Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER STANCEU, Judge. Plaintiffs National Fisheries Institute, Inc. (“NFI”), a non-profit trade association, and twenty-seven of its members move, pursuant to USCIT Rule 56. 1, for judgment upon the agency record against United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs,” “CBP,” or the “Agency”). Pis.’ Mot. for J. on the Agency R. 1 (“Pis.’ Mot.”). Plaintiffs claim that Customs contravened statutory provisions in imposing a new and more stringent bonding requirement (the “enhanced bonding requirement”) on importers of certain shrimp products that are subject to antidumping duty liability. See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pis.’ Mot. for J. on the Agency R. 1, 3-16 (“Public Mem. of P. & A.”). Plaintiffs also claim that Customs arbitrarily and capriciously applied its enhanced bonding requirement to shrimp importers without any basis for concluding that shrimp importers pose an increased risk of default, that Customs relied on formulas without considering factors specific to each importer, and that requiring shrimp importers to satisfy the enhanced bonding requirement is not a solution reasonably related to the problem of under-collection of antidumping duties. Id. at 17-23. The twenty-seven plaintiff importers contest individual bond sufficiency determinations in which Customs applied the enhanced bonding requirement to govern their continuous entry bonds. Pis.’ Mot. 1. The twenty-seven member plaintiffs are commercial importers of shrimp products that are subject to six antidumping duty orders issued by the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or the “Department”). First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19. Earlier in these proceedings, in November 2006, eight of the twenty-seven member plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction. Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Prot., 30 CIT 1838, 1842, 465 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1305 (2006) (“Nat’l Fisheries I”). The twenty-seven member plaintiffs, in the memorandum supporting their Rule 56.1 motion, seek additional equitable relief. Arguing that Customs is statutorily precluded from considering antidumping duty liability in the determination of bond sufficiency, they urge the court to order Customs to allow replacement of their bonds with bonds for which the limit of liability is determined without regard to potential antidumping duty liability. See Public Mem. of P. & A. 4, 28-30. They also seek a permanent injunction to prohibit Customs from applying the enhanced bonding requirement to them in the future and from considering potential antidumping duty liability when setting the liability limits for their bonds. Pis.’ Mot., Attach. 1 at 2-4 (“Pis.’ Proposed Order”); see Public Mem. ofP. &A. 30-31. The court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that Customs lacks any statutory authority whatsoever to consider potential antidumping duties when determining bond sufficiency but concludes, nevertheless, that the authority Customs possesses in this subject area is narrowly confined by the ministerial character of Customs’ role in the administration of the antidumping duty laws. The court also rejects the government’s argument that the enhanced bonding requirement, as related to the sufficiency determinations that Customs made on plaintiffs’ bonds, is consistent with law. The court holds that the enhanced bonding requirement is arbitrary and capricious in imposing greatly increased bond requirements only on importers of shrimp products subject to antidumping duty orders. The court also holds that the enhanced bonding requirement is unreasonable in applying a formula that secures potential antidumping duties at a substantial amount over the required cash deposit. The court concludes that Commerce, as the agency to which Congress delegated authority to determine estimated anti-dumping duty liability, is required by law to set the cash deposit by estimating the final antidumping duty liability as accurately as possible. For these reasons, the court sets aside as contrary to law the contested individual bond determinations that Customs made according to the enhanced bonding requirement and orders relief, in the form of a remand order, appropriate to this case. I. BACKGROUND Background information is set forth in National Fisheries I, 30 CIT at 1843-47, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1305-09, in which the court granted preliminary injunctive relief, and is supplemented below. Directive 99-3510-004 (the “Bond Directive”), originally issued by Customs on July 23, 1991, established guidelines under which Customs port directors are to assess the adequacy of an importer’s continuous entry bond. See Monetary Guidelines for Setting Bond Amounts, Directive 99-3510-004 (July 23,1991), available at http://www. cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/legal/ directives/3510-004.ctt/3510-004.txt (last visited Aug. 24, 2009) {“Bond Directive ”). Prior to the amendment by Customs in 2004, the Bond Directive set a non-discretionary, minimum continuous entry bond amount at $50,000 and established a formula by which “the bond limit of liability amount shall be fixed in multiples of $10,000 [or $100,000] nearest to 10 percent of duties, taxes and fees paid by the importer or broker acting as importer of record during the calendar year preceding the date of the [bond] application.” Id. (setting forth formulas under “Activity 1— Importer or Broker — Continuous”). Whether the bond limit was fixed in multiples of $10,000 or $100,000 depended upon whether the total duty and tax liability for an importer during the calendar year preceding its bond application exceeded $1,000,000. Id. A. Modifications of the Bond Directive and Its Application to Shrimp Importers Customs, on July 9, 2004, posted on its website an amendment to the Bond Directive (the “Amendment”), which set forth new formulas for calculating minimum continuous entry bond amounts. See Amendment to Bond Directive 99-8510-001 for Certain Merchandise Subject to Anti-dumping! Countervailing Duty Cases (July 9, 2004), available at http://www. ebp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/priority — trade/revenue/bonds/07082004.xml (last visited Aug. 24, 2009) {“Amendment”). The Amendment was neither published in the Federal Register nor subjected to the established notice-and-comment procedures provided for under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Customs did not publish the Amendment in the Customs Bulletin. The Amendment was the first issuance of several in which Customs set forth special bonding requirements for importers of agricultural and aquacultural merchandise that is subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty order. The Amendment required all Customs port directors “to review continuous bonds for importers who import agriculture/aquaculture merchandise subject to antidumping/countervailing duty cases and obtain larger bonds where necessary.” Amendment. A formula contained in the Amendment directed that “in fixing the limit of liability amount,” port directors will calculate the product of an importer’s antidumping or countervailing duty rate and the value of merchandise subject to antidumping or countervailing duties imported by that importer during the previous year. Id. (setting forth the formula as the “[Commerce] rate at Order [multiplied by the] value of imports of merchandise subject to the case by the importer during the previous year”). The Amendment also applied similar formulas to importers subject to provisional measures and to importers with no prior history of importing agricultural or aquacultural merchandise. Id. In the Amendment, Customs cited an “increasing concern regarding the collection of antidumping and countervailing duties, the impact of these collections on the amount of disbursements pursuant to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA or Byrd Amendment) and continued vigilance by CBP to ensure collection of all appropriate antidumping and countervailing duties.” Id. Customs listed under-collections of antidumping duty liabilities for imports of fresh garlic and crawfish as examples of why it deemed it necessary to change the formula for determining minimum bond requirements. Id. On January 24, 2005, Customs posted on its website a document entitled “Current Bond Formulas,” which contained, inter alia, the formulas described in the Amendment. Current Bond Formulas (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/ cgov/trade/priority — trade/revenue/bonds/ pilot — program/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2009) {“Current Bond Formulas ”). The document, which was not published in the Federal Register or Customs Bulletin, also stated that a “new comprehensive CBP Directive will be issued at a later date.” Id. In February 2005, subsequent to the issuance of the Amendment and Current Bond Formulas, Commerce issued anti-dumping duty orders for certain frozen warmwater shrimp (“subject shrimp”) from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam. Pursuant to the Amendment and Current Bond Formulas, Customs issued to all twenty-seven plaintiffs letters advising that their continuous entry bonds have been deemed insufficient under the Customs regulations, 19 C.F.R. Part 113 (2004), and required plaintiffs to obtain new continuous entry bonds with substantially higher limits of liability. Nat'l Fisheries I, 30 CIT at 1845, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1307. After the application of the Amendment to shrimp importers’ bonds, Customs posted on its website a clarification to the Amendment of the Bond Directive (the “Clarification”), which established two classes of merchandise, “Special Categories” and “Covered Cases.” See Clarification to July 9, 2004 Amended Monetary Guidelines for Setting Bond Amounts for Special Categories of Merchandise Subject to Antidumping and/or Countervailing Duty Cases 3 (Aug. 10, 2005), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/ priority — trade/revenue/bonds/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2009) (“Clarification ”). The Clarification was not published in the Federal Register or the Customs Bulletin and was not the subject of a notice-and-comment proceeding. As announced in the Clarification, Customs would select Special Categories or Covered Cases and in doing so, Customs would consider several criteria. Id. at 3-4. “Special Categories of merchandise can be designated where additional bond requirements in the form of greater continuous entry bonds or other security, may be required.” Id. at 3. The Clarification designated only agricultural/aquacultural merchandise as a Special Category. Id. The Clarification explained that “[t]he term Covered Cases refers to merchandise within a previously designated Special Category where different standards or formulas for determining the bond amount will be applied.” Id. Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and orders pertaining to shrimp are the only Covered Cases that Customs designated as falling within the agriculture/aquaculture Special Category. See id. The Clarification set forth criteria that Customs would consider in determining whether imports designated as Special Categories or Covered Cases should be subject to increased bond requirements. See id. at 3^4. The Clarification also established the procedure for “Notice, Timing and Appeal” of increased bond demands made by Customs for importers of Special Category and Covered Cases merchandise. See id. at 5. Importers are provided thirty days from the mailing of the insufficiency notice to reply with a request for a lower bond amount and to present Customs with evidence supporting a lowering of the bond amount. Id. The Clarification stated that in reviewing an importer’s response, Customs will consider the factors in 19 C.F.R. § 113.13(b) and also any other relevant factors. Id. at 6. “To provide openness and consistency, this clarification allows for the consideration of certain factors that are relevant for determining duty risk and modifying the amount of the bond required. All relevant factors will be appropriately weighed by CBP when exercising its judgment and discretion in setting the bond amounts.” Id. at 3. In October 2006, more than a year after the issuance of the Clarification, and eight months after plaintiffs had commenced their lawsuit on December 21, 2005, Customs published a Federal Register notice (the “October 2006 Notice”) “to provide additional information on the process used to determine bond amounts for importations involving elevated collection risks and to seek public comment on that process.” Monetary Guidelines for Setting Bond Amounts for Importations Subject to Enhanced Bonding Requirements, 71 Fed.Reg. 62,276, 62,276 (Oct. 24, 2006) (“October 2006 Notice”). The October 2006 Notice announced changes to the process discussed in the Amendment and the Clarification and, although inviting public comment, made the changes in the process effective upon publication. Id. at 62,276-78. Despite the changes, Customs retained the same basic formulas for calculating limits of liability for the continuous entry bonds required of importers of merchandise in Special Categories. Id. at 62,-277. The October 2006 Notice stated, however, that Customs will provide for public notice and comment on the designation of new Special Categories, which designation would occur according to specified criteria, and that Customs also would provide for public notice of the removal of a designation. Id. The October 2006 Notice did not announce a change in the current designation of aquaculture merchandise as a Special Category or the current designation of the shrimp antidumping orders as Covered Cases, but it indicated that Customs no longer will designate Covered Cases. “CBP will continue to evaluate on an industry wide basis those types of merchandise where additional bond requirements may be needed.” Id. “However, because importers are only affected when merchandise is subject to different bond requirements, CBP will only designate Special Categories, that is, merchandise for which an enhanced bond amount may be required.” Id. The October 2006 Notice stated, further, that importers of Special Category merchandise “will be offered the opportunity to submit information on their financial condition related to the risk of non-collection for that importer and CBP will determine bond amounts based on that information, the importer’s compliance history and other relevant information available to CBP.” Id. The October 2006 Notice indicated that absent exceptional circumstances, Customs will apply the formulas to determine the bond amounts where a submission has not been made by a principal in response to a notice from Customs. Id. The October 2006 Notice reiterated much