Full opinion text
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE [RE DKT. NOS. 75, 77, 78, 84, 109] JAMES Y. SELNA, District Judge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the First Amended Complaint, all documents filed in connection with the pending motions to dismiss, motion to strike, and motions for summary judgment, and all of the records herein, including the attached Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge (“Report and Recommendation”), the parties’ objections thereto, and the parties’ responses to the objections. The Court has further made a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. The Court concurs with and adopts the Report and Recommendation with the following modifications: (1) Claim Ten is dismissed with leave to amend; and (2) Footnote 30, at page 23 is deleted. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: (1) the Motion to Dismiss is in part and denied in part; (2) the Anoufrieva Motion is denied; (8) the Anti-SLAPP Motion is denied without prejudice; (4) Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motions are denied; (5) to the extent plaintiff elects to amend those portions of the First Amended Complaint as to which leave to amend has been granted, plaintiff must file any Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days of the entry of this Order; and (6) plaintiff is advised that the failure timely to file a Second Amended Complaint will result in this action proceeding solely on the remaining portions of the First Amended Complaint absent further order of the court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Report and Recommendation on plaintiff and on defendants’ counsel. IT IS SO ORDERED. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATE MAGISTRATE JUDGE [RE DKT. NOS. 75, 77, 78, 84, 109] JACQUELINE CHOOLJIAN, United States Magistrate Judge. This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. I. SUMMARY On April 3, 2008, plaintiff King Brett Lauter (“plaintiff’), who is at liberty, has paid the filing fee, and is proceeding pro se, filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”) in this action. The eighty-four page First Amended Complaint purports to raise claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, claims under federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(2), and various state law claims. The seven named defendants are: (1) plaintiffs former wife, Irina Anoufrieva (“Anoufrieva”); (2) former paralegal Lauren Liebert (“Liebert”); (3) former paralegal Tere Lynn Guerrero (“Guerrero”); (4) deceased attorney Jonathan C.S. Cox (“Cox”); (5) Debra Cox as representative of the estate of Jonathan C.S. Cox (the “Cox Estate”); (6) Cox Pad-more Skolnik & Shakarchy LLP (the “Cox Firm”); and (7) former paralegal Ellen Bodiseo (Miller) (“Miller”). Pending before the court and addressed in this Report and Recommendation are five motions: (1) a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”) filed by defendants Liebert, Cox, the Cox Estate and the Cox Firm (collectively the “Liebert/Cox Defendants”) in which defendants Guerrero and Miller have joined;' (2) a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Anoufrieva (“Anoufrieva Motion”); (3) a Special Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint on Slapp Suit Grounds (the “Anti-SLAPP Motion”) filed by the Liebert/Cox Defendants in which defendants Guerrero and Miller have joined; (4) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Guerrero (“Plaintiffs Guerrero Motion”); and (5) Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Anoufrieva (“Plaintiffs Anoufrieva Motion”). (Plaintiffs Guerrero Motion and Plaintiffs Anoufrieva Motion will collectively be referred to as “Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motions”). Based upon the record and the applicable law, and as further discussed below: (1) the Motion to Dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part; (2) the Anoufrieva Motion should be denied; (3) the Anti-SLAPP Motion should be denied; and (4) Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motions should be denied. II. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff essentially alleges that defendant Anoufrieva and the other defendants — all of whom were at one time affiliated with the Cox Firm — engaged in a pattern of harassment against plaintiff, pursuant to which they, among other things, falsely reported to various government authorities and courts that plaintiff had physically abused Anoufrieva and had violated a restraining order. In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges, among other things, the following: A. Background On March 13, 1999, plaintiff executed and submitted to immigration authorities, a petition in support of obtaining a fiancee visa for defendant Anoufrieva, a Russian citizen. (FAC at 4, 11-12). On July 28, 1999, defendant Anoufrieva entered the United States based upon the fiancee visa. (FAC at 12). On October 26, 1999, plaintiff and defendant Anoufrieva married and lived together in an apartment on the Stanford University campus, where plaintiff was a student. (FAC at 12). On October 27, 1999, plaintiff and defendant Anoufrieva applied for a conditional permanent resident visa for Anoufrieva, based upon her status as plaintiffs wife. (FAC at 12). Defendant Anoufrieva later received the temporary visa. (FAC at 13). In August 2000, defendant Anoufrieva began to have an affair with another man and became pregnant with the other man’s child. (FAC at 12). In the same month, the Cox Firm hired Anoufrieva to work as a paralegal for defendant Cox and with defendants Liebert, Guerrero and Miller. (FAC at 12). On November 1, 2000, defendant Anoufrieva moved out and left plaintiff a voice-mail message stating that she had decided to end the marriage. (FAC at 13). B. Stanford Police Reports/Investigation On November 1, 2000 — the same date defendant Anoufrieva left plaintiff- — defendant Cox reported to the Stanford Police Chief that plaintiff had raped and committed domestic violence against Anoufrieva. (FAC at 13). Defendant Cox persuaded the Chief to initiate a criminal investigation against plaintiff. (FAC at 13). On the same date, defendants Cox, Liebert and Guerrero, acting on behalf of the Cox Firm, contacted another Stanford Police officer and stated that plaintiff had committed domestic violence and spousal rape against Anoufrieva and had threatened to kill her and dispose of her body. (FAC at 14). On November 2, 2000, defendants Anoufrieva and Liebert went to the police station to file a crime report (the “Stanford Police Report”). (FAC at 14). Defendant Liebert made a litany of false accusations against plaintiff. (FAC at 14). On November 6, 2000, the Stanford Police telephonically contacted plaintiff and told him that he was being investigated for domestic violence and spousal rape. (FAC at 14). Between November 1, 2000 and January 18, 2001, the Stanford Police investigated defendants’ allegations against plaintiff. (FAC at 16). The police concluded that there was no evidence and no charges were filed. (FAC at 16). C. The Bankruptcy Case On November 7, 2000 — the day after the Stanford Police advised plaintiff that he was being investigated — plaintiff, who had been experiencing financial hardship due in part to debts incurred by his father who had died the prior year, decided to file for bankruptcy. (FAC at 15). On May 11, 2001, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the bankruptcy case. (FAC at 22). D. The Asylum Case Between November 2000 and June 2001, defendants prepared and submitted documents, including the Stanford Police Report, to immigration authorities in an effort to demonstrate that Anoufrieva was a victim of domestic violence and to support a claim for asylum (the “Asylum Case”). (FAC at 16). E. The Domestic Violence Action and the Annulment Case On November 9, 2000, defendants Cox, the Cox Firm, Liebert and Anoufrieva initiated a Superior Court action (“the Domestic Violence Action”) against plaintiff, alleged that plaintiff had terrorized, raped and tortured Anoufrieva over a 15-month period, and obtained a domestic violence prevention restraining order against him. (FAC at 15). The next day plaintiff was served with the restraining order and hired an attorney. (FAC at 15). On December 1, 2000, the judge in the Domestic Violence Action concluded that there was no evidence that plaintiff had committed domestic violence or rape and that plaintiff did not owe Anoufrieva any money or support payments. (FAC at 17). On December 18, 2000, plaintiff filed a Superior Court action to annul his marriage to defendant Anoufrieva based upon fraud. (FAC at 18). On February 1, 2001, plaintiff and defendant Anoufrieva (through a non-defendant lawyer), agreed in writing to settle the annulment action on the following terms: (i) the restraining order would be vacated; (ii) the parties would sign mutual general releases for all civil and criminal claims accrued as of that date; (iii) a judgment of dissolution would be entered; (iv) neither party would receive any alimony or property from the other; and (v) the parties would make full disclosure to one another. (FAC at 20). The restraining order was vacated on February 1, 2001. (FAC at 17). F.Other Alleged Harassment Between November 1, 2000 and November 10, 2000, defendant Liebert covertly entered plaintiffs apartment without plaintiffs permission, removed plaintiffs personal files, including files containing correspondence between plaintiff and a former girlfriend, and provided the files to the Stanford Police. (FAC at 16). Between December 2000 and January 2001, defendants Cox, the Cox Firm, Anoufrieva and Liebert employed “dirty tricks” to harass and intimidate plaintiff. (FAC at 18). Among other things, defendants: (i) fraudulently filed three change of address forms (in defendant Liebert’s handwriting and billed by the Cox Firm to defendant Anoufrieva) so that plaintiffs mail would be sent to the Cox Firm; (ii) contacted the Stanford University Dean to make negative statements about plaintiff and to pressure the Dean to evict plaintiff from his campus apartment; (iii) contacted plaintiffs creditors to obtain private information about plaintiff; (iv) contacted a federal prosecutor to request that plaintiff be charged with social security and bankruptcy fraud; and (v) contacted and persuaded plaintiffs bankruptcy trustee to threaten plaintiff with criminal prosecution if he did not dismiss the bankruptcy. (FAC at 19). G. Menlo Park Police Report/Investigation and Resulting Prosecution On January 2, 2001, defendants the Cox Firm, Guerrero, and Miller and another non-defendant Cox Firm employee, filed a false report with the Menlo Park Police alleging that plaintiff had violated the restraining order. (FAC at 19). Defendants’ false police report led to a criminal prosecution of plaintiff that lasted for six and a half years. (FAC at 19). Defendants the Cox Firm, Guerrero and Liebert also submitted the Stanford Police Report to the Menlo Park Police, who in turn, attached it to their own report and provided it to the prosecutor. (FAC at 16, 20). On January 4, 2001, defendant Anoufrieva filed a false supplemental report with the Menlo Park Police in which she stated that she had quit her job due to her extreme fear of plaintiff. (FAC at 20). On February 14, 2001, at the offices of the Cox Firm, defendant Guerrero and Miller identified plaintiffs photo in a photospread. (FAC at 21). Between February 14, 2001 and June 6, 2007, defendants pursued a criminal prosecution of plaintiff by providing the Menlo Park Police and the prosecutor with photographs of plaintiff and his car and documents that presented plaintiff in a false light. (FAC at 21). Defendants’ refusal to recant their false statements to the police led to plaintiffs arrest and false imprisonment on a warrant and criminal complaint issued on March 7, 2001. (FAC at 21). Between March 7, 2001 and June 6, 2007, defendants continued to prosecute the criminal action against plaintiff. (FAC at 21). In the interim — in April 2001, plaintiff felt compelled to leave California due to defendants’ campaign of harassment and intimidation and the resulting anguish and humiliation plaintiff suffered. (FAC at 22). Over six years later, in September 2006, plaintiff returned to California. (FAC at 23). In November 2006, as a result of a criminal background check performed pursuant to a job application, plaintiff first learned that he was charged in the foregoing criminal proceeding. (FAC at 23). On April 30, 2007, plaintiff appeared in court in the criminal proceeding, was taken into custody, and had conditions imposed upon his liberty by the court. (FAC at 23). Plaintiff, for the first time, viewed the Menlo Park Police report which revealed the roles of defendants Guerrero, Liebert, Cox, and the Cox firm in instigating the criminal proceeding against him. (FAC at 23-24). On June 6, 2007, the criminal proceeding was terminated in plaintiffs favor. (FAC at 24). H. Post-Prosecution Events Beginning on June 6, 2007, plaintiff attempted to contact Debra Cox to determine whether she was the representative of the Cox Estate and to speak with her regarding his intent to file the instant federal lawsuit. (FAC at 24-25). Debra Cox was verbally abusive and accused plaintiff of threatening her. (FAC at 25). On June 22, 2007, a caller who identified himself as a police officer addressed plaintiff in an intimidating tone, told plaintiff that plaintiff had made terrorist threats to Ms. Cox, and advised plaintiff that the officer would file a crime report against plaintiff, and that plaintiff would be prosecuted. (FAC at 25-26). On September 1, 2007, defendant Anoufrieva left plaintiff a voicemail message, threatening to have plaintiff shot if he did not desist from suing her and defendant Guerrero. (FAC at 27). On October 19, 2007, plaintiff received a voicemail message from a male caller who identified himself as an inspector from Menlo Park, said he was calling on behalf of defendant Anoufrieva, and threatened to have plaintiff arrested and prosecuted if he did not immediately drop his lawsuit. (FAC at 27-28). On October 28, 2007, plaintiffs elderly frail mother advised plaintiff that she had received a call from a Menlo Park inspector who demanded that plaintiff drop his lawsuit and who threatened to harass her if plaintiff did not do so. (FAC at 29). In November and December 2007, plaintiff received numerous phone calls from the same man who identified himself as defendant Anoufrieva’s boyfriend. (FAC at 29). During the same time frame, defendant Anoufrieva was arrested on felony charges of making a terrorist threat and violating a court order, pleaded guilty, and was imprisoned through December 31, 2007. (FAC at 29). III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS A. Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to give the defendants fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”), 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted). While a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id. at 1965. A plaintiff must proffer enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 1974. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim because: (1) the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory; or (2) the complaint alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). In ruling on a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take as true all factual allegations in a complaint, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Yamaguchi v. United States Department of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir.1997). However, the court is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001), amended in non-pertinent part on denial of rehearing, 275 F.3d 1187 (2001). In the case of a pro se plaintiff, pleadings are liberally construed to afford him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted where the plaintiff fails to “nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974; Mitan v. Feeney, 497 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1124 (C.D.Cal.2007). Where the complaint discloses a fact that necessarily defeats a claim, the court may dismiss on that basis as well. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir.1984). “When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.1980) (citation omitted). Motions to dismiss cannot be granted “if the factual and legal issues are not sufficiently clear to permit [the court] to determine with certainty whether the doctrine [of equitable tolling] could be successfully invoked.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1995). “In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the Complaint to a plaintiffs moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” See Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir.1998) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The court may, however, consider documents properly submitted as part of the complaint or upon which the complaint necessarily relies, if the authenticity of such documents is not contested. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint. Mitan, 497 F.Supp.2d at 1124 (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998)). A court may also consider judicially noticed matters of public record. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689; Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.1988) (court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment); Schweitzer v. Scott, 469 F.Supp. 1017, 1020 (C.D.Cal.1979) (court may take judicial notice of court files and records) (citing Fed. R.Evid. 201); Tekle v. United States, 2002 WL 1988178 *3 (C.D.Cal.2002) (court may take judicial notice of prior complaint with exhibits) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)), aff'd, 58 Fed.Appx. 768 (9th Cir.2003). However, a court may not take judicial notice of a fact that is subject to “reasonable dispute” simply because it is contained within a pleading that has been filed as a public record or is asserted in another document which otherwise is properly the subject of judicial notice. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 689-90. If the court finds that a complaint has failed to state a claim, dismissal may be with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). A court may consider factual allegations outside of the complaint in determining whether to grant leave to amend. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n. 2 (9th Cir.2003). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only in “extraordinary” circumstances. Id. at 1028 (9th Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation omitted). A pro se complaint may not be dismissed without leave to amend unless “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the Complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (court should not dismiss pro se complaint without leave to amend “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). A court may also dismiss a complaint without leave to amend when amendment would be futile. McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.2004). B. Discussion In the Motion to Dismiss, the moving defendants argue, albeit in a different order that: (i) all claims, except claims seven through nine and eleven, fail to state claims and/or are improper and should be dismissed; (ii) claim eleven — the prima facie tort claim — is not cognizable and should be dismissed; (iii) claim fourteen— the civil conspiracy claim — and all portions of plaintiffs other claims which are predicated upon an alleged conspiracy, should be dismissed, inter alia, because California Civil Code § 1714.10 prohibits the filing of claims against an attorney predicated upon a conspiracy between the attorney and his/ her client; and (iv) all claims, except claims three, eleven and fourteen, are time-barred and should be dismissed. Defendant Anoufrieva also seeks dismissal of the First Amended Complaint based upon the statute of limitations. The court initially addresses defendants’ non-statute of limitations contentions. The parties’ statute of limitations arguments are then addressed, the extent necessary, in a separate section below. 1. Claim One: RICO — Against All Defendants The elements of a RICO claim are: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiffs ‘business or property,’ ” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1192, 126 S.Ct. 2861, 165 L.Ed.2d 895 (2006) (citations omitted). For purposes of RICO, “racketeering activity” means: (1) “any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical ... which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year”; and (2) any act which is indictable under a number of specified federal criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). A “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within ten years after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Plaintiffs RICO claim is predicated on alleged violations of federal statutes prohibiting witness tampering (18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)-(d)), presentation of false documents to immigration authorities (18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)), immigration document fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(l)), and mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341). (FAC