Full opinion text
ORDER CHARLES A. PANNELL, Jr., District Judge. This matter is now before the court on the following motions: Barbara Fouch’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 447]; the City of Atlanta’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 448]; Ben De-Costa’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 450]; Adam L. Smith’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 451]; Carolyn Chavis’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 453]; Kyle Mastin’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 457]; Hubert Owens’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 459]; James Riley, Michael Riley, and John McNeany’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 463]; Clear Channel Airports of Georgia, Inc. and Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 464]; Clear Channel Airports of Georgia, Inc. and Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.’s motion in limine to exclude evidence and testimony of plaintiffs proffered expert witness John H. Landon [Doc. No. 496]; the joint motion to exclude testimony of Brett Katzman [Doc. No. 571]; the joint motion to strike the declaration of Steve Moody [Doc. No. 575]; and Barbara Fouch’s motion to strike the declaration of Steve Moody [Doc. No. 576]. In Section I, the court will outline the factual background of this case. In Section II, the court will address the motion to exclude the testimony of Brett Katzman [Doc. No. 571] and the motions to strike the declaration of Steve Moody [Doc. Nos. 575 and 576]. In Section III, the court will rule on the respective motions for summary judgment as to each count in Corey’s Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 444]. In doing so, the court will examine the evidence and set out in specificity the facts that are relevant to the particular defendants and the claims against them. Because Landon testifies as to the relevant market and harm to competition, the court will address the motion to exclude the testimony of Landon when it rules on the motions for summary judgment as to Corey’s antitrust claims. I. Factual Background This case arises from the City of Atlanta’s (“City”) Request for Proposal No. FC-7430-02 for the advertising concession at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (“2002 RFP”). Before addressing the 2002 RFP itself, the court will first discuss the historical background leading up to the 2002 RFP. A. Historical Background of the Airport Advertising Concession and the 2002 RFP In 1980, the City’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (“Airport”) opened. In that same year, James Riley (the owner of Transportation Media, Inc.) and Barbara Fouch partnered to form Transportation Media, Inc. of Georgia (“TMI of Georgia”) in order to pursue the contract for the Airport advertising concession. J. Riley owned a 70% interest in TMI of Georgia, and Fouch owned a 30% interest. TMI of Georgia was awarded a 15-year no-bid contract for the Airport advertising concession (“1980 Airport Advertising Contract”). Initially, TMI of Georgia operated the Airport advertising concession as a subcontractor of Dobbs-Paschal Midfield Corp. (“DPMC”). In 1993, the City terminated DPMC’s master concessionaire contract. At that time, the City Council authorized a two-year contract directly with TMI of Georgia for the Airport advertising concession based on the 1980 Airport Advertising Contract and at the rate of 50% of revenue received (“1993 Airport Advertising Contract”). In September 1995, the City Council authorized a two-year extension of the contract (“1995 Airport Advertising Contract”). During this extension, TMI of Georgia continued to pay the City rent at the rate of 50% of revenue received. The term of the 1995 Airport Advertising Contract expired in September 1997, but Clear Channel has continued to operate the Airport concession on a month-to-month basis at the 50% rental rate. On February 17, 1998, J. Riley signed a consulting agreement, in which TMI of Georgia agreed to pay Fouch an additional $144,000 per year in consulting fees and an additional $50,000 per year bonus for “each year extension of the present airport contract, to a maximum of $250,000 for a 5 year renewal extension, said bonus to be paid concurrent with signing of the extension by the parties thereto.” Ex. 13 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. That same year, Universal Outdoor Holdings acquired TMI of Georgia. Later that year, Clear Channel’s parent corporation acquired the stock of Universal Outdoor Holdings, TMI of Georgia became a subsidiary of Clear Channel, and its name was changed to “Clear Channel Airports of Georgia, Inc.” Clear Channel Airports of Georgia, Inc. does not have its own employees. Instead, the people who operate the advertising concession at the Airport on a day-to-day basis are employees of Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. Under the terms of Clear Channel’s response to the 2002 RFP, Fouch’s status would change from a 30% owner of Clear Channel Airports of Georgia, Inc. to a subcontractor of Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. with a right to 30% of the profits from Clear Channel’s operation of the Airport advertising concession. Between 1997 and 2002, after the term of the 1995 Airport Advertising Contract had expired, Clear Channel was in communication with the City regarding the status of its contract. For example, J. Riley testifies in his deposition, “There was an effort to get a contract continually.” Ex. 2 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at 162. J. Riley also states that “some people that were working for the company were in negotiations with the airport to get us a contract, open up an RFP” and that “anything is better than a 30-day contract.” Id. at 165. In addition, J. Riley testifies that Fouch “was being paid to be [at the Airport] and try to work out a plan where [Clear Channel] could have a bid.” Id. at 196. In 1997, while Angela Gittens was the General Manager of the Airport, a request for proposal for the Airport advertising concession was issued (“1997 RFP”), but the 1997 RFP was soon cancelled prior to the submission of any proposals. The 1997 RFP reduced the number of advertising display locations from approximately 300 to approximately 100. In 1998, Gittens was replaced by Ben DeCosta, who left his position with the Newark International Airport (“Newark Airport”). DeCosta had the responsibility of determining whether and when a new request for proposal for the Airport advertising concession would be issued by the City’s Department of Procurement. From 1998 until 2002, no new RFP for the Airport advertising concession was issued and Clear Channel continued to pay the City rent at the 50% rate. The City and De-Costa state that the release of the new RFP was delayed due to revisions of the 1997 RFP. Kyle Mastín, the Concession Manager of the Airport, states that, when he prepared Section III of the 2002 RFP, he used the materials from the 1997 RFP and did little other than