Full opinion text
OPINION RIDGWAY, Judge. These consolidated actions are before the court on cross-motions for- judgment on the agency record. Domestic steel manufacturers Nucor Corporation, Gerdau AmeriSteel Corporation, and Commercial Metals Company (collectively, the “Domestic Producers”) and ICDAS Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim Sanayi, A.S. (“ICDAS”) — a Turkish producer/exporter of the subject merchandise — separately challenge various aspects of the final results of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s seventh administrative review of the anti-dumping duty order on Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Turkey. See generally Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Turkey; Final Results, Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review in Part, and Determination To Revoke in Part, 70 Fed.Reg. 67,665 (Nov. 8, 2005) (“Final Results”). Also here in dispute are the results of a voluntary remand to Commerce on the issue of the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, for use in Commerce’s antidumping margin calculations. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (“Remand Results”). In particular, the Domestic Producers contend that Commerce erred in the Final Results by classifying ICDAS’ sales through its U.S. affiliate as Export Price (“EP”) sales, rather than Constructed Export Price (“CEP”) sales. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Domestic Producers Brief’); Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief (“Domestic Producers Reply Brief’) at 1-8. The Domestic Producers further assert that ICDAS’ attacks on the Final Results are unfounded, and that the Final Results therefore should be sustained in all other respects — with one major exception. See Response Brief of the Domestic Producers (“Domestic Producers Response Brief’). Specifically, the Domestic Producers assert that the Final Results erred in using contract date as the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, and that the Remand Results — where Commerce reversed itself — are correct. See Domestic Producers Brief at 2 n. 1; Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 1, 8-15. For its part, ICDAS challenges four aspects of the Final Results: (1) Commerce’s disallowance of a start-up adjustment for ICDAS’ Biga melt shop; (2) Commerce’s decision to treat ICDAS’ foreign exchange gains within the category of “financial expenses,” and to cap ICDAS’ total financial expenses at zero; (3) Commerce’s use of the average cost of manufacturing for the entire period of review (“POR”), rather than ICDAS’ quarterly costs, in the agency’s “sales below cost” analysis; and (4) Commerce’s use of the date of entry, rather than the date of sale, to define ICDAS’ universe of sales. See Plaintiff ICDAS’ Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record Pursuant to Rule 56.2 (“ICDAS Brief’); Plaintiff ICDAS’ Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record Pursuant to Rule 56.2 (“ICDAS Reply Brief’). In addition, ICDAS contests Commerce’s decisioh in the Remand Results to use invoice date as the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, rather than using contract date (as the agency did in the Final Results). See DefendanNIntervenor ICDAS’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record at 1-3, 5-30 (“ICDAS Response Brief’); DefendanNIntervenor ICDAS’ Supplemental Reply Brief Regarding the Date of Sale Issue (“ICDAS Supp. Reply Brief’). ICDAS maintains that Commerce properly treated all of ICDAS’ U.S. sales as Export Price (“EP”) sales, rather than Constructed Export Price (“CEP”) sales, and therefore opposes the Domestic Producers’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record. See ICDAS Response Brief at 1, 3-4, 30-40. The Government maintains that the Final Results should be sustained in all respects, save three. See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ and Defendant-Intervenor’s Motions for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“Def. Response Brief’). First, the Government requests that two issues be remanded to Commerce for further consideration — specifically, Commerce’s use of the POR average cost of manufacturing (rather than ICDAS’ quarterly costs) in the agency’s “sales below cost” analysis, and Commerce’s use of the date of entry (rather than the date of sale) to define ICDAS’ universe of sales. See Def. Response Brief at 1-3, 8-9, 11-12, 28-29, 36. In addition, the Government asserts that, as to the issue of the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, the Remand Results (which used invoice date as the date of sale) — rather than the Final Results (which used contract date) — should be sustained. See Defendant’s Response to Defendanb-Intervenor’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Def. Supp. Response Brief’). Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). For the reasons set forth below, the Domestic Producers’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record challenging Commerce’s decision to treat sales made through ICDAS’ U.S. sales affiliate as EP sales must be denied. ICDAS’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record must similarly be denied as to ICDAS’ claims that Commerce improperly denied ICDAS’ request for a startup adjustment, and that Commerce erred in its treatment of ICDAS’ foreign exchange gains as well as in its decision to' cap ICDAS’ total financial expenses at zero. On the other hand, ICDAS’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record is granted as to ICDAS’ challenges to Commerce’s use of invoice date (rather than contract date) as the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, Commerce’s use of the POR average cost of manufacturing (rather than ICDAS’ quarterly costs) in the agency’s “sales below cost” analysis, and Commerce’s use of the date of entry (rather than the date of sale) to define ICDAS’ universe of sales; and this matter is remanded to the Department of Commerce for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. I. Standard of Review In reviewing a challenge to a final determination by the Commerce Department in an antidumping administrative review, the court must hold unlawful any agency determination, finding, or conclusion that is found to be “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i); see also Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 795, 800 (Fed.Cir.2006). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2003) (same). Moreover, “the substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,” including “contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.”' Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed.Cir.1994) (quoting Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456). On the other hand, the mere fact that “it [may be] possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from evidence in the record ... does not prevent Commerce’s determination from being supported by substantial evidence.” Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2001); see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (same). II. Background In April 1997, the Department of Commerce issued an antidumping order covering rebar from Turkey. See Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Turkey, 62 Fed.Reg. 18,748 (April 17, 1997). Subsequently, in every annual administrative review that Commerce has conducted for ICDAS since 1999 — including three consecutive administrative reviews, covering the periods April 1, 2001 through March 31, 2004 — Commerce consistently found that the dumping margin for ICDAS’ U.S. sales was zero or de minimis (at least until the Remand Results here in dispute were issued). The administrative review which is the subject of this action — the seventh such review — began in April 2004, when Commerce gave notice of the opportunity to request a review of the antidumping order on rebar from Turkey, for the period April 1, 2003 through March 31, 2004. See generally Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation; Opportunity To Request Administrative Review, 69 Fed.Reg. 17,129 (April 1, 2004). At the request of both the Domestic Producers and ICDAS, inter alia, Commerce initiated an administrative review the following month. See generally Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 69 Fed.Reg. 30,282 (May 27, 2004). In the Preliminary Results of the administrative review, Commerce calculated a margin of 0.47% for ICDAS. In light of that de minimis margin, and the company’s record of zero or de minimis margins in the two prior administrative reviews, the agency also announced its intention to revoke the antidumping order as to ICDAS. See generally Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from Turkey; Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Notice of Intent to Revoke in Part, 70 Fed.Reg. 23,990, 23,991, 23,995 (May 6, 2005) (“Preliminary Results”); see also Gerdau Ameristeel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.3d 1336, 1337-38 (Fed.Cir.2008) (summarizing history of de minimis findings in administrative reviews of ICDAS, leading to Commerce’s determination to revoke antidumping order as to ICDAS). Following briefing and oral argument by the parties before the agency, Commerce published the Final Results of the administrative review. See generally Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Turkey; Final Results, Rescission of Anti-dumping Duty Administrative Review in Part, and Determination To Revoke in Part, 70 Fed.Reg. 67,665 (Nov. 8, 2005) (“Final Results”); see also Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review on Certain Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars From Turkey — April 1, 2003, through March 31, 2004 (Nov. 2, 2005) (Pub.Doc. No. 256) (“Decision Memo”). In reaching the Final Results, Commerce decided, inter alia, (1) to treat all of ICDAS’ U.S. sales as Export Price (“EP”), rather than Constructed Export Price (“CEP”), transactions; (2) to disallow a start-up adjustment for ICDAS’ Biga melt shop; (3) to treat ICDAS’ foreign exchange gains within the category of “financial expenses” for purposes of calculating ICDAS’ cost of production, and to cap ICDAS’ total financial expenses at zero; (4) to use contract date (rather than invoice date) as the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, for purposes of calculating ICDAS’ antidumping duty margin; (5) to use in its “sales below cost” analysis the weighted average cost of manufacturing for the entire one-year period of review, rather than ICDAS’ quarterly average costs; and (6) to use the date of entry, rather than the date of sale, to define ICDAS’ universe of sales. Based on Commerce’s analyses as reflected in its Final Results, the final dumping margin for ICDAS was calculated to be 0.16% — once again, a de minimis margin. See Final Results, 70 Fed.Reg. at 67,667. As a result of the company’s de minimis dumping margin in the review at issue, as well as its de minimis or zero margins in the two previous administrative reviews, Commerce revoked the antidumping order as to ICDAS, in accordance with the agency’s regulations. See Final Results, 70 Fed.Reg. at 67,666; 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)® (providing for revocation of an order as to a particular exporter or producer of subject merchandise where, inter alia, the exporter or producer has “sold the merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at least three consecutive years”). ■ The Domestic Producers and ICDAS brought the two actions consolidated here, challenging various aspects of the Final Results. One of the two issues raised in the Domestic Producers’ Complaint was Commerce’s use of the contract date as the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales. On behalf of Commerce, the Government requested and was granted a voluntary remand on that issue. On remand, Commerce reversed itself, changing its “date of sale” methodology for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, using the invoice date — rather than the contract date — as the date of sale. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (“Remand Results”). As a result of that change, Commerce recalculated the dumping margin for ICDAS as above the de minimis level, and concluded that ICDAS does not qualify for revocation. See Remand Results at 2-3, 25. The parties’ pending cross-motions for judgment on the agency record are directed to the Final Results of Commerce’s seventh administrative review, as well as the “date of sale” issue addressed in Commerce’s Remand Results. III. Analysis In their Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record, the Domestic Producers contend that, in the Final Results, Commerce wrongly treated sales made through ICDAS’ U.S. affiliate as Export Price (“EP”) — rather than Constructed Export Price (“CEP”) — sales. In its Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record, ICDAS argues, in turn, that Commerce erred in denying ICDAS’ request for a startup adjustment in the Final Results, that Commerce both improperly treated ICDAS’ foreign exchange gains within the category of “financial expenses” for purposes of calculating ICDAS’ cost of production in the Final Results and also improperly capped ICDAS’ total financial expenses at zero, that Commerce erred on remand in using invoice date (rather than contract date) as the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, that Commerce erred in the Final Results by using in its “sales below cost” analysis the weighted average cost of manufacturing for the period of review (“POR”) (rather than ICDAS’ quarterly average costs), and that Commerce erred in the Final Results by using the date of entry (rather than the date of sale) to define ICDAS’ universe of sales. Each of the parties’ claims is discussed in detail below. As set forth there, there is no merit to the Domestic Producers’ challenge to Commerce’s decision to treat sales made through ICDAS’ U.S. sales affiliate as EP sales. The Domestic Producers’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record therefore must be denied. Similarly lacking in merit are ICDAS’ challenge to Commerce’s denial of ICDAS’ request for a startup adjustment, and ICDAS’ challenge to Commerce’s treatment of ICDAS’ foreign exchange gains as “financial expenses” as well as the agency’s decision to cap ICDAS’ total financial expenses at zero. Accordingly, ICDAS’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record must be denied as to those claims. In contrast, Commerce’s use of invoice date (rather than contract date) as the date of sale for ICDAS’ U.S. sales, Commerce’s use of the POR average cost of manufacturing (rather than ICDAS’ quarterly costs) in the agency’s “sales below cost” analysis, and Commerce’s use of the date of entry (rather than the date of sale) to define ICDAS’ universe of sales cannot be sustained on the existing administrative record. ICDAS’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record therefore must be granted as to those claims, and this matter remanded to Commerce for further appropriate action. A. Commerce’s Treatment of ICDAS’ U.S. Sales as Export Price (“EP”) Sales Dumping takes place when merchandise is ' imported into the United States and sold at a price lower than its “normal value” — ie., the foreign market value of the subject merchandise. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677(34). The difference between the normal value and the U.S. Price is the “dumping margin.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35). When normal value is compared to the U.S. Price and dumping is found, antidumping duties equal to the dumping margin may be imposed to offset the dumping. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(B). For purposes of an antidumping analysis, the U.S. Price is calculated using either the Export Price (“EP”) methodology or the Constructed Export Price (“CEP”) methodology. Commerce compares either the EP or the CEP with the “normal value” of the subject merchandise, to ascertain whether dumping is occurring, and, if so, to calculate the dumping margin. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677a. If a transaction is classified as a CEP sale, the statute requires that certain additional deductions be taken from the sales price in order to arrive at the U.S. Price. The bottom line is that use of CEP is more likely to result in a finding of dumping. See generally AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1361, 1364-65 & n. 4 (Fed.Cir.2000). Export Price (“EP”) is defined in the statute: The term “export price” means the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) before the date of importation by the producer or exporter of the subject merchandise outside of the United States to an unaffiliated purchaser in the United States or to an unaffiliated purchaser for exportation to the United States.... 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a). The statute defines Constructed Export Price (“CEP”) as well: The term “constructed export price” means the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold) in the United States before or after the date of importation by or for the account of the producer or exporter of such merchandise or by a seller affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated with the producer or exporter.... 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b). During the period of review, ICDAS exported merchandise to the United States both through a U.S. affiliate (which serves as importer of record, and is basically a “paper company”), as well as directly to unaffiliated customers. In the Final Results at issue here, Commerce classified all of ICDAS’ U.S. sales as EP sales, as it has since the 2001-2002 review, applying AK Steel (which includes a detailed analysis of the differences between EP and CEP sales) and emphasizing the locations of the transactions. See generally Final Results, 70 Fed.Reg. 67,665; Decision Memo at 63-68. Commerce concluded: While we note that it is undisputed that ICDAS’s U.S. importer is affiliated with ICDAS, this fact alone does not require a finding that the sales in question are CEP transactions. Under AK Steel, the salient issue is whether the sale at issue takes place inside or outside the United States, which the Court further discussed in Corus Staal, noting that “the focus of the inquiry is on the location of the sale not the role played by the affiliated importer.” See Corus Staal, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1259. In this case, the record indicates that ICDAS’s sales through its affiliated importer were concluded in Turkey.... [T]he sales agreement was signed in Turkey by ICDAS personnel, the invoice was issued by an entity in Turkey (ie., the producer/exporter) to an entity in the United States (ie., the U.S. customer), and it was concluded outside the United States. Regarding the petitioners’ arguments involving the transfer of title, we disagree that the evidence on the record shows that title passed to the customer inside the United States. We have examined the documents taken at verification and find that none of the contracts for ... entries [during the period of review] shows that title passed after entry. Decision Memo at 66-67. The Domestic Producers contend that Commerce erred in classifying sales made through ICDAS’ U.S. affiliate as EP sales. According to the Domestic Producers, those transactions instead should be treated as CEP sales. See generally Domestic Producers Brief, passim; Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 1-9. In their briefs, the parties devote much ink to their competing interpretations of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in AK Steel, and, to a lesser degree, the opinion of this court in Corus Staal. See AK Steel, 226 F.3d 1361; Corus Staal BV v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 27 CIT 388, 259 F.Supp.2d 1253 (2003) (concerning Final Determination in antidumping investigation). The Domestic Producers maintain that those two opinions require that sales made through ICDAS’ U.S. affiliate be classified as CEP sales. See Domestic Producers Brief at 8; see also id. at 9-17; Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 1-7. The Domestic Producers initially asserted that AK Steel holds flatly that “any sale in which the contract is between a U.S. affiliate and an unaffiliated U.S. customer must be classified as CEP,” based solely on the domicile of the seller and without regard to the location of the sale or transaction. See Domestic Producers Brief at 11; see also id. at 8, 12. In their Reply Brief, the Domestic Producers moderated their stance slightly, arguing that “[t]he decision [in AK Steel ] appears to support two different, mutually exclusive tests for whether a transaction is CEP or EP” — one test based on the domicile of the party making the sale to the first unaffiliated customer, and one test based on the location of the sale or transaction. See Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 2. Specifically, the Domestic Producers assert that “[portions of the opinion [in AK Steel ] clearly state that whenever the sale to the first unaffiliated U.S. customer is made by a U.S. selling affiliate, that transaction must be classified as CEP.” See Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 2. To illustrate this point, the Domestic Producers excerpt language from the Court of Appeals’ conclusion in AK Steel: “[I]f the contract for sale was between a U.S. affiliate of a foreign producer or exporter and an unaffiliated U.S. purchaser, then the sale must be classified as a CEP sale____ Similarly, a sale made by a U.S. affiliate or another party other than the producer or exporter cannot be an EP sale.” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1374 (quoted in Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 2). At the same time, however, the Domestic Producers candidly concede — as they must — that “other portions of the opinion [in AK Steel ] appear to state that a sale by a U.S. affiliate can be classified as EP where title transfers and consideration is [given] outside of the United States.” See Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 2-3. To illustrate that point, the Domestic Producers point to another excerpt from AK Steel: “The term ‘outside the United States,’ read in the context of both the CEP and the EP definitions, ... applies to the locus of the transaction at issue, not the location of the company.” