Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOLLOWING COURT TRIAL ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE, United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiffs Sylvia Darensburg and Vivian Hain are individuals of color, and Plaintiffs Amalgamated Transit Union 192 and Communities for a Better Environment are organizations with minority members, who use the bus system of the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (“AC Transit”). Defendant Metropolitan Transportation Commission (“MTC”), is the Metropolitan Planning Organization (“MPO”) for all twenty-six independent transit operators in the nine-county Bay Area. In this class action, Plaintiffs contend that MTC makes funding decisions that adversely affect AC Transit’s largely minority riders, in comparison to the riderships of the other largest operators in the Bay Area. The seven largest operators, which collectively account for 95% of transit riders in the Bay Area, are: (1) AC Transit; (2) Bay Area Rapid Transit District (“BART”); (3) Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (“Cal-train”); (4) Golden Gate Highway and Transportation District (“GGT”); (5) San Francisco Municipal Railway (“Muni”); (6) San Mateo County Transit District (“Sam-Trans”); and (7) Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority (‘VTA”). More specifically, Plaintiffs contend that three of MTC’s apparently neutral transportation funding practices in fact divert funding from preserving and improving existing bus operations to costly expansion and capital rehabilitation of rail services, disproportionately harming AC Transit’s predominantly minority bus riders, in violation of California Government Code section 11135. Specifically, Plaintiffs chailenge MTC’s: (1) selection and funding of rail expansion projects over bus projects through its Regional Transit Expansion Program embodied in Resolution 3434; (2) allocation of “committed” funds to capital rehabilitation instead of transit operations, and to capital expansion instead of capital rehabilitation of the existing transit system; and (3) assignment of “uncommitted” funds to offset projected capital rehabilitation shortfalls, but not operating shortfalls. Plaintiffs argue that they have made a prima facie showing of disparate impact as to each of these three practices, that MTC cannot meet its burden of proving necessity in response, and that even if MTC has, Plaintiffs have shown equally effective but less discriminatory alternatives. MTC disputes that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of disparate impact, and argues that even if they have, MTC has met its burden of showing a legitimate justification. First, MTC denies that it prioritizes rail expansion over maintenance and operations of the existing system. MTC also argues that it does not have control over the allocation of most “committed” funds, and that when it does have control over those funds, it has allocated funds for operations in the form of preventive maintenance to AC Transit. Second, MTC argues that it has little control over the allocation of “uncommitted” funds, and that it allocates the funds that it does control to cover operating shortfalls. Third, MTC further argues that its practices are justified by its reliance on the advice of the Partnership Board, which consists of representatives of federal and regional transit agencies, including AC Transit, and environmental entities, by its scoring system for allocation of committed funds that reflects the consensus of the Partnership Board, and by its “Fix it First” policy focusing on maintenance of existing capital systems, among other reasons. Finally, MTC argues that in response to its justification, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing an equally effective alternative with a less racially disproportionate impact. On August 21, 2008, 2008 WL 3915349, the Court issued an order resolving the parties’ motions for summary adjudication and for summary judgment. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication on the issue of whether Plaintiffs had established as a matter of law a prima facie case for disparate impact discrimination arising out of MTC’s failure to fund the operating shortfalls it identifies in the quadrennial Regional Transportation Plans, while funding capital shortfalls. The Court granted in part and denied in part MTC’s Motions for Summary Judgment, holding that there were triable issues of fact as to standing and disparate impact discrimination, but that there was no triable issue of fact as to intentional discrimination. This case was tried to the Court in October 2008. Because this case involved an array of funding source and other acronyms familiar to the transit cognoscenti but not necessarily to the rest of the public, the Court notes that a Joint Glossary of Terms prepared by the parties is available at docket number 340. The parties also submitted joint findings of fact (Nos. 1-369) on August 29, 2008 (docket no. 291), October 3, 2008 (docket no. 346), October 8, 2008 (docket no. 353) and October 21, 2008 (docket no. 364). After considering and weighing all the evidence and the parties’ arguments, and having assessed the credibility of the witnesses, the Court enters the following findings of fact and conelusions of law as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The Court begins with a few preliminary observations. First, throughout the litigation of this case, the Court has been impressed by the high level of advocacy on both sides of this dispute. Counsel have conducted themselves professionally and respectfully in their interactions with the Court and with each other during numerous court appearances and the three-week trial. The Court also appreciates the parties’ responsiveness to the Court’s suggestions to stipulate to facts not reasonably in dispute and to streamline presentation of this case at trial. The parties were well-served by their counsel in this case. Second, the Court was also impressed by the sincere dedication to meeting the needs of disproportionately minority riders of AC Transit on the part of Plaintiffs and their witnesses. The Court was left with no doubt that AC Transit’s bus riders would benefit from additional service and that many of them are burdened by fare hikes and service cuts, hampering their efforts to get to work, medical appointments, and grocery shopping and to meet other important needs. At the same time, the Court also came to appreciate the difficult challenge faced by MTC’s public servants of meeting a wide array of complex transportation needs and competing priorities of multiple operators throughout the Bay Area with limited and often highly restricted funds. The Court found the fact witnesses on both sides to be sincere and generally credible, although occasionally, as noted below, somewhat biased in their perceptions due to their particular roles. Further, the Court found the expert witnesses to be highly qualified. The Court was impressed by the extensive knowledge of Plaintiffs’ expert, Thomas Rubin, of transportation planning and his concern with meeting the transit needs of under-served minority populations. As set forth in more detail below, however, the Court found that a few of his comparisons of relative funding and other matrices