Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER Honorable PAUL A. CROTTY, District Judge: The pending cases are another chapter in New York City’s seven-decade attempt to control where outdoor advertising companies locate certain commercial billboards and street signs. Since 1940, New York City’s zoning regulations have banned outdoor advertising companies from placing commercial billboards, which do not advertise an on-premise business, within 200 feet and within view of the City’s major parkways and roadways, also known as “arterial highways.” The City’s enforcement of its zoning regulations has been inconsistent and less than vigorous. The billboard industry has taken advantage of this lax enforcement and has consistently ignored the regulations on billboard sign location. The first case is the consolidated action of Plaintiffs Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., Atlantic Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Scenic Outdoor, Inc., Troystar City Outdoor, LLC, and Willow Media, LLC (together, the “Clear Channel Plaintiffs”). They own large billboards located near arterial highways in New York City. The second case involves Plaintiff Metro Fuel, LLC (“Metro Fuel”), an owner of significantly smaller “panel” advertising signs that are situated on building fronts and poles close to the street, but are illuminated in a manner contrary to the zoning rules. The Plaintiffs challenge the City’s updated restrictions that: (1) limit the location and illumination of these commercial billboards and smaller signs; and (2) create strict permitting and registration procedures for existing outdoor signs. The Plaintiffs claim that the restrictions infringe upon their commercial free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under the New York State Constitution. The City asserts that the regulations further its interest in improving traffic safety and aesthetics. When put into effect the regulations will impact Plaintiffs’ business revenue from the rental of outdoor advertising signs because many existing signs will not conform to the location limitations embodied in the zoning regulations. The Clear Channel Plaintiffs and Metro Fuel argue that the City enforces its zoning regulations unevenly, and, in certain cases, in a manner that unconstitutionally favors the City in violation of First Amendment speech protections. Plaintiffs recognize, as they must, that the City is entitled to regulate outdoor advertising, but they argue that the City cannot regulate in the way that it intends. Plaintiffs claim that the City’s regulatory scheme is riddled with exceptions that undermine its efficacy to the point of unconstitutionality. Notwithstanding their unlawful behavior, both sets of plaintiffs seek equitable relief in the form of a preliminary injunction against the City’s enforcement of the. zoning rules. The City also moves for summary judgment against both plaintiffs, and the Clear Channel Plaintiffs and Metro Fuel cross-move for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court holds that the Zoning Resolution’s restriction on the Plaintiffs’ commercial speech rights is not unconstitutional and the City may enforce the arterial highway advertising ban, the registration regulations, and the location restrictions on internally illuminated advertisements. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED in both cases and the Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction are DENIED. BACKGROUND The factual background applies to both the Clear Channel Plaintiffs and to Metro Fuel. The facts in this section are derived from Plaintiffs’ Complaints, the parties’ statements of fact submitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the parties’ stipulations of fact, and supporting affidavits and exhibits, unless otherwise specified. I. History of New York City’s Regulation of Outdoor Advertising The claims and issues presented here cannot be fully understood without a brief recitation of the seven-decade history of New York City’s regulation of outdoor advertising. The outdoor advertising companies have long ignored or failed to comply with City regulation. They have adopted a variety of tactics, ranging from direct challenges to the City’s enforcement efforts in court; waiting until the City’s enforcement fever wanes and enforcement efforts again abate; or hoping for a new administration which may have other priorities. These defensive tactics are effective because of the City’s sporadic and lackadaisical enforcement of its zoning regulations. Time has worked to the advantage of the commercial billboard companies and the City has, at times, chosen to ignore past transgressions and instead grandfather out-of-compliance signs. a. Regulation from 1940 to 2001 In 1940, New York City restricted outdoor advertising signs in districts zoned for residential use and in all areas within 200 feet and in view of arterial highways and City parks larger than one-half acre. (See Declaration of Sheryl Neufeld (“Neufeld Deel.”) ¶ 5; Stipulations of Fact (“SOF”) ¶ 6, located at Declaration of Eric Hecker (“Hecker Deck”) Ex. 1.) At that time the City Planning Commission (“CDP1”) determined that billboard regulation was needed because “Millboards and signs not only dominate our business streets ... but they take advantage of every opportunity to crowd in upon public places, established and maintained by public funds, including civic centers, parks, and especially express highways and bridge approaches.” (Defendants’ (“Def.”) Ex. A at 90 (containing Major Reports of the City Planning Commission, 1940).) The regulations, then and now, distinguish between “accessory use” signs, which are signs located on the premises to which the sign directs attention, and “advertising signs,” which are signs that direct attention to a business or service conducted elsewhere. N.Y. City Zoning Resolution (“Z.R.”) § 12-10. A sign is not an advertising sign for purposes of the Zoning Resolution if it is an accessory use sign — that is, if it is promoting a business located on the premises. Id. Accessory signs are also referred to as “on-site” signs, while advertising signs are also referred to as “off-site” signs. The zoning rules enacted in 1940 distinguished between those two uses because on-site accessory use signs served the valuable economic purpose of identifying the business on the premises. (See Def. Ex. A at 90.) The Zoning Resolution permits advertising signs within the Times Square zoning district because signs in that area are “principal and traditional attractions.” (Id.) In 1961 the City adopted a comprehensive Zoning Resolution which carried on the general framework from the 1940 regulations. Of relevance to Metro Fuel’s challenge, the 1961 Zoning Resolution also added certain sign location and illumination restrictions. Outdoor advertising companies, however, frequently ignored the City’s ordinance and erected arterial advertising signs in violation of the zoning regulations. (See SOF ¶ 7.) In 1979-80, as the City’s fiscal crisis was coming to an end, the City faced a loss of $25 million in federal highway aid, unless it complied with the Federal Highway Beautification Act and enforced provisions of its Zoning Resolution. In 1980, after determining that enforcement was economically impracticable, the City grandfathered the