Full opinion text
ENTRY ON PENDING MOTIONS DAVID F. HAMILTON, Chief Judge. Introduction....................................................................889 Summary Judgment Standard.....................................................890 Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment........................................890 I. Undisputed Facts......................................................890 II. Royce’s Motion for Summary Judgment..................................893 A. Seizure...........................................................893 B. Searches.........................................................895 1. Search of the Car..............................................896 2. PaL-Downs....................................................896 3. Strip-Searches ................................................897 4. Royce’s Participation in the Strip-Searches........................899 C. Fifth Amendment Claims...........................................900 D. Qualified Immunity................................................900 1. Pat-Downs....................................................900 2. Strip-Searches ................................................901 E. State Law Claims..................................................902 1. State Constitutional Claims......................................902 2. State Tort Immunity...........................................902 F. New Federal Causes of Action ......................................902 G. Conclusion........................................................903 III. Other Police Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment......................903 A. Seizures..........................................................903 B. Searches.........................................................903 1. “Search Incident to Probable Cause to Arrest”.....................903 2. Reasonableness of the Strip-Searches............................904 C. Qualified Immunity................................................904 D. State Law Claims..................................................905 E. Conclusion........................................................905 IV. Madison and Supervisory City Officials’ Motion for Summary Judgment.....905 A. Supplemental Facts................................................906 1. Madison Procedures............................................906 2. Similar Incidents................ 906 3. Officer Misconduct and Investigations ............................907 4. Investigation and Statements to the Public........................907 B. Municipal Liability.................................................908 C. Personal Liability of the Supervisory Defendants......................910 D. Defamation.......................................................911 E. State Law Claims Against Officers...................................912 1. Law Enforcement Immunity ....................................912 2. Battery.......................................................913 3. Assault.......................................................914 4. False Arrest and False Imprisonment............................914 F. Claims for Punitive Damages........................................914 G. Conclusion........................................................914 V. Fire Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment..........................915 A. Additional Facts.........■..........................................915 B. State Claims......................................................915 1. The Hendricks.................................................915 2. Royce........................................................916 3. Cliffy.........................................................916 C. Federal Claims....................................................917 D. Conclusion........................................................918 Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment..........................................918 I. Statement of Facts Construed Favorably for Defendants....................918 II. Plaintiffs’ First Motion for Summary Judgment............................919 A. Strip-Searches....................................................919 B. Qualified Immunity................................................920 C. Law Enforcement Immunity........................................920 D. Tort Claim Notices ................................................921 E. Conclusion........................................................921 III. Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment..........................921 IV. Plaintiffs’ Third Motion for Summary Judgment...........................921 V. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment..........................921 Appeals of Magistrate Judge’s Orders..............................................921 Motion to Amend Complaint......................................................923 Motion to Open Discovery and Allow Further Summary Judgment Responses...........924 Documents Under Seal...........................................................925 Conclusion......................................................................925 Introduction It all began with a broken license plate light. One thing led to another, and the ensuing traffic stop in Madison, Indiana has become the subject of elaborate and expensive litigation that requires this lengthy tour through wide tracts of Fourth Amendment law, federal civil rights remedies, and state tort law. On January 19, 2007, Madison police officers pulled over plaintiffs Kristy Lessley, Kara Rhodehamel, and Kayla Messer for a broken license plate light. An officer smelled marijuana emanating