Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM LEGROME D. DAVIS, District Judge. I. BACKGROUND From approximately 2004 to 2006, Plaintiff Walter Van Doren (“Van Doren”) was an employee of Columbia Lighting LCA, Inc., in Bristol, Pennsylvania (“Columbia Bristol”). His duties included operating machines used to make housings for lights. One of the machines he operated was a straightener machine, a machine used to straighten large coils of metal. The machine had two large metal rolls between which the metal would be pulled in order to be straightened. On May 2, 2006, Van Doren suffered an accident at work in which both of his arms became trapped in the straightener machine. According to Van Doren, in the minutes preceding the accident he cleaned the machine in preparation for a project and then took a cigarette break. Upon returning from his break, Van Doren was walking in front of the machine when his right hand suddenly became trapped between the rolls of the machine. The machine lifted him off the ground and pulled him in. As he attempted to free his right hand using his left hand, his left hand, too, became entrapped in the machine. Van Doren screamed for help and eventually his co-workers came to his assistance. The workers attempted to extract Van Doren from the machine. When those efforts failed, a surgeon had to perform a field amputation, removing both of Van Doren’s arms while he was still trapped inside the machine. The straightener machine involved in the accident was manufactured by Seseo, Inc. The machine was originally built with a metal attachment called a stock support, which was used to guide material into the straightener. According to Manufacturer Defendants, the stock support also acted as a guard by ensuring that the machine operator remained approximately 18 inches away from the “pinch point,” namely the space between the machine’s two rolls. The machine’s Operator’s Maintenance Manual did not identify the stock support as a guard or safety feature. In 1981, Columbia Lighting in Spokane, Washington, (“Columbia Spokane”) purchased the machine. At some point during the course of its ownership, Columbia Spokane removed the stock support from the machine and replaced it with a feeder tray. In 2002, Colombia Spokane transferred the straightener to Columbia Bristol. The straightener was conveyed with neither the stock support nor the feeder tray. On June 28, 2006, Van Doren and his wife, Plaintiff Sandra Van Doren (together “Plaintiffs”), brought the present action in this Court. The complaint named two sets of defendants: a group referred to as the “Manufacturer Defendants” and a group referred to as the “Prior Owner Defendants.” The Manufacturer Defendants are corporations that Plaintiffs allege were successors to the original manufacturer of the machine, Seseo, Inc. The Prior Owner Defendants are corporations that owned or had at some point acquired Columbia Spokane and Columbia Bristol. The Manufacturer Defendants named in Plaintiffs’ complaint are Coe Press Equipment Corporation, Seseo Corporation, and Seseo Products Group, Inc. In September 1999, Coe Press Equipment Corporation set up Seseo Acquisition Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary, to purchase limited assets from Seseo, Inc. The purchase agreement included all the intellectual property of Seseo, Inc.; its customer, supplier, and advertising records; and a non-competition agreement. Seseo Acquisition Corporation also purchased other manufacturing assets outside of the Asset Purchase Agreement, including computer equipment, electrical and mechanical inventory parts, and certain inventory. Approximately one and a half years after the purchase, Seseo Acquisition Corporation transferred all of its acquired assets to Seseo Corporation. In 2002, Seseo Corporation changed its name to Seseo Products Group. Seseo Products Group remains a wholly-owned subsidiary of Coe Press Equipment. The Prior Owner Defendants named in Plaintiffs complaint are Hanson PLC, Jacuzzi Brands, Inc., Columbia Spokane, Hubbell Lighting, Inc., and Hubbell Incorporated. On September 4, 2007, this Court issued an Order granting Defendant Hanson PLC’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Jacuzzi Brands, Inc., was the parent company of Columbia Spokane and Columbia Bristol until April 2002. In April 2002, Columbia Spokane and Columbia Bristol were sold to another entity. In 2004, Columbia Spokane and Columbia Bristol, through a series of mergers, became part of Hubbell Lighting, Inc. Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert their negligence claims against Hubbell Lighting, Inc., as successor in interest to Columbia Spokane. Hubbell Incorporated is the sole shareholder of Hubbell Lighting, Inc. Manufacturer Defendants and Prior Owner Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court shall grant a motion for 3 summary judgment if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the initial responsibility of identifying the portions of the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir.2007). However, even if the moving party fulfills this requirement, “the non-moving party can defeat summary judgment if it nonetheless produces or points to evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 238 (citing Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir.1993)). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “the court must neither resolve factual disputes nor make judgments of credibility; instead, all ‘[ijnferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.’ ” Peloro v. U.S., 488 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d Cir.1992)). If the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, “then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc., 974 F.2d at 1363. A non-moving party may not rely solely on mere pleadings or allegations to identify unresolved genuine issues of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1); SEPTA, 479 F.3d at 238 (citing Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir.2006)). However, a non-moving party’s affidavit is enough to present a genuine issue of fact if it clearly asserts a specific fact in question. See Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990). III. DISCUSSION A. Manufacturer Defendants We turn first to Manufacturer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The foregoing discussion will address four main issues. Part 1 will address the appropriate choice of law to be used in this case. Part 2 will discuss Plaintiffs’ negligence, breach of warranty, and punitive damages claims. Part 3 will analyze Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim. Finally, Part 4 will address whether Coe Equipment Corporation can be held liable under Plaintiffs’ claims. 1. Choice of Law The parties in this matter disagree over whether this Court should apply Pennsylvania law or Michigan law in assessing Plaintiffs’ claims against Manufacturer Defendants. Accordingly, at the outset we must conduct a choice of law analysis. Because this is a diversity case, we apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, namely Pennsylvania. Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir.2007). The first step in a choice of law analysis under Pennsylvania law is to determine whether there is “an actual or real conflict between the potentially applicable laws.” Id. at 229-30. If the jurisdictions’ laws differ in relevant ways, “then the court should examine the governmental policies underlying each law, and classify the conflict as a ‘true,’ ‘false,’ or an ‘unprovided-for’ situation.” Id. The choice of law analysis continues past that point only if the Court finds that there is a “true” conflict, namely if “both jurisdictions’ interests would be impaired by the application of the other’s laws.” Id. If a true conflict exists, then the court must determine “which state has the greater interest in the application of its law.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Both parties agree that there is a true conflict between Michigan law and Pennsylvania law in this case because the laws differ in the extent to which they recognize exceptions to the traditional sue-cessor non-liability principle in a strict liability case. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 11-12; Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Def.’s Mot. 14.) Both states’ laws recognize the general rule that a successor that acquires the assets of another company by purchasing them for cash does not automatically assume the predecessor’s liabilities. Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106, 107 (1981); Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 460 Mich. 696, 597 N.W.2d 506, 509 (1999). Both states’ laws recognize five traditional exceptions to that principle. We need not address those traditional exceptions here because both Plaintiffs and Manufacturer Defendants agree that they do not apply in this case. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 11-12; Pls.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Def.’s Mot. 17-21.) However, Pennsylvania recognizes an additional “product line” exception to successor non-liability principles. That exception dictates that: [WJhere one corporation acquires all or substantially all the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if exclusively for cash, and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in units of the same product line, even if previously manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or its predecessor. Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 110. The social policy interests reflected in this exception have been articulated as follows: [T]he manufacturer rather than the factory employee is in the better position both to judge whether avoidance costs would exceed foreseeable accident costs and to act on that judgment.... because the manufacturer transfers to its successor corporation the resources that had previously been available to the manufacturer for meeting its responsibilities to persons injured by defects in products it had produced ... the successor rather than the user of the product is in the better position to bear accident-avoidance costs. Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 352, 431 A.2d 811 (N.J.1981) (internal quotations omitted). Michigan courts, on the other hand, have expressly rejected the product line exception in favor of the traditional, narrower “continuity of enterprise” exception, which states that: [Liability may attach to a corporation which acquires the manufacturer of the product where the totality of the acquisition demonstrates a basic continuity of the enterprise between the manufacturer and the acquiring corporation. Pele v. Bendix Machine Tool Corp., 111 Mich.App. 343, 314 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1981). In rejecting the product line exception, the Court of Appeals of Michigan based its reasoning partly on the fact that Michigan “has not yet openly embraced strict liability as a theory of recovery for products liability.” Id. The court therefore found that “continued adherence to the doctrine of successor liability as evaluated [under the traditional exceptions] will ... assure a uniform evolution of this area of the law most consistent and harmonious with the law and policy considerations of our jurisdiction.” Id. Therefore, it is clear that the laws of Pennsylvania and Michigan are directly at odds in their approach to the “product line” exception to successor non-liability. Accordingly, because each state’s recognized interests would be hindered by the application of the other state’s laws, we find that there is a true conflict between the laws of both jurisdictions. When there is a true conflict, Pennsylvania choice of law rules require that we apply the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws as a starting point and then apply Pennsylvania’s flexible interest analysis to determine which state has the greatest interest in having its law applied. Berg Chilling Sys. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 463 (3d Cir.2006) (applying Pennsylvania law). To do so, we must first “characterize the particular issue before the court as one of tort, contract, or corporate law — or some hybrid — in order to settle on a given section of the Restatement for guidance.” Id. In the present case, Manufacturer Defendants contend that the issue of whether the product line exception should apply in this case should be characterized as a “contract/corporate law” issue because successor liability is “rooted in corporate law” and because there was a “lack of Third Circuit precedent on the issue.” (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 13.) However, the case cited by Defendants for this proposition actually belies their argument. In Berg Chilling Sys. v. Hull Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that “[w]hile the basic tenet of successor liability is based in corporate law, the exceptions span a loose substantive continuum from contract to corporate to tort law.” 435 F.3d at 464. Although the Berg court declined to “characterize the substantive law of the product line exception,” it did state that it was an “explicitly tort-based exception” that was “generally analyzed using torts choice of law principles.” Id. at 465. The product line exception has indeed been traditionally analyzed as an issue of tort law. See, e.g., Kradel v. Fox River Tractor Co., 308 F.3d 328 (3d Cir.2002). Also, we find persuasive the fact that at least one U.S. Court of Appeals has held that the product line exception is a matter of tort law, not corporate law. See Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 327 (7th Cir.1996). Accordingly, we hold that the issue of whether to apply the exception is a question of tort law. Under the Pennsylvania choice of law approach, “for substantive tort law issues, ... [courts use] a combination of the ‘government interest’ and ‘significant relationship’ approaches.” Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Assocs., 243 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir.2001) (citing Troxel v. A.I. duPont Inst., 431 Pa.Super. 464, 636 A.2d 1179, 1181 (1994)). Under that approach, “a court applying Pennsylvania law should use the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws as a starting point, and then flesh out the issue using an interest analysis.” Berg, 435 F.3d at 463. The interest analysis requires us to “evaluate ‘the extent to which one state rather than another has demonstrated, by reason of its policies and their connection and relevance to the matter in dispute, a priority of interest in the application of its rule of law.’ ” Kirschbaum, 243 F.3d at 150 (citing Troxel, 636 A.2d at 1181). As the first step in our analysis, we consider the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145, which establishes the “general principles to be applied and contacts to be taken into account in choice of law determinations in tort actions.” Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 239 (3d Cir.1986). That section states: (1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6 [Choice-of-Law Principles]. (2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). We analyze each factor in turn. In .the present case, the injury occurred in Pennsylvania. The conduct allegedly causing the injury, namely the manufacture and sale of the defective machine, occurred in Michigan. The domicile of Plaintiffs is in Pennsylvania. The incorporation and the place of business of Manufacturer Defendants is in Michigan. There was no true relationship between Plaintiffs and Manufacturer Defendants. The only arguable “relationship” between the parties, namely Van Doren’s use of the straightener machine produced by Manufacturer Defendant’s alleged predecessor, Seseo, Inc., was based in Pennsylvania, where Van Doren worked. Therefore, the number of contacts for both states is roughly equal. However, under Pennsylvania law, it is not sufficient to conduct merely a “counting of contacts.” Hammersmith, 480 F.3d at 231. Rather, we must apply Pennsylvania’s “interests/contacts” analysis, which combines both the Restatement’s analysis of the “contacts [between the States and the event] establishing significant relationships,” and a “qualitative appraisal of the relevant states’ policies with respect to the controversy.” Id. This analysis requires a court to “weigh the contacts on a qualitative scale according to their relation to the policies and interests underlying the particular issue.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In the present case, we find that Michigan’s interest in having its law applied is no greater than Pennsylvania’s interest. The public policy behind strict products liability is to “ensure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers ... for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.” Da-wejko, 434 A.2d 106 at 109. Courts have used that same rationale to support the product line exception because: [T]he manufacturer transfers to its successor corporation the resources that had previously been available to the manufacturer for meeting its responsibilities to persons injured by defects in products it had produced ... [and] the successor rather than the user of the product is in the better position to bear accident-avoidance costs. Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811, 821 (1981). The Pennsylvania Superior Court decision that first recognized the product line exception embraced that rationale as articulated in Ramirez. 434 A.2d 106 at 111. We find that Pennsylvania has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from defective products by ensuring that successor corporations that enjoy the benefit of continuing a predecessor’s product line take responsibility for the harms that products within that line may cause. On the other hand, the Michigan decision rejecting the product line exception identified the policy behind that decision as a desire to “assure a uniform evolution in this area of law” given Michigan’s lack of recognition of strict products liability. Pelc, 314 N.W.2d at 620. Defendant’s have further characterized Michigan’s interest as a choice to “enhance the protection of its successor corporation at the expense of plaintiffs with product liability claims.” (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 13.) Weighing the contacts on “a qualitative scale according to their relation to the policies and interest at issue,” we find that Michigan’s interest in protecting its local successor corporations from liability for an accident occurring in Pennsylvania is no greater than Pennsylvania’s interest in protecting its citizens injured by a defective product manufactured by a Michigan corporation. In fact, we find that Michigan’s interest in ensuring “a uniform evolution” in its local products liability law will not be greatly affected by an application in federal court of Pennsylvania law to an accident occurring in Pennsylvania and involving a Pennsylvania resident. We also find that, given the great prevalence of inter-state commerce, Pennsylvania’s interest in protecting its citizens against defective products will be greatly hindered if it is unable to hold out-of-state successor corporations liable for injuries suffered by its citizens resulting from accidents occurring within the state. Defendants cite Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970), for the proposition that “it is only fair to permit a defendant to rely on his home state’s law when he is acting within that state.” (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 16.) In Cipolla, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined the plaintiffs request to apply Pennsylvania law to an automobile collision that occurred in Delaware with a Delaware resident when the plaintiff was visiting Delaware. Cipolla encourages “a territorial view of torts” and discourages the withdrawal of “actions and affairs from the reach of domestic law because the persons (or at least one of the persons) participating in them are not domestic to the state.” Cipolla, 267 A.2d at 857. That territorial approach actually supports a finding that it is only fair to permit a local plaintiff to rely on his home state’s law when he is injured within that state, even if the injury is caused by a machine manufactured outside the state. Accordingly, we find that, under this territorial view, Pennsylvania’s contacts with the event are qualitatively more important because Pennsylvania has a greater interest in protecting its citizens who are injured inside its territory by machines manufactured outside the state. Therefore, we will apply Pennsylvania law, which recognizes the product line exception. 2. Plaintiffs’ Negligence, Breach of Warranty, and Punitive Damages Claims Defendants argue that the product line exception to successor non-liability only applies to strict liability claims. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 28.) Plaintiffs agree and assert that they will not be pursuing negligence, breach of warranty, or punitive damages claims against Manufacturer Defendants. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 28.) Accordingly, we will grant summary judgment in favor of Manufacturer Defendants on Counts I, II, and IV of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 3. Strict Liability a. Successor Liability Plaintiffs bring their strict liability claim against Manufacturer Defendants based on Manufacturer Defendants’ alleged status as successors to Seseo, Inc., the original manufacturer of the straightener machine. Plaintiffs rest their strict liability claim on Pennsylvania’s product line exception to successor non-liability. The exception as interpreted by Pennsylvania courts states: [Wjhere one corporation acquires all or substantially all the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if exclusively for cash, and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in units of the same product line, even if previously manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or its predecessor. Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 110 (citing Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825). Accordingly, there are two initial factors that Plaintiffs must show before we can apply the exception in this case: (1) that the successor corporation acquired all or substantially all of the manufacturing assets of its predecessor; and (2) that the successor corporation undertook essentially the same manufacturing operation as its predecessor. We will refer to these two factors as the Dawejko factors, as they were first adopted into Pennsylvania law by the Dawejko court. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has interpreted Pennsylvania’s product line exception to have three additional prerequisites: (1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiffs remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor’s acquisition of the business, (2) the successor’s ability to assume the original manufacturer’s risk-spreading rule, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer’s good will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business. Kradel v. Fox River Tractor Co., 308 F.3d 328, 332 (3d Cir.2002). These factors are commonly referred to as the Ray factors based on the decision that first outlined them, namely Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 136 Cal.Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977). Accordingly, to prevail in a successor liability claim premised upon the product line exception, a plaintiff must establish both the Dawejko factors and the Ray factors. Courts applying the product line exception have consistently found that the question of whether each particular required factor has been satisfied is a question for the jury. Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 2008 PA Super 203, 958 A.2d 498 (Pa.Super.Ct.2008) (holding that the plaintiff presented enough evidence at trial of each of the required factors to support the jury’s conclusion that the factors had been met); see also Fehr v. C.O. Porter Mach. Co., 2003 WL 22318009, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18028 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 8, 2003) (finding that the plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that each factor had been meet); Frantz v. Black & Decker Corp., 1996 WL 377119, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8902 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 1996); Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 112. Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, we must determine whether Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of material fact as to each of the five required factors. We turn first to the first Dawejko factor, which requires Plaintiffs to show that Manufacturer Defendants purchased “all or substantially all of Seseo, Inc.’s manufacturing assets.” Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 110. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that, under the Asset Purchase Agreement executed between Seseo Acquisition Corporation and Seseo, Inc., Seseo Acquisition Corporation purchased all of the intellectual property of Seseo, Inc., including “designs, prototypes, trade secrets, manufacturing and engineering drawings, process sheets ... and other industrial property.” (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. N at ¶ 1.1.) Manufacturer Defendants also purchased all of Seseo, Inc.’s customer, supplier, and advertising records and lists as well as the right to use Seseo, Inc.’s name and its advertisements. (Id., Ex. N at ¶ 1.2 — 1.4.) In addition, Plaintiffs presented evidence that Seseo Acquisition Corporation purchased other manufacturing assets outside of the Asset Purchase Agreement, including computer equipment, electrical and mechanical inventory parts, inventory related to what was referred to as the “Ford Project,” and plant equipment such as machines, machine parts, and tools. (Id., Ex. R.) Plaintiffs also presented evidence that Werner Leh-mann (“Lehmann”), the original owner of Seseo, Inc., testified that his understanding was that he was selling his company under the Asset Purchase Agreement. (Id., Ex. Q at 23-24.) We find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that Seseo Acquisition Corporation purchased “substantially all” of Seseo, Inc.’s manufacturing assets. We turn now to the second Dawej-ko factor, under which Plaintiffs are required to show that Manufacturer Defendants undertook essentially the same manufacturing operations as their predecessor company. In Schmidt v. Boardman Co., the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that, to meet this requirement, a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence that the successor “continued to manufacture the same general line of business” and need not prove that the successor continued to produce the same exact product. 2008 PA Super 203, P23, 958 A.2d 498 (Pa.Super.Ct.2008). The court in Schmidt based its reasoning on a California decision that found that, where the products manufactured by the predecessor are customized, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show that the successor continued the “general business” of the predecessor. Id. at 21, 958 A.2d 498 (citing Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal.App.3d 890, 159 Cal.Rptr. 119 (1979)). In the present case, Manufacturer Defendants assert that the product line was not continued because the machines manufactured by Ses-eo, Inc., were customized. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 24.) As in Schmidt, however, Plaintiffs here have presented sufficient evidence that Manufacturer Defendants continued to manufacture the same general line of business as Seseo, Inc. For example, Plaintiffs presented evidence that Manufacturer Defendants hired an engineer from Seseo, Inc., to “continu[e] with the Seseo product work.” (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. A at 44.) In fact, at least eight former Seseo, Inc., employees were hired by Manufacturer Defendants to work exclusively on the Seseo line. (Id., Ex. A at 135, 139.) Also, one of Seseo, Inc.’s employees, who worked as a draftsman, testified that when he was hired by Defendant Manufacturers he spent approximately 80% of his time working on Seseo products. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. F at 28.) He also testified that Manufacturer Defendants did not apply any specific design improvements to the Seseo products. (Id., Ex. F at 33.) Also, John Charles Coe (“John Coe”), owner of Coe Press Equipment, testified that Manufacturer Defendants have the ability to produce any of the products previously manufactured by Seseo, Inc. (Id., Ex. A at 82.) Plaintiffs also presented evidence that, although the products were customized, the straightener machines were built based on existing models and had model numbers that reflected the basic parts of the design. (Pls.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. A at 72; Id., Ex. F at 108-110.) Plaintiffs also point to evidence that Mr. Coe described the machines as being different designs within a product line. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs’ Mot., Ex. A at 83.) We find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to raise a question as to whether Manufacturer Defendants undertook essentially the same manufacturing operations as Seseo, Inc. With regard to the first Ray factor, we must determine whether Manufacturer Defendants’ acquisition of Seseo, Inc.’s assets caused the virtual destruction of Plaintiffs’ remedies against Seseo, Inc. Plaintiffs have submitted evidence that the Asset Purchase Agreement required Ses-eo, Inc., to notify its customers that it was “terminating its business and its corporate existence and assigning to [Manufacturer Defendants seller Seseo, Inc.’s] relationship with its customers.” (Id., Ex. N at ¶ 6.9.) According to Mr. Coe, Seseo, Inc., closed its doors about one week prior to the day that the Asset Purchase was signed and about five weeks after Mr. Coe first contacted Seseo, Inc., about purchasing its assets. (Id., Ex. A at 140-41.) Mr. Coe testified that at the time he met with Seseo, Inc., “they were in big trouble and didn’t look like they were going to make it and ... wanted to do a deal,” which was the deal through which Manufacturer Defendants acquired Seseo, Inc.’s assets. (Id., Ex. A at 142.) Therefore, it appears from the evidence presented by Plaintiffs that Seseo, Inc., ceased doing business in connection with Manufacturer Defendants’ purchase of its assets. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that the Purchase Agreement effectively terminated costumers’ remedies against Seseo, Inc. The second Ray factor requires Plaintiffs to show “the successor’s ability to assume the original manufacturer’s risk-spreading rule.” Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332. This Court has found that, where a successor company acquired “all the parts and accessories, patterns and blueprints, client lists, and all other pertinent files from [the predecessor’s original product] line, they acquired the ability to estimate the risks involved with the ... line, and could have spread those risks out to consumers in costs.” Frantz, 1996 WL 377119, at *4, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8902, at *9. In the present case, Manufacturer Defendants similarly acquired all “designs, prototypes, trade secrets, manufacturing and engineering drawings, process sheets ... and other industrial property” from Sesco, Inc. (Pls.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. N at ¶ 1.1.) Therefore, since they acquired all the intellectual property related to the Seseo, Inc.’s products, they had the ability to estimate the risks involved with the product and spread those risks out to consumers in costs. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to meet this factor. The third Ray factor requires Plaintiffs to show that it is fair to require the successor company to assume “a responsibility for defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer’s good will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business.” Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332. In the present case, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Manufacturer Defendants derived a benefit from the goodwill created by being associated with Seseo, Inc. Plaintiffs pointed to evidence that the Asset Purchase Agreement required Seseo, Inc., to transfer to Manufacturer Defendants its “relationship with its customers.” (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. N at ¶ 6.9.) Also, Ron David, who had been chief engineer at Seseo, Inc., and was later hired by Manufacturer Defendants testified that he participated in sales calls with Coe salesman because “the Seseo name was well known in this industry and well respected and my name was attached to Seseo for many years.” (Id., Ex. T at 98.) He further testified that the purpose of his participation in the sales calls was to “introduce] Coe to our old customers as well as introduc[e] Seseo to their customers.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also presented evidence that Manufacturer Defendants sent a mailing to all their customers advising of the acquisition. (Id., Ex. A at 164.) Manufacturer Defendants also engaged in a marketing campaign to publicize the fact that “Seseo Products Group” was now part of Coe. (Id., Ex. S at 43.) Also, Seseo Products Group solicited Seseo customers for the business of servicing existing Seseo machines. (Id., Ex. A at 88.) Finally, Seseo Products Group benefitted from being able to use the well-known Seseo name. Therefore, it appears from the evidence presented by Plaintiffs that Manufacturer Defendants did benefit from Seseo, Inc.’s good will through the relationships it gained with Sesco’s former customers and through the association with Seseo and its products created by the acquisition. We find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the third Ray factor for the purpose of summary judgment. Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence on each of the Dawejko and Ray factors to raise a question of material fact as to whether the product line exception to successor non-liability applies in this ease. b. Risk-Utility Analysis We move now to an analysis of the substance of Plaintiffs’ strict products liability claim. In order to determine whether Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, we must first determine whether, as a matter of law, the machine in question is defective. Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 424 Pa.Super. 473, 623 A.2d 322, 324 (1993) (citing Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978)). Under the Restatement of Torts, a product is defective when it has “a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). To make the threshold determination of whether the product is defective, we must conduct a risk-utility analysis in which we “balance the utility of the product against the seriousness and likelihood of the injury and the availability of precautions that, though not foolproof, might prevent the injury.” Fitzpatrick, 623 A.2d at 324. Under Pennsylvania law as interpreted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, courts utilize seven factors to guide the risk-utility analysis: (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product — its utility to the user and to the public as a whole; (2) The safety aspects of the product— the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury; (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe; (4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; (6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instruction; and (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss [by] setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408, 423 n. 5 (1984)). These are called the “Wade” factors because they were developed by Dean John Wade in his article On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). Under the first Wade factor, it is undisputed that the machine was useful, desirable, and especially designed to meet the specific needs of the user. Under the third Wade factor, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that there was an alternate, safer product available to achieve the same purpose. Therefore, we find that Wade factors one and three weigh in favor of not