Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER HAMILTON, Chief Judge. This matter arises on Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on June 11, 1996. (Docket # 13). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on June 28, 1999 through July 1, 1999. Because Petitioner’s constitutional claims are procedurally barred, and because Petitioner cannot establish cause to excuse her procedural default, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has presented sufficient evidence of actual innocence in accordance with Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). If the Court determines that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing of actual innocence, it will rule on the merits of Petitioner’s constitutional claims. See Docket # 80. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 2, 1983, Petitioner was convicted of capital murder, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 565.001 (repealed effective October 1, 1984) by a jury in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County in State of Missouri v. Ellen Maria Reasonover, Cause No. 488120. (Pet.App.46, 66). After the jury was unable to agree on the appropriate punishment, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for fifty years. (Id, at 46, 65). The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on June 17, 1986. State v. Reasonover, 714 S.W.2d 706 (Mo.App.1986). On December 27, 1988. Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Pet.App.604). On November 20, 1989, the Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh denied Petitioner’s ha-beas corpus petition, adopting United States Magistrate Judge Robert D. Kings-land’s Review and Recommendation. (Pet. App.830). TRIAL EVIDENCE The Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the evidence at trial as follows: On January 2, 1983, at approximately 2:00 a.m., the body of James Buckley, a gas station attendant, was discovered in the storage room of a Vickers station on West Florissant Avenue, Dellwood, Missouri. He had been shot to death. The crime was publicized, and persons who had information about the crime were asked by the police to come forward. On January 3rd a woman who identified herself as Sheila Hill called the Dell-wood police department, claiming she had been at the Vickers station and had seen three persons. Officer Pike, with whom she spoke, asked her to call again to speak with Captain Chapman. She called again on January 4th, and came down to the police station at 11:30 that evening. When asked for identification, Sheila Hill identified herself as Ellen Reasonover, the defendant herein. Defendant said she had been doing laundry and went to the Vickers station to get change. She was not sure of the time, but thought she was at the station at about 1:30 a.m. the night of the murder. Defendant, who was considered a witness at this time, was taken to the Vickers station to reenact what she had seen. She stated that as she drove up, she saw a cream-colored station wagon leave the station. She also saw a black man in the cashier’s cage, whom she assumed was an attendant. As she approached the cashier’s cage, the black man took off his cap and left the cage to enter the main part of the station. Defendant knocked loudly on the window of the cage, but the black man did not return. She also saw a car parked on the right side of the building, which she described as a dark blue or black Oldsmobile or Buick with silver or gray trim and a spare tire container protruding from the top of the trunk. She described a second black man that she saw at the station, who was taller than the first and wore a green Army jacket. A third person was in the back of the car. As defendant was pulling out of the station she saw the man from the cashier’s cage enter the car. She then proceeded to a nearby 7-Eleven store, where she again saw the two men as she was coming out of the store. Defendant then returned to the laundromat. In the early morning hours of January 5th, defendant picked out two photographs from 250 photographs shown to her by the police. The photographs were of Isaac Scott and Herman Staples. In subsequent lineups, she failed to pick out Isaac Scott but did identify Herman Staples as one of the two men she had seen. Upon investigation, the police discovered that the two men defendant picked out had both been incarcerated at the time of the crime. At about this time, it also came to the attention of the police that defendant had complained to the police about an ex-boyfriend who had broken out the windows of her car. The man was Stanley White, and he was seen by the defendant driving away in a car remarkably similar in description to the car she had described to the police as being at the Vickers station. The incident took place only a few days before the murder. Upon being told by the police that the men she had picked out were in custody at the time of the murder, defendant stated she would try to get the name of the man with the cap from her sister or her sister’s friend, as she believed she had seen this man at various parties. She gave the police the name of Willie Love, and identified him from a photographic array. On January 6, defendant identified Willie Love in a lineup. Also on January 6, the police began to question defendant about the incident concerning her car windows. On January 7 defendant was ... questioned about her activities from December 31, 1982 to January 3, 1983 in order to establish her whereabouts on the night of the murder. She repeated a sequence of events six times, and only once did she mention that she had been at the Vickers station January 2.... Defendant was then arrested and given her Miranda warnings. Later, on the evening of that same day, defendant was transported from the Dellwood jail to the Jennings jail, where she was placed in a cell with Rose Jolliff and Marquita Butler. Defendant was released the following morning, January 8. Rose Jolliff later talked with the police who were investigating the murder. In essence, Jolliff stated that the defendant admitted committing the crime with Stanley White and Robert McIntosh. Defendant told Jolliff that she shot the victim seven times with a rifle because something had gone wrong and she feared the victim could identify her. On February 9, 1983, the defendant was in custody on a separate unrelated charge, and was placed in a holdover cell of the St. Louis County jail with Carol Coates, Rose Winston, Elaine Carpenter, and Mary Ellen Lyner. Lyner subsequently made a deal with the prosecution in exchange for her testimony regarding admissions made by the defendant to her while both were confined in the holdover cell. The admissions in question are: “Those mother-fuckers picked me out of a lineup. I told them we should have blew their brains out too,” and “Girl, we robbed a gas station and killed a man, you know, that Vickers station. I stay right down the street from there.” Subsequent to the admissions to Lyner, defendant had several conversations with various police officers, during which she them of “putting a case on her,” and stated that she would not “come in” or “roll over” on anyone. Stanley White was identified as being at the Vickers station on the night of the murder by a witness, Kenneth