from the ear, and he searched the car. He found either nothing or a trace amount of marijuana. Another officer searched the plaintiffs’ pockets. He found nothing. The officers then called a female Madison officer who performed warrantless strip-searches on the three plaintiffs at a local fire station. The female officer found marijuana on Kristy Lessley. Lessley was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana, but those charges were dismissed. Plaintiffs filed this complaint against the officers involved in the stop and search, the City of Madison and many of its supervisory officials, and the fire station and two volunteer firefighters. The complaint includes multiple state and federal claims. Each side has filed four motions for summary judgment. The court addresses first the defendants’ motions, which are separated by defendant. The court then addresses the plaintiffs’ motions, which are separated by issue. Plaintiffs have also filed a motion to amend the complaint and a motion to reopen discovery and summary judgment briefing. As detailed below, each side’s motions are granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs’ core search claims under federal law survive, as do some of their state claims. Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim also survives under federal law, but summary judgment is granted for the supervisory defendants on the individual claims against them. Defendants have appealed two discovery orders of Magistrate Judge Hussmann. One appeal is denied and the other is sustained. Finally, at this late stage of the case, plaintiffs will not be permitted to amend the complaint to add an entirely new defendant, the city’s liability insurer. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment must be granted if the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A factual issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual issue is material if resolving the factual issue might change the suit’s outcome under the governing law. Id. The motion should be granted only if no rational fact finder could decide in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all factual disputes in that party’s favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The essential question is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Because both sides have moved for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence through two different lenses. When considering defendants’ motions, the court gives plaintiffs the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and favorable inferences. When considering plaintiffs’ motions, defendants receive those benefits. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment I. Undisputed Facts For purposes of defendants’ motions, the court describes the disputed events surrounding the January 19, 2007 stop and search of the plaintiffs in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. This version of the facts will remain operative for each of defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court will supplement the facts where necessary. When the court addresses the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment, it notes how the assumed facts differ. On January 19, 2007, plaintiffs Kristy Lessley, Kara Rhodehamel, and Kayla Messer were riding in Rhodehamel’s car. Lessley and Rhodehamel each possessed a small bag of marijuana. Lessley Dep. 32-33. Rhodehamel drove, Lessley sat in the front passenger seat, and Messer sat behind Rhodehamel. Lessley Dep. 36; Rhodehamel Dep. 41. While in the car, they each smoked from a marijuana cigarette. Lessley Dep. 38; Messer Dep. 25. After plaintiffs smoked the cigarette, they noticed a police car following their car. Messer Dep. 28. Rhodehamel then gave her bag of marijuana to Lessley, and Lessley placed the two baggies into her underwear. Lessley Dep. 47,49. Madison police officer Jonathon Simpson pulled over Rhodehamel’s car because the license plate light was not working. Simpson Dep. 45-47. Rhodehamel parked in a church parking lot. Simpson Dep. 47. This traffic stop for a license plate light attracted three police cars. Two police cars parked behind Rhodehamel’s car, and one police car parked in front of it. Lessley Dep. 51-52. Officer Simpson approached the car. He saw rolling papers in the car and smelled marijuana. Simpson Dep. 51. He asked for and received Rhodehamel’s license and registration. Rhodehamel Dep. 87. Sergeant James Royce approached the car and instructed Lessley to get out of the car. Lessley Dep. 68; Rhodehamel Dep. 94. Royce placed Lessley in the front seat of his patrol car. Lessley Dep. 68. At the same time, Officer Simpson asked Rhodehamel and Messer to get out of the car. Rhodehamel Dep. 94; Messer Dep. 52. He placed Rhodehamel and Messer in his patrol car. Messer Dep. 52. Officer Simpson told Rhodehamel that he was going to search her car. Rhodehamel Dep. 99; Messer Dep. 52. He did not ask for consent to search the car. Rhodehamel Dep. 98-99; Messer Dep. 52. Simpson, along with officers Christopher Strouse and William Watterson, searched the car. Rhodehamel Dep. 105, 109. They searched Messer’s and Rhodehamel’s purses in the car. Watterson Dep. 30; Rhodehamel Dep. 99-100. Simpson’s deposition testimony does not clarify whether or when he found marijuana in Rhodehamel’s car. He first testified that he found only rolling papers and that he completed the search before Royce took the plaintiffs to the fire station. Simpson Dep. 56. He then testified that he continued searching the car after Royce left the scene with the plaintiffs and found “two green leafy pieces.” Simpson Dep. 68. Finally, he testified that he found the pieces