 2006-1, Lobbyist Contribution and Solicitation Ban, Garfield Deck Ex. 1 at 1 (“SEEC Ruling 2006-1”). In that ruling, the SEEC interpreted the phrase “requesting that a contribution be made” require that either: “(1) an express request that a contribution be made; or (2) a request is made such that a reasonably prudent person would not construe it as anything other than a request that a contribution be made, to a covered candidate or committee.... ” Id. at 3. Communicator lobbyists may also not participate in any fundraising activities, which include attending fundraisers, forwarding tickets for fundraisers, receiving contributions, or bundling contributions. Id. at 4. “Bundling” is “the practice of collecting several contributions for forwarding or delivery to a campaign, generally so as to receive credit or good will for their collection.” Id. In addition, communicator lobbyists may not hold certain positions within a campaign, such as chairperson, campaign treasurer, deputy treasurer, or other committee officer. Id. The solicitation ban, however, is as notable for the conduct it does not prohibit as for the conduct it does. SEEC Ruling 2006-1 explains that communicator lobbyists may still “inform their clients (or anyone else, for that matter) that a certain legislator or public official has been helpful, or not, on an issue that they are concerned about.” Id. at 5. Moreover, “[a] lobbyist subject to the ban can provide anyone with a candidate’s website, phone number or other contact information,” and “could even inform someone that the candidate was having a fundraising event, but would have to avoid suggesting that they should attend or contribute.” Id. The ruling provides further that the SEEC “believes it is clearly permissible conduct for a communicator lobbyist to orally inform a person of a fundraising event being held on behalf of a candidate’s campaign. An express request that the person should attend or contribute, or an implicit request capable of no other construction by an ordinarily reasonably prudent person, would constitute a prohibited solicitation under the ban.” Id. SEEC Ruling 2006-1 listed the following examples of activities that are unaffected by the contribution and solicitation bans: 1) Volunteer for a covered candidate’s political campaign (except as chairperson, treasurer, deputy treasurer or other officer, or in any fundraising capacity); 2) Put a sign on his or her lawn; 3) Make get out the vote calls; 4) Express support for a candidate or his or her views; 5) Advise someone whether a candidate is likely to be elected; 6) Communicate his or her evaluations of a legislator or candidate to his or her clients or anyone else; 7) Contribute to a political committee that is not established or controlled by one of the covered candidates (but could not contribute to one committee with the direction to pass through to another, otherwise known as laundering, earmarking or giving in the name of another); 8) Contribute to candidate committees for candidates for Judge of Probate, municipal office and referenda committees; 9) Make independent expenditures on behalf of a covered candidate (no coordination, as defined in Conn. GemStat. § 9-333a(19) [replaced by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-601(19) ]); 10) Provide advice to a candidate for public office; 11) Run for office; 12) Be the spouse or dependent child of someone running for office; 13) Attend campaign events for covered candidates that do not involve fundrais-ing, such as debates or meet and greet events where fundraising is not involved; 14) Host an event for a candidate that was not a fundraising event; 15) Serve as chairperson, treasurer, deputy treasurer or other officer for a candidate committee of a candidate for municipal office. Id. at 5-6. The ruling described, in detail, a multitude of ways in which communicator lobbyists can still participate in the political process short of donating to, or soliciting contributions on behalf of, candidates for state office. SEEC Ruling 2006-1 further explained that the actions of third-parties cannot convert permissible activities into prohibited activities for lobbyists or other affected individuals. Id. at 9. For example, if a lobbyist held a non-fundraiser meet and greet event for a candidate, he or she would not be penalized if an attendee unilaterally asked the candidate how to make a campaign contribution. Id. With regard to enforcement of the CFRA, SEEC Ruling 2006-1 stated that, “[a]ny implicit request that a contribution be made by a lobbyist in violation of [the solicitation ban] would have to be established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 3-4. Moreover, “[a]ny determination of whether a solicitation was made would be based upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged solicitation, and not solely on the subjective belief of the individual” with whom the individual communicates. Id. at 6. The SEEC thus employs “an objective test ... to determine whether a reasonably prudent person would believe that they were being solicited to make a contribution.” Id. The same definition of solicitation, and the same analysis of prohibited and permissible conduct set forth in the Act, and in SEEC Ruling 2006-1, with respect to communicator lobbyists also applies to state contractors. Id. at 8. B. The Pending Motions The parties have filed three summary judgment motions. First, the Association of Connecticut Lobbyists, LLC and Barry Williams (collectively, the “ACL plaintiffs”) have moved for summary judgment on counts one and two of their second amended complaint (doc. # 64), which allege that the solicitation and contribution bans on communicator lobbyists violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (count one) and sections Four and Five of the Connecticut Constitution (count two). Second, the Green Party plaintiffs, including Elizabeth Gallo, Roger Vann, Ann Robinson, and Joanne Phillips have moved for summary judgment on count four of their amended complaint (doc. # 17), which alleges that the contribution and solicitation bans violate the First Amendment. Finally, the government and the intervenor-defendants (collectively, “the government” or “the state”) have moved for summary judgment on the ACL plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety, and on count four of the Green Party plaintiffs’ amended complaint. II. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (court is required to “resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but rather must present significant probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir.1995). “Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992). If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is “merely colorable,” or is not “significantly probative,” summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To present a “genuine” issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In such a situation, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; accord Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (movant’s burden satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of nonmoving party’s claim). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment may enter. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When cross-motions for summary judgment are presented to the court, the standard is the same as that applied to individual motions for summary judgment. Morales v. Quintel Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.2001). “Each party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Id. Summary judgment should not be granted “unless one of the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon facts that are not genuinely in dispute.” Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir.1975). In this ease, the task of deciding cross-motions for summary judgment is easier than in most cases because the record, with rare exceptions, is not in serious dispute. III. First Amendment Claims The plaintiffs argue that the contribution and solicitation bans impermissibly burden them First Amendment rights of free political expression and association. The state defends the CFRA as a constitutional restriction on speech because it burdens only marginal speech and associational rights, while still permitting the affected individuals to participate in the political process and express their political views in myriad and substantive alternative ways. For each contested provision, the parties dispute what level of scrutiny should be applied to determine whether the law runs afoul of the First Amendment. 1. Contribution Bans The plaintiffs argue that strict scrutiny applies because the law imposes an outright ban on contributions by lobbyists, state contractors, and their immediate family members rather than imposing a limit that will permit at least a nominal level of political expression. The state maintains that, although the CFRA bans contributions rather than imposing a contribution limit, it does not change the level of scrutiny typically applied to contribution limits and that the “closely drawn” level of intermediate scrutiny should apply. A. Scrutiny Since its decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court has routinely upheld limits on campaign contributions. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000). In those cases, the Supreme Court drew a clear line between campaign contributions and campaign expenditures, subjecting the latter to more exacting “strict scrutiny,” while subjecting contribution limitations to the “closely drawn” standard primarily because contribution limits, unlike expenditure limits, involve an indirect form of speech. As the Buckley Court explained, “[w]hile contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association ..., the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Nixon Court echoed: A limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for. the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. 528 U.S. at 386-87, 120 S.Ct. 897 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21, 96 S.Ct. 612). The Nixon Court concluded that “in effect, ... limiting contributions [leaves] communication significantly unimpaired.... [Restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending. It has, in any event, been plain ever since Buckley that contribution limits would more readily clear the hurdles before them.” Id. at 387, 120 S.Ct. 897 (internal quotations omitted). Contribution limitations are considered “merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment, because contributions he closer to the edges than the core of political expression.” Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, 123 S.Ct. 2200. As such, even those contribution limits that significantly interfere with First Amendment rights can pass muster under the less exacting, “closely drawn” level of scrutiny. Id. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (citing Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387-88, 120 S.Ct. 897). Although contribution limits do impose restrictions on the free exercise of political expression and association, they also provide value to the electoral process by protecting the integrity of the system, which in turn, encourages greater political participation. As the McConnell Court explained: Because the electoral process is the very “means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action,” contribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For that reason, when reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contribution limits, “there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’” The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits {Buckley’s “closely drawn” scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process. 