Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION ROGER W. TITUS, District Judge. Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ensure that employees are treated fairly in the workplace without regard to their age, sex, race, and physical characteristics, among others. These vital protections are designed to ensure that employees are evaluated on the basis of their merit as opposed as to their immutable characteristics. The Civil Service Reform Act provides that a number of factors are to be considered in conjunction with a decision to discipline or terminate a federal employee in order to ensure that (1) the action is proportional to the employee’s conduct; (2) employees are subject to consistent criteria and decision-making processes; and (3) there is transparency for what may be a life-altering decision. Last, but not least, the Whistle-blower Protection Act seeks to provide protection to those employees who go above and beyond the call of duty to report abuses and, in doing so, risk their livelihood. Congress sought to create a broad shield of protection in these three statutes that would immunize employees from any discrimination, retaliation, or arbitrary decisionmaking. The substantial protections offered by these statutes are subject to important standards regarding the inferences and burdens applicable to the assertion of a claim. In its wisdom, Congress recognized that not every decision or action that affects an employee or with which an employee disagrees is actionable. Thus, courts interpreting and applying theses statutes and the cases that interpret them must draw a distinction between personality clashes and discriminatory or retaliatory animus, between honestly-held beliefs and reasons for actions taken and pretext, and between asserting one’s beliefs and true whistleblowing. Plaintiff Duane R. Bonds, M.D. has filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants violated the provisions of Title VII, the Whistleblower Protection Act, and the Civil Service Reform Act in removing her as the Project Officer from two medical studies and then removing her from federal service. The Court will address each one of her contentions below. I. BACKGROUND A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Dr. Bonds is an African-American, female doctor, who has dedicated her career to combating sickle cell disease and other medical disorders that severely impact fetal and maternal health. (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 1, 5). She has achieved recognition in the research and understanding of sickle cell disease. (PL’s Ex. 2 OSC Report Summary 2). In 1990, she left private practice and academia to become the Deputy Chief of the Sickle Cell Disease Branch of the Division of Blood Diseases and Resources (“DBDR”), a division of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (“NHLBI”) of the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”). (PL’s Ex. 148 at 1). From 1990 until October 24, 2006, Dr. Bonds was employed as a medical officer in DBDR. Id. She was the Project Officer (“PO”) for two clinical trials called “SWiTCH” and “BABY HUG.” (Defs Ex. 1 at 1). Her first-line supervisor was Dr. Blaine Moore and her second-line supervisor was Dr. Charles Peterson. Id. at 2-3. From 1997 to 2004, Dr. Bonds received positive performance reviews, within-pay-grade increases, and awards for her merit and service. (Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 1-54; Pl.’s Ex. 15 at 2). In October of 1999, Dr. Bonds filed an EEO complaint against Dr. Peterson (later resolved through the NIH Ombudsman office) in which she alleged that he sexually harassed her by requesting that she share a hotel room with him during an overnight business trip and that her refusal to do so resulted in his “interfer[enee] with [her] professional duties.” (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 57). Dr. Peterson later removed Dr. Bonds from her position as NHLBI’s Sickle Cell Disease Group Leader, and Dr. Bonds filed a second EEO complaint in March, 2003. See EEOC No. 120-2004-00176X; Agency No. NHLBI_2003-0002. The NHLBI resolved the complaint by creating a new position called the Division of Blood Diseases and Resources Sickle Cell Coordinator, and allowing Dr. Bonds to take that position. (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 50). As noted above, Dr. Bonds was the Project Officer during this time for two clinical trials called “SWiTCH” and “BABY HUG.” (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 11). The SWiTCH clinical trial studied the effect of the drug Hydroxyurea on infants who have suffered a stroke. (Def. Ex. 1 at 6). The BABY HUG clinical trial studied the use of Hydroxyurea in infants to ascertain if this drug could prevent the onset of end-organ damage, a major source of morbidity and mortality in sickle cell disease patients. (Def. Ex. 1 at 6). Discovery of the Immortalized Cell Lines Dr. Bonds alleges that, in September 2005, she discovered that Dr. Russell Ware, who was a principal investigator in the BABY HUG clinical trial, had obtained genetic material from the blood samples of the BABY HUG infant participants and used them to clone immortalized cell lines without the consent or knowledge of the infants’ parents or guardians. (Def. Ex. 1 at 1-10). Dr. Bonds alleges that the test subjects were all African Americans, and that Dr. Ware was harvesting the genetic material without the consent of the subjects. (Pl.’s Ex. 14 at 14-15). On September 6, 2005, Dr. Bonds wrote in an e-mail to Dr. Ware that she was “very dismayed” over his creation of the immortalized cell lines because “NHLBI did not authorize this work, it is not in the protocol, and the work is not specifically mentioned in the consent forms” and she instructed that he “destroy these cell lines immediately.” (PL’s Ex. 6). Dr. Bonds then brought her concerns before the Data and Safety Monitoring Board (“DSMB”). (PL’s Ex. 4 at A-18). The DSMB, which is charged with safeguarding the interests of study participants, ordered on October 5, 2005 that the cell lines be destroyed. (PL’s Ex. 9; PL’s Ex. 4 at A-18). On October 18, 2005, Dr. Bonds and Dr. Peterson met with Dr. Elizabeth Nabel, the Director of NHLBI, to discuss the cell lines. (PL’s Ex. 1 ¶ 21). Initially, Dr. Nabel supported the position of Dr. Bonds, and a decision was made to support the destruction of the immortalized cell lines Dr. Ware had created. (PL’s Ex. 4 at A-3). The decision to destroy the cell lines, however, was left to the individual Internal Review Boards (“IRBs”) at BABY HUG clinical sites at each medical center and/or research hospital that was involved in the study. (PL’s Ex. 4 at 8, 14-16). Some IRBs chose to seek consent from the study participants for the creation of these lines, while others chose to interpret the existing consent forms as sufficient to permit the creation of these cell lines. Id. Dr. Ware contends that Dr. Bonds was fully aware that the cell lines were being created and that she “readily agreed” to their creation. (PL’s Ex. 4 at A-12). He states that he discussed the cell lines at length with Dr. Bonds before creating them, and that he was used as a scapegoat when it was determined that the consent form