Full opinion text
Opinion & Order CARMAN, Judge. In this omnibus Slip Opinion, the Court entertains and decides the following motions: (1) Defendant United States’ (“Government”) motion to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action and all “reasonable care” claims in Plaintiffs complaint, pursuant to USCIT R.12(b)(l) and R.12(b)(5); (2) motion to strike certain allegations contained in Plaintiffs complaint, pursuant to USCIT R.12(f); (3) Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a sur-reply to Defendant’s motion to dismiss; (4) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the First Cause of Action in its complaint, pursuant to USCIT R.56; (5) Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the First Cause of Action in Plaintiffs complaint, and motion for summary judgment on the Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs complaint, pursuant to USCIT R.56; (6) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgement on the Second Cause of Action, pursuant to USCIT R.56; and (7) Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action, pursuant to USCIT R.56. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000). For the reasons set forth below, the Court (i) denies Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a sur-reply; (ii) grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action; (iii) denies Defendant’s motion to strike; (iv) grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs First and Second Causes of Action; (v) grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action; (vi) denies Plaintiffs motions for summary judgment on the First Cause of Action; and (vii) denies Plaintiffs motions for summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action. Procedure & Background Plaintiff Kahrs International, Inc. (“Kahrs”) is the U.S. division of AB Gustaf Kahr the Swedish parent company founded in 1857 and Europe’s largest wood flooring manufacturer. Kahrs is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business located in Florida. {See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 2; see also n.l, supra.) Kahrs is the owner and importer of record of the six entries of merchandise that are the subject of this action (the “subject merchandise”), alternatively described as “engineered wood flooring panels” or “pre-finished flooring strips.” Kahrs’ six entries were imported via the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach and classified by the importer under subheading 4418.30.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (Compl. Exhibits (“Ex.”) 2-7). This duty-free provision is for “Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels; shingles and shakes: parquet panels.” 4418.30.00 HTSUS (2006). Following importation and entry of Kahrs’ merchandise, the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP” or “Customs”) issued successive notices of action (“CF-29s”) on each entry and subsequently liquidated them under Heading 4412 (“Plywood”), at the duty rate of 8% ad valorem, on or between October 27, 2006 and February 16, 2007. Kahrs subsequently filed a protest with CBP, Protest Number 270407-101011, which was denied on August 15, 2007 (Compl.Ex. 1A). On September 12, 2007, Kahrs commenced its lawsuit against the United States challenging the denial of its protest over the “liquidation, classification, duties, and fees assessed on the pre-finished, veneered, hardwood, flooring strips,” imported by Kahrs. (Compl.p.l.) The Government filed its Answer to the Complaint on February 14, 2008. Kahrs’ Complaint sets forth seven causes of action. In the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that certain “prior rulings and decisions,” which it claims permitted Kahrs to classify “imported shipments of similar or substantially identical [engineered wood flooring]” as “parquet panels under 4418.30.0000, HTSUS,” were unlawfully revoked by CBP’s issuance of certain CF-29’s, because such revocation violated the notice and comment provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2006). (CompLIffl 1-29.) The Second Cause of Action in Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that CBP’s act of imposing a higher duty for the “imported [engineered wood flooring]” contravened an “established and uniform practice” whereby, as a result of “hundreds of entries of these similar or identical” products made each year for several years prior to August 16, 2006, the agency permitted Kahrs and other importers throughout the U.S. to import “similar or identical [engineered wood flooring] under subheading 4418.30.0000, HTSUS, as parquet flooring panels.” (Compilé 30-39.) This imposition of a higher duty by CBP is alleged to have violated the publication requirement of 19 U.S.C. § 1315(d) (2006). (Id. at ¶¶ 36-39.) Plaintiffs Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action allege Kahrs’ preferred and alternative classifications of the imported “[engineered wood flooring]” under 4418.30.00 HTSUS (“[p]arquet panels”), 4418.90.20 HTSUS (“edge-glued lumber”), and 4418.90.4590 HTSUS (“builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels; other, other”), respectively. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-41 (3d Cause of Action); ¶¶ 42-47 (4th Cause of Action); ¶¶ 63-65 (6th Cause of Action).) Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action, the “Commercial Designation” claim, alleges that “[i]n the wholesale wood flooring trade, the scope of the commercial designation of the term ‘plywood’ does not include pre-finished multilayer flooring strips.” (Comply 59.) As a result, Plaintiff contends that its imported products are properly classifiable duty-free under 4412.29.56 HTSUS (“veneered panels and similar laminated wood.”) (Id. ¶ 62.) Resolution of this claim on the merits has been stayed pending the decision on the balance of the case. Finally, in Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action, Kahrs alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) and presents a potpourri of allegations in support of its request for declaratory relief. (Compl.1ffl 66-75.) Specifically, Kahrs requests, inter alia, that this Court declare as erroneous the denial of its protest by CBP; declare its preferred classification — 4418.30.00 HTSUS — as the correct one; and declare that Kahrs “exercised reasonable care as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1484 when classifying the subject [engineered wood flooring] covered by” its protest. (Compl., Prayer for Relief, pp. 26-28, and ¶¶ 66-75.) The Government moved (1) to dismiss Kahrs’ Seventh Cause of Action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to USCIT R. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to USCIT R.12(b)(5); and (2) to strike, inter alia, certain allegations throughout the Complaint that Kahrs “exercised reasonable care” in its classification of the imported merchandise. (See Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Part Of This Action And To Strike (“Mot.Dismiss”).) Plaintiff opposed these motions. Both Kahrs and the Government additionally filed separate cross-motions for summary judgment, pursuant to USCIT R.56, regarding Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action in its complaint. Defendant also pursued summary judgment on the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action to Plaintiffs complaint. This Court will first address the Government’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike. Discussion I. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike A. Plaintiffs Sur-Reply Motion As a preliminary matter, the Court must entertain Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply To Defendant’s Reply To Plaintiffs Opposition To Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss (“Sur-Reply Mot.”). Kahrs requests the Court’s indulgence and moves to file a sur-reply “in order to bring to the Court’s attention certain facts that are omitted from Defendant’s Reply [to its motion to dismiss] but that are relevant to the issues raised by Defendant and were not previously presented to the Court.” (Sur-Reply Mot. 1.) In “the interests of time and ease of administration,” Plaintiff filed its proposed Sur-Reply along with its motion. (Id.) The Government objected to Kahrs’ motion for a sur-reply and filed opposition papers. (“Def.’s Sur-Reply Op.”) Defendant contends that it “did not omit any ‘facts’ from [its] reply brief which could be pertinent or relevant to the Court’s determination” on the Government’s motion to dismiss. (Def.’s Sur-Reply Op. 2.) Additionally, Defendant argues that Kahrs has failed to demonstrate a basis for “the extraordinary privilege of filing a sur-reply brief here.” (Id. at 3.) The Rules of the U.S. Court of International Trade do not provide for the filing sur-replies to motion papers. Cf. C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. v. United States, 68 Cust.Ct. 377, 343 F.Supp. 1387, 1394 (1972) (striking surreply and noting that sur-replies are “not provided for in the rules”); see also U.S. Court of Int’l Trade, Rules and Annotations. Generally, the “decision to permit the filing of a sur reply is purely discretionary and should generally only be allowed when ‘a valid reason for such additional briefing exists, such as where the movant raises new arguments in its reply brief.’ ” First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. 633 Partners, Ltd., 800 Fed.Appx. 777, 788 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Fedrick v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 366 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1197 (N.D.Ga.2005)). Moreover, as this court has once noted “after [the] issue is properly joined ... succeeding rebuttal or supplementary briefs normally serve more to relieve the anxieties of counsel than to help the court.” The Newman Co. v. United States, 57 Cust.Ct. 117, 119 (1966). This Court finds that, upon on the papers presented, there appears to be no valid basis to grant Kahrs’ request for supplementary briefing. Moreover, Plaintiff has had sufficient opportunity via its response papers to respond to the legal issues raised by the Government in its motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs proffered reason for seeking to bring “certain facts” to “the Court’s attention” that were allegedly ignored by the Government, is not singularly in accord with this Court’s understanding of the case law and this court’s rules of practice. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to file a sur-reply is DENIED. Cf. Saha Thai Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. v. United States, 661 F.Supp. 1198, 1201 n. 5 (CIT 1987) (“The court cannot allow the pre-trial ... process to become needlessly protracted by endless sur-reply briefs.”); see also US-CIT R. 1. The Court now addresses Defendant’s motion to dismiss and to strike. B. Motion to Dismiss The Government moved separately, under USCIT Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5), to dismiss the Seventh Cause of Action in the complaint (Compl.1ffl 66-75) in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) and/or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Mot. Dismiss 1.) The Government also moved to dismiss, under USCIT Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(5), Plaintiffs “reasonable care” “claims” alleged in paragraphs 20, 22, 36, 68, and 72 of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581® and/or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Id.) Finally, the Government moved to dismiss, under US-CIT Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiffs “reasonable care” claims alleged in paragraphs 20, 22, and 36 of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). (Id.) 1. Standards of Review In deciding a USCIT Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss that does not challenge the factual basis for the complainant’s allegations, and when deciding a USCIT Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court assumes that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed.Cir.1995); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1583-84 & n. 13 (Fed.Cir.1993); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed.Cir.1991). When a defendant challenges the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating jurisdiction exists. See Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Len-Ron Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 24 CIT 948, 959, 118 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1277 (2000). “It is elementary that [t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued ..., and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980) (internal quotation omitted). The threshold inquiry before the Court is whether subject matter jurisdiction exists over the claims presented. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”).) Finally, assuming that all of the factual allegations are true, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)) (quotations omitted). Even assuming that all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). 2. Parties’Contentions In Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action, Complaint ¶¶ 66-75, titled “Declaratory Relief,” Kahrs alleges that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(i), 1585, 2201 and 2643(c) “as it pertains to administration and enforcement [by CBP] with respect to the matters specified in the six causes of action set forth [in the complaint].” (Comply 67.) The essence of Kahrs’ Seventh Cause of Action is an application for a “determination” by the Court that Kahrs exercised reasonable care, as specified in 19 U.S.C. § 1484, when it classified the [engineered wood flooring] under 4418.30.0000, HTSUS ... and that CBP’s actions in changing the classification, assessing [higher] duties, threatening penalties, and causing actual, immediate and irreparable harm to Kahrs by failing to comply with the provisions of both 19 U.S.C. §§ 1315(d) and 1625(c), is inconsistent with the plain meaning of these controlling provisions and is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not otherwise in accordance with law causing Kahrs extraordinary hardship and unusual injury. (Comply 69.) Kahrs describes with specificity the variety of declaratory relief it seeks in the Prayer for Relief. (Compl., Prayer For Relief, pp. 26-28.) The Government argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581® over any entry of imported merchandise that are the subject of Protest No. 2704-07-101011 “or any other unidentified entries made between January 2001 and January 2006.” (Mot. Dismiss Mem. 14, 