Main, who identified White on January 7, after his memory had been refreshed through hypnosis. On March 4, 1983, Robert McIntosh was identified as being at the Vickers station on the night of the murder by another witness. Anthony Longo. Reasonover, 714 S.W.2d at 710-12. In denying Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Missouri Court of Appeals relied on the following facts: [D]efendant admitted to the police that she was present at the Vickers station on the night of the murder, close in time to when the murder was committed; she specifically admitted to Rose Jolliff and generally admitted to Mary Ellen Lyner that she committed the offense, along with Stanley White and Robert McIntosh; and both Stanley White and Robert McIntosh were identified as being at the scene of the crime around the time of the murder. Reasonover, 714 S.W.2d at 712. As the findings by the Missouri Court of Appeals reflect, the State’s case against Ellen Reasonover was based almost entirely on the testimony of Rose Jolliff and Mary Ellen Lyner. For clarity, the Court will describe in greater detail the trial testimony of these witnesses. A. Rose Jollijfs Trial Testimony The linchpin of the State’s case was the testimony of Rose Jolliff. Jolliff testified that she was in custody at the Jennings jail on January 7, 1983, when, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Petitioner was brought into the same cell. (Trial Tr., at 673-74). Jolliff and Petitioner had never before met. (Id., at 678). According to Jolliff, Petitioner admitted that she “did the Vicker’s Station robbery and murder, and she went on to say how it was done and how it was supposed to have been.” (Id., at 675). Jolliff testified that Petitioner said that she committed the crimes with Robert McIntosh and Stanley White, and that “someone was supposed to have went up to the window, one of the guys, to distract the boy at the window and something supposedly went wrong ... [s]o when something supposedly went wrong, she had to shoot him.” (Id.). Jolliff testified that Petitioner admitted shooting the Vicker’s attendant “seven times” with a “rifle,” and stated that she and her accomplices also “beat” the attendant. (Id., at 675-76). According to Jolliff, Petitioner stated that the attendant “wasn’t supposed to see her, so she had to shoot him” because “she lived close by and he could identify her.” (Id., at 676-77). Jolliff testified that Petitioner recounted these events in “good humor.” (Id.). During Petitioner’s statements to Jolliff, Marquita Butler, the only other person in the cell, was sitting on the “next bunk.” (Id., at 679, 690, 693-94). Jolliff testified that she had been put on probation several times — once for passing bad checks and another time for interfering with the mail — and had an “account closed check case” pending in St. Louis County. (Id., at 681). She testified that, although she had received probation several times, she had never been convicted of a crime. (Id., at 683-84). Jolliff testified that neither the prosecutor. Steven Goldman, nor anybody else, offered to make a deal with her with regard to the pending case. (Id., at 681). She testified that neither Goldman, nor anybody else, promised her “any kind of deal” in exchange for her testimony. (Id., at 700). Jolliff further testified that she was never promised that she would get “any kind of recommendation on [the pending] case at all” in exchange for her testimony. (Id., at 701). Jolliff stated that she was testifying because, if something happened to one of her kids, she would want someone to testify. (Id., at 702). B. Mary Ellen Lyner’s Trial Testimony Mary Ellen Lyner testified that, on February 9, 1983, she was in custody in the St. Louis County Court “holdover” — a cell where prisoners are held before they are brought into the courtroom. (Trial Tr., at 608). Petitioner, Carol Coates, Rose Winston, and Elaine Carpenter were also in the holdover. (Id.). Lyner testified that when Petitioner came into the holdover she sat down and said, “Those mother fuckers picked me out of a line-up. I told them we should have blew their brains out too.” (Id., at 609). Lyner testified that Petitioner then stated. “Girl, we robbed a gas station and killed a man, you know, that Vicker’s Station. I stay right down the street from there.” (Id., at 610). Lyner admitted that she had been convicted of thirteen crimes — eight bad check charges, four stealing charges, and one misdemeanor assault — and that she had four forgery counts pending in St. Louis Count and one pending bad check case in the City of St. Louis (Id., at 607, 612). Lyner testified that, although twelve of her thirteen convictions were for felonies, she had never been sentenced to time in a penitentiary. (Id., at 616, 618, 621). Lyner admitted that, in exchange for her testimony, Steven Goldman promised to recommend one year in jail on her pending forgery charges, and to recommend one year concurrent on the pending “check charge” in the city. (Id., at 612). Lyner testified that this was the first time she had made a deal with a prosecutor to avoid serving time in a penitentiary. (Id., at 675). Lyner testified that, after informing the police about Petitioner’s statements, she was transferred from the St. Louis County Jail to a “work release dorm.” (Id., at 617). Lyner had been in the St. Louis County Jail since November 18, 1982 because she was unable to post bond on her pending charges. (Id., at 612, 617). Lyner admitted that, on February 9, 1983, she was “looking for a way not to go to the penitentiary,” and that she was “looking for a deal.” (Id., at 620). GROUNDS FOR RELIEF In her First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner asserts the following grounds: I. Ms. Reasonover was denied due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the prosecutor failed to produce to the defense material, exculpatory evidence. (First Amended Petition, at 63). II. The State’s failure to provide to Petitioner a taped copy of her recorded statement violated her rights to a fair trial and due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Id., at 69). III. The State violated Ms. Reason-over’s constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by failing to disclose to defense counsel Petitioner’s statements to police on January 7, 1983, denying any involvement by her or Mr. White in the Vicker’s crime. (Id., at 71). IV. The State violated Ms. Reason-over’s rights to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to disclose evidence bearing upon the credibility of State’s witnesses Ken Main, Rose Jolliff, and Mary Ellen Lyner. (Id., at 74). V. The cumulative effect of all of the Brady violations undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial and deprived Ms. Reasonover of a fair trial and due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id., at 92). VI. Prosecutorial misconduct permeated the entirety of Ms. Reasonover’s trial, and denied her a fair trial and due process of law in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id., at 94). VII. Ms. Reasonover was denied due process of law and effective assistance of appellate counsel in that appellate counsel failed to fully investigate the criminal backgrounds of Lyner and Jolliff, failed to raise as plain error the