Full opinion text
ORDER WILLIAM H. STEELE, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 50). The Motion has been briefed and is ripe for disposition. I. Background Facts. Plaintiff, Edward Pears, is an African-American male who began working as a court police officer at the Mobile County Courthouse in December 1994. (Pears Dep., at 33-34, 37; Collier Dep., at 117-18.) He was discharged on January 22, 2007 for the stated reason that he had failed a mandatory drug test. (Graddick Deck, ¶ 5; Plaintiffs Exh. 21.) In his Complaint (doc. 1), Pears maintains that he was fired because of his race and in retaliation for having made internal complaints of race discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The three named defendants are Mobile County, 13th Judicial Police Department, and James Collier (individually and in his official capacity as police chief). A. Pears’ Employment History in the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department. Although the Complaint focuses on Pears’ discharge in January 2007, neither the termination of his employment nor the circumstances on which his claims of discrimination and retaliation are predicated can be understood in a vacuum. Review of Pears’ employment history at the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department is imperative to understanding the parties’ respective positions on summary judgment. 1. The May 2006 Complaint of Discrimination, and Plaintiffs Suspension. As an initial matter, the summary judgment record reflects that Pears voiced complaints of race discrimination during his 12 years of employment with the Mobile Thirteenth Judicial Police Department. Most notably, on May 31, 2006, Pears submitted a written memorandum to all five supervisors in his chain of command, including Sgt. Gerry Hummel (his immediate supervisor), Lt. Bob Patterson, defendant James Collier (then-Chief of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department), Mobile County Circuit Judge Joseph Johnston (then-Director of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department), and Mobile County Circuit Judge Charles Graddick (Presiding Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court). (Plaintiffs Exh. 9; Pears Dep., at 170-71.) Pears’ May 2006 memo was, by its terms, “a formal complaint regarding discriminatory practices by the Chief of Mobile Court police.... ” (Plaintiffs Exh. 9.) Specifically, Pears wrote in that memo that Chief Collier “and/or his designees have continuously engaged in acts of blatant racial discrimination” in such areas as “scheduling, assignments, promotions, raises, and granting of overtime.” (Id.) According to the May 2006 memo, Pears had brought these concerns to Chief Collier and his “designees” on multiple occasions, but “no favorable action has been taken” as they responded with “a lack of concern, unwillingness to intelligently discuss the issues ... and actions which may be construes s [sic] retaliatory.” (Id.) Pears’ memo urged an investigation and implementation of a system “free of racially discriminatory actions.” (Id.) The May 2006 memo provoked an immediate and forceful response. On June 2, 2006, Chief Collier sent Pears a letter on Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Police Department letterhead that (1) unequivocally denied that Pears had ever come to him, Lt. Patterson or Sgt. Hummel regarding any items described in the memo; (2) notified Pears that he had breached chain of command protocols by bringing his concerns to Judges Johnston and Graddick, for which he would “face disciplinary action”; and (3) demanded that Pears furnish supporting details of his claims within 10 days. (Plaintiffs Exh. 10.) With respect to the chain of command issue, it is undisputed that in August 2000, Chief Collier sent a memorandum on Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Police Department letterhead to all Department employees, including Pears. That memorandum provided that employees making written complaints to their immediate supervisors or Chief Collier “shall not send copies of the written letter or memo to anyone” else, and that the supervisor would determine “whether the letter or memo requires forwarding to other persons.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 28.) Essentially, then, Chief Collier’s August 2000 memo forbade Pears from submitting written complaints to Judges Johnston or Graddick. That is precisely what Pears did with his May 2006 memo. On June 16, 2006, Chief Collier notified Pears in writing that Pears was being suspended without pay for five days, effective June 19, 2006, because his May 2006 discrimination complaint violated the chain of command policy. (Plaintiffs Exh. 13.) The decisionmaker for this suspension was Judge Johnston. (Id.; Johnston Aff., ¶ 3; Collier Dep., at 39; Graddick Dep., at 30.) The June 16 memo cautioned Pears that “[s]ubsequent displays of disrespect and failure to follow directives will result in additional disciplinary action including termination.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 13.) Plaintiffs evidence is that no other officer at the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department had ever been disciplined for not adhering to the chain of command policy. (Patterson Dep., at 35.) Plaintiffs evidence is also that the Department’s discrimination policy expressly instructed employees that “[i]f the immediate supervisor is the person discriminating, report the situation to the Lieutenant or Chief.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 8; Graddick Dep., at 40.) Indeed, Chief Collier understood that if a supervisor is the discriminatory agent, the employee is permitted by that discrimination policy to go above his head and bring his complaint directly to the supervisor’s supervisor, chain of command notwithstanding. (Collier Dep., at 46.) Setting aside the chain of command issue and associated suspension, Pears authored a follow-up memorandum to Chief Collier on June 9, 2006, wherein he purported to provide detail supporting his claims of race discrimination. In particular, Pears complained that he had been denied overtime, that he had been denied access to court computers that less senior employees had been allowed to use, that he was assigned 5-day workweeks while less senior employees worked just 4 days in 10-hour shifts, that he was denied work hours (and the hours of his choosing) while the Lieutenant and Sergeant worked whenever they wanted, and that merit raises had been given only to less senior employees. (Plaintiffs Exh. 11.) Pears requested investigation into these matters. On June 26, 2006, Chief Collier sent Pears a point-by-point rebuttal of his accusations. At that time, Chief Collier purported to “refute all statements and concerns in your letter,” accused Pears of improperly trying to “supervise [his] supervisors,” and closed with an ominous warning that Pears was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time, with or without cause. (Plaintiffs Exh. 14.) 