Full opinion text
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, District Judge. Pending before the Court are Plaintiff West Virginians for Life’s (WVFL) Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket 112], Plaintiff Center for Individual Freedom, Inc.’s (CFIF) Emergency Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket 90], Intervenor Defendant Margaret L. Workman’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket 99], Defendant Betty Ireland’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket 103] and Motion to Strike [Docket 105], and WVFL’s Motion for Reconsideration [Docket 106]. The Court will address each motion in turn. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action is the consolidation of two similar actions, Center for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Ireland, Case No. 1:08-cv-00190, and West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Ireland, Case No. 1:08-cv-01133. CFIF is a non-partisan, non-profit organization organized under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. (Docket 1 ¶¶ 3, 3(b) in Case No. 1:08-cv-00190.) CFIF’s stated mission “is to protect and defend individual freedoms and individual rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” (Id. ¶ 3.) It plans to “speak to the public in the Southern District of West Virginia on matters of litigation reform and related justice issues, including criminal law enforcement and sentencing, legal reform, and judicial decision-making [using] various media, including broadcast, print, and telephone banks.” (Id. ¶ 17.) That speech “will refer to West Virginia candidates [for public office] to illustrate its points and ask members of the public to contact the candidates and petition them to take or maintain certain positions.” (Id.) For fear of prosecution and litigation, CFIF suspended its plans pending judicial intervention, allegedly resulting in an unconstitutional chill on its speech. (Id. ¶ 23.) CFIF filed its initial action on March 21, 2008, seeking to invalidate a number of provisions of West Virginia’s campaign finance laws as unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad. Specifically, CFIF challenged West Virginia’s prohibition on corporate spending, W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-8(a), 3-8-8(b)(2)(H), 3-9-14, and W. Va.Code R. § 146-1-3, and reporting and disclosure requirements for expenses incurred for “advocating or opposing the nomination, election or defeat of any candidate,” W. Va.Code § 3-8-5, for independent expenditures “in support of or opposition to the nomination or election” of a candidate, §§ 3-8-1a(14), 3 — 8—2(b), and for “electioneering communications,” §§ 3-8-1a(11), 3-8-2b. In anticipation of the May 13, 2008, primary election, CFIF filed a motion for a preliminary injunction holding those laws unconstitutional facially and as applied to a number of communications CFIF intended to publish in the days leading up to the primary. By order, the West Virginia Association for Justice (WVAJ), West Virginia American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (WV AFL-CIO), West Virginia Council of Churches (WVCOC), West Virginia Education Association (WVEA), West Virginia Citizens Action Group (WVCAG), Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition (OVEC), (Docket 13), West Virginia Employment Lawyers Association (WVELA), and West Virginia State Democratic Executive Committee (WVSDEC), (Docket 45), were permitted to participate as amici curiae. Also by order, Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Margaret L. Workman, Menis E. Ketchum, WVEA, and WV AFL-CIO (Labor Intervenors) were permitted to intervene as defendants. (Docket 25.) Judge Faber heard argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction on April 9, 2008. On April 22, 2008, Judge Faber entered an order granting in part and denying in part CFIF’s motion. More specifically, Judge Faber enjoined Defendants Betty Ireland and Timothy D. Boggess “from applying West Virginia Code §§ 3-8-1a(14), 3 — 8—2(b), 3-8-5(a), 3-8-8(a), 3-8-8(b)(2)(H), and 3-9-14, and West Virginia Code of State Rules § 146-1-3, to anything other than communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” (Docket 38 at 1-2.) In that ruling, Judge Faber adopted “the bright-line definition” of express advocacy set forth in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Judge Faber also restricted the definition of “electioneering communications” to certain forms of broadcast media and enjoined Defendants “from applying [West Virginia’s] reporting and disclosure requirements to the following forms of political advocacy: mailings, faxes, emails, phone banks, leaflets, pamphlets, and other printed or published materials.” (Docket 38 at 2.) Based on that ruling, CFIF ran a series of ads, including ads about current West Virginia Attorney General Darrell V. McGraw. (Docket 72-2 ¶ 2.) On June 28, 2008, in a second extraordinary session, the West Virginia Legislature passed H.B. No. 219, amending W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-1, 3-8-1a, 3-8-4, 3-8-5, and 3-9-14. Thereafter, several Defendants moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the basis that the amendments rendered the injunction moot. CFIF opposed the dissolution of the injunction, stating that the amendments did not remedy the constitutional infirmities. Shortly before the amended sections took effect on October 1, 2008, Judge Faber granted Defendants’ motions and dissolved the injunction and directed CFIF that it would need to move for a new injunction based on the language in the amendments. (Dockets 79 and 80.) CFIF appealed that order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which issued an Order on October 8, 2008, agreeing with Judge Faber and dismissing the appeal. WVFL, like CFIF, is a non-partisan, non-profit organization organized under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. (Docket 2 ¶ 9 in Case No. 1:08-cv-01133.) Zane Lawhorn, who is also a named Plaintiff in this case, is a resident of Princeton, West Virginia, and wishes to receive WVFL’s communications. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) WVFL’s stated purpose “is to present information upon which individuals and the general public may make informed decisions about such topics as fetal development, abortion and its alternatives, and euthanasia.” (Id. ¶ 25.) In connection with that stated purpose, WVFL seeks to conduct a petition drive, run a radio ad, and distribute a mass mailing regarding Margaret L. Workman, who is currently a candidate for an open seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the upcoming November 4, 2008, election. (Id. ¶¶ 32-36.) Although WVFL has not run the radio ad or begun the mass mailing, it briefly circulated the petition on its website. However, it “immediately stopped doing so upon learning of the [statutes at issue here].” (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) WVFL alleges that its speech has been chilled by the recent amendments to West Virginia’s campaign finance laws because it reasonably fears prosecution by Defendants if it proceeds with the communications and for its brief circulation of the petition. (Id. ¶ 44.) On September 30, 2008, WVFL filed a verified complaint and motion for preliminary injunction seeking relief from several of the amended provisions, such as West Virginia’s ban on corporate express advocacy, W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-1a(13), -8; W. Va.Code R. § 146-1-3, reporting requirements for express advocacy, W. Va.Code §§ 3-8-2b, -5a,-5b, definition of political committee, political action committee (PAC), and unaffiliated PAC, §§ 3-8-1a(21), 1a(22), 1a(29), definition of electioneering communication, §§ 3-8-1a(12), 1a(26), and reporting requirements for electioneering communications, §§ 3-8-1a(20), -2(a), -2(d), -2b(a)-(g), -5, -5b. Specifically, WVFL alleges that those provisions are vague and overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Shortly after WVFL filed its complaint, CFIF filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2008, challenging some of those same provisions, namely the ban on corporate express advocacy and the definition of electioneering communications, §§ 3-8-1a(13), (12), (26), 3-8-8, and the reporting requirements pertaining thereto. In support of its emergency motion, CFIF states that Attorney General McGraw has engaged in a series of threats and retaliatory acts in response to CFIF’s earlier ads. (Docket 90-2 ¶ 2.) CFIF further states that it wishes to respond to McGrav/s alleged threats and retaliatory acts; however, it fears that such a response would be deemed express advocacy or an electioneering communication under the recent amendments. (Id. ¶ 6.) Accordingly, CFIF seeks injunctive relief holding that the amended sections are unconstitutional both facially and as applied. On October 7, 2008, CFIF v. Ireland, No. 1:08-cv-00190, was reassigned to the undersigned District Judge and consolidated with WVFL v. Ireland, No. 1:08-cv-01133. The Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the case arises under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court held a hearing on both preliminary injunction motions on October 14, 2008, in which it heard argument from counsel for Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Intervenors. The issues have been fully briefed and argued, and the matter is now ripe for the Court’s consideration. II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD The issuance of a preliminary injunction is entrusted to the district court’s discretion. See In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 524-25 (4th Cir.2003). The Fourth Circuit follows the “hardship-balancing test” first articulated in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir.1977). The test involves four factors which the Court must examine when considering a motion for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied; (2) the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the requested relief is granted; (3) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir.1991) (citing L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 120 (4th Cir.1988)). Under the Blackwelder test, the balancing of the likelihood of harm to the plaintiff and the defendant are the two most important factors. Id. The Court must first consider the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff. Id. If the plaintiff makes a “clear showing” of “immediate and irreparable' harm,” the Court must “balance the ‘likelihood’ of irreparable harm to the plaintiff [without an injunction] against the ‘likelihood’ of harm to the defendant [if an injunction is granted.]” Id. (citing Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195). “If, after balancing those two factors, the balance ‘tips decidedly' in favor of the plaintiff, a preliminary injunction will be granted if ‘the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.’ ” Id. at 813 (citing Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir.1991)). The more the balance tips in favor of defendants, the greater the showing of success on the merits is required. Id. Finally, the Court should consider the public interest. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 196. The burden of establishing that the factors weigh in favor of injunctive relief normally rests on the plaintiff. Id. However, when a challenged law implicates First Amendment concerns, it is subject to strict scrutiny. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2664, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007). In an as-applied challenge, “[u]nder strict scrutiny, the Government must prove that applying [the challenged law] furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, “[a]s the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of ... constitutionality, [a party seeking a preliminary injunction] must be deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has shown that [the law survives the strict scrutiny analysis].” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004). Conversely, when a plaintiff mounts a facial challenge, the plaintiff faces a “heavy burden,” FEC v. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 207, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), because facial invalidation is “strong medicine to be applied sparingly and only as a last resort.” United Seniors Ass’n v. Social Sec. Admin., 423 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. BLACKWELDER ANALYSIS “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Thus, where Plaintiffs’ alleged harm “is inseparably linked to [a] claim of a violation of [their] First Amendment rights,” the Court must first turn to Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits. Newsom ex rel. Newsom v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 254-55 (4th Cir.2003); see also Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 511 (4th Cir.2002) (“Determination of irreparable harm thus requires analysis of [the plaintiffs] likelihood of success on the merits, and we turn to this question first.”) Accordingly, the Court will first address Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits WVFL raises four claims: (1) that it is a so-called MCFL corporation and accordingly exempted from West Virginia’s ban on corporate express advocacy, W. Va.Code § 3-8-8(a); (2) that West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy, § 3-8-1a(13), is vague and overbroad both facially and as applied to WVFL; (3) that West Virginia’s definition of political committee, political action committee (PAC), and unaffiliated PAC, § 3 — 8—1a(21), (22), (29), are vague and overbroad both facially and as applied to WVFL; and (4) that West Virginia’s definition of electioneering communication, § 3-8-1a(12), is vague and over-broad both facially and as applied to WVFL. CFIF joins in claims (2) and (4). The Court will address each claim and Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits on each claim in turn. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. The seminal case addressing the interplay between campaign finance regulation and the First Amendment is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). According to Buckley, Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order “to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” 424 U.S. at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612, (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). “[T]he use of funds to support a political candidate is ‘speech....’” Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990). “[Restrictions [on campaign speech], while neutral as to the ideas expressed, limit political expression ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.’ ” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 96 S.Ct. 612 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968)). The power of legislatures to regulate elections is well established. Id. at 13, 96 S.Ct. 612. That power is rooted in the Constitution and justified by the need to “limit the actuality and appearance of corruption” in elections. Id. at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, when a legislature steps beyond that justification, its regulatory power is circumscribed. Thus, in demarcating which speech is regulable, the Supreme Court held that legislatures may regulate only speech that is “unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular ... candidate.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. (1) MCFL Corporation WVFL asserts that it qualifies as an MCFL corporation. In FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 263, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986), the Supreme Court identified a class of corporations which “should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely because of their incorporated status.” Courts have since referred to such corporations as “MCFL corporations.” See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 619 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). If it is found to be an MCFL corporation, then WVFL posits that West Virginia’s ban on corporate express advocacy, W. Va.Code § 3-8-8(a), is unconstitutional as applied to it. WVFL asserts that, if it is found to be an MCFL corporation and section 3-8-8(a) is unconstitutional as applied to it, it “has a First Amendment right to do the [communications] notwithstanding West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy and ban on corporate express advocacy,” and that it would then be “unnecessary to consider ... whether West Virginia’s express-advocacy definition is vague and therefore overbroad.” (Docket 113 at 23 n. 30.) The Labor Intervenors contest WVFL’s allegation that it is an MCFL corporation. Specifically, the Labor Intervenors assert that determining whether WVFL’s major purpose is political campaign activity “requires factual determinations [and cannot be] established on WVFL’s assertions alone.” (Docket 102 at 3 n. 1.) Further, they claim that the statutes at issue here “need not explicitly exempt ‘MCFL organizations’ in order to be understood to do so.” (Id.) Finally, the Labor Intervenors posit that MCFL corporations are nevertheless “properly subject to the same reporting and disclosure requirements as any other organization making independent campaign expenditures.” (Id.) a. Applicable Law W. Va.Code § 3-8-8(a) provides: Notwithstanding any provision of section two-b of this article, no officer, agent or person acting on behalf of any corporation, whether incorporated under the laws of this or any other state or of a foreign country, may pay, give, lend or authorize to be paid, given or lent any money or other thing of value belonging to the corporation for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for state, district, county or municipal office, to any candidate, financial agent, political committee or other person. No person may solicit or receive any payment, contribution or other thing from any corporation or from any officer, agent or other person acting on behalf of the corporation. By the plain language of this statute, a ban on express advocacy by all corporations using corporate funds is contemplated. In MCFL, the Supreme Court examined an as-applied challenge to a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibiting corporations from engaging in express advocacy using corporate funds. 479 U.S. at 241, 107 S.Ct. 616. Thus, MCFL was “subject to more extensive requirements and more stringent restrictions than it would be if it were not incorporated [and which] may create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech.” Id. at 254, 107 S.Ct. 616. Although Congress’s justification for the ban was to remedy “the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace,” id. at 257, 107 S.Ct. 616, the Court found such a justification to be inapplicable to a corporation whose “available [resources] are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace.” Id. at 259, 107 S.Ct. 616. Accordingly, applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that any remaining legitimate legislative interest in assuring that contributions to MCFL corporations are used as the contributor intends may be served by a “more narrowly tailored and less burdensome” restriction. Id. at 261, 107 S.Ct. 616. In finding that corporations with “features more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms ... should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely because of their incorporated status,” id. at 263, 107 S.Ct. 616, the Supreme Court identified three characteristics of MCFL that gave rise to its holding: First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that political resources reflect political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace. Id. at 264, 107 S.Ct. 616 (emphasis in original). These factors, however, do not “impose a code of compliance that other nonprofit corporations must follow to the letter.” FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, Inc., 65 F.3d 285, 292 (2d Cir.1995). It is permissible, for example, for a corporation to accept a “modest percentage of revenue” from for-profit corporations, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett (NCRL I), 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th Cir.1999) (so finding in the case of a corporation that accepted contributions from for-profit entities up to eight percent of its overall revenue), and to “engage[] in minor business activities,” Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. FEC (MCCL), 113 F.3d 129, 130 (8th Cir.1997), without forfeiting their MCFL status. Finally, the failure of a statute to expressly exempt MCFL corporations is not fatal. In McConnell, the Supreme Court addressed this precise issue when it evaluated a federal prohibition on corporate express advocacy. 