prosecutor’s comments on Ms. Reasonover’s failure to testify; and failed to move to compel production of the tape recording of the Reasonover-White conversation in the appellate court. (Id., at 97). VIII. Ms. Reasonover was denied due process of law and the effective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to investigate and present exculpatory evidence, failed to vigorously and effectively cross-examine the State’s informants, failed to object during trial to Ken Main’s identification of Stanley White and failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment that Reasonover failed to testify. (Id., at 99). On June 29, 1999 and on July 12, 1999, the Court granted Petitioner leave to amend her First Amended Petition. (Docket # 96, 103). Petitioner’s amend- - ments supplement the grounds in her First Amended Petition by incorporating evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing. (Id.). PROCEDURAL DEFAULT In a Memorandum and Order entered on June 16, 1999, the Court concluded that the claims in Petitioner’s First Amended Petition were procedurally defaulted and that Petitioner was unable to establish cause and prejudice to excuse her procedural default. (Docket # 80, at 3-5). To the extent that Petitioner raises separate grounds in the amendments to her First Amended Petition, these grounds suffer from the same unexcused procedural default as a result of Petitioner’s failure to file a Rule 27.26 motion in state court. (Id.). See Hall v. Delo, 41 F.3d 1248, 1249 (8th Cir.1994). (Pet.App.650-51, 830). Because Petitioner cannot establish cause to excuse her procedural default, the Court may reach the merits of her claims only if she presents sufficient evidence of actual innocence in accordance with Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). DISCUSSION I. Schlup v. Delo: The Actual Innocence Gateway In Schlup, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 851. Based on this underlying principle, the Supreme Court has long-recognized the duty of a habeas court to adjudicate procedurally defaulted claims when failure to so would result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id., at 320-21, 115 S.Ct. 851 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-340, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96, 106 S.Ct. 2678, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). “To ensure that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would remain “rare” and would only be applied in the ‘extraordinary case,’ while at the same time ensuring that the exception would extend relief to those who were truly deserving, th[e] [Supreme] Court explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioner’s innocence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321, 115 S.Ct. 851 (citing Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452, 106 S.Ct. 2616; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2678). “Explicitly tying the miscarriage of justice exception to innocence thus accommodates both the systemic interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial resources, and the overriding individual interest in doing justice in the ‘extraordinary case.’ ” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 322, 115 S.Ct. 851 (internal citation omitted). In Schlup, the Supreme Court held that a habeas court could review the merits of procedurally defaulted constitutional claims if the petitioner showed that a “ ‘constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’ ” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2678). “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—-that was not presented at trial.” Id., at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. A petitioner must show that, in light of the new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 (“[P]etitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.”). A petitioner meets his burden under Schlup if he presents “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the Court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Id., at 316, 115 S.Ct. 851. Thus, a claim of actual innocence under Schlup is “ ‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim[s] considered on the merits.’ ” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993)). The Supreme Court explained that the Schlup gateway is designed to “focus the inquiry on actual innocence,” rather than legal innocence. Id., at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. See also, Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 1503, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998) (“‘[T]he miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.’”) (quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514) (alteration in original). For this reason, a district court considering a claim under Schlup is “not bound by rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. “[T]he emphasis on ‘actual innocence’ allows the reviewing tribunal to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial.” Id., at 327-28, 115 S.Ct. 851. The habeas court must make its determination under Schlup “ ‘in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after trial.’” Id., at 328, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). The habeas court must consider the “probative force of the newly presented evidence in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332, 115 S.Ct. 851. “The newly presented evidence may ... call into question the credibility of witnesses presented at trial.” Id., at 330, 115 S.Ct. 851. Thus, the habe-as court must assess the credibility of witnesses in light of the new evidence and the evidence presented at trial. Id., at 330-32, 115 S.Ct. 851. II. Defining “New Evidence’’ under Schlup v. Delo The Eighth Circuit has instructed that, when considering the sufficiency of a petitioner’s showing under Schlup, the district court may only consider evidence that was “not available at trial and could not have been discovered exercise of due diligence.” Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc). In support of its definition of new evidence, the Eighth Circuit cited Smith v. Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 542 (8th Cir.1989). Amrine, 128 F.3d at 1230. In Smith, decided five years before Schlup, the Eighth Circuit held that a petitioner might avoid the “abuse of the writ” doctrine if a claim omitted from a previous petition was based on facts that “could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of reasonable diligence.... ” Id., at 541. Because the evidence proffered by Smith was available at the time the prior petition was filed, the Court concluded that to allow Smith to rely on the evidence in the subsequent petition would “sanction a clear abuse of the writ.” Id., at 542. Reliance on Smith to define “new evidence” in a Schlup claim is inappropriate because the actual innocence exception does permit a habeas court to review the merits of a constitutional claim, notwithstanding that the claim is abusive, successive, or otherwise procedurally barred. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316-17, 115 S.Ct. 851 In addition, while the abuse of the writ doctrine is designed to prevent habeas petitioners from deliberately withholding available claims, the actual innocence exception is designed to identify extraordinarily cases in which a “ ‘constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id., at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2678). Because some of the evidence presented by Petitioner is not “new evidence” as defined by Amrine, the Court must attempt to reconcile the tension between the Eighth Circuit’s definition of “new evidence” and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Schlup. In Schlup, the Supreme Court stated that a petitioner must support his allegations of constitutional error with “new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. Although the Supreme Court could have defined “new evidence” to include only evidence that was unavailable at the time of trial and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, it did not do so. The Supreme Court referred to “unavailable” evidence in only one paragraph in its opinion: [T]he district court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. Instead, the emphasis on ‘actual innocence’ allows the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial. Indeed, with respect to this aspect of the ... standai'd, we believe that Judge Friendly’s description of the inquiry is appropriate: The habeas court must make its determination concerning the petitioner’s innocence “in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28, 115 S.Ct. 851 (footnote omitted). In the foregoing paragraph, the Supreme Court did not limit “new evidence” to evidence which was unavailable at the time of trial. Rather, the Supreme Court directed the habeas court to consider “all the evidence,” which includes, but is not limited to, evidence “available only after trial.” Id. This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier statement requiring a petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with “new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. See also, Calderon, 118 S.Ct. at 1503 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial.”). Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s view that, because of the “emphasis on actual innocence,” a habeas court considering a Schlup claim is permitted to consider a “broader array of evidence.” Id., at 328, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Supreme Court’s delineation of what constituted “new evidence” under the facts of Schlup further reveals the conflict between the Eighth Circuit’s definition of “new evidence” and that of the Supreme Court in Schlup. The essential underlying facts in Schlup were summarized by the Eighth Circuit in Armine: Schlup was a Missouri prisoner who had been convicted of participating in the murder of a fellow inmate and sentenced to die. The state’s case at trial consisted primarily of eyewitness testimony from two correctional officers who said they had seen Schlup holding the victim while another inmate stabbed Mm. Schlup denied involvement and presented a videotape showing him entering the dining hall shortly after the stabbing. He claimed he could not have reached the hall at the time shown on a clock if he had participated in the murder. Amrine, 128 F.3d at 1227. The Supreme Court stated that the affidavits of John Green and Lieutenant Robert Faherty were “new statements” which wei'e “particularly relevant” in determining whether Schlup presented sufficient evidence of actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 317, 331, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Supreme Court did not suggest that statements of Faherty and Green were unavailable at the time of trial. Rather, the Supreme Court indicated that both witnesses were available at the time of trial and were willing to state precisely what they stated in their affidavits in the habeas proceeding. Id., at 311 n. 21, 312 n. 25, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Supreme Court noted that “Faherty had testified at Schlup’s trial, but had not been asked about the significant details of his encounter with Schlup that are recited in his affidavit.” Id., at 312 n. 25, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Court further noted that Green stated in an affidavit in the habeas proceeding that, if he had been contacted before Schlup’s trial, he would have informed Schlup’s attorney of the information contained in his affidavit. Id., at 311 n. 21, 115 S.Ct. 851. The United States Supreme Court characterized Faherty and Green’s affidavits as “new statements,” even though the information in those statements was available at the time of trial and could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence. Thus, the Supreme Court’s definition of “new evidence,” as articulated and as applied in Schlup, is broader than the Eighth Circuit’s definition. The Eighth Circuit’s definition of “new evidence” limits the scope of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception in a manner not contemplated by the Supreme Court. The availability of the fundamental miscarriage of justice, or actual innocence, exception is extremely limited, according to the Supreme Court, not because the petitioner must present evidence that was unavailable at the time of trial, but because “habeas corpus petitions that advance a substantial claim of actual innocence are extremely rare.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321, 115 S.Ct. 851. By requiring the petitioner to bear the burden of proving that it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict in light of the new evidence, the Supreme Court accommodated the “systemic interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial resources, and the overriding interest in doing justice in the ‘extraordinary case.’ ” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 322, 115 S.Ct. 851. Because evidence sufficient to sustain this burden is “unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Supreme Court, therefore, emphasized that, by their nature, substantial claims of actual innocence are extremely rare. Id. To restrict the availability of the actual innocence exception based upon whether the evidence was available at the time of trial places greater limits on the exception than the Supreme Court contemplated in Schlup. III. Application of Schlup v. Delo to the Evidence Presented by Petitioner Because of the different definitions of “new evidence” specified in the previous section, see supra, Discussion Section II, the Court will divide its discussion of the evidence it considered in assessing Petitioner’s showing of actual innocence into two sections — evidence unavailable at the time of trial and evidence not presented at trial. The former section consists of reliable evidence that is “new” within the meaning of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Amrine. The latter section consists of all other reliable evidence of actual innocence which was presented to this Court, but not presented during Petitioner’s trial. This case does not present the Court with the difficult choice of whether it is appropriate to follow the definition -of new evidence articulated in Amrine in light of its inconsistencies with the Schlup opinion because the Court concludes that the evidence presented by Petitioner that was unavailable at the time of trial, see infra, Discussion