20-25.) Moreover, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs “reasonable care. claims” under § 1581(i). (Id. at 20-25.) Kahrs “strenuously opposes” Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Pl.’s Response To Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss Part of This Action And To Strike (“Pl.’s Resp. MTD”) 1.) While not a model of clarity, the Court was able to extract from Kahrs’ response papers the • foundation of its opposition. Kahrs contends that § 1581(i) is appropriate as to its Seventh Cause of Action because “jurisdiction under another subsection of Section 1581 is either unavailable or manifestly inadequate.” (PL’s Resp. MTD Br. 14) (citing Int’l Custom Products v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir.2006).) Kahrs argues, inter alia, that § 1581(a) is jurisdictionally unavailable “to confirm the correctness of its actions,” that is, to confirm the propriety of its preferred classification in at least six earlier entries of imports (not the subject imports of this action), which it contends established a “prior treatment” or an “established and uniform practice” under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1625(c) or 1315(d) respectively. (PL’s Resp. MTD Br. 16-17.) In other words, Kahrs states that its motivation in procuring a declaratory judgment from the court is to confirm that it exercised “reasonable care,” thus blunting any future action by CBP that it violated 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2006) — i.e., as a “defense to an alleged violation of ... [sjection 1592.” (PL’s Resp. MTD Br. 8,18-19.) 3. Analysis First, Kahrs concedes that this Court has no jurisdiction under § 1581(a) over any pending or suspended protests (to the extent that there are any) and any entries not covered by the protest identified in the summons in this action. (See PL’s Resp. MTD Mem. 4; Def.’s Reply To Opp. To Defs Mot. To Dismiss (“Defs MTD Reply Br.”) 4.) Put another way, this Court has jurisdiction only over the entries that are the subject of this challenge to a denied protest, pursuant to § 1581(a), as indicated in the summons filed with this action. Therefore, to the extent that the Seventh Cause of Action asserts a claim that this Court has § 1581(a) jurisdiction over pending or suspended protests, or any other entries not identified in the summons of this case, such claims are unreviewable and accordingly dismissed pursuant to USCIT R. 12(b)(1). See Dexter v. United States, 78 Cust.Ct. 179, 181 (1977) (“[T]his court has no jurisdiction” over any entries “[u]ntil the entries are liquidated and [the] protests [are] denied[.]”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a). Next, the Court notes that § 1581(i) — the residual jurisdiction provision — may only be invoked when another subsection of § 1581 is unavailable or the remedy provided by another subsection is “manifestly inadequate.” See Nat’l Com Growers Ass’n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1557 (Fed.Cir.1988); see also Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041, 108 S.Ct. 773, 98 L.Ed.2d 859 (1988). Here, the Court agrees with the Government that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction over the Seventh Cause of Action and the “reasonable care” “claims.” (Mot. Dismiss 20-25; Defs MTD Reply Br. 5.) Reviewing this court’s central jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a)-(i), it is apparent that the court has no jurisdiction to review a “reasonable care” claim by an importer, a claim arising from penalty investigations, or a pre-enforcement claim. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1582 provides jurisdiction for issues arising from a penalty enforcement action; that is, any claims arising under 19 U.S.C. § 1592. See Tikal Distrib. Corp. v. United States, 21 CIT 715, 720, 970 F.Supp. 1056, 1061 (1997) (Section 1582 “provide[s] a complete judicial remedy for those who believe that Customs has wrongfully assessed a penalty. Specifically, the statute allows a party to obtain de novo review of a government claim from the Court of International Trade before paying any penalty.”). Plaintiffs unsubstantiated assertion that the Court has jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because “no other subsection of § 1581 is available or the remedies afforded by other subsections would be manifestly inadequate,” Pl.’s MTD Resp. 25, is insufficient ipse dixit. Accordingly, this Court holds that the Government’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action is GRANTED and Kahrs’ “reasonable care” claims are dismissed pursuant to USCIT R. 12(b)(1) for want of jurisdiction. Furthermore, because the Court dismisses in its entirety Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action and the “reasonable care” claims for the reasons stated above, the Court need not address the Government’s 12(b)(5) issues. C. Motion to Strike The Government also moves this Court, presumably under USCIT R.12(f), for an order striking various and sundry statements, allegations, and claims contained in Kahrs’ Complaint. (Mot. Dismiss 1-2, 3 n.l.) Plaintiff opposes this motion and contends that the particular phrases Defendant seeks to strike relate to or parrot various statutory or regulatory language upon which Plaintiff based its Complaint. (Pl.’s MTD Resp. 25-26.) 1. Standards of Review USCIT Rule 12(f) provides that the Court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Rule 12(f) also provides that a party may move the court to strike, but such motion must be brought before responding to a pleading, or if no response is permitted no later than 20 days after being served with the pleading. USCIT R. 12(f)(2). Here, Kahrs filed its Complaint on September 12, 2007. The Government filed its Answer on February 14, 2008 and filed its motion to strike on September 19, 2008. Mindful of these dates, the Government’s motion is not timely and must be rejected. USCIT R. 12(f)(2); see also First Nat’l City Bank v. Burton M. Saks Constr. Corp., 70 F.R.D. 417, 419 (D.Vi.1976) (rejecting as untimely motion to strike filed six months after receipt the pleading). Furthermore, it is axiomatic that “motions to strike are not favored by the courts and are infrequently granted.” Jimlar Corp. v. United States, 10 CIT 671, 673, 647 F.Supp. 932, 934 (1986); 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Civil Procedure § 1380 (2009). The Court will grant a motion to strike only when there is a “flagrant disregard of the rules of court.” Jimlar Corp., 647 F.Supp. at 934. The Government’s motion to strike is therefore DENIED. II. Motions for Summary Judgment The Court now turns to the Parties’ various motions and cross-motions for summary judgment. To summarize the pending motions, Kahrs filed a Motion For Summary Judgment On First Cause of Action (Docket #15) (“Pl.’s Mot. SJ”), pursuant to USCIT R.56(a). The Government responded in opposition and filed a Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (Docket # 68) on the First Cause of Action as well as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action (Docket # 68) (“Def.’s X-Mot. SJ”). During the pendency of these motions, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment On Second Cause of Action (Docket #57) (“Pl.’s Mot. SJ 2d”) pursuant to USCIT R.56(a). The Government responded in opposition and filed a Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of Action (Docket # 80) (“Def.’s X-Mot. SJ 2d”). At the heart of the matter, this action is a classification case. Therefore, the Court will first address the proper classification of the subject merchandise as raised in the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action. Thereafter, the Court will take up the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the First and Second Causes of Action. A. Standards of Review The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (protest denial jurisdiction). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R.56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must view the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 259, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, “a court has an independent obligation to determine, on the basis of parties’ submissions, whether a movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v. T.J. Manalo, Inc., 26 CIT 1117, 1119, 240 F.Supp.2d 1255, 11257 (2002). In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must determine whether either party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT Rule 56(c); see also Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 679, 684 (CIT 1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d 1366 (Fed.Cir.2001). In classification cases, “summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to ... what the merchandise is ... or as to its use.” Ero Indus., Inc. v. United States, 24 CIT 1175, 1179, 118 F.Supp.2d. 1356, 1359-60 (2000). The parties claim there are no genuine issues as to any material facts; therefore summary judgment is appropriate in this matter. This Court agrees. Where, as here, “the nature of the merchandise is undisputed, ... the classification issue collapses entirely into a question of law,” and the court reviews Customs’ classification decisions de novo. Cummins Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (2000). In making its determination as to the proper classification under the HTSUS, the Court must consider whether “the government’s classification is correct, both independently and in comparison with the importer’s alternative.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed.Cir.1984). B. Summary Judgment — Undisputed Material Facts The following are the undisputed material facts as stipulated by the Parties and additional undisputed material facts gleaned from the evidentiary record on all motions and cross-motions for summary judgment before the Court. Jurisdiction & Background 1. This is a civil action which contests the denial of a protest under § 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1515. (Parties’ Uncontested Facts (“UF”) ¶ 1 (Docket # 102).) 2. Kahrs, is the owner and importer of record of the merchandise involved in this action and is the party which caused the protest herein to be filed; therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2631(a), Kahrs has standing to bring this action. (UF ¶ 2.) 3. Kahrs made the following entries through the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach and subsequent CF-29s were issued by CBP: Entry Number Entry Date CF-29 Issue Date 399-0808699-2 2/24/06 8/16/06 701-5216140-5 9/14/06 10/3/06 701-5216149-6 9/20/06 10/11/06 701-5216163-7 9/20/06 10/11/06 399-0411896-3 9/26/06 10/17/06 399-0807626-6 11/05/05 11/27/06 (UF ¶¶ 3, 6.) 4. Kahrs entered all of the merchandise it imported in the entries identified in paragraph 3, above, under Heading 4418, subheading 4418.30.00 HTSUS, a duty-free provision for “assembled parquet panels.” (UF1Í4.) 5. The imported subject merchandise is identified on the entry summaries (CF-7501) for all six entries as “PARQUET PANELS BUILDERS’ JOINE[RY].” See CF-7501, Entry Papers, USCIT Court File (Ct. No. 07-000343). 6. The imported subject merchandise is identified on the commercial invoices as either “Parquet flooring” or “LINEAL FLOORING].” See Commercial Invoices, Entry Papers, USCIT Court File. 7. The commercial invoices also describe other aspects of the imported subject merchandise including product thickness, type of wood on the face ply, finish, number of wood strips, length, quantity, unit value and total value. For example, the invoice for Entry # 399-0807626-6 describes one article of merchandise as “LINNEA[L] REDOAK STYLE 3-STRIP; Glazed Woodloc.” See Commercial Invoice for Entry # 399-0807626-6, Entry Papers, USCIT Court File. 8. On August 16, 2006, Customs issued a CF-29 to Kahrs for Entry Number 399-0808699-2 proposing to rate advance the imported “Lineal Floor, plyw — Mat Satin, entered under 4418.30.0000/free” to subheading 4412.14.3170, HTSUS, at an 8% duty rate because the “product is not parquet panels by tariff standards, but is specifically engineered flooring (flooring of plywood construction), with a nonconiferous face ply and no ply exceeding 6mm in thickness.” PL’s Mot. SJ, Ex. 3, Brennan Deck 1. The CF-29 also stated to Kahrs that it should “classify future shipments of this merchandise accordingly.” See Ex. 3, Brennan Deck 1. 9. Kahrs responded to CBP’s August 16, 2006 CF-29, by letter dated September 1, 2006, explaining that it “disagree[d]” with CBP’s classification change and noted that it “will continue to classify these products under 4418.30.0000.” Def.’s X-Mot. SJ, Ex. N. 10. Customs issued additional CF-29s to Kahrs on October 3, 2006, October 11, 2006, October 17, 2006, and November 27, 2006 in connection with the remaining five entries at issue in this action (Entry Nos. 701-5216140-5, 701-5216163-7, 701-5216149-6, 399-0411896-3, 399-0807626-6). Brennan Deck 1, Exs. 4-8. The CF-29s for all six entries indicated that they were liquidated by Customs under Heading 4412, in either subheading 4412.14.3170, 4412.22.3170, 4412.29.3620, or 4412.29.3670, HTSUS, at the duty rate of 8%, ad valorem, on or between October 27, 2006 and February 16, 2007. (UF ¶ 7.) 11. On October 31, 1997, Customs denied two protests of Kahrs and announced its intention to liquidate their engineered wood flooring products under subheading 4418.30.00 HTSUS. See Protest No. 1001 97-105319, Brennan Deck 1, Ex 1A; Protest No. 1001 97-105320, Brennan Deck 1, Ex. IB; Brennan Deck 1, ¶¶ 12 & 18. 12. Protest No. 2704-07-101011 was timely filed within 180 days of the liquidation of the six entries in this suit that were made through the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach. (UF ¶ 8.) 13. On August 15, 2007, Customs denied Protest No. 2704-07-101011 pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(a). (UF ¶ 9.) 14. This action, filed September 12, 2007, was timely commenced within 180 days of the date of denial of the protest which is the subject of this action. (UF ¶ 10.) 15. All duties, charges and exactions assessed at liquidation pertaining to the protested entries referred to herein were paid prior to the commencement of this action. (UF ¶ 11.) 16. This Court has jurisdiction over the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action in the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). (UF ¶ 12.) The Imported Subject Merchandise 17. Kahrs describes the imported subject merchandise as “Engineered Wood Strip Flooring.” See Kahrs Int’l, Inc., Technical Manual 3d (Def.’s X-Mot. SJ, Ex. J). 