2. Other Employment Actions against Pears in the Second Half of 2006. The five-day suspension of Pears in June 2006 was only the beginning of the disciplinary actions taken against him. On July 28, 2006, Sgt. Hummel sent Pears a “Letter of Reprimand” after the two men argued concerning the procedure for assigning weekend overtime shifts. Sgt. Hummel wrote that Pears had been “argumentative and challenging” to him in the presence of other officers and expressed displeasure at Pears’ suggestion that he would go over Sgt. Hummel’s head by taking up the matter with Lt. Patterson. Sgt. Hummel concluded that Pears’ attitude “borders on insubordination” and that future disrespectful outbursts “could result in additional disciplinary action up to and including dismissal.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 16.) On July 31, 2006, less than two months after Pears complained of race discrimination, Sgt. Hummel issued a performance review of Pears for the August 2005 through August 2006 time frame. This process was unusual, inasmuch as the Department had never before conducted written performance reviews of Pears or his co-workers. (Pears Dep., at 241; Patterson Dep., at 62.) Although that evaluation is just one sentence long, it states that Sgt. Hummel rated Pears’ performance “unsatisfactory,” with no explanatory verbiage. (Plaintiffs Exh. 17.) This evaluation was signed by Sgt. Hummel and by Pears, but there is no indication that it was reviewed or approved by anyone else. The record reflects that no other officer in the Department has ever received an “unsatisfactory” rating. (Pears Dep., at 241-42; Patterson Dep., at 62; Collier Dep., at 78.) Moreover, Pears disputes that his performance was, in fact, unsatisfactory during that time period. (Pears Dep., at 187.) There is no evidence, however, that this rating was ever used against Pears, or that it had a material adverse effect on Pears’ employment. To the contrary, Judge Grad-dick, who ultimately was in charge of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department, testified that he was unaware that performance evaluations were even being done. (Graddick Dep., at 33.) Chief Collier explained that the evaluation was placed in Pears’ file, but that Pears received no other discipline or stigma as a result of that rating. (Collier Aff., ¶ 6.) Then, on December 27, 2006, Lt. Patterson issued a “Written Reprimand” to Pears on the grounds that Pears had been “rude, disrespectful and sarcastic to patrons” entering Government Plaza eight days earlier. (Plaintiffs Exh. 29.) In the letter, Lt. Patterson cautioned Pears that “negative communications with the public cannot and will not be tolerated” and that “[rjepeated acts of this nature will lead to further disciplinary action to include termination.” (Id.) Pears’ evidence, however, is that the incident underlying the December 2006 written reprimand was pure fabrication, and that no unusual events of any kind took place on the day in question. (Pears Dep., at 243 — 44.) Indeed, Pears’ former co-worker Reginald White testified that he was on duty with Pears at the same post on the date referenced in the reprimand, but that he observed no altercations, confrontations, or other events out of the ordinary. (White Dep., at 44-45.) B. Termination of Pears’ Employment. On January 4, 2007, all officers of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department were subjected to a random drug test. The test originated with Judge Graddick’s suggestion to Chief Collier and Lt. Patterson that from a liability and public safety standpoint it would be prudent for the armed court police officers to be screened randomly for drugs. (Graddick Dep., at 34-35; Graddick Aff., ¶ 3.) Thus, the decision to test court police officers was Judge Graddick’s. (Collier Aff., ¶ 5; Graddick Aff., ¶ 3.) Pears’ sample was found by Community Corrections Center to test positive for benzodiazepine, and subsequent testing by an independent laboratory in Virginia identified Temazepam as the substance in Pears’ system. (Plaintiffs Exh. 31.) The independent lab results were reported back to Pears’ supervisors on January 10, 2007. {Id.) Upon receipt of this information, Lt. Patterson and/or Chief Collier apprised Judge Graddick of the situation, and recommended that Pears’ employment be terminated because of the positive drug test. (Patterson Dep., at 19, 21; Graddick Dep., at 36.) Judge Graddick agreed that Pears’ employment should be terminated based on the positive drug test result. (Graddick Aff., ¶ 5; Collier Dep., at 74.) On that basis, Judge Graddick requested that Chief Collier deliver a resignation letter to Pears and, if Pears refused to resign, that he also be given a termination letter. (Graddick Aff., ¶ 5.) Both letters were on “Thirteenth Judicial Police Department” letterhead, and were signed solely by Chief Collier. (Plaintiffs’ Exh. 21.) The so-called “resignation letter” was dated January 22, 2007 and set forth the following facts: (i) a Department-wide drug test was conducted on January 4; (ii) Pears was instructed to provide documentation concerning all medications he was taking; (iii) Pears’ sample had tested positive for Temazepam, a member of the benzodiazepine family and a Schedule IV controlled substance; and (iv) none of the drugs listed in Pears’ pharmacy records corresponded with that substance. Based on these circumstances, Chief Collier’s letter continued, Pears’ “services with the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department ... must end,” although he would be given the option of resigning immediately. (Plaintiffs Exh. 21.) Evidently, Pears refused to tender his resignation. A second letter from Chief Collier dated the same day then notified Pears that “[y]our services with the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department are no longer needed, and you are hereby terminated immediately from your employment as a Court Security Officer.” (Id.) Thus, Pears’ employment was terminated on January 22, 2007 for the sole stated reason that he had tested positive for drugs. (Collier Dep., at 89.) Indeed, Chief Collier testified that “[i]f it hadn’t been for the drug test, Officer Pears would still be working with us.” (Id. at 116.) Pears has never disputed the drug test results. (Pears Dep., at 56, 116.) After being discharged, however, Pears sought to exonerate himself by presenting evidence that he was not on drugs at the time of his dismissal. (Pears Dep., at 255.) In particular, Pears obtained information from his dentist, David Lairmore, M.D., concerning medications he had been administered during a tooth extraction on December 28, 2006, just days before the drug test. (Id. at 254.) A handwritten note from a nurse at Dr. Lairmore’s office dated January 23, 2007 confirmed that during his December 28 surgery, Pears had been sedated via a combination of Valium (a benzodiazepine) and fentanyl, administered intravenously. (Plaintiffs’ Exhs. 24 & 25.) Pears submitted this documentation to Chief Collier, Judge Johnston and Judge Graddick (but not Lt. Patterson) as an attachment to a letter on January 25, 2007, explaining that he had been given Valium during his oral surgery, stating that Valium “would test positive for Temazepam,” indicating that his pharmacist would not have had a record of the Valium, and asking that he be returned to duty. (Plaintiffs Exh. 22.) Pears sent a follow-up letter to the same three supervisors on February 1, 2007, appealing to their sense of justice and fairness. (Plaintiffs’ Exh. 23.) The information Pears