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369 (quoted in Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 2-3). Summing up their analysis of AK Steel, the Domestic Producers state: “Thus, at different points in the opinion, the Federal Circuit appears to endorse a bright-line rule whereby all sales through a U.S. selling affiliate are CEP; in others, it appears to make the distinction based solely on the location of title transfer.” Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 3. The Domestic Producers conclude — based on both their analysis of the language of the opinion, as well as their analysis of the facts and outcome of the case — that AK Steel’s references to “the location of the sale” were actually intended to refer to “the domicile of the seller”; and, moreover, that, under AK Steel, it is “the seller’s domicile, rather than the location of title-transfer” which is “the defining factor” in an EP/CEP analysis. See Domestic Producers Brief at 13-17; Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 8. To be sure, the detailed analysis in the Court of Appeals’ opinion in AK Steel is necessarily dense, and can therefore be challenging to follow at points. It is therefore difficult not to sympathize with the Domestic Producers, as they struggle to distill the implications of AK Steel for this case. And, as the Domestic Producers indicate, some statements in AK Steel appear (at least at first blush) to be somewhat in tension with other statements in the opinion. The Government and ICDAS correctly note, however, that the gravamen of AK Steel is the significance of the location of the sale or transaction — specifically, “whether the sale or transaction takes place inside or outside the United States.” See AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369-70 (characterizing location of sale or transaction as a “critical difference” between EP and CEP sales). In AK Steel, the Court of Appeals focused repeatedly and definitively on the importance of the location of a sale or transaction in determining its classification as an EP or CEP sale. Thus, the Court framed “[t]he question at the root of [the] appeal” in that case as whether a sale can be properly classified as an EP sale “if the sales contract ... is executed in the United States.” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1368 (emphasis added). AK Steel’s analysis of the language of the statute similarly highlights the significance of the location of the sale or transaction. Reviewing the text of the statute, the Court of Appeals determined that “the plain meaning of the language enacted by Congress ... focuses on where the sale takes place.” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369 (emphasis added) (discussing 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (defining “EP” and “CEP”)). Underscoring the fact that the location of the sale or transaction is a “dispositive” factor in classifying sales as EP sales or CEP sales, the Court of Appeals continued: The text of the [statutory] definition of CEP states that CEP is the “price at which the subject merchandise is first sold in the United States.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (emphasis added). In contrast, EP is defined as the price at which the merchandise is first sold “outside the United States.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b). Thus, the location of the sale appears to be critical to the distinction between the two categories. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369 (second emphasis added). Echoing its characterization of the location of the sale or transaction as a “dispositive” factor, the Court expressly identified “whether the sale or transaction takes place inside or outside the United States ” as a “critical difference” between EP and CEP sales. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369-70 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals’ review of the specific facts of AK Steel continues the drumbeat on the location of the sales or transactions. There, too, the Court of Appeals focused like a laser on the issue, ultimately concluding that the transactions in the ease were not EP sales, but CEP sales. See AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1370-72, 1374. Observing that — as a practical matter — “whether a sale is ‘outside the United States’ depends, in part, on whether the parties are or are not located in the United States,” the Court ruled: A transaction, such as those here, in which both parties are located in the United States and the contract is executed in the United States cannot be said to be “outside the United States.” Thus, such a transaction cannot be classified as an EP transaction. Rather, classification as an EP sale requires that one of the parties to the sale be located “outside the United States,” for if both parties to the transaction were in the territory of the United States and the transfer of ownership was executed in the United States, it is not possible for the transaction to be outside the United States. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1370 (emphases added). Emphasizing that “Congress has made a clear distinction between [EP sales and CEP sales] based on the geographic location of the transaction,” the Court of Appeals stated that it would be “contrary to the plain meaning of the statute” to classify the transactions in AK Steel as EP sales “[w]hen ... there are contracts showing that the sales at issue took place in the United States between two entities with United States addresses, one of which was an affiliate of the producer/exporter.” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1370-71 (emphases added). In AK Steel, the Korean producers argued that the statutory term “seller” was ambiguous, and that Commerce should be permitted to interpret it in terms of the U.S. affiliate’s activities. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1371. The Court of Appeals made short work of that argument, again highlighting the significance of the location of the sale or transaction. The Court of Appeals concluded: “If Congress had intended the EP versus CEP distinction to be made based on which party set the terms of the deal or on the relative importance of each party’s role, it would not have written the statute to distinguish between the two categories based on the location where the sale was made and the affiliation of the party that made the sale.” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1372 (emphasis added). Finally, the significance of the location of the sale or transaction is highlighted in the ultimate statement of the holding of AK Steel: Stated in terms of the EP. definition: if the sales contract is between two entities in the United States, and executed in the United States and title will pass in the United States, it cannot be said to have been a sale “outside the United States”; therefore, the sale cannot be an EP sale. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1374 (initial emphasis added). As illustrated by the excerpts quoted in the discussion above (including notes 9 through 12), AK Steel’s emphasis on the location of a sale or transaction in classifying it as EP or CEP is much greater than the Domestic Producers acknowledge. In short, there is no merit to the Domestic Producers’ claim that AK Steel mandates that any sale in which the contract is between two U.S. domiciled entities — ie., a U.S. affiliate of a foreign producer/exporter and an unaffiliated U.S. customer— must necessarily, by definition, be classified as a CEP sale, without regard to the location of that sale or transaction. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in AK Steel held that a critical inquiry in making an EP/CEP classification is the location of the sale or transaction — in particular, whether the sale or transaction takes place inside or outside the United States. See AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369; 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a)-(b) (defining “export price” in terms of a sale made (or an agreement to sell reached) “outside of the United States,” and defining “constructed export price” in terms of a sale made (or an agreement to sell reached) “in the United States”). The Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a, the term “outside of the United States” refers to “the locus of the transaction at issue, not the location of the company.” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369. The Court noted that, in most situations, EP sales will involve one party domiciled outside the United States, because sales between two U.S. domiciled parties normally will take place inside the United States. AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1370. Nevertheless, as all parties acknowledge, the Court of Appeals expressly reserved judgment as to whether “a sales contract between two U.S. domiciled entities that is entirely executed outside the United States” would be classified as an EP sale or a CEP sale. See AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1370 n. 8 (emphasis added); Domestic Producers Brief at 17 n. 11; ICDAS Response Brief at 33-34; Decision Memo at 63. Thus, under the AK Steel test, it may be possible for two U.S. entities to conduct an EP sale, provided that the sale is completed outside the United States. In any event, as discussed herein, Commerce determined in this case that all sales in question were between ICDAS (a Turkish producer/exporter) and unaffiliated U.S. purchasers, and that all sales in question were completed outside the United States. The Domestic Producers’ argument was fully laid to rest by the Court of Appeals in Corus Staal. See Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2007) (concerning second administrative review of antidumping order covering hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from the Netherlands). The Court of Appeals there underscored its holding in AK Steel, reiterating the significance of the location of a transaction in classifying it as an EP or CEP sale: AK Steel does not stand for the proposition that all sales by foreign sellers to unaffiliated U.S. customers should be considered EP transactions. In fact, AK Steel states that transactions ... in which the sale made by a foreign producer or exporter occurs in the United States, should be treated as CEP transactions. Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1377 (emphases added); see also id. (quoting AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1369: “[T]he location of the sale appears to be critical to the distinction between the two categories.”). It is thus a major overstatement to assert (as the Domestic Producers do) that AK Steel mandates that “where the first sale to an unaffiliated party is made by a U.S. selling affiliate of the foreign producer/exporter, the sale must be classified as CEP,” without regard to the location of the transaction. See Domestic Producers Brief at 8. As the Government correctly points out, the.statute requires that — -in determining whether a sale is an EP sale or a CEP sale — the first step in Commerce’s analysis is to identify when “the subject merchandise is first sold (or agreed to be sold).” See Def. Response Brief at 30-31 (discussing definitions of EP and CEP in 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a)-(b), both of which include quoted phrase). The Government further notes that, in determining where merchandise is “first sold (or agreed to be sold),” Commerce must adhere to the plain language definitions of the terms “sold” and “agreed to be sold.” See Def. Response Brief at 31. AK Steel defined a “sale” in the context of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a to “require[ ] both a ‘transfer of ownership to an unrelated party and consideration.’ ” AK Steel, 226 F.3d at 1371 (citation omitted; emphases added in AK Steel). Similarly, in Corus Staal, the Court of Appeals defined an “agreement to sell” (for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a) as “a binding commitment that has not yet been consummated by the exchange of goods for consideration, i.e., the ‘sale’ itself.” Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1376-77. Thus, “[a]s used in the statute, the terms ‘sale’ and ‘agreement to sell’ ... cover different types of transactions.” Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1377. Further, the Court of Appeals has held that “[njeither a sale nor an agreement to sell occurs until there is mutual assent to the material terms [of a deal] (price and quantity).” Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1376. ’ In the case at bar, all activities relevant to sales of ICDAS’ rebar to U.S. customers — including sales negotiations, issuance of invoices, and preparation of documentation to facilitate payment — were handled outside the United States, by ICDAS personnel in Turkey. See Section A Questionnaire Response of ICDAS Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim Sanayi, A.S. (Pub. Doc. No. 67; Conf. Doc. No. 1) at A-8. Specifically, all of ICDAS’ sales to the United States were based upon contracts which were negotiated and finalized in Turkey prior to ICDAS’ shipment of merchandise. See id. The Domestic Producers highlight the fact that, inter alia, ICDAS’ sales documentation shows that — for sales made through ICDAS’ U.S. affiliate — ICDAS first invoiced merchandise from itself to its U.S. affiliate, and then from the U.S. affiliate to ICDAS’ U.S. customer. See, e.g., Domestic Producers Brief at 11. But ICDAS’ U.S. affiliate is merely a “paper” company that has no employees or business premises in the United States, is not involved in the sales process, never takes possession of subject merchandise, and acts only as importer of record. See Section A Questionnaire Response of ICDAS Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim Sanayi, A.S. (Pub. Doc. No. 67; Conf. Doc. No. 1) at A-8, A-14-15. The Domestic Producers can point to no evidence refuting these record facts, and thus cannot establish that any entity other than ICDAS prepared all relevant invoice documentation. See id. at A-8 (stating that “[a]ll sales activities related to the sales to U.S. customers ... such as ... issuing of invoices ... occurred in Turkey”); ICDAS Sales Verification Report (Conf.Rec. No. 44) at 3 (confirming, in the course of verification process, that “the personnel in ICDAS’s export sales department act on behalf of [the importer] because [the importer] itself has no employees”). See generally Decision Memo at 66 (finding that “the sales agreement was signed in Turkey by ICDAS personnel, the invoice was issued by an entity in Turkey (i.e., the producer/exporter) to an entity in the United States (i.e., the U.S. customer), and [the sale] was concluded outside the United States”) (emphasis added). Moreover, pursuant to the terms of ICDAS’ sales, all deliveries of merchandise (first from ICDAS to its U.S. affiliate, then immediately from the affiliate to the unaffiliated purchaser) occurred at the port of shipment in Turkey — outside the United States. See Section A Questionnaire Response of ICDAS Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim Sanayi, A.S. (Pub. Doc. No. 