Section III.A, is more than sufficient to prove Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo. The evidence which was available, but not presented at trial, see Discussion Section III.B, infra, strengthens, but is not essential to, Petitioner’s successful showing of actual innocence. A. Evidence Unavailable at the Time of Trial 1. The Reasonover-White Tape Petitioner was arrested for the Vicker’s murder at approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 7, 1999. (Suppression Hr’g Tr., at 64). See Reasonover, 714 S.W.2d at 711. Petitioner was arrested at the Dellwood police station where she had been “interviewed” during the previous two hours. (Suppression Hr’g Tr., at 61-62, 70-71). After her arrest — but before she was incarcerated with Rose Jolliff, at approximately 10:00 p.m., at the Jennings jail— Petitioner was put into a cell at the Dell-wood jail. (Reasonover Test., Sta. White Test., Chapman Test.; Pet.Ex. 1-2). Stanley White, who had also been arrested for the Vicker’s murder, see Suppression Hr’g Tr., at 67, was placed in a separate cell next to Petitioner at the Dell-wood jail. (Reasonover Test., Sta. White Test., Chapman Test.). The two cells were on the same side of a hallway and were separated by a wall. (Reasonover Test., Sta. White Test.). Petitioner and White saw each other when White was escorted down the hallway to his cell. (Id.). After White was locked in his cell. Petitioner and White could not see each other. (Id.). Petitioner and White, however, could hear each other and engaged in an extended discussion. (Id.). Although Petitioner and White thought they were engaged in a private conversation, see id., the police secretly recorded their conversation. (Chapman Test.; Pet.Ex. 1-2). The purpose of recording Petitioner and WTiite was to see whether, in a private discussion, they would say anything incriminating. (Chapman Test.). To that end, a recording device was strategically placed in an area around the cells, and Petitioner and WTiite were left alone to talk. (Id.). The tape of the conversation between Petitioner and WTiite (“Reasonover-White Tape”) is approximately fifty-six minutes in length. (Pet.Ex.1-2). The parties stipulate that Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 is an accurate copy of the tape, and that Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 is an enhanced version of the tape which does not alter the spoken words in any way. (Stipulations, ¶¶ 1-2). The Court finds that Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 is a written transcript of the spoken words which can be heard on the Reasonover-White Tape. (Pet.Ex.1-3). Because Petitioner and White believed they were engaged in a candid discussion, and because the tape is accurate recording of what was said, the Court finds that the tape is reliable evidence material to Petitioner’s showing of actual innocence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851 (petitioner must support claim of actual innocence with “reliable evidence”); Amrine, 128 F.3d at 1230 (habeas court must determine if the “evidence is reliable”). Although Petitioner and White’s candid statements are laced with profanity and could best be described as “street talk,” the natural language confirms that Petitioner and White believed that they were talking only to each other. a. What Petitioner Saw and Did on the Night of the Murder Petitioner tells White that she drove her car to the laundromat at around midnight on the night of the murder to do laundry. (Pet.Ex. 3, at 6, 30). Between 1:15 a.m. and 1:45 a.m., Petitioner drove her car to the Vicker’s station to get some change. (Id., at 3, 30). Petitioner got out of her car and, while “standin’ off at a distance,” saw a man at the cashier’s window who she believed was Willie Love. (Id., at 35) (“And you know who it was? ... William Love, Looked like it. I’m pretty sure it was. But then, you know, it might not ‘cause see I was standin’ off at a distance. See what I’m sayin’?”). See also, Id., at 3, 6, 10, 14. The man whom Petitioner saw at the window was wearing a red and black shirt. (Id., at 5) (“[H]e had on a red shirt .... had black checkers, um cotton, fishin’ hun-tin’ shirt.”). See also Id., at 26, 35. After she saw the man at the window, he “took his cap off and went in the back.” (Id., at 5). Petitioner tells White that she saw another man at the Vicker’s station, and that this man was wearing a green army jacket. (Id., at 5, 8, 14). Petitioner tells White that she knocked on the cashier’s window at Vicker’s, but could not get any service. (Id., at 3, 30). See also, Id., at 33 (“Yeah, knocked on the motherfuckin’ window and shit, and the nigger didn’t come back to the window.”). Unable to get change at the Vicker’s station, Petitioner drove her car to a nearby 7-Eleven. (Id. at 3, 33). Petitioner tells White that the same men she saw at the Vicker’s station arrived at the 7-Eleven shortly after she did. (Id., at 8) (“And when I got up to 7-Eleven I seen Love again and I seen his friend ... in that army jacket.”). See also, Id., at 3, 10, 35. After getting change at 7-Eleven, Petitioner returned to the laundromat, finished her laundry, and drove home. (Id., at 24) (“When I went to the laundromat and came back ... I had to make six trips up and down to the car to bring the clothes up.”). b. What Stanley White Did on the Night of the Murder Petitioner discusses the fact that she and Stanley White were not together on the night of the murder. Petitioner and White had not seen each other since White “knocked out” the windows in Petitioner’s car, which was several days prior to the Vicker’s murder. (Pet.Ex. 3, at 4, 14). Evidently, White and Petitioner had been dating and White’s actions relating to Petitioner’s car triggered a breakup. (Id., at 14) (W: “Still love me, baby?” R: “Nope and I told you ... that shit dead after what ya’ll did to me. I told em’ ‘Yeah, last time I seen Stan was the uh, the night he broke out my windows. He’s been calling me ‘bout a thousand time, but I ain’t seen him since.’ You know that shit dead ... you know you drink too much ... turn you wild.”). White does not appear to know when the murder occurred. He asks Petitioner several times about when the murder happened. (Id., at 19) (“Now, this incident took place Saturday night?”). See also, Id., at 6 (W: “What night’s that?” R: “Saturday night carrying over to Sunday mornin’. Saturday night — think I got [to the laundromat] ‘bout twelve o’clock.”). Petitioner reminds White that she called him on that Saturday night and told him that she was “goin’ down to do that wash.” (Id., at 6). White recalls that he had been staying at “Woody’s” house since the previous Tuesday, he had not been out toward the Vicker’s station since Saturday morning, and was at “Woody’s” house on Saturday night. (Id., at 6-7, 19-20, 24, 31). c. Petitioner and White’s Attempts Help the Police Early on during their conversation, White encourages Petitioner to tell the police exactly what she saw. (Id., at 4). Petitioner responds, “I told! They know that, they know that, that I told ‘em I seen that nigger William Love at the window, or if it wasn’t, it was his motherfucking twin. And I told ‘em I had seen ‘em up there at the 7-Eleven too, they know that ... I told.” (Id.). Later, 