which he contended show unjustified disproportionate impact on AC Transit riders were not persuasive because they did not treat all transit operators alike or focused only on one type of comparison to the exclusion of other equally valid alternatives. Nor was the Court persuaded that the transportation statute and planning documents that he pointed to required the very strong, indeed paramount, priority on preserving existing urban bus operations that he advocated, at the cost of meeting other important transportation needs that MTC is also mandated by statute to consider. These other needs include, for example, a modern, integrated transit network that aids smart growth, and lures commuters out of their single occupancy vehicles to improve air quality. By the same token, the Court was not entirely persuaded by the testimony of MTC’s planning expert, Dr. Robert Cervero, to the extent that he downplayed the importance of preserving urban bus services. Similarly, although MTC’s statistician, Stefan Boedeker, provided a number of illuminating comparisons, two of his graphs used inconsistent scales that made AC Transit’s funding pattern look more similar to that of other operators than it really was. Ultimately, as explained in detail below, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not proven disparate impact discrimination in violation of the California statute. It is worth pointing out that the Court’s conclusion is supported in part by MTC’s recent practice, commenced the same year that this lawsuit was filed, of allowing more operating funds in the form of preventive maintenance to flow to AC Transit than MTC allowed under its previous practice of reserving such funds for capital rehabilitation only. Indeed, this lawsuit may have had some salutary impact on causing MTC to refine such policies. FINDINGS OF FACT Background 1. Created by the California Legislature in 1970, MTC is the transportation planning, coordinating and financing agency for the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 66500 et seq.; Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 8. 2. MTC is not a transit operator. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 9. 3. MTC sets policy and makes funding decisions through its Board of Commissioners. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 11. 4. MTC’s work is guided by a nineteen-member policy board. Fourteen commissioners are appointed directly by local elected officials. In addition, two members represent regional agencies, the Association of Bay Area Governments and the Bay Conservation and Development Commission. Finally, three nonvoting members have been appointed to represent federal and state transportation agencies and the federal housing department. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 19. 5. MTC convenes three advisory committees: (1) the MTC Advisory Council; (2) the Elderly and Disabled Advisory Committee; and (3) the Minority Citizens Advisory Committee. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 27. 6. The Minority Citizens’ Advisory Committee (“MCAC”) advises MTC on issues of concern to African-American, Hispanic, and Asian-American constituencies. MTC recently added low-income interests to the MCAC’s portfolio. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 28. 7. MTC functions as both the regional transportation planning agency, a state designation, and as the region’s MPO for federal purposes. It is responsible for regularly updating the Regional Transportation Plan (“RTP”), a comprehensive blueprint for the development of mass transit, highway, airport, seaport, railroad, bicycle and pedestrian facilities. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 12. 8. MTC is the designated recipient of a variety of federal and state funding sources, and is responsible for setting policies and making decisions about the allocation and use of those funding sources that are within its control. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 30. 9. With the authority over the Bay Area’s transportation purse strings has come responsibility for overseeing the efficiency and effectiveness of the region’s transportation system. MTC monitors transit operators’ budgets, conducts performance audits and adopts a yearly productivity/transit coordination improvement program to ensure that the region’s numerous bus, rail and ferry systems are in sync in terms of their routes, fares, transfer policies, schedules, passenger information and facilities. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 16. 10. In January of 1992, MTC convened the Bay Area Partnership Board. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 26.. 11. The Bay Area Partnership Board is a confederation of the top staff of various transportation agencies in the region (e.g., MTC, public transit operators, county congestion management agencies, city and county public works departments, ports, Caltrans, U.S. Department of Transportation) as well as environmental protection agencies. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 25. Plaintiffs 12. The Class consists of Black, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, and American Indian or Alaskan native individuals who are patrons of Alameda Contra Costa Transit District (AC Transit). See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 1. 13. The named class representatives are Sylvia Darensburg and Vivian Hain. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶¶ 2, 4. 14. The Organizational Plaintiffs are Communities for a Better Environment (“CBE”) and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 192 (“ATU”). ATU represents transit employees, including bus, rail and ferry operators and advocates for its members primarily in the areas of wages, benefits and working conditions. See Aug. 21, 2008 Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Mot. for Summ. Adjudication; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Aug. 21, 2008 Order on Summ. Adjudication/Judgment”) at 15:23-25. ATU’s legislative agendas reveal that they are interested in, inter alia, increasing funding for public transit, including to “allow certain federal transit funds to be used for operating assistance.” See id. at 16:2-4. CBE is a “social justice organization with a focus on environmental health and justice,” focusing on “working class communities of col- or because those communities suffer the most from environmental pollution and toxics.” See id. at 16:5-7. The vision of CBE is to “protect the earth and human life for future generations.” See id. at 16:10-11. 15. On February 1, 2005, MTC received a letter from Public Advocates, Inc., Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) and Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) 192, alleging that MTC has historically engaged, and continues to engage in policies and practices “that benefit the disproportionately white riders of BART and Caltrain ... at the expense of disproportionately minority riders of AC Transit.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 7. 