Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER CONNER, Senior District Judge. Plaintiff, Rita Flynn, brings this action against New York State Division of Parole (“DOP”) and Michael Burdi, Regional Director of DOP (“Burdi,” and together with DOP, “defendants”), asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against DOP and violations of her “right to equal employment opportunity” under the Fourteenth Amendment against Burdi pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered disparate treatment due to unlawful discrimination based on her gender as well as retaliation for making complaints of such treatment. Defendants now move for summary judgment. Defendants also move to strike certain evidence submitted by plaintiff in her response papers. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. We do not consider defendants’ motion to strike because we did not rely on the evidence at issue in our decision. BACKGROUND Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed. 1. The Parties Plaintiff, who is female, has been employed as a parole officer for DOP since 1979. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) DOP is a state agency “whose mission is to promote public safety by preparing inmates for release and supervising parolees to the successful completion of their sentenee[s].” (Id. ¶ 2.) Burdi has been employed by DOP as a Regional Director for Region III since 2000. (Id. ¶ 3.) As the Regional Director, Burdi oversees the daily supervision of parolees and the approximately 170 members of the parole staff in Region III. (Id.) DOP employs approximately 1,500 peace officers throughout New York State. (Id. ¶ 4.) The powers and duties of DOP are prescribed by statute. (Id.) Parole officers have “substantial investigative and arrest powers, playing an important role within the criminal justice system for the maintenance of public safety.” (Id.) The work of parole officers involves “considerable activity” on the streets, as they monitor parolees who have been released into society. (Id.) Because parole officers must spend significant amounts of time out of the office, “it is critical that parole officers report to their supervisors about their whereabouts while on duty out of the office.” (Id.) DOP operates by a chain of command, pursuant to which each employee reports to a supervisor. (Id. ¶ 5.) In the “area offices,” each parole officer is assigned to a unit run by a SPO. (Id.) The SPOs report to an Area Supervisor, who in turn reports to a Regional Director. (Id.) Parole officers are required to submit “flight plans (projected work schedules), times [sic] sheets, CMS entries, community preps, stability scale, pre-approval for overtimes and call ins to [their] [S]enior [P]arole [Officer.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Jose Burgos (“Burgos”) has been the Director of Human Resource Management (“HR”) since January 2003. (Id. ¶ 6.) In this position, he is responsible for oversight of the Labor Relations Unit, the Staff Development and Training Unit, as well as the Personnel Office. (Id.) His office also handles complaints lodged against parole officers. (Id.) Prior to 2007, complaints made against parole officers were handled by the Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”). (Id. ¶ 7.) Since 2007, HR has handled all such complaints. (Id.) According to defendants, “DOP has a progressive disciplinary system.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendants outline the steps in the disciplinary process as follows: Generally, the first step is to counsel the employee. If there is no change in behavior, then the next step is guidance and instruction to the supervisor to counsel the employee again using verbal or written counseling methods. Counseling does not constitute a disciplinary action. Only [HR] can discipline a parole officer, after issuing a Notice of Discipline. (Id.) Since 2003, a number of new policies have been implemented at DOP “which [make] parole officers more accountable for their work both out in the field and in the office.” (Id. ¶ 9.) In 2003, DOP began to require parole officers to “put into their projected work hours the actual hours to be spent in the office and the field.” (Id.) In 2005, DOP started requiring parole officers to report back to the office at the end of each work day. (Id.) Prior to these changes, “parole officers had more control and autonomy over how they spent their hours.” (Id.) II. The Peekskill Area Office The Peekskill Area Office is located in Region III. (Id. ¶ 10.) David Bush (“Bush”) has been the Area Supervisor of this office since November 2004. (Id.; Bush Decl. ¶ 2.) As Area Supervisor, Bush reports directly to either the Deputy Regional Director or the Regional Director for Region III. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10.) There are approximately 28-30 parole officers assigned to the Peekskill Area Office, including four SPOs. (Id. ¶ 11.) To become an SPO, “one must take an [sic] civil service examination, achieve a satisfactory grade on the examination, and then be interviewed and selected for [an] open SPO position.” (Id. ¶ 12.) All parole officers have a mixed caseload, supervising parolees with various criminal backgrounds, unless an officer has been designated to a “special assignment.” (Id. ¶ 14.) In the Peekskill Area Office, there are two special assignments to which a parole officer may be designated: the Absconder Search Unit and the Special Offender Unit (“SOU”). (Id. ¶ 15.) Parole officer positions in these two units “hold the same rank, title, compensation and benefits as any regular parole officer position. The difference is the type of parolees the parole officer supervises.” (Id.) A. SOU Parole Officers SOU parole officers are responsible for the supervision of “special offender parolees,” “which can include high profile cases.” (Id. ¶ 16.) They have a reduced caseload of 25 parolees per officer so that they “can devote more time to these special cases that are of high interest to the community and are of a sensitive nature.” (Id.) An SOU parole officer serves “at the pleasure of the appointing authority” and has no inherent right to remain in such position, and SOU parole officers are so informed. (Id. ¶ 17.) According to defendants, “[t]here is no difference in [the] pay, rank or status” of an SOU parole officer and that of a non-special assignment parole officer. (Id. ¶ 18.) However, plaintiff disputes this and contends that while a transfer to the SOU is not a promotion, “[SOU] assignments are often a road to promotion, as the parole officer develops special skills, including leadership skills.” (PI. Resp. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18; Flynn Aff. ¶ 12.) There are SOU parole officer positions in other area offices within Region III and these positions are filled by both male and female parole officers. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶ 19.) Constance Augustin, a female, was the SOU parole officer for Suffolk County from 2003 to 2007, and Sulay O. Gomez-Cox, also a female, is currently the SOU parole officer for Westchester County. (Id.) B. The Orange County Sex Offender Task Force The Orange County Sex Offender Task Force (the “Task Force”) was formed in approximately 2003 by various state and county entities to encourage collaboration for the successful management of sex offender parolees in Orange County. (Id. ¶ 23.) The Task Force is comprised of representatives from several organizations, including the Orange County Department of Mental Health, DOP, the Orange County Division of Probation, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office, the State Police, the Orange County Department of Social Services and the New York State Office of Mental Health. (Id.) The Task Force holds monthly meetings. (Id.) Cira DePietro (“DePietro”), Parole Services Program Specialist, was “instrumental in [the Task Forcej’s creation” and attended the meetings as a representative for DOP. (Id.) C. Treatment of Female Parole Officers According to plaintiff, female parole officers are treated differently from their male counterparts “and this culture permeates the workplace.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9, citing Walsh Aff. ¶¶4-5.) Plaintiff asserts that “female [pjarole [ojfficers who exhibit the same assertive conduct and manners as their male counterparts are targeted by Region [III] management for criticism and reassignment.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10, citing Walsh Aff. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff also asserts that “[fjemale [p]arole [ojfficers who complain about their working conditions are labeled as ‘hysterical’ and ‘out of control’ by Region [III] management,” and that “Region [III] management refuses to acknowledge or investigate complaints of gender discrimination made by female [p]arole [o]ffieers” and “tolerates lewd and sexist comments in the workplace.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶¶ 11-13, citing Walsh Aff. ¶¶ 7-9.) According to plaintiff, who cites her own sworn statement, in June 2003, a male parole officer in Region III was charged with referring to his female co-workers with lewd and pejorative terms in the workplace, but, at Burdi’s direction, he was not disciplined. (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14, citing Flynn Aff. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also offers Walsh’s statement that “[m]anagement ... subjects female [pjarole [o]fficers to unwarranted criticism for minor rule infractions but overlooks the same infractions by male [pjarole [officers.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 16, citing Walsh Aff. ¶ 10.) For example, according to plaintiff, who cites her own affidavit, a female parole officer was disciplined for having an accident while driving a state-owned vehicle, while “similarly-situated male [pjarole [ojfficers are not disciplined.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 17, citing Flynn Aff. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff also cites a statement made by Walsh for the proposition that, under Burdi’s direction, Region III management will discuss complaints made by parolees and their families against male parole officers with those officers “to obtain their side of the story,” but that “management credits the parolees’ complaints about female officers without any discussion.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 19, citing Walsh Aff. ¶ 11.) III. Plaintiff’s Experiences Working at POP Plaintiff was, at all times relevant to this action, a parole officer in the Peekskill Area Office. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 28.) She was supervised by SPO John McKeon (“McKeon”) until approximately January 2006, by SPO Lois Fairchild (“Fairchild”) from January 2006 to September 20, 2006 and by SPO Kathleen Graham (“Graham”) from September 21, 2006 to May 3, 2008. {Id. ¶29.) Plaintiff has never taken an examination to be promoted to the position of SPO. {Id. ¶ 13.) A. Plaintiff’s Position as the SOU Parole Officer In 2003, plaintiff became the SOU parole officer. {Id. ¶ 30.) Her application for the position was approved by a committee of three individuals, including Burdi. {Id.) She held this position until October 1, 2006. {Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff contends that she worked “extremely hard in handling her sex offender parolee eases,” that she “made strong efforts to place parolees in treatment programs or school” and “assist[ed] them in finding housing and jobs.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 30.) Defendants state that “[i]n September 2006, ... Bush recommended to ... Burdi that [plaintiff] be removed as the SOU parole officer because [Bush] found her performance as the SOU parole officer unsatisfactory and determined that it was not in the best interest of DOP or [plaintiff] for her to stay in that position.” (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff denies this and contends that “Burdi and Bush removed [her] from her position in retaliation for her complaints of gender discrimination.” (PI. Resp. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 21.) Burdi and Burgos concurred with Bush’s recommendation that plaintiff be removed from the SOU and, effective October 1, 2006, plaintiff was relieved of her SOU caseload and reassigned a mixed caseload of parolees. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff was notified of the transfer on September 21, 2006. (Jones Aff. ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff avers that, in response to her inquiry into the reason for her transfer, Bush stated, “because we can.” (PL R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 97.) According to plaintiff, her transfer “was viewed as a demotion by [her] colleagues and representatives of community agencies with [which] she worked.” (PL R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 98.) B. Plaintiff’s Attendance at Task Force Meetings While she was the SOU parole officer, plaintiff attended the Task Force meetings as a representative of DOP. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶ 24; DePietro Decl. ¶ 3.) According to defendants, in the fall of 2004, DePietro recommended to Burdi that plaintiff stop attending these meetings. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 25.) Defendants contend that, as a result of DePietro’s recommendation, Burdi prohibited plaintiff from attending any future meetings of the Task Force, however, plaintiff still remained in her position as the SOU parole officer and was instructed to attend any future case management meetings with members of the Task Force. {Id. ¶26.) According to plaintiff, DePietro had reported to Burdi that plaintiff had insulted Assistant District Attorney Michael Milza (“Milza”), however, Burdi did not speak with plaintiff, her SPO, or Milza before removing plaintiff from the Task Force. (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 36-37.) Burdi did not advise plaintiff of his reasons for removing her from the Task Force and, according to plaintiff, he refused to meet with her to discuss the matter. {Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff notes that both Bush and McKeon, her supervisor at the time, thought that she should have been restored to the Task Force. {Id. ¶¶ 67, 69.) McKeon “though[t] that [plaintiff] felt ‘slighted’ and that her credibility was tainted and the removal would effect [sic] her career path when she leaves the agency.” (Flynn Aff., Ex. 3 at 1773.) C. Complaints Made About Plaintiff During the relevant time period, OPR and HR received a number of complaints about plaintiffs demeanor and behavior from parolees, parolees’ families and members of the community. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶ 32; Burdi Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendants contend that although another parole officer, John White, was formally disciplined and suspended for three days after making “misleading and offensive” comments to a parolee’s wife in April 2005, plaintiff has never been disciplined by DOP “[in] any fashion.” (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 33-34.) Plaintiff contests defendants’ assertion and states that she received “counseling memos” from her supervisors, which are the “third step in the DOP progressive diseiplinary process.” (Pl. Resp. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 34; Jones Aff. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff states, citing a statement by Patrick Lyons (“Lyons”), a parole officer at DOP, that she was “at all times a conscientious [p]arole [o]fficer who treated assigned parolees fairly and in accordance with DOP policy.” (PL R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20.) According to Lyons, “most of the parolees assigned to plaintiffs unit ... were either African-American or Hispanic, and many came from a culture that discouraged female authority,” and, as a result, “many parolees had difficulty taking orders from a female [p]arole officer, and ... often questioned [her] authority.” {Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiff asserts that, from 2000 to 2003, parolees learned that, if they complained about plaintiff, Burdi would transfer their cases to another parole officer. {Id. ¶ 23, citing Lyons Aff. ¶ 8.) According to plaintiff, Burdi transferred these cases without any investigation into the merits of the complaints. (PL R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 24, citing Lyons Aff. ¶ 9; Ullrich Affm, Ex. 3 (Flynn Dep. 89:23-90:2).) However, when parolees complained about male parole officers, Burdi did not transfer their cases from the male parole officer. (PL R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff states further that “word quickly got around that if a parolee complained that plaintiff was a racist, he would be reassigned to another [p]arole [o]fficer.” {Id. ¶26.) Plaintiff testified that the removal of cases from her undermined her credibility “with an appearance [that] something [she] was doing was unethical or wrong.” (Ullrich Affm, Ex. 3 (Flynn Dep. 98:7-16).) D. The Briggs Incident Around 2003, Reverend Coleman Briggs (“Briggs”), a minister in Newburgh, accused plaintiff of racism in dealing with parolees (the “Briggs Incident”). (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶ 32.) According to plaintiff, as a result of this accusation, Burdi removed cases from her, without first investigating the charge against her and despite protests from her supervisor, co-workers and community agencies with which she worked. (Id. ¶ 33.) Burdi also refused to meet with her to resolve Briggs’ complaints and refused “to permit plaintiff to meet with ... Briggs.” (Id.) According to plaintiff, in April 2006, she received a telephone call from Briggs and, during their conversation, Briggs told her that he had been told that she refused to meet with him concerning his belief that she was racist. (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff again asked Burdi to allow her to meet with Briggs, but received no response to this request. (Id.) E. Plaintiff’s Initial Complaints of Disparate Treatment Beginning in April 2005, following plaintiffs removal from the Task Force, she sent a series of memos to Burdi, complaining that DOP and Burdi treated her differently than they treated her male colleagues. (Id. ¶ 39.) Burdi forwarded these memos to his supervisor and to DOP’s EEO office, but no one from either EEO or HR contacted plaintiff to discuss her disparate treatment complaints. (Id.) However, Burdi did meet with plaintiff in the presence of Bush and McKeon, after receiving one of these memos from plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 40.) On July 13, 2005 plaintiff faxed to OPR a copy of a memo that she had previously sent to Burdi, in which she alleged discriminatory treatment on account of her gender, and included a reference to Burdi’s decision to remove her from the Task Force. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.) On August 31, 2005, plaintiff also filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“SDHR”) and the United States Equal Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) against DOP, alleging that DOP, through Burdi, discriminated against her because of her sex. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 45; Lee Deck, Ex. B; Complt. ¶ 7.) HR and OPR conducted parallel internal investigations into plaintiffs allegations. (Flynn Aff., Ex. 3.) OPR’s investigation was conducted by Fairchild, who was an OPR investigator at that time. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff avers that “OPR failed to investigate [her] gender discrimination complaint.” (Flynn Aff. ¶ 24.) According to Fairchild, she did investigate the gender-based disparate treatment claims, but only with the information that plaintiff gave her; she did not conduct an “extensive inquiry into the overall operation of the office,” because such an inquiry requires a separate mandate. (Ullrich Affm, Ex. 4 (Fairchild Dep. 56:4-21).) On November 29, 2005, OPR issued a report stating that plaintiffs complaint of disparate treatment could not be substantiated “without a more complete and extensive inquiry into the overall treatment of other parole officers,” but that her complaint regarding her transfer from the Task Force was valid, as the decision was made “based on unsubstantiated allegations of poor behavior and misconduct.” (Flynn Aff., Ex. 3 at 1768.) The report also confirmed plaintiffs allegations that Burdi had disclosed personal information about plaintiff and her family to the public, “in violation of Employee Manual Article 15.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that “despite [her] repeated requests, both individually and through her union, DOP refused to provide a copy of the report of its investigation and ultimately only did so upon Court order.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 73.) F. September 2005 Counseling Memo According to plaintiff, on September 7, 2005, “Burdi directed Bush to reprimand plaintiff and issue a counseling memo to her when she appeared at the Area Office to pick up her paycheck. At the time, plaintiff was off-duty and not carrying her weapon.” (Id. ¶ 63; see also Flynn Aff., Ex. 3 at 1774.) The memo indicates that plaintiff was observed in the office without her firearm, in violation of certain DOP rules. (Flynn Aff., Ex. 5.) Plaintiff contends that Burdi, when ordering Bush to issue this memo, did not first investigate her work status at the time of the incident and that “Bush knew that [she] was off-duty as he had her flight plan.” (PL R.56.1 Stmt, ¶ 64; see also Flynn Aff., Ex. 3 at 1774.) According to an OPR report, Burdi explained that “he had a particular concern about [parole officers] working without their equipment and had counseled other officers (male) in the past,” but he “acknowledged that these officers only received verbal counseling.” (Flynn Aff., Ex. 3 at 1774.) G. The John Duck Incident In early 2004, plaintiff issued a violation against a repeated sex offender, John Duck (“Duck”). (Pl. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶51.) Plaintiff disagreed with the pre-release recommendation regarding the community in which he should live upon his release from prison due to the number of children who reside there. (Id.) She reported her disagreement to DePietro, but DePietro did not change the recommendation and, in September 2005, Duck was released to the community named in his pre-release recommendation. (Id.) Community members then held meetings protesting the placement. (Id. ¶ 53.) Burdi appeared at a community meeting and told the audience that plaintiff had investigated Duck’s placement and approved it as appropriate. (Id. ¶ 55.) According to plaintiff, Burdi “lied to community members in telling them that [she] had approved Duck’s placement in the community.” (Id. ¶ 58.) Burdi also told several community members that plaintiff was a single parent with two young children, which statements “revealed personal information about plaintiffs family, potentially jeopardizing her safety.” (Segal-Belgrave Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.) According to plaintiff, who cites the affidavit of Jill Segal-Belgrave (“Segal-Belgrave”), a teacher from the local school district, “[i]t is common knowledge in law enforcement that personal information about a peace officer, no matter how innocent, should never be revealed.” (Pl. R.56.1 Stmt. ¶ 58, citing Segal-Belgrave Aff. ¶ 7.) Segal-Belgrave wrote a letter to DOP complaining about “Burdi’s handling of this situation, his dismissive conduct toward the parents who were concerned about protecting their community and his false statements about [plaintiff].” (Segal-Belgrave Aff. ¶¶ 9, 11.) DOP never responded to the letter. (Id. ¶ 12.) H.Plaintiff’s SDHR Hearing According to defendants, in June 2006, a hearing was held before an SDHR officer regarding plaintiffs SDHR complaint. (Defs.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 47.) Burdi, Bush, Fairchild and plaintiff were all present. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that she had asked William Noonan (“Noonan”), her “PEF Field Representative,” to assist her, but the SDHR investigator would not allow Noonan in the conference room. (P1.R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶¶ 78-79.) Bush first learned that plaintiff had filed an SDHR complaint when he received a notice requiring his attendance at the hearing. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff contends that after she made her complaints to OPR and SDHR, “defendants commenced a pattern of retaliatory acts to discredit and punish her,” citing her own sworn testimony. (PI. R.56.1 Stmt. ¶ 61.) I. Supervision Under SPO Fairchild Fairchild supervised plaintiff from January 2006 to September 21, 2006, at which time plaintiff was transferred to the supervision of Graham. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 36.) Fairchild counseled plaintiff verbally and in writing for various problems with “case management mechanics,” including, what defendants contend were, plaintiffs “erratic work schedule, unknown whereabouts, travel vouchers and unauthorized overtime.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff contends that she was “frequently singled out for criticism of the types of behavior that management tolerated in males,” citing Jones’s statement that he observed plaintiff being criticized “for being loud and argumentative, for writing comprehensive reports, changing work schedules, for working split shifts.” (P1.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 31; Jones Aff. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff avers that, from January 2006 until the hearing in June 2006, her relationship with Fairchild was “friendly and collegia!” and that Fairchild considered plaintiff “a good [p]arole [ojfficer.” (P1.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 77.) During the hearing, Fairchild testified favorably about plaintiffs qualifications as a parole officer. (Id. ¶ 82.) Immediately after the hearing, plaintiff discovered that Bush and Graham “were telling [plaintiffs] colleagues that she had ‘lost the hearing’ and that she was mentally unstable.” (Id. ¶ 83.) The next day, Fairchild told plaintiff to take an extended leave or “Bush would recommend [a] § 72 psychiatric examination.” (Id. ¶ 84; Flynn Aff. ¶ 37.) Fairchild told plaintiff that she was “feeling pressure from Bush” after the hearing. (PL R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 85.) According to plaintiff, “[thereafter, Fairchild changed her manner of supervising plaintiff, berating and harassing her by writing her up for action that was previously permitted.” (Id. ¶ 86.) Plaintiff attests that Fairchild “refused to speak with [her]” when she called Fairchild; that Fairchild “began to remove [her] from cases for no reason, forbade her from working in the field, assigned her work to other [p]arole [o]fficers, refused to meet with her and yelled at her in a threatening and intimidating manner.” (Id., ¶¶ 87-88.) According to plaintiff, a meeting was arranged to be held on August 23, 2006 between plaintiff, Noonan, Bush and Fair-child “to address retaliatory supervision by Bush and Fairchild,” however, it was adjourned when Fairchild failed to appear. (Noonan Aff. ¶ 6.) On September 11, 2006, plaintiff complained to Bush that Fairchild “harassed and berated her ‘non-stop’ during work hours.” (PI. R.56.1 Stmt. ¶ 90.) J. The Letter Incident On September 15, 2006, plaintiff took personal leave to attend to a family crisis. (Id. ¶ 91.) While plaintiff was on leave, Bush directed Fairchild to deliver a letter to plaintiffs home. (Id. ¶ 92.) According to plaintiff, “Bush made [the] arrangement although he knew about the confrontational relationship between Fairchild and plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 94.) Bush testified that “[a]t that point in time, [plaintiff] was quite volatile in the office with frequent yelling and screaming sessions.” (Ullrich Affm, Ex. 2 (Bush Dep. at 87:22-24).) K. Plaintiff’s New York State Civil Service Law § 72 Examination In the fall of 2006, Fairchild recommended that plaintiff be referred for a New York State Civil Service Law § 72 examination (“ § 72 examination”) to determine her fitness for duty. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 39.) This recommendation was forwarded to Burdi, who concurred and forwarded it to Albany, where Burgos made the final decision to refer plaintiff to be examined by a medical professional to determine her fitness for duty. (Id. ¶ 40.) In October 2006, while under Graham’s supervision, plaintiff underwent the § 72 examination. (Id. ¶ 43.) While the results of the examination were pending, she was given the option of performing office work or using her accrued vacation time. (Graham Decl. ¶ 12.) According to Graham, “she chose the latter option initially but then she also performed office duties.” (Id.) In December 2006, plaintiff was found to be “fit for duty” and she promptly resumed her caseload duties. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 43; Graham Decl. ¶ 12.) She was never suspended and, according to Burgos, she “did not lose any compensation, vacation, or other benefits associated with her parole officer status” during the period in which the results of her examination were pending. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 44; Bur-gos Decl. ¶ 11.) However, plaintiff contends that the fact that she had been referred for the examination “was common knowledge throughout the law enforcement community in Orange County as well as in social and community agencies,” and her “professional reputation and credibility were ... undermined.