Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge: This action arises out of the expropriation of property from thousands of Jews and other “undesirables” during World War II as they were transported by rail to French holding camps, detained at those facilities, and ultimately deported to Nazi-run concentration camps. Plaintiffs are Holocaust survivors, as well as the heirs and beneficiaries of some Holocaust victims. They allege that, between August 1941 and July 1943, their money and property was confiscated while they were aboard trains operated by Defendant So-ciété Nationale des Chemins de Fer Fran-gais(“SNCF”) and held at camps run by civil servants of the Republic of France (“France”). They further allege that proceeds from those confiscations were deposited at Defendant Caisse des Dépóts et Consignations (“CDC”). Before the Court are Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the bounds of its jurisdiction are not coterminous with the moral force of Plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (the “FSIA” or the “Act”), and that, even if jurisdiction were proper, the case presents serious jus-ticiability issues that make abstention appropriate. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts During World War II, 75,000 Jews and thousands of other “undesirables” were taken captive and detained at holding camps in France. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) SNCF transported the detainees by train between various French holding camps, and to Nazi-run concentration camps. (Id. ¶ 8.) When the detainees boarded the trains, SNCF employees demanded their money, suitcases, and valuables. (Id.) Upon arrival at the French holding camps, the detainees were forced to turn over any remaining money and property. (Id. ¶ 7.) Much of the confiscated property was ultimately deposited at CDC. (Id.) Some of the victims were searched again before the SNCF trains transported them to concentration camps. (Id.) In total, property was confiscated from approximately 56,400 people. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Interest of the United States of America, June 29, 2006 (“Statement of Interest”) at 3; Rakower Decl. Ex. B at 25.) 1. The Parties Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of other Holocaust survivors and victims, their heirs, and beneficiaries. (Compl. ¶ 1.) The putative class includes all individuals detained in French holding camps, as well as those transported by SNCF trains either to those holding camps or to Nazi-run concentration camps. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States, France, and other foreign nations. (See id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Plaintiffs have named the Republic of France as a defendant in this action in its sovereign capacity as a “foreign state” under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). (Id. ¶ 24.) Defendant CDC was created by an 1816 French statute in order to “restore faith in public finances following the Napoleonic Wars.” (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶ 4.) It has been designated the “public depository of France” and is subject to the “oversight and guarantee of the French Legislature.” (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) During World War II, CDC accepted deposits of property taken from the detainees in the holding camps. (See id. ¶ 7 & Ex. D.) Today, the President of France appoints the CDC’s Chairman and Chief Executive. (Id. ¶ 6.) The CDC also has a twelve-member Supervisory Board, including four members from the French Senate and French Chamber of Deputies. (Id.) Defendant SNCF was created in 1938, when the French government consolidated five regional train networks. (Compl. ¶ 25.) It is the national railway of France and is wholly owned by the French government. (Id.) SNCF is also one of the 500 largest companies in the world, and it derives substantial revenue from international business, including business conducted with United States citizens. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 61.) 2. The Drancy Holding Camp Plaintiffs’ claims center on property expropriations at French provincial holding camps such as Pithiviers, Beaune-la-Ro-lande, Compiégne, and Drancy. (See id. ¶ 10.) The Complaint focuses on the events in and around the camp at Drancy as Plaintiffs’ starkest example of the atrocities that serve as the basis for their claims. Over a six-day period starting on August 20, 1941, acting on orders from Nazi authorities, the Paris Police captured approximately four thousand Jews and brought them to a camp outside the city at Drancy. (See Rodd Decl. Ex. 6 at 14.) By March 1942, Drancy was being used as a “transit station” for deportation to Nazi concentration camps, mainly Auschwitz. (Compl. ¶ 10; Rodd Decl. Ex. 6 at 4,14.) Between July and November 1942, approximately 29,000 victims were deported to Auschwitz, and an additional 8,000 people were sent between February 9 and March 25, 1943. (Rodd Decl. Ex. 6 at 4.) The Nazis took control of Drancy in July 1943 and used it as a concentration camp. (Id.) Approximately 80,000 people “passed through” Drancy, including 40,000 Jews from outside of France. (Compl. ¶ 11.) About 67,000 of those victims were deported to Nazi-run concentration camps elsewhere in Europe. (Compl. ¶ 11; Rodd Decl. Ex. 6 at 14.) Less than 3% of these victims survived. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Before the Nazis seized control of Dran-cy, it was run by French civil servants who kept records of the property that was seized from detainees. (Rodd Decl. Ex. 6 at 14.) The records from Drancy reflect that approximately 12,039,892 French francs were seized. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Overall, an estimated 200,000,000 francs were expropriated from detainees at the French provincial camps. (Id. ¶ 14.) The proceeds from the Drancy expropriations were initially deposited with the City of Paris Municipal Savings Bank, but, starting in February 1942, the money was brought directly to CDC. (Rodd Decl. Ex. 6 at 14.) At the end of World War II, 1,081,158.75 expropriated francs from Drancy had been returned. (Id. at 15.) However, as of December 1999, 9,733,308 expropriated francs remained deposited at CDC. (See Compl. ¶ 21.) Limited amounts of the expropriated funds were reimbursed to 138 claimants in 1945 and 1946, but only twenty-five reimbursements were made after October 1947. (Rodd Decl. Ex. 6 at 15.) Physical property that was seized was returned on an even more limited basis. A series of auctions was held in the early 1950s, and the proceeds from the sales were deposited at CDC. (Id.) Although CDC forfeited some of the spoliated funds to the French Treasury between 1978 and 1986, it also retained significant amounts of those funds. (Id.; Statement of Interest Ex. 1, Declaration of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Jan. 19, 2001 (“Eizenstat Decl.”) ¶ 6) 3. The Mattéoli Mission And United States Diplomatic Efforts In 1995, French President Jacques Chi-rac publicly declared that France would seek to remedy the harms done by the Vichy Regime and Nazi occupation. (Eiz-enstat Decl. ¶ 6.) Two years later, the French government initiated the Study Mission on the Spoliation of Jews in France (the “Mattéoli Mission”). (Statement of Interest at 3.) The Mattéoli Mission issued a 3,000 page report in April 2000, which described various types of spo-liations suffered by Jews in France between 1940 and 1944 (the “Mattéoli Report”). (Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 