16. AC Transit’s change in transfer policy in 2001 limiting transfers to use within 90 minutes increased Plaintiff Sylvia Darensburg’s transit expenses by causing her to have to pay full fare more often. She also has been injured by increases in fares that stretch her limited budget. She has been unable to accept or keep certain attractive jobs as a result of inadequate AC Transit service. She has been docked pay at jobs due to being late because of unreliable AC Transit service. Increases in transit fares have also stretched her budget such that she has been unable to pay other bills on time. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(a). 17. Ms. Darensburg would benefit from improvements to the International Boulevard/East Oakland and Hesperian routes. She would also benefit from improvements to routes such as San Pablo Avenue, Foothill/MacArthur, MacArthur/Oakland Airport, College Avenue/University, and Mission/Outer 14th Avenue routes. Signal improvements along these lines would also benefit her if they led to shorter travel times. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket #364) at ¶ 263(a). 18. Newer, low-floor vehicles would also benefit Ms. Darensburg because it would make it easier for her to grocery shop, as the buses would more easily accommodate a grocery cart, allowing her to reduce the number of trips she takes to the grocery store. This improvement would save her time, energy, and transportation costs. It would also make it easier for her to travel with her granddaughter because low-floor vehicles would more easily accommodate a stroller. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket #346) at ¶ 263(b). 19. Ms. Darensburg would also benefit from increased night and weekend service, in particular on Line 98, which would allow her to go to WalMart to shop. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) ¶ 263(c). 20. Increases in AC Transit fares and recent limitations in use of transfers makes transit more expensive and more difficult for Plaintiff Vivian Hain to afford. Unreliable transit has also forced her to rely on unreliable cars that break down frequently and require frequent expensive repairs. Increases in AC Transit fares negatively impact her ability to buy food for herself and her family. Inadequate service has caused Ms. Hain to be subject to discipline at work for tardiness and put her at risk for failing to meet Welfare-to-Work requirements. Ms. Hain cannot afford to use BART regularly. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(b). 21. Ms. Hain would benefit from enhanced AC Transit bus service and increased frequency of service in certain high traffic areas. In particular, she and her family would directly benefit from improvements to the Telegraph/International Boulevard/and College Avenue/University routes. Signal improvements along these lines would also benefit her and her children if they led to shorter travel times. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket #346) at ¶ 263(d). 22. In addition, newer low-floor vehicles would make it easier for Ms. Hain to grocery shop since the buses would more easily accommodate a grocery cart. This would allow her to make fewer trips to the grocery store overall which would reduce her transportation expenses, as well as saving her time and physical energy. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 34) at ¶ 263(e). 23. Class member Jose Casias has been forced to own a car, on which he must spend money for gas, maintenance, and insurance, due to inadequate bus service for getting to and from work. He has lost money due to having to leave work early to catch a bus before AC Transit service stops running at night. He and his mother find the fares difficult to afford, especially as they have increased over the last ten years. Further increases would force his family to spend less on food. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(c). 24. Mr. Casias would benefit from enhanced routes/increased frequency of buses along the following routes: San Pablo Avenue, Telegraph/International Boulevard, Foothill/MacArthur, MacArthur/Oakland Airport, Shat-tuck/Alameda, College Avenue/University, Hesperian, 6th Street/Hollis, Sacramento/Market, and Mission/Outer E. 14th Avenue. Mr. Casias would also benefit from additional night and weekend service, because he would be able to take AC Transit to work instead of driving his car, and would be able to save considerably on gas money and mileage. Expanded night and weekend service would also make AC Transit a safer choice for his family and him, because it would mean less time waiting at bus stops. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 263(k). 25. Class member Concepcion Chavez sometimes has to take a taxi to medical appointments because AC Transit buses are unreliable. The taxi costs much more than the bus. AC Transit’s fare increases since 1996 are not affordable for Ms. Chavez on her Social Security income. Because she can not afford the fares she needs, she has to ask her kids for money. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(d). 26. Ms. Chavez would benefit from additional benches and shelters at AC Transit stops because it is difficult for her to walk and stand for long periods of time, and because it would provide shelter from rain and cold. Ms. Chavez would also benefit from low-floor buses because she believes it would be easier for her to get in and out of the bus with her arthritic knee. Ms. Chavez would also benefit from increased frequency of service so she could avoid planning her day around transit and could get to church on time. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 263(h). 27. Class member Octavio Hernandez has little flexibility in his budget. Mr. Hernandez has missed work because he could not afford AC Transit’s fares. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(e). 28. Mr. Hernandez would benefit from greater frequency of service, especially on the 82/1, 40, and 43 lines. He believes increased priority for buses at traffic signals might reduce delays and make his travels more efficient. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 263(i). 29. Class member Virginia Martinez has to pay two AC Transit fares to get to and from the grocery store since AC Transit limited transfer use to ninety minutes. She has received warnings at work due to tardiness because of too-infrequent bus service. She has pursued fewer job opportunities, including jobs that would provide more hours than her existing job, because it was too difficult and expensive to reach certain jobs on AC Transit. Ms. Martinez’s husband could not take a better-paying job further from home because it required AC Transit and BART to reach it, and the extra fares would have exceeded the increased wages. AC Transit fare increases cut into her family’s food budget, and her family’s wages do not keep up with AC Transit’s fare increases. She must spend money on gas and other vehicle expenses because AC Transit’s buses are too infrequent to be reliable transportation for her children to get to school. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(f). 30. Ms. Martinez would benefit from covered bus stops and benches because they would provide shelter from the rain. She would also benefit from exclusive bus lanes and more frequent service because they would speed up her travel. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 263(j). 