Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge. I. PREFACE At approximately 3:00 a.m. on October 15, 1995, Sara Robles was brutally murdered in a vacant lot adjacent to a Winn-Dixie store in Kissimmee, Florida. Her body was discovered that morning, and the Kissimmee Police Department began an investigation. A pager was found at the scene and traced to Petitioner, Scott Mansfield. It was also determined that Mansfield and another man, William Fin-neran, were the last people to be seen with the victim before her death. About 9:30 p.m. that same day, several detectives from the Kissimmee Police Department went to Mansfield’s house and took him to the Kissimmee police station where he was interrogated over the course of two and one-half hours without any Miranda warnings. Shortly after midnight, he was arrested and charged with the murder of Sara Robles. Mansfield’s jury trial was held two years later. Over Mansfield’s objection, the trial judge permitted the State to play a two- and-one-half-hour video of Mansfield’s interrogation to the jury. On November 10, 1997, after approximately five and one-half hours of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict: guilty of murder in the first degree. Following the penalty phase, the jury returned a 12-0 recommendation for imposition of the death penalty. The trial court sentenced Mansfield to death on January 30,1998. Having exhausted his direct appeals and State collateral review over the past ten years, Petitioner now seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The facts, as set forth by the Florida Supreme Court, are as follows: On the morning of October 15, 1995, the body of Sara Robles was found lying in a grassy area next to a Winn-Dixie grocery store in Kissimmee, Florida. Robles was lying on her back with her legs and arms outstretched. Her shirt and skirt were pushed up partially revealing her breasts and pelvic area which were mutilated. Examination revealed that Robles’ nipples had been excised, as well as portions of her labia minor, majora and clitoris. The police recovered from the scene a Winn-Dixie bag with a receipt inside, and another receipt reflecting the purchase of some groceries which were found scattered near Robles’ body, [nl] Robles was found wearing a watch, apparently broken during the murder, which was cracked and stalled at 3 a.m. Additionally, among the items recovered strewn around her body were food stamps and a pager. [nl] Juanita Roberson, a Winn-Dixie night clerk working the early morning hours of October 15, testified that Robles, accompanied by Mansfield, made the purchases reflected in the receipts recovered by the police at the scene. The ensuing investigation revealed that the receipts found near Robles’ body reflected purchases made roughly at 2:35 and 2:36 a.m. [n2] The police then questioned Jesus Alfonso, a friend of Robles, who visited with Robles the previous evening. Alfonso told police that he and Robles went to Rosie’s Pub, located in the same shopping plaza as the Winn-Dixie. Alfonso left the bar at 1:30 a.m., but Robles remained at the bar playing pool with a male whose description matched Mansfield’s. [n2] The receipts found at the crime scene indicated that the documented purchases were made at 1:35 and 1:36 a.m. However, when the police took the receipts to the Winn-Dixie and had the assistant manager run some receipts to check the accuracy of the time reflected therein it was discovered that the registers were approximately an hour behind. Karen Hill, a bartender at Rosie’s Pub, was then interviewed and indicated that Robles was at the bar the previous evening in the company of Mansfield. According to Hill, Mansfield, Robles, and a third individual by the name of William Finneran exited the bar together shortly after 2 a.m. After speaking with other witnesses confirming that Robles was in the company of Mansfield and Finneran during the early morning hours of October 15, the police questioned Finneran who indicated that he had exited the bar with Mansfield and Robles shortly after 2 a.m. and that he last saw them around 3 a.m. at Winn-Dixie. The police, after learning that the pager found at the murder scene was traced to Mansfield, focused their investigation on him. Additionally, the police interviewed Juanita Roberson, a Winn-Dixie night clerk, who indicated that Robles purchased the items reflected in the recovered receipts with a man whose description matched Mansfield’s and that Robles was in the company of that same man outside the Winn-Dixie when Roberson took her break at approximately 3 a.m. the night of the murder. With this information in hand, three detectives went to Mansfield’s residence the night following the murder to question him. Mansfield agreed to be interviewed by the detectives at the police station. Prior to being transported to the station, the detectives noticed that Mansfield had fresh scratches on his knees and hands. Once at the station, he avoided and inconsistently answered many of the questions posed to him during the roughly two-and-a-half hour videotaped session. Specifically, Mansfield admitted to being at Rosie’s Pub with Robles, but initially insisted that he had gone directly home after leaving the bar. Following further questioning, he begrudgingly admitted going to Winn-Dixie after leaving Rosie’s Pub. Shortly before the interrogation ended, the police received further evidence placing Mansfield at the scene of the crime. Juanita Roberson, the Winn-Dixie night clerk, identified Mansfield in a photograph lineup at the police station as the man she saw with Robles outside the Winn-Dixie the previous evening at approximately 3 a.m. The detectives directed Mansfield to lift his shirt at which time they observed a bruise on his chest. The police then arrested Mansfield and took into evidence a ring he was wearing with a distinctive “grim reaper” design. The following day, Mansfield’s brother, Charles, called the police and asked them to come down to his apartment to gather some items found in Mansfield’s room. Once there, the police recovered food stamps, a knife and sheath, clothing, and a towel. [n3] [n3] During its case in chief, the State’s senior crime lab analyst, David Baer, testified as to the results of DNA and blood testing done on the items recovered from Mansfield’s room. His testimony established that some of the items had blood that was consistent with Mansfield’s. The tests conducted on the items recovered from Mansfield’s room, however, did not reveal the presence of Robles’ blood. While at the apartment the police also questioned Mansfield’s 10-year-old niece, Melissa [Johnson], who told them that Mansfield arrived home on the morning of October 15 at about 4:30. Melissa told police that Mansfield came to the door soaking wet, wearing shorts but no shirt, and carrying his shoes. Melissa told police