finding the machine defective. However, for the reasons discussed below, we find that each of the remaining factors weighs in favor of finding the machine defective. Under the second Wade factor, we consider the likelihood and gravity of the potential injury caused by the machine. Plaintiffs presented evidence that the top pinch roll of the machine was completely unguarded. In the human factors analysis conducted by Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Stephen Wilcox, he found that “given that there was an unguarded in-running nip point, it was inevitable that workers would, at times, be injured ... [especially] when the operator has a reason to be in the vicinity of the hazard.” (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. V at 10.) Given the large size and high power of the machine and the fact that there was no emergency off-switch near the nip point, the injury, when it occurred, would likely be grave. In analyzing a case with similar circumstances the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that: [g]iven ... the fact that the profiler will from time to time cause injury and, if so, the injury will be serious given the immensity and huge weight of the machine, we do not believe that the court could properly hold, on account of disputed habituation evidence, that there was not a sufficiently grave risk of harm from the profiler to weigh in favor of [defendant] on the risk-utility analysis. Surace, 111 F.3d at 1048. We find that the risk and potential gravity of the injury involved in this case weighs in favor of finding the product defective under the second Wade factor. Under the fourth Wade factor we must weigh “the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.” Surace, 111 F.3d at 1046. Here, Plaintiffs argue that two of the main aspects of the product that made it unsafe were the inadequate guarding of the rolls and the lack of warnings and instructions related to the stock support and the cleaning of the rolls. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the machine’s manual contained no warnings regarding the purported guarding function of the stock support nor any instructions on how to clean the machine safely. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. E.) Such warnings and instructions would not be costly and would help eliminate the unsafe character of the product by making consumers aware of the need to keep the stock support in place and of the appropriate safety precautions that they should take when cleaning the machine. In addition, Plaintiffs presented evidence that the stock support left the top roll exposed and that the machine was operable when that stock support was removed. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. U at 5; Id., Ex. V at 10.) According to Plaintiffs, the main safety measure that would have eliminated the dangerous aspect of the machine would be the installation of interlocked top and bottom guards. (Id.) These guards would have prevented workers from accidently coming too close to either roll and being drawn into the pinch point between the two rolls. Plaintiffs presented evidence that these guards were available and feasible. (Id.) Defendants argue in their motion that Plaintiffs “have admitted that they have never seen a straightener with ... the alleged alternative features.” (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 32.) However, given that they argue that the machine stock support was a guard for the bottom roll, it seems reasonable that the top roll could have a similar guard. Accordingly, we find that the manufacturer had the ability to install a top guard and to provide adequate warnings and explanations as to the guarding feature of the stock support. The manufacturer also had the ability to provide instructions for safe cleaning of the rolls. Also, Manufacturer Defendants make no argument that these safety features would have been excessively expensive or that they would have diminished the machine’s utility. Accordingly, we find that this factor weighs in favor of finding the machine defective. Under the fifth Wade factor, we must consider not Van Doren’s ability to avoid danger but rather “the objective user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the [machine].” Surace, 111 F.3d at 1052. Manufacturer Defendants argue that this factor should weigh in their favor because Van Doren knew and understood the dangers presented by the machine and therefore could have anticipated and avoided the risk of getting his hand stuck in the machine. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 33.) However, under governing precedent, “[t]he proper focus in applying the fifth Wade factor ... is an objective inquiry into whether the class of ordinary purchasers of the product could avoid injury through the exercise of care in use of the product, not whether this particular plaintiff could have avoided this particular injury.” Surace, 111 F.3d at 1051. Therefore, “[a]n individual plaintiffs failure to exercise care in the use of a product is not relevant to whether the product is unreasonably dangerous in the first place.” Id. In the present case, because the top roller was fully exposed, a person working with the machine would not have been able to completely avoid the possibility of coming into accidental contact with it. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. V at 10.) In addition, Manufacturer Defendants’ predecessor did not include any instructions on how to clean the machine. (Id., Ex. V at 9.) Therefore, any time the workers needed to clean the rolls, they would have had to come near the rollers to clean them. (Id., Ex. U at 5.) Finally, Van Doren testified that his arm became trapped while walking in front of the machine, which he had turned off prior to taking his break. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. B, 48; Id. at 112— 14.) Given that the machine operator’s job involved standing in front of the roller area to put the metal into the rollers before beginning a job, the operator would not have been able to avoid being in front of the rollers in the course of his work when he thought the machine was off. (Id., Ex. B at 47.) Accordingly, we find that an objective user would not have been able to completely avoid the danger presented by the exposed rollers. Under the sixth Wade factor, we analyze “the user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instruction.” Surace, 111 F.3d at 1046. The focus in this inquiry is on the product, not on Van Doren’s actual knowledge. Id. at 1052. Manufacturer Defendants allege that Plaintiffs’ experts admitted that the danger was open and obvious. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 32.) However, Dr. Wilcox testified that the danger was open and obvious to Van Doren, not necessarily to the general public. (Id., Ex. H at 105.) Also, nothing in the machine’s manual indicated that the stock support was a safety feature or provided any warnings regarding its removal. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. E.) Therefore, due to the lack of suitable warnings or instruction regarding the function of the stock support, it would not be obvious to the general public that the machine was missing an original safety feature. In other words, although it would be obvious that the rolls were not guarded, it would not be obvious they were supposed to be guarded or that a guard ever existed. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Wilcox, testified that “in-going nip points formed between parts of rotating cylinders are particularly hazardous .. [because] [t]he hazard is not as immediately apparent as it is with machines that contain more obvious injury-causing parts, such as blades, grinding devices, or rams.” (Id., Ex. V at 6.) Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that a user would not be necessarily aware of the machine’s dangerous conditions. Under the seventh Wade factor, we must weigh the manufacturer’s ability to spread the risk of loss by adjusting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. Manufacturer Defendants do not argue that the manufacturer lacked this ability. Rather, they argue that manufacturers should not be required to spread the economic loss of an accident that was caused “not by any defect in the product, but rather by an inattentive user.” (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 33.) They further argue that it goes against public policy to hold manufacturers responsible for such a “bizarre” accident. (Id.) Under governing precedent, however, “an individual plaintiffs failure to exercise care in the use of a product is not relevant to whether the product is unreasonably dangerous.” Sumce, 111 F.3d at 1050. In fact, it is improper to “factor in the specific circumstances surrounding the cause of injury into th[e] threshold inquiry.” Id. at 1053. We find that, as the party in the best position to determine the potential risks and costs, the manufacturer in this case had the ability to spread the risk of loss. Therefore, the seventh Wade factor weighs in favor of finding the product defective. Accordingly, upon balancing the risk and utility of the machine as guided by the Wade factors discussed above, we find, as a matter of law, that the machine was unreasonably dangerous and defective. c. Questions of Fact: Intended Use, Alteration, and Causation Under Pennsylvania law, “[i]f the judge concludes that a product is ‘unreasonably dangerous’ the case is submitted to the jury, which then decides, based on all the evidence presented, ‘whether the facts of the case support the averments of the complaint.’ ” Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., 473 F.3d 532, 538 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1026). In so doing, the jury must determine whether when “the product ‘left the supplier’s control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use.’ ” Id. at 539 (citing Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644, 841 A.2d 1000, 1005 (2003)). To find a defendant liable based on strict liability, the jury must find: “(1) that the product was defective, (2) that the defect existed when it left the hands of defendant, and (3) that the defect caused the harm.” Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 376 Pa.Super. 220, 545 A.2d 906, 909 (1988). To survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must have presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact as to each element. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In the present case Manufacturer Defendants argue: (1) that there is no evidence that the machine was being used for its intended use; (2) that the machine was substantially altered by the purchaser; and (3) that Plaintiffs’ evidence pertaining to causation is insufficient to survive summary judgment. We address each argument in turn. First, Manufacturer Defendants assert that there is no evidence that the machine was unsafe for its intended use because there is no explanation as to how the accident happened. Here, Van Doren testified that, on the day of the accident, he cleaned the machine, went out for a break, and was walking by the machine on his way back to work to start a new job on the machine when his hand became trapped in the machine. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. B, 48; Id. at 112-14.) Cleaning the machine, starting a job on the machine, and walking in front of the machine in the course of preparing to operate it are all aspects of its intended use. In analyzing whether the machine was safe for its intended use, “it is clear that ‘unless the use giving rise to a strict liability cause of action is a reasonably obvious misuse ... or unless the particular use ... is clearly warned against, the manufacturer is not obviously exonerated.’ ” Surace, 111 F.3d at 1054 (citing Metzgar v. Playskool, Inc., 30 F.3d 459, 465 (3d Cir.1994)). Here, there is no evidence that Van Doren’s use of the machine was an obvious misuse. Also the manufacturer provided no warnings about any of the ways in which Van Doren was using the machine. Accordingly we find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence that the machine was unsafe for its intended use to raise a genuine question of material fact. Second, Manufacturer Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence that the defect existed at the time the machine left the manufacturer’s control because the machine was altered when the purchaser removed the stock support. Under Pennsylvania law, “a manufacturer or seller is not liable for injuries caused by a defective product if the defect was created by an alteration which amounts to an intervening or superseding cause, as distinguished from a concurrent cause, of the injuries.” Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille, Div. of Houdaille Indus., Inc., 364 Pa.Super. 178, 527 A.2d 1012, 1019 (1987). However, “it is altogether possible that a plaintiffs injuries could be caused jointly by a defective product and also by third party negligence so long as the negligence does not constitute a supervening cause.” Rogers v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 523 Pa. 176, 185, 565 A.2d 751 (Pa.1989). Here, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the lack of a top guard and the fact that the machine could operate when the stock support was removed were both factors that made the machine defective and caused Van Doren’s injury. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. U at 5; Id., Ex. V at 10.) Had the machine been designed so that it could not operate if the stock support was removed, the machine would obviously not have been operable after Columbia Spokane removed the stock support. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to raise a question of material fact as to whether the removal of the stock support was a concurrent or a superseding cause of the injuries. Third, in arguing that Plaintiffs failed to show causation, Manufacturer Defendants assert that the opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts as to the cause of the accident are “premised upon unsupported assertions” because they are unable to determine how Van Doren came in contact with the machine. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 39.) Under Pennsylvania law, causation is an issue for the jury and a Court must not decide it as a matter of law unless “it is clear that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue.” Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284-5 (1978). Also, under Pennsylvania tort law “multiple substantial factors may cooperate to produce an injury ... and that concurrent causation will give rise to joint liability.” Estate of Harsh v. Petroll, 584 Pa. 606, 887 A.2d 209, 218 (2005). Here, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that one of the aspects that made the machine defective is that the machine lacked a top guard, leaving the nip point of the machine exposed. (Pis.’ Resp. to Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. U at 5; Id., Ex. V at 10.) According to Plaintiffs’ experts, another aspect that contributed to the defect is that the machine was able to operate without guards. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ experts have specifically found that if the machine had top and bottom guards that prevented the machine from operating when removed, Van Doren would not have been injured. (Id.) It is logical that if the machine had guards that physically prevented a person’s hand from coming near the nip point, in any way and for any reason, when the rolls were in motion, Van Doren’s hand would not have been able to reach the nip point. Accordingly, we find that, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, the experts’ inferences are reasonable and sufficiently based on the evidence to raise genuine questions of material fact as to causation. 4. Coe Press Equipment’s Liability Defendants assert that Coe Press Equipment cannot be held liable because it was Seseo Products Group, not Coe Press Equipment, which originally purchased the assets of Seseo, Inc. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot., Ex. L at 1.) Seseo Products Group is a wholly owned subsidiary of Coe Press Equipment. {Id., Ex. G at 25-26.) Defendants argue that the Court should not “pierce the corporate veil” to find Coe Press Equipment liable. (Manufacturer Defs.’ Mot. 42-43.) Piercing the corporate veil “was a doctrine originally designed by the courts to protect innocent parties by treating the corporation and its shareholders, or as in this case the parent and subsidiary, as identical for purposes of suit.” Kiehl v. Action Mfg. Co., 517 Pa. 183, 535 A.2d 571, 574 (1987). Under Pennsylvania law, “[t]here is a strong presumption against piercing the corporate veil ... [and][a]ny court must start from the general rule that the corporate entity should be recognized and upheld, unless specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception.” Lumax Indus. v. Aultman, 543 Pa. 38, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (1995) (citations omitted). The factors that Pennsylvania courts consider in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil include “undercapitalization, failure to adhere to corporate formalities, substantial intermingling of corporate and personal affairs and use of the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud.” Id. at 895. In the present case Plaintiffs have alleged no specific fats that would justify holding Coe Press Equipment liable as an alter ego of Seseo Products Group. Accordingly, we will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as to Coe Press Equipment. B. Prior Oumer Defendants We turn now to Prior Owner Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion. Our discussion will proceed in three parts. Part 1 will address Prior Owner Defendants’ argument that Hubbell Lighting, Inc., and Hubbell Incorporated are immune from any action in tort by Plaintiffs based on Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Part 2 will address Prior Owner Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence with regard to their negligence claims. Finally, Part 3 will address Plaintiffs’ claims against Jacuzzi Brands, Inc. 1. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity Prior Owner Defendants first argue that Hubbell Lighting, Inc., and Hubbell Incorporated are immune from suit due to the fact that Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for workers against their employers for injuries arising in the course of employment. (Prior Owner Defs.’ Mot. 6-9.) Defendants argue that Columbia Bristol and Columbia Spokane were merged out of existence on January 1, 2005, approximately ten months before Van Doren’s injury. (Id. at 6.) They therefore assert that, at the time of the accident, Van Doren was employed by Hubbell Lighting Inc., which is wholly owned by Hubbell Incorporated as its sole shareholder. (Id.) Thus, they argue, Hubbell Lighting Inc. and Hubbell Incorporated are immune from suit because they were Van Doren’s employers at the time of the accident. (Id. at 6-9.) The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act states, in relevant part: The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death ... 77 P.S. § 481(a) (1992). This section makes the Workers’ Compensation Act “the exclusive remedy for an injured employee seeking redress from an employer for an on-the-job injury.” Peck v. Del. County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 572 Pa. 249, 814 A.2d 185, 188 (2002). In the present case, it is undisputed that the injury is an on-the-job injury as defined by the Act. However, Plaintiffs assert that the Act’s exclusivity should not apply in this case for two reasons. First, they assert that Van Doren is entitled to sue his employer as a third party under the “dual persona” doctrine. (Pis.’ Resp. to Prior Owner Defs.’ Mot. 6-9.) Second, they argue that Hubbell Lighting, Inc., was not Van Doren’s employer because its mergers with Columbia Spokane and Columbia Bristol were invalid. (Id. at 14-18.) We address each argument below. a. The Dual Persona Doctrine Plaintiffs initially note that the Workers’ Compensation Act expressly permits an action for injury against a third party. Section § 481(b) of the Act states: In the event injury or death to an employee is caused by a third party, then such employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages by reason thereof, may bring their action at law against such third party ... 77 P.S. § 481(b) (1992). Based on this provision, Plaintiffs argue that they should be able to bring suit against Hubbell Lighting, Inc., not as Van Doren’s employer but as the successor-in-interest to the alleged tortfeasor, namely Columbia Spokane. The argument on which Plaintiffs rely is referred to as the “dual persona” doctrine, under which an employee is permitted to bring suit against their employer for injuries caused by a third party which has merged with the employer. See, e.g., Thomeier v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 548 (W.D.Pa.1996). Under this doctrine, “[a]n employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, if — and only if — it possesses a second persona so completely independent from and unrelated to its status as employer that by established standards the law recognizes that persona as a separate legal person.” 6-113 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 113.01[4]. For the doctrine to apply, the duties owned by the employer under its separate persona must be “totally separate from and unrelated to those of the employment.” Id. Courts that apply this doctrine in the merger context usually base its application on the theory that employer immunity should not insulate an employer “from obligations it inherited through corporate merger simply because of the immunity for its own negligence it possessed as the employer of the insured employee.”