31. Class member Rebecca Jones-White has had to pay for taxi trips to get home from work due to lack of AC Transit service late at night. She had to buy a car because AC Transit had insufficient service for her to get to and from work and to get where she needed to go on weekends. Ms. Jones-White has to incur significant expenses for gas, repairs, and insurance for her car because she can not get where she needs to on AC Transit. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(g). 32. Ms. Jones-White would benefit from AC Transit buses running more often near her Union Hall at night, so she could use AC Transit to get to and from work without waiting outside in unsafe areas for long periods of time. Being more able to use AC Transit to get to and from work would also save her money on gas. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 263(f). 33. Class member Margo Robinson has been written up at work for tardiness due to reduced frequency of the AC Transit bus she takes to get to work. She purchased a car because she could not get to work early enough on the only AC Transit line near her home and because the line does not go to the other places she needs to reach. Ms. Robinson’s car is expensive; she spends money on maintenance, insurance, gas, and repairs that she would not have to spend if she could reach the destinations she needs to reach on AC Transit’s bus. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 262(h). 34. Ms. Robinson would benefit from earlier service on the AC Transit lines that she could use to get to work, including the 45 and the 82. She would also benefit from reinstatement of the 58 line, because it would allow her to connect more conveniently to many locations. Ms. Robinson would also benefit from increased AC Transit service because it would allow her to save money on gas and other expenses of owning and driving a car. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 263(g). Regional Transportation Plan (“RTP”) 35. The RTP is the region’s long-range transportation plan over a twenty-five year time horizon. The RTP is a prerequisite for the Bay Area’s transportation projects to qualify for federal funds. See 23 U.S.C. § 134(g); Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 34. 36. MTC uses the terms “Regional Transportation Plan” and “long-range transportation plan” interchangeably. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 35. 37. MTC adopted its 1994 RTP in or about June, 1994, by Resolution 2687. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 36. 38. MTC adopted its 1998 RTP in or about October, 1998, by Resolution 3116. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 37. 39. MTC adopted its 2001 RTP in or about December, 2001, by Resolution 3427. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 38. 40. MTC adopted its current RTP, known as the “Transportation 2030 Plan,” in or about February, 2005, by Resolution 3681. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 39. 41. Among other mandates for the planning process, MTC is required to “emphasize the preservation of the existing transportation system.” 23 U.S.C. § 134(h)(1)(H). 42. Other mandates for the planning process set forth in the same statute require MTC to also: “support the economic vitality of the metropolitan area, especially by enabling global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency,” “increase the safety of the transportation system for motorized and nonmotorized users,” “increase the security of the transportation system for motorized and nonmotorized users,” “increase the accessibility and mobility of people and for freight,” “protect and enhance the environment, promote energy conservation, improve the quality of life, and promote consistency between transportation improvements and State and local planned growth and economic development patterns,” “enhance the integration and connectivity of the transportation system, across and between modes, for people and freight,” and “promote efficient system management and operation.” 23 U.S.C. § 134(h)(l)(A)-(G). 43. Since 1991, Congress has required long-range transportation plans to be fiscally constrained. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 42. 44. In MTC’s 2005 RTP, Financially Constrained Element refers to programmed local, regional, state, and federal funds, as well as discretionary state and federal funds anticipated to be available over the long term of the Transportation 2030 Plan. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 46. 45. The financially-constrained element of MTC’s 2005 RTP included approximately $118 billion. Of that sum, approximately $76 billion in funding is designated for transit, with the remainder for highways and local streets and roads. Of the transit portion, approximately $61 billion is designated for maintaining and operating the existing system, approximately $2 billion for system efficiency, and approximately $13 billion for transit expansion. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 48. 46. MTC’s 2001 RTP included six goals, one of which was “equity,” which the RTP described as the goal of “achiev[ing] fairness in the planning, funding and operation of the region’s transportation system.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 50. 47. MTC broadly follows a four-step process in preparing the financial plan of its RTP. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 86. 48. In step one of the RTP process, for the revenue side, MTC staff prepares financial estimates for all transportation-related funding sources, including fund sources for transit, and assigns these dollars to transit projects based on current laws, policy, or historic funding levels, as applicable. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 87. 49. In step two of the RTP process, for the expense side, MTC generally relies on data from the Short Range Transit Plans (“SRTP”) for the first ten years and uses standard escalating assumptions for operating or life cycles for capital for the remaining years of the long-range plan. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 88. 50. MTC’s 2003 SRTP Guidelines provide in part that: “The [ten year] operations budget must be sustainable and generally balanced each year over the period of the SRTP, using currently available or reasonably projected revenues .... Where reductions in service levels are required in order to achieve a balanced operating budget, [the operator must] describe the reductions and assess their impact on the affected service areas and communities.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 85. 51. At step three, MTC determines what funding sources are eligible for meeting the operation and maintenance needs, “taking into account eligibility restrictions on those funds.... ” See Aug. 21, 2008 Order on Summ. Adjudication/Judgment at 21:27. 52. At step four, after applying all eligible funds to operations and maintenance of the existing system, MTC applies any excess Track 1, or uncommitted, funding to prior committed projects or new projects in the long-range plan. See Aug. 21, 2008 Order on Summ. Adjudication/Judgment at 21:28-22:2. 53. For the 1998 RTP, the 2001 RTP, and the Transportation 2030 plan, assignment of regional transportation plan revenues was consistent with MTC policies current at the respective time those plans were prepared, and provided the basis for projecting those revenue assignments forward into the future. MTC policies were assumed to be consistent throughout the respective twenty-five-year period encompassing each plan. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 89. 54. As part of its process of preparing the financial plan of its RTP, MTC issues “calls for data” to the transit operators, requesting year-by-year projections over twenty-five years of operating costs and local operating revenues (in year of expenditure dollars), and an explanation of the assumptions on which these projections were based. MTC requests data on an existing “baseline” of service. The “baseline” includes only those services in operation, under construction, or that have full funding commitments, but not potential Regional Transit Expansion Program projects under MTC Resolution No. 3434. MTC instructs operators to use their most recent SRTP operating costs as a “baseline,” and to “trend off’ of that baseline for the outer fifteen years. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 99. 55. A “transit operating shortfall” in the RTP is the difference between an operator’s projected operating revenues and its projected operating costs. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 107. 56. In or about 2004, MTC stated to the California Legislature that its draft 2005 RTP “projects a transit operating shortfall totaling $1.6 billion over 25 years that will need to be addressed with similar fare and service changes absent a new source of operating funds.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 108. 57. MTC identified a projected operating shortfall for AC Transit of $860.5 million in the 1994 RTP. See Second Supplemental Joint Proposed Findings of Fact (docket # 353) at ¶ 306. 58. MTC identified a projected operating shortfall for AC Transit of $136.2 million in the 1998 RTP. See Second Supplemental Joint Proposed Findings of Fact (docket # 353) at ¶ 307. 59. MTC identified a projected operating shortfall for AC Transit of $36.7 million in the 2001 RTP. See Second Supplemental Joint Proposed Findings of Fact (docket # 353) at ¶ 308. 60. MTC identified a projected operating shortfall for AC Transit of $64.4 million in the 2005 RTP. See Second Supplemental Joint Proposed Findings of Fact (docket # 353) at ¶ 309. Transit Operators 61. Alameda Contra Costa Transit District (“AC Transit”), Bay Area Rapid Transit District (“BART”), Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (“Cal-train”), Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation District (“GGT”), San Francisco Municipal Railway (“Muni”), San Mateo County Transit District (“SamTrans”) and Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority (“VTA”) are the seven largest operators in the region. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 53. 62. In the aggregate, these seven operators account for more than 95% of the Bay Area’s total annual transit trips. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 54. 63. The annual ridership of these seven largest transit operators for Fiscal Year 2005-2006 was approximately as follows: AC Transit (65.383 million); BART (101.578 million); Caltrain (10.149 million); GGT (9.403 million); Muni (220.880 million); SamTrans (14.506 million); VTA (40.187 million). See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 55. 64. Minorities account for approximately 61% of the Bay Area’s aggregate transit ridership. The proportion of minority riders on the seven largest transit operators is as follows: 78% of AC Transit riders; 53% of BART riders; 50% of Caltrain riders; 38% of GGT riders; 58% of Muni riders; 70% of SamTrans riders; and 70% of VTA riders. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 56. 65. AC Transit connects with nine other bus systems, twenty-one BART stations, six Amtrak stations, and three ferry terminals. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 63. 66. AC Transit was created by statute. See Cal. Public Utilities Code §§ 24561 et seq.; Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 64. 67. AC Transit’s patrons in Contra Costa County include a higher percentage of white riders than AC Transit’s patrons in Alameda County. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conelusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 65. 68. In or about 2001, the AC Transit Board of Directors adopted a policy-document entitled, “Strategic Vision: A World Class System for the East Bay” (“Strategic Vision”). See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 66. 69. AC Transit has published an SRTP that contains the Strategic Vision. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 67, 69. 70. AC Transit’s Strategic Vision describes a tiered approach to “accomplish the goal of increasing ridership to about 85 million by 2005-06, then rising to 100 million by 2010.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 72. 71. The first tier is known as the Financially Constrained Operating Plan (“FCOP”), “which is based on anticipated revenue from existing sources.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 73. 72. Bay Area Rapid Transit (“BART”) operates rail service consisting of five routes to forty-three stations in four counties. See Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 312. 73. According to BART’s STRP for FY 2003-2012, “[t]he Bay Area economy began to slow in late 2000, mid-way through FY01, and BART ridership declined as a result.” See Trial Exhibit (“Tr. Ex.”) 1172, Chap. 3, p. 3; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 315. 74. According to BART’s SRTP for FY 2005-2014, BART ridership, after growing at record rates for several years, decreased with the Bay Area economic downturn from FY02 through FY03. BART reported that much of the ridership decrease was attributable to the Bay Area economy, hard hit by the loss of technology jobs and by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. See Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 325. 75. According to BART’s SRTP for FY 2005-2014, “BART’s ridership is often directly impacted by the health of the economy.” See Tr. Ex. 1898, p. 3-6; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 328. 76. Caltrain is a train system operating in San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara counties. See Tr. Ex. 667 at 32-34. The Joint Powers Board, consisting of Muni, SamTrans and VTA, took over ownership of Cal-train in July 1992. See id. 77. Caltrain lost 4.25% of its ridership in FY 2001-2002 and 11.85% in FY 2002-2003. See Tr. Ex. 1166 at 4-1. 78. Caltrain cut service after the 2002-2003 recession. See Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 549:12-18. 79. In or about June 2004, Caltrain began to run eighty-six trains each weekday, including ten express trains known as “Baby Bullet” trains between San Francisco and San Jose. See Tr. Ex. 219. Weekend service was also restored at that time, with thirty-two Saturday trains and thirty Sunday trains. See id. Service increased in July 2005, when Caltrain began running ninety-six trains each weekday, including twenty-two Baby Bullet trains. See id. 80. Since the Baby Bullet opened, ridership has increased on Caltrain by more than 50%. See RT 884:25-885:4. 81. GGT is the smallest of the seven largest operators in terms of number of passengers carried per year. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 57. 82. GGT owns the Golden Gate Bridge, which provides GGT with toll revenues as a source of operating funding. Demand for GGT bus services has fallen by 25% since 2000-2001. See RT 510:16-22. 83. In late 2001 and early 2002, the economy contributed to GGT’s projection of a revenue shortfall of one billion dollars over ten years. See RT 972:18-973:19. GGT developed a strategic plan to address the projected shortfall, which was updated in 2002, and included service cuts. See RT 973:20-974:15. 84. GGT had service cuts after the 2002-2003 recession. See RT 549:4-5. 85. Since fiscal year 2004, GGT has increased service because ridership increased. See RT 979:17-20. 86. The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency is composed of San Francisco Municipal Railway (“Muni”) and the Department of Parking and Traffic. See http://www. sfinta.com/cms/ahome/indxabmu.html. 87. Muni served approximately 217 million riders in FY 2006-2007. See Stipulation Regarding Ridership, Revenue Vehicle Miles, and Revenue Vehicle Hours of Seven Largest Operators (docket # 371) at Ex. C. 88. Muni had service cuts after the 2002-2003 recession. See RT 549:8-9. 89. Muni receives parking-related revenues. See RT 927:9-11. 90. In 2004, Muni had a $13 million shortfall that was covered with a fare increase, parking fee and fine increases, as well as staff reductions. See Tr. Ex. 1178 at 66. 91. SamTrans provided bus service to approximately 14.5 million riders in San Mateo County in FY 2006-2007. See Stipulation Regarding Ridership, Revenue Vehicle Miles, and Revenue Vehicle Hours of Seven Largest Operators (docket # 371) at Ex. C. 92. SamTrans cut service after the 2002-2003 recession. See RT 549:6-7. 93. In 2003, SamTrans restructured their local service to provide feeder service to the new BART extension. See RT 417:4-22. 94. SamTrans’s ridership stabilized in FY 2007 due to some rebound in the economy. See Tr. Ex. 1902 at 1. 95. On June 12, 2002, the Board of Directors for SamTrans adopted certain bus service changes comprising the elimination of some routes, the combination of other routes and adjusted frequencies. The Board of Directors adopted the changes with the understanding that staff would be authorized to implement the changes as of August 25, 2002. See Tr. Ex. 1920; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 369. 96. VTA operates bus and light rail service. See Tr. Ex. 1913; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket #364) at ¶ 342. 97. VTA is the Congestion Management Authority (“CMA”) for Santa Clara County. See Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 343. 98. VTA has statutory authority to enact sales and use taxes if so authorized by the voters. See Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 345. 99. The VTA Board of Directors on August 9, 2000 voted to place a half-cent transit sales tax, Santa Clara County 2000 Measure A, on the November 7, 2000 General Election ballot. The voters passed the tax, which is dedicated to specified public transit capital improvement projects and operations in Santa Clara County, including the BART extension to Silicon Valley. See Tr. Ex. 1914; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 346. 100. On June 15, 2006, the VTA Board approved the 2000 Measure A Revenue and Expenditure Plan, a $21.6 billion capital and operations program. See Tr. Ex. 1180 at 4; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 348. 101. Approximately 18.5% of 2000 Santa Clara County Measure A sales-tax revenues are designated annually for operating purposes, which VTA projected to be $6,869 million in FY 2006 and $28,815 million in FY 2007. See Tr. Ex. 1180 at 6-7; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 349. 102. VTA reported to MTC in its MiniSRTP for FY 2007-2016 that “the addition of Measure A Operating Assistance” allows VTA “to project a reduction of Federal Preventive Maintenance in FY 2008 to levels consistent with pre-recession numbers, so that it may reinstate its local capital program.” See Tr. Ex. 1180 at 6, § 1.3; Tr. Ex. 1181 at 54; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 350. 103. On May 2, 2002, the VTA Board of Directors made a finding that a fare increase was necessary to meet operating expenses and to fund capital projects necessary to maintain service within the existing service area, while maintaining minimum required financial reserves, and adopted Resolution No. 02.05.15 establishing new rates and fares for VTA bus, light rail, and paratransit services effective July 1, 2002. See Tr. Ex. 1915; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 354. 104. VTA implemented a 5% service reduction in July 2002. See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 2-8; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket #364) at ¶ 355. 105. VTA implemented a 9% service reduction in April 2003. See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 2-8; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 357. 106. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that the high rate of unemployment in Santa Clara County had a dramatic impact on transit ridership. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that ridership trends closely mirror unemployment trends — as unemployment increases, ridership declines. See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 2-8; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 359. 107. VTA bus ridership declined 13% between FY 2001-02 and 2002-03. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that the decline was attributed to the “weak local economy.” See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 2-5; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 360. 108. VTA light rail ridership declined 22% between FY 2001-02 and 2002-OS. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that the decline was attributed to the “weak local economy.” See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 2-5, 2-7; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 361. 109. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that after 2001, declines in bus and light rail productivity were primarily due to the poor performance of the local economy. See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 2-8; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 362. 110. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that “[i]n excess of 200,-000 jobs have been lost in our community.” See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 2-8; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 363. 111. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that “[between FY 1997 and FY 2001, VTA bus and light rail passengers per scheduled revenue hour steadily declined for several reasons. These were years of system expansion, and it is very difficult for new services to be as productive as the core services that were already in place. Added to that, the most highly productive markets were already being served.” See Tr. Ex. 1183 at 2-7; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket #364) at ¶ 364. 112. On September 12, 2008, VTA reported a rise in both bus and rail ridership with average weekday ridership being at the highest levels since August 2002. See Tr. Ex. 1917; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 365. 