18. Kahrs also describes the imported subject merchandise as “engineered wood flooring panels.” See Summons, Attach. 1. 19. “Engineered wood flooring” panels are composed of multiple laminated layers of varying thicknesses, with the grain of each layer running perpendicular to that of the contiguous layer. Engineered wood flooring panels are “imported in ... strips or planks (ie., rectangular panels) with a face ply of, generally, a hardwood species.” The face ply may be constructed of single or multiple strips of wood veneers simulating a “strip” or “plank” flooring. Duvall Decl. ¶ 42; see also Kahrs Int’l, Inc., Technical Manual 3d (Def.’s X-Mot. SJ, Ex. J); Kahrs Int’l, Inc., 2005-2006 Guide Specifications (Def.’s X-Mot. SJ, Ex. I). 20. There are three categories of engineered wood flooring at issue in this case: (a.) 1-strip engineered wood flooring panels that are 14 millimeters (“mm”) thick; (b.) 2-strip engineered wood flooring panels flooring that are 15 mm thick; and (c.) 3-strip engineered wood flooring panels flooring products that are 15 mm thick. (UF ¶ 13.) 21. The 14 mm thick engineered wood flooring panels consist of 7-plies with the face plies made of varying wood species. These panels are imported in random lengths from 16 inches, 26 inches, 35 /£ inches, and 52 inches, are approximately 5 inches wide and no ply exceeds 6mm in thickness. (UF ¶ 14.) 22. The imported 15 mm, 2-strip, 3-ply engineered wood flooring panels consist of three layers (“plies”) of wood glued and pressed one on the other and disposed so that the grains of successive layers are perpendicular to each other. The top layer is a 3.6 mm (slightly less than/: of an inch) thick hardwood or tropical wood with the grain running “vertical” along the length of the board. The middle layer (the “core” ply) consists of pine “fingers” which run horizontally across the board. This core ply exceeds 6 mm in thickness. They are 9.4 mm (approximately 6/16 of an inch) thick, with the grain running at right angles to the grain of the top layer. There is spacing between the pine fingers, which may be up to 2 mm (approximately 1/14 of an inch). The bottom layer is made from spruce and is 2 mm (approximately 1/14 of an inch) thick, with the grain running “vertical” along the length of the board and the grain is running at right angles to the grain of the middle layer. (UF ¶ 25.) 23. The 14 mm and 15 mm engineered wood flooring panels are laminated. (UF ¶ 16.) 24. Kahrs’ 14 mm and 15 mm engineered wood flooring panels were designed to simulate solid wood strip or plank flooring, are competitive with solid wood strip or plank flooring, and have advantages that solid wood strip or plank flooring does not have. (SeeUFH17.) 25. The Kahrs 14 mm flooring products in the Protest consist of pre-finished multilayered hardwood or tropical wood planks. There is a top or wear layer of hardwood or tropical wood, a core layer of five layers of poplar wood, and a bottom layer of spruce. The top layer is a single face strip that is assembled on a support of the core and bottom layers that are laminated together with adhesive to form a flooring panel 5 inches wide that simulates a solid wood “plank” when assembled after importation into flooring. During manufacture of the 14mm panels, tongue and groove edges are cut into the core so that other panels can be joined together after importation to form a complete floor covering. See Colgan Decl. 1, Enel. B. 26. The 15 mm flooring is imported in lengths of 82% to 95% inches and the majority are approximately 8 inches wide. See UF ¶ 15; Colgan Depo. Tr. 27:22-25. 27. The face of the 15 mm flooring product is constructed of two or three narrow strips of wood measuring 4 inches wide for the 2-strip and 2% inches wide for the 3-strip, 3.6 mm thick and 8 inches, 10% inches or 13 inches in length to simulate solid wood “strip” flooring at the time of importation, and when subsequently assembled into finished flooring. See Representative Samples; Colgan Decl. 1, ¶¶ 16, 35, 50; Colgan Decl. 2, ¶ 11; Colgan Depo. Tr. 80:18-25-81:1-6. 28. During the manufacture of the 15 mm panels, the patented “Woodloe” interlocking system is cut into the core so that other panels can be joined together after importation to form a complete floor covering. See Colgan Decl. 1, Enel. B. 29. All of the imported 14 mm and 15 mm three-strip engineered wood flooring panels consist of an odd number of veneers of wood disposed so that the grains of successive layers are at a right angle to layers above and below. The veneers of wood are glued and pressed one on the other and, thereby, bonded together using adhesive and pressure. See Colgan Decl. 1, Enel. B, at 5-6. Classification History of Kahrs’ Engineered Wood Flooring Products 30. In November 1997, the World Customs Organization amended the Explanatory Notes to both headings 4412 and 4418 to clarify that panels with a face ply composed of multiple parallel strips are properly classifiable as “plywood” and not as “parquet panels.” See Explanatory Notes to Headings 4412 and 4418, as amended; Annex IJ/14 to Doc. 41.600 E (HSC/20/N ov.97). 31. Prior to May 30, 2001, Customs classified engineered wood flooring in Heading 4418 when the panel had a face ply consisting of multiple veneer strips of wood. (UF ¶ 18.) 32. Prior to May 30, 2001, Customs classified engineered wood flooring with a face veneer consisting of a single strip of wood in Heading 4412. (UF ¶ 19.) 33. In light of the clarifying amendments to the Explanatory Notes, Customs changed its position and concluded that engineered wood flooring, whether of multiple veneer strips or a single veneer strip, are properly classified in Heading 4412. (UF ¶ 20.) 34. As required by 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), Customs published notice of its proposal to revoke [¶] 962031 and three other rulings (N.Y. 806603, N.Y. 806462, and N.Y. 832721) and its treatment of engineered wood flooring in the Customs Bulletin on December 20, 2000. This notice provided a full copy of each of the relevant rulings which Customs proposed to revoke or modify and a ruling providing its current position. (UF ¶ 21.) 35. Customs revoked its prior rulings and treatment which found that engineered wood flooring is classifiable as “[pjarquet panels.” See Notice of Revocation and Modification of Ruling Letters and Treatment Relating to Tariff Classifi cation of Laminated Flooring, 35 Oust. Bull. 22 (May 30, 2001) (“Revocation Ruling”). (UF ¶ 22.) 36. The classification position set forth in the Revocation Ruling became effective 60 days after the date of its publication, i.e., on July 29, 2001. (UF ¶ 23.) 37. Between July 29, 2001 and August 16, 2006, Kahrs made 1867 entries of engineered wood flooring panels at 28 ports that were liquidated as entered under subheading 4418.30.00, HTSUS or under Heading 4409, HTSUS. (UF ¶ 24; Duval Decl., ¶ 28.) 38. Customs did not advise Kahrs that its entered classifications of any of the engineered wood flooring panels it imported during the period 2001 to 2006 were correct. See Brennan Depo. Tr. 128:5-129:3. 39. Of the 1867 entries which were liquidated under subheading 4418.30.00 during the period between July 29, 2001 and August 16, 2006, 1776 entries (approximately 95%) were “paperless” and 91 entries were paper (approximately 5%). See Duvall Decl., ¶ 29. 