of the procedure for appeal first set forth in the Clarification. Compare Clarification 5-6 with October 2006 Notice, 71 Fed.Reg. at 62,278. Unlike the Clarification, the October 2006 Notice was published in the Federal Register. As did the Clarification, the October 2006 Notice procedure provides the principal with thirty days to respond and to submit evidence supporting a lower bond amount, including financial information relevant to the importer’s ability to pay, such as financial statements and tax returns. October 2006 Notice, 71 Fed.Reg. at 62,278. Customs stated that it will consider this information along with the factors identified in the applicable Customs regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 113.13(b), in determining a new bond requirement. Id. This new bond requirement “will not take effect with respect to a principal until 14 days after the date of CBP’s reply to the principal’s response.” Id. The October 2006 Notice indicated that Customs intends to exercise discretion in setting new bond amounts. “If CBP determines that the principal has a record of compliance with customs laws and regulations and that the principal has demonstrated an ability to pay, CBP may decide not to require an increased bond amount even though the principal imports Special Category merchandise.” Id. However, the October 2006 Notice also stated that “[a]t any time after CBP determines a bond amount for a principal below that provided by the formula, if the principal fails to remain compliant with customs laws and regulations, CBP will recalculate the principal’s bond amount in accordance with the formulas outlined in this notice.” Id. Considering the Bond Directive as modified by the Amendment, Current Bond Formulas, and Clarification and as applied to shrimp importers, the court in November 2006 granted a preliminary injunction with respect to eight of the twenty-seven plaintiffs in this action. Nat’l Fisheries I, 30 CIT at 1842, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1305. The court issued the injunction to maintain the status quo and limited the injunction to the eight plaintiffs who had testified before the court, on the ground that only those eight plaintiffs had demonstrated immediate, irreparable harm. Id. at 1883-84, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1335-36. The court also ordered Customs to review, and modify as appropriate, the sufficiency determinations it had made on certain of the bonds of the eight plaintiffs addressed in the preliminary injunction order. Id. Since the issuance of that opinion and order, Customs and the parties have filed numerous motions and status reports and have participated in the court’s status conferences. B. Procedural History Subsequent to the Issuance of National Fisheries I After the ordering of the preliminary injunction, plaintiffs and defendant regularly updated the court through the filing of reports and motions, filing their first round of status reports with the court in December 2006. Status Report (Pis.), Dec. 4, 2006; Status Report (Def.), Dec. 4, 2006. Soon thereafter, as directed in the preliminary injunction order, defendant reported on the status of certain member plaintiffs with bonds for which the limit of liability was $1.5 million or greater. See Status Report in Resp. to the Ct.’s Inj., Jan. 26, 2007. Plaintiffs then filed several motions to compel defendant to file status reports with respect to the continuous entry bonds of plaintiffs Mazzetta Company, LLC (“Mazzetta”), Ore-Cal Corporation (“Ore-Cal”), and Eastern Fish Company, Inc. (“Eastern Fish”). See Mazzetta Company LLC Mot. to Direct Def. to Provide Supplemental Status Report; Ore-Cal Corporation Mot. to Direct Def. to Provide Supplemental Status Report; Eastern Fish Company’s Mot. to Direct Def. to Provide Supplemental Status Report. Customs objected that Mazzetta did not obtain a preliminary injunction and therefore was not entitled to obtain review of its bonds. Resp. to Mazzetta’s Mot. to Compel the Filing of a Supplemental Status Report 1-4. Regarding Ore-Cal and Eastern Fish, Customs objected, inter alia, that it was not obliged under the preliminary injunction to review bonds for which the term had expired. Resp. to Ore Cal’s Mot. to Compel the Filing of a Supplemental Status Report 1-4; Resp. to Eastern Fish’s Mot. to Compel the Filing of a Supplemental Status Report 5-8. In response to defendant’s motion “to address a disagreement between the parties concerning the administration of the Court’s preliminary injunction order,” the court held a telephonic status conference. See Consent Mot. for a Telephonic Status Conference 1; Order, Feb. 26, 2007 (ordering that the court shall hold a status conference on March 2, 2007). Pursuant to matters discussed during the status conference, the court denied as moot all three of plaintiffs’ motions to compel. Order, June 19, 2007. On January 18, 2007, plaintiffs moved for judgment upon the agency record pursuant to USCIT Rule 56. 1, which defendant opposed. Pis.’ Mot.; Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to NFI’s Mot. for J. Upon the Admin. R. (“Def.’s Resp.”). After the filing of plaintiffs’ motion, the Southern Shrimp Alliance attempted to intervene on the side of defendant. Mot. to Intervene of Southern Shrimp Alliance. The court denied the motion, concluding that “intervention at this [late] stage of the proceedings would unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties.” Order 1, Mar. 15, 2007. The court held oral argument in April 2007. Oral Argument Tr., Apr. 17, 2007. In response to issues raised in the parties’ pleadings and at oral argument, the court requested additional briefing regarding Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979 (“Reorganization Plan”), which the parties provided. Letter from TJ.S.Ct. Int’l Trade to Erie C. Emerson, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP and Stephen C. Tosini, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 17, 2007); Br. in Resp. to the Ct.’s Sept. 17, 2007 Letter, Oct. 31, 2007; Supplemental Br., Oct. 31, 2007; see Reorganization Plan No. S of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,273 (1979) (effective as of January 2, 1980 under Exec. Order No. 12,188 of January 2, 1980, 45 Fed.Reg. 989, 993 (1980)) (“Reorganization Plan ”). In March 2008, at defendant’s request, the court held an in camera status conference on the record, during which plaintiffs further clarified the nature of their cause of action. Status Conference Tr. (Confidential) 31-32, Mar. 28, 2008. Plaintiffs stated that they “are challenging any bond determination for the 27 plaintiffs in this case to the extent that those bond determinations were made based on Customs’ enhanced bonding practice.” Id. at 31. Plaintiffs urged the court, “should [it] conclude that the enhanced bonding practice is contrary to statute or that ... it was an unreasonable practice applied only to one product,” to “take action with respect to all bond determinations made for ... [the] 27 plaintiffs.” Id. at 31-32. Additionally, plaintiffs set forth the status of plaintiffs’ individual bonds, to which defendant did not object. Id. at 6-27. Plaintiffs later submitted additional information on plaintiffs’ individual bonds. Pis.’ Submission of Supplemental Information Requested by the Ct. During In Camera Proceedings on Mar. 28, 2008. In this and other status conferences with the parties held during the course of this litigation, counsel for the parties have informed the court of developments affecting this litigation, including the status of the various continuous bonds on which the plaintiffs in this case are the principals. Some disputes between the parties concerning specific bonds have been resolved during this process. However, the parties continue to disagree concerning the reasonableness of the liability limits pertaining to other of the plaintiffs’ continuous bonds. The latter group of bonds consists principally or entirely of those bonds (“previous” bonds) that apply to importations for past time periods but on which plaintiffs remain liable due to entries of subject shrimp that remain unliquidated. Plaintiffs moved to supplement the first amended complaint in May 2008 to inform the court that two plaintiffs in this action had sold assets. Mot. to Supplement the First Am. Compl. 1-2. After a telephone conference in August 2008 with the court and defendant, plaintiffs withdrew their motion to supplement the first amended complaint. Order, Nov. 6, 2008. Plaintiffs then submitted, in October 2008, a status report regarding a sale of assets by one plaintiff and a motion to substitute a plaintiff. Mot. to Substitute Party; Status Report (Pis.), October 14, 2008. Defendant opposed the motion to substitute a party. Def.’s Resp. to Mot. to Substitute Parties 1-3. The court denied the motion to substitute without prejudice on grounds unrelated to defendant’s opposition. Nat'l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Prot., 32 CIT-, 2008 WL 5642082 (Dec. 17, 2008). C. Parallel Proceedings in the World Trade Organization Earlier in 2009, Customs published a notice proposing to end the designation of shrimp subject to antidumping or countervailing duty orders as a special category or covered case subject to the “enhanced bonding requirement” (“January 2009 Notice”). Enhanced Bonding Requirement for Certain Shrimp Importers, 74 Fed. Reg. 1224 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“January 2009 Notice ”). The notice states that Customs proposes to end the designation because “[a] recent World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body Report has found that CBP’s application of this requirement to shrimp from Thailand and India is inconsistent with U.S. WTO obligations.” Id. at 1224. The Appellate Body Report resulted from requests in 2006 by India and Thailand that the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) establish panels to consider whether the application of the enhanced bonding requirement to importers of shrimp was inconsistent with the international obligations of the United States under the WTO agreements. Id. at 1225. In reports circulated on February 29, 2008, both panels concluded that the application of the enhanced bonding requirement was an impermissible action against dumping and did not constitute reasonable security. Id. India, Thailand, and the United States appealed certain findings. Id. The Appellate Body affirmed the panels’ decisions that the amended bond directive as applied to importers of shrimp from India and Thailand did not result in a reasonable security requirement. Id. The United States indicated that it would comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Id. Customs therefore “propose[d] to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by ending the designation of shrimp covered by antidumping ... duty orders as a special category or covered case subject to the requirement of additional bond amounts.” Id. Customs also stated that “shrimp importers may request termination of existing continuous bonds pursuant to 19 C.F.R. [§ ] 113.27(a) and submit a new continuous bond application pursuant to 19 C.F.R. [§ ] 113.12(b).” Id. Customs explained that “[a]ny change to the designation of [shrimp] and the bond amounts required of importers of [shrimp] will be effective for entries made on or after the date of publication of the final notice.” Id. The court held a telephonic status conference with the parties after granting defendant’s motion for leave to file a status report addressing the January 2009 Notice. See Order, Feb. 17, 2009; Status Report (Def.), Feb. 17, 2009. In the conference, counsel for defendant responded to the court’s question concerning the Agency’s intention regarding the various bonds that are the subject of this litigation. The court asked, specifically, if Customs intended to take actions that could resolve the remaining disputes between the parties. Counsel for defendant clarified that the January 2009 Notice did not signify an intent on the part of Customs to consider terminating, and allowing substitution of, any bonds other than those on which importers of shrimp currently are importing merchandise. In the conference, the parties confirmed to the court that the liability limits on some continuous bonds for past periods of importations remained in dispute and that the current proposal by Customs, if implemented, would not resolve the remaining issues in this litigation. Therefore, the court is ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for judgment upon the agency record. On April 1, 2009, Customs published a second notice concerning its implementation of the Appellate Body decision (“April 2009 Notice”). Enhanced Bonding Requirement for Certain Shrimp Importers, 74 Fed.Reg. 14,809 (Apr. 1, 2009) (“April 2009 Notice ”). Customs announced that it was ending the designation of shrimp subject to antidumping or countervailing duty orders as a special category or covered case subject to an enhanced bonding requirement. Id. Customs announced that it would permit importers to seek termination of current bonds but that it would take no action to alter the liability on bonds for previous terms. Id. at 14,811— 12. Customs gave several reasons for refusing to apply retroactively its rescission of the enhanced bonding requirement. Customs mentioned its obligation to protect the revenue and ensure compliance with law; its reluctance to interfere with the contractual relationship between principals and sureties; its concern that the existence of two bonds for the same period could pose legal confusion and lead to court action between competing sureties, resulting in serious risk to the agency’s ability to collect duties lawfully owed; and that the court, in National Fisheries I, did not order Customs to take any action on the previous bonds. Id. II. DISCUSSION The court exercises jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (2000), under which the cause of action generally is considered to arise under the APA. See Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 28 CIT 806, 818, 342 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1258 (2004), aff'd per curiam, 437 F.3d 1356 (Fed.Cir.2006). In exercising jurisdiction in such cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court is to review the matter as provided in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(e) (2000). In accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 706, the court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action ... found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). The court first addresses defendant’s argument that the modifications of the Bond Directive and the individual bond sufficiency determinations made thereunder are matters committed to agency discretion by law. See Def.’s Resp. 15-21. The court concludes, contrary to defendant’s argument, that