Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER NORGLE, District Judge. Before the court is Defendant Miriam Santos’ Motion for Release Pending Appeal. For the following reasons, the court denies Defendant’s motion. I. INTRODUCTION Defendant is the former Treasurer of the City of Chicago, which is a position that is responsible for the oversight of approximately $2.5 billion' in city funds. Defendant was appointed Treasurer in 1989, and she later ran successfully as the Democratic candidate for Treasurer in elections in 1991, 1995, and (February) 1999. While serving as Treasurer in September 1997, Defendant announced that she would seek the Democratic nomination for Illinois Attorney General. Defendant eventually secured the nomination, but lost in the general election in November 1998. On January 27, 1999, the Government filed a 12-count indictment that charged Defendant with five counts of attempted extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 & 1952, five.counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §.1341, and two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. In short, the Government alleged that Defendant attempted to extort contributions from several brokerage firms for the Democratic Party of Illinois and that she engaged in a scheme to defraud the City of Chicago (“the City”) for her political advancement. All of the underlying illegal conduct was alleged to have occurred between October 1997 and October 1998, and was allegedly done to further Defendant’s candidacy for Attorney General of Illinois in the then-upcoming November 1998 general election. At Defendant’s arraignment on February 3, 1999, the court set a trial date of April 14, 1999. On February 12, 1999, the court denied Defendant’s motion for a continuance. On February 23, 1999, Defendant was re-elected Treasurer. As scheduled, jury selection began on April 14, 1999, and opening statements began two days later, on April 16, 1999. After two and a half weeks of trial, the jury deliberated approximately six hours before rendering its verdict on May 3, 1999. The jury found Defendant guilty on one count of attempted extortion and the five counts of mail fraud, but,acquitted her on the remaining four counts of attempted extortion and the two counts of wire fraud. Upon her conviction, Defendant automatically lost her position as Treasurer. On July 27, 1999, the court, sentenced Defendant to a prison term of 40 months. The court granted Defendant’s motion to surrender in eight weeks, on October 1, 1999. , , Defendant now moves for release pending appeal pursuant to, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). She argues that'the court committed several errors that will ultimately require the court of appeals to reverse her conviction on all counts or to order a new trial. Specifically, Defendant contends that: (1) several of the court’s evidentiary rulings deprived her of a fair trial; (2) the Government’s misconduct during its rebuttal argument resulted in an unfair trial; (3) the court’s refusal to continue the trial date violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; (4) the court improperly excluded three critical defenses; (5) the court erroneously pérmitted specific evidence involving an episode with Citibank, N.A., that, coupled with the Government’s improper reference to that evidence during closing argument, resulted in an unfair trial. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), governs the issue of release pending appeal by the defendant. Enacted largely to reverse the presumption in favor of bail under the Bail Reform Act of 1966, see United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir.1985), the statute provides that a court may allow a convicted defendant to remain free on bond pending appeal if: (1) the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community, (2) the appeal is not for the purpose of delay, and (3) the appeal raises a “substantial question of law or fact” likely to result in reversal, an order for a new trial, a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or a sentence that reduces the term of imprisonment. United States v. Ashman, 964 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir.1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)); see also United States v. Greenberg, 772 F.2d 340, 341 (7th Cir.1985). “The change Congress enacted ‘requires an affirmative finding that the chance for reversal is substantial. This gives recognition to the basic principle that a conviction is presumed to be correct.’ ” Bilanzich, 771 F.2d at 298 (quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3182, 3210). Further, § 3143(b) suggests “that harm results not only when someone is imprisoned erroneously, but also when execution of sentence is delayed because of arguments that in the end prove to be without merit.” United States v. Shoffner, 791 F.2d 586, 589 (7th Cir.1986). Here, the first two inquiries to determine whether Defendant is entitled to release pending appeal—likelihood of flight and danger to the community, § 3143(b)(1)(A)—are not at issue. Nor is there any indication .that Defendant’s motion is for the purpose of delay. See § 3143(b)(1)(B). The sole contention is whether Defendant raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. See § 3143(b)(1)(B), Section 3143(b)(1)(B) places “the burden of showing the merit of the appeal” on the defendant. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d at 298, Under § 3143(b)(l)(B)’s framework, a defendant who is not a danger or flight risk and does not intend delay must satisfy two elements. See Shoffner, 791 F.2d at 588; Bilanzich, 771 F.2d at 298. First, she must show that her appeal presents, a “substantial” issue. See Shoffner, 791 F.2d at 588; Bilanzich, 771 F.2d at 298. “An issue is ‘substantial’ ... if it presents ‘a “close” question or one that very well could be decided the other way.’ ” United States v. Hattermann, 853 F.2d 555, 557 n. 6 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Shoffner, 791 F.2d at 589 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting in turn United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir.1985))); see also United States v. Eaken, 995 F.2d 740, 741 (7th Cir.1993). While “[t]his standard does not require the district court to predict the outcome of the appeal[,]” Hattermann, 853 F.2d at 557 n. 6, the court must find “that the appeal could readily go either way, that it is a toss-up or nearly so.” Greenberg, 772 F.2d at 341. Once the defendant satisfies this first element, she must address whether the substantial issue will affect the validity of her conviction. See Shoffner, 791 F.2d at 588; Bilanzich, 771 F.2d at 298. At this stage, the court “must determine whether a contrary appellate ruling is likely to require a reversal of the conviction or a new trial.” Shoffner, 791 F.2d at 588 (citing Bilanzich, 771 F.2d at 298; United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir.1985)). Thus, the defendant must do more than show that an error occurred at trial; she must persuade the district court that “the appellate court is more likely than not to reverse the conviction or order a new trial on all counts for which imprisonment has been imposed.” Bilanzich, 771 F.2d at 298 (emphasis added); see also Morison v. United States, 486 U.S. 1306, 1306-07, 