in the car before Royce took the plaintiffs to the fire station. Simpson Dep. 100-01. Royce reported that Simpson found “small stems” in the car before Royce took the plaintiffs to the fire station. Dkt. No. 105, Ex. 5 at 25. Royce testified that Simpson found marijuana in the car before Royce discussed a strip search with Lessley. Royce Dep. 101. Giving plaintiffs the benefit of the conflicting accounts, the court assumes that Officer Simpson did not find marijuana in the car at any time. Sergeant Royce questioned Lessley while she was in his car. He did not read Miranda rights to her. Lessley Dep. 77-78. Royce smelled marijuana on Lessley, told her this, and asked her to give him the marijuana. Lessley Dep. 70, 74; Royce Dep. 86, 89. Lessley told Royce that she did not have marijuana. Lessley Dep. 77, 165. Royce instructed Lessley to get out of the car and to pull out her pants pockets and open her jacket. Lessley Dep. 74-75. While Lessley was wearing the jacket, Royce placed his hands in the jacket’s breast pockets, and his hand came into contact with her chest. Lessley Dep. 76. Royce found nothing and instructed Lessley to get back into his car. Lessley Dep. 77. Sergeant Royce then spoke to Rhodehamel behind Simpson’s patrol car. Rhodehamel Dep. 111. He did not read Miranda rights to her. Id. Royce instructed Rhodehamel to pull out her pants pockets, and he inserted his hands into the pockets on her jacket. He found nothing. Rhodehamel Dep. Ill, 115. Sergeant Royce then spoke to Messer. He did not read Miranda rights to her. Messer Dep. 56-58. Royce instructed Messer to pull out her pants pockets, and he put his hands through the stomach pocket in her hoodie sweater. He found nothing. Messer Dep. 58-59. All three plaintiffs testified that they do not believe that Royce received sexual gratification from these searches. Rhodehamel Dep. 114-15, 118; Messer Dep. 59; Lessley Dep. 77. Neither Rhodehamel nor Messer told Royce that Lessley possessed marijuana. Messer Dep. 60; Rhodehamel Dep. 112. With the plaintiffs in police cars, the officers discussed the situation. Eventually, Royce called police dispatch and requested a female officer to perform a more thorough search. Royce Dep. 106. Female Madison officer Mika Season Jackson arrived at the scene. Lessley Dep. 84. Plaintiffs then got into Royce’s vehicle, and Royce drove them to a nearby fire station, Clifty Fire Company Number 6. Royce Dep. 109-10. Royce took the plaintiffs into the fire station and directed them to sit in chairs. Lessley Dep. 89-90; Messer Dep. 66; Rhodehamel Dep. 127. Royce introduced the plaintiffs to Officer Jackson. Lessley Dep. 90. No officer asked the plaintiffs to consent to a strip-search. Lessley Dep. 82-83, 91-92; Rhodehamel Dep. 123,128; Messer Dep. 64, 67-68. No plaintiff signed Madison’s “Consent to Search” form. Royce Dep. 112. However, at some point, Royce briefed Jackson on the situation. He told her that each plaintiff had consented to “the search.” Jackson Dep. 44. Royce left the room and entered the front room of the fire station where he saw volunteer firefighter and Louisville police officer Jennifer Hendrick, her husband Clifty Fire Captain James Hendrick, and two unnamed people. Royce Dep. 112-14. Royce asked Jennifer Hendrick if she would join him in watching the women. Royce Dep. 114. Royce said an investigation was occurring and asked James Hendrick to keep the other occupants of the front room in the room. Wolf Dep. 74, 170. James Hendrick never encountered the plaintiffs, and he was not aware that searches were occurring. James Hendrick Dep. 50-52. After they left the front room, Royce told Jennifer Hendrick that Jackson was going to search the plaintiffs in the bathroom following a traffic stop. Royce Dep. 114. Royce introduced Jennifer Hendrick to the plaintiffs as a Louisville police officer. Royce Dep. 114-15; Jennifer Hendrick Dep. 58-59. Jennifer Hendrick asked Lessley and Messer if they possessed marijuana. Lessley Dep. 94; Messer Dep. 70. Jackson strip-searched each plaintiff in a windowless fire department bathroom with a solid door. Lessley Dep. 99; Messer Dep. 72-73; Rhodehamel Dep. 130. The door was closed during the searches. Messer Dep. 76, 80-81; Rhodehamel Dep. 130. Jackson searched Rhodehamel first. Jackson instructed Rhodehamel to remove all of her clothes except her bra and underwear. Rhodehamel Dep. 132-34. Jackson instructed Rhodehamel to pull her bra forward and shake the bra cups, exposing her breasts. Rhodehamel Dep. 133. Jackson then instructed Rhodehamel to pull her underwear below her knees and to spread her legs while squatting. Rhodehamel Dep. 135. Jackson found no marijuana on Rhodehamel and instructed her to get dressed and leave the bathroom. Rhodehamel Dep. 136. Jackson searched Messer next. Messer was searched in the same manner as Rhodehamel, but her breasts were not exposed. Messer Dep. 74-76. Jackson searched Lessley in the same manner as Rhodehamel. Lessley Dep. 100-04. Before she would have had to squat down, however, Lessley pulled two bags of marijuana from her underwear and handed them to Jackson. Lessley Dep. 102. Jackson told Royce that she found marijuana on Lessley. Royce placed Lessley under arrest and handcuffed her. Lessley Dep. 106. Royce took the plaintiffs to his car and placed Lessley in the front seat while Messer and Rhodehamel got into the back seat. Lessley Dep. 108. As Royce buckled Lessle/s seatbelt, his hands touched her breasts. Lessley Dep. 115. As he began driving, Royce reported his mileage to dispatch (a practice for him when he is transporting women) and drove back to the site of the original traffic stop. Royce Dep. 123. At the site of the traffic