540 U.S. at 137, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at 400-01, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring)) (internal citations omitted). The state argues that similar deference, in the form of intermediate “closely drawn” scrutiny, must be shown to the General Assembly’s particular expertise in the area of state elections when considering the constitutionality of the contribution bans. The plaintiffs rest their argument that the contribution bans should be subject to strict scrutiny on the fact that they are bans rather than limits. By preventing lobbyists and state contractors from making even a small donation, the plaintiffs argue, the CFRA deprives them of the ability to make even a symbolic expression of support. The Supreme Court in Beaumont, however, considered and squarely rejected that argument. The plaintiffs in that case argued that 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), which banned campaign contributions from nonprofit advocacy corporations, “should be subject to a strict level of scrutiny, on the ground that [it] does not merely limit contributions, but bans them on the basis of their source.” 539 U.S. at 161, 123 S.Ct. 2200. The Beaumont Court rejected that argument, concluding that it ignored the “basic premise” it has followed when “setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial restrictions: the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the political activity at issue to effective speech or political association.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). In concluding that the closely drawn standard would apply to contribution bans, the Court reiterated that, unlike political expenditures, contributions generally “lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression.” Id. Thus, a contribution ban was still a “marginal” speech restriction “subject to relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment.” Id. When considering the statute’s ban on contributions from nonprofit advocacy corporations, the Beaumont Court reaffirmed Buckley’s rationale for differentiating the speech value of expenditures and contributions. Id. at 161-62, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (“While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21, 96 S.Ct. 612). Significantly, however, the Court did not distinguish between a contribution limit and a contribution ban. In holding that the “closely drawn” standard applied, the Beaumont Court noted that “[i]t is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself.” Id. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court concluded that, because the contribution bans were marginal speech restrictions not involving direct political expression, the statute’s contribution bans were still subject to the less exacting “closely drawn” scrutiny. Id. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. Similarly, the closely drawn standard applies here. The solicitation and contribution bans will be upheld provided the state can demonstrate that the CFRA has been “closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). B. Sufficiently Important Interest The legislature enacted the contribution and solicitation bans in the wake of several widely publicized corruption scandals involving high-ranking public officials. The state asserts it did so in order to limit the potential for actual corruption and, even more significantly, to combat the public’s perception that there was widespread corruption among elected state officials. The state argues that a strong response, i.e., an outright ban on contributions from lobbyists, state contractors, and their immediate family members, was necessary to restore the public’s confidence in state government. The plaintiffs primarily contest the state’s assertion that it has successfully demonstrated that the General Assembly had a sufficiently important interest for passing the CFRA. First, as a threshold issue, the plaintiffs contend that Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals, discussed in more detail below, have little temporal or material relation to the contribution and solicitation bans and therefore, do not provide sufficient justification for those measures. Next, the plaintiffs note that lobbyists and state contractors contribute only a small percentage of overall donations to statewide and General Assembly campaigns and that there is not enough evidence in the record demonstrating how those personal contributions or efforts to solicit and bundle contributions lead to undue influence. Third, they dispute that lobbyists make or solicit contributions primarily to further the interests of their clients, arguing that lobbyists have a right to contribute, in their personal capacities, to those candidates that reflect their individual political beliefs. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the competitive bid process for state contracts successfully defeats the state’s argument that contributions from or solicited by state contractors have an undue influence on public officials. The problem with the plaintiffs’ position is that it ignores the Supreme Court’s consistent rulings that preventing the perception of corruption, not just actual corruption, is a sufficiently important state interest to support contribution limits. It is well-established that attempts to prevent both actual and perceived corruption provide a “constitutionally sufficient justification” for contribution limitations. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Buckley Court explained that it not only undermines “the integrity of our system of representative democracy” when large contributions are made to candidates in order to “secure a political quid pro quo,” but “[o]f almost equal concern,” is the “appearance of corruption.” Id. at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). With regard to the contribution limits at issue in Buckley, the Court held that “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical ... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’ ” Id. (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973)). Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has reiterated the sufficiency of that interest, stating that “[o]ur cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143, 124 S.Ct. 619. See also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2672, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (noting that in contribution limit cases, the “Court has long recognized the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in election campaigns”) (internal quotations omitted); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897 (citing cases). The need to address the perception of corruption stems not just from actual and documented corruption, but also arises out of “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897. “Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.” Id. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 897. The Court reasoned further that, “[d]e-mocracy works ‘only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961)). It is within the state’s interest to prevent not just “cash-for-votes corruption,” but also to prevent “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150, 124 S.Ct. 619 (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, where the state can demonstrate that there is a perception of corruption among public officials, particularly when presented in conjunction with highly-publicized episodes of actual corruption, it can successfully meet its burden of proving it had a sufficiently important interest in enacting contribution limits. To meet its burden of demonstrating a sufficiently important interest, the state is not required to prove that many elected officials are on the take or that elected officials uniformly act only in accordance with the interests of their largest contributors. Actual corruption is only one factor the state is permitted to consider; the public’s perception of corruption is another important factor. As discussed below, the undisputed facts in the record demonstrate that there was both actual corruption at the highest levels of state government in Connecticut and a declining level of public trust in elected officials as a result of corruption scandals that gave rise to a sufficiently important interest to support enactment of the CFRA. 1. Recent Corruption Scandals in the State of Connecticut On June 21, 2004, Governor John Rowland announced his resignation after being accused of improperly accepting tens of thousands of dollars in gifts and services from state contractors in return for facilitating the award of several state contracts. Feinberg Decl. Ex. 3. Rowland subsequently pled guilty to federal criminal charges, including conspiracy to defraud the state and its citizens of the honest services of its Governor and federal tax evasion. Feinberg Decl. Exs. 2 & 4. In March 2005, Rowland was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year and a day and ordered to pay $82,000 in fines. Feinberg Decl. Ex. 4. As part of his plea agreement, Rowland acknowledged that he conspired with other public officials and state contractors to award and/or facilitate the award of state contracts in return for free or greatly reduced vacation stays in Florida and Vermont, free construction work on his Connecticut lake cottage, and free private jet flights to Las Vegas and Philadelphia — the value of which totaled in excess of $100,000. Feinberg Decl. Ex. 3. Peter Ellef, Rowland’s chief of staff, Lawrence Alibozek, his deputy chief of staff, and several state contractors, including William Tomasso and the Tunxis Management Company, also pled guilty to federal charges stemming from their roles in that corruption scandal. Feinberg Decl. Exs. 5-10. The Rowland episode was neither the first, nor the last, of Connecticut’s string of corruption scandals involving state officials. In 1999, State Treasurer Paul Sil-vester pled guilty to federal racketeering and money laundering charges stemming from a kick-back scheme involving state pension investments. Feinberg Decl. Ex. 11. In return for investing over $500 million of the state’s pension funds with certain financial institutions, Silvester directed millions of dollars in “finder’s fees” to be paid to various friends and associates, who then funneled part of the money back to his campaign fund. Feinberg Decl. Exs. 11-17. Silvester eventually pled guilty to two counts of racketeering and conspiracy to launder money and was sentenced in federal court to a term of imprisonment of fifty-one months. In addition he paid a forfeiture sum of $230,000. Many of Silvester’s co-conspirators either pled guilty or were convicted on counts arising out of the public official bribery scheme and received terms of imprisonment. One of the financial firms involved in the conspiracy, Triumph Capital, was fined $4,000,000. In an additional episode of public corruption, in September 2005, State Senator Ernest Newton II pled guilty to federal bribery charges in connection with a kickback scheme involving a non-profit organization in Bridgeport. Feinberg Decl. Ex. 19. In return for a $5,000 bribe, Newton agreed to assist the non-profit group, Progressive Training Associates, Inc., in its quest to secure a $100,000 grant from the state. Id. Newton also pled guilty to federal mail fraud and tax evasion charges for diverting $40,000 in campaign contributions to his personal use. Id. Newton was ultimately sentenced to 60 months in federal prison and ordered to pay over $13,000 in restitution. Feinberg Decl. Ex. 21. Although candidates for municipal office are not subject to the CFRA, the corruption scandal involving the mayor of Bridgeport, Joseph Ganim, is also relevant because it contributed to the atmosphere of public distrust and perception of corruption of public officials in Connecticut. In March 2003, a jury convicted Ganim of sixteen counts of federal racketeering, extortion, bribery, mail fraud, and tax evasion arising from a scheme to award city contracts in exchange for illegal kickbacks from contractors. United States v. Ganim, Case No. 3:01cr263 (JBA), 2006 WL 1210984, at *1 (D.Conn.2006). At least three contractors also pled guilty to their role in that scheme. United States v. Lenoci, 377 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that “Lenoci also agreed to raise funds for the mayor’s anticipated campaign for governor, in return for Ganim’s support for the [development project]”); Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 269 F.Supp.2d 6, 7 (D.Conn.2002) (noting that the three contractors “acknowledged that they corruptly provided bribes, kickbacks, and other things of value ... in return for preferential treatment from Mayor Ganim in connection with the awarding of city contracts.”). Ganim’s criminal case continues to make