provided to Chief Collier, Judge Johnston and Judge Grad-dick concerning his medications elicited no response from them, much less an invitation to return to work. (Pears Dep., at 255-56.) Judge Graddick decided that this additional information did not warrant modification or rescission of the termination decision. (Collier Dep., at 103-04.) In his deposition, Judge Graddick explained his reasoning as follows: “I was told, that the apparent substance that he was supposed to have been given in the dental surgery ... didn’t match the ingredients of what he had in his system, that it might have been in the same family, but it wasn’t the same.... He was fired because the drug in his system was not the same as the paperwork he gave us, nor was it the same as what he was alleged to have gotten in the dental surgery.” (Graddick Dep., at 47-49.) Judge Graddick testified that “[a]ll of [his] information came from the chief and the lieutenant.” (Id. at 48.) It is unclear, however, whether any investigation of Pears’ explanation was conducted, or whether there was any factual basis for the apparent determination that Pears’ surgical use of Valium one week before the drug test could not have produced a positive test result for Temazepam (a benzodiazepine like Valium). To add further ambiguity, defendants admitted in discovery responses that Pears was discharged because “a random drug test showed that he had an unacceptable level of benzodiazepine in his system” (Plaintiffs Exh. 27, at # 3), without distinguishing between Valium (a benzodiazepine as to the presence of which Pears had provided a legitimate explanation) and Temazepam (a benzodiazepine as to which no explanation was provided). II. Summary Judgment Standard. Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only for those eases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected the notion that summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases because they involve issues of motivation and intent. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.2004). Rather, “the summary judgment rule applies in job discrimination cases just as in other cases. No thumb is to be placed on either side of the scale.” Id. at 1086 (citation omitted). III. Analysis of Defendant-Specific Issues. In this litigation, Pears has raised parallel claims of race discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mobile County, 13th Judicial Police Department, and Chief Collier in his official capacity. Also in play is a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 cause of action against Chief Collier in his individual capacity. Defendants maintain that there are insuperable defects in the designation of each named defendant that mandate dismissal of plaintiffs claims against them, as a matter of law, without reaching the merits. The Court takes up these issues first. A. Status of Plaintiff’s Claims against Mobile County and Chief Collier. 1. Mobile County. Defendant Mobile County maintains that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Pears’ claims because it was not his employer. In response, Pears acknowledges that “[apparently, the County exercises no control as to the fundamental aspects of Pears [sic ] employment, including his suspension and discharge. As such, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his Title VII claims against Mobile County.” (Doc. 55, at 14.) Plaintiffs admission that Mobile County is not his employer is fatal to his Title VII claims against it. See, e.g., Dearth v. Col lins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir.2006) (“relief under Title VII is available against only the employer”); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) (“relief granted under Title VII is against the employer”). In light of this fact, coupled with Pears’ stated desire to abandon his Title VII claims against Mobile County, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in that respect, and plaintiffs Title VII claims against defendant Mobile County are dismissed. In hoisting the white flag of surrender as to his Title VII claims against Mobile County, Pears remained silent as to his § 1983 claims against that defendant. However, nothing in Pears’ Complaint or summary judgment filings suggests that his § 1983 claims are based on anything other than alleged constitutional and statutory violations in the employment relationship. Stated differently, Pears’ § 1983 claims allege that his suspension, performance evaluation, and discharge were in violation of his § 1981 right to be free from discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, as well as his equal protection right to be free from racial discrimination and retaliation. He has identified no facts suggesting that defendant Mobile County had anything to do with these alleged deprivations, and all record evidence is to the contrary. It is uncontroverted that Mobile County did not direct, control or supervise the operations of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department. (Pafenbach Dep., at 35-36; Pafenbach Aff., ¶ 3.) As such, defendant Mobile County can have no liability under § 1983 for plaintiffs claims of equal protection and § 1981 violations predicated on adverse employment actions taken while he worked for an entity that was beyond the control and supervision of Mobile County. For that reason, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all § 1983 claims asserted against Mobile County, and those causes of action are dismissed because the record in the light most favorable to Pears establishes no genuine issues of material fact that Mobile County did or failed to do anything to cause the alleged violations and deprivations on which such § 1983 claims hinge. 2. Chief Collier. Pears’ pending claims against Chief Collier consist of the following: (a) Title VII claims against him in his individual and official capacities; (b) Section 1983 claims against him in his official capacity for violations of § 1981 and the equal protection clause; and (c) a Section 1981 claim against him in his individual capacity. Defendants are correct that Pears cannot sustain an individual-capacity Title VII claim against a supervisory employee, as a matter of law. See, e.g., Dearth, 441 F.3d at 933 (“we now expressly hold that relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act”); Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1520 n. 3 (11th Cir.1995) (noting that individual capacity suits under Title VII are inappropriate). In pleading those claims, the Complaint alleged that Chief Collier was Pears’ “joint employer.” On summary judgment, however, plaintiff backs off that contention, identifying neither facts nor law that could support such a designation of Chief Collier, much less enable him to surmount the general prohibition on individual-capacity Title VII claims against supervisors. Accordingly, plaintiffs Title VII claims against Chief Collier in his individual capacity fail as a matter of law, and are properly dismissed at this time. Plaintiffs official-capacity Title VII claims against Chief Collier stand on a different footing. The Eleventh Circuit has authorized Title VII claims against supervisors in their capacity as agents of the employer (i.e., in their official capacity). See, e.g., Hinson