update the number of authorized locations. B. Release of the 2002 RFP In 2002, the City released the 2002 RFP, which is a request in accordance with the City’s competitive sealed proposal method pursuant to the Procurement and Real Estate Code of the City, § 2-1189. Parts I and II of the 2002 RFP, which are entitled “General Information” and “Instructions”, were drafted by the City’s Department of Procurement under the supervision of Senior Contract Analyst Carolyn Chavis. Chavis began working for the Department of Procurement in 1994 as a contracting officer assigned to the Department of Aviation. In that capacity, she provided procurement services exclusively to the City’s Department of Aviation. She was the contracting officer for hundreds of procurements and was promoted to senior contracting officer in 2002. Chavis left her position in 2007. As the contracting officer assigned to the 2002 RFP, Chavis served as the contact person for the bid proponents. In this capacity, bid proponents would contact Chavis with any questions they had regarding the 2002 RFP. For any substantive questions, bid proponents were to submit the questions in writing, and Chavis would ensure that those questions were answered and attached to the 2002 RFP as an addendum. Questions relating to Part I or Part II of the 2002 RFP were to be answered by the Department of Procurement, while responses to Part III were the responsibility of the Department of Aviation. Part III of the 2002 RFP, which contains all of the technical provisions, was drafted by the Department of Aviation, specifically Kyle Mastín and Marlene Coleman. Mastín is the Concession Manager for the Airport and served in that capacity when the 2002 RFP was released. Section 3.4 of the 2002 RFP requires bid proponents to project their gross receipts for the first five years of the term of the contract and to commit to pay the City a monthly rental payment of not less than 60% of their gross receipts. Section 3.4 also includes Clear Channel’s annual revenue for the years 1996-2001, which were as follows: Year Revenue 1996 $5,524,980 1997 $4,925,822 1998 $5,106,848 1999 $6,257,820 2000 $9,448,465 2001 $7,113,930 Section 3.4 also provides for a Minimum Annual Guaranteed payment (“MAG”) to protect the City if the contractor fails to attain its projected gross receipts. The first year’s MAG is 85% of the bid proponent’s projected receipts for the first year, multiplied by the bid proponent’s proposed rental percentage. The second year MAG is the greater of the first year MAG or 85% of the second year gross receipts multiplied by the proposed rental payment. Each month, the successful bid proponent is required to pay the City the greater of the rental payment or one-twelfth of the MAG. The RFP specifies that the first rental/MAG payment “will begin on the 31st day after the execution of the agreement even if installation is not complete.” (“31-Day MAG Provision”). Ex. 22 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. Thereafter, all rental/MAG payments are due monthly in advance. The 2002 RFP does not require the incumbent concessionaire, Clear Channel, to remove its existing advertising displays in the event a new concessionaire is ultimately awarded the contract. Instead, the 2002 RFP gives Clear Channel the option of either removing the old displays itself or abandoning them for the new concessionaire to remove. If Clear Channel were to remove its existing signs, it would not be required to do so until the day before the execution of the new agreement. The 2002 RFP requires that fabrication of new displays be approved by the City before the displays are installed, which would take approximately one month. Furthermore, all people and companies associated with the installation, maintenance, and management of the Airport advertising concession who do not already have security clearance would have to obtain that clearance before they could install and manage the new displays, which the City stated would take approximately sixty days. Corey sent written questions to the City asking whether it would consider extending Clear Channel’s contract for an additional sixty days, if a new concessionaire was selected, in order to enable a new concessionaire to design and fabricate its displays and start generating revenue with which to pay the MAG or percentage-based rent after the first thirty-one days. The City would not agree to such an extension. Section 3.2 of the 2002 RFP, as amended by Addendum 4, entitled “PROJECT DESCRIPTION”, sets forth instructions to proponents concerning the scope of their proposals: Interested proponents will be proposing to design, install, operate, maintain and manage advertising and hotel/motel courtesy phone boards at the AIRPORT at locations set forth in Exhibit A hereto. There are approximately three hundred and twenty-seven (327) locations for advertising and three (3) hotel/motel courtesy phone boards in the AIRPORT. The total number of advertising display units included in this RFP may be increased or decreased as deemed necessary by the Aviation General Manager with all units subject to the terms and conditions specified in the related contract. The following is a list of the various locations .... Ex. 22 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. Section 3.2 then lists the authorized locations for advertising in the Airport by terminal/eoncourse and the number of individual locations within each. Section 3.3, as amended by Addendum 4 and entitled “PERMITTED USE”, further provides, “The successful proponent will have the non-exclusive right to install, operate, maintain and manage approximately three hundred and twenty-seven (327) advertising display units and three (3) hotel/motel courtesy phone boards in designated locations (listed in section 3.2).” Ex. 22 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. The number of authorized display locations is important because, if the number of locations is increased, then the concessionaire can generate additional revenue. C. The Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Requirement and the Certification of Barbara Fouch The City administers a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) program in connection with its public contracts, including the contract at issue in the 2002 RFP. Because the City accepts federal funding for the Airport, the DBE program is subject to the federal DBE rules promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation, which are codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 23 and 26 (2005). Under those rules, a DBE firm is one that is at least 51% owned by one or more individuals who are both socially and economically disadvantaged and whose management and daily business operations are controlled by one or more of the socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who own it. 49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2005). Socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within society because of their identities as members of certain groups and without regard to their individual qualities. 