stop, Sergeant Royce told Officer Simpson that Officer Jackson had found marijuana on Lessley. Royce Dep. 123-24. Simpson released Messer and Rhodehamel. Simpson Dep. 74. After Messer and Rhodehamel returned to Rhodehamel’s car, Royce was alone in his car with Lessley and drove her to jail. Royce picked up the marijuana baggies, placed them under his nose, and said to Lessley that the marijuana smelled “like really good stuff.” Lessley Dep. 111. Royce then told Lessley that there were other ways that the situation could be handled, leading Lessley to believe that Royce wanted a sexual favor. Lessley Dep. Ill— 12. Royce also said that he would deny making the statement. Lessley Dep. 111. Royce never explicitly asked Lessley to perform a sexual act. Lessley Dep. 112. Lessley was booked at the jail and released on bond. Lessley Dep. 118-19; Messer Dep. 95. Lessley was charged with possession of marijuana in Jefferson Superior Court. Dkt. No. 112, Tab 4. Lessley later filed a motion to suppress, and the state responded by dismissing the charges. Id. Plaintiffs filed this civil action on October 15, 2007. II. Royce’s Motion for Summary Judgment Royce has moved for summary judgment on many of the federal and state claims against him. Summary judgment is appropriate for some of the federal claims, but not for plaintiffs’ core strip-search claim. Indiana law gives Royce immunity from personal liability for the state law claims. Unless otherwise noted, the court addresses the federal claims. Royce’s motion does not mention every claim in the complaint. Summary judgment is granted only to the extent specified in this entry. A. Seizure Sergeant Royce argues that plaintiffs’ federal false arrest and false imprisonment claims fail because there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs. The court agrees that the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs. Royce first points out that Simpson had probable cause to pull over the plaintiffs because it is an infraction to drive with a broken license plate light. Plaintiffs agree. Royce then argues that there was probable cause to detain the plaintiffs because the officers smelled marijuana in the car and the officers saw rolling papers in the car. Finally, he argues that there was probable cause to arrest Lessley formally because Jackson found marijuana in Lessley’s possession. The existence of probable cause to arrest a person bars federal Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir.1989). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004). Probable cause to arrest exists when an officer possesses “knowledge from reasonably trustworthy information that is sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed, or is committing, a crime.” United States v. Hobbs, 509 F.3d 353, 359-60 (7th Cir.2007), quoting United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 458 (7th Cir.2004). When Simpson smelled marijuana in the vehicle, he had probable cause to search the vehicle. He did not need a warrant. See United States v. Franklin, 547 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir.2008). Royce smelled marijuana on Lessley, which gave him probable cause to believe that she possessed marijuana, so her federal seizure claims fail. See United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004) (smell of marijuana emanating from area does not give officers probable cause to believe that all individuals in area possess marijuana, but “if an officer smells the odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a person, the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing the crime of possession of marijuana”). Though it is a closer question, the officers also had probable cause to arrest Messer and Rhodehamel because of the smell of marijuana emanating from Rhodehamel’s vehicle. The Supreme Court faced a similar situation in Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). In Pringle, officers pulled over a small car for speeding a little after 3:00 a.m. An officer observed a large roll of money in the car’s glove compartment. The officer obtained consent to search the car and found five baggies of cocaine in the back-seat armrest. After all three occupants denied knowledge of the cocaine, the officer arrested all three. One occupant confessed to possession of cocaine at the police station, but he moved to suppress the confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest. 540 U.S. at 368-69, 124 S.Ct. 795. The Supreme Court held that there was probable cause to arrest all three of the occupants of the car, including Pringle, who was the front seat passenger. The Court explained that the officer reasonably inferred “that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.” Id. at 372, 124 S.Ct. 795. But see Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.6(b) at 313-14 (4th ed.2004) (“The detection of the odor of marijuana in a certain place will not inevitably provide probable cause to arrest a person who is at that place.... Similarly, it has been held ... that a passenger in an automobile may not be arrested simply because the odor of marijuana is emanating from the car.”). The court sees no principled distinction between this case and Pringle. The plaintiffs in this case were traveling in a px-ivate passenger car. Simpson smelled marijuana, which suggested that at least one of the occupants had been smoking marijuana in the presence of the others. While some commentators have criticized the Court’s analysis in Pringle, see, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.6(c) at 343-47 (4th ed.2004), the case holds that the presence of contraband in a small private passenger vehicle, combined with