40. Of the 1776 “paperless” entries liquidated during the period between July 29, 2001 and August 16, 2006, six entries (approximately 0.3% of the total number of entries) were filed as paperless “informal,” 933 (approximately 50% of the total number of entries) were filed as paperless electronic invoice entries, and 837 (approximately 45% of the total number of entries) were filed as paperless bypass entries. Duvall Decl., ¶ 30. 41. “Bypass” means that an entry is not reviewed by an import specialist (the review of the entry is bypassed) and the entry is liquidated “as entered,” ie., with no change to the entry data originally submitted to Customs. Duvall Decl., ¶ 31. 42. Of the 933 paperless electronic invoice entries liquidated during the period between July 29, 2001 and August 16, 2006, 236 (approximately 25% of the total number of the paperless electronic invoice entries) were filed with electronic invoice data. Duvall Decl., ¶ 32. 43. No paper copy of an entry summary (CF-7501) was filed with Customs for any of the paperless entries liquidated during the period between July 29, 2001 and August 16, 2006, and with the exception of Entry No. 399-0800233-8, none of the paperless entries were reviewed by an import specialist. Duvall Decl., ¶ 33. 44. Where paper entries were made, 73 of the 91 paper entries (approximately 4% of the total number of entries) liquidated during the period between July 29, 2001 and August 16, 2006 were filed as “paper bypass,” which means that the entries were liquidated automatically without review by an import specialist. Duvall Decl., ¶ 34. 45. Eighteen of the 91 paper entries (less than 1% of the total number of entries) liquidated during the period between July 29, 2001 and August 16, 2006 were filed as paper for import specialist review; however, 11 of the 18 entries were “manually bypassed,” which means that the entries were liquidated without review by an import specialist. Duvall Decl., ¶ 35. 46. The paper entry summaries for Entry Nos. 399-0800233-8, 201-3042459-9, F23-0114325-1, F23-0114725-2, F231145004-3, F23-0115067-8, and F230115182-5, which represent less than 0.4% of the total number of entries made by Kahrs from July 29, 2001 and liquidated before August 16, 2006, were reviewed by an import specialist. Duvall Decl., ¶ 36. 47. With the exception of the entries identified in ¶ 46, above, no import specialist reviewed an entry summary for any of the entries made by Kahrs on or after July 29, 2001 and liquidated before August 16, 2006. Duvall Decl., ¶ 37. 48. No import specialist requested a sample or additional information, or effected a change liquidation for any of Kahrs’ entries made on or after July 29, 2001 and liquidated before August 16, 2006. Duvall Decl., ¶¶ 37, 39. 49. With the exception of the entries identified in ¶ 46, above, all of the Kahrs’ entries liquidated without a confirmed review by an import specialist. See Duvall Decl, ¶ 39. 50. Customs selects entries for intensive cargo examinations for a variety of purposes including national security, in order to ensure that prohibited goods do not enter into the territory of the United States. See Ex. S, Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Req. for Admissions, Interrog., and for Production of Docs. Pertaining to 2d Cause of Action, ¶ 13(c). 51. Cargo examinations may also be conducted to validate the information provided with the entry, including, country of origin marking, other marking issues, classification to the six-digit international tariff level, quantity verification and documentation review. See id. 52. Because of the security devices or techniques employed, cargo examinations are not public events and Customs’ records of these examinations are not made on the entry documents or otherwise reported to an importer. See generally Swanson Depo. Tr. 53. Kahrs admits that, aside from the CF-29s at issue in this case, all communications regarding the status of its entries during importation came from its freight forwarder and/or customs broker, and not directly from Customs. See Brennan Depo. Tr. 160-165. 54. The only record in this case containing information regarding the results of the cargo examinations is contained in the CBP Importer Trade Activity (“IT-RAC”) Report for Kahrs, which contains data that was initially recorded in the ACS database. See ITRAC Report; Duval Depo. Tr. 19; see generally Swanson Depo. Tr. 55. The ITRAC report was provided to Kahrs in response to its Freedom of Information Act request in November 2006, several years after the cargo examinations of Entry Nos. 399-0801291-5, 399-0802301-1 and 399-0803895-1 and after the entries at issue in this action were made. (UF ¶ 26.) 56. Customs conducted cargo examinations and certain information was recorded by CBP personnel in CBP databases and produced in the ITRAC Report regarding the following entries: Port of Entry Entry Entry/Cargo Import Specialist Number_Date Exam Site_Comments_Remarks_ 701-5112456-0 7/2/02 San Francisco, OK COMPLIANT INV.591662, CA INVAL:72476, ISNI, PARQUET FLOORING(SC:MS)_ INV:629915, INVAL:60223, C/O SWEDEN, LINNEA CHERRY LIFE 3-STRIP. OAKGRANDA WOOD. XND. 399-0801291-5 9/3/03 San Francisco, OK COMPLIANT CA 399-0803895-1 9/22/04 Newark, NJ 203 MB 12/15/04-EXAM <>:1:PG:INV# 036576, PERFORMED NO DIS- INVAL$31738, PANELS, CREPANCIES FOUND COMPLIANT, ISNI. <> = redacted as per 5 USC 552(b)(2) & (7) 399-0802301-1 3/15/04 Houston, TX COMPLIANT <> = INV# PROFORMA, redacted as per 5 USC INVAL$54673, ISNG < > 552(b)(2) & (7) COMMODITY VERIFIED PER INVOICE/EXM INSTRUCTIONS C/O SWEDEN. NO ANOMALIES PRESENT. <> = redacted as per 5 USC 552(b)(2 [sic ] CM, INV# 1207741, INVAL:35861, WP:NC, PARQUET PANELS, NLM CF 4647 ISSUED, <>-NG-SE, oEQUIP, ET, 1129 <> = redacted as per 5 USC 552(b)(2) & (7) 399-0808440-1 1/31/06 Chicago, IL SUMMARY LINE COMPLIANT MARKING CERTIFICATION ACCEPTED See Entry Summary Review Table and Cargo Exams Table, ITRAC Report. 57. Kahrs admits to having no knowledge of either Customs’ procedures or personnel involved with its or any cargo examinations. See Brennan Depo. Tr. 155— 166. 58. The cargo examinations of Entry Nos. 399-0803895-1 (Sept.2004), 399-0802301-1 (March 2004) and 399-0808440-1 (Jan.2006) were conducted by CBP after the entry of judgment by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Boen Hardwood Flooring, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1262 (Fed.Cir. Feb.2, 2004). See ITRAC Report. 59. The cargo examination of Entry No 399-0808440-1 was a random examination (not based on suspicion of an illegal activity) where both a security and trade exam were conducted. Swanson Depo Tr. 74:12-78:13; see also ITRAC Report. 60. As a result of a trade exam, CBP determined that Entry No 399-0808440-1 was noncompliant for country-of-origin marking purposes. See ITRAC Report; Swanson Depo Tr. 78:16-79:4. 61. The following entry, which was claimed by Kahrs to be one of the “six intensive examinations,” was not the subject of a Customs cargo examination; however, the entry summary form (CF-7501) associated with the entry was reviewed by an import specialist: Port of Entry Entry Entry/Cargo Import Specialist Number_Date Exam Site_Comments_Remarks 201-3042459-9 7/16/03 JFKInt’l 253:PARQUET None Aii-port (N.Y.) PANELS:C/ O =CH:EV = $7,524: _ _COMPLIANT:MM_ See ITRAC Report; Swanson Depo. Tr. 137-38; Duvall Deck, ¶ 36. 