108 S.Ct. 1837, 100 L.Ed.2d 594 (1988) (denying bond' application for appeal to Supreme Court where the petitioner had “not shown that his appeal [was] likely to result in reversal with respect’ to all the counts for which imprisonment was imposed-”). With these principles in mind, the court must “return its attention to its own analysis of these issues at earlier stages of the proceedings[,]” Shoffner, 791 F.2d at 589, and provide a statement of reasons supporting its. disposition of Defendant’s motion. See United States v. Swanquist, 125 F.3d 573, 575-76 (7th Cir.1997). In Swanquist, the Seventh Circuit explained: Rule 9(a) [of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure] unambiguously requires that the district court “must” provide a statement of “reasons” for a decision- regarding 'release, either in writing or orally on the record. Although the standards for what suffices as a statement of reasons are not subject to rigid definition, we believe that a statement of reasons encompasses more than a mere recitation of the statutory language followed by nothing more than a conclusory statement that the applicable factors have (or have not) been met. See United States v. Fields, 466 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.1972) (reasons must “be stated with particularity”); United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1336 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1971) (“A mere parrotting of the provisions of the applicable statute is not an adequate substitute for a full statement of reasons”), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 467 (1972). In other words, “a district court’s reasons for its decision must be adequately explained; conclusory statements are insufficient.” [United States v. Wheeler, 795 F.2d 839, 841 (9th Cir.1986) ] (citations omitted). The district court’s failure to provide the mandatory statement of reasons has several negative consequences. First, in the absence of a remand, it forces us to undertake a task specifically designated to be completed by the district court. Although we conduct a de novo review of orders granting or denying release pending appeal (United States v. Eaken, 995 F.2d 740, 741 (7th Cir.1993)), it is nevertheless vital to the court of appeals to be apprised of the district court’s rationale. See United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 581-84 (D.C.Cir.1972). Where we are not provided with an adequate statement of reasons, we are forced to speculate as to the reasons for the district court’s decision. This is unfair to the bail applicant because it hampers his efforts to obtain bail in the court of appeals and because it injects unnecessary delay in the proceedings of the bail motion. See United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 954 (10th Cir.1985) (the writing requirement aids the appellate function); Stanley, 469 F.2d at 583-84 (“ ‘[t]he District Judge’s reasoning must be delineated both out of fairness to the appellant and as an aid to this court’ ”) (citation omitted). Finally, it stifles the goal of judicial economy by forcing the case to bounce back and forth between the two courts. Judicial economy is particularly important in motions for release, as these motions must be handled expeditiously due to the liberty interest at stake. See Fed. R.App.P. 9(a) and (b). 125 F.3d at 575-76; see also United States v. Hooks, 811 F.2d 391 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Cordero, 992 F.2d 985, 986 n. 1 (9th Cir.1993); Wheeler, 795 F.2d at 841; United States v. Wong-Alvarez, 779 F.2d 583, 585 (11th Cir.1985). Thus, the court must review the record in light of Defendant’s arguments and explain why her motion for release pending appeal is denied. See, e.g., United States v. Swanquist, 979 F.Supp. 679 (N.D.Ill.1997) (denying release after second remand). III. SUMMARY OF THE INDICTMENT As already noted, the Government’s 12-count indictment included allegations that Defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud the City for her political advancement and that she attempted to extort contributions from brokerage firms for the Democratic Party of Illinois. ■ First, the Government alleged a scheme to defraud in which Defendant, while acting in her official capacity as Treasurer, made decisions that were not in the best financial interests of the City, but instead were based upon the financial interests of her campaign for Illinois Attorney General and of the Democratic Party of Illinois. One charge was that Defendant allegedly diverted City Treasurer Office (“CTO”) resources, including employees’ time, away from City business in order to assist her campaign for Attorney General and to solicit contributions. Defendant also allegedly made decisions about certain programs based on whether those decisions could further her campaign. For instance, Defendant allegedly “sought to induce ■ Citibank to host a fundraising event and to make a contribution to her campaign through reference to the contract [that Citibank had with the City to provide custodial services for approximately $1.4 billion in assets].” (See Indictment ¶ 1h, ¶ 12.) The Government further alleged that between July 2, 1998, and September ,18, 1998, Defendant directed the CTO to cease doing business with (or “blacklist”) seven brokerage firms (Fuji Securities, Pryor McClendon, Inc., Paine Webber, D.H. Brush & Associates, Everen Securities, Smith Barney, and SEI Investments) based on their refusal to satisfy Defendant’s requests, for contributions. Consequently, on at least 20 occasions during that period, the City allegedly did not invest funds at the highest rate possible, leading to the loss of approximately $16,-000 in interest income. These allegations were incorporated into the Government’s specific charges of mail and wire fraud. To that end, the Government alleged' that on numerous occasions, Defendant used the United States Mail in furtherance of her scheme to defraud by sending (Counts I, II, VI, and VII) and receiving (Count III) mail to and from various financial institutions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The Government also alleged that on two days in June 1998, Defendant, in furtherance of her scheme to defraud, directed telephone calls to be placed to two investment offices outside of Illinois (Pryor McClendon (Count IV) and Bank One (Count V)) in order to acquire $10,000 contributions for the Democratic Party of Illinois. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Finally, the Government alleged that during June 1998 Defendant attempted to extort, by wrongful use of fear of economic harm, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951,1952, $10,000 contributions for the Democratic Party of Illinois from five of the seven brokerage firms listed above: (1) Fuji Securities (Count VIII); '(2) Pryor McClendon, Inc. (Count IX), (3) Paine Webber (Count X), (4) D.H. Brush & Associates (Count XI), and (5) Everen Securities (Count XII). IV. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL The Government began its case in chief by presenting evidence of Defendant’s attempted extortion of brokerage firms. The first witnesses to testify were employees of Fuji Securities in Chicago. The Fuji employees testified how John Henry (“Henry”), the First Deputy Treasurer, telephoned to request a $10,000 contribution for the Illinois Democratic Party, and repeatedly called back in pursuit of the money. After one of his requests was denied on June 4, 1998, Henry transferred his call with Eugenie Polhorsky (“Polhor-sky”), a junior sales associate at Fuji, directly to Defendant. The following conversation, recorded by Fuji as part of its routine practice of recording incoming calls, ensued: Defendant: Yeah, hi, Genie. It’s Miriam Santos. Polhorsky: Hi, how are you? Defendant: I’m fine. Polhorsky: Good. Defendant: Uhm, I’m calling regarding the status of our request for the Illinois Democratic Party. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: And, uhm, wondering, what was going on with that. Polhorsky: Oh, uhm, although we fully support you as a candidate, we regret that we’re not, unable to contribute to your, uh, to that organization. Defendant: And why is that? Polhorsky: Uh, well, uhm, it has to go further up and the, uh. Defendant: Okay, then I’m gonna urge you to take that request further up. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: I’m going to urge you strongly. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: To not blow off this request as you’ve blown off any request from my campaign in the past. Polhorsky: Well. Defendant: The Illinois Democratic Party is a completely different entity. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: It is not bound by any S.E.C. rule or any other rule. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: To accept contributions. Polhorsky: Okay. Defendant: Inasmuch as Fuji has in the past been not cooperative in helping me out. Now this request is from the State Democratic Party and I’m gonna urge you. I’m going to urge you very strongly, to appeal that and to find out who we need to talk to get a positive response. Polhorsky: Okay. I will do that. Defendant: And I need an answer ASAP. Polhorsky: Alrighty. Defendant: And, uhm, I, I do not know how to emphasize to you that this request is incredibly important. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: That in the past, I have been more than tolerant of no’s and no shows. That I have been a good customer. That the Illinois Democratic Party is not an entity that you are barred in any shape or form or sense [sic.]. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: Uhm, a, a lack of response to me indicates that you are just unwilling to be cooperative and I just don’t understand it. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: Because I think I’ve been a good (UI) [Unintelligible] urge you (UI). (STATIC) Polhorsky: Miriam? (UI) Polhorsky: Something’s happening. Are you there? Defendant: Yes, I’m here. Polhorsky: Okay. Sorry. No, we, uhm, you know, it’s just not the situation and, and we fully support you and I, I personally do. Defendant: In what sense. In what sense. Polhorsky: I personally do. I mean, you know, I’ve, I’ve contributed to your campaign. Defendant: You know what? And I appreciate the small contributions we’ve received in the past, but you know what? This is a campaign. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: And, you. know, when I get a call from the speaker of the house who is now the head of the Illinois Democratic Party. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: I have to be able to offer to do my part as a good Democrat. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: And when I ask the people that, you know, that I know ought to be able to, without a blink of an eye, be supportive and they’re not, I have a problem with that. Polhorsky: I understand that. Defendant: Because we have, I, you have never had' this conversation with me-before, but you’re having it now because I wanna urge you to really consider this request- and consider it strongly. Polhorsky: Okay. I will bring it up, I just wanna let you know' personally, I’m there for you, but I will make that request. You know, and it’s not like we’re trying to hold back anything and we’ll see what we can do. . I’m not trying to ignore your request. I just wanna let you know that. Personally, I, you know, it’s not.in my hands right now. . Defendant: I don’t understand why the firm is so recalcitrant to help the people that helped them. I really don’t. Polhorsky: Yeah. Defendant: And it has nothing to do with you personally. This is a firm issue. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: This is absolutely and unequivocally a firm issue. When they came in here and sat in my office and asked for business and asked for help, we were there. Never asked for a damn thing. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: Now every time I ask, I get oh, well, you know the G-37 and all that stuff that doesn’t even apply to me. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: And then they’re willing to say okay, fine, But this is a little different. This is the Illinois Democratic Party. You’re not precluded. There is no issue. If you want, I’ll give you the name of their lawyer that they can talk to. Polhorsky: Oh, no, I understand that. Defendant: Who they can debate the law with. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: But this is not a choice. Polhorsky: Okay. Defendant: You know I’m tired of it. Polhorsky: Mmm-hmm. Defendant: And, you know, I don’t like to get on this phone and have to ask for contributions because its just ridiculous. It shouldn’t ever have to get to this point and I’m really kind of frustrated by it. I really am. Polhorsky: I understand. Defendant: When they sat in here and asked for my time and asked for my help and asked for my business, I was there. Now it’s time for people to belly up. Polhorsky: Okay. Defendant: And if you could take that up and give me a response real quick, I would appreciate it. Polhorsky: I will. Defendant: Thank you. Polhorsky: Bye. (Gov. Trial Ex. Fuji 3A.) Ultimately, Fuji refused to contribute, as did numerous other brokerage firms. Henry testified (under a grant of immunity) that Defendant therefore ordered him to cut off the brokerage firms that refused to contribute to the Democratic Party of Illinois. According to Henry, Defendant’s order came as she reviewed a list of the brokerage firms that did business with the CTO. Henry later communicated the cutoff order to Patricia Errera (“Errera”), the CTO’s Chief Fund Manager, and Samuel Wright (‘Wright”), Deputy Treasurer of Investments and Pensions. In addition to Henry, other CTO employees such as John Galante (“Galante”), the Coordinator of Economic Development, and Eugenia Krzyzanski (“Krzyzan-ski”), an assistant to the Treasurer, testified about the cut-off. Galante stated that he was present when Defendant asked for a fist of firms that did business with the CTO and that he understood that she wanted the list in order to cut off City business to firms that failed to contribute. As for Krzyzanski, she testified that she overheard Defendant’s telephone conversation with Polhorsky and that within days she heard Defendant tell Henry to “cut them [Fuji] off.” With respect to the alleged fraudulent use of City resources, Galante testified that on average he spent 65% of his work days working on Defendant’s campaign matters at her direction. In addition to Galante, the following CTO employees testified that they performed campaign work on City time at Defendant’s direction: (1) Henry; (2) Krzyzanski; (3) Wright; (4) Colleen Brayer (“Brayer”), a former assistant to the Treasurer; (5) Laurie Dittman (“Dittman”), a Deputy Treasurer; and (6) Laura Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), an executive secretary at the CTO. Another witness, Jackie Nehs, Defendant’s scheduler until 1997,- stated that she quit because she did not want to perform all the campaign-related duties that Defendant had required her to perform during the 1995 campaign for Treasurer. Additionally, the Government presented, inter alia, evidence of attempts to acquire contributions from Citibank.