113. In November 2001, the VTA and BART Boards of Directors approved “a cooperative agreement regarding institutional, project implementation and financial issues related to the BART extension.” See Tr. Ex. 1181, p. 78; Tr. Ex. 1182, p. 74; Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 4-23; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 366. VTA reported in its SRTP for FY 2004-2013 that it is “seeking to close the gap in the regional transportation network by providing an extension of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system to Silicon Valley.” See Tr. Ex. 1183, p. 4-23; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 366. 114. BART reported in its SRTP for FY 2008 through FY 2017 that: “VTA is providing the funding support for all BART costs related to support work for the Silicon Valley Rapid Transit project. BART and VTA will continue to work towards the completion of the proposed BART to Santa Clara County Extension, with VTA taking the lead in financing and completing the project planning, design and construction.” See Tr. Ex. 1898, p. 5-22; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 367. 115. The revenue from the one-eighth cent sales and use tax that was proposed by the VTA Board of Directors and approved by the voters on November 4, 2008 can be used only to fund the operation, maintenance and future capital reserve for the BART Extension to Santa Clara County. See VTA Board Resolution No. 08.08.23, http://www.vta.org/ bart/documents/other/adoptecL resolution_08_08_23.pdf; see also http://www.vta.org/bart; Third Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 364) at ¶ 368. MTC Demographic Survey 116. In 2006, MTC commissioned a region-wide demographic survey of Bay Area transit ridership (“Demographic Survey”). See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 58. 117. In or about June 2007, MTC issued a final report entitled “MTC Demographic Survey, Phase One” (“the 2007 Report”). See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 59. 118. The 2007 Report reports the findings of Phase One of a survey of the ridership of riders of fixed-route transit service provided by approximately twenty Bay Area transit operators. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 61. 119. The MTC Demographic Survey was the first demographic survey of the riderships of Bay Area transit operators that MTC had prepared, commissioned or conducted. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 62. 120. Since at least as early as September 2000, MTC has annually published a report entitled “Statistical Summary of Bay Area Transit Operators.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 77. 121. MTC’s “Statistical Summary” publication provides, for each Bay Area transit operator, a variety of data on operating budgets and service levels. Among other things, it reports annual ridership, annual revenue vehicle miles and hours, and operating budget. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 78. Lifeline Transportation Network 122. In or about December 2001, MTC adopted the Lifeline Transportation Network Report as a part of the “Blueprint element” of the 2001 RTP. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 235. 123. The “Blueprint” element of the 2001 Regional Transportation Plan was “MTC’s advocacy document for new transportation revenues” to fund key transportation projects. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 248. 124. The purpose of the Lifeline Transportation Network Report was to assess the current ability of the fixed route transit system to serve low-income communities in the region. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 236. 125. The Lifeline Transportation Network Report, which was included in the 2001 RTP, defined a network of lifeline transit routes identified by MTC as critical to meeting the transportation needs of low income people in the San Francisco Bay Area. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 237. 126. The Lifeline Transportation Network Report estimated that, assuming a fixed route solution, a total of 1.55 million service hours per year of additional service would be needed to fill the gaps identified in the Lifeline Transportation Network. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 241. 127. The Lifeline Transportation Network Report identified as a “first priority” supporting “the current network of transit routes that effectively serve low-income communities.” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 242. Equity Analysis 128. In the Equity Analysis of its 2001 RTP and its 2005 RTP, MTC analyzed “Communities of Concern” that were defined on the basis of proportional geographic concentrations of minority populations and low-income populations in “Regional Travel Analysis Zones” (“RTAZs”). See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 257. 129. RTAZs are small area neighborhoods or communities that serve as the smallest geographic basis for travel demand modeling. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 253. 130. Communities of Concern, as defined in the 2001 and 2004-05 Equity Analyses, are found in each of the nine Bay Area Counties. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 257. 131. The 2005 RTP Equity Analysis included an RTAZ as part of a community of concern if 30% or more of the households within that zone are below 200% of the poverty level because using this threshold places an emphasis on evaluating areas with significant concentrations of low-income households. Also, as 50% of the Bay Area is non-white (according to the 2000 U.S. Census data used in the 2004-05 Equity Analysis), an RTAZ was also included as a community of concern if 70% or more of the persons in the households were of the following descent: African American, Asian American, Hispanic or Latino, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, or MultiRacial (two or more races). These two thresholds of 30% and 70% were also used to define a community of concern in the 2001 equity analysis. The 30%/70% thresholds together represent 33% of the Bay Area population. See Supplemental Joint Findings of Fact (docket # 346) at ¶ 252. Funding Types Resolution 3434 132. Resolution 3434 is also known as the Regional Transit Expansion Program (“RTEP”). Resolution 3434 consists of a list of high-priority rail and express/rapid bus improvements to serve the Bay Area’s most congested corridors. MTC adopted Resolution 3434 in December 2001 to establish clear priorities for the investment of transit expansion funds. See Joint Glossary at 13. 133. MTC’s 2001 RTP states that: “The cornerstone of this RTP is the Regional Transit Expansion Program— adopted by the Commission as Resolution 3434 — which calls for a nearly $11 billion investment in new rail and bus projects ---- Resolution 3434 is the successor to MTC’s Resolution 1876, which was adopted in 1988 and delivered ... improvements [such] as the BART extensions to Pittsburg/Bay Point and Dublin/Pleasanton, the Tasman light-rail extension in Silicon Valley, and the ... BART extension to [SFO].” See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 208. 