62.The ITRAC Report contains no record that an import specialist requested or examined a sample of the merchandise covered by Entry No. 201-3042459-9. See ITRAC Report, 63. The ITRAC Report contains no record that an import specialist was involved in the cargo examination of Entry-No. 399-0801291-5. Comments were entered by unknown personnel in the data field “Import Specialist Comments” as reported within the ITRAC Report. See ITRAC Report. 64. The acronyms “ISNI” and “ISNG” are contained in the remarks column corresponding to Entry Nos. 701-5112456-0, 399-0802301-1 and 399-0803895-1, which were the subject of Customs cargo examinations as provided on the ITRAC Report. See ITRAC Report. 65. “ISNI” means “Import Specialist Not Involved.” “ISNG” means “Import Specialist Not Involved Due to Geography.” See Swanson Depo. Tr. 105-107, 126; Duvall Deck, ¶ 41. 66. No import specialist participated in the cargo examinations of Entry Nos. 701-5112456-0, 399-0802301-1 and 399-0803895-1. See ITRAC Report; Swanson Depo. Tr. 105-107, 126; Duvall Deck, ¶ 41; Ex. Kl, Def.’s Resp. to Pk’s Interrog., served on June 27, 2008. 67. The only information Kahrs received regarding the five cargo examinations was from its broker or freight forwarder. See Brennan Depo. Tr. 148, 151-152,161-162. USCIT Suspended Cases 68. Kahrs filed nine summonses during the period from September 27, 1996 through February 10, 2000. See Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) System, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE # : l:96-cv-02282-DCP; CM/ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE #: l:97-cv00948-DCP; CM/ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE # : l:97-cv-00949-DCP; CM/ ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE #: l:97-cv-01215-DCP; CM/ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE # : l:97-cv-02019DCP; CM/ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE # : l:98-cv-00946-DCP; CM/ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE #: l:99-cv00224-DCP; CM/ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE # ; l:99-cv-00292-DCP; CM/ ECF, CIT DOCKET FOR CASE #: l:00-cv-00075-DCP. 69. The consent motion for test case designation and suspension identifies the merchandise as consisting of “laminated hardwood flooring.” See id. 70. The nine civil actions set forth in ¶¶ 68-69, above, were suspended under Boen Hardwood, which was designated as a test case. See id. 71. In those nine civil actions (¶¶ 68-69, above), Kahrs was represented by the same counsel (John J. Galvin, Esq., Galvin & Mlawski, New York, NY) that represented the plaintiff-appellee in Boen Hardwood and, subsequent to the decision in Boen Hardwood, each of those nine actions was voluntarily dismissed or dismissed by stipulation of the parties. See id. and Boen Hardwood, 357 F.3d at 1263. C. Summary Judgment — Third, Fourth, & Sixth Causes of Action Before the Court is the Government’s motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action. The issue common to all is the correct tariff classification of Plaintiffs imported engineered wood flooring panels. Customs refused to classify the subject merchandise as assembled parquet panels under HTSUS heading 4418, treating it as plywood under heading 4412. Kahrs challenges the classification on the grounds that the merchandise, as imported, are “assembled parquet panel[ ]” flooring and should therefore be classified under heading 4418. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s X-Mot. for SJ (“PL’s Opp. Br.”) 18.) In the alternative, Kahrs contends that the engineered wood flooring constitutes “Edged-glued lumber” classifiable as “Other” under subheading 4418.90.4590. (PL’s Opp. Br. 28-29.) Finally, in yet another alternative, Kahrs argues that the imported merchandise is classifiable as “builders’ joinery” under subheading 4418.90.4590 because “the provision for builders’ joinery is clearly narrower and includes a smaller number of products than the provision for plywood, which involves multiple applications.” (PL’s Opp. Br. 29-30.) Classification consists of a two-step analysis — first, construing the relevant tariff headings, then second, determining under which of those headings the merchandise at issue is properly classified. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Universal Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491 (Fed.Cir.1997)). Determining the proper meaning of the relevant tariff headings is a question of law, while application of the terms to the particular merchandise is a question of fact. Id. When construing tariff terms, the Court may look to common and eommercial meanings if such construction would not contravene legislative intent. JVC Co. of Am. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2000). To ascertain the common meaning of a tariff term, the Court may refer to dictionaries, scientific authorities, and similarly reliable resources. Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2002). “The HTSUS scheme is organized by headings, each of which has one or more subheadings; the headings set forth general categories of merchandise, and the subheadings provide a more particularized segregation of the goods within each category.” Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1439 (Fed.Cir.1998). “A classification analysis begins, as it must, with the language of the headings.” Id. at 1440. In pertinent part, the HTSUS General Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 1 states that “classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS (2000). In fact, “Section and Chapter Notes are not optional interpretive rules, but are statutory law, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202.” Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United States, 347 F.3d 922, 926 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1999)). The GRIs are applied in numerical order. See ABB, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1274, 1276 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed.Cir.1999)). To apply GRI 1, the Court must construe “the language of the heading, and any section or chapter notes in question, to determine whether the product at issue is classifiable under the heading.” Orlando Food, 140 F.3d at 1440. The Court must identify the proper heading or headings in which an article is classifiable before it can determine the subheading that provides the classification for the item. Id. Accordingly, in this case, the Court must consider whether the subject merchandise is classifiable under HTSUS heading 4412 or 4418. 