outdoor signs that did not comply with the Zoning Resolution but did comply with less restrictive federal and state standards. (Id. ¶ 8.) Thus, many signs existing on or before November 1, 1979 were granted “nonconforming use” status and remain exempt to this day from the ban on arterial advertising. See Z.R. §§ 42-55, 32-662. Despite the exemption for pre-1980 signs and the prohibition on additional arterial advertising signs, outdoor advertising companies continued to build illegal signs. Sometimes the billboard companies would obtain accessory-use sign permits and then illegally convert the accessory copy to off-site advertising copy. (SOF ¶ 9; see also Affirmation of Mark Geraghty (“Geraghty Affirmation”) ¶¶ 32-37.) Other times, the billboard companies would not bother with subterfuge and simply erected signs with no permitting at all. (SOF ¶ 9.) From 1980 until the late 1990s the City minimally enforced the arterial advertising restrictions. (Id. ¶ 10.) In 1998 the City amended the Zoning Resolution to clarify that non-commercial signs were permitted wherever any other types of signs were permitted. The amendment was enacted in response to a New York State court decision in City of New York v. Allied Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 172 Misc.2d 707, 659 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup.Ct. Kings Co.1997), which held that New York could not favor on-site accessory signs over non-commercial signs. Thus, as a result of the 1998 amendments, both on-site accessory-use signs and off-site non-commercial signs were — and currently are — permitted within 200 feet of an arterial highway. Off-site advertising signs are still prohibited in those areas. b. Recent Regulations: Local Law 14, Local Law 31, and Rule 49 In February 2001, the New York City Council amended the Zoning Resolution to reduce and limit the size of all accessory signs near arterial highways and to establish size, height, and projection requirements for all signs in districts zoned as manufacturing. The purpose of the accessory-sign size limitation was to reduce the incentive for billboard companies to illegally convert accessory signs to off-site advertising signs. (See Def. Ex. F at 2-5.) At the same time that it amended the Zoning Resolution, the City Council also amended the Administrative Code to provide for an enhanced enforcement and penalty scheme for sign regulation. Previous fines were so insubstantial that even when the City enforced the Zoning Resolution, the billboard companies absorbed the fines as a cost of doing business. Mayor Giuliani signed the amendment as Local Law 14/2001 (“Local Law 14”) on March 19, 2001. Local Law 14 created a registration scheme requiring all outdoor advertising companies to register their arterial signs with the Department of Buildings (“DOB”). (See Def. Ex. N §§ 26-253 to 255, 26-260.) As part of the registration process, a company would have to include a certification from a registered architect or engineer, and an officer of the company, stating that all its arterial signs complied with the City’s zoning regulations. (Id. § 26-261.) Local Law 14 also created enhanced civil penalties of $15,000 for a first violation of the registration scheme and up to $25,000 per day for subsequent violations, plus criminal penalties and fines. (Id. §§ 26-256, 26-262.) The DOB was empowered to bring a special nuisance abatement action to compel removal of an illegal sign or structure, and the DOB was given the power to revoke a company’s registration where the company made false statements in the registration application. (Id. § 26-260(d).) None of the provisions of Local Law 14 went into effect until the DOB promulgated a rule. Over the next two years, the City claims it was unable to promulgate the rule due to delays from litigation over the rules, the events of September 11, 2001, and an internal determination that several provisions of Local Law 14 would be impossible to implement. Thus, in 2003, the City Council again amended the registration requirements. The amendments were relatively minor, but they clarified that outdoor advertising companies were required to provide the DOB with an inventory of all signs within 900 feet and within view of an arterial highway. The amendments were eventually signed into law by Mayor Bloomberg in 2005 as Local Law 31. As before, Local Law 31 did not take effect until the DOB promulgated a rule, which it did by publishing the proposed rules in the City Record on August 15, 2005. The DOB eventually held public hearings and the regulations — now known as Rule 49 — went into effect on August 25, 2006, establishing the registration scheme that the Clear Channel Plaintiffs now challenge. The Court now turns to the precise regulations that the Plaintiffs challenge and the rationale for their claims. II. The Challenged Regulations a. The Clear Channel Plaintiffs The Clear Channel Plaintiffs challenge Zoning Resolution Sections 42-55 and 32-662, the provisions of the Zoning Resolution that ban off-site advertising signs within 200 feet and within sight of arterial highways in manufacturing and commercial districts. The Clear Channel Plaintiffs also challenge the registration and enforcement procedures set forth in Department of Buildings Rule 49, which identifies how DOB will determine whether an advertising sign is a non-conforming use sign, making the sign eligible to carry off-site arterial advertising copy. The Zoning Resolution provides that within 200 feet of an arterial highway, “(1) no permitted sign shall exceed 500 square feet of surface area; and (2) no advertising sign shall be allowed, nor shall an existing advertising sign be structurally altered, relocated or reconstructed.” Z.R. § 42-55 (2001) (governing manufacturing districts); see also id. § 32-662 (2001) (governing commercial districts). Plaintiffs estimate that the total number of arterial advertising signs on private property in the City is 634 signs, while the City estimates that the number is at least 692 signs and probably higher. (See Declaration of Victor Kovner (“Kovner Decl.”) ¶ 7; Declaration of Edward Fortier (“Fortier Decl.”) ¶24 n. 7.) The Zoning Resolution also grants legal non-conforming use status to arterial signs existing on November 1, 1979. Z.R. §§ 42-55, 32-662. Rule 49 amends the Administrative Code to require that all outdoor advertising companies submit an inventory of their signs and sign structures located within 900 feet and within view of an arterial highway. See 1 Rules of the City of New York (“RCNY”) § 49-15(a). Advertising companies that submit an inventory which includes non-conforming signs — in other words signs exempted in 1980 — must submit documentation establishing that the sign qualifies for non-conforming use status. Id. § 49-15(d)(15). As part of that requirement, companies must submit: Evidence that the non-conforming sign existed and the size of the sign that existed as of the relevant date set forth in the Zoning Resolution to establish its lawful status [i.e. November 1, 1979], Acceptable evidence may include permits, sign-offs of applications after completion, photographs and leases demonstrating that the non-conforming use existed prior to the relevant date. Id. § 49-15(d)(15)(b). Further: Affidavits, Department cashier’s receipts and permit applications, without other