signed by participants in the study did not cover the creation of the cell lines. Id. On December 27, 2005, Dr. Bonds contacted the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) concerning the cell lines and an investigation ensued. (PL’s Ex. 4 at 1). Removal of Dr. Bonds as the PO for the SWiTCH Clinical Trial Dr. Ware subsequently wrote to Dr. Moore and requested that Dr. Bonds be removed as the PO for the SWiTCH trial because of his “ongoing negative experiences with [Dr. Bonds] in other NHLBIsponsored studies.” (Def.’s Ex. 3 at 2). In his affidavit, Dr. Ware states that his prior experiences with Dr. Bonds had been decidedly negative [and] the relationship had recently deteriorated further-certain issues relating to the creation of [immortalized cell lines] in BABY HUG had come up in early September 2005, and Dr. Bonds’s accusatory, abrasive manner, implying disingenuous motive on my part, had further damaged our working relationship. Id. Dr. Ware also cited her “abrasive, controlling style of managing the study” and “confrontational” attitude, and he alleged that she had a history of misrepresenting statements by the DSMB and the Chair of the Steering Committee. Id. at 3. Dr. Winifred Wang also complained to Dr. Moore about the problematic performance of Dr. Bonds as the PO of BABY HUG, which included, among other things: (1) her lack of communication; (2) her misrepresentation of information about the study; and (3) her refusal to comply with the approval process of each study center’s Institutional Review Board when she wanted to make changes to the study. (Def.’s Ex. 4 at 2). Her alleged mismanagement of the BABY HUG study and her penchant for misleading communications was corroborated by Dr. Susan Shurin, chair of the DSMB. (Def.’s Ex. 5 at 2-3). Dr. Shurin stated that the Principal Investigators in several studies had reported that Dr. Bonds made “informal and misleading communication of DSMB recommendations [which] undermined the formal systems within the Institute for ensuring the safety of participants and the integrity of the study.” Id. at 3. On October 11, 2005, Dr. Moore informed Dr. Bonds that she was being removed as the Program Officer for the SWITCH clinical trial. (Def.’s Ex. 7 at 3). On October 28, 2005, Dr. Bonds filed an EEO complaint regarding her removal. (Pl.’s Ex. 19 at 1). In her EEO complaint, she alleged discrimination and retaliation by Drs. Peterson and Moore, and by Dr. Liana Harvath, who was the Deputy Director of the DBDR. Id. Subsequent Removal of Dr. Bonds as the PO for the BABY HUG Clinical Trial On November 15, 2005, Dr. Moore temporarily removed Dr. Bonds as the PO of BABY HUG. (PL’s Ex. 8). He explained that the temporary removal was done in response to “concerns raised regarding the work that Dr. Bonds had performed in her position as the Project Officer (PO)” and was intended to allow an inquiry into the concerns. Id. This removal came two weeks after Dr. Bonds filed her EEO complaint against Drs. Moore and Peterson and one month after her removal as the PO for the SWITCH trial. Id. This temporary removal was determined to be necessary so that the NHLBI could investigate the serious allegations against her. Id. The investigation was conducted by Dr. Moore and William Rudman, who was an outside attorney hired by the NIH. (PL’s Ex. 110 at 164-65). The Investigation The office computer used by Dr. Bonds was examined during the subsequent inquiry. (PL’s Ex. 136; Def.’s Ex. 7 at 22). Investigators discovered that Dr. Bonds had sent sensitive non-public NHLBI documents to her attorney, her priest, a former employee involved in employment litigation against NHLBI, and her “spiritual counselor at church.” (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 4-6). This information allegedly included “budget figures related to upcoming negotiations with potential contractors,” a “spreadsheet listing contractors and expenditures,” the study’s total projected budget, and other potentially damaging information. Id. at 4. In March of 2006, after these disclosures were discovered, Dr. Bonds was placed on paid administrative leave. (Def.’s Ex. 7 at 8). Dr. Bonds conceded making these disclosures but contended that these documents were not confidential, and that the persons to whom she disclosed the information “had ethical and moral obligations to preserve the confidentiality of what [she] confided to them.” (Def.’s Ex. 15 at 4-5). On February 21, 2006, Dr. Moore sent a memo to Dr. Bonds instructing her that she should (1) work on nothing but cleaning her office for fifteen days; (2) use her computer only for communication related to “MSH trial follow up extension;” (3) copy Dr. Moore on all email communications; and (4) keep her office door open at all times during work hours. (PL’s Ex. 20). On February 23, 2006, Dr. Bonds emailed Dr. Peterson and informed him that she planned to attend a grant study section meeting outside of NIH that was scheduled to review her grants portfolio. (PL’s Ex. 21 at 4). Dr. Peterson allegedly called Dr. Bonds out of the meeting and “threatened her with AWOL (absent without official leave) if she failed to return to her office.” (Pl.’s Ex. 1 ¶ 20). On March 27, 2006, the FDA placed a “Full Clinical Hold” on the BABY HUG trial. (Def.’s Exs. 12-13). The clinical hold had a devastating effect on the study as well as the study participants. (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 3; Def.’s Ex. 13 at 2). Investigators around the country were instructed “to cease further enrollment in the trial and to remove all patients from existing drug/placebo.” Id. This meant that “it [wa]s very possible that removal of the drug from infants may allow organ damage to proceed during this hold period and potentially reduce the chances of determining a statistical difference in the primary outcomes, namely, spleen and kidney function.” (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 3). The FDA halted the BABY HUG trial because of its concerns about the safety of the drugs and the “[u]nreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury to human subjects,” which was due to the absence of expiration dates on bottles containing the drug being tested in the study. (Def.’s Ex. 12). Prior to the clinical trial stage, Dr. Bonds had submitted an Investigational New Drug (“IND”) application to the FDA for what would later become known as the BABY HUG clinical trial. (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 2). In that application, Dr. Bonds submitted labels for the study treatment bottles, which displayed an expiration date for the drug inside. Dr. Bonds was the only project officer listed on the IND application, and she was named “as the person responsible for monitoring the conduct and progress of the clinical investigation.” Id. Three NIH employees who were involved with the preparation of the drug for the clinical trial, Michael Soler (a Quality Assurance Specialist), Annette Quinones (Chief of Quality Assurance), and Thomas Shaffer (Project Coordinator), testified by affidavit that Dr. Bonds instructed them to remove the expiration date from the labels on the bottles. (Def.’s Ex. 16 at 2; Def.’s Ex. 17 at 2; Def.’s Ex. 18 at 1; Def.’s Ex. 19 at 1; Def.’s Ex. 20 at 