'White asks Petitioner if she told the police whom she saw. (Id., at 6). Petitioner responds, “Yeah, I told ‘em Willie Love ... Hell yeah, I told ‘em.” (Id.). See also, Id., at 27 (W: “Now I don’t know who did what, but, uh — You know what you seen don’t ya?” R: “Fuck, yeah!”). Petitioner repeatedly states that she was just trying to help the police, but now regrets coming forward as a witness. (Id., at 13-14) (“Be glad when these mother-fucks get they shit together. But if I ever do see that dude again in that green army jacket on an the nigger out there at the window I won’t tell no motherfuckers shit! I was trying to help them.... I told ‘em who I thought I seen.... They don’t believe me. These motherfuckers are crazy!”). Petitioner states, “Pm tryin’ to help they motherfuckin’ ass an’ tell ‘em who I seen behind that motherfuckin’ window. They standin’ there tellin’ me Love is a diamond man. I don’t give a fuck. I know what the fuck I seen up there at the window. Hell, it sure the fuck looked jus’ like him ...” (Id., at 10). See also, Id., at 8. Petitioner says that, if she had information that White or anybody else was involved in the murder, she would tell the police. Petitioner says, “[I]f I had someth-in’ to do with that shit, ... I’d a snitched on you and everybody else that I thought was involved.” (Id., at 4). White agrees with Petitioner, saying, “If you did, if we did do that, you s’posed to tell em,” to which Petitioner responds, “I’da told ‘em! Hell, yeah I’da told ‘em! Shit, I told ‘em if I’d been up there with ya, and you did it, I’da jumped out the ear and ran to the motherfuckin’ police station!” (Id., at 11-12). Petitioner and White discuss how the police attempted to get each of them to “spill the beans” on the other. Petitioner quotes the police, saying “ ‘Soon as Stan spill the beans on you, you gonna be gone and he gonna be out.’ ” (Id., at 16). The following exchange ensued: W: I ain’t got no beans to spill. R: I’m tellin’ ya! W: And going to tell you somethin’ — if had some they gonna be failin’! You hear me? ... Just like if you knew, if I knew somethin’ was goin’ on and you knew somethin’ was going on you might — hey— R: You know how I run my mouth! I’da told ‘em quick! W: I’m gonna tell you somethin’. I don’t give a fuck what they say to me. Pm speakin’ the truth for what I know. R: Hell, yeah! W: I know I ain’t did nothin’ R: Hell, yeah! I been telling the truth all day. (Id., at 16-17). Petitioner recalls the police saying, “He gonna spill the beans on you in a minute. You might as well spill them on him first.” (Id., at 33). White then says. “Ain’t no beans to be spillin’,” to which Petitioner responds, “I’m tellin ya’. Ain’t no motherfuckin’ beans to spill. These motherfuckers is crazy!” (Id.). d. Petitioner and White’s Shock and Disgust about the Murder of the “Young Boy” Petitioner and White repeatedly express shock and disgust over the murder of the Vicker’s attendant. Petitioner says to White, “I know you ain’t did no shit like that.... Talking ‘bout rob and kill some motherfucker, took a young boy’s life, aint that a bitch? And here I gotta motherfuc-kin’ daughter.” (Id., at 4). Petitioner says that whoever took the “young boy’s” life is “sick” and “cold,” to which White responds, “I’m tellin ya!” (Id., at 13). See also, Id., at 40 (R: “These motherfuckers gotta be out of their mind and think that we gonna take a young boy’s life, Stan. Ain’t that pitiful?” W: “I’m tellin’ ya!”). Petitioner and White comment about how the police officers showed them pictures of the victim’s dead body. Petitioner and White stated as follows: W: I’m tellin’ ya. That hurt me ba — ,it hurt me even knowing that happen .... R: I’m tellin’ ya, boy! It hurt me when I heard it happened too, ‘cause it right around from my corner and plus they showed me these pictures, boy, and that really fucked me up. They really fucked me up.... [I]t don’t make no difference, he coulda been red, white, black, blue — he’s a young boy and he got killed. I don’t trip off the mother-fuckin’ color. But if — You know if he’d been a black boy, they wouldn’ta been all about this, tryin’ to find out who killed him and shit. (Id., at 37). In another exchange. Petitioner and White state as follows: R: [T]hey had the nerve to show me that little white boy picture. That jus’ really fucked me up. W: Did it? R: Yeah they showed that shit. He look all pitiful layin’ down there. I said, ‘Man, whoever killed him, that was cold.’ That was really cold. They, did they show it to you? W: Um hum (affirmative) R: And they gone tell me — I say, ‘You get that bullshit out of my face. I don’t wanna see that bullshit.’ Then he gonna go upstairs and tell everybody in the building that I didn’t want to look at it. Then gonna come back and ask me ‘why you ain’t ... gonna look at the pictures?’ I said, ‘For what? I done seen too many motherfuckers below my feet dead and I ain’t about to see, ready to see no more.’ (Id., at 29). See also, Id., at 8 (W: “They showed me them pictures I mean, I just looked like and I ... babe ... I ... ” R: “Of that dead dude?” W: “Yeah.” R: ‘Yeah, I, they showed me them pictures too. I told ‘em, ‘Get ... that shit outta my face. I don’t wanna look at no shit like that.’ And I didn’t look at that shit. I threw that shit back at him. I turned that shit over. Fuck that shit. See nobody dead. I ain’t did shit!”). e. Petitioner and White’s Attempts to Figure Out Why They’ve Been Arrested Petitioner and White search in vain for a reason why they’ve been arrested. Petitioner and White believe that White has probably been arrested because he is wearing a red and black shirt similar to the one worn by the man that Petitioner saw at the cashier’s window. (Id., at 5) (R: “I ain’t never seen you with that shirt on before, ain’t gonna lie to *ya ... [H]e had on a red shirt like yours, had black checkers, um cotton, fishin’ huntin’ shirt.... That’s what that nigger had on at the window.... That’s why they probably trippin’ off of you so tough.”). See also, Id., at 8, 10, 14, 26, 28, 30, 35. Petitioner also tells White that she thinks he may have been arrested because the police know he broke the windows out of Petitioner’s car. (Id., at 8). Petitioner and White believe that Petitioner has probably been arrested because the police had previously accused her of robbing another Vicker’s station. (Id., at 11, 16, 27, 32). Petitioner and White think that, perhaps, the police just “want somebody.” 