Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER VIRGINIA M. KENDALL, District Judge. On March 20, 2003, a large group of protestors gathered in Chicago’s federal plaza to demonstrate their disapproval of the United States’ military action in Iraq. The original group, numbered between five thousand and ten thousand, left the Federal Plaza and began to march northward. The protestors did not have a permit to assemble or to march. As the march proceeded, thousands more individuals joined the original group. Although the march proceeded on various streets at different times throughout the evening, the primary march proceeded north on Lake Shore Drive and approximately one to two thousand marchers eventually converged in the area of Chicago Avenue and Mies Van der Rohe Way. At some point, approximately 313 individuals were arrested within this area. They were charged with reckless conduct and transported to area police stations. Approximately 800 were detained in the area for a few hours. All of the cases were eventually dismissed. As a result, two federal cases were filed against the Chicago Police Department and individual officers: one involving individual plaintiffs (Beal v. City of Chicago, 04 C 2039, 2007 WL 1029364 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) and a class action (Vodak v. City of Chicago, 03 C 2463)). Both cases were subsequently transferred to this Court’s docket. On March 30, 2007, this Court granted in part and denied in part motions for summary judgment in Beal. On January 5, 2009, this Court consolidated the two cases for trial due to the similarity of the issues, facts and law and for the efficient adjudication of the matters. The Vodak Plaintiffs and the City Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The Parties The Class is represented by the following Plaintiffs: Sarah Bergstrand (“Bergstrand”), Prudence Browne (“Browne”), Robert Castillo (“Castillo”), Patrick Donnell (“Donnell”), Matthew Gaines (“Gaines”), Angela Garcia (“Garcia”), Kathleen Gruber (“Gruber”), Steven Hudosh (“Hudosh”) Elizabeth Johnson (“Johnson”), Sophia Sieczowski (“Sieczowski”) and Kevin Vodak (‘Vodak”). PI. 56.1 at ¶ l. These Plaintiffs represent a Class of people that was surrounded by Chicago Police Department Officers on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue east of Michigan Avenue and west of Mies Van Der Rohe Way. PI. 56.1 at ¶2. The class is divided into three subclasses. Id. at ¶ 3. Subclass A-l (represented by Browne, Gaines, Garcia, Johnson and Sieczowski) consists of persons detained in the bounded area but not taken into custody. Id. Subclass A-2 (represented by Bergstrand, Castillo, Donnell and Vodak) consists of persons who were taken into police custody but released without charges. Id. Subclass A-3 (represented by Gruber and Hudosh) consists of persons taken into custody and charged with a criminal offense. Id. The Vodak action also includes Individual Plaintiffs who have elected not to join the class: Sharon Ambielli (“Ambielli”), John Pennycuff (“Pennycuff’), Daniel Pineda (“Pineda”), Aaron Robin (“Robin”) and Brad Thomson (“Thomson”). PI. 56.1 at ¶ 4. In addition to other claims, these individual Plaintiffs bring claims of violations of their Fourth Amendment rights subject to the same analysis as those of the class members. Defendants are the City of Chicago and several Chicago Police Department members, including both command personnel and officers: Former Superintendent Terry G. Hillard (“Superintendent Hillard”); Former Police Chief Philip Cline (“Cline”); Chief Jerry Robinson (“Chief Robinson”), Deputy Chief Tom Byrne (“Deputy Chief Byrne”), Deputy Chief Ralph Chiczewski (“Deputy Chief Chiczewski”), Commander John Killacky (“Commander Killacky”), Commander Sam Christian (“Commander Christian”), Commander David Dougherty (“Commander Dougherty”), Commander Marienne Perry (“Commander Perry”), Commander John R. Risley (“Commander Risley”), Commander Joseph Griffin (“Commander Griffin”), Commander Daniel Dugan (“Commander Dugan”), Commander Charles Williams (“Commander Williams”), Lieutenant Kevin Ryan (“Lieutenant Ryan”), Lieutenant Neil Sullivan (“Lieutenant Sullivan”), Lieutenant Dave Sobscyzk (“Lieutenant Sobscyzk”), Assistant Deputy Frank Limón (“Assistant Deputy Limón”), former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman (“Assistant Deputy Superintendent Huberman”), counsel Karen Rowan (“counsel Rowan”), counsel Thomas Epach, Jr. (“counsel Epach”), Officer Barker, Officer Bilyj, Officer M. Black (“Officer Black”), Lieutenant Carson Earnest (“Lieutenant Earnest”), Officer L. Coleman (“Officer Coleman”), Officer E. Cortez (“Officer Cortez”), Officer W. Chicas (“Officer Chicas”), Officer A. Dakuras (“Officer Dakuras”), Officer C. Decicco (“Officer Decicco”), Officer G. Gamboa (“Officer Gamboa”), Officer E. Gedrekis (“Officer Gedrekis”), Officer R. Hagen (“Officer Hagen”), Officer L. Heise (“Officer Heise”), Officer D. Herrera (“Officer Herrera”), Officer R. Hughes (“Officer Hughes”), Officer Hunt, Officer K. Jaros (“Officer Jaros”), Officer Johnson, Officer A. Kizziah (“Officer Kizziah”), Officer D. Koonig (“Officer Koonig”), Officer T. Lieber (“Officer Lieber”), Officer T. Loconte (“Officer Loconte”), and Officer K. McClearn (“Officer McClearn”) (collectively the “Officer Defendants”). The Parties subsequently agreed to dismiss Officers Robinson, Christian, Dougherty, Sullivan, Limón, Perry and Hunt. The Plaintiffs claim that they were falsely arrested and imprisoned in violation of the Federal Constitution (Count I) and Illinois Constitution (Count VII) as well as Illinois state law (Count VIII), that they were maliciously prosecuted (Count X), that the officers violated their First Amendment Rights (Count II), and that the officers conspired together to violate their rights (Count XI). The Individual Plaintiffs bring claims of Excessive Force (Count III), deliberate indifference to medical needs (Count IV), deprivation of property (Count V) and assault and battery (Count IX). In addition, Plaintiffs seek to hold the City liable under theories of municipal liability (Count VI) and respondeat superior (Counts XII-XIII). The City brings a Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs seeking damages for the additional costs of providing government services incurred as a result of Plaintiffs’ violations of several municipal ordinances. The parties now bring four Motions for Summary Judgment. The Defendant Chicago Police Department members bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Class Plaintiffs’ claims alleging that they are entitled to qualified immunity and therefore are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Fourth and First Amendment claims and also that Plaintiffs cannot set forth evidence to support their claims of civil conspiracy, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Defendant City of Chicago brings a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims of municipal liability, claiming that any unlawful arrests are not pursuant to a municipal policy or custom and were not a result of decisions made by a policymaker. Plaintiffs bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims, claiming that they have established as a matter of law that the Defendant Officers arrested them without probable cause, and a Motion for Summary Judgment on the City’s Counterclaim, claiming that there is no evidence that the Plaintiffs violated or intentionally violated any law and that they did not proximately cause any damages the City may have suffered. For the reasons stated below, Defendant Chicago Police Department Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims is denied, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the City’s Counterclaim is granted. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike As an initial matter, Plaintiffs bring a Motion to Strike Defendant Officers’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike several statements of fact therein discussing civil disobedience training that took place prior to the demonstration at issue and to strike three exhibits submitted in the record: 1) a flyer proposing “Chez Daley’s Direct Action Against the War;” 2) a transcript of Chicago Police Department radio transmissions; and 3) an account of the protest distributed on Chicago Indymedia-Webcast News. The Motion to Strike is granted in.part and denied in part. Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant Officers’ Statement of Facts should be stricken because it violates Local Rule 56. Specifically, many supposed “statements” are lengthy paragraphs actually containing several statements of fact. Although this Court declines to strike the Officers’ Statement of Facts as a whole, where more than one discrete issue was included within a paragraph, the Court strikes the surplus statements. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809-10 (7th Cir.2005) (“a district court does not abuse its discretion when, in imposing a penalty for a litigant’s non-compliance with Local Rule 56. 1, the court chooses to ignore and not consider the additional facts that a litigant has proposed”); Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir.2004) (“a district court is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1”). Plaintiffs next argue that this Court should not consider various statements addressing training in or a history of practice of civil disobedience on the part of the Plaintiffs or organizations involved in the demonstration. To the extent that any one of the Officers knew or was aware of the Plaintiffs’ prior practice of civil disruption or violence and it was taken into account when determining a course of action on the night of the march it is relevant and is considered by the Court. Plaintiffs move to strike Defendant Officers’ Exhibit 23, a flyer entitled “Chez Daley’s Direct Action Against the War,” arguing that Defendants cannot attribute the production of the leaflet to any Plaintiff or Class Member. Defendant Officers put forth, however, factual statements establishing that the leaflet was distributed both at meetings of organizations involved in the protest and at the rally in the Plaza. As such, the Court will consider the flyer as evidence of the tenor of the demonstration, which is relevant to the Court’s consideration of the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. Plaintiffs move to strike Defendant Officers Exhibit 38, a transcript of Chicago Police Department radio transmissions made during the protest, arguing that the transcript does not adequately identify the speakers and that the communications made therein were not under oath. Defendant Officers provided a list of radio identification codes that allows identification of the speakers on the transcript and note that this list, along with the actual recordings, were produced to Plaintiffs. In addition, Defendants submit Commander Griffin’s affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the recordings and the transcript. The Court finds that the Officers’ submission provides adequate authentication of the transcript and thus denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike. Lastly, Plaintiffs move to strike an account of the protest distributed on Chicago Indymedia Webcast News. The parties agree that no author of the posting has been identified. The Motion to Strike is granted as to this posting because the unidentified individual’s account of the march is hearsay and irrelevant. STATEMENT OF FACTS Chicago’s Ordinances Regulating Public Demonstrations Chicago Municipal Code § 10-8-330 requires demonstrators to obtain a permit if they wish to march in the street. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 7. Chief Maurer assumes that a public demonstration will result in a march. Id. at ¶ 18. On occasion, Chicago Police Department command personnel have allowed demonstrators to march in the street without a permit. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 16-17. In the past, when the Chicago Police Department has permitted marchers to march without a permit, they have used the “standard” route of Dearborn Street. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 31. According to Chief Cline, a person who marches where he is ordered to do so by police is not committing a crime. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 21. Regardless, both permitted and non-permitted marches cause inconvenience and obstruct traffic. Id. at ¶ 20. The City, for example, seeks to hold Plaintiffs liable for: 1) failure to obtain a permit to march in violation of Section 10 — 8—330(b) of the municipal code; 2) committing disorderly conduct by acting in an unreasonable manner such as to alarm or disturb another and promote a breach of the peace or as to provoke or aid in making a breach of the peace; 3) hindering or disrupting traffic on the streets of downtown Chicago in violation of Section 9-80-180 of the municipal code; 4) committing state public nuisance violations by obstructing or encroaching on public highways, private ways, streets and alleys in violation of 720 ILCS 5/47-5(5); 5) committing reckless conduct by obstructing public streets and highways in a reckless manner and by endangering the bodily safety of motorists and pedestrians in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12 — 5(a); 7) crossing roadways at points other than those within marked crosswalks in violation of Section 9-60-050 of the municipal code; 7) failing to yield to vehicles in roadways when crossing outside of the marked crosswalks in violation of Section 9-60-050(a) of the Municipal Code; and 8) obstructing the passage of vehicles crossing the Chicago River on Lake Shore Drive in violation of Municipal Ordinance 10-40-55. City Resp. 56.1 at ¶ 2. The Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants admit that no person obtained a permit to assemble or to march on March 20, 2003, and likewise, no person obtained a permit to authorize closure of Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. Preparation for the Demonstration The Chicago Coalition Against War and Racism (“CCAWR”) planned the demonstration against the war in Iraq that took place in Chicago on March 20, 2003. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 3. CCAWR planned the demonstration several months in advance and wanted it to begin in the Federal Plaza (“Plaza”) the day following the start of U.S. bombing in Iraq. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. The organizers discussed obtaining a permit and Organizer Romero believed that Organizer Andy Thayer (“Thayer”) looked into getting a permit but could not get one because they did not know the specific date for which they would need the permit. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Prior to the march, CCAWR held planning meetings during which protesters Beckstrom and Nicotera provided civil disobedience training. Id. at ¶ 19, 21. An undercover Chicago Police Department officer present at these meetings heard some organizers discussing a plan to be disruptive on Michigan Avenue and for groups to break off from the main group in order to divert police. Id. at ¶ 11. In addition, he heard CCAWR members discuss various property crimes, obstructive conduct and outrageous conduct such as breaking windows. Id. at ¶ 23. A flyer entitled Welcome to Chez Daley’s Direct Action Against the War was distributed at a coalition meeting prior to the march and to marchers on the Federal Plaza on the day of the march. Id. at 17. The flyer targeted Lake Shore Drive, Michigan Avenue, Chicago Avenue, Oak Street and several businesses and foreign consulates on Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶ 17. In addition, it encouraged “screwing up traffic” and “turning off their profit spigots.” Id. at 33. The Chicago Police Department was aware of the flyer prior to the demonstration. Id. at ¶ 32. In addition, a leaflet advertising the demonstration and encouraging civil disobedience was distributed to some members of the demonstration. Id. at ¶ 20. Chicago Police Department Command Personnel planned and were prepared for the march on the day after the United States began to bomb Iraq, which turned out to be March 20, 2003. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 23-24. They anticipated that there would be in excess of 5000 demonstrators. Id. at ¶ 24. Command Personnel did not discuss whether the group had a permit to march or whether they should order them to disperse from the Federal Plaza because they did not have a permit to gather. Id. at ¶ 28. Then-Superintendent Hillard directed the police planning for the demonstration. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 29. Commander Radke, the Deputy Chief of Special Functions at the time, met with command staff to determine the number of officers needed to respond to potential problems. Id. at ¶ 30. According to Commander Radke and Lieutenant Neil Sullivan’s plan, First District Police were assigned to the Plaza, while Gang and Tactical units were on standby. Id. at ¶ 31-32. The Chicago Police Department was prepared for the possibility of multiple arrests. Id. at ¶ 34. The Demonstration Begins in the Federal Plaza The Federal Plaza filled with somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 demonstrators by 5 p.m. on March 20, 2003. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 26-27. Superintendent Hillard warned the demonstrators before the rally that they would be prosecuted for any property damage. Id. at ¶ 31. At the Plaza, the protest leaders used a public address system to address the crowd, but they did not announce a march route. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 35. Although Deputy Chief Byrne knew that the organizers had not obtained a permit, he was prepared to facilitate a march. Id. at ¶ 37. The demonstrators and police did not discuss the lack of a permit or an order to disperse at this time. PL 56.1 at ¶ 28. As the rally continued, Commander Risley spoke with Thayer, a march leader, and others about a potential march route, but they did not provide him with details. Off. 56.1 at ¶¶ 36, 38. As a result, Commander Risley decided to shut down traffic. Id. at ¶ 40. Deputy Chief Byrne similarly attempted to clear squad cars from State Street so that a march could proceed. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 30. Command Personnel believed that the organizers had planned a march route in advance and were attempting to evade police. Thayer knew he wanted to march on Lake Shore Drive but not how he wanted to get there. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 43 He stated that “our goal all along was to take Lake Shore Drive.” Id. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Deputy Chief Byrne told Commander Griffin to take his officers to the Leo Burnett Building, located at Dearborn Street and Wacker Drive, because “it looked like this group was going to march down Dearborn.” Id. at ¶ 41. Past demonstrations had marched north on Dearborn to Wacker and then west on Wacker. Id. Before the marchers stepped off the Plaza, however, Thayer told Commander Risley that they wanted to go east on Adams. Id. at ¶ 42; Pl. 56.1 at ¶29. As such, Lieutenant Oliver positioned a mounted unit north of Adams on Dearborn to prevent the marchers from going north. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 42. Commander Risley ordered that traffic be stopped at Adams so that marchers could go east. Id. at ¶ 45. Chicago Police Department officers did not order the marchers to leave the area nor did they prevent them from leaving the Plaza. Pl. 56.1 at ¶¶ 29, 31-33. The March Leaves the Plaza The marchers proceeded from the Federal Plaza in two groups — one proceeding east on Jackson and the other east on Adams. Id. at ¶ 34. Assistant Deputy Superintendent Huberman heard radio communications reflecting surprise that the marchers had left the Plaza in two groups. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 46. Thayer later boasted that “The police were caught flatfooted” by the two groups of marchers. Id. at ¶ 47. Throughout the march, the organizers communicated with each other by radio. Id. at ¶ 47. Lieutenant Oliver set up a mounted unit to block marchers from proceeding east on Adams. Id. at ¶52. As a result, the marchers then turned north on State Street, and Lieutenant Oliver positioned his unit at Monroe and State in order to stop their progress north. Id. at ¶ 52; PI. 56.1 at ¶ 40. The marchers stopped at State and Monroe became unruly and began screaming, hitting windows with sticks and chanting “Lake Shore Drive!” Off. 56.1 at ¶ 55. The horses in the line became jittery and two were eventually removed from duty due to the actions of the surging protesters. Id. As a large crowd built at State and Monroe, Commander Radke gestured for Lieutenant Oliver’s mounted unit to move aside. Id. at ¶ 54-55; PI. 56.1 at ¶ 41. Eventually, the portion of the marchers proceeding on Jackson met with a police line and turned north on Michigan until they met up with the Adams Street demonstrators. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 49. Chicago Police Department officers followed alongside the marchers, walked in front of the crowd and monitored the march. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 35. They proceeded in a single-file line on the side of the march as it proceeded through the streets in order to prevent marchers from walking on the sidewalk. Id. at ¶ 37. The police directed traffic and helped the demonstrators move in an orderly fashion. Id. at ¶¶ 230-31. The March Enters Lake Shore Drive Commander Risley eventually allowed the marchers to proceed northbound onto Lake Shore Drive and therefore made arrangements to stop traffic on Lake Shore Drive. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 57. He specifically directed a number of marchers to march onto Lake Shore Drive. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 42-43. Similarly, Commander Griffin told an unknown individual on Lake Shore Drive who identified himself as the demonstrators’ leader that the demonstrators should be told that they could march on Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶ 52. Command Personnel stood at the intersection of Monroe and Lake Shore Drive as the demonstrators passed. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48. The police eventually closed northbound Lake Shore Drive entirely. Id. at ¶ 54. As the march proceeded north, southbound traffic on Lake Shore Drive was crawling while northbound traffic was completely stopped. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 64. Commander Dougherty and counsel Rowan directed and rerouted traffic on lower Wacker Drive due to safety concerns arising from the protestors’ presence on Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶ 67. While on Lake Shore Drive, some protestors stood on the fronts or backs of cars, banged on cars and yelled at occupants. Id. at ¶ 70. Other protestors did not engage in disruptive conduct. Id. at ¶ 61. Many protestors crossed the cement median to enter the Southbound lanes. Id. at ¶ 63. The protestors that crossed onto southbound Lake Shore Drive pounded on cars, yelled and frightened a motorist and engaged in disruptive behavior including banging on doors and windows of cars and breaking off antennae. Id. at ¶ 65-66. Twenty or thirty protestors shook or jumped on cars and at least one verbal confrontation occurred between a protester and a motorist. Id. at ¶¶ 67-69. Commander Griffin periodically slowed down the demonstration as it proceeded north on Lake Shore Drive in order to keep the marchers together. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 51. He instructed Lieutenant Ryan to move the demonstrators who began marching in the southbound lanes back to the northbound lanes. Some complied with Lieutenant Ryan’s request while others refused and ran around the police. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 72. The police stopped the crowd and formed a skirmish line around Grand Avenue, where it would be difficult for protesters to cross into the southbound Lanes. Id. at 72-73. Some protestors attempted to push past the officers; some screamed and threw bottles and rocks at police. Id. Commander Griffin asked an unidentified individual who identified himself as a march leader to help calm the crowd. Id. at ¶ 74. The March Approaches Oak Street As the march proceeded north on Lake Shore Drive, Commander Griffin had a conversation with a self-identified (but unidentified) march leader wherein the leader said that he wanted to exit Lake Shore Drive at North Avenue and that he would help get all the protestors to North Avenue. Protestors Thayer and Beckstom stated that they did not have such a conversation. Id. at ¶¶ 76-79. As the crowd approached Oak Street, the self-identified leader who had spoken with Commander Griffin disappeared back into the crowd. Commander Griffin got the impression that something was wrong and radioed for support at Oak and Michigan. Id. at ¶ 80. Thayer told the people in front of the march that they could exit Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street and told the other organizers via two-way radio to exit Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street. Id. at ¶¶ 81-82. Leaders then told their followers: “Let’s go down Michigan Avenue.” Id. The marchers did not tell police that they would turn onto Oak Street. Id. at ¶ 82. Police tried to stop the marchers by instructing them to go to North Avenue. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 84. Some complied; most did not. Id. Police officers ran to the intersection of Oak and Michigan and formed a skirmish line. Id. at ¶¶ 85-86. Some of the protestors were “very confrontational” with the skirmish line and threatened to “storm” Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 87-88. Protestors jumped up and down on a squad car, tried to set it on fire and wrote on its windows with markers. Id. at ¶ 90. Deputy Chief Byrne told marcher Romero to disperse and told him that the police would not let the protestors onto Michigan. Id. at ¶ 91. Some protestors believed that the police had guided them onto Oak. Vodak observed a line of police officers blocking progress on Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street as the marchers turned down Oak Street. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 272. Hudosh saw police direct marchers west on Oak. Id. at ¶ 303. Ambielli, similarly, simply followed all the marchers turning onto Oak from Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶ 318. Thompson could not see the front of the march as it exited at Oak and thus just followed the crowd. Id. at ¶ 366. Command Personnel met at Oak and Michigan and discussed where the marchers should be allowed to proceed from there. Id. at ¶ 59. They decided to speak to the leaders to see what the demonstrators wanted. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 92. Commanders Griffin and Risley met with Thayer and others, and Thayer told the them that the protesters wanted to march down Michigan. Id. Risley told Thayer that they could not march down Michigan Avenue, but rather they needed to go back down Lake Shore Drive, disperse or be arrested. Id. at ¶¶ 93, 96. Thayer then yelled to the crowd to “turn around and go that way. They won’t let us go down Michigan.” Id. at ¶ 98. In addition, Chief Maurer heard organizers announce to “go back the way you came” through voice amplification devices and thought the message was passed backwards through the crowd. Id. Protesters Garcia and Galvin heard others in the crowd saying to go back on Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶ 100. Protester Newberger heard other protesters announcing to go back the way they came on bullhorns. Id. at ¶¶ 99, 101. Eventually Protester Wolf made an announcement on a PA system to go back down Inner Lake Shore Drive. Id. Pineda heard an announcement that if he remained at Oak and Michigan he would be arrested. Id. at ¶ 103. Although Plaintiffs concede that Command Personnel’s decision that they should return to the Plaza the way they came was communicated, they claim it was communicated in a conversational tone to five or six individuals and that any directions were not heard by the entire crowd. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 63, 65. One protester heard a “rumor through the crowd” that the police wanted them to go back to the Federal Plaza via Inner Lake Shore Drive. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 100. In addition, the demonstrators were not told a specific route to take to leave the area. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 64. Many of the Plaintiffs did not hear any directions and simply followed the crowd when it turned to go south on Inner Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 163 198-99, 235, 245, 274-76, 304, 319-20, 356-57, 368. The March Returns Down Inner Lake Shore Drive Rather than return down Inner Lake Shore Drive, some of the protesters left through the nearby underground pedestrian tunnel. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 104. Some people were allowed to leave in very small groups down Michigan Avenue. Id. The rest of the marchers headed east down Inner Lake Shore Drive where Chief Cline told mounted officers to flank the crowd. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 68. As the march proceeded south on Inner Lake Shore Drive, Commander Griffin asked the mounted unit to prevent marchers from going west on the side streets off of the Inner Drive such as Walton, Pearson, Delaware and Chestnut. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 106; PI. 56.1 at ¶ 71. Commander Dugan’s unit followed the march down Inner Lake Shore Drive at a considerable distance. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 117. He was told they had agreed to go down Inner Lake Shore Drive and was “following up” to make sure they did so. Id. Some groups of protesters attempted to turn west from Inner Lake Shore Drive in order to proceed westbound on those streets. See, e.g., Id. at ¶ 106, 111, 113. Commander Griffin led officers east on Walton Street to stop at least one such group of about 50 males in their late teens to early twenties and returned to Inner Lake Shore Drive to find a group of about 150 that he also thought was attempting to “break out.” Id. at ¶ 107. Another group tried to run down Delaware, and in response, Commander Griffin again told the marchers that they could not go to Michigan Avenue but rather had to march down Lake Shore Drive or be arrested. Id. at ¶110. The March Reaches Chicago Avenue The Defendant Officers attempted to block protesters at each successive side street when the march got ahead of them and broke westbound on Chicago Avenue toward Michigan Avenue. See Id. at ¶ 124. Commander Griffin yelled at the marchers not to go that way and eventually ran toward Michigan Avenue. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 72. Lieutenant Ryan and other officers tried to stop the marchers on Chicago Avenue but were ignored. Off. 56.1 at ¶¶ 126-127. While some protestors broke from the main group and turned west down Chicago Avenue, many continued to proceed down Inner Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 118-119. One protestor estimates that while there were eight to ten thousand protesters at Oak Street and Michigan Avenue, there were only about one to two thousand at Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶ 12 1. Some demonstrators thought that the police had led them onto Chicago Avenue and some just followed the crowd without knowledge of where the police directed them. Bergstrand simply followed the crowd as did Pennyeuff. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 236, 337. Vodak saw police on horses leading the crowd down Chicago Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 277-78. Gruber also thought the police were directing the crowd westbound on Chicago Avenue because of the position of the horses at the intersection of Chicago and Lake Shore Drive. Id. at ¶¶ 287, 289. Pineda thought police were blocking Lake Shore Drive and directing people onto Chicago Avenue. Id. at ¶ 368. Thomson said that the police did not indicate to demonstrators what they should or should not be doing. Id. at ¶ 371. Johnson saw mounted police at the intersection with Chicago Avenue who looked like they were guiding the march onto Chicago; so Johnson proceeded onto Chicago. Id. at ¶¶ 201-02. The Chicago Police Department does not allow large marches on Michigan Avenue from the Chicago River to Oak Street because of the disruption that results. Id at ¶ 97. Chief Cline ordered officers to form a line at Chicago and Michigan to prevent marchers from going West of Chicago or north or south on Michigan. Id. at ¶ 75. Police set up a skirmish line across Chicago Avenue that stopped the marchers east of Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 76-78. Commander Griffin ordered Commander Williams, an off-duty officer who came to the scene with others to help, to also block the east end of the crowd to prevent anyone from leaving to the east; so he set up a line to the East. Id. at ¶¶ 78-79; Off. 56.1 at ¶ 150. The Police Stop the Marchers at Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue Commander Williams began to allow individual people to leave the area ten or fifteen minutes after establishing his line. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 151. Many protesters refused to go. A young woman asked Chief Maurer why she could not leave and he told her that she could. Id. at ¶ 153. In response, she conferred with someone with a bullhorn and then sat down in the street. Id. Similarly, a woman with a dog asked counsel Epach if she could go home and feed her dog, and Chief Cline replied “come with me.” Id. at ¶ 154. In response, she conferred with an organizer and told Chief Cline that she could not leave. Id. A man in his sixties asked counsel Rowan if he could leave and when she said yes, he responded “forget it.” Id. at ¶ 186. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, allege that nobody was allowed to leave the bounded area for at least an hour. PL 56.1 at ¶¶ 79-82. Bergstrand could not maneuver anywhere on Chicago Avenue and therefore could not get out. Id. at ¶ 238. Police told Donnell to leave at the corner of a building to the north, but when he proceeded there he was not allowed to go through the police line. Id. at ¶¶ 264-67. Gruber asked four or five police officers where she could leave and was finally told that she could not. Id. at ¶¶ 291-92. According to Hudosh, police on the west side of the crowd told people they could leave by walking east, and police on the east side of the crowd told people they could leave by walking west. Id. at ¶ 305. Hudosh finally asked police in the front of the march if he could leave, and they said no. Id. at ¶ 306. Ambielli also asked police officers whether she could leave three separate times and was told that she could not because the they had been told not to let anyone go. Id. at ¶¶ 325-27. Pineda also could not leave simply because there were so many people crowding the area. Id. at ¶ 352. Robin attempted to walk away from the police line on Michigan in order to leave but saw that a police line had also been formed behind him and therefore thought he was trapped. Id. at ¶ 360. Some of the protesters at Chicago and Michigan were banging on three or four cars. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 133. Lieutenant Ryan assisted officers struggling with a protester who was kicking while others were trying to pull him into the crowd. Id. at ¶ 135. Another protester hit Lieutenant Ryan with a skateboard and ran away. Id. Assistant Deputy Superintendent Huber-man characterized the behavior on Chicago Avenue as “mob action.” Id. at ¶ 137. Some protestors were spitting and kicking what “appeared to be horse crap” at officers and others were climbing on a CTA bus and banging on cars. Id. at ¶ 138. However, after the Chicago Police Department lines were set up, Chief Cline walked back past the crowd on the sidewalk and was not harassed nor did he see any property damage. PI. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 17. Lt. Bryan Martin of the Chicago Fire Department saw some cars and a bus stopped in front of the firehouse blocking access to the fire station. Id. at ¶ 191. Chicago Police Department members including Chiefs Cline and Maurer, Commanders Griffin and Risley and Counsel Rowan were present at Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue shortly after the marchers arrived. PI. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 24. They conferred and decided to give the marchers the options of dispersing, going back to Lake Shore Drive, or being arrested. Id. Chief Byrne discussed with Chiefs Cline and Maurer what they needed in order to arrest individuals and together they decided to begin arrests. Id. at ¶ 12. Chiefs Byrne, Cline and Maurer and Commanders Griffin and Risley gave orders to arrest. Id. at ¶ 13. Commander Griffin decided to start making arrests around 8:35 p.m. based upon the communications with the demonstrators at Oak and Michigan that they would not be allowed on Michigan. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 94. He did not instruct officers to provide individuals an opportunity to leave before making arrests. Id. Chief Maurer ordered the arrests on the west end of the crowd. Id. at ¶ 96. Superintendent Hillard was advised about and agreed with the decision to make arrests. Deputy Chief Chiczewski instructed Commander Christian regarding the arrests on the eastern end of the demonstration. PI. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 15. After the arrests were underway, Chiefs Cline and Maurer and counsels Rowan and Epach began discussions of what charges to bring against the arrestees. Id. at ¶ 18. Prior to effectuating the arrests, Chief Cline never witnessed or was aware of orders to disperse given at the bounded area. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 85. Commander Williams never heard, nor did he and his officers issue, any order to disperse. Id. at ¶ 86. Commander Christian was not told to give orders to disperse. Id. at ¶ 87. Commander Dugan also did not hear any orders to disperse and did not observe officers telling people they had to leave. Id. at ¶88. Sergeant Maraffino and his team never told anyone to disperse and were directed to arrest and not allow people to leave. Id. at ¶ 89. Officer Bilyj also did not hear an order telling the crowd to disperse before he was directed to go into the crowd and bring out females for arrest. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 90. He did not allow any of the individuals he arrested an opportunity to leave the area prior to arresting them. Id. at ¶ 91. Officer Rodriguez was not told why the crowd was to be arrested and he did not give individuals an opportunity to leave before being arrested. Id. at ¶ 92. Plaintiffs put forth sworn affidavits of 250 class members stating that they were prevented from leaving the bounded area and that they were not given orders to disperse nor an opportunity to leave. PI. Resp. Off. at ¶ 1. The named Class Plaintiffs testified similarly. Although Castillo was told to leave, he was arrested as he attempted to do so. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 255-56. In addition, he did not hear police communicating with the crowd. Id. at ¶ 254. Vodak did not receive an order to disperse. Id. at ¶ 283. Gruber testified that no police officer ever approached her and told her she would be arrested if she did not leave the area. Id. at ¶ 293. Hudosh did not hear an order to disperse at any point in the night. Id. at ¶ 307. In fact, he testified that police told him that the march would be allowed to continue in ten to fifteen minutes. Id. at ¶ 308. Ambielli heard no announcements from the police. Id. at ¶ 328. Pennycuff was told to leave, but was arrested as soon as he attempted to do so. Id. at ¶¶ 339-40. Pineda did not receive any communications from police and was not ordered to disperse. Id. at ¶ 353. Robin testified that the police did not order people to disperse before arresting them. Id. at ¶ 360. Thomson similarly did not receive any instructions from police before he was arrested. Id. at ¶¶ 372-73. Multiple officers gave orders to disperse or heard orders to disperse given individually prior to arrest, yelled, or broadcasted over amplification devices. Lieutenant Riccio’s group asked people if they wanted to leave at the point of potential arrest. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 198. Deputy Chief Byrne repeatedly shouted to those at the police line to disperse and protesters responded by sitting down and locking arms. Id. at ¶ 142. Chief Maurer saw police “pass the word” that if the protesters did not go back the way they came, they would be arrested. Id. at ¶ 152. Pursuant to an order from Chief Maurer, Deputy Superintendent Huberman directed officers to give protestors the opportunity to disperse and place them into custody if they refused. Id. at ¶ 155. He saw officers enter the crowd and do so, and he saw a few people resist arrest. Id. Officer Mendoza heard orders to disperse and heard a protester respond over a bullhorn that the police could not make them leave. Id. at ¶ 166. Commander Radke announced orders to disperse and saw protesters sit in the street and lock arms. Id. at ¶ 170. He also heard dispersal orders announced from a squadrol behind the western skirmish line, although he was unsure of the extent to which all members of the demonstration could hear such an order. Id. at ¶ 171. Deputy Chief Byrne saw several officers give dispersal orders. He ordered the arrests of those in the middle of Chicago Avenue and people who wanted to leave were allowed to proceed east. Id. at ¶ 172. See also, Id. at ¶¶234, 236, 173, 175, 174, 179-80, 219-220, 222-224, 226-28. Police arrested people on both the streets and the sidewalk. PI. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 29. After about five hundred individuals were arrested, Chiefs Cline and Maurer decided to stop the arrests if people agreed to leave in small groups. Id. at ¶ 19; Off. 56.1 at ¶ 200. Once the arrests stopped, the command staff went into the crowd and gave orders to disperse. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 204. Counsel Epach and Chief Cline went into the crowd to aid in an orderly dispersal. Id. at ¶ 201. Chief Cline did not know of any arrests that occurred after this point. Id. As the remaining marchers left, Lieutenant Ryan’s unit monitored larger groups and he directed sergeants to make arrests if those groups reformed rather than dispersed. Id. at ¶ 204. Commander Williams allowed groups as large as eight or nine to leave together. Id. at ¶205. General Counsel Rowan sent an officer to Walgreens to buy markers with which officers could write the arresting officer’s star number on arrestees’ arms. Id. at ¶ 206. After Commander Christian was advised to stop making arrests, the officers at the east end of the area created a chute through which individuals could leave. Police informed the protestors that they could leave if they did so peacefully. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 102. Sergeant Boone supervised the chute. Id. Police took the marchers’ signs from them as they left through the chute. Id. at ¶¶ 103-04. Protesters were let through the chute in a staggered manner; that is, the flow was intermittently stopped, and at the end of the night, the remaining people were released on the street. Id. at ¶¶ 108-09. The arrestees were transported to various police districts. City Resp. 56.1 at ¶ 9. All the female arrestees were transported to the Twenty-Fifth District in Area 5. Id. The police department incurred overtime costs in order to complete the processing of the arrestees. Id. at ¶ 10. Male arrestees were sent to the Fifth District for processing, which was overseen by John Roberts, and officers from the detective division came to assist in processing. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Such processing of arrestees included preparing arrest and other supporting documents, health screening, searching, photographing, fingerprinting and conducting a criminal history of arrestees. Id. at ¶ 13. Problems with the Records of Arrests Chief Cline discussed potential charges with Chief Maurer, and counsels Rowan and Epach. PI. Resp. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 18. Rowan and Epach conferred with each other and Epach conferred with Assistant State’s Attorney Darren O’Brien and ASA Patrick McGuire and Corporation Counsel Dorothy Capers to determine the most appropriate charge for the arrestees. Off. 56.1 at ¶207. They discussed the elements of potential charges and the appropriateness of potential sanctions. Id. They decided that the appropriate charge was reckless conduct. Id. at 208. Three hundred thirteen individuals were arrested and all were charged with reckless conduct. PI. 56.1 at 119. Two hundred and twenty-four had arrest reports completed on them but were released without charges because their arresting officers could not be identified. Id. at ¶ 117. Two hundred and forty seven arrest reports for arrested males contained an identical narrative: “The above subject was arrested for Reckless Conduct in that he endangered the bodily safety of citizens by acting in such a reckless manner so as to disrupt vehicular traffic and pedestrian traffic. The defendant acted with total disregard for the personal safety of motorists and pedestrians.” Id. at ¶ 121. Seventy-one other arrest reports for males contained the same statement without the words “bodily” or “pedestrian traffic.” Id. at ¶ 123. One hundred sixty-eight arrest reports for females also contained an identical narrative: “The subject along with 1000’s of persons endangered the safety of others in that they blocked access to a fire station, positioned themselves in front of the water pumping station and blocked access to the emergency entrance of Northwestern Hospital and refused to leave after being told to do so by police.” Id. There is no emergency entrance to Northwestern Hospital located on Chicago Avenue between Lake Shore Drive and Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶ 124. In addition, ten arrest reports for females taken into custody state “above subject assembled with 100’s of persons to do unlawful acts and refused to disperse when ordered to do so,” and six state “assembled with numerous other persons to do an unlawful act by refusing to disperse upon public order.” Id. at ¶¶ 125-26. Rowan testified that she thought the arrest narratives adequately described each protester’s conduct. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 208. The Chicago Police Department’s General Order for Mass Arrest Procedures states that an arresting officer must complete a multiple arrest card for each arrestee. Officers failed to complete such cards for individuals arrested at Chicago and Michigan. PI. 56.1 at ¶¶ 128-29. No Chicago Police Department members have been identified that can specifically testify to the conduct of any of the Class Plaintiffs or the Individual Plaintiffs other than the fact that they were present at the intersection of Chicago Avenue and Michigan Avenue. Id. at ¶¶ 111-114. Chicago Police Department witnesses claim to have particular knowledge of the behavior of approximately 59 of the 313 individuals arrested and charged. Id. at ¶ 120. Officer Black is listed as the arresting officer on twenty-five reports, but he does not remember arresting more than five people, nor does he remember any specific information as to those he arrested. Id. at ¶ 131. He made arrests solely on information provided to him by a supervisor. Id. at ¶¶ 132-33. Officer Laurence Coleman’s name appears on seven arrest reports although he did not observe any of the arrestees do anything illegal-when he first saw them they were handcuffed on Chicago avenue. Id. at ¶ 134. Names of officers who did not arrest anyone, were not at Chicago and Michigan or were even off-duty or retired also appear on arrest reports. Id. at ¶¶ 135-139, 145-146. Officer FigeroaMitehell’s name appears on sixteen arrest reports when she was at Area Five police headquarters the evening of the march and not at Chicago and Michigan. Id. at ¶ 135. Officer Kamal Judeh’s name appears on Class Plaintiff Hudosh’s arrest report, but Judeh was not on duty when he was arrested. Id. at ¶ 136. Assistant Deputy Superintendent McNulty’s name appeared on one hundred seventy-five arrest reports, although he was only on the scene for three to five minutes, did not recall witnessing any arrests, and did not observe what individual arrestees did prior to being arrested. Id. at ¶¶ 142, 144. McNulty authorized his name to be put on reports for individuals whose arresting officers could not be identified. Id. at ¶ 143. Counsel Epach thought that the original arrests were made “in haste” and when he learned that Chicago Police Department was unable to identify many arresting officers, he advised Chief Cline to let the relevant arrestees go. Off. 56.1 at ¶ 209. In addition, when he learned that some arresting officers signed the names of other uninvolved officers on arrest reports, he advised assistant state’s attorney McGuire to throw those cases out. Id. at 1211. Investigation After the March The Plaintiffs assert that the march was on the whole peaceful. PI. 56.1 at ¶ 153. Superintendent Hillard assigned Detective Tony Jin to interview all the supervisors who were on the scene. Jin prepared a report detailing the results of his investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 148-49. He identified damage to two cars- — one a police department vehicle and one belonging to a civilian. No one was arrested or identified as responsible for the damage. Id. at ¶¶ 150-51. Jin did not report property damage to any federal building or adjoining property. Id. at ¶ 152. General Chicago Police Department Training Programs The Chicago Police Department is certified by the State of Illinois to train police officers since 1985. City 56.1 at ¶ 12. In order to be certified, the Department is required by statute to comply with rules and minimum standards adopted by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board which has reviewed the Department’s curriculum and approved it since 1985. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. The Department’s Education and Training Division trained on average over 500 officers per year in the three years before Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit. Id. at ¶ 11. In 2003, the State required that each police recruit complete a curriculum of 400 hours of training, which the Chicago Police Department exceeded by giving its recruits over 1,000 hours of training. Id. at ¶ 15. Specifically, the Chicago Police Department required forty-one hours of physical skills and personal fitness, sixty-three hours of control and arrest tactics, whereas the state required only twenty-four and twenty hours, respectively. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. Recruits were given periodic exams as well as a fifteen question exam regarding the use of force on which each recruit must obtain a perfect score. Recruits were also given a comprehensive final exam at the end of their training. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. Recruits were required to pass the final exam and the operations simulation test in order to become police officers. Id. Officers already certified and assigned to units also received training known as “In-Service Training.” Id. at ¶ 24. Part of this training was “Roll Call Training,” which officers were required to attend on a daily duty basis. Id. at ¶¶ 23-25. Roll Call Training consisted mainly of lectures and instructional videos viewed via computer. Id. at ¶ 26. Chicago Police Department written directives, such as General Orders and Special Orders, were also distributed during Roll Call Training. Id. at ¶ 29. In 2003, Chicago Police Department officers were governed by Chicago Police Department’s Rules and Regulations, General Orders, Special Orders and other written directives, and it was Chicago Police Department’s practice to enforce these directives. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. All members of the Department were required to have knowledge of all Department and unit written directives that apply to their positions at all times relevant to the Complaint. Id. at ¶ 30. Officers could also access the written directives and streaming videos at any police district. City Id. at ¶ 3 1. Any proven violation of the directives would result in discipline. Id. at ¶ 45. Training Specific to Probable Cause and Mass Arrest The Department also trained its officers specifically with regard to assessing probable cause and dealing with mass arrest situations. Department recruits and officers received training that specifically dealt with issues of probable cause for arrest, First Amendment rights and mass arrest issues. Recruit training included instruction on legal requirements for detaining and arresting individuals for violations of state and local laws. Id. at ¶ 16. The recruits were given fourteen hours of training related to the United States Constitution and laws dealing with arrest, search and seizure. Id. at ¶ 33. The Department provided additional in-service training to over two thousand Tactical, Gang and other officers in specialized units, including those who typically would be called to citizen demonstrations, regarding crowd control and the rights of citizens under the First Amendment. City 56.1 at ¶ 37. These training sessions took place at the National Guard Armory from August through October and lasted one day. Id. at ¶ 38. They included both classroom instruction and simulated protests. Id. at ¶ 39. The purpose of these sessions was to teach effective crowd control while ensuring the right of citizens to assemble peaceably. Id. at ¶ 40. Police recruits are not specifically trained to verbally communicate with a crowd, and Lieutenant Libert, the commanding officer in charge of recruit training programs between March of 2001 and August of 2005, does not remember any training regarding how to disperse a crowd. PI. Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 38. In addition, directives governing the Chicago Police Department addressed these issues. General Order 02-10, Chicago Police Department’s policy relating to citizens engaged in First Amendment Conduct, states that members “may not investigate, prosecute, disrupt, interfere with, harass, or discriminate against any person engaged in First Amendment Conduct for the purpose of punishing, retaliating, or preventing the person from exercising his or her First Amendment rights.” City 56.1 at ¶ 36. This order was distributed to all Chicago Police Officers in January of 2003. General Order 02-11 dictates Chicago Police Department’s mass arrest policy. Id. at ¶ 64. It provides a blueprint for dealing with mass arrest situations and requires that officers complete a multiple arrest card for each arrestee and mark the mass arrest card number on each arrestee’s forearm so that each arrestee can be properly identified. Id. Special Order 97-2 dictates Chicago Police Department’s policy for drafting and signing of criminal complaints, and requires that all complaints be sworn and verified by a member other than the complainant. Id. at ¶ 64. Also, the Chief of Patrol may designate a member to sign complaints, and that member may then sign complaints for all arrestees for which he or she has personal knowledge of the circumstances substantiating probable cause for arrest. Id. In addition, the City is governed by a consent decree entered in Alliance to End Repression et al v. City of Chicago and ACLU v. City of Chicago that prohibits discrimination “against any person on the basis of their conduct protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 34. Superintendent Hillard testified that he was not aware of any general orders, rules or regulations regarding announcing prevailing law to a crowd of people and directing them to disperse. PI. Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 33. In addition, recruits are trained to follow superiors’ orders, and officers are obligated to arrest a person if they are ordered to do so by a superior. Id. at ¶¶ 36-37. It is Command Personnel’s responsibility to convey an order to disperse to a crowd. Id. at ¶ 39. No written policies exist addressing warnings and officers are not trained regarding the requirement to provide warnings to demonstrators that their conduct is illegal before making arrests. Id. at ¶ 40. Training Specific to Proper Completion of Arrest Reports Recruit training includes instruction on legal requirements for detaining and arresting individuals for violations of state and local laws as well as proper methods for preparing complete and accurate arrest reports. City 56.1 at ¶¶ 16-17. Recruits are trained to complete arrest reports and criminal complaints and specifically to identify probable cause justifying arrest and the meaning of signing a declaration under penalty of perjury. PI. Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 42. Such reports must be completed in order for a person to be arrested and for the completion of arrest procedures. Id. at ¶ 46. The narrative section of such a report must contain facts that substantiate probable cause for the arrest but need not identify where the facts came from nor whether the facts are based on the officer’s own observation. Id. at ¶ 44. A criminal complaint is a necessary charging document that initiates a criminal proceeding against an arrestee. Id. at 48. Lieutenant Libert, the commanding officer in charge of implementing recruit training programs from March 2001 to August 2005, testified that an officer could properly sign another officer’s name to a complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 43. Chicago Police Department officers are expressly forbidden to make false reports and are required to communicate accurate and factual accounts of occurrences of public interest. City 56.1 at ¶ 41. In addition, they have an affirmative duty to report acts of misconduct committed by other police officers. Id. at ¶ 42. No rule explicitly prohibits an officer from signing another officer’s name on an arrest report or criminal complaint. See, Id. at ¶¶43, 50, 64, The Chicago Police Department’s Command Structure on March 30, 2003 On March 20, 2003, Hillard was the Superintendent of Police-the highest ranking officer of the Chicago Police Department. PL Resp. City 56.1 at ¶ 1. Superintendent Hillard monitored the demonstration and related police operations from the command room at police headquarters continuously from the time it reached Lake Shore Drive and Chicago Avenue until it ended. Id. at ¶ 7. He was able to monitor the situation there using television screens, radio transmissions and telephone calls from command personnel. Id. Hillard did not consult the Mayor or the City Council before making his decisions regarding the protest. Id. at ¶ 17. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir.2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, the Court will “limit its analysis of the facts on summary judgment to evidence that is properly identified and supported in the parties’ [Local Rule 56.1] statement.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir.2000). Where a proposed statement of fact is supported by the record and not adequately rebutted, the court will accept that statement as true for purposes of summary judgment. An adequate rebuttal requires a citation to specific support in the record; an unsubstantiated denial is not adequate. See Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir.2001); Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir.1998) (“‘Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a particular matter[;] rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted.’ ”). DISCUSSION At issue are four separate motions for Summary Judgment: 1) Defendant Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims; 2) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment Claims; 3) Defendant City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior Claims; and 4) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on. the City’s Counterclaim. The Court will address each of these motions in turn. Defendant Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant Officers bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that: 1) they are not liable because they are protected by qualified immunity; 2) they did not violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment; 3) Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of a conspiracy to violate their rights; and 4) Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of their state law claims. Qualified Immunity Defendants first assert that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because qualified immunity protects their actions on the night of the march. In evaluating claims under § 1983, courts must determine whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether the official acting under color of state law is entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 821-22, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Qualified immunity operates to shield officials who perform discretionary functions “from liability for civil