v. Clinch County, Georgia Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir.2000) (“The only proper individual defendants in a Title VII action would be supervisory employees in their capacity as agents of the employer.”). Defendants recognize this principle, but emphasize case authorities holding that an official-capacity suit against an individual defendant is redundant when the employer has already been named as a defendant. See, e.g., Portera v. State of Ala. Dep’t of Finance, 322 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1287 (M.D.Ala.2004) (any Title VII claim against governmental supervisor “in his official capacity is redundant since the Finance Department is already a defendant”). But this line of authorities actually works against defendants here. Defendants’ position is that Pears’ employer (Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama) was not separately named as a defendant; therefore, there is no redundancy, and the Title VII official-capacity claims against Chief Collier are not precluded on the basis of Poriera-style reasoning. With respect to the § 1983 claims, defendants’ first argument is that “[w]hen individual state actors are defendants, the § 1983 claims are for prospective injunctive relief only.” (Doc. 50-2, at 17 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff has not challenged defendants’ contention that Chief Collier qualifies as a state actor for § 1983 purposes; therefore, the Court will refrain from sua sponte analysis of that often-technical and complex question. But defendants’ suggestion that the only viable § 1983 claims against state actors are for prospective injunctive relief would obliterate the distinction between official-capacity claims and individual-capacity claims. Of course, Eleventh Amendment immunity does nothing to shield a state official from liability for damages under § 1983 in his individual capacity. See, e.g., Cross v. State of Ala., State Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir.1995) (“Nor does the Eleventh Amendment preclude a damages award against [state officials] in their individual capacities pursuant to section 1983”); Jackson v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir.1994) (“the Eleventh Amendment does not protect state employees sued in their individual capacity for employment-related acts”). As such, to the extent that Chief Collier would invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity to defeat the § 1983 claims against him in his individual capacity, that argument is meritless. That said, the Court agrees with Chief Collier that the Eleventh Amendment bars Pears’ § 1983 claims against him in his official capacity. After all, “[i]n the absence of consent, a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). No such consent or abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity has occurred in the § 1983 context. See, e.g., Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373, 1379 n. 4 (11th Cir.1990) (“The Fourteenth Amendment does not by its own force override the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, ... nor did Congress abrogate that immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983”) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he state need not be formally named as a defendant for the amendment to apply; state officials sued in their official capacity are also protected by the amendment.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir.1998); see also Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir.1999) (“the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against state officials where the state is, in fact, the real party in interest”); Jackson, 16 F.3d at 1575 (“state officials sued for damages in their official capacity are immune from suit in federal court”). Pears has identified no colorable basis for circumventing the prohibition on his § 1983 claims against Chief Collier in his official capacity; therefore, those claims are dismissed pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity. With respect to the § 1983 causes of action against Chief Collier in his individual capacity, defendants trot out a pair of underdeveloped, perfunctory defenses. First, defendants devote a single sentence to the proposition that Chief Collier is entitled to qualified immunity, without expounding on the legal or factual basis for such a contention. When a government official is sued in his individual capacity for money damages for alleged civil rights violations, he may posit an affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 994 (11th Cir.1995). “To receive qualified immunity, the officer must first show that he acted within his discretionary authority.” Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2009). Chief Collier has offered neither evidence nor argument on this point, and the Court will not “fill in the blanks” by formulating his arguments or presenting his proof for him as to this affirmative defense. Second, defendants advance an ill-conceived argument that the § 1983 claims against Chief Collier in his individual capacity are precluded by his retirement following the filing of this lawsuit. It is true enough that § 1983 claims generally do not reach private conduct. See, e.g., Weaver v. James Bonding Co., 442 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1223 (S.D.Ala.2006) (“the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct”) (citation omitted). But Pears is not suing Chief Collier for post-retirement private conduct; rather, he is suing Chief Collier for allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory actions he took during the course of his employment as Chief of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department. The “private conduct” limitation on § 1983 claims has absolutely no application here, and defendants’ facile contention to the contrary borders on the absurd. In sum, then, Pears’ Title VII claim against Chief Collier in his individual capacity and his § 1983 claim against him in his official capacity are dismissed for the reasons set forth above. The remaining claims against him (Title VII official capacity, § 1983 individual capacity, and § 1981 individual capacity) are not defeated by the various immunities and affirmative defenses recited in defendants’ summary judgment briefs, but will be evaluated on the merits. B. Status of Plaintiff’s Claims against 13th Judicial Police Department. A critical preliminary issue on summary judgment is whether Pears has properly named as a defendant the entity that employed him and, if not, whether he may amend his pleadings now to correct that defendant’s name. 1. The Correct Name is Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama. The Complaint (doc. 1) names as defendants Mobile County, 13th Judicial Police Department and James Collier, individually and in his official capacity. As discussed supra, everyone now agrees that Mobile County was not Pears’ employer, and Pears has abandoned his earlier position that Chief Collier was his joint employer for Title VII purposes. Thus, plaintiff has pegged “13th Judicial Police Department” as the entity that employed and fired him, and as the employer defendant against which his Title VII claims and the bulk of his § 1983 claims are