134. Resolution No. 3434 is a strategic long-range master plan. The plan contemplates that MTC would find additional sources of funds to fully fund the projects in the plan. In order to be included in the RTP, however, the project would have to have full capital funding and its transit agency must demonstrate an ability to operate the increase in service. If a project had a capital shortfall, it could not be included in the RTP. See RT 1028:3-19. 135. For Resolution No. 3434, the funding projections are long range projections which are expected to take twenty-five to thirty years to fulfill. See RT 961:1-12. 136. Resolution 3357 sets forth the criteria MTC adopted to govern the selection of projects for Resolution 3434. See RT 423:4-10; Tr. Ex. 104. In Resolution 3357, MTC formulated different selection criteria for bus projects than for rail projects. See RT 1255:8-10; Tr. Ex. 104, Attachment A. When Resolution No. 3434 was originally adopted in 2001, MTC issued a call for projects. Projects were to be judged by criteria adopted in Resolution No. 3357, which fell into two main categories. First, there were financial-based criteria which assessed whether a sponsor already had funds, whether federal, state and/or local, committed to the project. Second, there were performance-related criteria, which assessed the relationship of the project to land-use goals, connectivity with other systems, and ability to fill gaps in the transit network. See RT 1012:2-1013:25; Tr. Ex. 1456. 137. For a bus project to be included in Resolution 3434, Resolution 3357 required a demonstration that the bus project could effectively address congestion relief by providing a clearly attractive (i.e., faster and/or more convenient) alternative to single occupancy vehicles. The same criteria was not listed in the requirements for rail projects, although MTC assumed that rail projects would satisfy this requirement. See RT 1256:17-1258:3; Tr. Ex. 104, Attachment A. 138. MTC issued a call for project candidates specifically instructing operators to submit projects based on these criteria. See RT 423:14-17. One of the evaluation criteria in Resolution 3357 was cost-effectiveness, as rated on a scale of high, medium, or low. See RT 424:4-9, 1256:3-5; Tr. Ex. 104, Attachment A, Section A. MTC assigned a high cost-effectiveness score to projects with a capital cost of $0 to $15 per new rider. See RT 424:10-12. However, a high rating on the cost-effectiveness scale was not a prerequisite to a project’s inclusion in Resolution 3434 and several Resolution 3434 projects had low efficiency ratings. See RT 424:13-21. 139. When formulating Resolution 3434, MTC intended to include bus projects to “provide transitional express bus services more quickly in corridors where rail service is planned but not deliverable for many years.” See RT 1258:4-1259:7; Tr. Ex. 104 at MTCP151108. 140. MTC recognizes that express bus projects can be completed more quickly than new rail extensions, and generally require a much smaller capital investment. See RT 1259:8-1260:22. 141. AC Transit requested funds from MTC for the 2001 RTEP for the Berkeley-Oakland-San Leandro Bus Rapid Transit, Phase 1 Project. See RT 425:23-426:6; Tr. Ex. 103 at MTCP000982; see also RT 116:18-117:9; 117:24-118:2. The total capital cost of that project was approximately $104 million in 2001 dollars. See RT 426:7-10; Tr. Ex. 103 at MTCP000982. That service area is largely minority and predominantly loW-income. See Spencer Dep. of 09-10-07 at 65:21-66:4. AC Transit sought funding for that project to contribute to improved mobility for area residents and greater access to jobs. See id. at 66:12-21. AC Transit received some money for that project, but MTC did not allocate the full amount requested by AC Transit. See id. at 66:22-67:2. The project is currently not fully funded. See id. at 67:3-6. AC Transit has plans to go forward with the improvements if it receives full funding. See id. at 67:7-10. 142. AC Transit also requested funds from MTC in the 2001 RTEP for the AC Transit/ Oakland/San Leandro Bus Rapid Transit, Phase Two (International Boulevard — East 14th Street) Project. See RT 426:13-17; Tr. Ex. 103 at MTCP000985; see also RT 116:18-117:9; 118:5-8. The total capital cost of that project was approximately $270 million in 2001 dollars. See RT 426:18-20; Tr. Ex. 103 at MTCP000985. 143. AC Transit also requested funds from MTC in the 2001 RTEP for the AC Transit Enhanced Bus/Rapid Transit, Miscellaneous Corridors project. See RT 426:21-25; Tr. Ex. 103 at MTCP000988. AC Transit submitted a proposal for eight miscellaneous corridors set forth in the Strategic Vision Plan chart, including San Pablo Avenue, Telegraph/International Boulevard/East 14th, MacArthur Boulevard and Hesperian/Mission/East 14th. See RT 116:18-117:4, 118:14-17, 162:18-24; Tr. Ex. 582 at Table ES-1. The total capital cost of that project was approximately $906 million in 2001 dollars. See RT 427:1-6; Tr. Ex. 103 at MTCP000988. 144. AC Transit’s funding requests under Resolution 3434 were close to a billion dollars. See RT 119:8. In 2001, Resolution 3434 ultimately provided just above $200 million for AC Transit’s projects. See RT 119:5-12. 145. As adopted in 2001, Resolution No. 3434 included nineteen projects with a total projected capital cost of $10,519 billion in 2001 dollars. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 213. 146. As adopted in 2001, Resolution No. 3434 included five BART projects: BART to Warm Springs; Warms Springs to San Jose; Oakland Airport Connector; East Contra Costa Rail Extension; and Tri-Valley Rail Extension. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 214. 147. As adopted in 2001, Resolution No. 3434 included three Caltrain projects: Caltrain Rapid Rail/Electrification; Caltrain Express, Phase 1; and Caltrain Express, Phase 2. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 215. 148. As adopted in 2001, Resolution No. 3434 included two AC Transit projects: AC Transit Oakland/San Leandro Bus Rapid Transit, Phase 1 (Enhanced Bus); and AC Transit Enhanced Bus, Hesperian/Foothill/MacArthur corridors. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket #291) at ¶ 216. 149. As adopted in 2001, Resolution No. 3434 projected the total project cost of the following projects, in 2001 dollars, as follows: (1) BART to Warm Springs: $634 million; (2) BART, Warms Springs to San Jose: $3,710 billion; (3) BART Oakland Airport Connector: $232 million; (4) BART East Contra Costa Rail Extension: $345 million; (5) BART Tri-Valley Rail Extension: $345 million; (6) Caltrain Rapid Rail/Electrification: $602 million; (7) Caltrain Express, Phase 1: $127 million; (8) Caltrain Express, Phase 2: $330 million; (9)AC Transit Oakland/San Leandro Bus Rapid Transit, Phase 1 (Enhanced Bus): $151 million; and (10) AC Transit Enhanced Bus, Hesperian/F oothill/M acA'thur corridors: $90 million. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (docket # 291) at ¶ 217. 150. As adopted in 2001, Resolution No. 3434 projected the capital shortfall for the following projects, in 2001 dollars, as follows: (1) BART to Warm Springs: none; (2) BART, Warms Springs to San Jose: none; (3) BART Oakland Airport Connector: none; (4) BART East Contra Costa Rail Extension: $99 million; (5) BART Tri-Valley Rail Extension: $145 million; (6) Caltrain Rapid Rail/Electrification: none; (7) Caltrain Ex