6.) The Mattéoli Report quantified, to some extent, past restitution for the French expropriations, but found that “significant portions of the spoliated bank assets remain[ ] unknown.” (Id.) It recommended, inter alia, creating a commission to hear claims relating to lost property, and establishing a foundation that would provide support to Holocaust victims and their families, as well as education regarding the Holocaust. (Id. ¶ 7.) While the Mattéoli Mission was conducting its inquiry, individual Holocaust victims began filing claims in United States courts relating to the expropriations in France. (Id. ¶ 8.) In August 2000, just months after the Mattéoli Report had been released, “a United States District Court denied a motion to dismiss two of the cases, indicating that they would be allowed to proceed.” (Id.) As the Mattéoli Mission was working in France and the American lawsuits against French banks proceeded, the United States government sought to facilitate an alternative resolution of the Holocaust survivors’ claims. Between the fall of 1998 and the summer of 2000, Stuart E. Eizens-tat, serving as the Secretary of State’s Special Envoy on Property Restitution in Central and Eastern Europe, led a team of United States officials seeking to “facilitate! ] negotiations leading to a resolution of class action lawsuits filed in [United States] courts against German companies arising from slave and forced labor and other wrongs by those companies during the Nazi era.” (Statement of Interest at 4; see also Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 1.) Eizenstat was experienced with the task at hand. He had led a team with a similar mission in Austria, which resulted in the October 2000 creation of an Austrian foundation and a general settlement fund to compensate those who were victimized within the Austrian territory during World War It. (Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 10.) Eizenstat was also involved in the creation of a German Foundation known as “Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future,” which makes payments to victims who were forced to work for German companies during the Nazi era. (See Statement of Interest at 4-5; Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 10.) Meanwhile, as a result of the Mattéoli Report, France established the Commission for the Compensation of the Victims of Acts of Despoilment Committed Pursuant to Anti-Semitic Laws in Force During the Occupation (the “CIVS” or the “Commission”) in September 1999. (Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 7.) In December 2000, the Foundation for Memory of the Shoah (“Foundation” or the “Shoah Foundation”) was established. (Id.) In light of Eizenstat’s progress with the Austrian and German settlements, parties to similar discussions in France requested his assistance in resolving litigation against French banks. (Id. ¶ 11.) 4. The Joint Statement And The Executive Agreement Beginning in November 2000, Eizenstat represented the United States at negotiations between the French government, French banks, and attorneys representing Holocaust victims with claims against the banks. (Id. ¶ 12.) The claimants’ representatives were concerned that the CIVS and the Shoah Foundation would not provide enough compensation to the victims. (Id. ¶ 14.) They were also concerned that some victims would not be compensated because they could not substantiate their losses. (Id.) A major breakthrough in the negotiations occurred in January 2001, when the participating banks agreed to establish a fund that would make payments to victims who lacked documentation for their claims before the CIVS (the “Fund”). (Id. ¶ 15.) The participating banks agreed to contribute $22.5 million to the Fund in exchange for the dismissal with prejudice of all cases pending against the banks as of January 18, 2001. (Statement of Interest Ex. 1A at 1-2; see also Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 15.) The banks’ contributions to the Fund were deposited at CDC. (See Statement of Interest Ex. 1A Annex A at 2.) The parties agreed that the CIVS would refer cases to the Fund for compensation when the CIVS process was unable to verify the victims’ losses through its own procedures. (Id. Annex A at 2-3.) The parties to the negotiations memorialized this agreement in a January 18, 2001 Joint Statement, which was signed in Washington, D.C. (See Statement of Interest Ex. 1A (“Joint Statement”).) The signatories included representatives of France and the United States, a French banking association known as Association Francaise des Éstablissements de Crédit et des Entreprises d’Investissement (“AFECEI”), and several attorneys representing victims’ interests, including Plaintiffs’ counsel, Harriet Tamen. (See id. at 3-4.) Because the parties to the Joint Statement agreed to dismiss pending expropriation claims against French “banks,” the term “bank” took on central significance during the negotiations. The Joint Statement defined the term to include (1) “[t]he defendants in the actions Benisti, et al. v. Banque Paribas, et al., No. 98 Civ. 7851 (E.D.N.Y.); Bodner, et al. v. Banque Paribas, et al., No. 97 Civ. 7433 (E.D.N.Y.); and Mayer v. Banque Paribas, et al., Civ. Action No. 302226 (Cal. Superior Court)”; (2) members of the AFECEI; and (3) “other financial institutions that receive deposits.” (Id. Annex B.) The definition excluded insurance companies, and it prohibited challenges to settlements regarding these claims with Barclays Bank and JP Morgan that predated the agreement between the parties to the Joint Statement. (Id.) Finally, the Joint Statement noted, “[wjith respect to banks of French nationality, this definition applies to all World War II activities of such banks.” (Id.) The Joint Statement referenced an Executive Agreement between the United States and France, which was executed on the same day as the Joint Statement. (See Statement of Interest Ex. IB (“Executive Agreement”).) Through the Agreement, the two nations stated that “it is in the interests of both the [United States and France] to have a resolution of these issues that is non-adversarial and non-confrontational, and outside of litigation,” and that “both parties desire all-embracing and enduring legal peace with respect to all claims asserted against the Banks arising out of World War II .... ” (Id. at 3.) To further those goals, France undertook to enforce the banks’ promised contributions to the Fund, and to provide legal oversight of the CIVS and the Foundation in connection with the parties’ agreement. (Id. at 4.) The United States promised: in all pending and future cases [to] ... inform its courts through a Statement of Interest ... that it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the Commission, the Foundation, and the Fund to be the exclusive remedies and fora for resolving ... claims asserted against the Banks and that dismissal of such cases would be in its foreign policy interest. (Id. at 5.) As characterized by Eizenstat, [t]he Executive Agreement negotiated is not a government-to-government claims settlement agreement, and the United States has not extinguished the claims of its nationals or anyone else. Instead, the intent of our participation was ... to bring expeditious justice to the widest possible population of survivors, and to help facilitate legal peace. Among these parties, the United States facilitated the essential arrangement by which the French side would establish the Fund, and make certain enhancements to the [CIVS] and [Shoah] Foundation ..., and the class action representatives in pending United States litigation agreed to give up their claims. The [United States] further contributed its own commitment to advise United States courts of its foreign policy interests ... in current and future litigation being dismissed. (Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 17.) 