supporting documentation, are not sufficient to establish the non-conforming status of a sign. The submitted evidence must specifically establish the non-conforming aspect of the sign. For example, where evidence is submitted to establish that a sign is a non-conforming advertising sign, proof that the sign was erected, but that does not establish that it was advertising, will not be sufficient. Id. (emphasis added). Along with the requirements listed above, outdoor companies must submit an “[affidavit signed by the registered architect or professional engineer, that he or she reasonably believes the sign to be nonconforming based on the evidence submitted.” Id. § 49-15(d)(15)(c). As part of this affidavit: A responsible officer of the [advertising company] shall co-sign the affidavit, that he or she reasonably believes the sign to be non-conforming based on the evidence submitted, and that to the best of his or her knowledge there has not been any discontinuance of the non-conforming use for two or more years. Id. § 49-15(d)(15)(c)(l). The Clear Channel Plaintiffs challenge these documentary requirements as “draconian and punitive” and claim that many of the required documents will be impossible to produce decades after their creation. Further, the Clear Channel Plaintiffs divine that the City’s purpose for the registration requirements is to “eliminate from New York City’s arterial highways even the non-conforming signs that had been lawful for decades.” (See Geraghty Affirmation ¶ 70.) b. Metro Fuel Metro Fuel’s position is different from the Clear Channel Plaintiffs. It is generally not affected by the restriction on arterial advertising signs, as its signs are significantly smaller and not situated so as to attract the attention of drivers on arterial highways. Rather, Metro Fuel challenges the aspects of the Zoning Resolution that control where it may place its panel advertisements and how it may illuminate those ads. While accessory signs can be placed anywhere in commercial and manufacturing districts, subject only to size, height, illumination, and projection limitations, advertising signs are more restricted; those signs may only be placed in large commercial districts, labeled C6-5, C6-7, and C7; and, subject to illumination restrictions, in large commercial and manufacturing districts, labeled C8, Ml, M2, and M3. Z.R. § 32-63, 42-52. In the C8, Ml, M2, and M3 districts (e.g. Garment District and waterfront areas) advertising signs may only be non-illuminated or indirectly illuminated. Id. § 32-645, 42-533. The result of these regulations is that Metro Fuel’s advertisement panels, due to their illumination system, may only be placed in the C6-5, C6-7, and C7 large commercial districts. Metro Fuel challenges the provisions of the Zoning Resolution that exclude its illuminated panel advertisements from their current locations. III. The Parties a. The Clear Channel Plaintiffs Clear Channel is one of the largest media companies in the world. Clear Channel operates 236 sign faces in New York City. (See Stauning Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Stauning Aff.”) ¶ 34.) Eighty-four of these sign faces are arterial sign faces, and Clear Channel derives approximately $10 million in revenue yearly from these signs. (SOF ¶¶ 132, 140.) The arterial sign faces are all illuminated and affixed to buildings or pylons. (Id. ¶ 132.) The sign faces range in size from 11,258 square feet (a size equal to one-quarter acre) to 315 square feet, with the majority at either 1,200 square feet or 960 square feet. (Id.) Clear Channel entered the New York market when its parent purchased Universal Outdoor Holdings, Inc., in April 1998, acquiring 34,000 outdoor advertising signs in 23 markets. (Id. ¶ 131.) Clear Channel acquired the vast majority of its arterial signs from Universal and the rest through smaller purchases. (See Stauning Aff. ¶ 36.) Clear Channel also built one arterial sign structure. (Id.) When Clear Channel purchased its signs in New York, it did not perform due diligence on a sign-by-sign basis to determine which signs complied with New York’s zoning laws. Instead Clear Channel relied on representations from the sellers that they operated the signs within the law. (SOF ¶ 145.) The City’s enforcement of the Zoning Resolution substantially affects Clear Channel. The vast majority of Clear Channel’s arterial sign faces do not have permits to display advertising — Clear Channel estimates that “at least” 19 of its arterial sign faces should qualify for legal non-conforming use status. (Id. ¶ 134.) None of Clear Channel’s arterial signs carried accessory advertising as of April 2008, and the signs carry only sporadic noncommercial advertising — for instance, eight sign faces carried non-commercial ads in 2005 and 13 carried non-commercial ads in 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 135-39.) Atlantic Outdoor Advertising entered the New York City outdoor advertising market in 1997 and operates three arterial structures. Atlantic built two of those sign structures. The sign faces vary in size from 1,950 square feet to 1,200 square feet. (Id. ¶ 146.) Scenic Outdoor also entered the market in 1997 and operates five arterial sign faces on three structures. Scenic built two of the structures. The sign faces range from 1,200 square feet to 672 square feet. (Id. ¶ 147.) Troystar Corporation entered the New York City outdoor advertising business in 1995 and operates nine arterial signs on eight structures. Troystar built two of the structures, and the sign faces range from 5,760 square feet to 420 square feet. (Id. ¶ 148.) Willow Media entered the market in 1999 and operates seven arterial signs on four structures. Willow built all four structures. All the signs are 1,200 square feet, except one which is 960 square feet. (Id. ¶ 149.) Atlantic, Scenic, Troystar, and Willow all display advertising copy without permits. The companies generally obtained only accessory-use permits for their sign faces. (Id. ¶ 151.) Atlantic, Scenic, Troystar, and Willow have rarely sold non-commercial advertisements on their arterial faces other than for a nominal fee. (Id. ¶ 153.) As for the Individual Defendants, Patricia J. Lancaster was the Commissioner of the New York City DOB at the time the complaint was filed. Edward Fortier is the Director of the Padlock/Sign Enforcement Unit of DOB. b. Metro Fuel Metro Fuel operates approximately 440 panel signs in New York City. The panel signs are 69 inches tall by 48 inches wide, or approximately 23 square feet. The panels are internally illuminated, meaning that they contain posters lit from behind by fluorescent bulbs. (See Declaration of Michael Freedman (“Freedman Deck”) ¶ 2.) Enforcement of the City’s zoning regulations would severely affect Metro Fuel’s advertising business because 93% of Metro Fuel’s signs are located in districts where internally illuminated advertising signs are prohibited. (Id. ¶ 7.) Metro Fuel places the majority of its panel signs (77%) in or near parking garages, either inside the door to the garage, above or near the door, or attached to the outside of the garage. The remaining panel signs are either attached to the outside of other mixed-use properties or located in parking lots, either mounted on a pole or affixed to an adjacent building. Metro Fuel rents space from the landlord in