the individual bond determinations that Customs made according to the enhanced bonding requirement are subject to judicial review under the APA “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review. Second, the court considers whether plaintiffs are correct that 19 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000), when read in conjunction with 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e(a)(3) or 1673g(a) (2000), prohibits Customs from considering anti-dumping duty liability when setting limits of liability on continuous bonds because security for potential antidumping duty liability is specifically provided for in §§ 1673e(a)(3) or 1673g(a), which require posting of a cash deposit to secure estimated antidumping duties. See Public Mem. of P. & A. 3-9. The court concludes that these statutory provisions do not preclude Customs from considering potential anti-dumping duty liability exceeding the amount of the required cash deposit. The court concludes, however, that in making actual bond sufficiency determinations under § 1623, Customs is constrained by the limitations of its ministerial role in the administration of the antidumping duty laws. Third, the court considers the competing arguments of the parties as to whether Customs acted in accordance with law in calculating the limits of liability in plaintiffs’ continuous entry bonds according to the enhanced bonding requirement. See id. at 17-26; Def.’s Resp. 21-28. The court concludes that the bond sufficiency determinations at issue are not in accordance with law. The enhanced bonding requirement was arbitrarily and capriciously applied only to importers of shrimp subject to antidumping duties, and the bonding formula included in the Amendment and Clarification sought to secure antidumping duties greatly exceeding the cash deposits. Finally, the court considers defendants’ various arguments against the court’s ordering relief in this case, including the fact that the sureties who issued the continuous entry bonds at issue are not parties to this action. See Def.’s Resp. 28-BO. The court rejects defendant’s arguments, concluding that the court has the power to fashion a remedy that is appropriate to redress the Agency actions that have been shown to be contrary to law. A. Customs’ Determinations Are Not Beyond APA Review as Actions “Committed to Agency Discretion by Law ” In National Fisheries I, the court concluded that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of succeeding on the merits on their claim that Customs’ actions in imposing on plaintiffs increased bond requirements pursuant to the Amendment and Clarification were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion and therefore contrary to law. Nat’l Fisheries I, 30 CIT at 1864-75, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1320-29. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected defendant’s arguments that the “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review did not apply. Id. at 1865-70, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1321-25. In again arguing this point, defendant repeats and augments the arguments it made previously. The court again rejects defendant’s arguments and concludes that the arbitrary, capricious standard of review applies to the administrative actions that are contested in this case. Defendant argues that the contested modifications of the Bond Directive and bond determinations made thereunder fall within the category of actions committed to agency discretion under the APA and that, therefore, “[t]he standard of review applicable to the bond requirements at issue here is not the ‘abuse of discretion’ or ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standards contained in 5 U.S.C. § 706.” Def.’s Resp. 15. Instead, according to defendant, “review is limited to whether: (1) CBP exceeded its statutory authority; (2) there was a constitutional violation; or (3) CBP violated its own regulation,” and because none of these three scenarios arises, plaintiffs have no recourse under the APA or otherwise. Id. at 16 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-31, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). Defendant maintains that the statute is drafted in a way that provides no meaningful standard by which the court can judge the agency’s exercise of discretion thereunder. Id. at 18-21. The court rejects defendant’s argument concerning the applicable standard of review. Defendant relies principally on Heckler in arguing that the contested bond determinations fall within the exception to APA review under which “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006); see Def.’s Resp. 15-18. Defendant’s reliance on Heckler is misplaced. In Heckler, plaintiffs challenged the refusal of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to conduct enforcement proceedings to stop the use of certain drugs as lethal injections in state death penalty proceedings, a use the FDA had not approved. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 1649. The plaintiffs in that case requested that the FDA instruct prisons to halt the unapproved use, seize the drugs, and prosecute the persons involved. Id. at 824, 105 S.Ct. 1649. The FDA refused, explaining that even were it to assume it has jurisdiction over the issue, it would not commence enforcement proceedings because such proceedings “[g]enerally ... are initiated only when there is a serious danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud.” Id. at 824-25, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (internal quotation marks omitted). The FDA perceived no such dangers in the state lethal injection laws, which it described as “duly authorized statutory enactments in furtherance of proper State functions.” Id. at 825, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court viewed the agency’s declining to act as a decision committed to agency discretion, explaining that “recognition of the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.” Id. at 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649. In contrast to Heckler, which arose from an agency’s refusal to act, this case arose from actions Customs took as an exercise of its authority over importers. In Heckler, the Supreme Court drew a pertinent distinction: [W]hen an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect. Similarly, when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner. The action at least can be reviewed to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory powers. Id. at 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (citation omitted). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Supreme Court declined to hold an agency action exempt from APA review, stating that “the exception for action ‘committed to agency discretion’ ... is a very narrow exception.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (emphasis added and footnote omitted). As the Court explained, “[t]he legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that [the exception] is applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” Id. at 410, 91 S.Ct. 814 (quoting S.Rep. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). The Supreme Court in Overton Park reasoned that the statute at issue, which gave paramount importance to park protection and disfavored the use of public parkland for highway construction, when viewed in the context in which it was enacted, ie., the relatively low cost of building highways on public parkland due to the publicly owned right-of-way and the minimal disruption of local residences and businesses, provided law to apply that was sufficient for judicial review under the APA. Id. at 412-13, 91 S.Ct. 814. As in Overton Park, there is law for a court to apply in this case. Congress enacted 19 U.S.C. § 1623 among its various other measures that regulate, and collect revenue on, imports. Under § 1623(a), “the Secretary of the Treasury may by regulation or specific instruction require, or authorize customs officers to require, such bonds or other security as he, or they, may deem necessary for the protection of the revenue or to assure compliance with any provision of law, regulation, or instruction.” 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a). The authority to require bonds includes the authority to set bond conditions and limits of liability. See id. § 1623(b)(1). The statute grants discretion to accept different types of bonds, including “term,” ie., continuous, bonds and consolidated bonds. See id. § 1623(b)(3)-(4). The discretion granted to the Agency by § 1623 is not boundless. Congress delegated authority to require such bonds as Customs “may deem necessary” for the protection of the revenue or to ensure compliance with law. See id. § 1623(a). Under the plain meaning of the provision, Customs is not free to set bonding requirements so onerous as to be unjustified by the statutory purpose of ensuring compliance or securing collection of the revenue. Overly burdensome bond requirements are not “necessary” to the fulfillment of either of those two statutory purposes. Yet, defendant’s arguments would suggest, contrary to the congressional intent of the APA as construed in Overton Park, that Customs could impose any bond requirements it desires, whether or not Customs adequately considered relevant factors, and be sustained upon judicial review so long as Customs does not exceed its discretion under 19 U.S.C. § 1623, which defendant views as sufficiently broad to justify all actions contested in this litigation. In this case, defendant advances a construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1623 and 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) under which the Agency’s bond determinations are, in a practical sense, unreviewable. The Court of International Trade previously has observed that Customs’ bond determinations are reviewable. In Hera Shipping, Inc. v. Carnes, 10 CIT 493, 640 F.Supp. 266 (1986), the court granted summary judgment for Customs after rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that Customs was required to conduct a full administrative hearing before increasing a bond amount. In upholding Customs’ determination, however, the court cautioned that “[ojbviously, the power to set bonds can be abused to put people out of business without reasonable justification” and that such an “extreme possibility is guarded against by the requirement that the notice provide sufficient information as to the basis for the change to allow it to be challenged in court.” Hera Shipping, Inc., 10 CIT at 496, 640 F.Supp. at 269. The opinion adds that “[i]t must be emphasized that a party is not entirely helpless when its bond is increased” and that “[t]he question of whether the increase was based on a reasonable belief as to the existence of the necessary justifying conditions will always be open, as will the reasonableness of the increase in relation to the objectives sought to be secured.” Id. at 497, 640 F.Supp. at 269. Relying on Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), defendant argues that “the ‘protection of the revenue’ standard is much like the ‘necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States[ ]’ standard that the Supreme Court concluded was ‘drawn in such broad terms that in a given ease there is no law to apply.’ ” Def.’s Resp. 19 (quoting Webster, 486 U.S. at 599-600, 108 S.Ct. 2047). The Supreme Court in Webster, 486 U.S. at 599-601, 108 S.Ct. 2047, considered the availability of APA review for an employee’s discharge from the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) under section 102(c) of the National Security Act, which provides that “the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” Id. at 594, 108 S.Ct. 2047 (quoting section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 498, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1982)). The Supreme Court concluded that Congress, in enacting section 102(c), “meant to commit individual employee discharges to the Director’s discretion, and that [5 U.S.C.] § 701(a)(2) accordingly precludes judicial review of these decisions under the APA.” Id. at 601, 108 S.Ct. 2047. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion based on the language of § 102(c), which the Court concluded “fairly exudes deference to the Director,” and the structure of the National Security Act, which created the CIA and gave the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Id. at 600-01, 108 S.Ct. 2047. Other than the use of the words “deem” and “necessary,” the court does not find in the language of 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a) enough that is in common with § 102(c) of the National Security Act to accept the premise of defendant’s argument. The stated purpose of § 1623(a), ie., to provide for bonding requirements that are necessary for the protection of the revenue and to ensure compliance with law, guides a Customs officer’s exercise of discretion to set the limit of liability on a continuous entry bond. Therefore, the breadth of discretion granted by 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a) is not analogous or comparable to that granted to the CIA Director under section 102(c) to discharge an employee engaged in critical national security functions whenever the CIA Director deems it “necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” The court concludes instead that § 1623 provides law to apply when reviewing a bond sufficiency determination according to the “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review. B. Customs Acted Unlawfully in Imposing the Enhanced Bonding Requirement on Plaintiffs The court will review Customs’ actions under the “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review. The standard of review is a narrow one under which the court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974). In reviewing agency action under this standard, a court “must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814 (citations omitted). To uphold an agency action under this standard, the court must conclude that Customs articulated a “ ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” Bowman, 419 U.S. at 285, 95 S.Ct. 438 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)). Although the court will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the court reasonably can discern the agency’s path, the court will not advance reasoning that the agency has not itself provided. Id. at 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438. Agency actions are held to be arbitrary and capricious if the agency, inter alia, “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [offered an explanation that] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). Plaintiffs argue that Customs lacks the statutory authority to consider antidumping duty liability when determining the sufficiency of an importer’s