directed. The court file reflects that Pears served process on the 13th Judicial Police Department by that name on July 11, 2008, via certified mail addressed to Judge Johnston at Government Plaza, the building that houses both the Department and the Mobile County Circuit Court. (See doc. 4.) On July 30, 2008, an Answer (doe. 8) was filed in this case by an entity calling itself “The 13th Judicial Circuit Police Department,” which was represented by the same counsel that appeared on behalf of Mobile County and Chief Collier. Nowhere in that Answer did counsel posit that this defendant did not exist, that it had not properly been served with process, or that Pears had somehow incorrectly named it (other than the Answer’s addition of the words “The” and “Circuit” in that defendant’s name). Defendants assert that, with respect to named defendant 13th Judicial Police Department, “[t]here is no such legal entity subject to suit or capable of fling suit.” (Doc. 50-2, at 11.) Defendants fail to explain how an entity that does not exist could possibly have filed an Answer and actively defended itself in these proceedings for a year. Nonetheless, uncontroverted evidence establishes that “[tjhere is no such entity as the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department.” (Collier Aff., ¶ 2; see also Graddick Aff., ¶ 2.) Defendants’ evidence is that “[ejmployees of the police department of the 13th Judicial Circuit of Alabama are at-will employees of the 13th Judicial Circuit of Alabama. The 13th Judicial Police Department exists in name only and is not an entity subject to suit.” (Graddick Aff., ¶ 2.) Judge Graddick’s statements are echoed by John Pafenbach, County Administrator for Mobile County, who avers that court police officers such as Pears “have always been employed by the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, which is a separate legal entity and a subsidiary of the State.” (Pafenbach Aff., ¶ 2.) Chief Collier signed an affidavit with similar averments. (Collier Aff., ¶ 3.) It appears, then, that the correct name of the entity that employed Pears is “Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama,” not the named defendant “13th Judicial Police Department.” 2. Plaintiffs Request to Substitute the Correct Name of This Defendant. Faced with this evidence on a Rule 56 motion, plaintiff identifies no facts suggesting that the proper name of the employing entity is actually 13th Judicial Police Department. Instead, plaintiff cavalierly invites the Court (without a single citation to authority) to substitute Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama for existing defendant 13th Judicial Police Department if the Court decides that the former name is correct. The sum total of plaintiffs reasoning on this point is that “it makes no difference to the Plaintiff’ which name is used for his employer, as well as a blanket statement (with no elaboration) that “defendant would suffer no prejudice from this substitution.” (Doc. 55, at 15.) Defendants decry plaintiffs proposal and insist that the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama would be unduly prejudiced by the proposed substitution because “neither this subsidiary of the State of Alabama nor the State of Alabama have participated in discovery, pleadings, motions or any other aspect of this case.” (Doc. 58-2, at 6.) Defendants also suggest that plaintiff is the author of his own misfortune, inasmuch as he “has always known” the identity of “the proper entity who was his employer.” (/A) Unhelpfully, neither side offers any legal framework or cogent analysis by which to evaluate their conclusory contentions concerning whether Pears can or cannot modify the name of a defendant at this time to reflect its true identity. The starting point of the Court’s analysis is the so-called “misnomer rule,” which generally allows for correction of a defendant’s name pursuant to Rule 15 at any time where a plaintiff has sued a defendant by an incorrect name. “ ‘Misnomer’ denotes the case in which the plaintiff has the wrong name of the right party, while in a case of mistaken identity the plaintiff has named the wrong party.... [A] misnomer can be corrected at any time, provided that the plaintiff serves the defendant with reasonable promptness.” Athmer v. C.E.I. Equipment Co., 121 F.3d 294, 296 (7th Cir.1997); see also Roberts v. Michaels, 219 F.3d 775, 777-78 (8th Cir.2000) (pointing out “well-recognized distinction between a complaint that sues the wrong party, and a complaint that sues the right party by the wrong name,” and finding that district court erred by not allowing plaintiff to correct misnomer by amendment); Morrel v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 224 (4th Cir.1999) (“As a general rule the misnomer of a corporation in a notice, summons ... or other step in a judicial proceeding is immaterial if it appears that [the corporation] could not have been, or was not, misled.”) (citation omitted); Datskow v. Teledyne, Inc., Continental Products Div., 899 F.2d 1298, 1302-04 (2nd Cir.1990) (reversing lower court with instructions to allow plaintiff to amend complaint to name proper defendant where plaintiff had simply “mislabeled” defendant which conducted business under confusingly similar name to that of parents and affiliates, and correct defendant was on notice of proceedings); Flynn v. Best Buy Auto Sales, 218 F.R.D. 94, 97 (E.D.Pa.2003) (“misnomer rule” may be used to correct name of defendant where plaintiff “has actually sued and served the correct party but has mistakenly used the wrong name of the defendant in the original caption,” so long as “it would be reasonable to conclude that plaintiff had in mind the proper entity or person, merely made a mistake as to the name, and actually served the entity or person intended”) (citation omitted). Simply put, then, “Rule 15 allows amendment of a claim, changing either party provided that the defendant will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits and knows or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the proper party.... [T]he purpose of the rule is to prevent parties against whom claims are made from taking unjust advantage of otherwise inconsequential pleading errors.” Marco’s Franchising, LLC v. Marco’s Italian Exp., Inc., 239 F.R.D. 686, 687 (M.D.Fla.2007); see also Rule 15(c), Fed. R.Civ.P., Advisory Committee Notes 1991 Amendment (“An intended defendant who is notified of an action within the period allowed ... for service of a summons and complaint may not under the revised rule defeat the action on account of a defect in the pleading with respect to the defendant’s name---- [A] complaint may be amended at any time to correct a formal defect such as a misnomer or misidentification.”). In accordance with these principles, federal courts “have consistently held that mistakenly failing to sue the proper party does not itself constitute the kind of circumstance which would permit denial of leave to amend,” inasmuch as that kind of mistake is “nothing more than a remedial pleading defect.” Ynclan v. Department of Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1391 (5th Cir.1991) (citations omitted); see generally Diaz v. Shallbetter, 984 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir.1993) (explaining that the law “does not care whether the complaint gets the defendant’s name right” so long as “the right person receives service promptly”). Indeed, courts have routinely allowed a plaintiff to correct his pleadings under Rule 15 to designate a defendant’s name properly, provided that the defendant has notice of the proceedings and knows or should know that the action was being brought against it. This case is one in which misnomer principles apply. In naming 13th Judicial Police Department as the defendant employer, Pears did not sue the wrong entity; rather, he sued the right defendant (Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama) by the wrong name because of a mistake. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama was clearly on notice that he was trying to bring suit against it; indeed, service was perfected on behalf of the named defendant via Judge Johnston, a Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Judge and the Director of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department. Any reasonable defendant reviewing the Complaint would have recognized that Pears had simply made a mistake and mislabeled the defendant’s name; therefore, it cannot reasonably be suggested (and defendants do not argue) that the correct defendant lacked notice of these proceedings. In opposing the requested amendment, however, defendants insist that there was no mistake, inasmuch as Pears “has always known ... the proper entity who was his employer.” (Doc. 58-2, at 6.) This statement is simply untrue. Pears’ confusion as to the correct name of his employer is palpable and obvious. For example, in his deposition, Pears testified that, if asked on a hypothetical loan application form, he would have listed his employer as “13th Judicial Police Department.” (Pears Dep., at 34.) Moments earlier, Pears had testified that he understood his employer to be “13th Judicial Court System.” (Id. at 33.) Of course, neither appellation is correct. Pears’ confusion was not without reasonable basis in the record. For example, Chief Collier’s letter to Pears advising him that he would be discharged unless he resigned was issued on “Thirteenth Judicial Police Department” letterhead, depicted the seals of both Mobile County and the State of Alabama, and made references to “employees of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department” and Pears’ “services with the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 21.) The published discrimination policy stated that “[t]he Thirteenth Judicial Police is an Equal Opportunity Employer.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 8.) And one of Pears’ former coworkers, Reginald White, testified that the name of his employer was “13th Judicial Police Department.” (White Dep., at 40.) The picture was further muddied in discovery when John Pafenbach, Mobile County’s Administrator and evidently its Rule 30(b)(6) deponent, testified that the Title VII employer for Pears and other courtroom police officers was “the presiding judge,” meaning Judge Graddick. (Pafenbach Dep., at 11-12.) Pafenbach also acknowledged that Pears and other court police officers are paid by Mobile County, that Mobile County makes pension contributions and health insurance payments on their behalf, that they work in a Mobile County-owned building, and that Mobile County supplies them with uniforms, badges, radios and a designated vehicle. (Id. at 10, 12-14.) Pafenbach explained that there is a line item in the County budget for “13th Judicial Police” and that the County appropriates funds for that entity. (Id. at 18-19.) Given the pervasive murkiness surrounding the correct identity of Pears’ employer that lingered throughout much of the discovery process, the Court readily finds that the mislabeling of the defendant was a product of a bona fide mistake by the plaintiff. Not only was Pears in the dark as to the correct name of his employer, but defendants bear substantial responsibility for leading Pears away from the light switch. The Answer (doc. 8) filed by something called “The 13th Judicial Circuit Police Department” (by and through the same attorneys representing Mobile County and Chief Collier) was misleading and lulled plaintiff into thinking that he had named the correct defendant. Nowhere does that defendant’s Answer suggest that Pears had mislabeled the defendant. Moreover, the Court is at a loss to understand why and how that Answer could have been filed in conformity with counsel’s Rule 11 obligations if, as counsel now insists, “[t]here is no such entity as the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department.” (Collier Aft, ¶ 2; see also Graddick Aff., ¶ 2.) If that entity does not exist, then how could it have filed an Answer? If (as seems reasonable) a nonexistent entity was incapable of filing an Answer, then who or what filed an Answer purporting to be “The 13th Judicial Circuit Police Department”? Nor is defendants’ role in the confusion confined to the Answer. During Pears’ deposition on December 29, 2008, defense counsel asked questions suggesting that the 13th Judicial Police Department was, in fact, Pears’ employer, such as “Do you remember when you were hired by the 13th Judicial Police Department?” (Pears Dep., at 34.) Such questions are irreconcilable with defendants’ position on summary judgment, and served to exacerbate the confusion as to the proper name of the employing entity. By all appearances, the first time defendants pointed out Pears’ mislabeling of the employing entity was in a Motion to Dismiss filed a month after the Rule 16(b) deadline for amending pleadings or joining parties. (See docs. 15, 18.) Not surprisingly, federal courts have frowned on this sort of hide-the-ball approach. For example, in Barrett v. Qual-Med, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 653 (D.Colo.1994), the plaintiff brought an ADEA action against Qual-Med, Inc., when the correct name for the employing entity was QualMed Plans for Health, Inc. Qual-Med, Inc. answered the complaint without giving the plaintiff any notice that it was not the correct defendant, and misled the plaintiff in other respects as the litigation wore on, then sought dismissal on the eve of trial on the ground that the wrong defendant had been named. The Barrett court was sharply critical of this tactic, explaining as follows: “Of course the normal, and decent, procedure in situations such as this is to raise the matter by a telephone call notifying opposing counsel that she has sued the wrong entity, so that a correction can be made with a minimum of wasted time and expense. Absent decency, at least the issue should be promptly and clearly raised by a timely motion to dismiss. Neither of those steps occurred here.” Barrett, 153 F.R.D. at 655. The same is true in the case at bar. Moreover, the court in Barrett decried the defendant’s strategy as “hardball tactics,” “the very kind of litigation by technicality the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to preclude,” and antithetical to the expressed aims of Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P. Id. For those reasons, the plaintiff was allowed to amend the complaint, despite the untimeliness of the request, to name the defendant by its proper name. Barrett is not unique in its reasoning or result. Upon consideration, the Court agrees with the Bamtt line of authorities. It would be manifestly unjust to preclude Pears from correcting the misnomer in his Complaint that defendants concealed from him until after the deadline for amending pleadings had passed. Defendants’ other arguments against allowing the amendment are unpersuasive. Although defendants protest that an amendment now would be untimely, other courts have allowed amendment of pleadings to correct a misnomer in a defendant’s name at even later stages of the litigation than that presented here. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 33 n. 25 (1st Cir.2001) (rejecting defendant’s post-judgment misnomer defense that it was improperly named as “Ashland Chemical Inc.” rather than “Ashland Chemical Co.” where correct entity received adequate notice of suit and owned facility from which liability stemmed); My Favorite Muffin Too, Inc. v. DK Holdings, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 781, 784 (N.D.Ill.1999) (following conclusion of arbitration proceedings and entry of award, court allowed plaintiff to correct defendant’s name from DK Holdings, Inc., to proper name of DK Holding Corporation Too, Inc., where that entity had, in essence, been before court and arbitrator from the beginning). Equally unavailing is defendants’ contention that the amendment would be prejudicial. Defendants’ position is that “neither this subsidiary of the State of Alabama nor the State of Alabama have participated in” this action, and that “[i]nserting a new defendant in the place of a non-existent entity would radically alter the case.” (Doc. 58-2, at 6.) But the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court was clearly on notice from the time that process was served on the 13th Judicial Police Department through Judge Johnston that Pears was trying to sue it. If that entity chose to remain on the sidelines, despite notice, for the 12 months that this action has proceeded, it has only itself to blame for the consequences of that strategic choice. This is not prejudice. Nor is it at all apparent that the correct entity has not, in fact, been participating. If the 13th Judicial Police Department is, as defendants claim, “a non-existent entity,” then how has it filed an Answer and actively participated in discovery and motion practice in this action for the last 12 months? Because defendants’ evidence is that Mobile County does not control or supervise the 13th Judicial Police Department, surely the County could not properly purport to speak for the named defendant in this litigation. Simply put, defendants have made no showing that the correct entity or its agent has not in fact been pulling the strings of the defense actively mustered by the “non-existent entity” herein, and therefore have failed to establish prejudice. The point — namely, that the correct entity has been a participant in this litigation since its inception-is sharpened by examination of Pears’ official — capacity claims against Chief Collier. The law of this Circuit allows a Title VII plaintiff to file suit against “supervisory employees in their capacity as agents of the employer.” Hinson, 231 F.3d at 827; see also Busby, 931 F.2d at 772 (“We think the proper method for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is by suing the employer, either by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the employer or by naming the employer directly.”) (emphasis added); Portera, 322 F.Supp.2d at 1287 (in Title VII context, “[a] suit against the Department of Finance may be commenced by naming either the supervisory employee as an agent of the employer ... or by naming the employer directly. Either way, the effect is the same.... ”). Likewise, in § 1983 actions, the law is well established that a suit against a government supervisor in his official capacity is the same as a suit against the entity itself. See, e.g., Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1322 n. 14 (11th Cir.2000) (plaintiffs Title VII and § 1983 action “against Sheriff Barrett in her official capacity is the functional equivalent of suing the County”); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1293 n. 15 (11th Cir.1999) (“Official capacity claims are tantamount to a suit against the governmental entity involved.”). Pears expressly sued Chief Collier in both his individual and his official capacities. Chief Collier’s official capacity was Chief of the Thirteenth Judicial Police Department, a position he still held when he was served with process. Chief Collier averred that he was employed at all relevant times by the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama. (Collier Aff., ¶ 1.) As such, Pears’ claims against Chief Collier in his official capacity are tantamount to claims against the governmental entity that employed him, to-wit: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, the very entity that defendants claim has never participated in this lawsuit. Defendants are wrong. That entity has been joined in this litigation from the outset, and cannot be heard now to protest otherwise. Defendants’ final argument is that the Rule 16(b) deadline for amending the pleadings expired sometime ago. This is true. It is also true that where a request to amend is filed after that scheduling order deadline, “the party must show good cause why leave to amend the complaint should be granted.” Smith v. School Bd. of Orange County, 487 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir.2007); see also Rule 16(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P. (modifications to scheduling orders may be made “only for good cause and with the judge’s consent”). Based on the foregoing discussion, including specifically plaintiffs confusion as to the proper name of the employer defendant and defendants’ role in misleading him until that deadline had passed, the Court finds the requisite good cause to authorize the amendment at this time. See generally Scheidecker v. Arvig Enterprises, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 630 (D.Minn.2000) (finding good cause for modification of Rule 16(b) deadline for amending pleadings, where plaintiff sought to correct name of defendant employer, defendant had been “somewhat coy” about identity of employer, defendant was on notice of entity plaintiff was trying to sue, and amendment would correct uncertainties as to plaintiffs true employer). For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs request to amend the pleadings to correct the mislabeling of defendant “13th Judicial Police Department” is granted. The Complaint is deemed amended pursuant to Rules 15 and 16 to correct the misnomer of that defendant’s name and reflect its proper name, to-wit: Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama. Accordingly, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama shall henceforth be considered the operative governmental defendant in this action, and references to that defendant as 13th Judicial Police Department will be deleted. IV. Analysis of Merits of Plaintiffs Claims. When the dust settles after these protracted preliminaries, the following claims remain in play: (1) Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims against Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama and Chief Collier (official capacity only); (2) Section 1983 race discrimination and retaliation claims against Thirteen Judicial Circuit of Alabama and Chief Collier (individual capacity only), with such claims having both equal protection and § 1981 components; and (3) Section 1981 race discrimination and retaliation claims against Chief Collier (individual capacity-only). Because the legal standards governing each of these categories of claims are the same, it is unnecessary to evaluate separately the Title VII, the Section 1983 and the Section 1981 causes of action. However, it will be beneficial to break out the race discrimination theories from the retaliation theories, for analytical purposes, and to consider in isolation the evidence against Chief Collier. A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework. The parties’ summary judgment arguments on Pears’ discrimination and retaliation claims will be evaluated in accordance with the time-honored McDonnell Douglas framework. Absent direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation (which has not been presented here), Pears must make a showing of circumstantial evidence that satisfies the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this familiar burden-shifting analysis, plaintiff is required to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination and/or retaliation. If he does so, that showing “creates a rebut-table presumption that the employer acted illegally.” Underwood v. Perry County Com’n, 431 F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir.2005). At that point, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.... If the employer does this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir.1997) (outlining similar procedure for Title VII retaliation claims). A plaintiff may establish pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Brooks v. County Com’n of Jefferson County, Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). Either way, “[i]f the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, a plaintiff cannot recast the reason but must meet it head on and rebut it.... Quarreling with that reason is not sufficient.” Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1088; see also Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir.2008) (“It is the plaintiffs burden not merely to raise a suspicion regarding an improper motive, but rather to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s proffered reason for [the adverse employment action] was pretextual.”). The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. See E.E.O. C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir.2002). Thus, “[i]f the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to summary judgment.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). B. Plaintiff’s Race Discrimination Causes of Action. Plaintiffs race discrimination claims are focused exclusively on his contention that he was discharged because he is African-American. Defendants’ briefs do not question whether Pears can establish a prima facie case of race discrimination with respect to his termination. In light of this omission, the Court will not sua sponte analyze the adequacy of plaintiffs evidence to satisfy the relevant prima facie test for race discrimination, but will instead advance to the next step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Defendants unquestionably satisfy their burden of production in proffering a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Pears’ discharge. In particular, defendants maintain, and offer supporting evidence, that Pears was fired for having a positive drug test in January 2007. According to their discovery responses, defendants’ position is that “Pears was terminated due to the fact that a random drug test showed that he had an unacceptable level of benzodiazepine in his system.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 27, at #3.) Defendants’ evidence is that Lt. Patterson and/or Chief Collier recommended to Judge Graddick that Pears be fired for his positive drug test result, and that Judge Graddick concurred with and adopted that recommendation with no independent investigation. Defendants having thus met their burden of production, it becomes incumbent on Pears to make a showing of pretext. A plaintiffs pretext evidence “must reveal such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable fact-finder could find them unworthy of credence.” Vessels v. Atlanta Independent School System, 408 F.3d 763, 771 (11th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted); see also Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1278 (“The plaintiff must demonstrate weaknesses or implausibilities in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve the reasons.”); Jackson v. State of Alabama State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir.2005) (to demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must show that the employer’s offered reason was not the true reason for its decision, “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence”). Although he in no way challenges the results of the drug test, Pears marshals two distinct arguments in an effort to show pretext. First, he asserts that defendants’ failure to offer him a “last chance agreement” pursuant to the County of Mobile’s Drug-Alcohol Policy violated the policy and therefore is evidence of pretext. (Doc. 55, at 26.) Plaintiffs evidence is that Mobile County’s drug testing policy applied to officers of the 13th Judicial Police Department. (Pafenbach Dep., at 19-20.) That policy sets forth circumstances under which employees who test positive may avoid discharge by entering into a so-called “last chance agreement.” (Plaintiffs Exh. 30.) Plaintiffs evidence is that he was never offered a last chance agreement. (Pears Deck, at 1.) But nothing in the text of the policy requires the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama to offer last chance agreements to every employee who tests positive for a controlled substance. Moreover, Judge Graddick (the final decisionmaker as to Pears’ discharge) testified to his understanding of the policy that employees were eligible for last chance agreements only if they self-reported a drug problem. (Graddick Dep., at 56-57.) Pears did not. Finally, the policy provides that the “last chance” option is available only for employees who report to an approved substance abuse professional for counseling and evaluation within five days. (Plaintiffs Exh. 30.) There is no indication in the record that Pears ever did so, or that he ever acknowledged a substance abuse problem, which appears to be a prerequisite for the last chance option outlined in the policy. Plaintiff identifies no aspect of the policy that would allow an employee who steadfastly denied responsibility for a positive drug test to avail himself of a “last chance” arrangement. For all of these reasons, defendants’ failure to offer Pears a last chance agreement following his positive drug test did not violate the written policy and is not indicative that defendants’ stated reason for firing him was pretextual. Pears’ second pretext argument fares better. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the mere