49 C.F.R. § 26, app. E (2005). Economically disadvantaged individuals are socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or similar line of business who are not socially disadvantaged. 49 C.F.R. § 26, app. E (2005). The City, as a recipient of federal transportation funding, must insure that the DBEs it certifies are actually owned and controlled by disadvantaged individuals by scrutinizing the relationships of the purported DBE firms with non-DBE firms in such areas as personnel, facilities, equipment, financial and bonding support, and other resources. 49 C.F.R. § 26.71(b)(1) (2005). As part of that scrutiny, for each DBE applicant the City must: conduct an on-site visit to the applicant’s offices; analyze the firm’s stock ownership, bonding, and financial capacity; compile a list of equipment owned by the firm; compile a list of licenses held by key personnel within the firm; and require applicants to complete and submit a DBE application form. 49 C.F.R. § 26.83 (2005). Fouch, doing business as Creative Media Displays of Georgia, submitted a DBE application to the City on June 5, 2002. Fouch’s DBE application and supporting materials stated that she owned 30% of Clear Channel Airports of Georgia, Inc. The DBE application and supporting materials also revealed that she owned a Beverly Hills, California-based firm called “Fouch-Roseboro & Associates” and that she owned a majority share of Creative Media Displays, Inc., a New York corporation that is a subcontractor to the Newark Airport advertising contract. Fouch’s DBE application and supporting materials stated that the business for which she sought DBE certification, Creative Media Displays of Georgia, owned no business equipment and had executed a sublease with its non-DBE partner, Clear Channel, the month before filing its DBE application. Owens is the Director of the City’s Office of Contract Compliance (“OCC”) and served in that capacity when Fouch submitted her DBE application, and he oversaw and gave final approval of Fouch’s DBE application. It is uncontested that Owens and his office made mistakes in the DBE certification process. For example, neither Owens nor anyone else in his office conducted the required site visits for any of the DBEs that were certified in connection with the 2002 RFP, but Owens and his office did not conduct any site visits for any DBE applicants in connection with any City contracts prior to 2003. There is also evidence, however, that Owens and his office more thoroughly examined the DBE application of Maureen Malone, doing business as Sydney Baxter & Co., who partnered with Corey for the 2002 RFP. The City set a DBE participation goal of at least 29% for the Airport advertising concession, which required that each bid proponent make a good faith effort to have DBEs perform at least 29% of the contract. All three bid proponents received the full 15 point allocation for satisfying the City’s DBE goal. D. The 2002 RFP Process: Selection of Clear Channel as Highest-Ranked Proponent and Corey’s Protest During the 2002 RFP process, the City received and responded to multiple questions from potential and actual proponents. As the contact person, Chavis was responsible for ensuring that these questions were directed to the correct department, answered, and then attached to the 2002 RFP as an addendum. Corey submitted more than 31 questions to the City in letters dated May 7, 2002, and May 8, 2002, all of which were answered by the City. Corey submitted four additional questions to the City in a letter dated July 15, 2002, and those questions were never answered. In addition, Chavis responded to questions in writing from Clear Channel and JCDeeaux North America (a company that ultimately did not submit a proposal). There is also evidence that Chavis responded verbally to two non-substantive questions from Clear Channel and also sent a fax to Fouch. Ultimately, three companies submitted proposals in response to the 2002 RFP: Creative Airport Advertising, Corey, and Clear Channel. In its bid, Corey offered to pay 72.1% of its gross receipts to the city. Clear Channel offered to pay 61.1% of its gross receipts. In addition, Clear Channel and Corey made the following five-year revenue projections: Corey Clear Channel Year 1 $ 9,273,636 $10,109,777 Year 2 $10,201,000 $12,471,244 Year 3 $11,221,100 $14,766,931 Year 4 $12,343,210 $16,831,970 Year 5 $13,577,530 $20,206,766 John McNeany prepared the pro forma that contained Clear Channel’s revenue projections and that was included with Clear Channel’s proposal. Based on these numbers, Corey’s MAG for the first year would have been 85% of $9,273,635 multiplied by its proposed 72.1% rental rate, which would have amounted to $5,683,347.83. Clear Channel’s MAG for the first year would have been 85% of $10,109,777 multiplied by 61.1%, which would have amounted to $5,250,513. Though the 2002 RFP states that the successful proponent would have the right to manage approximately 327 display locations, there is evidence that Clear Channel did not limit its proposal to that number of locations and based its revenue projections on the assumption that there would be significantly more than 327 advertising displays. For example, Michael Riley (who is J. Riley’s son and the President of Clear Channel Airports, a division of Clear Channel) testifies in his deposition that Clear Channel identified “a lot of additional locations” for its proposal and that those locations were “certainly not limited to” the locations authorized in the 2002 RFP. Ex. 39 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at 110. Clear Channel’s proposal, however, indicates that its proposal was based on 334 displays, an increase of only seven additional locations. Ex. 39 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at 110. In addition, J. Riley has testifies that Clear Channel based its response to the 2002 RFP “on a large number of new signs.” Ex. 2 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at 173. The City’s proposal evaluation team, which consisted of Mastín, Coleman, Charles Ewing, and Paul Meyer, evaluated and scored each of the proposals on a 100-point scale in the following categories: Categories Points General and Specialized Experience 10 Past Performance and Experience 10 Performance Capabilities 10 Business Plan 10 Fee (MAG and Percentage Rent Proposed) 35 Financial Condition 10 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise 15 Ability to Comply with Applicable Laws Pass/Fail Ability to Comply with Constr. Schedule Pass/Fail The City’s proposal evaluation team ultimately scored the proposals as follows: Offeror Points Clear Channel 82.55 Corey 79.18 Creative Airport Advertising 72.05 Felicia Strong Whitaker of the Department of Procurement then sent a letter dated May 8, 2002, to Clear Channel that informed Clear Channel that it “had been selected as the top ranked proponent.” Ex. 46 to the Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. On November 14, 2002, Corey filed a protest of the City’s