2; Def.’s Ex. 21 at 1). Dr. Bonds denies that she ever ordered anyone to remove the expiration dates from the bottles and contends that Soler, Shaffer, and Quinones provided inconsistent accounts and that she was never asked for her version of events, which she maintains is a violation of NIH policy. (Def.’s Ex. 15 at 2). Dr. Bonds also allegedly failed to follow the IND application procedure with regard to the distribution and testing of the lots of the drug at issue. The IND application required that within one year of manufacture, the first lot of the drug would be returned and replaced with a second lot in order to ensure that the drug did not lose its efficacy and potency as well as to ensure that it did not become toxic. (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 3). The removal of the expiration dates from the drugs in the first lot allowed them to be used for “more than 18 months after the 12 month expiration period.” (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 4). The NIH concluded that Dr. Bonds had acted negligently in allowing the drug to continue to be dispensed to infants for more than two and a half years, which “jeopardized the[ir] safety and health.” Id. Termination of the Employment of Dr. Bonds On May 12, 2006, Dr. Moore issued a Proposal to Remove Dr. Bonds from her position. (Def.’s Ex. 14; Def.’s Ex. 22 at 6). The proposal charged that she had (1) performed her duties negligently by removing the expiration dates from the BABY HUG labels; (2) made unauthorized disclosures of sensitive agency documents to outside parties; (3) failed to follow Dr. Roth’s instructions to maintain the chain of command regarding the cell lines, and failed to return copies of documents which were described in charge 2; and (4) failed to follow internal policies. (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 1, 6-14). On October 18, 2006, Dr. Peterson sustained Dr. Moore’s proposal to remove Dr. Bonds and notified her that her employment was terminated. (Def.’s Ex. 23). Although Dr. Peterson did not agree with each of Dr. Moore’s charges, he reviewed the documentary evidence in the file and sustained the findings that Dr. Bonds had (1) given the instruction to remove the expiration dates from the bottles; and (2) released sensitive documents to outside parties without authorization. Id. at 1-2. Dr. Peterson found that Dr. Bonds had been responsible for ensuring that the drug lots were replaced and retested. Id. at 2-3. After reviewing the NIH Table of Penalties, Dr. Peterson found that the two instances of behavior by Dr. Bonds that amounted to “gross negligence” that supported her removal, as either one of those instances alone would suffice to warrant her removal. Id. at 5. The agency asked Timothy Wheeles, who was a management official (Deputy Executive Officer) with the NHLBI, to review Dr. Peterson’s decision to terminate Dr. Bonds because Wheeles had not been involved in the events leading up to her termination. (Def.’s Ex. 25 at 2). Upon review of the documentary evidence, Wheeles “supported Dr. Peterson’s conclusion that [Dr. Bonds] was negligent in failing to properly oversee various aspects of the [BABY HUG] trial, including the stability testing and other aspects of the study, ... [which] led eventually to the FDA’s putting the BabyHug [sic] project on hold, an extremely serious occurrence with Clinical Studies” and concurred with the decision to terminate Dr. Bonds. Id. B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Dr. Bonds filed her Complaint on September 12, 2007. [Paper No. 1]. On February 28, 2008, Defendants filed their Initial Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. [Paper No. 9]. On April 25, 2008, Dr. Bonds filed her Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion and a Rule 56(f) affidavit. [Paper Nos. 15 & 16]. On June 5, 2008, Defendants filed their Reply. [Paper No. 24]. The Court held a hearing on August 18, 2008, and issued an Order the following day that dismissed Count I (Hostile Work Environment), denied Defendants’ Motion as to Counts II (Retaliation) and III (Discrimination) without prejudice to renew after discovery, withdrew Defendants’ Motion as to Count IV (Whistleblower Protection Act), and dismissed Count V (Civil Service Reform Act) without prejudice to the right to seek reconsideration after discovery. [Paper No. 29]. The Court’s order permitted limited discovery in the form of depositions of Drs. Blaine Moore, Charles Peterson, Elizabeth Nabel, Russell Ware, Michael Terrin, Herman Branson, and Jean Henslee-Downing, in addition to Michael Soler, Tom Shaffer, and Annette Quinones. Id. Pursuant to the Court’s Order, the parties engaged in the limited discovery that was authorized. On December 18, 2008, Defendants filed their Renewed Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. [Paper No. 32]. That same day, Dr. Bonds filed her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal of Count V (CSRA). [Paper No. 33], The parties timely filed their Oppositions and Replies to these motions. On March 23, 2009, Dr. Bonds filed a Motion to Strike the Defendants’ Renewed Motion in addition to another Rule 56(f) Affidavit requesting additional discovery and seeking to submit a declaration. [Paper No. 56]. The Court held a hearing on these motions on March 30, 2009. Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment [Paper No. 32], Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Dismissing Count V (CSRA) [Paper No. 33] and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants’ Renewed Motion [Paper No. 56], II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. MOTION TO DISMISS A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court declared the “retirement” of the long-cited “no set of facts” standard first announced in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The Court in Twombly looked instead to whether the Petitioner alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (observing that “[p]etitioner’s obligation to provide grounds for his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and formalistic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”). In sum, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (holding that “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). No matter the standard used, the Court must consider all well-pled allegations in a complaint as true, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and must construe factual allegations in the light most favorable to the Petitioner, see Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson County, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.2005). Nevertheless, the Court is not required to accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), conclusory allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.1979), or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences,” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir.2002). If “matters outside the pleading are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). B. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “A material fact is one that ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ ” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To avoid summary judgment on a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Of course, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir.2006). Nevertheless, this Court recognizes the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted)). III. ANALYSIS A. TITLE VII CLAIMS: COUNT TWO (RETALIATION) & COUNT THREE (DISCRIMINATION) Dr. Bonds contends that Defendants violated the provisions of Title VII when they discriminated against her on the basis of her age, race, sex, and physical disability, and retaliated against her for asserting her claims under Title VII. The Court will first address whether Dr. Bonds has satisfied her burden of articulating a prima facie case; the Court will then determine whether Defendants have articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory and nonretalitory reasons, and finally the Court will determine whether Dr. Bonds has satisfied her burden of demonstrating that those reasons are pretextual. 1. Discrimination The Court will first address the claim that NHLBI discriminated against Dr. Bonds on the basis of her age, race, sex, and physical disability by removing her as the PO of the SWiTCH and BABY HUG trails, investigating her, placing her on administrative leave and ultimately removing her from federal service in contravention of Title VII. This claim is governed by section 717(a) of Title VII, which provides that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting” certain federal employees “shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). As for private-sector employees, section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it unlawful for their employers “to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained that “[a]l-though phrased - differently, section 703(a)(1) and 717(a) have generally been treated as comparable, with the standards governing private-sector illegal claims applied to such claims brought by federal employees.” Baqir v. Principi 434 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir.2006) (citing Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc)); accord Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“Despite the difference in language ..., we have held that Title VII places the same restrictions on federal ... agencies as it does on private employers, and so we may construe the latter provision in terms of the former.”) (citation omitted). To defeat summary judgment, a plaintiff must present either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Here, Dr. Bonds does not present any direct evidence of discrimination so her claim must be evaluated under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Dr. Bonds has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. This requires proof that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was performing her job duties at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action; and (4) the position remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc). Establishing a prima facie case gives rise to an inference of discrimination, and the burden then shifts to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. This burden is not one of persuasion, but rather one of production. Id. Once the employer has met its burden, the McDonnell Douglas framework disappears and the only remaining issue is whether there is discrimination vet non, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). i) Prima Facie Case Here, it is undisputed that Dr. Bonds is a member of a protected class. Assuming without deciding that she is able to satisfy the other elements of the prima facie case — that she was performing her job duties at a level that met the employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action and that her position remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class — Dr. Bonds has failed to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action with regards to some of the challenged conduct. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that her ultimate removal from federal service constitutes an adverse employment action for purposes of establishing a prima facie case. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 253 (4th Cir.1998). However, Dr. Bonds also contends that Defendants’ acts of (1) removing her as the PO of the SWITCH and BABY HUG trials; (2) investigating her; and (3) placing her on administrative leave are adverse employment actions. The removal of Dr. Bonds as PO of the BABY HUG and SWITCH trials arguably might constitute adverse employment actions, but only if Dr. Bonds had been able to demonstrate what her prospects would have been absent her disclosure of sensitive pricing information and absent the FDA’s clinical hold on the BABY HUG trial. Cf. James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 368 F.3d 371, 377(4th Cir.2004) (holding that plaintiff-appellant who departed the company before being considered for a promotion left the Fourth Circuit to “guesswork and conjecture as to what his prospects would have been.”). Likewise, here, it is unclear what the prospects of Dr. Bonds might have been in the absence of intervening events, which were her disclosure of sensitive information and in the absence of the clinical hold on the BABY HUG trial, which will be discussed in greater detail infra. Dr. Bonds has adduced no contrary evidence, apart from her bare allegations and her contention that her removal as the PO during the middle of a trial was “unheard of.” See Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 44. In support, Dr. Bonds cites only her own self-serving assertions as contained in her complaint and depositions, PL’s Ex. 33 ¶ 14; PL’s Ex. 1 ¶ 14, but fails to adduce any factual support otherwise for that proposition; rather the information she adduces suggests that project officers have been removed from trials before. (PL’s Ex. 37 at 45) (Nov. 3, 2008 Nabel Dep.). Accordingly, Dr. Bonds has failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that her removal as the PO of the two trials constituted an adverse employment action. Dr. Bonds also contends that the investigation undertaken by the Defendants was an adverse employment action. She asserts that “[t]he investigation, standing alone, is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII.” PL’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. As a threshold matter, Dr. Bonds has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she did not include the claim regarding the investigation in her EEO Complaint even though she could have raised it at the time because she was aware of the investigation and even though she amended her 2005 EEO Complaint twice and then filed a new EEO Complaint after her termination. Ex. 27; Riley, 872 F.Supp. at 1459-60. Her multiple amendments of her EEO Complaint and filing of a new EEO Complaint undercut a finding that she (or a reasonable employee) would have felt inhibited by the discrimination. The typical rule that a retaliation claim may be raised in the district court that was not included in the EEO complaint is inapplicable here because her alleged retaliation claim could have been raised in the original EEO complaint. See Riley, 872 F.Supp. at 1459-60; Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584 (4th Cir.1992). The record demonstrates that Dr. Bonds amended her EEO complaint Uvice and then filed a new EEO complaint after her termination yet never mentioned the investigation conducted against her as a basis for retaliation. See (Def.’s Ex. 27). Though Dr. Bonds was unaware of the investigation against her until she received the proposal to remove her, she had received that proposal by the time she filed her second EEO complaint and could have raised it then yet chose not to do so. See, e.g. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs retaliation allegations were not properly before the court because they all occurred before his termination and he could have raised these alleged instances of retaliatory conduct in his earlier charge for retaliation for filing a sexual harassment complaint). Her failure to raise and include the claim regarding the investigation in either her amended EEO complaint or second EEO complaint also undermines any inference that this purported adverse employment action was such that under White it would have inhibited a reasonable employee from exercising her EEO rights; to the contrary, the facts here demonstrate the opposite. Even if the exhaustion requirement had been was satisfied, Dr. Bonds nevertheless has not supported her claim that the investigation of her work computer was improper with the requisite facts to oppose Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. See Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 45. Nor has Dr. Bonds rebutted the fact that NIH’s policy provides that “[s]taff cannot expect a right to privacy while using government-provided IT resources or equipment at any time” because administrators and supervisors, inter alia, may access information if there is a “reasonable suspicion” that an individual is using NIH IT resources in an unauthorized or illegal manner. See (Def.’s Ex. 36). Dr. Bonds similarly has not rebutted the existence of a warning pop-up screen that appeared on NHLBI computer screens at start-up that relayed substantially the same information. (Def.’s Ex. 37). In the Fourth Amendment context, the Fourth Circuit has held that such policies and pop-up screens undermine a reasonable expectation of privacy in government computers. See, e.g. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398-99 (4th Cir.2000) (denying motion to suppress evidence from government computer). Similarly, any assertion of privilege in the email communications is undermined and the privilege rendered inapplicable by the existence of a warning in the pop-up screen. See United States v. Etkin, No. 07-CR-913 (KMK), 2008 WL 482281, at *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008) (holding that “[b]y virtue of the log-on notices, Defendant is properly charged with knowledge of the fact that any email he sent to his wife from his work computer could be read by a third party” and that the marital privilege was inapplicable). It is a somewhat closer question in the Fourth Circuit whether placement on administrative leave constitutes an adverse employment action. Compare Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 869 (4th Cir.2001) (placing employee on administrative leave during investigation of complaint lodged against employee is not an adverse employment action) with Karpel v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 134 F.3d 1222, 1229 (4th Cir.1998) (including in a listing of adverse employment actions taken by the employer an investigation of the plaintiff that did not result in a loss of pay or termination). The Court need not however resolve this issue because, as discussed in greater detail infra, the Court finds that even for those actions that might constitute an adverse employment action, Dr. Bonds has failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that Defendants’ asserted reasons for these actions were a pretext for discrimination. Finally, the Court notes that the laundry list of minor slights and grievances that Dr. Bonds challenges, which include limitations on her use of a computer, her ability to attend meetings, her ability to close her office door, and the requirement that she return her badge, are nothing more than the everyday inconveniences of working with others in a professional setting and, as such, they do not, either individually or collectively, rise to the level of adverse employment actions. See, e.g. Moret v. Geren, 494 F.Supp.2d 329, 343 (D.Md.2007) (holding that denial of use of a computer did not constitute an adverse employment action); Santa Cruz v. Snow, 402 F.Supp.2d 113, 122 (D.D.C.2005) (holding that requirement that employee keep her office door open during the day did not constitute an adverse employment action); Simmons v. Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Sews., No. 02-C-9492, 2004 WL 2584801, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 10, 2004) (holding that employer’s requirement that plaintiff-employee turn in her badge and weapon while not on active duty due to injury was not an adverse employment action); Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 370 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that the denial of opportunity to attend conferences was not an adverse employment action). The Supreme Court has also cautioned that Title VII does not establish a “general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Sews., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998); see also Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (stating that Title VII does not immunize employees from “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners”). Therefore, “complaints premised on nothing more than rude treatment by coworkers, callous behavior by one’s superiors, or a routine difference of opinion and personality conflict with one’s supervisor, are not actionable under Title VII.” E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir.2008). Finally, even if Defendants’ other acts were to qualify as adverse employment actions, for reasons stated in greater detail below, Dr. Bonds has failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ proffered reasons for these actions were pretextual. ii) Employer’s Proffered Reasons Even assuming arguendo that the Defendants’ actions qualify as adverse employment actions (her ultimate removal certainly does), the Defendants have articulated multiple legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the decision to remove Dr. Bonds as the PO for the SWITCH and BABY HUG trials in addition to the ultimate decision to remove her from federal service. In terms of her removal as the PO for the SWITCH trial, Dr. Moore explained, in the memorandum he issued on the same day as the removal of Dr. Bonds on October 11, 2005, that his decision to do so was based upon “multiple factors,” which included his concerns that (1) Dr. Bonds would be overwhelmed by managing the trial given her existing responsibilities; (2) her “dogmatic and inflexible approach in overseeing the BABY HUG trial might carryover [sic] into the SWITCH trial where her primary role should be observational and facilitative;” and (3) her “strained relationship” with Dr. Ware as a result of