- Samuel Bo-rowski, a Citibank executive, testified that Defendant pressured Citibank to make contributions to the Democratic Party of Illinois and described how she responded with implicit threats to terminate a Citibank contract after Citibank refused to contribute. After the Government rested, Defendant testified in her own defense. During her testimony, Defendant denied ever uttering the words “cut them off’ while in the CTO. Defendant also accused Henry and the other witnesses of lying on the stand. Defendant further explained that she did not intend to extort Fuji or any other brokerage firms. According to Defendant, she was simply urging Polhorsky to take the matter up with higher authorities at Fuji. Defendant further claimed that the tone of her voice in the recordings resulted from a medical condition and an aspect of her personal character. The foregoing is merely a brief summary of the evidence. Though the trial record is extensive, the court discusses additional testimony and evidence when addressing Defendant’s arguments. V. DISCUSSION As already noted, Defendant argues that there are numerous substantial questions of law or fact upon which the appellate court is likely to reverse her conviction on all counts or order a new trial. Specifically, Defendant contends that: (1) several of the court’s evidentiary- rulings deprived her of a fair trial; (2) the Government’s misconduct during its rebuttal argument resulted in an unfair trial; (3) the court’s refusal to continue the trial date violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; (4) the court improperly excluded three critical defenses; (5) the court erroneously permitted specific evidence involving an episode with Citibank, N.A., that, coupled with the Government’s improper reference to that evidence during closing argument, resulted in an unfair trial. The coürt addresses each argument in turn. A. Defendant’s Challenge of the Court’s Evidentiary Rulings “A district court’s evidentiary rulings are matters within the court’s discretion; [an appellate court] will overturn them only when the [district] court has abused that discretion.” United States v. Heath, 188 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 705 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. McCulley, 178 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.1999). “A court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence only when no reasonable person could agree with its rulings.” United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Federal Rules of Evidence are essentially rules of inclusion, see United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697, 706 (11th Cir.1993) (“the Federal Rules of Evidence generally favor the inclusion rather than the exclusion of evidence.”), with an end toward attaining the truth. Indeed, Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: These, rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. Id. Further, an. appellate court “afford[s] great deference to the district court’s judgment.” McCulley, 178 F.3d at 875 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d 1248, 1260 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir.1991)). The Seventh Circuit recently described the expanse of this deference, stating that “ ![a]ppellants who challenge evidentiary rulings of the district court are like rich men who wish to enter the Kingdom: their prospects compare with those of camels who wish to pass through the eye of the needle.’ ” United States v. Coleman, 179 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir.1993)). The appellate court, however, will reverse when the district court’s evidentiary ruling is “fundamentally wrong.” Council 31, Amer. Fed. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Doherty, 169 F.3d 1068, 1074 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Williams v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir.1998)); see also Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected_”). (1) CTO Employees’ Testimony that Defendant Ordered Cut-Offs Defendant first argues that there is a substantial issue as to whether the court should have permitted witnesses to “speculate” on “the central issue in the case: whether Santos or Henry had ordered the cut-off [of brokers].” (Mem. in Supp. at 3.) Defendant contends that virtually every witness from the CTO infected the jury’s evaluation of the issue when they were permitted to testify that there was “no doubt in [their] minds” that Defendant ordered the cut-off. (Id.) Defendant claims that the testimony was inadmissible speculation that ultimately prejudiced the outcome of the trial. At trial, the following CTO employees testified that the order to cut-off brokers came from Defendant: Euginia Krzyzanski: Q. Where were you when you overheard the conversation between Miriam Santos and John Henry? A. I was sitting at my desk. Q. Did you overhear any portion of the conversation? A. When they came out of her private office, they were standing in front of Colleen’s desk, and the Treasurer said: “Cut them off.” Q. Can you repeat that? A. The Treasurer said: “Cut them off.” Q. Based upon the portion of the conversation that you overheard, to whom did you understand the Treasurer to be referring to? [objection overruled] Q. Based upon the portion of the conversation you overheard, to whom did you understand the Treasurer to be referring? A. To the phone call. Q. The phone call that we just heard, Fuji No. 3? A. Yes, sir. (Trial Tr. at 550-51.) Samuel Wright: Q. Sometime in June up until the Fourth of July weekend— A. yeah. Q. — did you have a meeting with Mr. Henry and Ms. Errera? A. Yes. Q. And who was at this meeting besides the three of you? A. Just the three of us. Q. Where did the meeting take place? A. In John Henry’s office. Q. Can you tell us very generally what the subject matter of this meeting was? A. John Henry presented us with a list of brokers that he told us that the treasurer didn’t want us to do business with. Q. As you sit here now, do you specifically remember him saying that the treasurer did not want you to do business with them? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember the names of the firms Mr. Henry said that treasurer did not want you to do business with? A. No, not all of them. There was just three that comes to mind. That’s Fuji, Pryor McLendon, and; I believe Paine Webber. Q. Are you aware, Mr. Wright, of any legitimate business reason you were told not to do business with these particular firms. (Trial Tr. at 605-07.) John Galante: Q. And what did you overhear Miss Santos say to Mr. Henry? A. She asked Mr. Henry to obtain a list of how much business was being done with brokerage houses in the City of Chicago. Q. And based upon what you personally overheard during that conversation, what was your understanding of the purpose of that request? [objection overruled] A. The purpose of that request was to, was to link business with campaign contributions. Q. What happened in the office after that request? The treasurer’s office, I am speaking generally, not Mr. Henry’s office. A. What happened in the office, it was my understanding that certain brokerage houses were forbidden from doing any more business from the treasurer’s office. (Trial Tr. at 1496.) Q. Again focusing you on the period of June of 1998, did you ever hear Miriam Santos use the phrase “belly up”? A. Yes. Q. How frequently did you hear her use that phrase? A. On more than one occasion. Q. What was your understanding of what she meant when she used that phrase “belly up”? [objection overruled] A. My understanding was that the firms that did do business with the treasurer’s office needed to, needed to make campaign contributions to her because of that business.... (Trial Tr. at 1500.) Q. And what else if anything did she [Defendant] tell you about that campaign contribution she had received? A. . She told, she told me among other things that it was funny how they, how they contributed after they knew they would be cut off. Q. What did you understand her to mean to be saying at that time to you on this phone? A. That in some way it had been insinuated to them that they needed to make a contribution or their city business would be in jeopardy. (Trial Tr. at 1501.) Patricia Errera: Q: Let me ask you this, Ms. Errera: At this June 11th meeting when Mr. Henry told you not to do business with these nine firms, what was his tone when he told you that? A: He wasn’t like — he seemed like he was upset, too. He understood— * * * * * * Q: What about what he was saying to you and how he said it made it appear that he was upset? A:. Because he agreed with me. He agreed that it wouldn’t look good to cut these brokers off, but that there was no choice. Q: Now, you mentioned that he said the orders came from the defendant; is that right? A: Yes. # :¡; ;}c jH Q: Was there any doubt in your mind, Ms. Errera, where the orders came from? A: . No. Q: Why not? A: Because of all the situations that have occurred in the office in the past. I’ve worked there five years. Q: What do you mean by .that? A: Well, I know that in the office the decisions were made by Ms. Santos. Q: Based on your five years in the office and your contact with him, how often would you have contact with him? A: With Mr. Henry? Q: Yes, ma’am. A: On a daily basis. Q: Was Mr. Henry the one who made the decisions, major decisions in the office? A: No. (Trial Tr. at 754-55.) Michelle Belcher (a CTO Fund Manager): Q: Let’s talk about June of 1998, Ms. Belcher. Did there come a time in the summer of 1998 when the investment group at the Treasurer’s .Office did not make, trades to make the most money for the City? A: Yes. Q: What happened? A: We were told not to do trades with certain brokers. Q: Who told you that? A: Patricia' Errera. * * * * “ # Q: In June of 1998, do you remember having a conversation with — conversations with Ms. Errera? A: Yes. * * * ❖ , Hi * Q: And did Ms. Errera tell you where the orders had come from' not to do business with certain brokers? A: We pretty much knew where they came from. Q: What do you mean by that? A: Normally, she would come out of the office. John Henry would call her in his office, and they would have closed-door meetings. And when she would come out, then she would tell us not to do business with whatever broker there was and— # ' >¡í % , # Q: When you say she would tell you, are you talking about Ms. Errera? A: Yes. Q: What would she tell you about where the orders came from? A: She would say John Henry stated that.we could not do business with ■ this broker. Q: And was it your understanding that Mr. Henry gave the ultimate orders, Ms. Belcher? A: No. Q: Why is that? A: I was understood [sic] that the direct orders came from Miriam Santos. Q: Now you never personally heard Ms.' Santos tell you that, did you? A: No. ‡ ‡ ‡ ^ Q: Mr. Belcher [sic.], Mr. Gair asked you if Pattie Errera was the only source for your belief that the defendant had ordered you not to do trades with certain companies. Do you recall that question? A: Not exactly. Q: Well, in fact, that was the answer you gave. You said “not exactly when he asked you if Pattie Errera was the only way you knew it was her.” Do you remember that? A: Okay. Yes. Q: Why did you say “not exactly”? A: Because it was — normally, it was discussed in the office in the investments section between me and Robert and Patti. It was discussed as to why we could not do business with those certain brokers. Q: Is there any doubt in your mind that the defendant ordered you not to do those trades? A: There is no doubt. (Trial Tr. at 1041-43,1056-57.) The court allowed this testimony under Rules 401, 701, and 406 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 401, 701, 406. As a preliminary matter, the court notes that Defendant and Henry were joint ven-turers in raising campaign funds. Further, Defendant was a principal and Henry an agent. Accordingly, Defendant’s admissions, as Henry relayed them, are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) & (E). See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) & (E). As the court instructed the jury: An offense may be committed by more than one person. A defendant’s guilt may be established without proof that the defendant personally performed every act constituting the crime charged. If a defendant knowingly caused the acts of another, the defendant is responsible for those acts as though she personally committed them. (Trial Tr. at 2502.) (a) RuleJfOl The employees’ testimony that Defendant ordered the cut-offs is relevant in demonstrating their state of mind while working in the CTO. For example, whether Wright was correct in his perception of activities at the CTO is of no moment, for his state of mind explains his daily conduct. Further, the testimony adds context to the developing factual scenario and assists the jury in understanding the operation of the CTO. (b) Ride 701 And under Rule 701, the employees could testify to their perception of a standard practice in the CTO. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1063.) Rule 701 provides: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701. Clearly, the inferences drawn by the CTO employees were rationally based on their perception and are helpful to a clear understanding of the facts at issue. Additionally, the testimony of Wright, Galante and Dittman highlighted the fact that Defendant made all the decisions at the CTO: Samuel Wright: Q: Turning ahead, Mr. Wright, to June of 1998. Did there come a time, Mr. Wright, in June of 1998 when you were asked to make campaign solicitations? A: Yes. Q: And who at the Treasurer’s Office asked you to make those solicitations? A: John Henry. Q: Did Mr. Henry tell you where the orders came from? A: Yes. Q: And who did he say the orders came from? A: He indicated the treasurer would like for me to make the calls. Q: Was there any doubt in your mind where the orders came from? A: No, there wasn’t. Q: Who were you asked to call? A: The money managers from the pension funds. *** Q: And did you make any such calls, Mr. Wright? A: Yes. Q: What were you asking these pension-fund managers to do? A: To contribute to the Democratic party as well as Ms. Santos’ campaign. for Attorney General. *** Q: Was anybody else from what you saw personally in the Treasurer’s Office making similar telephone solicitations for the campaign? A: John Henry. Q: Was there any discussion between you and Mr. Henry about making these calls from City Hall in the Treasurer’s Office? *** A: The only discussion was on a day-to-day basis where each morning, John would state that he has to go make his calls and he would ask if I made mine. Q: And did it become sort of a joke in the office? A: Basically, yes. (Trial Tr. at 601-04.) John Galante Q: You had an opportunity to observe her [Santos] in the, her day-to-day dealings with other people. A: Yes. Q: Her dealings with you? A: Yes. Q: Her dealings in how she managed her campaign? A: Yes. Q: And in that time, were you able to observe or witness her management style firsthand? A: Yes. Q: And what management style did you personally observe? A: I observed that Miriam was what is commonly called as a micromanager. Q: And what do you mean by micro-manager? A: Meaning that she wanted to be involved in every decision made in that, in the treasurer’s office. Q: What about her campaigns? A: The same type of management style. Q: If I could direct your attention to October of 1997 through the period of June of 1998, the end of June. A: Yes. Q: You were in the office at that time, is that correct? A: Yes. Q: And during that period of time, did you have an opportunity to observe the office’s practice and habit in terms of making decisions. A: Yes. Q: Was it the practice of the office to make decisions without consulting Mariam Santos? A: No. *** Q: Were you familiar with John Henry? A: Yes. Q: And again during the same period of time I would like to direct your attention to, October of 1997 through June of 1998, did you see Mr. Henry’s style in the office? A: Yes. Q: And did you have an opportunity in that time period to observe his style and how he dealt with decisions in the office? A: Yes. Q: Were you present when there were conversations between — How long did you work in the office? That’s about a six or eight-month period that I am speaking of, October of ’97 through June of ’98? A: Yes. Q: And during that time, did you have an opportunity to personally observe the interaction between Mar-iam Santos and John Henry? A: Yes. Q: And during that time, how much contact on a day-to-day basis would you have with the two of them? A: A good amount. Q: And during that time, did you have an opportunity to observe how they interacted in terms of decisions together? A: Yes. *** Q: Was it Mr. Henry’s habit or routine to make important decisions without consulting Mariam Santos? A: No. Q: And did that habit or routine differ with how he dealt with the treasurer’s office and the campaign matters? A: No. • Q: What was you understanding as to the reason for the habit and routine of the office from what you personally observed? Why did people not make decisions without consulting with Mariam Santos? A: It was my observation that people were afraid to make decisions in the office without consulting Mariam. Q: And what was your understanding of what that fear was based upon? A: It was based upon making the wrong decision and consequently, consequently having repercussions. Q: Were you personally fearful of Miss Santos? A: Yes. Q: Was it your understanding that other employees were fearful? A: Yes. (Tr. Trans at 1460-66.) Laurie Dittman: Q. . Was Mr. Henry, from what you say ■ and what you personally observed, a decision-maker? ■ A. No. Q. Who was the decision-maker in the office from what you personally observed? A. The treasurer. Q. And by that do you mean Miriam Santos? ' ' A. Yes. (Trial Tr. at 1054-56;) Other ■ considerations also support the admission of CTO employees’ testimony identifying Defendant as the decision-maker in the -CTO. First, defense counsel told the jury in his opening statement -that Defendant cut the .number of employees in the CTO from 30 to 14 during her tenure. (See Trial Tr. at 22.) Furthermore, Henry testified that he even lacked the authority to approve vacation time for the employees he supervised and that he had very little discretion to" make decisions on behalf of the CTO. (See id. at 215.) Henry also testified that Defendant told him more than once to keep' his opinions to himself. (See id. at 336.) In one instance, as Henry recalled on cross-examination, Defendant asserted her authority: Q. And she told you: “If you can’t ' keép your mouth shut, just stay in the car,” 'isn’t that right? A Actually, the words were: ‘When are you going to learn to shut your f-ing mouth”? . The Court: What words did she speak? A. “When are you going to learn to shut your fucking mouth?” (Trial Tr. at 376.) This testimony and the testimony of the other . CTO employees (Krzyzanski, Wright, Errera, Belcher, Galante, and Dittman) are based on their perceptions and assist in understanding the operations 'of the CTO. Therefore, the testimony, of these witnesses was admissible under Rule 701. Defendant, however, argues that the court’s rationale, particularly the court’s finding that the testimony is admissible as evidence of “standard practice” under Rule 701, is “flatly wrong.” (Mem. in Supp. at 4.) Defendant attacks the employees’ testimony that, based on standard practice in the CTO, Henry would not have cut off brokers unless Defendant told him to do so. According to Defendant, this testimony was inadmissible because the employees failed to satisfy Rule 701’s personal knowledge requirement. Relying on Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986 (7th Cir.1999), Defendant characterizes the testimony as mere speculation. In Stagman, the plaintiff in a civil rights lawsuit alleged that the Attorney General of Illinois was involved in his allegedly wrongful termination. 176 F.3d at 990-92. To support his contention, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of the office’s personnel director, who stated that based on standard practice, the plaintiff would not have been fired without the Attorney General’s knowledge and express approval. See id. at 995-96. According to the director, the Attorney General would have been directly involved, in the termination decision because the plaintiff was a close relative of a state legislator and a candidate for a union presidency. See id. The district court excluded these statements and granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorney , General’s Office. See id. The Seventh , Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiff failed to show that the director had personal knowledge of the statements in the affidavit. See id. The Seventh Circuit characterized the statements as “mere speculation and, as such, a meaningless assertion.” Id. at 996. The court finds Defendant’s reliance on Stagman unavailing. The Rule 701 issue in Stagman arose in the context of an affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment; whether the affiant actually had knowledge of the facts asserted in his affidavit is unclear. Here, by contrast, the record includes sufficient foundations to satisfy the requirements of personal knowledge as to the operations of the CTO. Indeed, the CTO employees worked in a small office on a daily basis and thus