5. The French Alternative Fora: The CIVS, The Fund, And The Shoah Foundation The CIVS initially focused on publicizing the availability of its compensation mechanism. (See id. ¶ 19.) It did so by contacting Holocaust victims organizations, as well as by establishing outreach offices in the United States and other countries to obviate the need for victims and their heirs to travel to France to file claims. (Statement of Interest at 8; Eizenstat Decl. ¶¶ 18-24.) Claimants may appear in the CIVS through representatives and do not have to attend the proceedings. (Eizens-tat Decl. ¶ 20.) CIVS also employs a “relaxed standard of proof’ relative to United States courts. (Id.) As part of its process, individual CIVS panels aim to award an “amount designed to compensate fully the claimants for any material damages” suffered from their assets being expropriated. (Id.) There is no cap on compensation awards, and the participating banks committed to paying the full amount recommended by the Commission to each successful claimant. (Id. ¶ 21.) The CIVS issues periodic reports of its activity as well as the criteria on which its decisions are based. (Id. ¶ 23; Rakower Decl. ¶ 5.) There is also an appeals process through which claimants may appeal panel decisions to the full Commission. Decisions of the full Commission are also subject to reconsideration based on new facts or previous errors. (Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 22.) Individuals “whose claims cannot be substantiated by the” CIVS are referred to the Fund. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Fund is administered by a five-person board comprised of two members appointed by France, two members appointed by the United States, and one member appointed by the attorneys who represented the victims in the negotiation of the Joint Statement. (See Joint Statement Annex B at 3.) Each referred claimant receives a $1,500 lump sum payment from the Fund, and, in February 2005, the Fund agreed to make a second round of supplemental payments to some of those who had already received compensation from it. (See Larrivet Decl. ¶ 34.) The third component of the French efforts to redress these expropriations is the Shoah Foundation, which was established by decree of the French Government in December 2000. (Eizenstat Decl. ¶ 7.) It was designed “as the primary mechanism to achieve full disgorgement by French banks and other French institutions of any remaining assets that were not subject to restitution.” (Id. ¶ 25.) The Foundation’s objectives include research and education regarding the Holocaust and Holocaust victims, as well as studying other acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. (Id. ¶ 26.) It also provides funding for “moral, technical, and financial support” to victims and their families. (Id. ¶ 26.) The Foundation was initially endowed with approximately $375 million, approximately $100 million of which was contributed by French banks. (Id. ¶ 25.) B. Procedural History 1. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit Plaintiffs commenced this action on March 2, 2006 by filing a complaint on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against France, SNCF, and CDC. They bring claims for conversion and unjust enrichment, they seek an accounting of the allegedly expropriated property, and they also contend that they are entitled to compensatory and punitive damages based on Defendants’ alleged violations of international law. Defendants have not answered, and instead filed the instant motions to dismiss on December 1, 2006. The case was reassigned to the undersigned on October 14, 2007. The Court held oral argument on June 3, 2008. 2. The United States Statement of Interest On July 12, 2006, the Department of Justice submitted to the Court a document titled “Statement Of Interest Of The United States Of America” (the “Statement of Interest”). The background information contained in the Statement of Interest is drawn from the Eizenstat Declaration, the Joint Statement, and the related Executive Agreement, all of which are attached to the Statement of Interest as exhibits. (See Statement of Interest Exs. 1, 1A, IB.) The Statement of Interest is expressly limited to Plaintiffs’ claims against CDC. (See Statement of Interest at 2 n.2.) It states that “[t]he United States has determined that the CDC is a ‘bank’ as that term is used in the Executive Agreement, and that plaintiffs’ claims against the CDC are thus covered by the Agreement.” (Id. at 11.) After outlining the interests of the United States in providing compensation to Holocaust survivors, furthering close diplomatic cooperation with France, and avoiding conflicts between Holocaust victims organizations and banks, the Statement of Interest asserts that: The United States does not suggest that these policy interests described above in themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismissal.... Because of the United States’ strong interests in the success of the CIVS, the Foundation, and the Fund, however, the United States recommends dismissal on any valid legal ground. (Id. at 14.) II. The Sequenoe of the Court’s ANalysis Although Defendants filed separate motions, their principal arguments are similar. Each Defendant argues, albeit for different reasons, that: (1) it is immune from Plaintiffs’ claims under the FSIA; (2) the act of state doctrine and forum non conveniens require dismissal; (3) the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ claims; (4) abstention is appropriate based on the political question doctrine and principles of international comity; and (5) Plaintiffs did not effectuate valid service of process. In considering Defendants’ motions, the Court is mindful that it must “address questions pertaining to its ... jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”); Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85-88 (2d Cir.2006). Thus, because the act of state doctrine is substantive rather than jurisdictional, see W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 408-10, 110 S.Ct. 701, 107 L.Ed.2d 816 (1990), courts may not consider its application prior to establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists, see In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 256 (D.C.Cir.1998). Similarly, the Court may not — and in light of its holding, does not — reach Defendants’ statute of limitations arguments before resolving the questions regarding jurisdiction and justiciability. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2369, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (“[A] statute of limitations ... provides an affirmative defense ... and is not jurisdictional ....”) (internal citations omitted). These principles, however, do not prescribe a “sequencing” for Defendants’ remaining arguments. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). Courts have discretion to decide motions on forum non conveniens grounds before deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 1192, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007). Courts may also, under some circumstances, resolve justiciability issues before deciding whether jurisdiction is proper. See Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57, 73 n. 18 (2d Cir.2005); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 n. 1 (2d Cir.1994) (“[JJusticiability is also a ‘threshold’ question.”). Based on these principles, the Court first addresses whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to decide Plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons set forth in Part III of this Opinion and Order, the Complaint is dismissed because Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Additionally, for the reasons stated in Part IV, even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, the Court would abstain, based on the political question doctrine and principles of international comity, from deciding the claims of those Plaintiffs who are eligible to seek compensation from the CIVS and the Fund. Finally, in light of these holdings, the Court does not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments based on forum, non coveniens, the act of state doctrine, and the statute of limitations. III. The foreign Sovereign immunities Act France, CDC, and SNCF argue that the FSIA grants them sovereign immunity and that, therefore, they are not subject to liability for Plaintiffs’ claims in United States courts. Plaintiffs argue that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because each Defendant fits within the “takings exception” to the FSIA based on the alleged property expropriations in violation of international law. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ claims against each Defendant are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A. Law “[T]he FSIA was enacted to address ‘the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states.’ ... [I]t aimed ‘to facilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states and to minimize irritations in foreign relations arising out of such litigation.’ ” Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1016 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1487, at 45 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6631, 6634). The FSIA, therefore, “provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court,” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989), and it applies to the instant case despite the fact that the alleged conduct occurred prior to its enactment, see Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004). Under the Act, “foreign state[s]” are presumptively immune from suit in United States courts unless one of the statute’s exceptions apply. See Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 582 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993)). The only exception at issue here is the FSIA’s “takings” exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), which denies “foreign states” sovereign immunity for certain types of claims relating to expropriations of property in violation of international law. 1. Motion to Dismiss Standard In a motion to dismiss on FSIA grounds, the movant must first make a prima facie showing that it is a “foreign state” under the Act. See Cabiri v. Republic of Ghana, 165 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir.1999). “This proof establishes a presumption that immunity applies.” Baglab Ltd. v. Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd., 665 F.Supp. 289, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Once the movant makes that showing, the opposing party “has the burden of going forward with evidence showing that, under exceptions to the FSIA, immunity should not be granted.” Cabiri, 165 F.3d at 196 (quoting Cargill, 991 F.2d at 1016). However, “the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the alleged foreign sovereign.” Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Fed’n, 528 F.3d 934, 940 (D.C.Cir.2008) (internal citation omitted). In considering such a motion, the “district court ‘retains considerable latitude in devising the procedures it will follow to ferret out the facts pertinent to jurisdiction.’ ” APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C.Cir.2000)). This discretion includes the ability to “ ‘resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits.’ ” Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom, S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 948 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir.1991)); see also Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir.2000) (“On a ... motion challenging the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the court may resolve the disputed jurisdictional fact issues by referring to evidence outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits ....”). 2. The FSIA’s “Takings” Exception For the purposes of the FSIA, a “foreign state” includes a foreign state’s political subdivisions, agencies, and instru-mentalities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). The statute further defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” to include entities that are (1) “separate legal person[s],” (2) “organ[s] of a foreign state or political subdivision[s] thereof,” and (3) neither United States citizens nor organized under the laws of a third country. Id. § 1603(b). When determining immunity under the FSIA, the court looks to the entity’s form at the time the complaint was filed, not the time of the alleged wrongdoing. See Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français, 389 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Altmann, 541 U.S. at 696, 124 S.Ct. 2240). The “takings” exception to the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), was interpreted by the Second Circuit in Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d at 588. It held that: To establish subject matter jurisdiction [over a “foreign state”] pursuant to the “takings” exception of the FSIA, a plaintiff must demonstrate each of four elements: (1) that rights in property are at issue; (2) that the property was “taken”; (3) that the taking was in violation of international law; and either (4) (a) “that property ... is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state,” or (4) (b) “that property ... is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States[.]” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) and Zappia, 215 F.3d at 251) (emphasis in original). As the Garb court’s emphasis makes clear, there are four elements to the “takings” exception and the fourth element has two disjunctive prongs, which the Court refers to below as “4(a)” and “4(b).” Id. The term “taken” is not defined in the FSIA, but “the legislative history makes clear that the phrase ‘taken in violation of international law’ refers to ‘the nationalization or expropriation of property without payment of the prompt adequate and effective compensation required by international law,’ including ‘takings which are arbitrary or discriminatory in nature.’ ” Zappia, 215 F.3d at 251 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 19). Thus, the “taking” must be done by a sovereign — not a private entity — in a manner that “deprive[s] a plaintiff of property without adequate compensation.” Id. (citing Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 685, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976)). To prove that the applicability of the “takings” exception precludes immunity for a “foreign state,” Plaintiffs may show that either one of the disjunctive prongs of the fourth element is satisfied. The first prong, 4(a), “sets a higher threshold of proof for suing sovereign states in connection with alleged takings by requiring that the property at issue be ‘present in the United States.’ ” Garb, 440 F.3d at 589 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3)). In order to establish that the requirements of the second prong, 4(b), are met, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the expropriated property, or funds derived therefrom, is currently owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state; and (2) the agency or instrumentality in question is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). The FSIA defines “commercial activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.” Id. § 1603(d). “The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.” Id. The Act’s legislative history suggests that the commercial activity need not take place entirely in the United States. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1498, at 17. Moreover, the text of the second prong of the fourth element does not require that the commercial activity be connected to the actions resulting in the expropriation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Finally, “agencies and instrumen-talities of foreign governments are entitled to a presumption of independent status that can be overcome only where ‘internationally recognized equitable principles’ require disregarding the corporate form in order to avoid injustice.” Gabay v. Mostazafan Found. of Iran, 151 F.R.D. 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (“Bancec”), 462 U.S. 611, 626, 633, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983)). This “presumption of separateness” prevents the “takings” exception from being used to exert jurisdiction over “foreign states” on the basis of conduct by entities with separate juridical status: Freely ignoring the separate status of government instrumentalities would result in substantial uncertainty over whether an instrumentality’s assets would be diverted to satisfy a claim against the sovereign, and might thereby cause third parties to hesitate before extending credit to a government instrumentality without the government’s guarantee. As a result, the efforts of sovereign nations to structure their governmental activities in a manner deemed necessary to promote economic development and efficient administration would surely be frustrated. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626, 103 S.Ct. 2591. “While the presumption of separateness is a strong one, it may be overcome if a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by the sovereign that the latter is effectively the agent of the former, or if recognizing the corporate entity as independent would work a fraud or injustice.” Zappia, 215 F.3d at 252. B. Analysis The Court concludes at the outset that France is a “foreign state” under the FSIA (Compl. ¶ 24), and that both CDC and SNCF are “agencies or instrumentalities” of France under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). (See Compl. ¶ 25 (“SNCF is the national railway of France and .... wholly owned by the French government.”); id. ¶ 9 (“CDC [is] the national public depository of France .... ”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument on June 3, 2008 (“Tr”) at 70 (“[Plaintiffs] agree that the CDC and the SNCF are agencies or instrumentalities .... ”).) Defendants have therefore made the required prima facie showing that the FSIA applies and that they are presumptively immune from suit. In order to show that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claims, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that one of the exceptions to immunity under the Act applies to each Defendant. Plaintiffs’ arguments focus exclusively on the “takings” exception to the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). In order to focus the analysis, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiffs have satisfied the first, second, and third elements of this exception. See Garb, 440 F.3d at 588-89 (making similar assumptions); see also Russian Federation, 528 F.3d at 940 (characterizing the first three elements as jurisdictional and suggesting that they may be satisfied by the plaintiffs allegations so long as not “wholly insubstantial and frivolous”) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). Specifically, the Court assumes that: Plaintiffs’ claims involve rights in tangible property (see Compl. ¶ 2); that expropriations occurred (see id. ¶¶ 12-13,18); and that at least some of the alleged expropriations violated international law (see id. ¶¶ 10-11, 67-71). Consequently, the Court focuses its analysis on prongs 4(a) and 4(b) of the fourth element of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). See Russian Federation, 528 F.3d at 941 (holding that the fourth element “must ... be resolved in the plaintiffs favor before the suit can proceed”). For the reasons stated below with respect to each Defendant, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the “takings” exception applies. The Court finds the present record sufficient to apply the FSIA, and Plaintiffs have not shown that jurisdictional discovery would aid the Court’s determination. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for discovery is denied and Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 1. CDC Plaintiffs do not allege that, under prong 4(a), the allegedly expropriated property is “present in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Thus, in order to establish that CDC is within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the “takings” exception, Plaintiffs must show, under prong 4(b), that: (1) expropriated “property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated” by CDC, and (2) that CDC “is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.” Id. Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that CDC is “engaged in a commercial activity in the United States” due to the conduct of its subsidiaries. (See Pis.’ Opp’n at 19-21.) CDC responds that “an indirect ownership interest cannot be used to confer jurisdiction .... ” (CDC Mem. at 16.) The Court finds that CDC is entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA because it is not “engaged in a commercial activity” based on the actions of the distant subsidiaries Plaintiffs describe. The FSIA defines “commercial activity” to include either “a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). The verb “engaged,” which precedes this phrase in the statute, id. § 1605(a)(3), suggests a requirement of an affirmative decision by the entity in question — CDC'—to conduct such activity. See Webster’s Third New Int'l Dictionary 751 (2002) (defining “engage” as “to begin and carry on an enterprise, especially] a business or profession”). Even if, as Plaintiffs argue, the threshold of commercial activity required to satisfy the “engaged in” requirement is low (see Pls.’ Opp’n at 19-21), the language of the statute necessitates, at least, an affirmative decision by the “agency or instrumentality” to perform a commercial transaction or act. Plaintiffs point to no such direct acts or decisions by CDC. Instead, Plaintiffs’ allegations focus on the acts of CDC’s subsidiaries. (See Pis.’ Opp’n at 20.) Plaintiffs argue that the website of a CDC subsidiary, Egis Groupe, “describes work done by its Egis Semaly division on the New York City subway system and lists a New York business office address for that division.” (Id.) The screenshots of the website provided by Plaintiffs, however, reference CDC only once, simply noting that Egis Groupe is a subsidiary. (See Rodd Decl. Ex. 7B at 4.) Similarly, Plaintiffs note that CDC subsidiary WF Vacances “lists vacation properties ... on U.S. based websites and offers to mail its brochures to interested potential customers in the U.S.” (See Pis.’ Opp’n at 20.) Again, however, the website cited by Plaintiffs does not mention CDC. The Court cannot simply disregard the corporate form of these entities and impute their actions to CDC. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003). To support its position, CDC has proffered evidence that it does not have direct relationships with these subsidiaries and that they are removed by multiple intermediaries. (See Ritz Decl. ¶¶ 13-15; Ritz Reply Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.) For example, Plaintiffs allege that CDC is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States on the basis of the activities of “CDC Capital, Inc.” (Pis.’ Opp’n at 19-20.) According to the declaration of Olivier Ritz, CDC owns a minority stake in Caisse Nationale des Caisses d’Epargne (“CNCE”), which is controlled by a different entity known as Caisses d’Epargne. Caisses d’Epargne is unaffiliated with CDC. CNCE controls IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank, which controls IXIS North America Inc., which, in turn, controls IXIS Capital Markets North America Inc., formerly “CDC Capital, Inc.” (See Ritz Decl. Ex. A.) Thus, CDC is removed from the entity to which Plaintiffs point — the former CDC Capital, Inc. — by three organizational layers. (Id.) It cannot control the business decisions through its 35% ownership interest in CNCE. On the basis of these facts, CDC cannot be said to be “engaged” in commercial activity based on the conduct of that subsidiary. Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Egis Se-maly, Inc. is subject to similar deficiencies. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 20.) Egis Semaly, Inc. is a fully owned subsidiary of a French company known as Semaly. (Ritz Reply Decl. ¶ 5.) Another French company, Egis Ingé-nierie, owns 82.55% of Semaly. (Id.) Egis Ingénierie is fully owned by Egis SA, and, finally, CDC owns Egis SA. (Id.) Thus, CDC is removed from Egis Semaly by four levels of subsidiaries. Plaintiffs have not alleged that CDC has abused the corporate form through the structuring of these entities. See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 477 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Bancec, 462 U.S. at 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591). Accordingly, for reasons discussed in more detail below, the Court declines to equate the conduct of Egis Semaly with the actions of CDC, a separate entity. Plaintiffs’ last contention is that a CDC subsidiary known as WF Vaeances solicits business from United States citizens. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 20.) CDC possesses only a 40% interest in WF Vaeances, however, and the relationship is maintained through an intermediate subsidiary. (See Ritz Reply Decl. ¶ 6.) Thus, based on the record before the Court, CDC could neither direct WF Vaeances to “engage in commercial activity” on its behalf nor order it to refrain from doing so. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege that the proceeds from WF Vaeances’ solicitations or transactions inure in any way to CDC. As such, CDC is not “engaged in a commercial activity in the United States” on the basis of this relationship. In addition to failing to satisfy the plain meaning of the statutory definition, Plaintiffs’ arguments based on these subsidiaries’ conduct are also contrary to the case law interpreting the statute. The principles arising out of Bancec and Patrickson demonstrate that “[corporate] structure often matters” when assessing jurisdiction over entities under the FSIA. Patrickson, 538 U.S. at 473, 123 S.Ct. 1655. The Ban-cec Court established a presumption that a government’s instrumentalities are separate from the sovereign. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626, 103 S.Ct. 2591. Applying the law of private corporations, the Supreme Court noted that recognizing juridical independence was less appropriate where one corporate entity “extensively controlled” its agent. Id. at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591. In support of its reasoning, the Supreme Court quoted the House Committee Report accompanying the FSIA: “If U.S. law did not respect the separate juridical identities of different agencies or instrumentalities, it might encourage foreign jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions between ... a U.S. corporation and its independent subsidiary.” Id. at 628, 103 S.Ct. 2591 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 29-30). Just so here. Declining to recognize CDC’s sovereign immunity based on its limited and largely indirect holdings in other entities would disregard the distinction between CDC and its independent subsidiaries. Doing so would encourage foreign courts to do the same when assessing the conduct of United States corporations. Patrickson provides additional support for the Court’s conclusion. There, the Supreme Court affirmed a court of appeal’s holding that “a subsidiary of an instrumentality is not itself entitled to instrumentality status.” Patrickson, 538 U.S. at 473, 123 S.Ct. 1655. The Court noted that the foreign sovereign “did not have direct ownership of shares in either of the [defendant] Companies at any time pertinent to [the] suit. Rather, these companies were, at various times, separated from the State of Israel by one or more intermediate corporate tiers.” Id. The Court found no authority for extending the doctrine [of piercing the corporate veil] so far that, as a categorical matter, all subsidiaries are deemed to be the same as the parent corporation. The text of the FSIA gives no indication that Congress intended us to depart from the general rules regarding corporate formalities. Id. at 475-76, 123 S.Ct. 1655. Based on Patrickson and the ownership structure of these organizations, this Court cannot conclude that CDC’s ownership in the subsidiaries to which Plaintiffs point is sufficient to deem CDC accountable for those subsidiaries’ activities and therefore subject to suit in the United States. Finally, courts in this District have applied the presumption of separateness established in Bancec when making jurisdictional determinations under the FSIA. See U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., No. 97 Civ. 6124(JGK), 1999 WL 307666, at *7 n. 15 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1999); Gabay v. Mostazafan Found. of Iran (“Gabay II”), 968 F.Supp. 895, 898 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Gabay v. Mostazafan Found. of Iran (“Gabay I”), 151 F.R.D. 250, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y.1993); Baglab Ltd. v. Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd., 665 F.Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y.1987). In Gabay I, a United States citizen brought an expropriation claim against two defendants, an Iranian Foundation acting as an instrumentality of Iran (the “Iranian Foundation”) and a foundation organized under New York law (the “New York Foundation”). Gabay I, 151 F.R.D. at 251-52. The plaintiff alleged that the FSIA’s “takings” exception applied to the Iranian Foundation, and the primary issue before the court was whether “the Iranian foundation is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States through the New York Foundation, its alleged ‘alter ego’ ” Id. at 253 (emphasis in original). The Gabay I court found that the presumption of separateness was applicable to the jurisdictional issue, holding that “[u]n-der Bancec and its progeny ... plaintiff has the burden of overcoming the presumption of independence on the part of defendant foundations.” Id. at 253 (citations omitted). The court also noted that the Iranian Foundation’s entitlement to the presumption of separateness hinged on the applicability of two exceptions articulated by the Bancec Court: (1) extensive control resulting in an alter-ego relationship, and (2) potential “ ‘fraud or injustice’ ” arising from recognizing the entities as separate. Id. (quoting Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629, 103 S.Ct. 2591). Because the plaintiff had presented evidence that the Iranian Foundation had “taken over” the New York Foundation and “closely controlled” it, as well as that the Foundations had commingled funds, the court granted limited jurisdictional discovery into the relationship between the two foundations. Id. at 257-58. After the discovery was completed, the plaintiffs action was dismissed. See Gabay II, 968 F.Supp. at 900. With respect to the applicability of Bancec, the court noted that “[e]ven if Judge Wood’s analysis were not the law of the case ..., this Court would adhere to it.” Id. at 899. Applying the presumption of separateness, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs claims because “the Iran Foundation did not exercise day-to-day control over the New York Foundation .Id. at 899. The Gabay cases suggests that CDC should be presumed to be separate from the subsidiaries at issue. Unlike in Gabay I, where the court found that discovery was appropriate, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that CDC controlled any of these entities in a manner that would give rise to an agency relationship under the FSIA. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 448 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“Majority shareholding and majority control of a board of directors, without more, are not sufficient to establish a relationship of principal to agent under FSIA.”). Indeed, Plaintiffs have not argued that the subsidiaries are alter-egos of CDC, or that recognizing CDC’s separateness from these subsidiaries would result in a “fraud or injustice.” In the absence of arguments to the contrary, the Court finds the reasoning of Gabay I and Gabay II persuasive. CDC is entitled to a presumption that it is separate from its far-removed subsidiaries for the purposes of this jurisdictional analysis. Rather than addressing CDC’s presumption argument, Plaintiffs contend, in their Sur-Reply, that “[t]he subsidiaries’ activities, which the CDC touts in its public reports but seeks to disavow in this proceeding, demonstrate that CDC engages in commercial activity in the United States sufficient to satisfy the FSIA taking[s] exception.” (Pis.’ Sur-Reply at 7.) This contention is unsupported by the record — the “public report” cited by Plaintiffs is that of Egis Groupe, not CDC. (Rodd Decl. Ex. 7B.) Plaintiffs’ citation to CDC’s website simply lists CDC’s subsidiaries without elaboration. (Id. Ex. 7A.) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ argument is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory definition of “commercial activity,” as well as the case law interpreting the “takings” exception. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that CDC is “engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.” As such, CDC is entitled to sovereign immunity. 2. SNCF Although Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that SNCF is engaged in commercial activity in the United States (see Compl. ¶ 61), they have failed to allege that either the expropriated property, or “property exchanged for such property,” “is owned or operated” by SNCF. Rather, the Complaint simply alleges that SNCF “took” the property. (Compl. ¶ 18; see also id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 54.) In their Memorandum of Law, Plaintiffs argue that “SNCF took property from them and the property was not returned.” (Pis.’ Opp’n at 21-22.) The Court has assumed that these allegations satisfy the second element of the “takings” exception, “that property was ‘taken.’” Garb, 440 F.3d at 588 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)). However, based on these assertions, and without a proffer of extrinsic evidence, Plaintiffs argue that the expropriated property should be considered to be “owned or operated” by SNCF because it was never returned to its owners and restitution has not been made. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 21-22; see also Tr. at 76.) Plaintiffs’ argument requires the Court to infer from their allegations that property that was allegedly taken over sixty years ago is presently owned or operated by SNCF. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶27 (“SNCF and French government officials participated in such confiscation.”); id. ¶ 34 (“SNCF was involved in the taking of his property.”).) These allegations and arguments with respect to the “owned or operated” component of prong 4(b) are insufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ “burden of going forward with evidence showing that, under exceptions to the FSIA, immunity should not be granted.” Cabiri, 165 F.3d at 196 (quoting Cargill, 991 F.2d at 1016). Similarly, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support a finding that “any property exchanged for [the expropriated] property is owned or operated” by SNCF. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (emphasis added). Put another way, Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that property presently owned by SNCF is somehow derived from the expropriated property, and they cite no authority that would permit the Court to infer such traceability. Instead, they allege in a concluso-ry fashion that “Defendants ... retained and converted the Property and its derivative profits into their own property .... ” (Compl. ¶ 73.) This blanket allegation against all Defendants simply restates, in different terms, the text of the “property exchanged for such property” component of prong 4(b). As such, it is insufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ obligation of demonstrating that immunity should not be granted. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that there is a strong inference that [SNFC does] own [the expropriated] property because although the Mattéoli Commission seems to have been able to trace funds from various places, they either didn’t have the archives or couldn’t— didn’t publicize anything about the SNFC. I don’t believe [SNCF is] mentioned in the Mattéoli Commission. (Tr. at 76:5-10.) This argument fails to recognize that, because SNCF has established that it is a “foreign state” as an “agency or instrumentality of France” under the FSIA, Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that SNCF is not entitled to sovereign immunity. Thus, the failure of the Mattéoli Commission to mention SNCF in its 3,000-page report provides no support for an inference that the expropriated property, or property derived therefrom, is “owned or operated” by SNCF. To the contrary, the absence of any such reference in the Mattéoli Report serves to underscore Plaintiffs’ failure to offer evidence, or even to allege, that the property taken by SNCF is in fact presently “owned or operated” by SNCF in any way. In addition to the Mattéoli Report, the National Center for Scientific Research (the “CNRS”) prepared a 1996 report in collaboration with SNCF, titled “The SNCF Under the German Occupation, 