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶ 109.) In October 2006, while plaintiff was under Graham’s supervision, plaintiff wrote memos “detailing her increasing concern about DOP’s inappropriate action toward her, including attempts to send Fairchild to her home unnecessarily, removal from her position as [SOU][p]arole [o]fficer and retaliatory treatment by management.” (Id. ¶ 102.) In addition, she requested that Fairchild, “whom she knew to have suffered mental illness in the past, be barred from coming to her home.” (Id.) Fairchild testified that “it was discussed with ... seniors in the office and with a lot of other people that [plaintiff] ha[d] essentially asked for an Order of Protection against ... Fairchild because [Fairchild] is so deranged that she is going to, in fact, kill her or her children.” (Ullrich Affm, Ex. 4 (Fairchild Dep. 161:19-162:4).) L.Supervision Under SPO Graham Graham supervised plaintiff from September 21, 2006 until May 6, 2008. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶41.) During this period, Graham counseled plaintiff verbally and in writing on several occasions about plaintiffs work performance, which, according to defendants, was characterized by “irregular work hours, not getting overtime pre-approved, [and] late flight plans, time sheets, community preps, and [CMS] entries.” (Id. ¶ 42.) However, plaintiff contends that “[t]hroughout 2007 and most of 2008, ... Graham falsely accused [her] of inadequate productivity, failing to submit work schedules on time, failing to make CMS entries and untimely Community Prep reports.” (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 110.) For example, one morning Graham accused plaintiff of making only one CMS entry in a four-hour period although she had made over 70 entries that morning. (Id. ¶ 111.) On one occasion, in 2007, Graham “improperly restricted plaintiff from working both in the field and in the office on the same day, an order that makes it impossible for a [p]arole [o]fficer to properly perform her job.” (Id. ¶ 112.) Plaintiff adds that “[n]o other [p]arole [o]fficer in the Peekskill Area Office was so restricted.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that while she was supervised by Graham, she was prohibited from working on weekends or late at night, while other parole officers had no such restrictions. (Id. ¶ 113.) Graham also “repeatedly” failed to make CMS entries approving plaintiffs “Community Prep investigations” ; Graham would then accuse plaintiff of “late Community Preps.” (Id. ¶ 114.) Furthermore, Graham “repeatedly” required plaintiff to attend what Jones describes as “unnecessary and time-consuming meetings in [Graham’s] office.” (Id. ¶ 115.) In response to Graham’s allegations that plaintiffs productivity was “inadequate,” Jones “compared plaintiffs records to those of other [p]arole [o]fficers in the unit for a three-month period in summer and fall [of] 2007.” (Id. ¶ 116.) He found that plaintiff “was routinely in 100% compliance with respect to home visits, office reports, program visits and ‘other’ contacts,” and that “[t]he records also revealed that plaintiff routinely made timely entries into the CMS system.” (Id.) Jones’ research also revealed that other parole officers “were often two or more weeks late in their CMS entries.” (Id. ¶ 117.) Graham required all of her “unit members” to call in to her at the beginning and end of each shift; however, while Graham allowed other unit members to leave a voicemail message if she did not answer her phone, Graham required plaintiff to speak directly with her or another supervisor. (Id. ¶ 118.) Around January 2008, “as Shop Steward, Jones ... participated in grievance procedures concerning Graham’s failure to reassign cases to plaintiff when she reassigned cases to all other [p]arole [officers in her unit,” which practice “deprived plaintiff of overtime.” (Id. ¶ 119.) Jones was also “involved in [a] series of grievances with respect to Graham and Bush’s failure to pay plaintiffs overtime from January 25, 2007 to August 8, 2007.” (Id. ¶ 120.) According to Jones, all unit members other than plaintiff “received their proper overtime payments for that period. Plaintiffs lack of payment was due to Graham’s failure to submit plaintiffs overtime forms to Bush for some eight months.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Graham also selectively enforced rules regarding the formal procedure for obtaining arrest warrants. (Id. ¶¶ 121-24.) According to Jones, when other members of plaintiffs unit requested an arrest warrant, Graham issued the warrant immediately, thereby circumventing the formal procedure for obtaining a warrant. (Id. ¶¶ 121-22.) Jones contends that, beginning in June 2007, “without explanation, Graham required plaintiff to first submit the required paperwork to the department typist and wait for it to be typed and approved by [Jones] before issuing a warrant.” (Id. ¶ 122.) According to plaintiff, “[w]hile this procedure is actually [DOP] policy, it is never followed because of the undue delay it causes in apprehending parole violators.” (Id.) On one occasion, in 2007, plaintiff waited more than one week for a warrant. (Id.) Furthermore, as a result of having to wait in the office for the typing to be completed, plaintiff worked longer hours, “[h]owever, when she turned in the additional hours on her time sheet, Graham reduced them, and plaintiff was therefore not paid for them.” (Id. ¶ 124.) No other parole officer in Graham’s unit was subject to such restrictions. (Id. ¶ 123.) Plaintiff contends that, at one point, “[i]n violation of DOP policy, [p]arole [o]fficer Distadio transferred two cases to plaintiff involving parolees who had tested positive for drug use.... Graham refused to counsel or discipline Distadio, telling plaintiff to ‘just deal with it.’ ” (Id. ¶ 125.) Plaintiff also contends that, in November 2007, Graham, at the direction of Bush, prepared a negative performance evaluation for plaintiff “that was so defective it had to be withdrawn.” (Id. ¶¶ 126-27.) In May 2007, while plaintiff was under Graham’s supervision, plaintiff was selected to be the Strict Intensive Supervision Treatment (“SIST”) parole officer for the Peekskill Area Office. (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 48.) Burdi approved the assignment. (Burdi Deck ¶ 17.) On January 3, 2008, plaintiff met with Burdi, Noonan, Jones and a Deputy Regional Director and a representative from HR to discuss her complaints; however, the meeting ended with no resolution. (PI. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶¶ 129,131.) M. This Lawsuit is Filed As of December 23, 2008, the date of plaintiffs sworn affidavit, plaintiff was still employed as a parole officer in the Peeks-kill Area Office, under the supervision of SPO Edward Agrisani. (Flynn Aff. ¶¶ 53-54.) Defendants contend that plaintiff “has never been disciplined by DOP. She has never been demoted. She has never been suspended. She has never lost vacation time, lost benefits or received a reduction in salary.” (Defs. R. 56.1 Stmt, ¶ 50.) However, plaintiff contests this, again directing the Court to testimony that she received counseling memos, which memos “are the third step in the DOP progressive disciplinary process,” and that DOP “improperly skipped the first two steps of the procedure with plaintiff.” (PI. Resp. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 50; Jones Aff. ¶ 48.) On June 20, 2007, plaintiff filed the instant action. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standard Summary judgment may be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material only if, based on that fact, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The burden rests on the movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all permissible factual inferences against the movant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The Court’s role at this stage of the litigation is not to decide issues of material fact, but to discern whether any exist. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). Nevertheless, as one court explained: [Sjummary judgment must be granted against a party in instances when such party fails to adequately establish an essential element on which it bears the burden of proof.... The non-moving party may not rest upon unsubstantiated allegations, conclusory assertions or mere denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but must set forth and establish specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.... A metaphysical or other whimsical doubt concerning a material fact does not establish a genuine issue necessitating a trial.... The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-movant’s case is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Brooks v. DiFasi, 1997 WL 436750, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While summary judgment must be granted with caution in employment discrimination actions, it “remains available to reject discrimination cases lacking genuine issues of material fact.” Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 40 (2d Cir.1994). Thus, “even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must prove more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997); see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (“The party opposing summary judgment may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.”). II. Timeliness of the Claims Title VII “precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Under Title VII, a claimant who has already filed a charge with a state or local agency must file discrimination charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir.1998) (citing 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e)(l)). The statute of limitations on federal claims brought under § 1983 is three years for claims arising in New York. Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.1994). Here, plaintiff filed her complaint with the SDHR and the EEOC on August 31, 2005 and, thus, the limitations period for her Title VII claims runs to November 4, 2004 (300 days before August 31, 2005). Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the instant action on June 20, 2007 and, thus, the limitations period for her § 1983 claim runs to June 20, 2004 (three years before June 20, 2007). The following two claims of discrimination arise from events that took place before November 4, 2004 and June 20, 2004: (1) plaintiffs claim that Burdi transferred cases from her after parolees lodged complaints about her, between 2000 and 2003; and (2) plaintiffs claim that Burdi transferred cases from her after Briggs accused her of racism without first investigating that accusation, in 2003. Defendants argue that “to the extent that plaintiffs Title VII claims are predicated upon acts alleged to have occurred more than 300 days before she filed her administrative complaint with the SDHR ... such claims are time-barred and must be dismissed” and that “all of plaintiffs Equal Protection claims against [Burdi] that precede the 3 years before the filing of the complaint ... are barred by the applicable ... statute of limitations.” (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 5-6.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should not disregard this evidence because it “places in context the discriminatory acts that took place during the limitations period.” (PL Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 18.) We accept both arguments, for different reasons. The Supreme Court has held that while “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to the acts alleged in timely filed charges,” Title VII does not “bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The Second Circuit has interpreted this holding to apply to § 1983 claims as well. Glynn v. County of Suffolk, 50 Fed.Appx. 58, 58-59 (2d Cir.2002) (directing district court to reconsider plaintiffs § 1983 claims in light of Morgan ). Accordingly, each of plaintiffs Title VII disparate treatment claims and retaliation claims that are based on conduct that occurred prior to November 4, 2004 and each of plaintiffs § 1983 claims that are based on conduct that occurred before June 20, 2004, are time barred under the relevant statutes of limitations and will not be considered as bases of liability. However, such conduct may be considered as “background evidence” in support of plaintiffs timely claims. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061. III. Disparate Treatment Claim Title VII makes it unlawful “for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Title VII discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court, pursuant to which a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case by establishing that: (1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) she is qualified for the position that she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2008). At the summary judgment stage, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, plaintiffs burden on her prima facie case is de mini-mus. Dister v. Cont'l Group Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir.1988). If a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. However, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Therefore, if the defendant carries its burden of production, then the presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiffs prima facie case is rebutted and the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s proffered, non-discriminatory rationale is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. Defendants characterize plaintiffs disparate treatment claim as based on three occurrences: (1) defendants’ decision to reassign plaintiff from the SOU parole officer position; (2) defendants’ decision to remove plaintiff from the Task Force; and (3) defendants’ decision to refer plaintiff for the § 72 examination to determine her fitness for duty. (Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 6.) After reviewing the Complaint and plaintiffs opposition papers to this motion, we discern two other timely claims upon which plaintiff appears to base her disparate treatment claim: her claim that Burdi “mislead [sic] the public about her decision concerning [John Duck] and revealed her personal information to the public,” and her claim that DOP withheld from her the results of the OPR investigation “for years,” until May 2007. (PL Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 19-21 (discussing the “adverse employment actions” that form the basis of plaintiffs disparate treatment claim).) Finally, plaintiff does not argue that defendants’ decision to refer her to a § 72 examination constituted a basis of liability for her disparate treatment claim. (Id.) Therefore, we assume that she does not ground this claim upon that occurrence. Furthermore, plaintiffs time-barred claims, as discussed above, will not be considered here as bases for liability. Therefore, we turn now to the question of whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs disparate treatment claim based on any of the following occurrences: (1) plaintiffs transfer from the SOU parole officer position; (2) plaintiffs removal from the Task Force; (3) Burdi’s handling of the John Duck Incident; and (4) DOP’s withholding of the results of the OPR investigation. A. Plaintiff’s Transfer From, the SOU Parole Officer Position As described above, the legal standard for a disparate treatment claim requires plaintiff to first set forth a prima facie case by establishing that: (1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) she is qualified for the position that she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Mathirampuzha, 548 F.3d at 78. For purposes of a disparate treatment claim, “[a] plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if ... she endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A materially adverse change in employment “include[s] discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand.” Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999). It “must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff argues that her removal from the position as the SOU parole officer constitutes an adverse action by defendants “because this was a prestigious and important appointment.” (PI. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 20.) It is undisputed that there is no difference in the salary or rank of the SOU parole officer position compared to a non-special parole officer position. For a plaintiff to establish that a lateral transfer — one that does not involve a change in salary or rank— constitutes an adverse employment action, “the plaintiff must show that the transfer created a ‘materially significant disadvantage.’ ” Galabya, 202 F.3d at 641 (internal citation omitted). Although a “transfer from an ‘elite’ unit to a ‘less prestigious’ unit could constitute an adverse employment action,” a plaintiff cannot rely on her own opinion of the difference in prestige levels to withstand a motion for summary-judgment. Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 254-55 (2d Cir.2007) (In a First Amendment retaliation claim case, in which a plaintiff must meet a standard that is less demanding than in Title VII cases, transfer from one unit to another was not an adverse action.). Plaintiff asserts that SOU “assignments are often a road to promotion” and that her transfer back to a position with a mixed caseload was viewed by her colleagues and community as a demotion, but she cites only her own sworn statements to support these propositions. (PI. Resp. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18; PI. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 98.) Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of fact as to whether her transfer from the SOU parole officer position to that of a parole officer with a mixed caseload created a “materially significant disadvantage” for her. She has set forth no evidence that the transfer caused her to lose a promotion that she would have received had she remained in the SOU parole officer position or that other officers in the SOU parole officer position have been promoted more frequently than non-SOU parole officers. Nor has she demonstrated that she has unique qualifications that render her better suited for the SOU parole officer position than other parole officers in the Peekskill Area Office. Cf. Rodriguez v. Bd. of Educ. of Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist., 620 F.2d 362, 366 (2d. Cir.1980) (Involuntary transfer of art teacher from junior high school to elementary school students constituted adverse employment action because the “evidence indicated that the art programs at the elementary level were so profoundly different from those in the junior high school as to render utterly useless her twenty years of experience and study in developing art programs for middle school children.”) Nor is plaintiffs conclusory allegation, based on her own opinion, that the transfer was “viewed as a demotion” sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Therefore, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that plaintiffs transfer from the SOU parole officer position was not an adverse employment action for purposes of her disparate treatment claim. B. Plaintiff’s Removal From the Task Force Plaintiff also argues that defendants’ decision to remove her from the Task Force constitutes an adverse action “because [the position on the Task Force] was a prestigious and important appointment.” (PL Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 20.) Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that her transfer from the Task Force constituted “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640. The Task Force met only once each month. Plaintiffs exclusion from the monthly meetings can hardly be described as a material change in the terms or conditions of her employment. See Dillon, 497 F.3d at 250, 254 (Plaintiffs exclusion from certain meetings of “top staff and administrative personnel” that plaintiff had previously attended did not constitute adverse employment action.). Furthermore, the undisputed facts indicate that plaintiffs removal from the Task Force did not result in a loss of salary or a demotion in rank. (See PL.Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 20.) Plaintiff states that, according to the OPR report, Bush and McKeon thought that she should be restored to the Task Force and that McKeon believed that the transfer would “[a]ffect her career path when she leaves [DOP].” (Flynn Aff., Ex. 3 at 1773.) A transfer to a position with fewer promotional opportunities may be considered an adverse employment action. See Rodriguez, 620 F.2d at 365. However, we are not satisfied that plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the transfer from the Task Force would, in fact, likely affect her career prospects should she leave DOP. She does not establish that McKeon had the requisite knowledge to testify as to this issue in the OPR report and, therefore, his opinion must be treated as mere speculation. See Stroud v. New York City, 374 F.Supp.2d 341, 349 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quoting Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir.2004)) (On a motion for summary judgment “the nonmoving party ‘may not rely on mere conclusory allegations or speculation, but instead must offer some hard evidence’ in support of its factual assertions.”). Nor has plaintiff presented any data or “affidavits and testimony demonstrating that the transfer was, in effect, a demotion that would constitute a serious professional setback and stigma to her career.” Rodriguez, 620 F.2d at 365. Therefore, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that plaintiffs transfer from the Task Force was not an adverse employment action and, thus, cannot be the grounds for her disparate treatment claim. C. Burdi’s Handling of the John Duck Incident Plaintiff argues that Burdi’s misleading public statements regarding plaintiffs role in the decision concerning sex offender John Duck and Burdi’s disclosure of personal information about plaintiff to the public, which violated DOP policy, constituted adverse employment actions. (PL Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 20.) However, plaintiff does not explain how Burdi’s conduct constitutes “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [plaintiffs] employment.” Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640. She does not cite, and the Court’s research has not revealed, any legal authority that supports the proposition that lying about an employee to the public or failing to defend an employee before the public constitutes an adverse employment action under Title VII. Plaintiff also contends that “[i]t is common knowledge in law enforcement that personal information about a peace officer ... should never be revealed,” and directs the court to the sworn testimony of a teacher, Segal-Belgrave, who stated that Burdi’s statements about plaintiffs family “violated] ... DOP policy” and “potentially jeopardized] [plaintiffs] safety.” (PL R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 58; Segal-Belgrave Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.) However, plaintiff has failed to support her contention that it is commonly known that personal information about peace officers should not be revealed with any citation to the record. Plaintiff also has failed to establish that Segal-Belgrave has any personal knowledge of DOP’s safety precautions or that she is qualified to testify to the effect of Burdi’s statements on plaintiffs safety and, therefore, her opinion must be treated as mere speculation. Fed.R.CivP. 56(e) (affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment “must be made on personal knowledge ... and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”) Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate with regard to plaintiffs disparate treatment claim, to the extent that it relies on Burdi’s handling of the John Duck Incident. D. DOP’s Withholding of the OPR Report Plaintiff argues that “DOP withheld from plaintiff the results of the only investigation it did conduct, one whose outcome validated plaintiffs complaints.” (Pl. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 19.) Defendants contend that plaintiff “misconstrues the facts and substitutes her own subjective viewpoint” regarding this occurrence, stating that “the report had been disclosed to plaintiff in a redacted version to protect the privacy interest of non-parties.” (Defs. Reply Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 5, 5 n.l.) Defendants appear to argue that plaintiffs delay in receiving the report was due to the sensitive nature of the information therein and the need to obtain this Court’s involvement before producing the document. Regardless of the reason that plaintiff did not receive the report in a timely fashion, plaintiff does not cite, and the Court’s research did not reveal, any legal authority that indicates that temporarily withholding a personnel-related report constitutes an adverse employment action. Indeed, we do not see how withholding an investigative report could be characterized as “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640. E. Summary Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs Title VII disparate treatment claim because none of the timely claims upon which plaintiff relies in making this claim constitute adverse employment actions under Title VII. Furthermore, except for certain differences not applicable here, “the core substantive standards that apply to claims of discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII are also applicable to claims of discrimination in employment in violation of § 1981 or the Equal Protection Clause.” Patterson, 375 F.3d at 225. Therefore, summary judgment must be granted with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claim as well. See id. (“[T]he factors justifying summary judgment dismissing [plaintiffs] Title VII claim against the municipal defendants for termination of his employment equally support the summary dismissal of his claims for termination brought under ... § 1981.”). IV. Retaliation Claim Plaintiff contends that DOP subjected her to retaliation, “including creation of a hostile work environment, loss of overtime, suspension, micromanagement, lost promotional opportunities and denigration of her reputation and credibility.” (Complt-¶ 33.) Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee “because [such employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice ... under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C.2000e-3(a). “The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis used in claims of discrimination in violation of Title VII also applies to retaliation claims brought pursuant to Title VII.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 141 (2d Cir.2003). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was engaged in protected activity by opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer was aware of that activity; (3) that the employer took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 282-83 (2d Cir.2001). If the plaintiff sets out a prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory rationale for its actions. Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir.1991). If the defendant proffers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the defendant’s reason was a pretext for retaliation. Id. The burden of proof and persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Milano v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4410131, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.26, 2008). In this case, defendants do not dispute that plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements of a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation: that she engaged in protected activity and that DOP was aware of that activity. (See Defs. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 14-18.) Plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII when she complained about gender discrimination informally, via a series of memos to Burdi and OPR in April and July of 2005, and formally, when she filed her complaint with the SDHR on August 31, 2005, and during the SDHR hearing in June 2006. See Amin v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc., 282 Fed.Appx. 958, 961 (2d Cir.2008) (“Informal complaints to management as to discrimination on a basis prohibited by Title VII are prohibited activity.”) She also engaged in protected activity when she: (1) attempted to meet with Fairchild and Bush on August 23, 2006, to discuss their allegedly retaliatory supervision of her; (2) complained to Bush about Fairchild’s treatment of her on September 11, 2006; and (3) complained of retaliatory treatment in her memos of October 2006. See Lindner v. Int’l Bus. Machs., Corp., 2008 WL 2461934, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008) (finding that plaintiffs request for meeting with EEOC counselor constituted protected activity); Martinez v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 2008 WL 2220638, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008) (recognizing that complaints of retaliation for protected activity constituted protected activity themselves). Further, DOP knew about plaintiffs complaints. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir.2007) (to satisfy knowledge requirement, “general corporate knowledge” is sufficient). Thus, the first two elements of a prima facie case of retaliation are met here. Plaintiff contends that, after making complaints about gender discrimination, DOP subjected her to various adverse actions. (PI. Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 22.) Although it is not clear from plaintiffs Complaint or from her opposition to the instant m