headlines; he recently filed a motion seeking a new trial on the basis of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. See Bill Cummings, Ganim Wants New Trial, Cites Deal, Conn. Post, Nov. 20, 2008. The above scandals have received widespread press coverage, leading some in the media to dub the state “Corruptieut.” See, e.g., Paul von Zielbauer, The Nutmeg State Battles the Stigma of Corruptieut, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2003 (“Nowadays, from Storrs to Stamford, there are jokes about living in Corruptieut, Connection-icut or, the new favorite, Criminalicut”). The plaintiffs do not dispute that, in the past decade, several elected state officials have pled guilty to federal charges arising out of widely publicized corruption scandals. They primarily dispute the state’s characterization of those episodes as demonstrating a “long series” of scandals involving corruption of public officials, arguing that there is not enough evidence of widespread corruption of elected officials to support the contribution and solicitation bans for lobbyists, state contractors, and their immediate family members. First, as a threshold matter, that argument goes more to the issue whether the contribution and solicitation ban is “closely drawn” enough to survive constitutional scrutiny, not whether the state had a sufficiently important interest in enacting the ban in the first place. Second, and more significantly, the plaintiffs’ focus on whether or not the state has presented enough evidence of actual corruption ignores the long line of cases that accept that combating the perception of corruption is also a sufficiently important interest, particularly when it coincides with evidence of actual corruption. It is certainly true that there is no evidence in the record to suggest that a majority, or even more than a handful, of state elected officials engage in quid pro quo arrangements with their top contributors. However, as discussed below, the actual episodes of corruption have contributed to the public’s belief that corruption among state elected officials is commonplace. 2. Public Perception of Elected State Officials in Connecticut A 2004 poll of likely Connecticut voters, the results of which the plaintiffs do not dispute, reveals public perception of Connecticut’s elected officials during the relevant time frame. According that poll, 78% of likely Connecticut voters agreed that the way political campaigns are financed in Connecticut encourages candidates to grant special favors and preferential treatment to their contributors. Meadow Decl. ¶20, Ex. A at 4. Of those polled, 49% strongly agreed that was true. Id. According to that same 2004 poll, 44% of likely Connecticut voters believed that state lawmakers voted the way that campaign contributors wanted them to vote in exchange for contributions “a lot” of the time; another 44% believed that happens “sometimes.” Id. at ¶ 29(second), Ex. A at 9. Only 9% stated they believed that happened “rarely” or “never.” Id. In a 2005 poll of likely Connecticut voters, 62% stated that elected officials in Connecticut are more concerned with the needs of those who pay for their campaigns than the needs of everyone. Id. at ¶ 28, Ex. A at 8. In that same poll, 82% of Connecticut voters agreed that it was necessary to limit the influence of money on politics. Id. The plaintiffs are correct to note that that polling data is not specific to contributions from lobbyists and state contractors, but those results certainly shed light on widespread public sentiment regarding the strong influence that campaign contributions have on candidates for public office, which speaks directly to the issue of perceived corruption. See also Brocchini Decl. Ex. 8, Smith Dep. at 12 (stating his constituents were bothered by special interest money “because they do think that folks get up for sale”). The Nixon plaintiffs sought to “take the State to task ... for failing to justify the invocation of those interests with empirical evidence of actually corrupt practices or of a perception among Missouri voters that unrestricted contributions must have been exerting a covertly corrosive influence.” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 897. The Nixon Court rejected that argument, holding that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up and down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.” Id. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 897. Because “the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible,” the Court concluded that the evidence submitted by the state, which included affidavits of state legislators who believed large contributions had the potential to buy votes and newspaper accounts detailing “large contributions supporting inferences of impropriety,” was sufficient to demonstrate “why voters would tend to identify a big donation with a corrupt purpose.” Id. at 391, 393, 120 S.Ct. 897. Like the plaintiffs in Nixon, the plaintiffs here attempt to undermine the state’s justification for the contribution and solicitation bans on the ground that the state has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence: (1) of “a culture of corruption” in Connecticut, particularly one stemming directly from contributions by lobbyists and state contractors to purchase influence, (2) that lobbyists and state contractors contribute enough to enable them to exercise undue influence over the legislative process, or (3) that the public’s mistrust of their elected officials stems from a perception of corruption specific to the contributions from and solicited by Connecticut lobbyists and state contractors. The idea that lobbyists and state contractors — whose livelihood depends in large part on successfully influencing state legislators and executive officials or from winning state contracts controlled by those officials — might seek to influence elected officials by contributing to and/or soliciting contributions on behalf of candidates for public office, however, is neither novel nor implausible. A lobbyist’s primary job description is to influence policymakers on behalf of the lobbyist’s clients who stand to benefit from the success or failure of a particular piece of legislation. There is no dispute that lobbyists have “constant interaction” with lawmakers when the General Assembly is in session and that lobbyists play an “integral role” in the legislative process and do work at the behest of legislators, such as drafting bills and amendments. PI. L.R. 