had more than adequate opportunity to observe and perceive the interaction between Henry and Defendant. With these foundations, the employees were in a position to provide lay inferences about the identity of the person who ordered the cutoffs; those inferences were therefore hardly “meaningless assertions.” And unlike Stagman, Defendant’s attorneys had the opportunity to cross-examine the employees about their personal knowledge. As the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 414 (7th Cir.1993), after acknowledging that the basis for a witness’s knowledge was not overwhelming: Rule 701 places great reliance on a party’s ability to cross-examine an opponent’s witness and present any weaknesses in the witness’s testimony to the trier of fact. United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir.1981). ‘The trier of fact can normally be depended upon — with the aid of counsel — to pick up the nonverbal signals which, although absent from the record, indicate fairly clearly what he saw and when he is describing what he thinks happened; the trier of fact also should generally be depended upon to give whatever weight or credibility to the witness’ opinion as may be due.’ 2 Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 701[02], at 701-32 (1993). Here, defense counsel grasped his opportunity to cross-examine and vigorously tested the employees’ personal knowledge. As for Rule 701’s second requirement (i.e., the witness’s opinions are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue), Allen is again instructive. The Allen court noted that where testimony dwells into the critical issues of the trial, the district court must assess the relationship of the opinion to the issues when weighing the value and need of the opinion. 10 F.3d at 414. The appellate court also noted that whether to allow particular testimony is ultimately a judgment call by the district court, concluding: “The closer the subject of the opinion gets to critical issues the likelier the judge is to require the witness to be more concrete ... because the jury is not sufficiently helped in resolving disputes by testimony which merely tells it what result to reach.” 2 Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 701[02], at 7-1-25; see also David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 376, at 622-23 (1979). “[M]eaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides,” such as statements that a defendant is “guilty,” are properly excluded by the helpfulness requirement. Fed.R.Evid. 701, Advisory Committee Note; see also Louisell & Mueller, supra, § 376, at 620. But ultimately, the question of whether a lay opinion falls into the category of “meaningless assertion” or whether that opinion actually will help the jury decide an issue in the case is a judgment call for the district court. Allen, 10 F.3d at 414-15; see also Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, § 701.1 at 602-11 (3d ed.1991) (and eases cited therein). Here, the court found that the testimony of the CTO employees was helpful to the jury in identifying the person who ordered the cut-offs of brokerage firms. In short, the court concludes that Defendant fails to show a substantial issue regarding the admissibility of CTO employees’ testimony under Rule 701. (c) Rule 106' In addition, the court properly admitted the testimony of the CTO employees under Rule 406. Rule 406 provides: Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. Fed.R.Evid. 406. “To admit evidence of routine practice ... ' the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere ‘tendency’ to act in a given manner, but rather, conduct that was ‘semi-automatic’ in nature.” Cusumano v. NRB, Inc., No. 96 C 6876, 1998 WL 673833, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Sep.23, 1998) (citing Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 1290, 1293 (7th Cir.1988)). This requirement helps prevent attempts to sneak in inadmissible' character evidence under Rule 404, i.e., evidence used to establish a party’s propensity to act in conformity with her general character, as habit or routine practice evidence. See Simplex, 847 F.2d at 1293. As already noted, the testimony from the CTO employees is based on their day-to-day perceptions of the chain of command and practice of the CTO’s operation. Part of the routine practice at the CTO, according to the testifying employees, was that Defendant made all the important decisions. The testimony was sufficiently specific to establish the frequency of the conduct, and it establishes more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner. Accordingly, the CTO employees could testify that based on their perceptions of the standard practice and operation of the CTO, Defendant issued the orders to, cutoff the brokerage firms. For these reasons, the court rejects Defendant’s argument that the admission of certain testimony of the CTO employees is a substantial issue for appeal likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. (2) Admissibility of Written Narratives Next, Defendant contends that the court incorrectly admitted: (1) a June 10, 1998 letter from Errera to Michael Haggerty (“Haggerty”), the Deputy Director of the City of Chicago Board of Ethics (“the Board”), [referred to as “BOE 3”]; (2) -a June 11, 1998 letter from Errera to Haggerty, [“BOE 4”]; (3) notes that Steve Berlin, a Board employee, took pursuant to a telephone conversation with Errera, [“BOE 5”]; and (4).“diary entries kept by one of the brokers” (“PMC 1”, “PMC 2”). (Mem. in Supp. at 5-6.) Upon review of these exhibits, the court finds that they were properly admitted at trial. (a) Errera’s June 10, 1998 Letter to the Board (BOE 3) Defendant first argues that the court improperly admitted BOE 3 (Errera’s June 10; 1998 letter to Haggerty). In BOE 3, Errera describes campaign activity in the CTO and h meeting with Wright, in which Wright told Errera that she could not execute investments with three brokerage firms. Although Defendant generally asserts that BOE 3 is inadmissible as a business record or a present sense impression, she fails to support these contentions and provides no citations to the record. (See Mem. in Supp. at 5.) Defendant also ignores that both Wright and Errera were subject to cross-examination. In any event, the court finds that BOE 3 was properly admitted. The court conditionally admitted BOE 3 during the Government’s direct examination of Errera. (See Trial Tr. at 737.) On cross-examination, however, defense counsel began questioning Errera about BOE 3. (See id. at 889-90.) At that point, the court admitted the document so that defense counsel could use it during his cross-examination. (See id. at 890.) Significantly, defense counsel did not object when the court admitted BOE 3, instead he immediately began to cross-examine Errera with it. (See id.) Accordingly, neither the court nor the Government expressly stated an independent basis for BOE 3’s admission. Defendant cannot now insist that an independent basis for BOE 3’s admission is required. Simply put, defense counsel’s failure to object to BOE 3’s admission at trial waives the issue here. See generally United States v. Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1266 (7th Cir.1993) (citing 3A Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 842 (2d ed.1982)); Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1352 (7th Cir.1983). (b) Errera’s June 11, 1998 Letter to the Board (BOE f) Defendant next argues that the court incorrectly admitted BOE 4 (a June 11, 1998 letter from Errera to Haggerty) as a present sense impression, see Fed.R.Evid. 803(1), and under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, see Fed.R.Evid. 807. (See Mem. in Supp. at 5); (Trial Tr. at 913.) BOE 4 describes a meeting with Errera, Henry and Wright, in which Err-era allegedly was told to cease doing business with nine brokerage firms. The court again emphasizes that Errera was subject to cross-examination. (i) Rule 803 Rule 803(1) defines a present sense impression as “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.” Fed.R.Evid. 803(1). A present sense impression is not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness. See id. Three requirements must be met before hearsay evidence is admitted as a present sense impression: “(1) the declarant must have personally perceived the event described; (2) the declaration must be an explanation or description of the event rather than a narration; and (3) the declaration and the event described must be contemporaneous.” United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir.1998); see also United States v. Campbell, 782 F.Supp. 1258, 1260 (N.D.Ill.1991) (citing United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 323 (4th Cir.1982)); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence P 803(1)[01], at 803-75-81 (1991). “ ‘The underlying rationale of the present sense impression exception is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to defective recollection or conscious fabrication. There is no per se rule indicating what time interval is too long under Rule 803(1)....”’ United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir.1979) (overruled sub silentio on other grounds by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990))). BOE 4 satisfies the three requirements of a present sense impression. First, Err-era personally attended the meeting she described in BOE 4. Second, Errera described the meeting factually. (See id.) Third, Errera’s testimony and BOE 4 itself demonstrate that she drafted it immediately after the meeting occurred. For instance, Errera’s testimony included the following exchange: Q: Now, after this meeting did you do anything? A: I left the meeting. I went back to my desk, and I typed up what had just occurred about the cutoff of the brokers. Q: Did you do that immediately after? A: Yes. (Tr. 746.) And BOE 4 states: “June 11, 1998, I was just brought into a meeting with Mr. Henry and Mr. Wright....” (BOE 4.) In short, Defendant fails to show that BOE 4 was not contemporaneous, and she does not contend that it is unreliable due to defective recollection or conscious fabrication. (ii) Rule 807 And even if BOE 4 was inadmissible under Rule 803(1), it was admissible under Rule 807, the residual exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 807. Rule 807 provides: A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address.of the declarant. Thus, under the residual exception, “a hearsay statement must meet five requirements to be admissible: (1) circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) materiality; (3) probative value; (4) the interests of justice; and (5) notice.” United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1110 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Moffett v. McCauley, 724 F.2d 581, 583 (7th Cir.1984)) (addressing the former Rule 803(24)). “Critical to the admission of a hearsay statement under [Rule 807] is a finding by the district court that the statement is trustworthy.” Id. (citing United States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889, 896 (7th Cir.1990); Moffett, 724 F.2d at 583). The non-exhaustive factors examined when determining a statement’s reliability or trustworthiness are: (1) the probable motivation of the declarant; (2) the circumstances under which the statement was made: (3) the knowledge and qualifications of the declarant; (4) the character of the declarant for truthfulness and honesty; (5) whether the testimony was made under oath and subject to cross-examination; (6) the declarant’s personal knowledge of the facts in the statement; (7) whether the declarant recanted the testimony; and (8) whether the statement was corroborated. See id. at 1110-11. First, the court found Errera’s descriptions of campaign activities reliable and trustworthy. (See Trial Tr. at 913.) During the trial, Errera testified she was concerned about wrongdoing in the CTO and documented the occurrences she believed to be problematic. (See, e.g., id. at 669, 682-83). To that end, Errera recorded what occurred during the meeting in which she was told to cut off brokers. Additionally, BOE 4 satisfies the other four requirements of Rule 807. The descriptions of Errera’s meeting with Wright and Henry included in BOE 4 are material and probative, and its admission furthers the interests of justice for the following reasons. First, BOE 4 demonstrates Err-era’s state of mind at the time CTO employees were campaigning for Defendant. Moreover, BOE 4 provides background as to why Errera recorded certain activities. BOE 4 is also relevant to show Errera’s motivation behind her complaints to the Board. Furthermore, BOE 4 provides insight into the events which led to the investigation of Defendant; it provides background and chronology to assist the jury. Finally, the Government satisfied the notice requirement of Rule 807 by informing Defendant of its intention to seek BOE 4’s admission under Rule 807 in its April 5, 1999 motion in limine. (See April 5, 1999 Govt. Mot. in Limine at 5.) For these reasons, the court properly admitted BOE 4 under Rule 807. - (c) Notes of Board Employee Berlin (BOE 5) Defendant also objects to the admission of BOE 5 (the notes that Berlin took pursuant to a telephone conversation with Errera) on the basis that it is hearsay. At trial, the court made clear to the jury that BOE 5 was not offered for its truth: Members of the-jury, you will receive a copy of BOE 5. Now, what Ms. Errera said to Mr. Berlin is not to be considered by you for its truth. You may take into account that this document and this witness are saying that she came to the ethics committee or commission. What she said to Mr. Berlin is not to be considered by you for, the truth of what she said. But you can take into account that she said it. (Trial Tr. at 988-89.) Because BOE 5 was not “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted[,]” see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), it was admissible. (d) Errera’s Credibility and BOE S, L and 5 Additionally, the court admitted BOE 3, BOE 4, and BOE 5 to allow the Government the opportunity to rehabilitate Err-era’s credibility. During his opening statement, defense counsel vehemently attacked Errera’s credibility as a Government witness. (See Trial Tr. at 50-54.) Specifically, defense counsel declared that Errera fabricated evidence against Defendant, that she referred to Defendant with unflattering names, that her pin-filled voodoo doll screen saver was a depiction of Defendant, and that she despised Defendant. (See Trial Tr. at 51-52.) Defense counsel also commented that Errera was worried that Defendant would discover t