exchange for the right to erect these signs. (Id. ¶ 3.) It in turn leases that space for advertising at a higher rate than its rental payments. Metro Fuel entered the New York City market in 2006 through an acquisition of another panel sign company. (See Metro Fuel/City of New York Stipulations of Fact (“Metro SOF”) ¶ 1, located in Declaration of Sheryl Neufeld (“Metro Fuel Neufeld Deck”) Ex. L.) Most of Metro Fuel’s panel signs do not have permits to display advertising. (Id. ¶ 4.) IV. The Exceptions to the City’s Enforcement Scheme Both the Clear Channel Plaintiffs and Metro Fuel contend that the City’s regulatory and enforcement scheme is so riddled with exceptions and inconsistencies as to undermine the very point of the regulations, thus making the relevant aspects of the Zoning Resolution an unconstitutional restraint on speech. The Court examines the exceptions that the Plaintiffs claim support their cases. a. Billboards on Government Property i. Signs on City Property Despite its own zoning regulations and ban on arterial advertising signs, New York City has utilized arterial advertising on City property. Starting in 1998 the City licensed Clear Channel to display advertising on two 960-square-foot arterial billboards on City property within view of the Belt Parkway in Brooklyn. (SOF ¶ 13.) The City terminated the agreement as of January 1, 2008 and requested that Clear Channel remove the signs. (Id. ¶ 14.) Another exception occurred in 2005 when New York City acquired the “High Line,” an inactive rail structure on Manhattan’s West Side which had several arterial billboards. The City negotiated with Clear Channel and with another media company to operate advertisements on those billboards. Following commencement of this litigation, the City declined to execute any agreements, but even so, both Clear Channel and the other media company operated arterial advertising signs on the High Line with the City’s permission until July 2007. (Id. ¶ 17-23.) Further, the Yankee Stadium parking lot, which is under the New York City Parks Department’s jurisdiction, contains a 1,248-square-foot double-faced arterial billboard. While the application to erect the sign contained assurances that the sign would be used exclusively as an accessory business sign to Yankee Stadium, the billboard contains both off-site advertising copy and non-commercial copy. In 1984 the DOB notified the Yankees that they must eliminate the advertising components of the sign or seek a variance. In light of the billboard industry’s conduct, it should come as no surprise that the Yankees complied with neither option — and the City took no further steps to enforce the Zoning Resolution. (Id. ¶ 24-26.) As part of negotiations with the Yankees over the new Yankee Stadium, the City agreed in 2006 to permit the Yankees to operate three additional arterial billboards near the new stadium. As of early January 2009, the Yankees had not erected any of these billboards, and the 2006 agreement with the City requires the Yankees to follow zoning laws and regulations. (See SOF Ex. H at 23.) In response to a request by this Court, the City specifically confirmed that the new Yankee billboards will be subject to the provisions of the Zoning Resolution restricting off-site arterial advertising signs. (See Jan. 14, 2009 Letter from Sheryl Neufeld (“Jan. 14, 2009 Neufeld Letter”) at 3.) There are two 600-square-foot arterial billboards on City-owned property near the West Side Highway at 145th Street. These billboards have been on City land since 1995, but the City recently settled a holdover proceeding and the signs’ operator was required to remove the billboards and structures by September 30, 2008. (SOF ¶ 15-16.) The City also permitted outdoor advertising companies to operate arterial advertising billboards on City land in Staten Island along the West Shore Expressway from 1994 until 2002, and in the Bronx along the Major Deegan Expressway from 2002 until 2008. The City has terminated these agreements. (Id. ¶ 27-30.) Finally, in connection with the City’s bid to host the 2012 Summer Olympics, the City, working through a non-profit organization called NYC 2012, required all major outdoor advertising companies to agree to make their billboards available to Olympic sponsors during the Games. (Id. ¶ 117-18.) While these billboards were not on City land, the negotiated arrangement would have made almost every billboard in the City — including arterial billboards— under the control of a quasi-City agency for a seven-week period. ii. Signs on MTA, Port Authority, and Amtrak Property In addition to these signs on City property, there are approximately 75 arterial billboards on property belonging to the Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”), the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the “Port Authority”), and Amtrak. (See Stauning Aff. Ex. 13.) The parties disagree over the City’s reasons for not enforcing its laws on these properties and the City’s good faith in prospectively enforcing the Zoning Resolution. The City did not enforce the Zoning Resolution against the MTA because, City officials claim, they believed that they did not have the authority to do so. (See Declaration of Phyllis Arnold (“Arnold Deck”) ¶ 66; Geraghty Affirmation Ex. F at 2.) City officials held this belief despite a 1982 “Informal Opinion” issued by the New York State Attorney General stating that “the City of New York may provide for the removal of commercial billboards erected in violation of its zoning law on property owned by MTA____” See 1982 N.Y. Op. Atty. Gen. (Inf.) 107, 1982 WL 178319, at *4 (Dec. 28, 1982). In conjunction with this litigation, the City now recognizes that it has the legal authority to enforce the Zoning Resolution against arterial signs on “non-New York City Transit Authority property that is owned or controlled by the MTA (e.g., Long Island Rail Road (“LIRR”) and Metro North property).” (See Arnold Deck ¶ 68.) The City apparently cannot enforce the Zoning Resolution against property under the Transit Authority’s jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 68 n. 12; N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1204(13-a).) Plaintiffs urge that the City surrendered its authority to do so when it acquiesced in the legislation. Going forward, the City states that it will enforce the Zoning Resolution against the MTA, with the exception of property controlled by the Transit Authority, in the same manner as it would against private owners. (Arnold Deck ¶ 69.) Signs controlled by the Port Authority and Amtrak are in the same position as signs on MTA property. The City claims that for years it mistakenly believed it did not have the authority to regulate those entities, but, in conjunction with these lawsuits, it now believes that it does. Going forward, the City states that it will regulate the Port Authority property — with the exception of the World Trade Center — and Amtrak property in the same manner as private property. (Id.) b. Street Furniture and Phone Kiosk Advertising The City has a contract with a private company, Cemusa, Inc., to install and maintain bus shelters, automatic public toilets, and newsstands (the “Street Furniture Franchise”). Plaintiffs, primarily Metro Fuel, argue that this contract allows Cemusa to operate advertising displays that are