the immortalized cell line situation in the BABY HUG trial would also “carry over” into their future working relationship in the SWITCH trial, in addition to (4) Dr. Ware’s belief that he and his colleagues “would have serious difficulty conducting their trial without intervention by Dr. Bonds;” (5) Dr. Ware’s written request, drafted in consultation with his SWiTCH trial colleagues, to have Dr. Bonds replaced as the PO on the SWiTCH trial; and (6) that it would be “better” to change POs at “the beginning of the trial rather than the middle.” (Def.’s Ex. 7 at 3; see also Def.’s Ex. 28 (Moore Dep.) at 87-89, 118-20, 145-46). Dr. Moore’s removal proposal was consistent with his deposition testimony. Compare (Def.’s Ex. 7 at 3) with (Def.’s Ex. 28 at 87-89, 118-20, 145-46). Moreover, Dr. Ware testified that not only was Dr. Bonds aware of the creation of the immortalized cell lines but that she approved it in 2003. (Pl.’s Ex. 99 at 99-137). This assertion is supported by unrefuted email evidence in 2004. (Pl.’s Ex. 103). Dr. Ware believed that the accusations by Dr. Bonds that he created the immortalized cell lines in defiance of her orders, when he contends he created them in accordance with her input and approval, strained their working relationship and thus requested a different project officer. (PL’s Ex. 99 at 99-137). The removal of Dr. Bonds as PO of the BABY HUG was based upon her supervisors’ awareness of “a number of concerns over long periods of time” that her colleagues had voiced informally about her performance and their belief that they needed to investigate to determine whether these concerns had merit. Def.’s Exs. 28 at 149, 169-70; see also Def.’s Exs. 29, 30; Def.’s Ex. 34 (including the same concerns in Dr. Bonds’s mid-year performance evaluation if Dr. Bonds in July 2005); PL’s Ex. 117 at 3 (noting inter alia that the “lines of communication have been ignored by [Dr. Bonds] on many occasions.”). These concerns had also been documented in the mid-year performance review of Dr. Bonds, which had occurred four months prior, in July 2005. (Def.’s Ex. 34). Dr. Moore explained that they planned to “temporarily remove [Dr. Bonds as PO] while we had an inquiry ... into people’s concerns about her interactions and the trial” so that they could interview her subordinates and colleagues in the BABY HUG trial without Dr. Bonds being in a position to influence or affect what those persons might say to ensure a fair and accurate investigation of the charges against her. (Def.’s Ex. 34 at 171, 173-74; Def.’s Ex. 28 at 187). During the time period of the investigation, NHLBI officials became aware of two serious instances of misconduct attributable to Dr. Bonds that formed the main bases for Dr. Moore’s recommendation that Dr. Bonds be removed from federal service. (Def.’s Ex. 14). First, the NHLBI’s investigation revealed that Dr. Bonds had transmitted confidential and sensitive NHLBI materials, which would typically not be available under the Freedom of Information Act and were considered not to be released, to persons outside of the NHLBI because some of this released information concerned pricing on a negotiated contract. (Def.’s Exs. 10 & 11). Second, during this timeframe, the FDA informed the NHLBI that it was going to place a clinical hold on the BABY HUG study because of a discrepancy between the expiration dates on the labels for the drug that had been submitted to the FDA and the labels that were actually being used that did not have an expiration date. (Def.’s Ex. 12). Dr. Moore interviewed individuals regarding their recollections about the details about the absence of the expiration dates on the bottles and those individuals “verified to [him] that they had been instructed to take the expiration date off the label” by Dr. Bonds. (Def.’s Ex. 28 at 191). Dr. Moore’s recommendation to remove Dr. Bonds as a result of these two occurrences was reviewed by his and her second-line supervisor, Dr. Peterson. (Def.’s Ex. 23). Ultimately, Dr. Peterson disagreed with several of Dr. Moore’s fíndings/recommendations, but concurred with the recommendation to remove Dr. Bonds from federal service. Id. Moreover, NHLBI commissioned Timothy Wheeles, who was a management official at NHLBI who had not worked with Dr. Bonds or been involved in either the BABY HUG or SWiTCH trials, to review the proposal to remove Dr. Bonds. Id. The Court finds that the Defendants have fully satisfied their burden of articulated legitimate reasons for their actions taken against Dr. Bonds that are not discriminatory or retaliatory or based in any way on impermissible considerations of age, race, sex, and physical disability under Title VII. iii) Burden of Demonstrating Pretext To begin with, Dr. Bonds has failed to demonstrate that NHLBI’s proffered reasons for her removal as the PO for the BABY HUG and SWiTCH trials and her ultimate removal from federal service were pretextual. Dr. Bonds claims that NHLBI’s beliefs were inaccurate and insists that she actually performed her job well at NHLBI. But when an employer satisfies its burden of providing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff, “it is not [the Court’s] province to decide whether the reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiffs termination.” DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a similar case, the Fourth Circuit held that, when assessing pretext, the Court’s focus must be on the decisionmaker’s perception, namely whether the decisionmaker’s belief in its stated reason was credible. Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir.2007). In Holland, the employer terminated the plaintiff based upon the president of the corporation’s honest belief that the employee had threatened his supervisor. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs evidence “failed to address whether [the decisionmaker] did not honestly believe that the threats were made,” “on the evidence in the record, no reasonable juror could conclude that Washington Homes’ ‘proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Id. (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). It follows a fortiori that, if an employer has a good faith belief in its proffered reason, a plaintiff has not established discrimination simply by showing that the employer was factually incorrect. Here, Dr. Bonds has adduced no legally sufficient evidence to establish that the Defendants’ multiple legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were a pretext for bias against her due to her race or gender. The uncontradicted evidence in the record, taken in the light most favorable to Dr. Bonds, fails to meet the degree of proof that the employer’s articulated reasons are pretextual. More to the point, even if the Defendants’ reasons were based upon erroneous information, Dr. Bonds has failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ beliefs were not honestly held. First, with regard to the disclosure of NHLBI information, though Dr. Bonds contends that “the manner in which [she] released the documents did not violate FOIA regulations” and that therefore “the decision not to terminate [her] when the release of the documents occurred demonstrates that the Defendants did not believe that the