67; Conf. Doc. No. 1), Exh. A-9 at 1, 2; ICDAS Sales Verification Report (Conf.Rec. No. 44) at Exh. 11. Under the circumstances, Commerce properly determined to treat ICDAS’ U.S. sales as EP transactions, in accordance with AK Steel, “because the[] sales were made pursuant to agreements made between [unaffiliated U.S. customers and] ICDAS personnel in Turkey.” See Decision Memo at 65 (emphasis added). Apart from their arguments disputing the legal significance of the location of the transaction based on their interpretation of AK Steel (addressed above), the Domestic Producers further contend that “the record lacks the evidence necessary to make any reasonable determination regarding the location of the sales at issue.” Domestic Producers Brief at 17-18; see also id. at 2, 8-10, 17-21, 24; Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 1, 7-8. Noting that AK Steel defined the term “sold” (for purposes of EP/CEP classification) by reference to the transfer of ownership or title, the Domestic Producers challenge the quantum of record evidence concerning the transfer of title in the sales at issue here. Specifically, the Domestic Producers point to the fact that Commerce collected sales trace information concerning two of ICDAS’ sales to unaffíliated U.S. customers during the period of review. The Domestic Producers further note that only one of those sales traces includes information concerning the transfer of title, and assert that it is not enough to support Commerce’s determination. See Domestic Producers Brief at 18; see also Domestic Producers Reply Brief at 7. Contrary to the Domestic Producers’ claims, the record evidence is sufficient to establish the location of the limited number of transactions at issue. As a threshold matter, it is well-established that, in principle, “[i]t is up to Commerce, not the court, to weigh the ... evidence that was properly submitted during verification.” See Corus Staal, 27 CIT at 394, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1259. In this case, Commerce “examined the documents taken at verification and [concluded] that none of the contracts for POR entries shows that title passed after entry.” See Decision Memo at 67. In other words, Commerce determined that — as to each transaction at issue — title transferred outside the United States. See Def. Response Brief at 34-35. One sale which was verified by Commerce specified that title passed when payment for the merchandise was received in full — which occurred well before the import entry date. See ICDAS Sales Verification Report (Conf.Doc. No. 44) at Exh. 14. Commerce thus confirmed that title for that sale passed before the goods entered this country — that is, outside the United States. See generally ICDAS Response Brief at 37; Def. Response Brief at 35. In addition, as to all other sales at issue, Commerce determined that all deliveries of ICDAS’ goods were made outside the United States, in accordance with the terms of each of the sales, which were governed by certain specific Incoterms provisions. See Decision Memo at 67. The Domestic Producers challenge ICDAS’ reliance on Ineoterms, insisting that “Incoterms are not relevant to transfer of title.” See Domestic Producers Brief at 19-20. But the Domestic Producers’ argument glosses over certain pivotal points. As ICDAS readily acknowledges, the relevant Incoterms (including FOB, CFR, and CIF) deal directly with the transfer of risk, rather than transfer of title. See ICDAS Response Brief at 39. However, under generally accepted principles of commercial law (reflected domestically in, inter alia, the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as in international lex mercatoria ), in the absence of an express agreement between the parties as to when title passes, title to goods transfers when the seller completes performance with respect to the physical delivery of the goods. See ICDAS Response Brief at 39. In each of the transactions here at issue, the goods were delivered outside the United States. Thus, as to each of those transactions, Commerce reasonably concluded that title transferred outside the United States as well. In short, contrary to the Domestic Producers’ assertions, the administrative record in this matter adequately supports Commerce’s determination that each of the transactions at issue occurred outside the United States. The record before Commerce plainly includes “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support the agency’s determination on this point. See Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. The law requires no more. B. Commerce’s Disallowance of Startup Adjustment for ICDAS’ Biga Melt Shop During the administrative review proceedings, ICDAS requested that Commerce grant it a startup adjustment for ICDAS’ Biga melt shop, which began production of steel billets in December 2003. See Decision Memo at 76-81. A startup adjustment is an adjustment to the costs incurred by a company for production that is affected by startup operations during the period covered by an administrative review. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(l)(C)(i). In the Final Results, Commerce denied ICDAS’ request, stating that ICDAS had failed to meet the requirements of the statute. See Decision Memo at 76. ICDAS here challenges Commerce’s disallowance of the claimed startup adjustment. See ICDAS Brief at 2, 5, 22-32; ICDAS Reply Brief at 5-10. The statute authorizes a startup adjustment only where a producer establishes both that it is “using new production facilities or producing a new product that requires substantial additional investment,” and that “production levels are limited by technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial production.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(l)(C)(ii). In the case at bar, Commerce concluded that ICDAS did not meet its burden as to the second criterion. Specifically, Commerce determined that ICDAS did not demonstrate sufficiently limited production levels for its claimed startup period (December 2003); nor did ICDAS establish that any asserted limitations on production were attributable to “technical factors associated with the initial phase of production.” See Decision Memo at 79. ICDAS basically raises two challenges to Commerce’s disallowance of the claimed startup adjustment. First, ICDAS argues that Commerce’s use of a full-month equivalent methodology to compare December 2003 production levels at the Biga facility to those of subsequent months is not in accordance with law, because — according to ICDAS' — it relies on “theoretical” data. See generally ICDAS Brief at 2, 5, 22-29; ICDAS Reply Brief at 5-8. And, second, ICDAS contends that Commerce erred in concluding that ICDAS did not provide sufficient information concerning technical factors limiting production. See generally ICDAS Brief at 5, 22-23, 29-31; ICDAS Reply Brief at 8-10. Both arguments are unavailing. 1. Commerce’s Determination That Biga’s December 2003 Production Was Not Limited The startup adjustment statute does not define what constitutes “limited production.” Nor does the statute dictate how Commerce is to measure levels of production. However, the statute does delimit the duration of the startup period. According to the statute, the startup period ends “at the point at which the level of commercial production that is characteristic of the merchandise, producer, or industry concerned is achieved.