bond. They view the effect of several statutory provisions, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1623, 1673e(a)(3), and 1673g(a), as vesting in Commerce the sole authority to decide how to secure collection of antidumping duties. See Public Mem. of P. & A. 3-9. Plaintiffs maintain that 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3) limits to the cash deposit the security required of importers upon issuance of an antidumping duty order. Id. at 3. They also argue that the role of Customs under the antidumping laws is ministerial, citing legislative history, the Reorganization Plan, and various precedents. Id. at 4-16. Plaintiffs argue, further, that the bond formulas under which the bond determinations were made are not reasonably related to the problem of under-collection of duties that Customs identified as the problem it sought to resolve. Id. at 22-23. Plaintiffs contend that Customs, in rigidly applying the formula in the Amendment, declined to exercise discretion and thereby acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Id. at 20-22. Plaintiffs submit, in addition, that Customs applied the modified Bond Directive to shrimp importers without any basis for concluding that shrimp importers pose an increased risk of default. Id. at 17-20. Defendant responds that the actions Customs has taken are within its statutory authority and that neither the cash deposit provisions of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e(a)(3) and 1673g(a) nor the Reorganization Plan precludes Customs from imposing bond requirements to protect the revenue generated by antidumping duties. Def.’s Resp. 9-15. Defendant points to the longstanding authority of Customs to administer “ ‘provisions of law relating to raising revenue from imports, or to duties on imports,’ ” id. at 5-6 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 66 (2000)), and argues that § 1623, an early version of which was enacted by Congress as part of the Tariff Act of 1930, Pub.L. No. 71-361, § 623, 46 Stat. 590, 759 (1930), specifically grants Customs expansive bonding authority to ensure the collection of revenue raised from imports. Id. at 6-7 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1623). In enacting the Homeland Security Act of 2002, defendant explains, Congress affirmed Customs’ authority over the collection of antidumping duties through certain statutory provisions such as 6 U.S.C. § 211, which established Customs within the Department of Homeland Security, and 6 U.S.C. § 215, which conferred “customs revenue authority” upon Customs that includes “[ajssessing and collecting customs duties (including antidumping and countervailing duties ...).” Id. at 6 (quoting 6 U.S.C. § 215(1)); 6 U.S.C. §§ 211, 215 (Supp. V 2005). To the extent that Customs has construed statutory provisions, particularly 19 U.S.C. § 1623, in applying the enhanced bonding requirement, the court recognizes that an agency’s interpretations of a statute may merit deference even where that interpretation does not issu'e from formal rulemaking or an adjudicative process. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). The degree of deference accorded “to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40, 65 S.Ct. 161). In this case, Customs has not articulated clearly a construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1623 and related provisions of law in the context of the specific issues to be decided in this litigation. The Agency’s issuances do not persuade the court that Customs, in taking the actions contested in this case, considered the appropriate factors and recognized the limitations on its authority. For reasons discussed in the remainder of this Opinion and Order, the court concludes that the individual bond sufficiency determinations at issue must be set aside under the applicable standard of review. 1. Section 623 of the Tariff Act Provides Broad Authority to Require Bonds to Protect the Revenue in Import Transactions In National Fisheries I, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits on their claim that the statute precludes Customs from considering potential antidumping liability in the sufficiency of a continuous bond. Nat’l Fisheries I, 30 CIT at 1862-64, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1318-20. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a), by limiting Customs’ authority to require importers to post bonds to “case[s] in which bond or other security is not specifically required by law,” precluded Customs from requiring additional security for anti-dumping and countervailing duty liability because the collection of cash deposits for such circumstances is already provided for in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a)(S) and 1673e(a)(3). Id. at 1862-63, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1318-19. The court reasoned that § 1623(a) primarily “addresses the matter of when a bond or other security may be required” and that while plaintiffs “would have the court construe the introductory phrase as a limitation on the authority of the Secretary and Customs to set the limit of liability of a term bond,” the “only language in subsection (a) that specifically relates to the limit of liability of a term bond allows for bonds ‘necessary for the protection of the revenue.’ ” Id. at 1863, 465 F.Supp.2d at 1319 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a)). The court explained, moreover, that the provisions of subsection (b) of § 1623 “appear to provide Customs considerable discretion in setting the requirements for term bonds so as to protect the revenue.” Id. In support of their motion for judgment upon the agency record, plaintiffs express the view that “the Court’s reading of [19 U.S.C. § 1623] is too broad.” Public Mem. of P. & A. 3. Plaintiffs augment their previous argument by pointing out that 19 U.S.C. § 1623(b)(1) “states that CBP has the discretion to establish the terms and conditions of bonds ‘[ejxcept as otherwise specifically provided by law.’ ” Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1623(b)(1)). Plaintiffs argue that “this provision must be read in conjunction with other acts of Congress that limit CBP’s authority,” id,., and that Customs therefore lacks authority to set the amount of bond with respect to potential antidumping duty liability because security for this liability is specifically set by 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e(a)(3) and 1673g(a), which provide for a cash deposit in an amount determined by Commerce, not Customs. See id. at 3-9; Oral Argument Tr. 35, Apr. 17, 2007 (according to plaintiffs’ counsel, plaintiffs, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1623(b)(1) “are not arguing that no bond whatsoever is permissible ... just that in setting the amount of that bond [Customs] cannot include potential anti-dumping duty liability.”). Plaintiffs construe §§ 1673e(a)(3) and 1673g(a) to mean that the cash deposit is the only security for antidumping duty liability that may be required of importers after issuance of an antidumping duty order. Public Mem. of P. & A. 3-5. In § 1673e(a)(3), Congress specified the contents of an antidumping duty order, providing as follows: (a) Publication of antidumping duty order Within 7 days after being notified by the [International Trade] Commission of an affirmative determination under section 1673d(b) of this title, the administering authority shall publish an anti-dumping duty order which— (3) requires the deposit of estimated antidumping duties pending liquidation of entries of merchandise at the same time as estimated normal customs duties on that merchandise are deposited. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3) (emphasis added). Similarly, in § 1673g(a), Congress provided that: For all entries, or withdrawals from warehouse, for consumption of merchandise subject to an antidumping duty order on or after the date of publication of such order, no customs officer may deliver merchandise of that class or kind to the person by whom or for whose account it was imported unless that person ... deposits with the appropriate customs officer an estimated antidumping duty in an amount determined by [Commerce]. Id. § 1673g(a). Plaintiffs’ argument correctly recognizes that under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e(a)(3) and 1673g(a), only Commerce, and not Customs, is empowered to set the cash deposit requirement based on the estimated antidumping duty, and that Customs has the role of collecting that cash deposit before releasing subject merchandise. Plaintiffs’ argument is unconvincing, however, in insisting that the introductory phrases in § 1623(a) and (b)(1) preclude Customs, when determining a bond amount, from requiring security to guarantee collection, upon liquidation, of any antidumping duties in excess of the cash deposit. Nor do plaintiffs point to anything in §§ 1673e(a)(3) or 1673g(a) connoting that Congress intended the cash deposits required thereunder to be the sole security that the government may require for potential antidumping duty liability. Section 623(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a), provides that [i]n any case in which bond or other security is not specifically required by law, the Secretary of the Treasury may by regulation or specific instruction require, or authorize customs officers to require, such bonds or other security as he, or they, may deem necessary for the protection of the revenue or to assure compliance with any provision of law, regulation, or instruction which the Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service may be authorized to enforce. Id. § 1623(a). It is admittedly plausible to construe the introductory phrase in 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a), “[i]n any case in which bond or other security is not specifically required by law,” to mean that Congress intended to place entirely beyond the scope of the “bonds or other security” authority conferred upon Customs by § 1623 any import transaction for which security is required elsewhere in law. Such, however, is not the only plausible construction. It is at least equally plausible to construe the introductory phrase such that potential antidumping duties exceeding the cash deposit, which are not secured by §§ 1673e(a)(3) and 1673g(a), constitute a “case” in which Customs may require additional security under subsection (a) of § 1623. Moreover, legislative history casts doubt on plaintiffs’ preferred construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1623. The House report associated with the enactment of Section 623 of the Tariff Act of 1930 explained the new provision as follows: In order to provide for more uniformity in these matters [ie., matters in the tariff laws pertaining to bonds] and for more elasticity in the requirements for bonds, there is included in the bill as section 623 a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury by regulations to require or to authorize collectors to require such bonds or other security as he or they may deem necessary for the protection of the revenue and to assure compliance with the customs laws and regulations. A number of specific provisions of Titles III and IV requiring bonds in particular cases have been eliminated to correspond with this amendment. The new provision will authorize the requirement of a bond wherever not specifically required by the law, but will not permit of the waiving of a bond where an express requirement occurs. H.R.Rep. No. 71-7, at 186 (1929). The sense of the quoted passage is that Congress, in enacting § 1623, wanted to broaden the existing authority of Customs to require security to protect the revenue. There is no indication of an intent to narrow the scope of existing authority, and Congress made clear that the new statutory framework would authorize Customs to require a bond even if the law did not specifically require one. In also explaining that Customs could not waive a bond requirement where the law did require one, the passage indicates that along with providing Customs more discretion (as suggested by the reference to “elasticity in the requirements for bonds”), providing security for the collection of revenue was a primary congressional concern. The legislative history of § 1623 does not support plaintiffs’ preferred construction of subsection (a) of that statute. Nor does the court construe the introductory provision of subsection (b)(1) of § 1623 as precluding Customs, in setting the amount of a term bond, from considering potential antidumping duty liability. Subsection (b) of § 1623 provides that [w]henever a bond is required or authorized by a law, regulation, or instruction which the Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service is authorized to enforce, the Secretary of the Treasury may— (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, prescribe the conditions and form of such bond and the manner in which the bond may be filed ... and fix the amount of penalty thereof, whether for the payment of liquidated damages or of a penal sum (2) Provide for the approval of the sureties on such bond, without regard to any general provision of law. (3) Authorize the execution of a term bond the conditions of which shall extend to and cover similar cases of importations over such period of time, not to exceed one year, or such longer period as he may fix when in his opinion special circumstances existing in a particular instance require such longer period. 19 U.S.C. § 1623(b)(l)-(3). While plaintiffs correctly point out that the agency has wide discretion to set the conditions and form of a bond “[ejxcept as otherwise specifically provided by law,” the court does not construe the provisions in the antidumping law that govern cash deposits as “specifically provid[ing]” the conditions and form of a bond used to secure potential antidumping duty liability that could exist above the cash deposit. Although Commerce, not Customs, determines the amount of the cash deposit under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e(a)(3) and 1673g(a), nothing in these provisions specifies that the cash deposit is the sole form of security that the government may require for potential antidumping duty liability following issuance of an antidumping duty order, such that bonding to guarantee payment of potential liability exceeding the cash deposit under 19 U.S.C. § 1623 is impermissible. When two or more statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm., 400 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2005); see County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 255-56, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992). Plaintiffs also cite legislative history from the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which required collection of the cash deposit for estimated antidumping duties on entries made after issuance of an