2. Evidence Impeaching the Credibility of Rose Jolliffs Trial Testimony The Reasonover-White Tape casts grave doubt upon the credibility of Rose Jolliffs trial testimony. The tape contains a candid, reliable account of Petitioner and Stanley White’s actions before, during, and after the murder of James Buckley. The tape describes Petitioner and Stanley White’s bewilderment over their arrests, their shock and disgust about the murder of James Buckley, a “young boy,” and their efforts to help police. Because they were recorded, Petitioner’s statements to Stanley White, do not depend on the credibility or motives of an informant. Significantly, Petitioner’s statements on the Rea-sonover-White Tape, regarding what she saw and did on the night of the murder, are consistent in all relevant respects to the recording of Petitioner’s statements to Captain Dan Chapman on January 4, 1983 (“Sheila Hill Tape”). (Trial Tr., at 442, 472). See Pet.Ex. 24. In order to believe Rose Jolliff, a finder of fact would have to believe that, just hours after her conversation with Stanley White, Petitioner contradicted herself in every relevant respect to a woman whom she had never before met. Not only is Jolliffs account of Petitioner’s statements impeached by almost every statement on the Reasonover-Tape, but Jolliffs account is not corroborated in any way by the Reasonover-White Tape. For instance, Petitioner and White never mention anyone by the name of Robert McIntosh, or any nickname likely to be associated with the name of Robert McIntosh. Petitioner and White never mention any details suggesting that they know the specific manner in which James Buckley died; they do not mention that Buckley was shot seven times; they do not mention that a rifle was used; they do not mention who shot the gun. Petitioner and White never mention any details suggesting that they know what the intentions of the assailants were; they do not mention knowing that someone was supposed to distract the boy at the window; they do not mention that the boy was shot because he could identify the assailants. The Court finds that the contents of the Reasonover-White Tape discredits the trial testimony of Rose Jolliff. Based on the contents of Reasonover-White Tape alone, this Court concludes that it “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have” believed Rose Jolliffs trial testimony. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. That is, it is more likely than not that any reasonable juror, conscientiously obeying the instructions of the trial court, would have a reasonable doubt as to the credibility of Jolliffs trial testimony. Id., at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851. The record also contains substantial additional evidence that would further impeach Jolliffs credibility in the mind of any reasonable juror. a. The Jolliff-Reasonover Tape Petitioner and Jolliff were in custody at the Jennings Jail from January 7, 1983, at approximately 10:00 p.m., until the morning of January 8, 1983. (Trial Tr., at 673-74). See Reasonover, 714 S.W.2d at 711. On January 12, 1983, Jolliff called Petitioner on the telephone and part of the conversation was recorded by the police (“Jolliff-Reasonover Tape”). (Pet.Ex.37). The taped conversation is approximately ten minutes in length. Petitioner’s Exhibit 37 is an unenhanced copy of the Jolliff-Reasonover Tape. Respondent does not dispute the authenticity of Petitioner’s Exhibit 37. Because the tape is accurate recording of what was said, the Court finds that the tape is reliable evidence material to Petitioner’s showing of actual innocence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851; Amrine, 128 F.3d at 1230. Exhibit A to Petitioner’s Post-Hearing Brief has been filed as a transcript of the Jolliff-Reasonover Tape. The Court finds that this transcript is an incomplete representation of the spoken words on the Jol-liff-Reasonover Tape. The transcript is missing many significant words and phrases which the Court discovered after listening to the tape numerous times. The Court has created a complete transcript which represents every spoken word which can be understood on the Jolliff-Reason-over Tape. (Appendix, Ex. A). The transcript created by the Court constitutes the Court’s findings as to what Jolliff and Petitioner can be heard saying on the Jolliff-Reasonover Tape. (Id.). The Court has attached its transcript as Exhibit A to the Court’s Appendix, and has attached the transcript submitted by Petitioner as Exhibit B to the Court’s Appendix. (Appendix, Ex. A-B). The Court will rely on its transcript, see Appendix, Ex. A, in making factual findings and in drawing inferences from the Jolliff-Reasonover Tape. The Court finds that the Jolliff-Reason-over Tape corroborates several of the statements made by Petitioner in the Rea-sonover-White Tape. First, Petitioner tells Jolliff that she was trying to help the police. (Appendix, Ex. A, at —) (R: “I was pickin’ out every motherfucker that I thought it coulda been, ya know, but see I was really trying to help they motherfuc-Mn’ ass.” J: “Um-ham.” R: “Ya know what I’m saying? And they pressuring me and shit.”). (Compare, Pet.Ex. 3, at 8, 10, 13-14). Second, Petitioner says that the men she saw at the 7-Eleven may have been the same men she saw at the Vicker’s station. (Appendix, Ex. A, at 982) (R: “When I had got up to the 7-Eleven, the niggers I has seen coming in looked like the nigger I had seen coming out that was goin’ in the back when I was pulling up there.” J: “Um-hm.” R: “And, uh, what I was saying, it might not even coulda been them. It could have been some more niggers.” J: “Um-hm.” R: “You know what I’m saying? That one just looks like it to me, ya know what I’m saying?”). Compare, Pet.Ex. 3, at 3, 8,10, 33, 35. Compare also, Trial Tr., at 443 (“[W]hen I got up to the 7-Eleven, I was coming up to the store, they were going out of the store.”) (statement by Petitioner on Sheila Hill Tape). Third, Petitioner seems to say that she believes that the police suspect her in the Vicker’s murder because they had previously accused her of committing a crime at a Vicker’s station. (“So ya know I told you I had that other Vicker’s thing back in ’78 when I used to work there.” J: “Uh-huh.” R: “And they tried to put me in the penitentiary for 30 years.” J: “Yeah.” R: “They tripped off_ I had the other Vicker’s thing_They mighta thought_”). Compare, Pet. Ex. 3, at 11, 16, 27, 32. While corroborating several of Petitioner’s statements, the Jolliff-Reasonover Tape fails to corroborate the details of Jolliffs trial testimony. In fact, Jolliff does not sound like someone who just days before heard Petitioner give a detailed confession to the murder. The Court finds significant the following exchange: R: _ Yeah, but what I can’t understand is _ why are they tryin’ to stick me with something I didn’t do? J: I guess they figured you said something to someone in the cell. (Appendix, Ex. A, at 983). Jolliff says that she believes that police “figured” Petitioner said “something to someone” in the cell. Jolliff does not say why the police “figured” this, she does not say what the “something” is, and she does not identify the “someone” to whom the police “figured” Petitioner spoke. Moreover, Jolliff seems to agree with the premise of Petitioner’s question — that the police are trying to “stick” Petitioner with something that she didn’t do. Jolliff says, “They makin’, ya know, they tryin’ to stick it to ya.” (Appendix, Ex. A, at 982). Jolliff portrays herself as Petitioner’s ally, advising Petitioner, “[J]ust be cool ... watch what you’re saying to whoever you’re saying it too.” (Appendix, Ex. A, at 982). See also, Id., at 983 (“[I]f you know your phone tapped, be cool.”). Jolliff tells Petitioner not to worry about her, but tells Petitioner that she might want to “trip off of’ the other woman who was in the cell. (Id., at 982). See also, Id., at 983 (“I don’t know what that other broad is doing, but, ya know, be aware what’s happenin’. Ya know, keep a low profile.”). Petitioner tells Jolliff that she is not worried about the other woman in the