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶¶ 75-78; Sen. Roraback Aff. ¶ 9. Similarly, a contractor can derive a significant source of income from state contracting jobs. It is not implausible for the public to surmise that candidates might look more favorably upon those lobbyists and state contractors who contribute to their election campaigns, even if that view does not necessarily bear out in practice. When candidates collect significant amounts of money- — or as the state argues in this case, any amount of money — from the very people whose livelihood depends on currying favor with policymakers and elected officials, the public trust in the system begins to erode, as demonstrated by the public opinion polls discussed above. Because this is neither novel nor implausible, the “quantum of empirical evidence” that the state must produce that bears out its justification for the contribution and solicitation bans is not high. The real question presented here is not whether the State of Connecticut lacked a sufficiently important interest when it enacted the contribution and solicitation bans. The undisputed evidence in the record supports the state’s contention that there was not only a history of corruption among public officials in Connecticut, but also that public sentiment towards elected officials had ebbed low enough to justify the legislature’s belief that some measures were necessary to shore up public confidence in state government. The truly contested issue is whether the legislature’s measures are adequately “closely drawn” to that important state interest to pass constitutional muster. C. Closely Drawn There is no question that contribution limits “operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment” rights of political expression and political association. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, the right to associate and the right to participate in political activities are not absolutely protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. “Even a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). A contribution limit meets the closely drawn standard if it “do[es] not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.” Id. at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612. To be sure, contribution limits can go too far by “working] more harm to protected First Amendment interests than their anti-corruption objectives could justify.” Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247-48, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). To violate the First Amendment under the closely drawn standard, however, the contribution limit must effectively “drive the sound of the candidate’s voice below the level of notice.” Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897. It is not simply a quantitative determination. Id. Rather than focusing on the dollar amount at issue, a court must consider whether the contribution limit adversely affects a candidate’s “power to mount a campaign.” Id. The pertinent inquiry for the closely drawn prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard is whether the contribution limit is “so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). See also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 135, 124 S.Ct. 619 (“Contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to prevent candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”) (internal quotation omitted). With regard to the CFRA’s effect on lobbyist and state contractors’ right to “symbolic expression of support,” it is necessary to balance that restriction against the rights not infringed upon, namely, “the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. See also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 135-36, 124 S.Ct. 619; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387-88, 120 S.Ct. 897. As the most recent Supreme Court decision to address the constitutionality of contribution limits, Randall provides a helpful demonstration of the closely drawn standard in practice. In a plurality decision striking down Vermont’s contribution limits as unconstitutional, the Court applied the closely drawn level of scrutiny to the contribution limits at issue in that case. Id. at 247-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Reaffirming Buckley and Nixon’s guidance that a contribution limit may be “too low” to pass constitutional muster if it “prevent[s] candidates from ‘amassing the resources necessary for effective campaign advocacy,’ ” id. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612), the plurality decision also highlighted a second inquiry: “whether [the contribution limits] magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a significant disadvantage.” Id. Acknowledging it had “no scalpel to probe” the varying contribution limits, but that the amount of a contribution limit could “make a difference,” the Court reiterated that “[i]n practice, the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have ‘particular expertise’ in matters related to the costs and nature of running for office.” Id. at 247-48 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137, 124 S.Ct. 619). Defending its decision to strike down the contribution limits as unconstitutional, the Randall plurality stated that “[a]t some point the constitutional risks to the democratic electoral process become too great.” Id. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Recognizing that the integrity of the political process depends on the eradication of actual and perceived corruption, the Court nevertheless expressed concern that a statute designed to enhance those interests could yet “prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to promote.” Id. at 249, 126 S.Ct. 2479. According to the Randall plurality, a key question for a court to probe is whether the contribution limits are so low that they “prevent[ ] challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders.” Id. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479. A reviewing court should “review the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the statute’s ‘tailoring,’ that is, toward assessing the proportionality of the restrictions.” Id. at 249, 126 S.Ct. 2479. 1. Ban v. Limit In support of their motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs first contend that the CFRA is not closely drawn because it is not merely a “limit” on contributions from lobbyists and state contractors, but is rather an outright ban. The plaintiffs argue that, although the legislature is entitled to some deference when it comes to setting the amount of a contribution limit, the legislature is not entitled to the same level of deference when it chooses to enact an outright ban on contributions. Because, as discussed above, contribution bans are subject to the same level of scrutiny as any other form of contribution limit, I will consider plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the CFRA is not closely enough drawn to pass constitutional muster because it suppresses even the symbolic expression of support evidenced by even nominal contributions. Undoubtedly, banning individual contributions is more constitutionally problematic than imposing a nominal contribution limit would be; the latter would at least preserve the value of the symbolic expression of support that political contributions represent. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 246-47, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (noting that, although contribution limits restrict the contributor’s ability to support a preferred candidate, “they nonetheless permit the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution”) (internal quotation omitted). Courts that have had the opportunity to examine bans on contributions from selected groups, including lobbyists, however, have rejected the argument that bans are per se unconstitutional simply because they are “bans” and not merely “limits” on contributions. For instance, in Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 164 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1191 (E.D.Cal.2001), the Court noted that the statute at issue was “not unconstitutional simply because it bans, rather than limits, contributions by certain lobbyists.” Relying on Nixon, the Court held that “the test for determining the validity of the amount of a limitation (here a com-píete ban) is whether the limit is ‘so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’” Id. (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897). Addressing a constitutional challenge to North Carolina’s in-session ban on lobbyist contributions, the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 716 (4th Cir.1999), similarly rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge that the ban was per se unconstitutional, concluding that the appearance of corruption arising from lobbyists’ political contributions was “corrosive” enough to support reasonable measures aimed at preserving “public confidence in the integrity of representative democracy.” Because “lobbyists are paid to effectuate particular political outcomes,” the in-session ban on lobbyist contributions was a constitutional, “narrowly tailored” restriction on lobbyists’ First Amendment rights of speech and association. Id. at 715-16, 718. The Court thus concluded that “North Carolina law does nothing more than recognize that lobbyists are paid to persuade legislators, not to purchase them.” Id. at 718. Similarly, in Casino Ass’n of Louisiana v. Louisiana ex. rel. Foster, 820 So.2d 494 (2002), the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed a ban on political contributions by individuals associated with the casino and gaming industry to candidates seeking elected office in Louisiana. The Court refused to hold that the statute’s contribution ban was per se unconstitutional by virtue of being a ban rather than a limit. Id. at 504. Concluding that “there is no indication in Buckley that a contribution limit of zero, as a opposed to a contribution limit of $1,000.00, would be unconstitutional,” the Court reasoned that even a contribution ban could withstand constitutional scrutiny under the closely drawn standard. Id. at 502, 509 (emphasis added). Of significance to the Court was evidence in the record suggesting that the public believed the gaming industry to be associated with political corruption, which was bolstered by evidence that governmental officials in nine states (including Louisiana) had been prosecuted for corrupt activity involving the gaming industry. Id. at 509. Noting that the ban would have a minimal effect on a candidate’s “ability ‘to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy,’ ” the Court concluded that the contribution bans did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 503, 509 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). In Soto v. New Jersey (In re Soto), 236 N.J.Super. 303, 565 A.2d 1088 (1989), a New Jersey appellate court considered the constitutional implications of a contribution ban versus a contribution limit for casino industry workers. The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a blanket prohibition on contributions was per se unconstitutional, accepting the state’s argument that the legislature had the expertise and discretion to determine that even a low limit on contributions from casino employees would not be sufficient to maintain the public’s trust in state government. Id. at 1098. Adopting the reasoning of an Illinois Supreme Court decision upholding a ban on campaign contributions from liquor licensees, the Soto Court stated that it was reasonable for the state legislature to believe that its efforts to prevent actual and perceived corruption “ ‘would have been much less effective if only contributions above a certain amount were prohibited.’ ” Id. (quoting Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 63 Ill.2d 499, 349 N.E.2d 61, 66 (1976)). Plaintiffs rely heavily on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Fair Political Practices Commission v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 25 Cal.3d 33, 157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46 (1979), to support their argument that comprehensive bans on political contributions by lobbyists are not closely drawn to further the state’s interest in combating actual and perceived corruption. Applying Buckley’s closely drawn standard, the California Supreme Court concluded that, “[w]hile either apparent or actual political corruption might warrant some restriction of lobbyist associational freedom, it does not warrant total prohibition of all contributions by all lobbyists to all candidates.” Id. at 52-53. The court pointed to three aspects of the law that rendered it unconstitutional: the ban applied to contributions to all candidates, not merely ones the lobbyist would necessarily be lobbying; the definition of lobbyist was overbroad and included those persons who appear before administrative agencies seeking to influence administrative determinations in their clients’ favor; and the law prohibited all contributions, not merely large ones. Id. The plaintiffs argue that Connecticut’s ban on contributions by lobbyists is similarly “a total prohibition” and therefore, is not closely drawn to the state’s sufficiently important interest in ridding the system of actual or perceived corruption. Fair Political Practices Commission is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the California Supreme Court decided that case shortly after Buckley and many years before the United States Supreme Court had occasion to consider the appropriate application of the “closely drawn” standard in campaign contribution limit cases. As discussed above, the more recent cases read Buckley as suggesting that an outright ban is not per se unconstitutional. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court did not explain why it believed the ban on lobbyist contributions was not closely drawn, other than identifying that some aspects of the law could have been more narrowly tailored. As more recent cases have discussed, “closely drawn” does not necessarily require the legislature to adopt the least restrictive means for addressing the state’s sufficiently important interest, nor does the legislature have to address all sources of corruption at once. The Court’s decision appears to accept the questionable premise that any ban is not closely drawn, rendering the holding of that case less persuasive. Furthermore, the relevancy of Fair Political Practices Commission has been diminished by a more recent case on California’s political contribution law: Institute of Governmental Advocates, 164 F.Supp.2d at 1194, which upheld a ban on contributions from lobbyists. The Court first distinguished the present version of the law from the previous version struck down in Fair Political Practices Commission, noting that the current law defined “lobbyist” more narrowly and “omit[ted] from its scope certain activities and individuals covered by the previous definition,” including those individuals who offer testimony before an administrative agency or who spend less than one-third of their compensated time in direct communication with qualifying officials. Id. at 1190. Next, the Court rejected the premise that a ban on contributions from lobbyists was per se unconstitutional. Id. at 1191. Using the test set forth in Nixon — that “the test for determining the validity of the amount of a limitation (here a complete ban) is whether the limit is ‘so low as to impede the ability of candidates to amass the resources necessary for effective advocacy’ ” — the Court determined that there was no evidence to suggest that candidates would be unable to seek office without lobbyist contributions. Id. (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897). The Court noted that the appearance of corruption naturally arises when lobbyists make personal contributions to “the very persons whose decisions they hope to influence.” Id. at 1194. The Court thus concluded that, by prohibiting contributions from those individuals “whose continued employment depends on their success in influencing legislative action,” the state had successfully demonstrated that the law was narrowly tailored to achieving the state’s sufficiently important interest of avoiding actual and perceived corruption. Id. at 1193-94. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that Randall, which struck down Vermont’s contribution limits as unconstitutional, demonstrates the Supreme Court’s disavowal of contribution bans. That argument is similarly unavailing. Although the Court rejected the premise that the “lower the limit, the better” was best for combating corruption, it did not eliminate the possibility that banning contributions from specific groups having greater access to lawmakers than the average member of the public and a well-documented history of exercising undue influence over public officials would necessarily be unconstitutionally “too low.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 248-49, 126 S.Ct. 2479. The contribution limits at issue in Randall, and their accompanying constitutional infirmities, are distinguishable on several grounds from the CFRA’s contribution bans for lobbyists, state contractors, and their immediate family members. Most significantly, Vermont’s contribution limits applied across-the-board to all individual contributors, all political committees, and all political parties; the statute even held local, state, and national party committees to a single contribution limit per candidate. Id. at 238, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Those limits were not indexed for inflation and applied to an entire two-year election cycle, which included a candidate’s primary and general election campaigns. Id. The statute also defined “contribution” broadly to mean that any expenditure made on a candidate’s behalf counted against an individual’s contribution limit, so long as it was “intentionally facilitated by, solicited by, or approved by” the candidate. Id. at 239, 126 S.Ct. 2479. In practice, that provision had the effect of counting all