circumstances suggesting that other occupants know of the contraband, provides officers probable cause to arrest all of the occupants for possession of the contraband. In this case, the smell of marijuana indicated that there was marijuana in the vehicle and that all the occupants knew it. Indiana criminalizes the constructive possession of marijuana, with a standard similar to the “knowledge and exercise of dominion and control” standard applied by the Supreme Court in Pringle. See Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind.2004); Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind.1999). The officers had probable cause to arrest each plaintiff for constructive possession of marijuana. Because Royce had probable cause to arrest Lessley, it is not necessary to reach Royce’s additional argument that Lessley cannot recover damages from her formal arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution, which were caused by marijuana found in the search. Royce is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ seizure claims. B. Searches Sergeant Royce argues that all the searches were constitutional because they were reasonable. The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. It does not require that all searches be supported by a warrant, but the Supreme Court has established that warrantless searches of a person are presumptively unreasonable. Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir.1983), citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). Recently some courts have tempered the warrant requirement with a more open-ended focus on “reasonableness” that requires courts to balance “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” See Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.2007), quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The balancing test requires the court to consider the scope of the particular intrusion, how it was conducted, the justification for the search, and the place where it was conducted. Campbell, 499 F.3d at 716. As a search becomes more intrusive, officers must come closer to demonstrating probable cause for the search. Id. In this case, the officers conducted three warrantless searches. First, they searched the car. Second, Royce patted down the plaintiffs. Third, Jackson strip-searched the plaintiffs at Royce’s direction. Under either standard, the search of the car and the pat-down of Lessley were constitutional. The pat-downs of Messer and Rhodehamel and all three strip-searches were not constitutional. 1. Search of the Car After Simpson smelled marijuana, Simpson and Royce told the plaintiffs to get out of the car. They placed the plaintiffs in their patrol cars, and Simpson, Strouse, and Watterson searched the car and the purses in the car. This search was constitutional. Police may search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999). The smell of marijuana gave the officers probable cause to search the car, United States v. Franklin, 547 F.3d 726, 735 (7th Cir.2008), and its contents, see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). 2. Pat-Downs Royce directed each plaintiff to empty her pants pockets, and he patted down some of each plaintiffs clothing. Plaintiffs deny consenting to the searches. Despite the lack of consent, Royce argues that the searches were legal because he had probable cause to believe that evidence would be found. Ordering the plaintiffs to empty their pockets and patting down their clothes was a significant infringement on their privacy, one that required probable cause to believe that contraband would be found. “A ‘careful tactile exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body’ is a ‘serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.’ ” Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Probable cause was required to support the searches whether the court adheres to the warrant requirement or the balancing approach. See United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1196 (7th Cir.1990) (warrant requirement treats searches “without probable cause” as unreasonable); Campbell, 499 F.3d at 716 (“The more intrusive the search, the closer governmental authorities must come to demonstrating probable cause for believing that the search will uncover the objects for which the search is being conducted.”). Based on the odor, Sergeant Royce had probable cause to believe that the pat-down of Lessley would reveal marijuana, but he did not have probable cause to believe that the pat-downs of Messer and Rhodehamel would reveal marijuana. The only evidence suggesting that Messer and Rhodehamel possessed marijuana was the smell of marijuana emanating more generally from the car. While the odor might have given the officers probable cause to arrest Messer and Rhodehamel under a constructive possession theory, they were not actually arrested. The odor alone did not give the officers probable cause to search them. Probable cause to search is different from probable cause to arrest. See United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004) (“In the search context, the question is whether the totality of circumstances is sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.... Whereas in the arrest context, the question is whether the totality of the circumstances indicate to a reasonable person that a ‘suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit’ a crime.”), quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). The smell of marijuana was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search specific to Messer and Rhodehamel. The Supreme Court has held that probable cause to search a car does not give an officer probable cause to search the persons of all of its occupants. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948). In Di Re officers approached a car and viewed one occupant with counterfeit ration coupons. The officers arrested the occupants of the car, including Di Re. At the police station the officers searched Di Re and discovered more counterfeit coupons in his clothes. The government defended the search in part on the ground that the probable cause to search the car gave the officers probable cause to search the occupants. Addressing probable cause, the Court defined the question presented as: “assuming ... that there was reasonable cause for searching the car, did it confer an incidental right to search Di Re?” Id. at 586, 68 S.Ct. 222. The Court’s answer was no. Id. at 587, 68 S.Ct. 222; see also United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.1993) (passenger’s presence in a car that had marijuana cigarettes, pipe with marijuana residue, and odor of methamphetamine did not provide probable cause to frisk him). Pringle does not limit Di Re’s applicability to this case. Pringle involved an arrest after cocaine was found in a search of an automobile, and it justified the arrest on the theory that the car occupants “had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). This is not the same as a determination that a search of the occupants may reveal contraband. Royce did not have probable cause to pat-down Messer and Rhodehamel. He did have probable cause to pat down Lessley, so he is entitled to summary judgment on her claim that the pat-down was unconstitutional. 3. Strip-Searches After Sergeant Royce transported the plaintiffs to the fire station, Officer Jackson strip-searched each plaintiff. Royce argues that the warrantless strip-searches of three young women who were not then under arrest complied with the Fourth Amendment. The court disagrees. It should go without saying that strip-searches are highly invasive. See Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir.1983) (“We can think of few exercises of authority by the state that intrude on the citizen’s privacy and dignity as severely as the visual anal and genital searches practiced here.”). Jackson, a female officer, performed the searches in a closed bathroom alone with the plaintiff being searched. Jackson ordered each plaintiff to remove all of her clothes except her bra and her underwear. She ordered each plaintiff (except Lessley, who eventually produced marijuana) to pull out her bra cups. Finally, she ordered each plaintiff to pull her underwear below her knees and to squat down. To support this extreme and warrantless invasion of the plaintiffs’ privacy, Royce had probable cause to believe that Lessley possessed marijuana. By the time these searches occurred, no officer had probable cause to believe that Messer or Rhodehamel possessed marijuana on their persons. The lack of probable cause to believe that the strip-searches would reveal marijuana ends the inquiry as to Messer and Rhodehamel. If the pat-downs were unconstitutional without probable cause, the more invasive strip-searches were unconstitutional as well. The strip-search of Lessley also violated the Fourth Amendment. While probable cause supported the search, warrantless strip-searches are sufficiently invasive that more than probable cause that a small amount of marijuana will be found is required. This court addressed a similar situation in Gray v. City of Columbus, where the court held that a police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity when she performed a strip-search and body-cavity search on a woman and her twenty-two month old son. 2000 WL 683394 (S.D.Ind. Jan. 31, 2000). In that case, Gray and her son were passengers in a car. An officer pulled over the car, searched the car, and found burnt marijuana joints in the car. The officer arrested the driver and transported Gray and her son to the police station. Gray and her son were not arrested. While at the station, a female officer ordered Gray and her son to submit to the strip-searches in a bathroom. The court held that the searches were unconstitutional: “the suggestion that American law enforcement officers have the authority, without a search warrant, to use the power of their badges and uniforms to conduct a strip search and body cavity search of a person who is not under arrest is simply stunning.” Gray, 2000 WL 683394, at *10. Gray accurately described the law in the Seventh Circuit. Strip-searches are permitted only in limited circumstances. Royce has identified no case in this district, any circuit, or from the Supreme Court where a court approved a warrantless strip-search of an individual who was not under arrest, at an international border, or at a school. To the court’s knowledge, the Seventh Circuit has approved warrantless strip-searches only in the arrest, school, and border contexts. See Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir.2007) (holding that strip-search incident to arrest was not per se unreasonable when supported by a reasonable suspicion that contraband would be found, but holding that search was performed in an unreasonable manner when conducted in public view); Cornfield v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir.1993) (school officials did not violate sixteen-year old student’s constitutional rights when they strip-searched him based on a reasonable suspicion that he was concealing drugs); Saffell v. Crews, 183 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.1999) (customs inspector entitled to qualified immunity for strip-search at international airport’s customs checkpoint). Under circumstances different from those in