540 U.S. at 209-11, 124 S.Ct. 619. Specifically, the Court held: That [a statute] does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire section. If a reasonable limiting construction “has been or could be placed on the challenged statute” to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it. Because our decision in the MCFL ease was on the books for many years before BCRA was enacted, we presume that the legislators who drafted § 316(c)(6) were fully aware that the provision could not validly apply to MCFL-type entities____ As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. Id. at 211, 124 S.Ct. 619 (citations omitted). Accordingly, there is an implied exemption for MCFL corporations where a legislature had the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in MCFL at the time it enacted the statute. b. Analysis Based on the record as it currently exists at this preliminary stage, it appears that WVFL has alleged in its verified complaint sufficient facts to show that it is likely to succeed in proving that it is an MCFL corporation. In its verified complaint, WVFL alleges that it was “formed to promote political ideas and engages in only the minor business activities of bake sales and selling ads for its convention booklets.” (Docket 2 in Case No. 1:08-cv-1133 ¶ 51.) It further alleges that it “has no shareholders or other people who have a claim on [its] assets or earnings” and that it “was not established by a business corporation or union and accepts only minor contributions from for-profit corporations.” (Id.) These allegations in WVFL’s verified complaint are sufficient to establish the three factors set out in MCFL. Moreover, WVFL’s practices of accepting only up to 4.4 percent of its revenue from businesses and engaging in minor business activities do not disqualify it as an MCFL corporation in light of Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d at 292, which recognized that the MCFL requirements may be relaxed somewhat in cases where a nonprofit organization does not adhere to those requirements “to the letter.” See also NCRL I, 168 F.3d at 714 (‘We do not think this modest percentage of revenue [ (zero to eight percent) ] disqualifies NCRL for the nonprofit exemption to North Carolina’s ban on corporate expenditures.”); MCCL, 113 F.3d at 130 (“MCCL may not be denied the MCFL exemption merely because it engages in minor business activities or accepts insignificant contributions from business corporations.”). No party has offered evidence genuinely disputing the factual basis for finding that WVFL is an MCFL corporation. However, even if WVFL eventually prevails on its claim that it is an MCFL corporation, it is not likely to succeed in showing that W. Va.Code § 3-8-8(a) is unconstitutional. This case presents a situation nearly identical to the one addressed by the Supreme Court in McConnell. Just as Congress had the benefit of MCFL when it enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub.L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.), also referred to as “McCain-Feingold,” the West Virginia Legislature had the benefit of MCFL when it amended § 3-8-8(a). Thus, because § 3-8-8(a) is similarly subject to a proper limiting construction, the Court concludes that it is likely to be construed as not applying to MCFL corporations and is, accordingly, valid. Finally, the Court turns to WVFL’s contention that a finding that it is an MCFL corporation precludes any further constitutional inquiry. When it decided MCFL, the Supreme Court based its decision on a policy that corporations resembling voluntary political associations should be treated as such and should not be punished based solely on their corporate form by being banned from engaging in express advocacy. 479 U.S. at 259-60, 107 S.Ct. 616. In articulating that policy, the Supreme Court recognized that the legitimate governmental interest implicated by a general ban on corporate express advocacy — preventing the translation of corporate economic success into political influence — does not apply to MCFL corporations because the economic success of MCFL corporations is a “rough barometer of public support” for their political ideas, rather than the result of “economically motivated decisions of investors and customers.” Id. at 258, 107 S.Ct. 616. Although such an interest may legitimize a complete ban on express advocacy by for-profit corporations, the Supreme Court in Buckley identified a separate and distinct interest to legitimize reporting and disclosure requirements for all other persons and entities engaged in express advocacy: the prevention of actual corruption or the appearance of corruption. 424 U.S. at 78-79, 96 S.Ct. 612. Thus, all entities, including MCFL corporations, may be subject to reporting and disclosure requirements when they engage in express advocacy. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262-63, 107 S.Ct. 616. Accordingly, even assuming that WVFL is an MCFL corporation, the Court must still proceed to the next step of the inquiry. (2) Express Advocacy Plaintiffs challenge West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy, W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(13). That section, which was added by the West Virginia Legislature in June 2008, states: “Expressly advocating” means any communication that: (A) Uses phrases such as “vote for the Governor,” “re-elect your Senator,” “support the Democratic nominee for Supreme Court,” “cast your ballot for the Republican challenger for House of Delegates,” “Smith for House,” “Bob Smith in '04,” “vote Pro-Life” or “vote Pro-Choice” accompanied by a listing of clearly identified candidates described as Pro-Life or Pro-Choice, “vote against Old Hickory,” “defeat” accompanied by a picture of one or more candidates, “reject the incumbent,” or communications of campaign slogans or individual words, that in context can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates, such as posters, bumper stickers, advertisements, etc. which say “Smith’s the One,” “Jones '06,” “Baker”; or (B) When considered in its entirety, the communication can only be interpreted by a reasonable person as advocating the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates because: (i) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and (ii) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidates. Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that subsection (B) is overbroad and vague, both facially and as applied. They take issue with the terms “reasonable person,” “electoral portion,” and “reasonable minds,” arguing that these words are vague, imprecise, and leave open the possibility of inappropriately including protected speech. Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege that the reporting requirements that attend to such express advocacy, §§ 3-8-2 and 3-8-5, chill their speech and are unconstitutional by extension. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the recent amendments cured any constitutional infirmities. a. Applicable Law Any discussion regarding the proper definition of express advocacy and associated reporting requirements must necessarily begin with Buckley. At the time Buckley was decided, it was well-established that “compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612. Applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court examined Congress’s purpose for enacting reporting and disclosure requirements in FECA — “promoting] full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of the federal election process,” id. at 78-79, 96 S.Ct. 612 — and determined that the purpose was insufficient to restrict the speech of persons and groups engaging only in issue advocacy. Id. (“To fulfill the purposes of the Act [the requirements] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.”). Accordingly, the Court limited the definition of “expenditure” to “reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate [and that are] directed precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate.” Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court then articulated a list of what have become known as “magic words” which are indicative of such express advocacy. Id. at 44 n. 52 and 80 n. 108, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley’s bright-line “magic words” test stood as the law on this issue for over twenty-five years, until Congress passed BCRA and the Supreme Court revisited the issue in McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491. In McConnell, the Court rejected the idea that “the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy” and determined that the “magic words” test was “functionally meaningless” because persons and organizations could avoid reporting simply by not using those words. Id. at 192, 124 S.Ct. 619. Then, finding that the governmental interests articulated in Buckley applied in full to the new provisions of BCRA requiring reporting and disclosure of expenditures for ads that “are intended to influence voters’ decisions and have that effect,” the Court expanded the legitimate sweep of such requirements to reach the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.” Id. at 206, 96 S.Ct. 612. A more recent discussion by the Supreme Court of the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” has resulted in a more refined demarcation of its limits. Addressing an as-applied challenge to the same provision that was held to be facially valid in McConnell, Chief Justice Roberts recognized in WRTL II that McConnell “did not explain that it was adopting a particular test for determining what constituted the ‘functional equivalent’ of express advocacy.” 127 S.Ct. at 2665. Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts held that “a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2667 (emphasis added). In declining to adopt a subjective, intent-based test because such a test “would chill core political speech by opening the door to a trial on every ad,” id. at 2666, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that “the proper standard for an as-applied challenge ... must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communication rather than the amorphous considerations of intent and effect,” id., and that “contextual factors ... should seldom play a significant role in the inquiry.” Id. at 2669. Since WRTL II was decided, the Fourth Circuit has had occasion to apply the Supreme Court’s holding to a case strikingly similar to the one at bar. In N.C. Right to Life v. Leake (NCRL III), 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2008), a*' non-profit corporation challenged, among other things, a North Carolina statute’s two-pronged test to determine whether “an individual acted ‘to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates.’ ” Id. at 280 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.14A(a)). The Fourth Circuit held that to be considered the “functional equivalent of express advocacy,” a communication must meet two separate requirements[:] the communication must qualify as an “electioneering communication,” [as] defined by [BCRA], [and then] only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 281-82 (emphasis added). Applying that test and recognizing that WRTL II “was entertaining an ‘as-applied challenge’ ” to a statute held facially valid in McConnell, the Fourth Circuit struck down North Carolina’s regulation as facially vague and overbroad. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 285. The Court based its holding on the “multiple First Amendment deficiencies that North Carolina’s definition displays,” including “determining] whether speech is regulable based on how a ‘reasonable person’ interprets the speech’s ‘essential nature’ in light of four ‘contextual factors.’ ” Id. at 285-86. With this precedent in mind, the Court turns to West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy. b. Analysis Much like the statute that was invalidated by the Fourth Circuit in NCRL III, West Virginia’s definition of express advocacy fails to comport with the boundaries set by Buckley, McConnell, and WRTL III. This failure is manifested in two ways. First, the definition contained in W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(13) in no way incorporates the definition of “electioneering communication” as adopted in BCRA. Indeed, subsections (12) and (13) of section 3-8-1a, which define “expressly advocating” and “electioneering communications,” respectively, appear to be entirely separate, both in meaning and application to the operative provisions of the statutes for which they provide definitions. For example, section 3-8-2b sets forth requirements for the disclosure of “electioneering communications,” while section 3-8-5a sets forth the information required in a financial statement “other than [for] a disclosure of electioneering communications.” On the other hand, section 3-8-5 sets forth requirements for the disclosure of independent expenditures “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,” and sections 3 — 8—8(a) and 3-9-14 provide for a ban on corporate express advocacy and resulting penalties. Nowhere in these sections are the phrases “expressly advocating” and “electioneering communication” mentioned together. Thus, not only is the BCRA definition of electioneering communications not incorporated into the West Virginia definition of express advocacy, it further appears that the two definitions serve separate functions in West Virginia law. Second, the language contained in W. Va.Code § 3-8-1 a(13)(B) does not comply with Chief Justice Roberts’ formulation of the functional equivalent of express advocacy as that which “is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” 127 S.Ct. at 2667. Subsection (B) includes within express advocacy communications that “can only be interpreted by a reasonable person” as advocating the election or defeat of a candidate because “the electoral portion” is clear and “[Reasonable minds could not differ” as to whether the message encourages electoral action. Like the statute in NCRL III, this statute “runs directly counter to the teaching of WRTL when it determines whether speech is regulable based on how a ‘reasonable person’ interprets a communication in light of ... contextual factors.” NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 283. Although there are no contextual factors spelled out in the West Virginia statute, there is likewise no guidance given with regard to how a “reasonable person” might approach a particular communication. Who is the reasonable person? What are the. reasonable person’s experience, intelligence, and sophistication in political matters? What does the reasonable person know about the various contextual factors condemned in NCRL II? See id. at 283-86. “[A] test based on the actual effect speech will have on an election or a particular segment of the target audience ... unquestionably chillfs] a substantial amount of political speech.” WTRL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2666; NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 