she gave Mansfield a towel at his request, and that she noticed what appeared to be a small blood stain on his shorts. [n4] [n4] During Mansfield’s interrogation with police the previous evening, Mansfield told police that he had taken a swim in the pool in the early morning hours of October 15 before entering the apartment and that his niece saw him enter the apartment afterwards. The State introduced several other witnesses at trial who placed Mansfield with Robles at or near the crime scene at approximately the time the murder was presumed to have occurred. The State’s medical examiner, Dr. Julie Martin, testified as to the existence of a pattern injury on the neck of Robles consistent with the pattern found on the “grim reaper” ring removed from Mansfield following his arrest. Dr. Martin testified that Robles died of asphyxia due to airway compression as a result of blunt force trauma to the neck. Specifically, Dr. Martin opined that the murderer, while straddling Robles, strangled her with one hand, using the other hand or an object (the ring) to press down on her lower neck, causing her trachea to collapse. She further testified as to the existence of extensive bruising about Robles’ eye, neck and collarbone. Dr. Martin concluded that Robles was conscious and struggling to breathe for “more than a few minutes” before becoming unconscious. According to Dr. Martin, Robles was alive but most likely unconscious when parts of her genitalia were excised by a sharp object consistent with the knife recovered from Mansfield’s room. The State also introduced the testimony of convicted felon Michael Derrick Johns who recounted a jailhouse conversation with Mansfield in which Mansfield confessed to Robles’ murder. The defense did not present any evidence. The jury, after being instructed on both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder, found Mansfield guilty of first-degree murder. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty. The trial court followed the recommendation and sentenced Mansfield to death. In support of the death sentence, the trial judge found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (2) the crime was committed during the commission of or an attempt to commit a sexual battery. The court found no statutory mitigation and five nonstatutory mitigators and found the following three mitigators were entitled to very little weight: (1) the defendant’s good conduct during trial; (2) the defendant is an alcoholic; and (3) the defendant’s mother was an alcoholic during his childhood. The court accorded the remaining two mitigators some weight: (1) the defendant had a poor upbringing and dysfunctional family; and (2) the defendant suffers from a brain injury due to head trauma and alcoholism. Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 640-12 (Fla.2000) [hereinafter “Mansfield I ”]. III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On direct appeal, Petitioner raised ten claims. Mansfield I at 642; (App. A55). On March 30, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court issued its opinion affirming Petitioner’s conviction and death sentence. Id.; (App. A58). Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and the Court denied cer-tiorari on April 23, 2001. Mansfield v. Florida, 532 U.S. 998, 121 S.Ct. 1663, 149 L.Ed.2d 644 (2001); (Apps. B1, B3). On April 19, 2002, Petitioner filed his motion for post-conviction relief (styled as “Second Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief’) pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851, raising sixteen claims. (App. D1 at 74-147). Petitioner then filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge based on comments the judge made when he presided over the penalty phase of Petitioner’s trial. (App. D1 at 151-58). The trial court denied the motion, and Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the Florida Supreme Court. (App. Cl). On September 6, 2002, the Florida Supreme Court denied the petition. Mansfield v. State, 826 So.2d 992 (Fla.2002); (App. C2). The trial court granted Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on fifteen of Petitioner’s sixteen post-conviction claims. At the outset of the hearing, Petitioner waived the majority of his post conviction claims related to mitigation. (App. D6 at 530-35). On June 30, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying all of Petitioner’s claims. (App. D3 at 443-77). Petitioner appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion and simultaneously filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Florida Supreme Court. (Apps. D36, D37). In a consolidated opinion, the Florida Supreme Court denied all relief on July 7, 2005. Mansfield v. State, 911 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 2005) [hereinafter “Mansfield II ”]; (App. D42). Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, and that motion was denied on September 15, 2005. (Apps. D43, D44). Petitioner filed the instant petition on October 3, 2005. See Doc. No. 1. IV. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11th Cir.2003). AEDPA “establishes a more deferential standard of review of state habeas judgments,” Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir.2001), in order to “prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (recognizing that the federal habeas court’s evaluation of state-court rulings is highly deferential and that state-court decisions must be given the benefit of the doubt). A. Standard of Review Under AED-PA Pursuant to AEDPA, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in State court unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “clearly established Federal law,” encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1324 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1169, 127 S.Ct. 1126, 166 L.Ed.2d 897 (2007). “[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider.” Maharaj v. Secretary for Dep't. of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir.2005). The meaning of the clauses was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000)): Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. If the federal court concludes that the State court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the State court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” A determination of a factual issue made by a State court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Parker, 244 F.3d at 835-36; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). B. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel’s performance was deficient and “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) whether the deficient' performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir.1989); see also White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir.1992). Accordingly, “the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.” Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir.1994). V. ANALYSIS Petitioner asserts fifteen claims for relief in his federal habeas petition. Upon thorough review and consideration of each claim, the Court has determined that Petitioner’s Miranda claim (Claim One) warrants detailed review. It will, therefore, be discussed in the final portion of this opinion. See Part IV, B, infra. Claims Two through Fifteen require less discussion and will therefore be addressed first. A. Non -Miranda Claims 1. Claims Two and Six — Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravator Petitioner ascribes constitutional error to the trial court’s determination that the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”) ag-gravator applied to his case because it was not supported by the evidence (Claim Two). Petitioner also asserts that the standard jury instruction given at the penalty phase on the HAC aggravator was unconstitutional because it failed to adequately channel the jury’s discretion in recommending a death sentence (Claim Six). At the penalty phase, the trial judge denied defense counsel’s proposed jury instruction on the HAC aggravator and instead instructed the jury: Heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious means outrageously wicked and violent. Cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to or even enjoyment of the suffering of others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious, or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the victim. (App. A51 at 98-99). In its Sentencing Order, the trial court found that the HAC aggravator had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. {See App. A5 at 1131-35). In making this determination, the trial court reasoned that the victim had been “savagely beaten and strangled” and her murder was “conscienceless, pitiless and unnecessarily torturous.” (App. A5 at 1134-35). The trial court further stated that the victim undoubtedly suffered a “slow, painful, and torturous death” in that she was alive and conscious for several minutes while gasping for air, knowing that she was about to die. (App. A5 at 1134). On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that it was pure speculation as to whether the victim suffered during the attack because the medical examiner could not state within a degree of medical certainty exactly how long it took for the victim to lose consciousness. Without this determination, Petitioner asserted, the HAC aggra-vator could not be established. Further, he alleged that it was likely the victim was not conscious during the attack because the victim’s blood alcohol level was over the legal limit. The Florida Supreme Court rejected these arguments and concluded that the trial court’s HAC determination was supported by substantial competent evidence. Mansfield I, 758 So.2d at 645-46. In Claim Two, Petitioner presents the same arguments he presented on direct appeal and asserts that the State courts unreasonably determined that the HAC aggravator applied to his case. Respondents assert that this claim is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal as a federal constitutional violation, but rather as a factual determination made under State law. Upon review of the record, Respondents are correct. Claim Two is proeedurally barred from review by this Court and is accordingly denied. With respect to Claim Six, Respondents similarly assert that this claim is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not raise the claim on appeal as one involving a federal constitutional issue. However, on direct appeal Petitioner argued that the standard HAC jury instruction used at trial violated both the Florida and United States Constitutions. Therefore, Petitioner satisfied the exhaustion requirement, and this claim is properly subject to review. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). Prior to trial, Petitioner’s counsel moved to declare the standard jury instruction on HAC unconstitutional and proposed a jury instruction emphasizing that the victim must have consciously suffered pain for the aggravator to apply. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his requested jury instruction and reaffirmed, as it had on prior occasions, the constitutionality of the objected-to HAC instruction. See Mansfield I, 758 So.2d at 649. Upon review of Claim Six, the Court finds that the Florida Supreme Court did not reach a determination that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Additionally, there is no indication that the result reached by the Florida Supreme Court was at odds with any United States Supreme Court case which considered materially indistinguishable facts. Petitioner has not shown that the instruction was in any manner invalid at the time it was provided to the jury. The trial court used the standard HAC jury instruction, which the Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have consistently upheld against constitutional vagueness challenges. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1159, 116 S.Ct. 1550, 134 L.Ed.2d 653 (1996); Preston v. State, 607 So.2d 404, 410 (Fla.1992); Marquard v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1317 (11th Cir.2005). Accordingly, Claim Six is denied. 2. Claim Three—Proportionality of Sentence Petitioner claims that his death sentence is disproportionate in comparison to other Florida cases and that such arbitrary application of the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Petitioner challenged the proportionality of his sentence on direct appeal and the Florida Supreme Court found Petitioner’s death sentence proportionate when compared to other cases in which the court found death to be the appropriate penalty. Mansfield I, 758 So.2d 636 at 647. Petitioner argues that the State court failed to reasonably compare his case to other cases in which death was found to be non-proportional. In addition, Petitioner requests this Court to address the question of the proportionality of his death sentence on a national scope. The United States Supreme Court has held that proportionality review is not required by the United States Constitution. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). In addition, where State law requires proportionality review, the Eleventh Circuit has held that A federal habeas court should not undertake a review of the state supreme court’s proportionality review and, in effect, “get out the record” to see if the state court’s finding of fact, their conclusion based on a review of similar cases, was supported by the “evidence” in the similar cases. To do so would thrust the federal judiciary into the substantive policy making area of the state. Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511, 1518 (11th Cir.1983) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the argument that federal law requires those State courts which are required to undertake such review to “make an explicit detailed account of their comparisons.” Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1154 (11th Cir.1987). To the .extent Petitioner challenges the Florida Supreme Court’s proportionality review and seeks to have the Court conduct a de novo proportionality review of his sentence, he is not entitled to such relief. The Florida Supreme Court conducted a proportionality review as required by Florida law and determined that no re-sentencing was warranted. This procedure was not done arbitrarily or capriciously and provided an adequate safeguard of Petitioner’s rights. Accordingly, this claim is denied. 3. Claim Four—Findings Related to Non-Statutory Mitigating Factors Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to fully consider and adequately weigh certain non-statutory mitigating factors in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In connection with this claim, Petitioner refers to the following non-statutory mitigating factors: (1) he served his country in the military; (2) he completed a substance abuse and mental health program; (3) he had never been convicted of a violent felony; and (4) assuming he committed the offense, he did so while he was intoxicated. During the penalty phase, Petitioner’s trial counsel introduced evidence of Petitioner’s service in the military by presenting his discharge papers. Although the military record indicated that Petitioner’s discharge was under honorable conditions, it also indicated that it was an expeditious discharge for failure to maintain acceptable standards for retention. (See App. A51 at 1101-02). In light of the type of discharge Petitioner received, the trial court found that this mitigating circumstance was not proven. (App. A5 at 1137). Additionally, trial counsel entered into evidence a certificate of recognition Petitioner purportedly received for completion of a substance abuse and mental health program in 1994. (App. A51 at 1101). However, the trial court discounted this mitigating circumstance because the certificate only indicated that Petitioner’s attendance and efforts in the program were excellent and not that he successfully completed the program. (App. A5 at 1139). With respect to Petitioner’s contention that he had never been previously convicted of a violent felony, the trial court found that it was not a valid mitigating factor to be considered. (App. A5 at 1139). Finally, the trial court found Petitioner to be an alcoholic and accorded this mitigating circumstance very little weight. Based upon the testimony, it is quite clear that the defendant has had a long history of alcohol abuse dating back many years. It is also clear that the defendant was drinking the night of this crime. But there is no evidence to show that at the time of the commission of this horrible crime that he did not know what he was doing or that alcohol has [sic] affected him in any way. The statements by the defendant to Michael Johns about what he did to the victim shows that he was keenly aware of what he was doing. (App. A5 at 1138). On appeal, Petitioner ascribed error in the trial court’s findings on the proposed mitigators. The Florida Supreme Court agreed that Petitioner’s service in the military and completion of a substance abuse and mental health program were not established by the evidence presented at the penalty phase. See Mansfield I, 758 So.2d at 646. Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court found no error in the rejection of Petitioner’s non-existent violent felony record to be a valid mitigating factor. Id. Finally, in considering Petitioner’s argument that the trial court erred in its decision to accord the voluntary intoxication mitigator little weight, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s finding and found it consistent with precedent. Id. at 646-47 (citing Raleigh v. State, 705 So.2d 1324, 1330 (Fla.1997)). To the extent Petitioner challenges the State courts’ findings, he has not carried his burden under § 2254(e). As such, he has failed to demonstrate that the resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, and this claim is therefore denied pursuant to § 2254(d). Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner challenges the amount of weight given to these mitigating factors, federal law provides him no relief. “The Constitution requires that the sentencer be allowed to consider and give effect to evidence offered in mitigation, but it does not dictate the effect that must be given once the evidence is considered; it does not require the sen-tencer to conclude that a particular fact is mitigating or to give it any particular weight.” Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1329 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1101 (11th Cir.1987)); see also Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11th Cir.1986). Accordingly, this claim is denied. 4. Claim Five—Admission of Evidence a. Knife and Sheath Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the knife and sheath into evidence because the admission of this evidence was more prejudicial than probative. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the State failed to link the knife to him and establish that it was the same knife used in the homicide. See Doc. No. 1 at 23. As a result, Petitioner claims the jury was allowed to falsely assume that he was in possession of the murder weapon at the time of his arrest. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude the knife and sheath, (App. A4 at 844-45), which the trial court denied. (App. A42 at 2528). On appeal, Petitioner argued that the knife and sheath were not sufficiently linked to him, did not have any evidentiary value, and that the State failed to adequately demonstrate that the knife was used in the victim’s murder. In denying relief, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the knife and sheath into evidence. Mansfield I, 758 So.2d at 648 (footnote and citation omitted). A federal court deciding a ha-beas petition will not review a trial court’s actions in the admission of evidence unless the admission creates a “fundamental unfairness” in the trial. Osborne v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir.1983); see also Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir.1989). The evidence must be inflammatory or gruesome, and so critical that its introduction denied petitioner a fundamentally fair trial. Osborne, 720 F.2d at 1239; see also Dickson v. Wainwright, 683 F.2d 348, 350 (11th Cir.1982). In other words, the admission of prejudicial evidence justifies habeas relief only if the evidence “is material in the sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant factor.” Hills v. Henderson, 529 F.2d 397, 401 (5th Cir.1976) (quoting Corpus v. Beto, 469 F.2d 953, 956 (5th Cir.1972)). Even if there was error in the admission of the knife and sheath, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that this error tainted the fundamental fairness of his trial. The State’s medical examiner was thoroughly questioned by both the prosecutor and defense counsel regarding the victim’s injuries and whether the wounds could have been inflicted by the knife that was turned over to police by Petitioner’s brother. In responding to these questions, the medical examiner merely represented that some of the victim’s injuries could have been produced by a knife and these wounds were consistent with certain characteristics of the knife found in Petitioner’s room. However, she further indicated that it was possible that another knife could have caused the victim’s injuries. (See Apps. A45 at 472-74; A46 at 514, 517). In light of this testimony, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate fundamental unfairness. Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of this claim on direct appeal was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it an unreasonable application of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Accordingly, this claim is denied. b. Photographs In addition to the knife and sheath, Petitioner challenged the admission of photographs depicting the mutilation of the victim’s genitalia and an autopsy photograph of the victim’s brain, arguing that they were unnecessary and served no other purpose other than to inflame the passions of the jury and further prejudice Petitioner. Pursuant to Florida law, “[t]he admission of photographs is within the trial court’s discretion,” and the appellate court’s review of the trial court’s ruling is based on whether the trial court abused its discretion. Manley v. State, 677 So.2d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs because they “were relevant to the medical examiner’s determination as to the manner of the victim’s death, and were probative in the determination of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel and sexual battery aggravators.” Mansfield I, 758 So.2d at 648. Prior to admitting these photographs into evidence, the trial court reviewed each picture, heard argument from both sides, as well as from the state medical examiner, and determined that each of the photographs was relevant and not du-plicative. (See App. A41 at 2236-38). As noted above, in order for an evidentiary error to warrant habeas relief, the admission of the evidence must have rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. See Dickson, 683 F.2d at 350. However, “[t]he introduction of graphic photographic evidence rarely renders a proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir.1992); see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. DeTella, 127 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir.1997). Nothing in the record indicates that the photographs were erroneously admitted. The photographs were relevant and served to corroborate the medical examiner’s testimony concerning the manner of death and the victim’s state of consciousness during the attack. Accordingly, this claim is denied. 5. Claims Seven and Fourteen—Trial Judge’s Comments The basis for Claims Seven and Fourteen concern statements which the trial judge made on the record to counsel, outside the presence of the jury, during the penalty phase of Petitioner’s trial. The statement was made after Petitioner’s trial counsel told the trial judge that the State had made a plea offer to Petitioner of life in prison without the possibility of parole if Petitioner would admit his guilt and waive all rights to appeal. Petitioner did not raise any issue regarding the trial judge’s comments on direct appeal, but first raised the issue in his State post-conviction proceeding. Shortly after filing his State postconviction motion, Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the post-conviction judge, who also served as his trial judge, based on the claim in his post-conviction motion alleging judicial bias. (App. D1 at 151-60). The post-conviction judge denied the motion, finding it to be legally insufficient. (App. D2 at 220-21). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the Florida Supreme Court seeking to prohibit the judge from presiding over any further proceedings in the case, and the court denied the petition. (Apps. Cl; C2). Petitioner’s post conviction motion proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, and thereafter, the post-conviction judge denied Petitioner’s claim related to his comments made at Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court denied relief, finding the claim procedurally barred. Mansfield II, 911 So.2d at 1170-71. Even assuming that the claim was not barred, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Mansfield had failed to demonstrate that he had a well-founded fear that he would not receive a fair trial. Id. In his instant petition, Petitioner raises the same claims he raised in his State post-conviction proceedings. First, Petitioner asserts that the trial judge’s comments indicated bias in favor of the State and the death penalty, and as such, he was denied his right to a fair and impartial tribunal. As the Florida Supreme Court found, this claim is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not make a timely motion to disqualify the judge. Petitioner attempts to overcome this procedural bar by asserting that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to timely file a motion to disqualify. However, this procedural default will be excused only if Petitioner can show both cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the default. See Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir.2003). To establish cause, “a petitioner must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] effort to raise the claim properly in the state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir.1999). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the claim been presented. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has stated that a claim of ineffective assistance will support a finding of cause for a procedural default only if counsel’s performance was “so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). Thus, in order for ineffective assistance of counsel to serve as cause for Petitioner’s procedural default, he must be able to satisfy the exacting standards of Strickland. Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1066 (11th Cir.2002). If Petitioner “cannot prevail on a separate ineffective assistance of counsel claim, then he cannot prevail on an argument that ineffective assistance caused the procedural default.” Id. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the trial judge’s putatively improper remarks, the Court rejects any argument that Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to disqualify the trial judge. Like the State courts, this Court also reads the trial judge’s comments to be an expression of frustration regarding the timing of the State’s plea offer and in no way indicative of bias or prejudice against Petitioner. Thus, because Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is inadequate to constitute cause to overcome the procedural default, Petitioner’s claim that he was denied a fair and impartial tribunal is not subject to federal habeas review. Petitioner’s final claim related to this matter is that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the issue of judicial bias on direct appeal. This claim was considered and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in Petitioner’s state habeas petition on the basis that the claim would have been pro-eedurally barred on direct appeal. See Mansfield II, 911 So.2d at 1179. In any event, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that, even if the claim had been preserved for appeal, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it “because the judge’s comments did not indicate that he was biased against [Petitioner] or that he had predetermined the appropriate sentence to be given.” Id. Having already determined that the trial judge’s comments did not indicate bias or prejudice, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim must also fail. The Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the state court made an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, this claim is denied. 6. Claim Eight—IAC for Failure to File Motion to Suppress Petitioner claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress the introduction into evidence of his “grim reaper” ring and the photographs taken of his torso'following his interrogation. Petitioner raised this claim in his motion for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the State court denied the claim. (App. D3 at 461-62). Petitioner appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding probable cause for the arrest and, therefore, no illegal seizure or improper photographs. Mansfield II, 911 So.2d at 1175 (internal citations omitted). “To obtain relief where an ineffective assistance claim is based on counsel’s failure to file a timely motion to suppress, petitioner must prove: (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, (2) that the Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious, and (3) that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would be different absent the excluded evidence.” Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 455 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)). As noted by the Florida Supreme Court, Petitioner predicates his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the theory that law enforcement officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and that his arrest was the result of law enforcement’s improper interrogation. Therefore, according to Petitioner, his ring and the photographs of his torso were “fruits of an improper arrest and should not have been admitted.” Mansfield, 911 So.2d at 1175. The Court finds no merit in the suggestion that law enforcement lacked probable cause to arrest Petitioner. Probable cause exists “if the facts and circumstances within the collective knowledge of the law enforcement officials, of which they had reasonable trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person of reasonable1 caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 780 F.2d 975, 978 (11th Cir.1986)); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Testimony adduced at the pre-trial hearing held on October 20, 1997, demonstrates that detectives had sufficient evidence tying Petitioner to the victim and the murder scene at the time Petitioner was questioned and subsequently arrested. Specifically, before Petitioner was interviewed, detectives had already spoken with individuals who identified Petitioner as one of the last two people seen with the victim the night of her death. (See App. A41 at 2356-57, 2383, 2391-95). Furthermore, detectives had already traced the pager found at the murder scene to Petitioner and, sometime during the interrogation, were informed that the Winn-Dixie clerk had identified Petitioner from a photo array as the man seen in the store with the victim shortly before her murder. (See App. A41 at 2383, 2391-95, 2402-03). On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court discussed the chronology of events surrounding law enforcement’s investigation and questioning of Petitioner when it considered Petitioner’s Miranda claim. See Mansfield I, 758 So.2d at 640-45. During this discussion, the Florida Supreme Court noted that law enforcement officers possessed “evidence strongly suggesting [Petitioner’s] guilt” during the interrogation. Mansfield I, 758 So.2d at 644. Based on the totality of the information, this Court concludes that law enforcement had sufficient probable cause to arrest Petitioner for the murder of Sara Robles. Having determined that Petitioner’s arrest was lawful, the Court finds that it was permissible for the officers to subsequently take Petitioner’s ring as part of a search incident to a lawful arrest. Moreover, Petitioner’s ring was not taken into police custody until after a judge had reviewed the charging affidavit and found probable cause for Petitioner’s arrest on October 16, 1995. (See App. A1 at 1). The ring was then placed with his personal items in the property room at the Osceola County Jaii and later obtained by investigating officers from the Kissimmee Police Department. It is well established that once a suspect is in custody, the items on his person at the time of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). “Indeed,” as the Edwards Court stated, “it is difficult to perceive what is unreasonable about the police’s examining and holding as evidence those personal effects of the accused that they already have in their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest.” Id. at 806, 94 S.Ct. 1234. Although Petitioner attempts to distinguish Edwards from the instant case in his reply brief, the Court finds his arguments unavailing. Based on the holding of Edwards, trial counsel had no legal basis upon which to file a motion to suppress. Trial counsel even testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that she did not move to suppress the ring because she felt there was no basis for the motion. (App. D7 at 825-27). Because Petitioner cannot establish that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress his ring must fail. Similarly, Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion to suppress the photographs of his torso is also without merit. Although the Florida Supreme Court determined that Petitioner’s videotaped interrogation was erroneously admitted because he was clearly in custody and officers failed to give him Miranda warnings, the officers still had probable cause to effect Petitioner’s arrest. A law enforcement officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation does not render physical evidence obtained subsequent to an improper interrogation inadmissible. See generally United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-42, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004). Irrespective, then, of law enforcement’s failure to give Petitioner Miranda warnings, Petitioner was lawfully arrested and the photographs were taken incident to his lawful arrest. As such, trial counsel would have been unsuccessful in an attempt to suppress the photographs. The State courts’ conclusions in this regard were neither objectively unreasonable nor were they contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, these claims are denied. 