cell, saying, “Well, if they do pick her up, then, uh, they ask her anything all she’s gonna tell them is what I told her. That I ain’t did shit. Because I didn’t do nothin’.” To this, Jol-liff responds in the affirmative, “Um-hm.” Significantly, at no time does Petitioner mention anyone by the name of Robert McIntosh, or any nickname likely to be associated with the name of Robert McIntosh. Petitioner does not mention any details suggesting that she knows the specific manner in which James Buckley died; she does not mention that Buckley was shot seven times; she does not mention that a rifle was used; she does not mention who shot the gun. Petitioner never mentions any details suggesting that she knows what the intentions of the assailants were; she does not mention knowing that someone was supposed to distract the boy at the window; she does not mention that the boy was shot because he could identify the assailants. Thus, Jolliffs trial testimony, which was bereft of any reference to a telephone conversation with Petitioner, is wholly uncorroborated by the Jolliff-Rea-sonover Tape. The Court finds that the contents of the Jolliff-Reasonover Tape further discredit the trial testimony of Rose Jolliff. The Court concludes that the contents of the Jolliff-Reasonover Tape further strengthen the Court’s conclusion that, in fight of the new evidence, it is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have” believed Rose Jolliffs trial testimony. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. b. The Understanding Between Jolliff and the State Which Resulted in the Unusually Favorable Disposition of Jolliffs Pending Cases In September of 1982, Rose Jolliff was indicted by the St. Louis County Grand Jury on three felony counts of passing bad checks, account closed. (Pet.Ex.33). On December 20, 1982, Lawrence Mooney, a St. Louis County Prosecutor, recommended that, in exchange for a plea of guilty on all counts, Jolliff receive: 1) five years imprisonment to run concurrently: 2) a suspended execution of sentence (“SES”); 3) five years probation; 4) an order to make restitution; 5) an order to contribute $500.00 to a charitable fund; and 6) eighty-hours of alternative community service. Mooney wrote the recommendation in the court file under which he signed his initials. (Pet.Ex. 33; Mooney Test., O’Hagan Test.). Rose Jolliffs public defender, Stormy White, wrote the recommendation in her case file. (Pet.Ex. 8-D; Sto. White Test.). In January of 1983, Steven Goldman, the prosecutor at Petitioner’s trial, spoke with Rose Jolliff. (Goldman Test.). Goldman recalls speaking with Jolliff immediately after finding out about her from the police. (Goldman Test.). On June 1, 1983, Goldman called Stormy White. (Exhibit 8F; Sto. White Test.). Although Goldman and White have no specific recollection of this phone conversation, (Sto. White Test., Goldman Test.), White’s records from her case file indicate that during the phone conversation Goldman mentioned “Rose Jolliff’ and provided her with the name “Dan Chapman,” the police officer who headed the investigation into the Vicker’s murder. (Pet.Ex.8-F). Goldman recalls speaking to Jolliff again prior to her deposition in South Bend, Indiana. (Goldman Test.). On August 12, 1983, Goldman took Jolliffs deposition in South Bend. (Resp. Hr’g Ex. D). At the deposition, Jolliff testified that Petitioner confessed to the Vicker’s murder. (Id.). On August 15, 1983, Goldman called Stormy White. (Pet.Ex.8-G). White and Goldman have no specific recollection of this conversation. (Goldman Test., Sto. White Test.). Therefore, the Court will rely on the documents in Stormy White’s case file in determining what was said during this conversation. White made handwritten notes documenting the August 15, 1983 conversation with Goldman. As interpreted by White, the notes indicate that 1) Goldman took Jolliffs deposition, 2) Jolliff is scheduled to testify on October 24, 1983, 3) all warrants and National Criminal Information Center (“NCIC”) notices have been cleared, 4) the plea should be done after trial, 5) Goldman will not burn her, and 6) the recommendation is still open. (Pet.Ex. 8-G; Sto. White Test.). In preparation for a maternity leave, White dictated summaries of her case files for Rob Maurer, a public defender who was taking over White’s caseload. (Sto. White Test.). These dictated summaries were typed by White’s secretary and placed in the appropriate case file. (Id.). Petitioner’s Exhibit 8-C is a typed summary relating to Rose Jolliffs case file. (Pet.Ex.8-C). The summary provides as follows: Rose Jolliff is going to be a witness in a Capital Murder case that Steve Goldman is trying. Rose is apparently in Indiana. I have not talked to her in months. The state deposed her in Indiana and is going to pay for her expenses to testify in the trial, [sic] She will be coming in the week of the 24th. After she testifies she is going to plead guilty to this case and be given probation. The details of the plea can be worked after she testifies. The state does not want to allow [Ellen Reasonover’s] Defense Attorney to bring up any kind of deal that might have been made in Rose’s case. I have been assured by Steve Goldman that the state isn’t going to burn her, that she will receive probation. (Pet.Ex.8-C). On December 1, 1983, Jolliff testified against Petitioner. (Trial Tr., at 673, at 710; Pet.App. at 5). Later the same day, Jolliff pleaded guilty to her pending charges in exchange for six months bench probation, a suspended imposition of sentence (“SIS”), and a $26.00 payment to the State of Missouri. (Pet.Ex. 8-H through 8-K). At some point before the plea proceeding, the State’s original recommendation was changed to six months bench probation with an SIS. (Pet.Ex.33). i. The Disposition of Jolliffs Pending Cases was Unusually Favorable The Court finds that the disposition of Jolliffs pending cases was unusually favorable, and significantly more favorable than the original recommendation made by the State. The State originally recommended that the Court impose, but suspend the execution of, a five year term of imprisonment. If Jolliff had received a SIS, the three felony convictions would have been added to her record, regardless of whether she violated probation. See Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Mo.1993) (en banc). By receiving an SIS, Jolliff was able to avoid any convictions so long as she did not violate her sixth month bench probation. Id. (“The obvious legislative purpose of the sentencing alternative of suspended imposition of sentence is to allow a defendant to avoid the stigma of a lifetime conviction and the punitive collateral consequences that follow.... [W]ith suspended imposition of sentence, trial judges have a tool for handling offenders worthy of the most lenient treatment.”). Furthermore, Jolliffs original recommendation called for a five years of standard probation, while the changed recommendation required only six months of bench probation. Thus, Petitioner ended up with a much shorter term of probation, and a less stringent form of probation. Standard probation is more stringent than bench probation because it requires the person on probation to be supervised by a probation officer who is required to report any violations to