at 33-36). Defendants allege, albeit in a different order, that the RICO claim should be dismissed because plaintiff (i) fails to plead the elements of the claim with adequate particularity; (ii) fails to allege activity lasting a period of time sufficient to constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity”; and (iii) lacks standing to pursue the claim. For the reasons stated below, this court recommends that plaintiffs RICO claim be dismissed with leave to amend. a. Adequacy and Particularity of Pleading Elements Defendants contend that plaintiffs RICO claim should be dismissed because it is not pleaded with the particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) in that it offers no details regarding “the who, what, where, why, when and how of the RICO allegations.” (Motion to Dismiss at 27). Plaintiff responds that the allegations are sufficiently specific. (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 20). Cases in which RICO claims are predicated upon fraud, must conform to the particularized pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), i.e., they must state the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir.2004). However, RICO claims not predicated upon fraud, need not be pleaded with particularity. See Marks v. City of Seattle, 2003 WL 23024522 *6 (W.D.Wash.2003) (rejecting defendant’s assertion that pleading of non-fraud RICO claims must conform to Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). In this case, plaintiffs RICO claim, as noted above, is predicated on alleged violations of federal statutes prohibiting witness tampering (18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)-(d)), presentation of false documents to immigration authorities (18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)), immigration document fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(l)), and mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341). (FAC at 33-36). As witness tampering is not a fraud predicate, it need not be pleaded with particularity. However, as the remaining three acts are alleged fraud predicates which must be pleaded with particularity, the court proceeds to examine the adequacy of the allegations of such predicate acts. As to the asserted violation of section 1546(a) of Title 18, plaintiff alleges that between November 2000 and June 2001, defendants, acting individually and in concert, prepared and presented to immigration authorities, on behalf of defendant Anoufrieva and in support of her asylum application, documents and petitions (including an INS Form 1-751 and the Stanford Police Report) which contain false statements and which fail to contain any reasonable basis in fact or law. (FAC at 16, 34). In order to state a claim under the portion of section 1546(a) implicated by plaintiffs allegations, plaintiff must allege: (1) defendants presented an application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations; (2) such application, affidavit or document contained a false statement with respect to a material fact or failed to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact; and (3) defendants acted knowingly. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). Plaintiffs claim is deficient and lacking in adequate particularity. First, he fails to provide adequate particularity regarding the date(s) on which the document(s) were presented to immigration authorities. Instead, he alleges an eight-month period of November 2000 to June 2001 during which the alleged submission occurred. Second, he fails to al-' lege the particular defendant or defendants who actually submitted documents. Third, he fails to specify all documents upon which his claim is predicated and instead merely notes that the submission includes two specific documents. Fourth, he fails to allege that the specifically referenced documents or other documents in issue were required by the immigration laws or regulations. Finally, to the extent plaintiffs claim is predicated upon the falsity of statements contained in the documents presented, he fails to specify the false statement(s) allegedly contained in such documents or to allege that such statement(s) were material. Accordingly, plaintiff fails adequately to allege a predicate racketeering act based upon a violation of section 1546(a) of Title 18. As to the asserted violation of section, 1324c(a)(l) of Title 8, plaintiff alleges that between November 2000 and June 2001, defendants, acting individually and in concert, prepared an application or document (including an INS Form 1-751 and the Stanford Police Report) with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the fact that the application or document contains a false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or has no basis in fact or in law. (FAC at 34). The foregoing statute makes it unlawful for any person or entity knowingly to falsely make any document for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of chapter 12 of Title 8 or to obtain a benefit under such chapter. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(l). The term “falsely make” means to prepare or provide an application or document, with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the fact that the application or document contains a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or material representation, or has no basis in law or fact, or otherwise fails to state a fact which is material to the purpose for which it was submitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(f). Assuming a violation of this statute qualifies as a racketeering act (see supra note 25), plaintiff fails adequately to allege such a violation for much the same reason that he fails adequately to allege a violation of section 1546(a). First, he fails to provide adequate particularity regarding the date(s) on which the documents) were presented to immigration authorities. Instead, he alleges an eight-month period of November 2000 to June 2001 during which the alleged submission occurred. (FAC at 16). Second, he fails to allege the particular defendant or defendants who actually submitted documents. Third, he fails to specify all documents allegedly in issue and instead merely notes that the description includes two specific documents. Fourth, to the extent plaintiffs claim is predicated upon the falsity of statements contained in the documents presented, he fails to specify the false statement(s) allegedly contained in such documents or to allege that such statements) were material. Accordingly, plaintiff fails adequately to allege a predicate racketeering act based upon a violation of section 1324c(a)(l). Finally, to state a claim for the asserted mail fraud, in violation of section 1341 of Title 18, plaintiff must allege that: (1) defendants formed a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) defendants used or caused the use of the United States mails in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) defendants did so with the specific intent to deceive or defraud. See Schreiber Distr. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986). As detailed in note 24, supra, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341 by engaging in two schemes. Plaintiff does not allege, however, that either scheme was a scheme to defraud or that defendants acted with the specific intent to deceive or defraud. Accordingly, in at least the foregoing respects, he fails adequately to allege that defendants committed mail fraud. As the alleged witness tampering does not by itself constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity” and, as plaintiff has not adequately pleaded any other racketeering acts which, when combined with the alleged witness tampering, would constitute such a pattern, plaintiffs RICO claim should be dismissed. b. Pattern of Racketeering Activity As noted above, a “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity ... the last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). “Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement: Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989); Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A pattern of activity lasting only a few months does not reflect the ‘long term criminal conduct’ to which RICO was intended to apply”); See also Howard v. America Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir.2000) (“Activity that lasts only a few months is not sufficiently continuous.”); but see Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1528 (9th Cir.1995) (no “bright line” one year minimum requirement). Defendants contend that the alleged predicate acts in this case encompassed only the approximately three-month period from November 2000 to January 2001, and that such period of time is insufficient as a matter of law. (Motion to Dismiss at 25-26). Plaintiff alleges that he also incurred injuries in November 2006 (being turned down for employment), between April 30 and June 6, 2007 (imprisonment), on June 22, 2007 (alleged extortionate threat by Debra Cox and the Cox Estate), on September 1, 2007 (alleged death threat by defendant Anoufrieva), and on October 19, 2007 (alleged intimidating threats by defendant Anoufrieva). The first two events referenced by plaintiff — plaintiff being turned down for employment and plaintiffs imprisonment — do not assist plaintiff in establishing a pattern of racketeering activity as such events are not predicate racketeering acts. The last three events, however, are alleged to constitute racketeering activity, i.e., witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)-(d). See supra note 21. The moving defendants suggest that the later acts are not properly the subject of the RICO claim because they were not associated with defendant Anoufrieva beyond early 2001. (Motion to Dismiss at 26). They essentially argue that they .and defendant Anoufrieva were not part of an enterprise after early 2001 — to the extent they ever were — and that any alleged activity after that date is not properly a predicate of the RICO claim. As plaintiff notes, the First Amended Complaint alleges that defendant Anoufrieva continued to be associated with the Cox Firm beyond early 2001 through, inter alia, her personal relationships with defendants Cox and Guerrero. (FAC at 32). He further alleges that a relationship of privity existed between them to June 2007 by virtue of Anoufrieva’s status as an employee of Cox/the Cox Firm from August 2000 through December 2000, her status as a client from November 2000 until at least June 2001, and her “personal relationship” with defendants Cox and Guerrero which continued at least through 2004. (FAC at 12, 13). Plaintiffs foregoing allegations are conclusory and are predicated upon unwarranted deductions of fact and unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. As noted above, plaintiff is required to, and has failed to plead with particularity the allegations of the RICO claim to the extent predicated upon fraud. Although plaintiff makes very broad brush allegations of generic activities spanning several months and/or years, no defendant is alleged to have performed a specific act vis-a-vis plaintiff, let alone a specific predicate act between mid-February 2001 and early June 2007. Even affording plaintiff the benefit of any doubt and construing the First Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to him, plaintiff fails to proffer enough facts to make plausible on their face, plaintiffs allegations that the alleged witness tampering in 2006 and 2007 can properly be considered as anything other than discrete acts of the individuals involved therein as opposed to predicate acts of his RICO claim. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. As the First Amended Complaint fails adequately to allege activity lasting a period of time sufficient to constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity,” plaintiffs RICO claim should be dismissed on this basis, as well. c. Standing To have standing, a civil RICO plaintiff must show that his alleged harm qualifies as injury to his business or property and that his harm was “by reason of’ the RICO violation. Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 458, 172 L.Ed.2d 327 (2008). RICO standing thus requires compensable injury and proximate cause. Newcal Indus., Inc. v. IKON Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1055 (9th Cir.2008), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2788, 174 L.Ed.2d 290 (2009). An injury is compensable under RICO if it constitutes “harm to a specific business or property interest” and if the alleged business or property interest is cognizable under state law. Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1131, 126 S.Ct. 1069, 163 L.Ed.2d 928 (2006). Plaintiff must show a concrete financial loss and must demonstrate that the racketeering activity proximately caused the loss. Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 707 (9th Cir.2006) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff alleges in the RICO claim that defendants’ “wrongful actions harmed Plaintiff in the following ways”: (1) the fraudulent asylum application perpetuated plaintiffs obligation to provide financial support to defendant Anoufrieva based upon plaintiffs prior execution of an affidavit of support; and (2) defendants’ submission of false and defamatory information to immigration authorities prejudiced plaintiffs future chances to sponsor other foreigners for entry/residency in the United States. (FAC at 37). Plaintiff further alleges in the RICO claim that defendants’ “harassment, intimidation and malicious prosecution of Plaintiff’ caused him to: (3) suffer severe emotional distress and humiliation; (4) suffer deprivation of his constitutional rights to file suit, to due process of law, and to security in his personal papers; (5) suffer deprivation of his California constitutional right to privacy; (5) incur legal fees and costs to defend himself and to clear his name; (7) lose income due to being denied employment; (8) lose future income due to the damage to his reputation damaged and his loss of educational opportunities; and (9) suffer 37 days imprisonment. (FAC at 37). Defendants contend that plaintiff lacks standing because he has