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(l)(C)(iii). The statute thus does not extend the startup period up to the date on which the new facility reaches optimum functioning capacity. Indeed, the Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act expressly provides that “[attainment of peak production levels will not be the standard for identifying the end of the startup period because the startup period may end well before a company achieves optimum capacity utilization.” See Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 836 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4173. To be sure, as ICDAS repeatedly emphasizes, the absolute (unadjusted) production figures for the Biga melt shop for December 2003 were relatively low. Indeed, no production at all occurred in the first 10 days of the month, while ICDAS was conducting a series of test runs. Thus, the facility did not begin production until well into the start of the month; and the December 2003 figures reflect only a partial month of production. Because the December 2003 production figures were based on a partial month, Commerce converted those figures to a full-month equivalent, so that Biga’s production data for December 2003 could be compared to the full-month production data for subsequent months. See Decision Memo at 80. Specifically, Commerce examined ICDAS’ actual production measured in units processed for the months of December 2003, and January through March 2004. Based on ICDAS’ actual production data, Commerce then calculated a full-month equivalent production figure for December 2003. In addition, Commerce calculated December 2003 production starts using a full-month equivalency, so that the agency would have data on production starts for that month to compare to production starts data for January, February, and March 2004. See Decision Memo at 80. With the production data for December 2003 restated as full-month equivalents, Commerce could reasonably compare the Biga melt shop’s production in December 2003 (the claimed startup period) to the facility’s production levels in January, February, and March 2004. Based on its comparison of production data, Commerce concluded thaN-while Biga’s production in December 2003 clearly was not at the optimal level that ICDAS planned to achieve— the facility’s production in December 2003 in fact was not limited within the meaning of the statute, and that ICDAS therefore was not eligible for a startup adjustment. See Decision Memo at 80. ICDAS charges that Commerce’s use of a full-month equivalent methodology is not in accordance with law, because it “improperly uses hypothetical production data.” ICDAS Brief at 27; see also id. at 2, 5, 26-28; ICDAS Reply Brief at 5-6, 8. To support its argument, ICDAS points to other instances in which Commerce has declined to grant a startup adjustment on the grounds that the production data proffered by producers were “theoretical” or “hypothetical.” See, e.g., ICDAS Brief at 24-25, 27 (citing Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Antidumping Investigation of Chlorinated Isocyanurates from Spain, 2005 WL 2290648 (May 2, 2005) (“Chlorinated Isos from Spain”), at comment 9 (where Commerce denied requested startup adjustment, because respondent’s calculations relied “on a theoretical production capacity rather than the level of commercial production as required by the [Statement of Administrative Action]”); Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the Administrative Review of Stainless Steel Bar from India, 2003 WL 24153851 (Aug. 4, 2003) (“Stainless Steel Bar from India”), at comment 2 (where Commerce rejected respondent’s production limitation analysis because respondent compared “its actual production levels to its theoretical production capacity”)). But there was nothing “hypothetical” about the full-month equivalent methodology that Commerce used in the administrative review at issue here — at least not in the sense in which Commerce has previously used that term. True enough, Commerce in the past has rejected purely hypothetical production data, such as data based solely on production capacity, or speculative projections as to future production. See Decision Memo at 81. However, those situations were very different from what Commerce did in this case. Here, Commerce did not use theoretical production data to project future production levels. Instead, the agency used actual production data to establish a full-month equivalent for a partial month of production in the past See Def. Response Brief at 19-20 (distinguishing full-month equivalent methodology in this case from situations presented in Chlorinated Isos from Spain and Stainless Steel Bar from India). Contrary to ICDAS’ implication, Chlorinated Isos from Spain and Stainless Steel Bar from India do not stand for the proposition that Commerce is precluded from using actual production data for a partial month of operations to extrapolate a full month equivalent for purposes of comparison with other actual production data for subsequent full months. Those two cases merely reflect Commerce’s policy of rejecting producers’ attempts to qualify for a startup adjustment by using projected or optimal production capacity to establish an artificially-inflated benchmark for commercial production. In sum, in analyzing ICDAS’ request for a startup adjustment, Commerce used ICDAS’ actual production data, and adjusted those data to permit an apples-to-apples comparison of partial-month production for December 2003 with full-month production in the three months that followed. Commerce’s full-month equivalent methodology thus used ICDAS’ actual production data and reasonably adjusted them to effectuate Congress’ intent — that is, to determine whether Biga’s production in December 2003 was limited. See generally Domestic Producers Response Brief at 20-21. Nothing about Commerce’s full-month equivalent approach is inconsistent with the language of the startup adjustment statute, which does not specifically define how Commerce is to measure whether, in any given case, production was “limited.” Under such circumstances, Commerce is entitled to substantial deference in interpreting the statute. And nothing about the agency’s interpretation here is inherently unreasonable. See generally Domestic Producers Response Brief at 20-21; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (holding that, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”); Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed.Cir.1992) (observing that courts have duty to “respect legitimate policy choices made by the agency in interpreting and applying the statute”). Cf. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (stating that, where Congress has entrusted agency to administer statute in fact-intensive situations, agency’s conclusion should be reversed only if the record evidence is “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder” could reach the same conclusion). ICDAS’ attack on Commerce’s full-month equivalent methodology must therefore be rejected. 2. Commerce’s Determination That ICDAS Failed to Prove That Technical Factors Limited Biga’s Production In addition to its challenge to Commerce’s full-month equivalent methodology, ICDAS also disputes Commerce’s conclusion that ICDAS failed to provide sufficient information to establish that any limited production at Biga was the result of “technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial production.” See ICDAS Brief at 5, 22, 29-32; ICDAS Reply Brief at 8-10. As discussed below, however, ICDAS’ argument is lacking in merit. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that ICDAS had established that Biga’s “production levels [were] limited” in December 2003 (the claimed startup period) (which, as discussed in section III.B.l immediately above, it did not), ICDAS nevertheless still would not be entitled to a startup adjustment, because ICDAS failed to meet its burden of proof to establish the cause of any assertedly limited production. See generally Def. Response Brief at 5-6, 9, 14-17;- Domestic Producers Response Brief at 3, 17-18, 21-26. In denying the requested startup adjustment, Commerce found that ICDAS failed to respond to the agency’s inquiries concerning technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial production. Indeed, the record on point consisted of only a single vague statement, with no documentary support. See Decision Memo at 80. Section D of Commerce’s antidumping questionnaire explicitly requests that respondents provide support for any claimed startup adjustments. Thus, in its questionnaire to ICDAS, Commerce expressly asked ICDAS to provide detailed information and documentation to support ICDAS’ claim that Biga’s production for the month of December 2003 was limited by (in the words of the statute) “technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial production.” Specifically, Commerce’s questionnaire requested that ICDAS: 8. [Ejxplain how the production levels were limited by technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial production (as part of your analysis, describe the technical factors which limited production, demonstrate how these technical factors restricted the number of units processed by the company, and demonstrate how these technical factors are unique to the startup phase, not a result of chronic or normal production problems). The sole information on point that ICDAS placed on the record was the following succinct statement, in the company’s Section D Questionnaire Response: ■ Production levels were limited by technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial production because the company had to 1) develop the production parameters of the new operations; 2) install, adjust, calibrate and test the new equipment; and 3) train new employees to operate the new equipment. Operations typically incur such technical problems because of the newness of the facility. Section D Questionnaire Response of ICDAS Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim Sanayi, A.S. (Pub.Doc. No. 67) at D-40. Although ICDAS bore the burden of proof on all elements necessary to establish its right to a startup adjustment, Commerce followed up on ICDAS’ terse questionnaire response, on its own initiative. Specifically, Commerce took affirmative steps to seek to elicit the requisite detailed information and documentary support concerning the claimed limiting technical factors, issuing a supplemental Section D Questionnaire to ICDAS, and inquiring again at ICDAS’ cost verification. ICDAS nevertheless failed to supply any further information. See Decision Memo at 79-80. Commerce ultimately concluded that the record lacked sufficient information to allow the agency to conclude that any. asserted limitation on production at the Biga facility in December 2003 was attributable to technical factors unique to startup, rather than “factors unrelated to startup, such as marketing difficulties or chronic production problems.” See Decision Memo at 79-80; Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 838, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4174. In this action, ICDAS raises two principal objections to Commerce’s conclusion. ICDAS first argues that the relationship between December 2003 production levels at the Biga facility and technical factors associated with the initial 'phase of commercial production should have been “self-evident” to Commerce, in light of the information that the agency had before it. See ICDAS Brief at 30; see also id. at 5, 22, 29-31; ICDAS Reply Brief at 8. In addition, ICDAS argues that Commerce’s failure to grant the requested startup adjustment amounts to the improper use of “facts otherwise available” or adverse inference. See ICDAS Brief at 31-32. Neither argument holds water. a. ICDAS’ Claim That Limitation Due to Technical Factors Is ■ “Self-Evident” Notwithstanding the fact that it bore the burden of proof, and despite Commerce’s requests for further detail and documentation (both through a supplemental questionnaire and at verification), ICDAS maintains that — other than the existing information on the record — it was not required to provide evidence that any asserted limitations on production at the Biga facility in December 2003 were due to factors unique to startup. ICDAS maintains that those factors and their limiting effects are “self-evident” from the record evidence, and that it thus “provided sufficient information for Commerce to address the startup issue.” See ICDAS Brief at 30, 31 n. 21. ICDAS further emphasizes that Commerce verified the fact that ICDAS conducted test runs at the Biga facility in early December, and that it did not begin actual production until later that month. See ICDAS Brief at 5, 22-23, 25, 30. Finally, ICDAS notes that the Biga facility produced only a limited number of types of billet in December 2003, but produced many more types in the months that followed. See ICDAS Brief at 22-23, 31 n. 20. As the Domestic Producers observe, however, the information to which ICDAS points was not an adequate basis for a startup adjustment. See generally Domestic Producers Response Brief at 3, 18, 21-26; see also Def. Response Brief at 5-6, 9, 14-17, 22. By any measure, the information on which ICDAS relies was not sufficient to demonstrate that technical factors unique to startup — rather than “factors unrelated to startup, such as marketing difficulties or chronic production problems” — were the cause of assertedly limited production levels at Biga in December 2003, and to “document that fact to the Department’s satisfaction.” See Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 838, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4174; Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties: Proposed Rule, 61 Fed.Reg. 7308, 7340 (Feb. 27, 1996) (Preamble). The Domestic Producers sum up the state of the record thusly: “The verified evidence, as identified by ICDAS, is this: Biga Melt was a new facility.... The production equipment was newly installed.... Test runs were conducted prior to production .... [A limited number of] types of billet were produced there in December 2003; [many more] types were produced in succeeding months.... That is all.” See Domestic Producers Response Brief at 23. As discussed below, these basic facts— considered alone, or even in the aggregate — simply do not suffice to allow Commerce to grant the startup adjustment that ICDAS seeks. For example, ICDAS’ first piece of evidence — that the Biga facility was entirely new — is logically relevant only to the first criterion of the startup adjustment standard (i.e., that “a producer [was] using new production facilities”), not to the second criterion (ie., that “production levels [were] limited by technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial production”), which is the criterion at issue here. Nothing about the newness of the Biga facility, in and of itself, demonstrates that production levels were limited due to technical factors unique to the startup phase. If newness were itself evidence that technical factors necessarily limit production in a facility’s startup phase, the second criterion of Congress’ startup adjustment standard would be entirely superfluous. See generally