1940-1944” (the “CNRS Report”). (See Snodgrass Decl. Ex. C at 10.) The Administrative Court of Toulouse found that the CNRS Report contains “incontestable and precise historical data” regarding SNCF during the relevant period. (Id. at 13.) Significantly, the Toulouse court relied on the CNRS Report when it held SNCF liable in Lipietz v. SNCF. (Id. at 10 (“[T]he record, notably the [CNRS] report ... shows that the railroad company ... transported the Jews to camps within French territory ... involving] the forceful transfer of the persons being transported .... ”).) Thus, both the CNRS Report and the Mattéoli Report contain information that has been relied on in other contexts to assign liability to entities that are parties to this action. And yet, Plaintiffs have not cited to any portion of these Reports in support of their argument that the “owned or operated” component of prong 4(b) is met as to SNCF. Contrary to counsel’s assertion, the absence of such evidence does not permit the Court to draw an inference in Plaintiffs’ favor. Finally, as explained in more detail below, see infra Part II.B.4, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated an entitlement to jurisdictional discovery, and comity concerns militate strongly against granting the request. The present record is sufficient to resolve the application of the FSIA to SNCF. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) that the expropriated property, or “any property exchanged for such property,” is “owned or operated” by SNCF. Accordingly, the “takings” exception is inapplicable, and SNCF is entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 3. France Relying exclusively on prong 4(b) of the “takings” exception, Plaintiffs argue that jurisdiction exists over France because “property in France is owned or operated by the CDC and SNCF,” which are “agencies or instrumentalities” of France that are “engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.” (See Pis.’ Opp’n at 19.) France responds that prong 4(a) provides the sole basis on which jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign may be asserted, and that “Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that [the expropriated] Property is located in the United States ... is fatal to their claim.” (France Mem. at 9.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that France is entitled to sovereign immunity, regardless of whether prong 4(b) may be applied in connection with assessing a foreign sovereign’s immunity under the “takings” exception of the FSIA. Clearly, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the expropriated property is “present in the United States” under prong 4(a). To the contrary, they “seek compensation for personal property in France taken during World War II in violation of international law.” (Compl. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).) Thus, the absence of an allegation that the expropriated property is currently located in the United States prevents Plaintiffs from making the “higher showing of proof’ required by prong 4(a) of the “takings” exception. Garb, 440 F.3d at 589. Assuming, arguendo, that prong 4(b) is applicable, it is likewise unavailing with respect to Plaintiffs’ argument that France is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Under prong 4(b) Plaintiffs would be required to show that the allegedly expropriated property “is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality” of France. Id. Plaintiffs cannot make this showing based on their allegations against France alone because France is not an “agency or instrumentality” of itself. See Garb, 440 F.3d at 589 (“ ‘[T]he Republic of Poland is not an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,’ because it is ‘the foreign state itself.’”). Nor can Plaintiffs establish that prong 4(b) is satisfied simply by incorporating against France their allegations as to SNCF and CDC. As discussed above, although CDC and SNCF are both instrumentalities of France, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy prong 4(b) with respect to those entities. Thus, even if a foreign sovereign may lose its immunity as a “foreign state” through the application of prong 4(b), no Defendant in this case satisfies that element of the “takings” exception. Accordingly, because the allegedly expropriated property is not present in the United States, and because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that an agency or instrumentality of France is engaged in conduct that would justify stripping France of sovereign immunity, Plaintiffs’ claims against France are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA. 4. Jurisdictional Discovery Finally, Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to jurisdictional discovery if the facts “do not seem sufficiently clear.” (Pis.’ Opp’n at 22.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations and arguments do not demonstrate that jurisdictional discovery would be fruitful or that it would be likely to alter the Court’s FSIA analysis. In addition, the comity concerns present in this case weigh strongly against the requested discovery. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery is denied. “[W]here jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute .... [a] district court retains considerable latitude in devising the procedures it will follow to ferret out the facts pertinent to jurisdiction.” APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court must “give the plaintiff ample opportunity to secure and present evidence relevant to the existence of jurisdiction ...,” id. (internal citation omitted), “in the FSIA context, ‘discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination,’ ” EM Ltd., 473 F.3d at 486 (quoting Rafidain, 150 F.3d at 176). Plaintiffs argue that their limited access to closed archives maintained by SNCF and France prevents them from substantiating the jurisdictional bases for their claims. (See, e.g., Pis.’ Opp’n at 6; Tr. at 76.) However, as discussed above with respect to SNCF, Plaintiffs have not cited to any of the publicly available studies relating to these events, such as the Mat-téoli and CNRS Reports, to suggest how such discovery would bolster their jurisdictional arguments. Reiss v. Societe Centrale du Groupe des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 738 (2d Cir.2000), cited by Plaintiffs in their opposition brief (Pis.’ Opp’n at 23 n.24), is not to the contrary. There, although it was undisputed that the defendants were “foreign states” under the FSIA, the district court dismissed the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute without analyzing sovereign immunity. Id. at 743. The district court made that finding based solely on the pleadings and excerpts from the plaintiffs deposition. The Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions to consider the applicability of the FSIA’s “commercial activity exception,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), and it suggested that factual findings were necessary regarding whether there was an agency relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant entities. Id. at 747-48. The court suggested that depositions of two of the defendants’ principals “would be helpful ... to assist the court in undertaking an FSIA jurisdictional analysis” that had not previously been conducted. Id. The language cited by Plaintiffs — “[plaintiff] should be permitted to go forward with the discovery to which he is entitled,” id. at 748—refers to discovery that had already been ord