similar to their advertisements, but which are not included in enforcement of the Zoning Resolution. The City and Cemusa entered into a 20-year Street Furniture Franchise agreement in 2006, under which Cemusa will replace and build up to 3,500 bus shelters, replace at least 284 newsstands, and potentially build another 330 newsstands. (See SOF ¶¶ 62, 63, 83.) The new bus shelters may contain up to 55 square feet of back-lit advertising. There is no restriction on displaying such advertisements in any district of the City or within 200 feet and within view of an arterial highway. (Id. ¶¶ 65-67.) Many of these new advertisements will contain rotating signs, and other advertisements may use electronic media. (Id. ¶ 68.) The Street Furniture Franchise also allows newsstands to bear advertising for the first time, permitting up to 82.5 square feet of advertising. (Id. ¶ 83.) The contract calls for the City to receive at least 50% of gross revenue derived from the Street Furniture Franchise, and more than $1 billion over the 20 years of the agreement due to guaranteed compensation and advertising revenues. (Id. ¶¶ 85-87.) The Zoning Resolution’s restrictions are not applicable to the street furniture advertising signs. The City states that the Zoning Resolution covers the City’s buildings and land, but “does not govern the use or development of the City’s streets and sidewalks.” (See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs First Consolidated Set of Discovery Demands, at 18, located at Hecker Deck Ex. 26.) Since bus shelters and newsstands are on sidewalks, they are not covered by the Zoning Resolution. Plaintiffs also argue that the City further dilutes the Zoning Resolution’s effectiveness by allowing advertisements on phone kiosks, lamppost banners, and taxicabs. c. Fresh Direct Sign Plaintiffs point to the Fresh Direct sign, a single billboard advertising the food delivery company along the Long Island Expressway in Queens, as evidence that the City unconstitutionally permits loopholes in its enforcement scheme. The City issued an accessory permit for the digital billboard, which advertises both the food delivery company Fresh Direct and the products sold through Fresh Direct. In 2002, following a DOB enforcement proceeding against the sign’s owners for using the billboard for non-accessory purposes, an Administrative Judge ruled that the Fresh Direct sign was an accessory use. The City now states that the sign is an accessory use because 51% of the billboard copy directs attention to the business on the lot, Fresh Direct. (SOF ¶¶ 129-30.) d. “New York Bus” Exemption The Zoning Resolution codifies one other exception to the ban on arterial advertising. Zoning Resolution § 42 — 55(d) grants legal non-conforming use status to signs that are within one-half mile of any of the City’s boundaries, were built prior to August 7, 2000, and are along any designated arterial highway that is also: (1) a “principal route” or “toll crossing” that prohibits direct vehicular access to abutting land and provides complete separation of conflicting traffic flows; and (2) a through truck route designated by the New York City Department of Transportation; and (3) that crosses a boundary of the City of New York. Z.R. § 42 — 55(d). Plaintiffs argue that the City created this narrow exception to exempt the signs belonging to one politically connected businessman who owns billboards along Interstate 95 near New York City’s border with Westchester County. Plaintiffs provide evidence that one company, New York Bus Service, Inc., owns eight billboards along 1-95 on New York City’s northern border. (See Stauning Aff. Ex. 42.) The City, however, argues that this exception to the restriction on arterial advertising signs was intended only to “aid New York City outdoor advertisers in maintaining a competitive equality with advertisers that operate immediately outside of the City’s boarders [sic].” (See Neufeld Decl. ¶ 20.) V. Procedural History Clear Channel first filed its complaint against the Defendants on October 6, 2006. Four days later, on October 10, Atlantic Outdoor, Scenic Outdoor, Troystar City Outdoor, and Willow Media filed their complaint against Defendants. The Court consolidated the actions on October 20, 2006, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). On October 24 and November 1, 2006, respectively, Clear Channel and Atlantic Outdoor, Scenic Outdoor, Troystar City Outdoor, and Willow Media filed motions for a preliminary injunction to prevent the City from enforcing the arterial advertising restrictions and the provisions of Local Law 14 (2001), Local Law 31 (2005), and DOB Rule 49 (2006). The City subsequently agreed to stay the enforcement of the challenged regulations until the Court resolved the motion for preliminary injunction. Following discovery and the filing of an amended complaint, the City moved for summary judgment on May 12, 2008, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 23, 2008, the Clear Channel Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment. Metro Fuel filed its complaint against the City on September 21, 2007, and this Court accepted the case as related to Clear Channel. Metro Fuel filed a motion for summary judgment or preliminary injunction on July 28, 2008, and the City cross-moved for summary judgment against Metro Fuel on August 25, 2008. The motions in the cases were fully briefed on October 23, 2008, and the Court held oral argument jointly with the Clear Channel Plaintiffs, Metro Fuel, and Defendants on December 1, 2008. DISCUSSION I. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate where the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of producing evidence on each material element of its claim or defense demonstrating that it is entitled to relief. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The evidence on each material element must be sufficient to entitle the movant to relief as a matter of law. Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.2004). Once the moving party has made an initial showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains, the nonmoving party may not refute this showing solely by means of “[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation,” Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem., Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir.2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted), but must instead present specific evidence in support of its contention that there is a genuine dispute as to material facts. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Court resolves all ambiguities and draws all factual inferences in favor of the nonmovant, but “only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The same standard of review applies when the court is faced with cross-motions for summary judgment. Morales v. Quintet Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.2001). Each party’s motion must be reviewed on its own merits, and the Court must draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. Id. II. Preliminary Injunction Standard To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the requested relief, as well as either: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; or (2) “sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.” Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir.1985) (citing Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.1983)). Where a party seeks to enjoin government action “taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme, however, the moving party cannot resort to the ‘fair ground for litigation’ standard, but is required to demonstrate irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted). The party seeking the injunction “must show a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ likelihood of success where the injunction sought is mandatory — i.e., it will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo.” Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir.2004). Because this ease involves a City regulatory scheme enacted in the public interest, and because Plaintiffs seek to alter the status quo by preventing the City from enforcing a duly enacted regulation, Plaintiffs must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See County of Nassau v. Leavitt, 524 F.3d 408, 414 (2d Cir.2008) (applying more rigorous “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” standard where county challenged interpretation of new law by Department of Health and Human Services); Wright v. Giuliani 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir.2000) (applying higher standard for injunction where plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of emergency housing administered by the New York City Human Resources Administration). Irreparable harm “means injury for which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation.” Jayaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1979)). Additionally, the “[irreparable harm must be shown by the moving party to be imminent, not remote or speculative.” Reuters, Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990). A loss of First Amendment rights is generally deemed irreparable harm, particularly where the injury is the result of a government regulation. See Field Day, LLC v. County of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 181 (2d Cir.2006); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir.2003) (“Where a plaintiff alleges injury from a rule or regulation that directly limits speech, the irreparable nature of the harm may be presumed.”). If the Court were to find Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims credible, it would necessarily have to find that the Plaintiffs suffered irreparable harm. The essential inquiry in this dispute is whether those First Amendment claims are convincing. III. Commercial Speech Regulation The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the 14th Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”). But courts recognize a distinction between commercial speech and other varieties of speech, and typically accord a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expressions. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) (commercial speech receives “protection somewhat less extensive than that afforded noncommercial speech”) (internal quotations omitted); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). Further, “within the class of regulations affecting commercial speech, [courts] accord varying levels of protection depending on the type of commercial speech at issue.” N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir.2009). For instance, government restrictions targeting commercial messages which are either “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” or “related to illegal activity” survive constitutional scrutiny. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980) (citations omitted). Where a communication is neither misleading nor related to illegal activity, the state must demonstrate its interest in restricting the speech, and the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. Id. at 564, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (“Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved ... Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”). In the seminal case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), the Supreme Court set out the four-part test to determine the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions such as the ones challenged here. The Central Hudson test asks the following: (1) is the expression protected by the First Amendment; (2) is the asserted governmental interest substantial; (3) does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted; and (4) is the regulation more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343. The burden is on the government to satisfy the test. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n. 20, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (“The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.”). There is little dispute here that the first and second factors of the Central Hudson test are satisfied. Plaintiffs’ challenges deal with the third and fourth prongs. Courts often interchange the elements of these last two prongs, and the Supreme Court has noted that “the last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.” United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427-28, 113 S.Ct. 2696, 125 L.Ed.2d 345 (1993) (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 92 L.Ed.2d 266 (1986)). In other words, the zoning regulation must be reasonable in its relation to its subject and adopted in the public interest. Before analyzing the Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court discusses how the Central Hudson test has been applied in the unique category of billboard regulation and in situations involving “underinelusive” speech restrictions. a. The Metromedia Decision In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981), the Court considered a sign ordinance that prohibited all outdoor advertising signs except for on-site accessory signs and signs that fell into 12 specified categories. Id. at 494-95, 101 S.Ct. 2882. A majority of the Court found that the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment by allowing on-site commercial advertising while forbidding off-site commercial advertising. Id. at 511-12, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (finding that San Diego could value one type of commercial speech over another type). Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court found that the “serious” question was whether the ordinance passed the third prong — whether the law directly advanced the government’s interest in traffic safety and the appearance of the city. Id. at 508, 101 S.Ct. 2882. The Court accepted the legislature’s judgment that the ordinance improved traffic safety, and the Court found no reason to carefully scrutinize the city’s aesthetic desires because there was no claim that San Diego had an ulterior motive in suppressing speech. Id. at 509-10, 101 S.Ct. 2882. Finally, the Court found that the “apparent incongruity” of allowing some billboards while rejecting others, when the effect of both is the same on traffic and beauty, did not create a constitutional problem because the city was permitted to value one type of commercial speech over another, as long as the determination was reasonable. Id. at 511-12, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (“underinelusive” ordinance permitted). A plurality of the Court found that the law violated the First Amendment in two manners. First, the law improperly protected commercial speech over non-commercial speech by granting an exception to on-site accessory signs, but not to noncommercial signs. Id. at 513, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (“Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to limit their content to commercial messages.”). Second, a plurality found that San Diego could not pick and choose among various types of non-commercial speech based on its content. Id. at 514-15, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (finding that if the City allowed some types of noncommercial messages on billboards, it must allow other types of noncommercial messages). The Court overturned San Diego’s ordinance because the regulation banned non-commercial advertising signs and thus reached “too far into the realm of protected speech.” Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 521, 101 S.Ct. 2882. Metromedia is the flag-bearer for billboard-regulation cases. Metromedia stands not just for the proposition that a City may favor on-site accessory advertising and non-commercial off-site advertising over commercial off-site advertising, see, e.g., Infinity Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 165 F.Supp.2d 403, 416 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (listing cases); it has also been extensively cited for the theory that “state interests in traffic safety and esthetics may justify zoning regulations for advertising.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001); see also Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); Long Island Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Vill. of Massapequa Park, 277 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir.2002) (where purpose of sign ordinance was to “preserve aesthetic value and reduce hazards,” it followed that “[o]n their face, such regulations directly advance the Village’s interest in aesthetics and safety”) (citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508-12, 101 S.Ct. 2882). b. Underinelusive Speech Restrictions: Rubin and Greater New Orleans Plaintiffs do not contend that Metromedia is inapplicable in this case. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the City’s Zoning Resolution fails under the Central Hudson test because the City cannot prove what San Diego was able to show in Metromedia — that San Diego’s underinelusive speech regulation still directly advanced its interests. New York City cannot show this, Plaintiffs argue, because the regulations hypocritically permit some commercial off-site advertising while restricting other commercial off-site advertising, but without a valid basis for the distinction and in such a widespread manner as to undermine the point of the regulations. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the City undermines the very point of its Zoning Resolution by allowing commercial billboards on City-controlled land and advertisements on franchised bus shelters. To support their position, Plaintiffs rely on two Supreme Court cases that overturned speech restrictions where the regulations were underinclusive. In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 119 S.Ct. 1923, 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999), a federal regulation prohibited broadcasters from advertising privately owned casinos, but permitted advertising for state-run lotteries or casinos operated by Indian tribes. Id. at 176-80, 119 S.Ct. 1923. The Court found that the government regulation was “so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies” that it could not pass Central Hudson's third prong. Id. at 190, 119 S.Ct. 1923. The Court found that the exemptions in the law “directly undermined and counteracted its effects” so as to create “little chance that the speech restriction could have directly and materially advanced its aim,” which was to reduce the social costs associated with gambling. Id. at 193, 119 S.Ct. 1923 (citations and quotation omitted). Greater New Orleans built upon an earlier case, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, 514 U.S. 476, 115 S.Ct. 1585, 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995), where the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“BATF”) banned beer makers from listing the alcohol content on beer labels because, the BATF argued, the ban would prevent “strength wars” among brewers. Id. at 478-79, 115 S.Ct. 1585. Applying the third prong of Central Hudson, the Court found that the government’s regulatory scheme was “irrational[ ]” because, under another set of federal laws, brewers were able to advertise the strength of their alcoholic content. Id. at 488, 115 S.Ct. 1585. The inconsistency of the laws created “little chance” that the regulation at issue could directly advance the government’s purpose. Id. at 489, 115 S.Ct. 1585. Secondly, the Court found that the regulation did not pass the fourth prong of Central Hudson because the government had other regulatory options that were less intrusive to the defendant’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 491, 115 S.Ct. 1585. Plaintiffs argue that the principles of Greater New Orleans and Rubin govern this case. While Plaintiffs agree that Metromedia allows for some underinclusiveness in laws regulating speech, they argue that the City’s Zoning Resolution restricting arterial advertising and panel advertising is so hypocritical that it pushes the regulations into the realm of Greater New Orleans and Rubin. The Court now turns to its analysis of the Clear Channel Plaintiffs’ and of Metro Fuel’s claims. IV. Application to Clear Channel Plaintiffs The Clear Channel Plaintiffs challenge: (1) the provisions of the Zoning Resolution that ban off-site advertising signs within 200 feet and within sight of arterial highways in manufacturing and commercial districts; and (2) the registration provisions of DOB Rule 49. Both regulations involve a restriction on speech and fall under the Central Hudson analysis. Because the challenge to the registration provisions of Rule 49 also involves a preliminary matter — whether the claim is ripe for review — the Court analyzes each challenge individually. a. Arterial Advertising Ban Under Central Hudson’s first prong — whether the First Amendment protects the expression — neither party disputes that off-site arterial advertising is protected. The advertising at issue is not deceptive and it does not promote illegal activity; it is protected commercial speech. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64, 100 S.Ct. 2343. Nor do the Clear Channel Plaintiffs argue that the City fails to satisfy the second prong, that the City’s asserted interests are substantial. The City’s interests in promulgating the restrictions on arterial advertising are to improve traffic safety and aesthetics, as evidenced by the discussions in the City Planning Commission’s 1940 report on the zoning amendments (see Def. Ex. A at 90), by the CDPl’s 2000 report on the Zoning Resolution (see id. Ex. F at 2), and by Mayor Giuliani’s statements when signing Local Law 14 (see id. Ex. O at 3-4). There is ample case law establishing that traffic safety and aesthetics constitute substantial government interests. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. 2118; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. 