7. Claim Nine—Giglio Violation Petitioner next asserts that the State presented false or misleading testimony from Michael Derek Johns, also known as Christopher Randall (“Randall”), a jailhouse inmate who testified at Petitioner’s trial that Petitioner made a number of incriminating statements to him while the two were sharing a holding cell at the Osceola County Courthouse. Specifically, Petitioner characterizes Randall’s trial testimony concerning, inter alia, the status of certain pending federal charges against him as false and misleading and asserts that the State knew of its falsity and failed to correct it in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Petitioner raised this claim for the first time in his motion for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the claim, and Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court considered Petitioner’s Giglio claim and found it to be without merit. Mansfield II, 911 So.2d at 1176-78. Nevertheless, Petitioner attacks the findings made by the Florida Supreme Court and contends that the prosecution “failed in its obligation to present Mr. Randall’s testimony in an accurate and truthful manner” and “Mr. Randall’s falsehoods and omissions deprived the jury of critical information which bore directly on his credibility and motivation to fabricate testimony.” (Doc. No. 1 at 48, 52.) Under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), a defendant’s due process rights are violated when the prosecution knowingly fails to correct a material falsehood in the testimony of any witness. This rule covers not only inculpatory false testimony, but also falsehoods tending to enhance the credibility of a witness. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. “[T]he falsehood is deemed to be material ‘if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.’ ” United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). The thrust of Giglio and its progeny has been to ensure that the jury knows the facts that might motivate or bias a witness, and to ensure that the prosecutor does not fraudulently conceal such facts from the jury. Ventura v. Att’y Gen., Fla., 419 F.3d 1269, 1282 (11th Cir.2005). To establish a Giglio violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the testimony was false, that the State knew the testimony was false, and that the false testimony was material (i.e., there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury). DeMarco v. United States, 928 F.2d 1074 (11th Cir.1991). In other words, to prevail on his Giglio claim, Petitioner “must establish that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony, and that the falsehood was material.” Maharaj v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d-1292, 1312 (11th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). The false testimony is material when it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1042 (11th Cir.2001). It is clear that Randall is a professional crook with an amazing ability to coax fellow inmates into confessing their crimes. He is also an habitual snitch, having testified or provided incriminating information against at least twenty (20) of his fellow inmates. In this case, he received Petitioner’s confession (and that of another cell mate) while in a courthouse holding cell. Ostensibly, Petitioner, while fighting first degree murder charges, decided to confess to Randall, even though they barely knew each other, and Petitioner had no reason to trust him. In exchange for his testimony against Petitioner, the State made his assistance known to both State and federal prosecutors in connection with pending sentencings. While no direct promises were made by the prosecutor in this case, Randall knew well how the system works. Providing assistance to the State in someone else’s trial results in favorable consideration by the sentencing court and the likelihood of a reduced sentence. With this scenario in mind, one must take Randall’s testimony with a grain of salt. Indeed, there is good reason to reject his testimony as incredible. However, the jury heard his testimony as well as the impeaching evidence against him. The weight, if any, given by the jury to this testimony is, of course, unknown. In any case, there was evidence from which a jury could convict Petitioner, even if Randall’s testimony were substantially discounted. Moreover, there is no support for the argument that Randall’s testimony was constitutionally infirm. In assessing Petitioner’s claim, the Florida Supreme Court correctly cited the standard for evaluating Giglio claims and determined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that such a violation occurred in his case. Similarly, this Court finds no Giglio violation in connection with Randall’s testimony. First, Randall’s testimony concerning his pending federal charges was not ostensibly false. Second, defense counsel was aware of, and had access to, the same information as the State’s attorney concerning the federal charges pending against Randall. Moreover, even if Randall’s testimony concerning his pending federal charges was false, it was immaterial. Although Randall was no doubt an important witness to the State, Petitioner’s trial counsel thoroughly impeached his credibility on cross-examination. The jury was made aware of Randall’s extensive criminal history and reputation for informing on fellow inmates. Further, trial counsel attacked Randall’s motivation for testifying, focusing on the fact that he was awaiting sentencing on State charges to which he pled guilty in the hopes that his cooperation with law enforcement would aid in a favorable sentence. If the things the members of the jury already knew about Randall did not convince them to reject his testimony, it seems unlikely that the knowledge that he was facing additional federal charges would have led them to do so. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Giglio claim is denied. 8. Claim Ten — IAC During Yoir Dire Petitioner next asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately question eight jurors during voir dire. Petitioner contends that these eight jurors revealed potential bias in responses to questions on their juror questionnaires, and that this potential bias was not adequately addressed by trial counsel. As a result, Petitioner argues that he may not have been tried by an impartial jury. Petitioner raised this claim in his motion for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the claim on the basis that it was “speculative in that it assumed different jurors would have come to a different conclusion, but offers no support for that proposition.” (App. D3 at 457-58). On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed and found: The trial record reveals that the trial court, the State, and defense counsel engaged in substantial questioning of the potential jurors. Michael Irwin, co-defense counsel for Mansfield, utilized the juror questionnaires throughout voir dire. He asked jurors about contradictory answers in their questionnaires. During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Mansfield’s trial counsel were questioned about jury selection. Counsel were not asked about specific jurors and why questions were or were not asked of specific jurors. However, defense counsel testified at the hearing that they struck the least desirable jurors. Defense counsel Kathleen Flam-mia testified at the postconviction evi-dentiary hearing that in this process, she generally employed a strategy during voir dire selection wherein she prioritized which jurors to strike. Trial counsel used all ten of their peremptory challenges. Trial counsel consulted with Mansfield, who gave his own input as to the jurors. Mansfield has not pointed to any instances in which the record demonstrates that counsel did not conduct the voir dire in accord with reasonable professional norms. Our review of the record indicates in the voir dire in this case that trial counsel and the trial court sufficiently questioned the prospective jurors so that it could reasonably be determined that the jurors who were jurors in the trial could lay aside bias and prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence and instructions. We find no error in the trial court’s denial of this claim. Griffin v. State, 866 So.2d 1, 12-13 (Fla.2003). Mansfield II, 911 So.2d at 1172. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be tried by an impartial jury, and this right is secured, in no small part, by the system of challenges exercised during the voir dire of prospective jurors. See United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir.1976) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)); see also Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1188 (11th Cir.1982). “The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain whether potential jurors can render a verdict solely on the basis of evidence presented and the charge of the trial court.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1150 (11th Cir.1987); see also J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143-44, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (“Voir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise then-peremptory challenges intelligently.”). Thus, “[v]oir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981); see also Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 481, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). “Counsel is ... accorded particular deference when conducting voir dire. An attorney’s actions during voir dire are considered to be matters of trial strategy.” Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1349 (10th Cir.1997)); see also Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1172 (5th Cir.1995). A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire must show that trial counsel’s actions were “so ill chosen that it permeate[d] the entire trial with obvious unfairness.” Hughes, 258 F.3d at 457. Further, because empaneled jurors are presumed to be impartial, see Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869, 876 (11th Cir.1985), the petitioner must show that the selection process produced a biased juror to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Id. at 458; see also Ingram v. Zant, 26 F.3d 1047, 1053 (11th Cir.1994) (“Be-caúse we presume that jurors follow such instructions, we must assume that the jury put aside any biases it may have had, applied the legal standards as enunciated in the jury instructions, and based its sentencing decision on the facts introduced at trial and sentencing.”). Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the voir dire transcript in relation to Jurors Best, Duffield, Etheridge, Hall, Hawes, Mathews, Henley and Santiago, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that these empaneled jurors could not be impartial. See Wilcox, 813 F.2d at 1150 (noting that federal courts reviewing the question of whether a particular juror is impartial must determine whether there is fair support in the record for the State court’s conclusion that the juror would be impartial). Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court must presume that the jurors were fair and impartial “as indeed they swore to be.” United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir.1990) (footnote omitted). As such, Petitioner cannot show that the State courts’ determinations that he failed to satisfy Strickland were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Having failed to make the necessary showing, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 9. Claim Eleven — IAC a. Failure to Present Theory of Defense Related to Location of Pager Petitioner’s next claim focuses on the location of his pager at the crime scene and law enforcement’s documentation of the crime scene. Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a “coherent” defense in connection with the location of his pager, which was “allegedly” found at the crime scene. Specifically, Petitioner contends that testimony by law enforcement officers created a false impression that the pager was found near the victim’s body. Petitioner raised this claim in his motion for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the claim finding that trial counsel was not ineffective because “[witnesses were questioned repeatedly about the distance between the victim’s body and where the pager was found, the premise being that [Petitioner] had simply dropped the pager near the wall of the Winn Dixie.” (App. D3 at 457). Further, the court noted that all estimates by witnesses ranged between three and twenty feet. Petitioner appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court aff