284-85. The West Virginia statute’s complete lack of guidance on the perspective of the reasonable person may well lead to the “open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors which invite burdensome discovery and lengthy litigation.” NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 282 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “this sort of ad hoc, totality of the circumstances-based approach provides neither fair warning to speakers that their speech will be regulated nor sufficient direction to regulators as to what constitutes political speech.” Id. at 283. The analysis for the term “reasonable minds” is the same as the Court can find no difference between that term and “reasonable person[s].” Finally, the term “electoral portion” of a communication appears to be new to the vocabulary of campaign finance. It is not defined in the West Virginia statutes. The Court has not been directed to any precedent for its meaning or interpretation. Does it imply that there are electoral and non-electoral portions of certain communications? How does one distinguish the two? Does this concept suggest that a portion of an ad could be express advocacy and another portion issue advocacy (to put it in what now must be considered the mercifully clear terminology of Buckley)? The Court must conclude that this term, along with its companions, “reasonable person,” and “reasonable minds,” is unconstitutionally vague. Counsel for Defendant Ireland suggested during oral argument that Chief Justice Roberts’ “reasonable interpretation” formulation is what is meant by the language contained in section 3-8-1a(13)(B). That may very well be. However, if the West Virginia Legislature indeed intended that meaning, why did it not use those words? It certainly could have. It had the benefit of having all of the relevant precedents to this Court’s decision available at the time subsection (13)(B) was enacted. Instead, it chose a formulation that has ventured too far from the substance of the communication itself and toward the impermissible factors and context-based standards condemned by the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit. Therefore, the West Virginia statute fails both prongs of the applicable two-part test for defining express advocacy because it fails to limit its scope to electioneering communications, as defined by BCRA, that are susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that, pursuant to the tests set forth in WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329, and NCRL III, 525 F.3d 274, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(13)(B) is unconstitutionally vague on its face. (3) Political Committee WVFL challenges several subsections of W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a, which provides the definitions for terms relating to political organizations, such as a political action committee (PAC). More specifically, “WVFL seeks a declaratory judgment that the political-committee, PAC, and unaffiliated-PAC definitions are unconstitutional.” (Docket 2 ¶ 161 in Case No. 1:08-cv-1133.) WVFL does not challenge the substance of the definitions. Rather, it is challenges their scope. WVFL claims that the definitions of political committee, PAC, and unaffiliated PAC are facially vague and overbroad and that WVFL does not know if its planned advertising and advocacy efforts will convert it into a political committee as that term is defined by W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(22). As a consequence of this uncertainty, WVFL states that it will continue to refrain from communicating its message for fear that it will run afoul of West Virginia law. In WVFL’s words, it seeks to conduct its operations “without fear of becoming a political committee.” (Docket 2 ¶ 163 in Case No. 1:08-cv-1133.) WVFL’s broader argument is that the phrase “the purpose of supporting or opposing” in the PAC definition is unconstitutional as applied to WVFL and facially vague and overbroad. However, WVFL dissects this phrase into “the purpose of’ and “supporting or opposing” and maintains that each constituent part is constitutionally infirm for separate reasons. WVFL points to its planned communications concerning West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals candidate Margaret Workman. In 1993, then-Chief Justice Workman penned the Supreme Court of Appeals’ decision in Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va. v. Panepinto, 191 W.Va. 436, 446 S.E.2d 658 (1993), a prominent abortion-rights case. WVFL plans to conduct a mass mailing, radio advertising campaign, and petition drive to highlight Workman’s opinion in Panepinto. (Docket 2-2 at 42-45 in Case No. 1:08-cv-1133.) WVFL fears that these communications may be construed as “opposing” Workman’s candidacy, thereby converting WVFL into a PAC and subjecting it to West Virginia’s campaign laws. a. Applicable Law In their current forms, the challenged definitions are as follows: (21) “Political action committee” means a committee organized by one or more persons for the purpose of supporting or opposing the nomination or election of one or more candidates. The following are types of political action committees: (A) A corporate political action committee, as that term is defined by subdivision (8) of this section; (B) A membership organization, as that term is defined by subdivision (18) of this section; (C) An unaffiliated political action committee, as that term is defined by subdivision (29) of this section. (22) “Political committee” means any candidate committee, political action committee or political party committee. (29) “Unaffiliated political action committee” means a political action committee that is not affiliated with a corporation or a membership organization. W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a (emphasis added). The challenged definitions were enacted by the West Virginia Legislature on June 7, 2007, and were not changed subsequent to Judge Faber’s April 22, 2008, ruling. See 2008 W. Va. Acts 13. Although WVFL fears becoming a “political committee” under West Virginia law, only the definition of “political action committee” need be addressed; an organization becomes a “political committee” or “unaffiliated political action committee” by virtue of its status as a PAC. See W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(22) (defining “political committee” as “any candidate committee, political action committee or political party committee”). b. Analysis WVFL’s bifurcation of the phrase “the purpose of supporting or opposing” in the PAC definition unnecessarily complicates the issue. Cf. NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 286 (evaluating the phrase “a major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates” as a compete unit in a challenge to North Carolina’s definition of political committee). However, in the interests of comprehensiveness, each argument will be addressed. i. “The Purpose Of” The definitions in W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a were not cut from whole cloth. Similarly worded statutes have been challenged in other cases and the contours of constitutionally permissible language are well-established. As will be explained in detail below, the question presented by WVFL’s PAC definition argument is a matter of semantics: Is the phrase “the purpose of supporting or opposing” found in W. VA.Code § 3-8-1a(21) more like “a major purpose to support or oppose” (which is unconstitutionally vague) or “the major purpose of supporting or opposing” (which is constitutional)? In Buckley, the Supreme Court made a distinction between issue advocacy and express advocacy. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612(holding that campaign finance laws must be “unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular ... candidate”). Although each form of speech is of equal constitutional gravity, see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193, 124 S.Ct. 619, the latter form may be subject to narrowly tailored regulation in order to serve the important governmental interests of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in elections. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26, 96 S.Ct. 612. The government’s interest in preventing corruption in elections, however, does not extend in equal measure to speech that advocates for or against issues that do not directly relate to the election of a candidate for public office. Accordingly, campaign finance laws must not be so broad as to infringe individuals’ rights to express opinions on such issues, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”), nor may they be so vague as to make it uncertain whether they cover issue advocacy, see Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 665 (5th Cir.2005). To screen issue advocacy groups from the reach of campaign finance laws, the Buckley Court stated that the term “political committee” “need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.” Id. at 79, 96 S.Ct. 612. Although the Buckley opinion addressed federal campaign law, many states, including West Virginia, have incorporated this language into their definitions of political committees, PACs, or similar terms. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 15.13.400(8); Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 16-901(19); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-4143(k); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18:1483(14); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-278.6(14); Wash.Rev.Code § 42.17.020(39); W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(21). It therefore behooves the Court to view West Virginia’s campaign law through the lense of Buckley and its progeny. Buckley makes it clear that it is constitutionally permissible to define a political committee as an organization controlled by a candidate or an organization for which “the major purpose” is the election of a candidate to public office. In NCRL III, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a North Carolina campaign law that closely tracked the language of Buckley. The law defined “political committee” as a combination of two or more individuals ... that makes, or accepts anything of value to make, contributions or expenditures and has one or more of the following characteristics: a. Is controlled by a candidate; [or] d. Has as a major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-278.6(14) (emphasis added). North Carolina’s campaign laws, like West Virginia’s, impose significantly greater burdens on political committees than on other entities. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. lodged a facial challenge to the law, arguing that the phrase “a major purpose” was unconstitutionally vague and potentially subjected it to regulation as a political committee. See NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 287. The task before the Fourth Circuit in NCRL III was to determine if there was a constitutionally significant difference between “a major purpose,” which was used by North Carolina to define “political committee,” and “the major purpose,” which was approved by Buckley. The Fourth Circuit concluded there was. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court did not speak haphazardly in Buckley when it said that a political committee was an organization with “the major purpose” of electing a candidate. By use of the definite article, “the,” the Buckley court was signifying that the major-purpose test referred to organizations whose “only or primary goal” was the election or opposition of a candidate. Id. at 287. In contrast, the phrase, “a major purpose,” does not denote an only or primary purpose. Rather, it indicates that the election or opposition of a candidate is but one purpose among many. “Permitting the regulation of organizations as political committees when the goal of influencing elections is merely one of multiple ‘major purposes’ threatens the regulation of too much ordinary political speech to be constitutional.” Id. at 288-89. West Virginia’s definition of PAC does not use “the major purpose” or “a major purpose.” It omits the word “major,” regulating groups “organized ... for the purpose of supporting or opposing the nomination or election of one or more candidates.” W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(21) (emphasis added). The question, therefore, is whether the absence of the adjective “major” makes West Virginia’s statute more like the definition of political committee in Buckley or NCRL III. Like the Supreme Court in Buckley, West Virginia’s legislature chose the definite article to limit the word “purpose.” However, West Virginia differs because it does not qualify the requisite purpose with the word “major.” This difference does not make West Virginia’s statute more vague or more broad; the opposite is true. Stating that an organization has one “major purpose” implies that it at least could have other, minor purposes. “The purpose,” being without qualification, indicates that there is but one and only one purpose — namely, to support or oppose a candidate. Thus, by omitting “major,” West Virginia’s definition of a PAC more precisely identifies the scope of regulated organizations than the language found to be constitutional in Buckley. The Court does not arrive at this meaning by construction or interpretation. Instead, it is the plain meaning of this statute to limit its application to singular-purpose organizations. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”). An organization is a regulable “political committee” under W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(22) only if it is a “candidate committee, [PAC,] or political party committee.” Similarly, “unaffiliated PACs,” as defined in W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(29), are merely a subset of organizations labeled as PACs. Because the definition of PAC is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad on its face, it follows that the definitions of political committee and unaffiliated PAC are not unconstitutional on the grounds alleged by WVFL. ii. “Supporting or Opposing ” WVFL lodges a facial constitutional challenge to the use of “supporting or opposing” in W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(22). It therefore bears the “heavy burden” of proving “a substantial risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of speech.” Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998). WVFL does not appear to meet this burden. Tellingly, WVFL cites no authority where a court has found the terms “supporting or opposing” a candidate in the definition of political committee or PAC to be unconstitutionally vague. The few courts which have addressed the issue raised here have concluded that “supporting or opposing” a candidate is not vague or overbroad. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64, 124 S.Ct. 619; NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 289 (“[T]he Supreme Court[] insist[s] that political committees can only be regulated if they have the support or opposition of candidates as their primary purpose.... ”); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, No. 3:08-cv-483, 2008 WL 4416282, *13, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73551, at *37 (E.D.Va. Sept. 24, 2008) (“[C]ase law and Supreme Court precedent make it clear that the use of ‘support or oppose’ is not unconstitutionally vague....”); EMILY’s List v. FEC, 569 F.Supp.2d 18, 53 (D.D.C.2008) (“EMILY’s List’s [vagueness] argument is entirely unavailing as to the words ‘support’ or ‘oppose,’ because the Supreme Court rejected just such a claim in McConnell ....”); Voters Educ. Comm. v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 161 Wash.2d 470, 166 P.3d 1174, 1184 (2007) (“[W]e conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to understand the meaning of ‘in support of, or opposition to, any candidate’ in the definition of ‘[p]olitical committee’ .... ”); cf. Carmouche, 449 F.3d at 663 (dismissing a vagueness and overbroad challenge to a Louisiana statute that defined “expenditure” as “a purchase ... made for the purpose of supporting, opposing, or otherwise influencing the nomination or election-of a person to public office” because a limiting construction was sufficient). In cases where statutes containing the phrase “support or oppose” were found to be vague or overbroad, the words “support” and “oppose” were not the offending terms. See Real Truth About Obama, 2008 WL 4416282, *12, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73551, at *36 (discussing cases). WVFL’s attempt to distinguish the instant action from McConnell is not persuasive. In McConnell, the Supreme Court held that the words “support” and “oppose” are not unconstitutionally vague in the campaign finance law context because they “clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64, 124 S.Ct. 619 (emphasis added). WVFL correctly points out that the statute at issue in this section of McConnell, 2 U.S.C. § 301(20)(A)(iii), applies to political parties involved in federal election campaigns. WVFL would have this Court limit the application of the McConnell Court’s holding to statutes applying to sophisticated political parties, but not other individuals. This argument might be more convincing were it not for the remainder of the Supreme Court’s discussion on the matter: “These words [support and oppose] ‘provide explicit standards for those who apply them’ and ‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.’ ” Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)) (emphasis added). Thus, it is evident that the McConnell Court’s reasoning should not be limited to sophisticated political party members. The phrase “supporting or opposing” is not unconstitutionally vague. Furthermore, because it has been established that the phrase applies to groups organized for the only purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate for election, its sweep is not overbroad. For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that West Virginia’s definitions of political committee, PAC, and unaffiliated PAC are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The definitions are “ ‘unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular ... candidate.’ ” NCRL III, 525 F.3d at 287 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612). Accordingly, the Court further FINDS that there is no likelihood that WVFL will succeed on the merits with its facial challenge to those definitions. c. Political Action Committee Definition As-Applied WVFL’s as-applied challenge to the definitions has a similar fate. Defendants have not argued in their briefs that WVFL’s only or primary purpose is to support or oppose a candidate for state election. Furthermore, Defendant Betty Ireland, West Virginia Secretary of State, conceded at the hearing on October 14, 2008, that WVFL’s sole purpose is not supporting or opposing candidates. Because there appears to be no basis to find that WVFL’s sole, or even major, purpose is supporting or opposing candidates, the likelihood of success of WVFL’s as-applied challenge is easily ascertained. As WVFL will be not be deemed a PAC under the constitutionally valid definition in W. Va. Code § 3-8-1a, there is little likelihood that the challenged section will be impermissibly applied to WVFL. See Turchick v. United States, 561 F.2d 719, 721 n. 3 (distinguishing overbreadth and as-applied challenges in First Amendment context). Accordingly, the Court FINDS that there is little likelihood that WVFL will succeed on the merits of its as-applied challenge to the organizational definitions in W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a. (4) Electioneering Communication Both CFIF and WVFL challenge West Virginia’s definition of “electioneering communication.” West Virginia’s definition was amended in the June 28, 2008, second extraordinary session, presumably in response to Judge Faber’s Order [Docket 38] granting a preliminary injunction on the motion of CFIF. In that order, Judge Faber held that West Virginia’s definition of “electioneering communication” was vague and overbroad because, unlike its federal counterpart in BCRA, West Virginia’s definition included “mailings, faxes, emails, phone banks, leaflets, pamphlets, and other printed or published materials.” (Docket 38 at 2.) Judge Faber concluded that the excessive portions of the definition of “electioneering communications” might not “further the compelling interests at which they are aimed” because there was no “empirical justification for regulating mailings, faxes, emails, phone banks, leaflets, pamphlets, and other printed or published materials.” (Docket 37 at 11.) In response, the West Virginia Legislature removed leaflets, pamphlets, flyers, and outdoor advertisements from the list of types of communications that are included in the definition of “electioneering communication,” but added billboard advertisements. See W. Va.Code § 3-8-1a(12)(A). Thus, the current definition of “electioneering communication” in West Virginia differs from its federal counterpart by its inclusion of mass mailings, telephone banks, billboard advertisements, newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals as types of communications that will be defined as “electioneering communications.” Plaintiffs contend that West Virginia’s inclusion of print media, in addition to broadcast media, chills the speech of organizations that wish to engage in these types of communications without adhering to b