not alleged that he suffered any compensable injury to his business or property directly and proximately caused by defendants. (Motion to Dismiss at 23-25). This court concludes that plaintiffs RICO claim should not be dismissed on this basis because plaintiff adequately alleges that defendants’ racketeering activity proximately caused the loss of tangible property (ie., his diverted mail), the expenditure of attorneys fees’ and legal expenses in the criminal proceedings resulting from the Menlo Park Police investigation, and the loss of income due to being denied employment. However, this court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs other allegations of injury are not cognizable under RICO and should be dismissed on this basis as they are insufficiently concrete, and/or constitute or stem from alleged personal injury. First, the alleged harm to plaintiff arising from the possibility that government authorities may seek to collect sums from him at least in part as a result of defendants’ submission of the allegedly fraudulent asylum application, is insufficiently concrete to constitute compensable injury. Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that such alleged harm constitutes a harm to a specific business or property interest cognizable under state law. Second, the alleged interference with plaintiffs asserted right to sponsor future individuals for entry/residency is likewise insufficiently concrete and constitutes, at most, a personal injury not compensable under RICO. Plaintiff again cites no authority for the proposition that such alleged harm constitutes a harm to a specific business or property interest cognizable under state law. Third, plaintiffs alleged emotional distress and humiliation are personal injuries not compensable under RICO. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 899-900, 902 (plaintiff not entitled to recover under RICO based upon allegations of emotional distress). Fourth, plaintiffs alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights to file suit and to due process of law are likewise personal in nature. See e.g., McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1208 (D.Kan.2004) (alleged deprivation of First Amendment rights alone does not constitute kind of injury required to invoke RICO’s civil remedies), aff'd, 130 Fed. Appx. 987 (10th Cir.2005). Fifth, plaintiffs alleged deprivation of his right to privacy is not compensable under RICO. Kelley v. Watts, 2007 WL 3232080 **2, 3 (E.D.Ark.2007) (lost privacy not considered injury to business or property under RICO). Sixth, plaintiffs alleged loss of future income due to having his reputation damaged and losing educational opportunities is not cognizable. To the extent the loss of future income is alleged to be attributed to the damage to plaintiffs reputation, such losses are not compensable under RICO. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 902 (plaintiff cannot recover under RICO for those pecuniary losses that are most properly understood as part of a personal injury claim); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir.2006) (damage to reputation not considered injury to business or property), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1209, 127 S.Ct. 1334, 167 L.Ed.2d 81 (2007); Kelley v. Watts, 2007 WL 3232080 at **2, 3 (damage to reputation/good name does not constitute injury to business or property under RICO). To the extent plaintiffs loss of future income is alleged to be attributed to the loss of educational opportunities, the First Amended Complaint reflects that the latter loss is again attributable to plaintiffs alleged emotional distress and reputational harm, neither of which, as discussed above, are cognizable injuries under RICO. Finally, false imprisonment is not a business or property injury compensable under RICO. See Diaz, 420 F.3d at 899-900, 902 (plaintiff not entitled to recover under RICO based upon allegations of false imprisonment). Accordingly, except for the allegations of injury due to the loss of plaintiffs tangible property (i.e., his diverted mail), the expenditure of attorneys’ fees and legal expenses in the criminal proceedings resulting from the Menlo Park Police investigation, and the loss of income due to being denied employment, plaintiffs alleged predicate injuries in his RICO claim are not compensable and should be dismissed on such basis as well as on the other bases discussed above. 2. Claim Two: 42 U.S.C. § 1983— Against All Defendants To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (citations omitted). The actions of private individuals and entities not affiliated with state or municipal government generally do not involve action under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978) (although private person may cause deprivation of constitutional right, he may be subjected to liability under Section 1983 only when he does so under color of law, i.e., that he both acted under color of law and that his actions were properly attributable to government); Associates & Aidrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir.1971) (violations of certain constitutional rights actionable under federal law only when accomplished by one who is clothed with authority of state and purporting to act thereunder) (citations and internal quotations omitted). A private individual may be liable under Section 1983 if he conspired or entered joint action with a state actor. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (2002) (citation omitted). Such a conspiracy requires the existence of an agreement or a meeting of minds among the private individual and state agents to violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights. See Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989); Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (explaining the requirements of a conspiracy claim under Section 1983). Defendants contend that they did not act under “color of state law,” that there is no “state action,” and accordingly, that plaintiffs Section 1983 claim fails as a matter of law. This court agrees that plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim because he fails to plead action under color of state law. First, the First Amended Complaint alleges that all of the defendants are private individuals/entities and does not allege that any of the defendants are affiliated with the government or state facts giving rise to such an inference. Providing false information to the police does not transform a private individual into a state actor. See Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir.1988) (“Police reliance in making an arrest on information given by a private party does not make the private party a state actor.”); Gilbert v. Feld, 788 F.Supp. 854, 859-60 (E.D.Pa.1992) (providing district attorney’s office with false and misleading information in order to instigate criminal charges against arrestee does not expose private parties to Section 1983 liability). Second, plaintiff fails to allege facts from which it can be inferred that any defendant conspired or entered joint action with a state actor. Although plaintiff alleges that defendants “acted with the help of or in concert with state officials” in filing police reports based on false information, and initiating criminal proceedings, plaintiff does not allege that state officials knew that the police reports were based on false information, or facts from which it could be inferred that such state officials conspired with defendants. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965-66 (claim based upon illicit agreement must allege enough factual matter, taken as true, to suggest that agreement was made); Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1357-58 (9th Cir.1981) (person who merely supplies inaccurate information that leads to arrest is not involved in joint activity with state and thus not liable under Section 1983) (citing Butler v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S.Ct. 82, 62 L.Ed.2d 53 (1979)). Indeed, plaintiff alleges that defendants withheld the true facts from law enforcement authorities. (FAC at 14, 40-42, 47). Although plaintiff hints at some impropriety due to defendant Cox initially contacting the Stanford Police Chief, before speaking to an officer (FAC at 13-14, 39-40), these allegations are insufficient to give rise to an inference that Cox conspired with the Chief to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights. See Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.2003) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy between private attorney and state officer insufficient to support Section 1983 claim); Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.1988) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy between judge and law firm insufficient to support Section 1983 claim), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995, 109 S.Ct. 561, 102 L.Ed.2d 587 (1988). As plaintiffs allegations do not implicate action under color of state law, the First Amended Complaint fails to state a Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, claim two should be dismissed with leave to amend. 3. Claim Three: 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)— Against the Cox Estate Section 1985(2) contains two clauses that give rise to separate causes of action. The first clause concerns access to federal courts, giving rise to a cause of action where: two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified ... 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). To state a claim based on the first clause of Section 1985(2), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy between two or more persons; (2) to deter a party or witness by force, intimidation or threat, from attending federal court or testifying freely, fully and truthfully in any matter pending therein; (3) which has resulted in injury to the party. See David v. United States, 820 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir.1987). Although a plaintiff need not suffer monetary damages, he must show that the conspiracy hampered the party’s ability to present an effective case in federal court. Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 859 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1988). Moreover, at least one circuit court, sitting en banc, has declined to apply Section 1985(2) to conspiracies entered into with the intent to deter a party from filing a federal lawsuit, as opposed to physically attending or testifying in such an action. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 347-48 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110, 102 S.Ct. 687, 70 L.Ed.2d 651 (1981). The second clause of Section 1985(2) concerns access to state or territorial courts, giving rise to a cause of action where: two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws.... 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). A cognizable claim based on the second clause of Section 1985(2) requires an allegation of class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir.1993); Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 763 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091, 112 S.Ct. 1161, 117 L.Ed.2d 409 (1992). Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint purports to allege a conspiracy between the Cox Estate and an officer of the San Francisco Police Department to violate both clauses of Section 1985(2), apparently predicated upon a June 22, 2007 telephone call from the officer to plaintiff, during which the officer allegedly (i) accused plaintiff of making terrorist threats to Ms. Cox; (ii) advised plaintiff that the officer would file a crime report against plaintiff and that plaintiff would be prosecuted; (iii) advised plaintiff that he had no right to call Ms. Cox; (iv) prohibited plaintiff from calling Ms. Cox or serving her with documents; (v) directed plaintiff to obtain any information regarding the Cox Estate from a specific named attorney and law firm (who were not in fact authorized to represent the Cox Estate); (vi) threatened to arrest plaintiff if he ever again did anything to annoy Ms. Cox or tried to contact her in any way; and (vii) refused to permit plaintiff to respond to the officer’s accusations. (FAC at 25-26, ¶¶ 79-83; FAC at 44-45, ¶¶ 153, 154). Plaintiff alleges that the conspiracy lasted from June 22, 2007 to August 13, 2007, deprived him of his right to file a suit and to due process, and resulted in plaintiff suffering economic loss (due to the delay in presenting his legal claims), fear and emotional trauma. (FAC at 45, ¶¶ 156,157). First, plaintiffs claim, to the extent based upon the first clause of Section 1985(2) is deficient because plaintiff does not allege that the conspiracy hampered his ability to present an effective case in federal court. Nor does plaintiff allege facts from which it can be inferred that he was so hampered. Indeed, as to plaintiffs allegation that the conspiracy delayed presentation of his federal claims, thereby causing him economic loss, the First Amended Complaint reflects the contrary. The First Amended Complaint alleges that, beginning slightly over a month after such conversation — during the period allegedly encompassed by the conspiracy— plaintiff actively pursued his lawsuit. (FAC at 26-27; ¶¶ 85-88) (July 23, 2007 demand letter; August 3, 2007 meeting with defendants’ counsel; August 3, 2007 service of Complaint on defendants’ counsel; August 14, 2007 submission of Complaint to federal court in conjunction with request to proceed in forma pauperis). Accordingly, this court agrees with defendants’ contention that plaintiffs third claim should be dismissed because it does not adequately allege that plaintiff was injured by the purported conspiracy. (Motion to Dismiss at 28). Second, plaintiffs claim, to the extent based upon the second clause of Section 1985(2) is not cognizable because plaintiff does not allege any class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Accordingly, this court agrees with defendants’ contention that claim three should be dismissed to the extent it is based on an “access to state court” predicate. (Motion to Dismiss at 28). 