recommendation and selection of Clear Channel as the highest-ranked (and therefore most responsible and responsive) bid proponent. On November 14, 2002, the City and Clear Channel held negotiations regarding the final terms of the contract for the Airport advertising concession. The City was represented by Kyle Mastín and Toni Darden, and Clear Channel was represented by J. Riley, M. Riley, and McNeany. DeCosta was the City representative responsible for the presentation of the recommendation of Clear Channel to the City Council and for the presentation of legislation approving the final contract with Clear Channel, the terms of which had been finalized during the November 14, 2002, negotiations. De-Costa did not immediately present the contract and legislation to the City Council for approval. DeCosta claims that he did not submit the recommendation and legislation to the City Council because of Corey’s protest. Adam Smith took office as the city’s Chief Procurement Officer in January 2003. Smith was aware of the allegations that Corey made in its bid protest. Smith believed that he had the authority to investigate Corey’s allegations and rebid the contract, but he did neither of these. According to Smith, he did not conduct an independent investigation or cancel the 2002 RFP and rebid the contract because the procurement took place prior to his employment with the City and because of the protest and litigation regarding the 2002 RFP. There is a letter, however, that states that the Department of Procurement had reviewed the 2002 RFP and “concluded that the City did not follow the established procurement process in such a manner as to serve the best interests of the City.” Ex. 56 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. The letter further states that the City had decided to cancel the 2002 RFP, reject all of the proposals, and issue a new RFP. The letter indicates that it was sent from Smith to M. Riley, with copies sent to DeCosta and Owens (as well as others). The letter, however, does not have Smith’s handwritten signature, and Smith denies knowledge of the letter. E. The 2002 RFP Process: Reopening of Negotiations On November 1, 2004, approximately two years after the November 14, 2002, negotiations between Clear Channel and the City, DeCosta submitted the recommendation of Clear Channel as most responsible and responsive bid proponent and the legislation necessary to approve the contract with Clear Channel. On November 4, 2004, Corey filed the instant lawsuit [Doc. No. 1]. According to DeCosta and the City, the City Council withheld approving the contract pending the outcome of the protest and litigation. Clear Channel continued to pay the 50% rental rate on a month-to-month basis. Early in 2005, Mastín called McNeany and told him that DeCosta wanted Clear Channel to start paying the percentage rate that Clear Channel had proposed in its response to the 2002 RFP, which was 61.1% of the advertising revenue. Also early in 2005, DeCosta and J. Riley had a phone conversation regarding the rate Clear Channel was paying, and, according to DeCosta, J. Riley and DeCosta reached a verbal agreement that Clear Channel would start paying the 61.1% rate beginning retroactively on January 1, 2005. Sometime in 2006, DeCosta learned that Clear Channel had not been paying the increased rental rate. DeCosta then contacted Clear Channel to explain that he expected Clear Channel to pay the increased rental rate in accordance with the verbal agreement that he had with J. Riley. DeCosta also told Clear Channel that it should pay interest on the amount past due at the rate specified in the 1995 Airport Advertising Contract. DeCosta contacted either J. Riley or Fouch and communicated that, if Clear Channel did not honor the agreement that DeCosta had reached with J. Riley, then the City would rebid the contract. Ex. 8 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts at 246. At some point, DeCosta increased his demand from 61.1% to 61.2%. In response, Sam Hart of Clear Channel sent a letter to Mastín, dated May 3, 2006, telling him that Clear Channel would agree to pay the 61.2% rate “retroactive to twelve (12) calendar months from the effective date of the new Concessions Operating Agreement” in exchange for, among other things, the City agreeing to authorize an increase in the number of display locations. Ex. 61 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. In that letter, Hart went on to state that, since Clear Channel would not be able to “retroactively recover the aforementioned twelve months of missed sales opportunities on existing inventory, the revenues we are able to generate on these new display locations will help us offset the impact of the retroactive payment on our current fiscal year.” Id. DeCosta continued to negotiate with Clear Channel and Fouch throughout 2006, and, at some point, Clear Channel agreed to the increased rental rate and a lump sum payment of back rent. On November 30, 2006, Fouch sent an email to M. Riley stating that the City expected to receive the check by December 4, 2006. Fouch went on to state that she had “met with Ben [DeCosta] and a determination of ‘where we all go from here’ is, hopefully secured.” Ex. 63 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. On December 4, 2006, Clear Channel sent a check to the City in the amount of $1,739,659.00. Fouch conveyed the check and an accompanying letter to DeCosta. The reference line of the check indicates that it was payment for back rent. In the letter, M. Riley stated, “In consideration for the new display advertising locations at the Airport, [Clear Channel] will pay the Airport a one-time upfront payment of $1,739,659.00, which is enclosed herewith.” Ex. 64 to Plaintiffs Statement of Facts. In addition, Clear Channel agreed to pay the 61.2% rental rate beginning as of November 1, 2006. On March 7, 2007, Clear Channel sent a second check for $100,000.00 in order to cover back rent for the months of October and November 2006. Clear Channel is the current Airport advertising concessionaire. II. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Brett Katzman, Ph.D. [Doc. No. 571] and Motion to Strike Declaration of Steve Moody [Doc. No. 575] The defendants have filed a joint motion to exclude the testimony of Brett Katzman [Doc. No. 571] and a joint motion to strike the declaration of Steve Moody [Doc. No. 575]. The court notes that Fouch did not originally join in the motion to strike the declaration of Moody, but she subsequently filed a motion entitled, “Motion to Strike the Declaration of Steve Moody” [Doc. No. 576], which, rather than being a separate motion to strike, indicated merely that she wanted to adopt and join in the other defendants’ motion [Doc. No. 575]. Accordingly, the court holds that Fouch has joined in the other defendants’ motion to strike [Doc. No. 575], and the court will rule on that motion on its merits. The court therefore dismisses as moot Fouch’s separate motion [Doc. No. 576]. A. Motion to Exclude Testimony of Brett Katzman [Doc. No. 571]. In support of its claims, Corey seeks to present the testimony of Professor Brett E. Katzman, Ph.D., who is an Associate Professor of Economics in the Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University. According to Corey, Katzman is an expert in competitive bidding. Though the Procurement and Real Estate Code of the City distinguishes between competitive sealed bids and competitive sealed proposals, it is clear that requests for proposals in general and the 2002 RFP in particular involve competitive bidding by the proponents. The defendants contend, however, that Katzman is not qualified to give expert testimony on the particular facts at issue in this case. Moreover, the defendants argue that Katzman’s opinions are not sufficiently reliable to meet the standards of admissibility set forth in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Furthermore, the defendants contend that Katzman’s opinions are not the proper subject of expert testimony because Katzman cannot testify about the subjective intent of the defendants, the opinions relate to matters within the common understanding of lay persons, and the opinions include inadmissible legal conclusions and lawyer arguments. Finally, the defendants claim that Katzman’s declaration, which was submitted with Corey’s responses to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, contains new opinions that were not previously disclosed in his prior reports and are therefore untimely pursuant to the court’s amended scheduling order [Doc. No. 251]. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-97, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Determinations regarding the admissibility of such testimony are controlled by Rule 702, as explained by the Supreme Court in Daubert and its progeny. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir.1998). The district court is obligated to act as a gatekeeper to the admission of expert testimony by ensuring that it “both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The objective of the gatekeeping “requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony” by making “certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). In its gatekeeper role, the district court must engage in a three-part inquiry to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 562. Specifically, the court considers whether: “(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. at 562; see also Quiet Technology DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2003). The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of demonstrating that the expert and his or her testimony meets this tripartite standard. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir.2004). This same standard applies to all expert testimony, including testimony regarding scientific, technical, and other specialized matters. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Based on the factors set forth in Daubert, the Eleventh Circuit has held, “In ascertaining the reliability of a particular scientific expert opinion, we consider, to the extent possible: (1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.” Quiet Technology, 326 F.3d at 1341 (citing McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir.2002) and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, however, has cautioned, “Those factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151, 119 S.Ct. 1167. The Supreme Court has also noted that, in some cases, “the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.” Id. at 150,119 S.Ct. 1167. “In the end, although ‘rulings on admissibility under Daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered expert’s methodology,’ it is not the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence.” Quiet Technology, 326 F.3d at 1341 (quoting McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1256). “A district court’s gatekeeper role under Daubert ‘is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.’ ” Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Allison v. McGhan 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir.1999)). Instead, as the Supreme Court has stated, “vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786. 1. Whether the Expert is Qualified As the court noted previously, Katzman is an Associate Professor of Economics in the Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University. He has held similar positions at the University of Miami and Mercer University. Katzman received his doctorate in 1996 based on course work that included classes on auctions, procurements, and competitive bidding, as well as his dissertation, entitled A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Multi-Unit Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands. Since receiving his Ph.D., Katzman has taught courses in Industrial Organization, Economics of Strategy, Game Theory, Theoretical Microeconomics, and Managerial Economics at the undergraduate, Masters, and Ph.D. levels. Katzman states that all of these courses have contained some element of competitive bidding, including process design, bidding strategy, or empirical analysis of results. Katzman has written research papers on competitive bidding encompassing both auctions and procurement settings, several of which have been published in highly regarded economics journals such as The Journal of Economic Theory and Economic Theory. These papers have usually focused on three areas: (1) process design; (2) bidding strategies; or (3) empirical analysis of bidding results. In addition, Katzman has served as a referee of manuscripts on competitive bidding for various journals, including The American Economic Review, The Journal of Economic Theory, the RAND Journal of Economics, and the Review of Economics and Statistics. The defendants do not contest Katzman’s particular academic credentials. Instead, they argue that Katzman is not qualified to testify as an expert in this case because he has no independent education, training, or experience in municipal RFPs and procurements or, more specifically, airport concession RFPs and procurements. The defendants further argue that Katzman is not qualified because his testimony was prepared solely for litigation. Corey, however, argues that Katzman’s extensive expertise in competitive bidding in general qualifies him to testify and that Katzman’s expertise was not prepared solely for this litigation. The court agrees with Corey. Even though he has not specialized in airport concession RFPs or municipal RFPs, Katzman has an extensive background in competitive bidding, including his education, research, teaching, and publications, which has provided him with specialized knowledge that the average person does not possess. Furthermore, though he prepared in part for his testimony in this case by reviewing various airport-related RFPs and other evidence in this case, Katzman has an extensive background in competitive bidding, which he has developed through years of study and research that predate this litigation. Though this case involves a request for proposal rather than an invitation for bid, there is no question that the 2002 RFP had competitive bidding characteristics. Thus, the court finds Katzman to be qualified to render an opinion in this case based on his expertise in competitive bidding. 