1. Third Cause of Action — The Subject Merchandise is Classifiable Under Heading and Not Classifiable Under Heading HI 8 Customs liquidated the entries of engineered wood flooring panels as follows: Entry No. CBP Classification Subheading 701-52161405_4412.29.3670_ 701-52161637_4412.29.3670_ 701-52161496_4412.29.3670_ 399-04118963_4412,29.3670_ 399-08076266_4412.29.3670_ 399-08086992_4412.14.3170_ Subheading 4412.29 HTSUS is the appropriate classification for “[p]lywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood,” made of plies that exceed 6 mm, and has “at least one outer ply of nonconiferous wood.” 4412.29 HTSUS. Whereas subheading 4412.14 HTSUS is the appropriate classification for “[p]lywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood,” “consisting solely of sheets of wood, each ply not exceeding 6 mm in thickness,” and that has “at least one outer ply of nonconiferous wood.” 4412.14 HTSUS (emphasis added.) The plain language of the HTSUS differentiates the various types of plywood as between “[p]lywood consisting solely of sheets of wood, each ply not exceeding 6 mm in thickness” and “[o]ther, with at least one outer ply of nonconiferous wood.” Compare 4412.13-4412.19 HTSUS with 4412.22-4412.92, HTSUS. The terms “plywood,” “veneered,” and “laminated” are not defined by the tariff heading and so the Court resorts to their common definitions. “Plywood” is “a structural material consisting of sheets of wood glued or cemented together with the grains of adjacent layers arranged at right angles or at a wide angle and being made up (1) wholly of uniformly thin veneer sheets [all-veneer plywood] or (2) of usually equal numbers of veneer sheets on either side of a thicker central layer [lumber-core plywood].” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1746 (1986). “Veneer” is “a thin sheet of wood cut or sawed from a log and adapted for adherence to a smooth surface ... as (1): a layer of wood of superior value or excellent grain for overlaying an inferior wood ... usually by gluing.” Id. at 2540. “Laminate” is “to make by uniting superposed layers of one or more materials ... as by means of an adhesive....” Id. at 1267. The Explanatory Notes for heading 4412 provides that plywood “is usually formed of an odd number of plies.” World Customs Organization, Harmonized Commodity Description & Coding System Explanatory Notes, Explanatory Note 44.12, 814-16 (3d ed. 2002) (“Explanatory Note(s)”). Moreover, the Explanatory Note details that heading 4412 “covers plywood panels or veneered panels, used as flooring panels, and sometimes referred to as ‘parquet flooring.’ These panels have a thin veneer of wood affixed to the surface, so as to simulate a flooring panel made up of parquet strips.” Explanatory Note 44.12 at 815. The Parties agree that the 14 mm and 15 mm engineered wood flooring panels are “laminated” and have certain physical dimensions and characteristics. See Undisputed Material Facts, H.B., supra, ¶¶ 17-29. The National Wood Flooring Association (“NWFA”), a trade association, defines “engineered flooring” as a “flooring product [that] consists of layers of wood pressed together, with the grains running in different directions. It is available in 3 and 5 ply.” See www.woodfloors. org/consumer/whyTypesStyles.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2009.) Having examined the Representative Samples submitted by the Parties, see Def.’s X-Mot. SJ, Ex. H and Pl.’s Mem. In Opp, to Def.’s X-Mot. SJ, Enclosures E-l, E-2, and E-3 (Docket #82), the Court finds that the manufacture and characteristics of the 15 mm, 2-strip engineered wood flooring panels and the 15 mm, 3-strip engineered wood flooring panels are described by the terms of subheading 4412.29 HTSUS, and are properly classified under that subheading. See Boen Hardwood Flooring, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1262 (Fed.Cir.2004) (finding substantially similar engineered wood flooring panels properly classifiable as “plywood” under heading 4412 HTSUS); see also Undisputed Material Facts, II.B., supra, ¶¶ 17-29. The Court also finds that the 14 mm, 1-strip engineered wood flooring panels conform with the defined terms of subheading 4412.29 HTSUS and are properly classified under that subheading. See Boen Hardwood, 357 F.3d at 1262; Undisputed Facts, II.B., supra, ¶¶21, 23-25. The Court’s analysis does not stop here, however, because Plaintiff alternatively suggests that the subject merchandise is also described by the terms of heading 4418. See GRI 3(a) (Requiring that— where merchandise is prima facie classifiable under two or more headings — “[t]he heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description.”). Kahrs asserts that its engineered wood flooring products at issue here are classified under heading 4418 HTSUS as “parquet panels” for several reasons. First, according to Kahrs, the “Explanatory Note definition to subheading 4418.30 applies to the ... engineered hardwood flooring.” (Pl.’s Opp. Br. 21.) Second, Kahrs argues that the imported merchandise conforms to the article description under subheading 4418.30 in that the products are both “assembled” and “parquet panels.” (Id.) Finally, Kahrs asserts that the imported merchandise is more specifically classified under “assembled parquet panels” (4418.30) than under “plywood” pursuant to the “Rule of Relative Specificity,” i.e„ GRI 3. (Id. at 26.) Heading 4418 covers “[bjuilders’ joinery and carpentry of wood, including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels .... ” 4418 HTSUS (emphasis added.) The terms “assembled” and “parquet” are not defined in the tariff code and so the Court may resort to the common meaning of these terms. The term “parquet” is “a patterned flooring; especially: one made of parquetry.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1644 (2002). “Parquetry” is “joinery or cabinetwork consisting of an inlay of geometric or other patterns usually of different colors and used especially for furniture and floors.” Id. The American Heritage Dictionary similarly defines “parquetry” as “inlay of wood, often of different colors, that is worked into a geometric pattern or mosaic and is used especially for floors.” The Am. Heritage Dictionary 1318 (3d ed.1996). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “parquetage” (a variant of the word “parquet”) as “flooring, wooden mosaic.” XI The Oxford English Dictionary 251 (2d. ed.1989). Finally, the wood flooring trade defines “parquet flooring” as “a series of wood flooring pieces that create a geometric design.” See NWFA website available at www.woodfloors.org/consumer/whyTypes Styles.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2009.) This Court finds that the sine qua non of “parquet” or “parquetry” is that the inlaid wood strips of the parquetry themselves form a geometric pattern or mosaic. The Parties agree that Kahrs’ imported flooring products “were designed to simulate solid wood stnp or plank flooring, are competitive with solid wood strip or plank flooring, and have advantages that solid wood strip or plank flooring does not have.” See Undisputed Material Facts, ¶ 24. It is evident to the Court that, in their imported condition, Kahrs’ 14 mm l-strip, 15 mm 2-strip, and 15 mm 3-strip flooring products do not form a geometric or mosaic pattern. See Representative Samples. Therefore, this Court holds that Kahrs’ engineered wood flooring panels of the 14 mm 1-strip, 15 mm 2-strip, and 15 mm 3-strip variety, in their imported condition, are not assembled parquet panels and consequently are not classifiable under subheading 4418.30 HTSUS. Plaintiff advances an interesting argument that, as imported, “the face strips on multi-strip engineered flooring panels [i.e., 15 mm 2-strip and 15 mm 3-strip flooring products] form a pattern because they simulate the patterns of solid wood plank and strip flooring.” (Pl.’s Opp. Br. 18.) The Court, however, finds this argument unavailing. The tariff text of heading 4418 HTSUS does not require that the subject merchandise contain mere patterns or simulations of patterns in its construction, but that the strips of inlaid wood forming the patterns must be genui