2882. The real issues are Central Hudson’s third and fourth prongs. In analyzing Central Hudson’s third element — whether the regulation directly advances the asserted governmental interest — this Court must determine how much underinclusivity is permitted in the arterial advertising regulations before the regulations fail to materially advance the City’s interests. There is little question, however, that without taking into account the exceptions that the Plaintiffs highlight, the City’s regulations directly and materially advance the City’s interests. In the billboard industry’s challenge to the same arterial ban in 2001, Judge Gershon of the Eastern District of New York held that the City’s regulation directly and materially advanced the City’s interest. See Infinity Outdoor, 165 F.Supp.2d at 417. Although the posture of that challenge was different because the Plaintiff argued that the City’s arterial advertising ban violated the First Amendment by banning advertising signs but permitting noncommercial signs, the regulations at issue were the same. Judge Gershon applied Central Hudson and, under the third prong, held that both the history of the City’s zoning laws and “the ‘accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety’ is sufficient to satisfy the third step of Central Hudson.” Id. (quoting Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509, 101 S.Ct. 2882). The Plaintiffs claim that the numerous exceptions to the Zoning Resolution riddle the entire regulatory structure — the exceptions swallow the rule. The Court now turns to whether these supposed inconsistencies fatally compromise the City’s scheme for regulating arterial advertising signs. Greater New Orleans and Rubin hold that “self-defeating speech restrictions will violate the First Amendment.” See Metro Lights, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190, 119 S.Ct. 1923). But those two cases involved the content of the speech allowed (advertising for gambling allowed and prohibited; strength of alcohol content allowed and prohibited) and not the location of the message. This case involves regulation of billboard location, not the content of the speech. As Metromedia discusses and makes clear, the law of billboard regulation is distinct from other speech regulation. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501, 101 S.Ct. 2882 (“Each method of communicating ideas is ‘a law unto itself and that law must reflect the ‘differing natures, values, abuses and dangers’ of each method.”); see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132 (“[W]ithin the class of regulations affecting commercial speech, we accord varying levels of protection depending on the type of commercial speech at issue.”). To demonstrate how the principles of Greater New Orleans and Rubin apply to billboard regulation, the Plaintiffs rely on two District Court cases from Los Angeles: World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 563 F.Supp.2d 1132 (C.D.Cal.2008), and Metro Lights, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 488 F.Supp.2d 927 (C.D.Cal.2006). Plaintiffs strongly urged the Court to accept Metro Lights as correct, but, unfortunately for Plaintiffs, it was reversed on appeal. See Metro Lights, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.2009). In World Wide Rush, the District Court found that a Los Angeles regulation banning off-site advertising signs within 2,000 feet of a freeway failed the Central Hudson test because the city “permitted multiple commercial signs” within 2,000 feet of a freeway, undermining the city’s interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. 563 F.Supp.2d at 1152. The court found that Plaintiffs showed three instances where the city permitted “giant commercial billboards” to stand within 2,000 feet of a freeway, and the court held that this was enough to satisfy the undermining standard of Greater New Orleans. Id. at 1150-51. Plaintiffs urge this Court to follow World Wide Rush, where there appeared to be significantly fewer exceptions to the billboard ban than exist in this case. Assuming that Greater New Orleans has any applicability in the billboard world, it was applied far too strictly. The World Wide Rush court found that “preserving even one freeway-facing sign still undermines the City’s stated interests in traffic safety and aesthetics.” Id. at 1151. This all-or-nothing approach misinterprets the reasoning of Greater New Orleans, which overturned the commercial speech restriction there because one part of the regulatory regime permitted certain content while another part banned the same content. Obviously the regime was internally contradictory. Further, banning billboards within 2,000 feet of Los Angeles’ freeway system is not at all like the much shorter 200-foot level specified in the City’s Zoning Resolution. Finally, as Ralph Waldo Emerson famously said, “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,” and the First Amendment does not mandate perfect consistency. See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 267 F.3d 1138, 1141 (D.C.Cir.2001) (restriction on target marketing not unconstitutional under Greater New Orleans where law had “just one exception”); Paradigm Media Group, Inc. v. City of Irving, No. 3:01-CV-612-R, 2002 WL 1776922, at *7 (N.D.Tex.2002), aff'd, 65 Fed.Appx. 509 (5th Cir.2003) (sign ordinance banning off-site advertising signs with exception for signs at two sports facilities not an unconstitutional restraint on speech). Greater New Orleans holds that when the regulation at issue is riddled by exceptions, contradictions, and internal inconsistencies as to what content can be delivered, it no longer passes constitutional muster. But that is not even remotely the case here, and the Court declines to follow World Wide Rush’s overly strict reading of underinclusivity. The second Los Angeles District Court case that Plaintiffs rely on is Metro Lights, 488 F.Supp.2d 927, which the Ninth Circuit overturned subsequent to the briefing and oral argument in this case. See Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 914. The District Court in Metro Lights found that under Greater New Orleans, Los Angeles could not ban commercial off-site signs while creating an exception for advertisements on city-controlled street furniture. 488 F.Supp.2d at 931-32. The Plaintiff in that case was a panel advertising company much like Plaintiff Metro Fuel, and Los Angeles’ street furniture program was substantially similar to New York City’s agreement with Cemusa. Id. at 933, 935-36. The Clear Channel Plaintiffs and Metro Fuel, in particular, naturally placed great reliance on the District Court decision, and urged the Court to follow its logic. On January 6, 2009, however, the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision on several grounds. See Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 908-11. In doing so the Ninth Circuit shredded the logic of the District Court’s decision. First, the Ninth Circuit stated that in Metromedia, the Supreme Court allowed San Diego to restrict all off-site advertising, but permitted an exception for such advertising on bus-stop benches. Id. at 908-09. Thus, since Metromedia had allowed an exception for ads on bus shelters, it followed that Los Angeles’ ordinance, which also permitted such an exception for the s