2. Whether the Expert has Employed a Sufficiently Reliable Methodology Though the court must focus on the methodology of the proffered expert, “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.” General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). In addition, as the Supreme Court has stated, “Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.” Id. The Supreme Court, however, has emphasized, “Nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Id. The defendants argue that “Katzman’s methodology is no methodology at all” and that Katzman’s reliance on his expertise and training with regard to competitive bidding is not reliable because such “self-proclaimed expertise is not a substitute for proof of a reliable methodology.” Defendants’ Brief at 20 [Doc. No. 571], Though the defendants are correct that experience alone does not guarantee reliability, the court disagrees with the defendants’ assessment of Katzman’s testimony. In reviewing Katzman’s testimony, the court finds that Katzman has sufficiently connected his extensive experience and expertise to his testimony and has sufficiently explained his methodology in reviewing the 2002 RFP. Essentially, Katzman has reviewed the 2002 RFP and other evidence in this case and applied his education and expertise in competitive bidding to that evidence. As the court has already noted, the list of factors enumerated in Dauberb for evaluating the methodology employed by an expert witness is not always relevant to evaluating the reliability of expert testimony. On the facts of this case, the court holds that most of these factors are inapplicable, but the court notes that Katzman has published articles in peer-reviewed journals on the topic of competitive bidding, served as a referee of manuscripts on competitive bidding, and taught courses involving the topic of competitive bidding. In this case, the most relevant reliability concerns are the personal knowledge, education, and experience of Katzman, and Corey has demonstrated that Katzman has an extensive academic background in competitive bidding. Furthermore, the court is satisfied that Katzman has not relied on mere speculation in giving his opinions. Instead, Katzman goes into detail in explaining how he reached his conclusions, and the trier of fact can evaluate Katzman’s reasoning and how he reached his conclusions. The defendants obviously object to Katzman’s opinions, but the court holds that these objections go to the weight and not the admissibility of Katzman’s testimony. The defendants will have their opportunity to cross-examine Katzman and call into question his testimony. But it is not the court’s role to rule on the persuasiveness of the proffered testimony. Although Katzman’s methodology may not be susceptible to testing, the court finds that, in this case, Katzman’s expertise, experience, and education and his application of general economic principles to the facts of this case are sufficient for establishing that he has employed a reliable methodology in analyzing the 2002 RFP and its implementation. 3. Whether the Expert Testimony Will Assist the Trier of Fact The defendants advance four arguments in support of their claim that Katzman’s testimony will not assist the trier of fact. First, the defendants argue that Katzman testifies to the intent and motivation of some of the defendants and expert testimony is not admissible on the issue of the parties’ intent. The court notes that the defendants do not cite any Eleventh Circuit authority in support of their argument. It is true that, in a criminal case, an expert cannot “state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.” Fed. R.Evid. 704(b). But, at least with regard to civil cases, the Eleventh Circuit has held, “An expert may testify as to his opinion on an ultimate issue of fact.” Montgomery v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir.1990). The court has reviewed the relevant portions of Katzman’s testimony and finds that, in this case, Katzman’s testimony will assist the trier of fact in determining whether the 2002 RFP process was biased in favor of the incumbent Clear Channel and to the detriment of all non-incumbent bid proponents, including Corey. Katzman is an expert in competitive bidding, and he has reviewed the 2002 RFP and other evidence in this case. Katzman can assist the trier of fact by explaining, for example, the terms of the 2002 RFP, how the solicitation process was implemented, whether such implementation was biased, and the basis of his opinion that the terms of the 2002 RFP were biased in favor of the incumbent Clear Channel. If the trier of fact believes such testimony, then the trier of fact could infer that the terms of the 2002 RFP and the administration of the RFP process demonstrate that the City defendants intentionally discriminated against Corey. Second, the defendants argue that Katzman’s opinions concern matters within the common understanding of the lay person. Though some of Katzman’s testimony might fall within the understanding of the lay witness, much of it goes beyond such understanding, in that, Katzman is applying his expertise in competitive bidding to the terms of the 2002 RFP and the facts giving rise to this case. The average lay person has very little experience with RFPs, how they are administered, and competitive bidding in general. Thus, Katzman’s expertise goes beyond the understanding of the average lay person and may assist the trier of fact in understanding certain issues in this case. Third, the defendants argue that Katzman’s opinions constitute inadmissible legal conclusions. In support of this argument, the defendants cite Montgomery, in which the Eleventh Circuit held, “A witness also may not testify to the legal implications of conduct; the court must be the jury’s only source of law.” Montgomery, 898 F.2d 1537 at 1541. On this issue, the court agrees with the defendants. Katzman may not give his opinion as to the legal implications of the defendants’ conduct. But Katzman may give his opinions to things such as whether the terms of the 2002 RFP were biased, whether the scoring of the proposals was manipulated, whether the conduct of the defendants favored the incumbent Clear Channel to the disadvantage of non-incumbent proponents such as Corey. Accordingly, the court grants the defendant’s motion as to those portions of Katzman’s declaration that constitute inadmissible legal conclusions, and, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the court will not rely upon that testimony. Fourth, the defendants argue that Katzman’s opinions constitute inadmissible argument. The court has reviewed the portions of Katzman’s declaration to which the defendants object, and the court finds that the relevant testimony does not constitute inadmissible