4. Claim Four: Filing a False Police Report — Against All Defendants Plaintiff alleges that on five dates between November 1, 2000, and February 14, 2001, defendants filed or caused to be filed false police reports accusing plaintiff of committing criminal acts. (FAC at 46). Plaintiffs claim is thus predicated on defendants’ communications, albeit allegedly false in nature, with the police regarding plaintiffs purported criminal activities. Such state law claim must be dismissed because, under California law, reports to police of suspected criminal activities— even false reports made with malice — are absolutely privileged and may not serve as predicates for tort claims, except the tort of malicious prosecution. See Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland, Security, 538 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir.2008) (recognizing that defendants’ telephone call to San Francisco police was privileged under state law and could not be the basis for tort liability) (citing Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350, 364, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244 (2004)). California Civil Code section 47 provides that certain publications or broadcasts are privileged. The privilege attaches if the statement is made in the proper discharge of an official duty (section 47(a)), or in any legislative, judicial, or other official proceeding authorized by law (section 47(b)), subject to certain exceptions that are not applicable in this case. This “litigation privilege” was discussed in Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244 (2004). Hagberg, the plaintiff in that case, attempted to cash a check at a bank. Employees of the bank erroneously believed the check was counterfeit and reported the matter to the police. Officers responded to the scene and detained Hagberg for approximately twenty minutes before releasing her. Hagberg sued the bank and various individuals, alleging, inter alia, claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Id. at 356-57, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment, which was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 358, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244. Both courts concluded that the statements to the police by the bank employees were absolutely privileged pursuant section 47(b). The California Supreme Court agreed and explained that the absolute privilege found in section 47(b) bars all tort causes of actions, except for a claim of malicious prosecution: [T]he absolute privilege established by section 47(b) serves the important public policy of assuring free access to the courts and other official proceedings. It is intended to assure utmost freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing. We have explained that both the effective administration of justice and the citizen’s right of access to the government for redress of grievances would be threatened by permitting tort liability for communication connected with judicial or other official proceedings. Hence, without respect to the good faith or malice of the person who made the statement, or whether the statement ostensibly was made in the interest of justice, courts have applied the privilege to eliminate the threat of liability for communications made during all kinds of truth-seeking proceedings: judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative and other official proceeding. Id. at 360-61, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The California Supreme Court concluded that these policies would best be served by applying the absolute privilege in section 47(b) to reports made to the police about a possible crime. Id. at 364, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244. Although Hagberg did not itself involve a discrete tort claim for making a false report to the police, section 47(b) extends to such tort claims as well. See Chabak v. Monroy, 154 Cal.App.4th 1502, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 641 (2007) (expressly applying absolute litigation privilege under section 47(b) to tort claim that defendant made false report to police of child abuse); see also Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1246, 63 Cal. Rptr.3d 398, 163 P.3d 89 (2007) (tort liability may not be imposed when a person contacts law enforcement to report suspected criminal activity). Accordingly, claim four fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed without leave to amend as any amendment would be futile. 5. Claim Five: False Imprisonment— Against All Defendants Construing claim five liberally, plaintiff appears to allege that defendants, by supplying false information to the Stanford Police, the Menlo Park Police, and the Superior Court in the Domestic Violence Case, caused (i) an arrest warrant to be issued for plaintiff on March 7, 2001; and (ii) plaintiff to be falsely arrested and imprisoned (or to have conditions imposed upon his liberty) in April 2007. (FAC at 46-48). Much like the preceding claim, the instant claim is predicated upon defendants providing information to the police and the court. Accordingly, claim five must be dismissed because, under the California law discussed above, tort claims arising from such reports and filings in judicial actions, are absolutely privileged and may not serve as predicates for tort claims, except the tort of malicious prosecution. See Hagberg, 32 Cal.4th 350, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244 (absolute litigation privilege under section 47(b) applies to tort claims of false arrest and false imprisonment predicated upon inaccurate report to police). Accordingly, plaintiffs claim for false imprisonment fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed without leave to amend as any amendment would be futile. 6. Claim Six: Malicious Prosecution— Against All Defendants To state a claim for malicious prosecution under California law, a plaintiff must allege that the underlying litigation in issue: (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in plaintiffs favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice. Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 174, 172 L.Ed.2d 44 (2008) (citation omitted). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate resulting damage by way of attorneys’ fees incurred in defense, mental distress, and/or injury to reputation or social standing. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim is predicated on two alleged underlying litigations: (1) the Domestic Violence Action; and (2) the Menlo Park Police criminal proceedings and resulting prosecution. (FAC at 49-53). As only the Menlo Park Police criminal proceedings and resulting prosecution are in issue with respect to the non-statute of limitations portion of the Motion to Dismiss, the court, in this section, focuses only on the allegations of the First Amended Complaint relating to such proceedings. The First Amended Complaint alleges, inter alia, that: (1) defendants, acting individually and in concert: (a) filed Menlo Park Police report no. 01-011 on January 2, January 4, and February 14, 2001, alleging that plaintiff violated a domestic violence restraining