circumstances surrounding the release of the documents made it a terminable offense,” Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 46, none of these contentions is supported by the facts in the record before the Court. To the contrary, the unrebutted evidence in the record before the Court is that Dr. Bonds had transmitted confidential and sensitive NHLBI materials, which would typically not be available under the Freedom of Information Act and were considered information not to be released, to persons outside of the NHLBI because some of this released information included negotiated costs and line item costs. (Def.’s Exs. 10,11,14 at 4-6, 45-47, 48). This sensitive pricing information “was prepared for internal review and approval upon which contracting funding decision would be made [and a]t the time the spreadsheet was prepared, the contract program was about to renegotiated” such that “[rjelease of this information prior to the negotiation and award of the contract modifications may have or could have been prejudicial to the outcome of the negotiations since the spreadsheet identified the overall amount of funding balance available to the program.” (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 4-5). As a result, this information would have been withheld from disclosure under FOIA. (Def.’s Exs. 10 & 11). Furthermore, the contention by Dr. Bonds that she disclosed the information pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or her attorney’s “First Amendment right to communicate” does not change the underlying unrebutted fact that she disclosed information that she should not have disclosed. See Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 55, 57. Though Dr. Bonds makes conclusory allegations that such release of information was commonplace and the information released was not confidential or sensitive, she has failed to adduce anything more than her self-serving allegations contained in her legal memoranda or complaint; she has pointed to no other instance in which a Project Officer (or any employee for that matter) released sensitive and prejudicial contract negotiation pricing information and was not disciplined. See PL’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 56. The fact that the documents were ultimately returned also does not change the fact that the unrebutted evidence in the record before the Court demonstrates that these documents should not have been disclosed in the first place. Moreover, that the documents were ultimately returned or that Dr. Bonds believed that their disclosure was proper does not change the undisputed fact that Drs. Moore and Peterson did not believe that the performance of Dr. Bonds was good in this regard. See Hawkins, 203 F.3d at 279. Again, Dr. Bonds has proffered nothing more than her conclusory allegations devoid of factual support in the record, which do not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact necessary to rebut the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by Defendants, which are supported by the record before the Court, and thus Dr. Bonds has failed to demonstrate that this reason is pretextual. Second, with regard to the FDA clinical hold, Dr. Bonds claims that the conclusion that she was responsible for the FDA clinical hold was pre-determined and that the subsequent investigation was therefore pretextual. In support, she alleges that it was the pharmacists’ duty (and thus not hers) to ensure that the medication being dispensed was properly labeled and that Dr. Peterson knew that the medication was missing expiration dates a year earlier but refused to investigate. PL’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 47. Dr. Bonds makes much ado about the fact that the affidavits of Soler, Shaffer, and Quinones were, at some points, inconsistent regarding the events leading up to the removal of the expiration dates from the bottles of the drug, which would later form the basis of the FDA’s decision to place a clinical hold on the study. Simply put, Dr. Bonds misses the point; the point for pretext purposes is not whether there were inconsistencies but whether the decisionmaker was aware of those inconsistencies when making its decision, as that might be probative of pretext. Here, there is no evidence in the record before the Court that Dr. Moore was aware of any inconsistencies among the accounts of events reported by Soler, Shaffer, and Quinones. See Def.’s Exs. 16-21. Rather, the evidence in the record is to the contrary. Dr. Moore testified that he spoke to Shaffer and Soler on the phone and was under the impression that Dr. Bonds had ordered the removal of the expiration dates from the drug bottles. Dr. Bonds has adduced no evidence that Dr. Moore was aware of any inconsistencies in their accounts of events and certainly Dr. Moore could not have in possession of their declarations, upon which she focuses her challenges, because they were executed after he issued his proposal to remove her from federal service on May 12, 2006. See Def.’s Exs. 14, 16-21. Dr. Bonds has not satisfied her burden of establishing that Dr. Moore knew of the alleged discrepancies to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, Dr. Peterson, who approved Dr. Moore’s proposal to remove Dr. Bonds from federal service, had at one time inquired about the removal of the expiration dates from the labels while he was the PO for the BABY HUG trial (after Dr. Bonds was removed as PO in November 2005). (Def.’s Ex. 31 at 167-73). Specifically, Dr. Peterson sought to determine if the problem was limited to the BABY HUG trial and at what point during the trial the problem has arisen. Id. Dr. Peterson, without Dr. Moore, also spoke with Soler, Shaffer, and Quinones all of whom also held the same belief that Dr. Bonds had ordered the removal of the expiration dates. See Def.’s Exs. 18-21. Dr. Bonds has similarly failed to adduce any evidence that Dr. Peterson was aware of the purported inconsistencies that are embodied in Soler, Shaffer, and Quinones’s other declarations. See Def.’s Exs. 16, 17, 20. “Once an employer has provided a nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, the plaintiff cannot seek to expose that rationale as pretextual by focusing on minor discrepancies that do not cast doubt on the explanation’s validity, or by raising points that are wholly irrelevant to it. The former would not create a ‘genuine’ dispute, the latter would fail to be ‘material.’ ” Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir.2006) (internal citation omitted). Dr. Bonds also contends that the six-month length of the investigation is evidence of pretext. Specifically, she cites to Dr. Moore’s memorandum removing her as the PO of the BABY HUG trial, which stated that “[a]n inquiry will be conducted as quickly as possible and you will have an opportunity to respond to any negative findings.” (Pl.’s Ex. 8 at 1). Dr. Bonds has cited, as evidence of pretext, the fact that an investigation was both too cursory and too intense and that NHLBI failed to follow what she alleges is its internal policy of creating a charging document and that she was not informed of the allegations against her until Dr. Moore formally proposed her discharge. See PL’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 45, 47; see also (PL’s Ex. 1 ¶¶ 40-43). It is undisputed that the NIH has established some points of “guidance” regarding administrative inquiries. See PL’s Ex. 30 at 1-2. A review of this “guidance” document demonstrates that the contentions of Dr. Bonds regarding the purportedly improper (and thus purportedly pretextual) nature of the investigation are factually unsupported. This “guidance” statement provides that an administrative inquiry is undertaken for purposes of “gatherin[ing] facts and relevant evidenee” relating to “incidents of misconduct which may lead to disciplinary action” “to provide the basis for management determining what, if any, action to take.” Id. at 2. It explicitly provides that the “inquiry may be conducted directly by the supervisor who is responsible for any subsequent administrative action, or the supervisor may ask an HR Specialist or outside investigator to conduct the inquiry.” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Here, the second-line supervisor of Dr. Bonds, Dr. Peterson, who would be responsible for any subsequent administrative action, participated in the inquiry with the aid of Dr. Wheeles, a colleague who was uninvolved in the relevant clinical trials, and Mr. Rudman, an outside investigator who was employed to determine the merits of the serious allegations against Dr. Bonds in the administrative inquiry surrounding the BABY HUG trial. (Pl.’s Ex. 110 at 164-65; Def.’s Ex. 25 at 2). The contention by Dr. Bonds that NHLBI’s decision to hire Mr. Rudman (a lawyer who was not affiliated with NHLBI) to conduct the investigation is evidence of pretext because “he was given a blank slate to investigate anything he could think of to justify termination [of Dr. Bonds],” PL’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 45, is not only without factual support but also is undermined by the contemplation of the need for “an outside investigator” to conduct “full” and exhaustive inquiries that “do not assume” the veracity of the allegations. (PL’s Ex. 30 at 1). Moreover, the document only provides “guidance” about conducting administrative inquiries; it acknowledges that though “usually” the accused is interviewed first, there may situations in which that may be contrary to the best interests of the investigation and thus gives the investigator the discretion on how to conduct the investigation. See, e.g. PL’s Ex. 30 at 1. Similarly, the document vests discretion in the investigator as to which interviews to conduct, in which order, whether and when the subject should notified; specifically, “[i]f you have some reason to believe it is not practical to begin your interviews with the subject, or you have some discomfort with doing so, you may have a basis for beginning your interviews with the complainant or witnesses.” Id. While the document provides “guidance” that witnesses’ statements should be memorialized in writing, which were not done thoroughly in this case, the mere fact that the Defendants did not use formal written procedures is not evidence of discrimination. See, e.g. DAG Petroleum Suppliers, L.L.C. v. BP P.L.C., 268 Fed.Appx. 236, 242 (4th Cir.2008) (quoting Dugan v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 722 (4th Cir.2002)) (“Therefore, evidence that [the employer] ‘erroneously or even purposely misapplied [its own] policy,’ will not suffice to overcome summary judgment.”); Beaver v. Rayonier, Inc., 200 F.3d 723, 729 n. 2 (11th Cir.1999), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1095, 120 S.Ct. 1739, 146 L.Ed.2d 657 (2000) (same). Furthermore, Dr. Bonds has not rebutted the fact that “[a]t this investigatory stage, the employee is not entitled to be informed of the charges.” (PL’s Ex. 30 at 2) (emphasis in original). As such, the contentions by Dr. Bonds that the investigation into her alleged misconduct was pretextual as it failed to follow internal NIH protocol is (1) inaccurate given the text of the “guidance” document and (2) unsupported factually given the steps the NHLBI actually took in compliance with its vested discretion and authority under the “guidance” document. Accordingly, Dr. Bonds has failed to meet her burden on summary judgment. Dr. Bonds also has failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate nondiseriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons for removing her as the PO from the BABY HUG trial were pretextual. Rather, the removal provided the necessary opportunity for Dr. Moore to interview the colleagues and subordinates of Dr. Bonds in the BABY HUG trial without the risk and concern that Dr. Bonds would interfere or influence the investigation. (Pl.’s Ex. 100 at 173-74, 176). That outside counsel was involved in the investigation and that Dr. Peterson was not is not probative of pretext; rather, Dr. Peterson’s lack of involvement with the investigation was reasonable given the possibility that Dr. Peterson would later serve as the supervisor who would have to decide if and how to discipline and/or terminate Dr. Bonds based upon the results of the investigation and the NIH’s internal “guidance” document contemplates the use of an outside investigator. (Pl.’s Ex. 47 at 106; Pl.’s Ex. 30 at 1). “In order to properly manage its business, an employer must be able to superase, review, criticize, demote, transfer and discipline employees.” Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 34 (5th Cir.1992). Dr. Bonds has not adduced any evidence to the contrary. With regard to the allegation by Dr. Bonds that Dr. Peterson’s statement to the FDA that she was responsible for the lack of expiration dates on the drug bottles prior to the investigation demonstrates pretext, the Court notes that Dr. Bonds has failed to demonstrate that Dr. Peterson lacked an honest belief to that effect when he made that statement. What Title VII requires is that the employer honestly believe its proffered reason for taking an adverse employment action against the employee even if that reason later turns out to be incorrect. Holland, 487 F.3d at 217. In this case, even if Dr. Peterson had been mistaken in his belief that Dr. Bonds was responsible for the error, she has adduced no evidence that demonstrates that Dr. Peterson did not have an honest belief that she was responsible. Id. Rather, the unrebutted evidence in the record demonstrates that Dr. Bonds was the sole individual responsible for submitting to the FDA the original drug label that included a place holder for an expiration date, which formed the basis for the FDA’s issuance of an IND that permitted the study to commence using that exact label. (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 2-4). It is also undisputed that as the PO of the trial, Dr. Bonds was “responsible for the management of [a] research portfolio” including “manag[ing] activities from preapplication phase through Council preparation and follow-up.” (Def.’s Ex. 32 Att. 1). This included Dr. Bonds submitting the BABY HUG application to the FDA. (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 22 (Apr. 18, 2003 IND application signed by Dr. Bonds)). The application certified to the FDA that the labels would have expiration dates. (Def.’s Ex. 14 at 28-29). The