argument. To the contrary, the testimony at issue may assist the trier of fact in determining an ultimate issue of fact in this case, i.e., whether the defendants intentionally discriminated against Corey. For example, the defendants object to Katzman’s conclusion “that the 2002 Atlanta advertising RFP, as written and implemented, was intentionally biased in favor of the Incumbent to the prejudice and exclusion of Corey and all other Proponents.” Katzman Declaration ¶ 95 [Doc. No. 557]. Katzman, however, explains why he reaches this conclusion, and, if the trier of fact believes Katzman, then the trier of fact may infer that the City defendants intentionally discriminated against Corey. Accordingly, the court holds that Katzman’s testimony may assist the trier of fact in determining an ultimate issue of fact in this case and is therefore admissible. Finally, the defendants argue that Katzman’s declaration should be excluded because it contains new opinions that were not timely disclosed pursuant to the court’s scheduling order. The court has reviewed the portions of the declaration of Katzman to which the defendants object and finds that either: (1) the information and opinions to which those paragraphs pertain has been disclosed by Corey prior to the May 25, 2008, deadline or (2) the failure of the disclosure is harmless since the defendants had access to Katzman’s expert report, rebuttal report, and the information Katzman used as the basis for his opinions. The portions of the declaration to which the defendants object are merely more detailed explanations of the testimony that Katzman has given previously. Accordingly, the court grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Brett Katzman. In ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the court will not rely upon any legal conclusions that may be contained in Katzman’s testimony. B. Joint Motion to Strike the Declaration of Steve Moody [Doc. No. 575]. As an initial matter, the court notes that the defendants have styled their motion to exclude the testimony of Moody as a motion to strike. Several district courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held that a motion to strike is not the proper method for challenging the admissibility of evidence in an affidavit. See, e.g., Lentz v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions, LLC, No. 1:06-ev-1893-WSD, 2008 WL 269607 at *9 (N.D.Ga. Jan.28, 2008) (noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits the court to strike a pleading, not an affidavit attached to a motion for summary judgment); see also Jordan v. Cobb County, Ga., 227 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1346-47 (N.D.Ga.2001); Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 700 F.Supp. 1574, 1576 (N.D.Ga.1988). The court in Lentz concluded, “The proper method to challenge such an affidavit is to challenge the admissibility of the evidence contained in the affidavit.” 2008 WL 269607 at *9; see also Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 650 F.Supp. 1138, 1141 (N.D.Ga.1986) (concluding that a party should file a notice of objection rather than a motion to strike to challenge the admissibility of evidence in an affidavit). On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court’s granting of a motion to strike an affidavit is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir.2008). In Reese, the court ultimately affirmed the district court’s order, but the Eleventh Circuit specifically held, “We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude Keller’s affidavit.” Id. at 1265 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has also denied a motion to strike declarations on the grounds that “it is in the interests of justice and efficiency to consider the supplemental declarations” and without considering whether a motion to strike a declaration was procedurally improper. Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1171 (11th Cir.2006). In addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 103 states that it is error to admit evidence only if “a substantial right of the party is affected” and “a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context” (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 103 implicitly recognizes that a motion to strike evidence is procedurally proper. Regardless, the court will construe the defendants’ motion to strike as a motion in limine to exclude the challenged testimony of Moody. In the briefing of their motion, the defendants point out that they seek to exclude paragraphs 8,12-16, 20-21, and 23 of Moody’s declaration on the grounds that those paragraphs are expert testimony, yet Corey did not disclose Moody as an expert witness and he did not disclose an expert report. In response, Corey argues that the relevant paragraphs are either not opinion testimony or constitute admissible lay opinion testimony. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A) requires that a party must disclose the identity of any expert witnesses that the party may use at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (26)(a)(2)(B) further requires the disclosure must be accompanied by a written report that includes certain information related to the qualifications and background of the witness and the testimony itself. In addition to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the local rules of this court state: Any party who desires to use the testimony of an expert witness shall designate the expert sufficiently early in the discovery period to permit the opposing party the opportunity to depose the expert and, if desired, to name its own expert witness sufficiently in advance of the close of discovery so .that a similar discovery deposition of the second expert might also be conducted prior to the close of discovery. L.R. 26.2C. If a party fails to comply with this provision of the local rules, then the party shall not be allowed to offer the testimony of the expert witness. L.R. 26.2C. In this case, it is undisputed that Corey did not designate Moody as an expert witness. Therefore, to the extent that the relevant portions of Moody’s declaration constitute expert testimony, the court will exclude that testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 states, “If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 701(c), the Eleventh Circuit has held lay witness opinion testimony based upon the witness’s “particularized knowledge garnered from years of experience within the field” and not based upon “specialized knowledge that is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702” is admissible. Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., Ltd., 320 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). “[T] he ability to answer hypothetical questions is ‘[t] he essential difference’ between expert and lay witnesses.” United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Asplundh Manufacturing Division v. Benton Harbor Engineering, 57 F.3d 1190, 1202 n. 16 (3d Cir.1995)). The court finds that some of the relevant testimony is inadmissible expert testimony, in particular, paragraph 14, in which Moody states, “No airport advertising professional could have legitimately projected such revenues [$74,386,688 over a five-year period] under the terms of the 2002 Atlanta RFP Request for Proposal, which limited Proponents to 327 locations.” Moody Declaration at ¶ 14 [Doc. No. 575-2], This testimony is not an inference based on his particularized knowledge. Instead, as he notes in the beginning of paragraph 14, Moody’s opinion is based on his specialized knowledge as “an airport advertising professional.” Id. This testimony is essentially an answer to a hypothetical question, such as, “Could an airport professional legitimately make a revenue projection such as the one that Clear Channel made under the terms of the 2002 RFP, which limited proponents to basing their projection on approximately 327 advertising locations?” As such, this testimony is governed by Rule 702. Accordingly, the court finds that this testimony is expert testimony and must be excluded since Corey did not disclose Moody as an expert witness. Other testimony in Moody’s declaration, however, is not expert testimony. For example, in paragraph 13, Moody states that he examined the Pro Forma that Clear Channel submitted to the City and that the Pro Forma contains Clear Channel’s projected revenue and expenses for the first five years of the proposed contract. The defendants argue that Moody’s testimony should be excluded because it is based on a forensic examination of the files in preparation for litigation. The court disagrees. Moody played an integral role throughout Corey’s preparation and presentation of its RFP, and he can give testimony related to his role and his knowledge of the facts of the case, including testimony based on his review of documents during the course of litigation. Thus, the court holds that paragraph 13 is admissible testimony. For the reasons stated above, the court grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ joint motion to strike the declaration of Moody [Doc. No. 575]. In ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the court will not rely upon the testimony of Moody that constitutes prohibited expert testimony. III. The Motions for Summary Judgment Each of the defendants has moved for summary judgment as to all counts against them. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment when all “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no dispute as to any material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 156, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir.1996). The moving party’s burden is discharged merely by “ ‘showing’— that is, pointing out to the district court— that there is an absence of evidence to support [an essential element of] the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether the moving party has met this burden, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Clifton, 74 F.3d at 1090. Once the moving party has adequately supported its motion, the nonmovant then has the burden of showing that summary judgment is improper by coming forward with specific facts showing a genuine dispute. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, it is not the court’s function to decide issues of material fact but to decide only whether there is such an issue to be tried. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The applicable substantive law will identify those facts that are material. Id., 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Facts that in good faith are disputed, but which do not resolve or affect the outcome of the ease, will not preclude the entry of summary judgment as those facts are not material. Id. Genuine disputes are those by which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Id. In order for factual issues to be “genuine” they must have a real basis in the record. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. When the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no “genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citations omitted). Corey’s Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 444] contains five counts in it. In Count I, Corey alleges that the City defendants deprived it of its constitutional right to equal protection. In Count II, Corey alleges that all of the defendants conspired to violate its constitutional right to equal protection. In Count III, Corey seeks attorney fees from all defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) due to their alleged violation of its constitutional right. In Count IV, Corey brings a claim against the private defendants on the grounds that they conspired to restrain trade and conspired to monopolize. Finally, in Count V, Corey brings a monopolization and attempted monopolization claim against the private defendants. A. Count I: Violation of Right to Equal Protection The City defendants have all moved for summary judgment as to Corey’s claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and set forth in Count I of the complaint. “By its terms, section 1983 provides a cause of action for ‘person[s] within the jurisdiction’ who have been ‘depriv[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ by a person acting ‘under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.” Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Eleventh Circuit has held that corporations are persons within the meaning of Section 1983 and have standing to bring claims under Section 1983. Id. In addition, municipalities are persons within the meaning of Section 1983, such that they may be liable under Section 1983. Pattee v. Georgia Ports Authority, 477 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (S.D.Ga.2006) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). “Section 1983 alone creates no substantive rights; rather it provides a remedy for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, in order to sustain a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must establish two elements: (1) that [it] suffered a deprivation of ‘rights privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States, and (2) that the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law.” Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hospital, Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting Dollar v. Haralson County, 704 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1983)). In this case, Corey alleges that the City defendants have deprived it of its rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. “Equal protection claims are not limited to individuals discriminated against based on their membership in a vulnerable class.” Campbell v. Rainbow City, Alabama, 434 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir.2006). Instead, “the Equal Protection Clause requires government entities to treat similarly situated people alike.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that equal protection claims can be divided into three general categories: (1) claims that a statute