Cornfield, the Seventh Circuit rejected the use of strip-searches at a school in Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir.1980) (holding that school officials were not entitled to qualified immunity). The Seventh Circuit has also held that even a lawful arrest does not necessarily justify a strip-search. See Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir.1983) (holding that city’s policy of performing a custodial strip-search of women arrested for misdemeanors without a reasonable suspicion that the women were concealing contraband was unconstitutional); Campbell, 499 F.3d at 718-19; see also Doan v. Watson, 168 F.Supp.2d 932 (S.D.Ind.2001) (holding that policy of strip-searching and delousing all prisoners without individualized suspicion that prisoners had contraband violated the Fourth Amendment); Thomas v. Wyser, 2008 WL 474216, at *12 (S.D.Ind. Feb. 15, 2008) (stating that policy of strip-searching all prisoners incarcerated for felonies may be unconstitutional). Based on plaintiffs’ evidence here, the warrantless strip-searches of the plaintiffs, not incident to arrest, were unconstitutional. 4. Royce’s Participation in the Strip-Searches Sergeant Royce argues that even if the strip-searches were unreasonable, he is not liable for them because he did not perform them. By its terms, section 1983 imposes liability on persons who “cause” a deprivation of rights under federal law. This requires personal responsibility. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir.1986). “A causal connection, or an affirmative link, between the misconduct complained of and the official sued is necessary.” Id., quoting Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983); accord, Nanda v. Moss, 412 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir.2005) (“Under § 1983, however, supervisory liability can be established if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at the supervisor’s direction or with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.”). Sergeant Royce was personally responsible for these strip-searches. Royce took the plaintiffs to the fire station. He caused Jackson to be called to perform the searches. He discussed the searches with Jackson, though the extent of their discussions is unclear. He told Jackson that the plaintiffs had consented to the searches. A jury may determine how much damage Royce caused through his participation in the strip-searches, but the evidence would easily allow a jury to conclude that he caused those violations of their constitutional rights. C. Fifth Amendment Claims Plaintiffs have withdrawn their Fifth Amendment claims. Dkt. No. 163. D. Qualified Immunity The doctrine of qualified immunity provides a complete defense to a claim for damages against a defendant sued in his individual capacity under § 1983. A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if he did not violate “clearly established” rights at the time of the conduct in question. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Royce is not entitled to qualified immunity for any of the surviving search claims. The test of whether a right is clearly established is objective. To show that a defendant violated a clearly established right, the plaintiffs must show “that a violation of [the] right has been found in factually similar cases, or that the violation was so clear that a government official would have known that his actions violated the [plaintiffs’] rights even in the absence of a factually similar case.” Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir.2008). The right must have been clearly established when the defendants’ actions occurred, not at the time of the lawsuit. See Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir.2005). 1. Pah-Downs As explained above, Royce lacked the probable cause necessary to justify the pat-down searches of Rhodehamel and Messer. Royce is not entitled to immunity on these claims because it was clearly established that the smell of marijuana and presence of rolling papers- — without more — does not provide an officer probable cause to believe that the occupants of a car possess marijuana on them persons. To search each plaintiff, the officers needed probable cause to believe that the search would uncover marijuana. This is different from a determination that the plaintiffs committed a crime, which would have permitted the officers to arrest the plaintiffs. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), established long ago that a person’s presence in a car with another person who possesses contraband does not, without more, give officers probable cause to believe that the person possesses contraband on his or her person. That holding clearly applies here. Also, in this case, a jury could conclude that the officers found no contraband in Rhodehamel’s car. The Ninth Circuit has held that the odor or presence of drugs in a car does not give an officer probable cause to search all of the occupants for drugs. United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.1993). Pringle does not change this outcome because it dealt with probable cause to arrest, not to search. Similarly, in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), the Supreme Court took care to distinguish between searching a car and its contents, which was permissible, and searching the persons of the occupants, which was barred by United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), because searches of persons are so much more intrusive and even traumatic. However, several state courts and at least one district court have held that the odor of marijuana emanating from a car provides probable cause that the occupants possess marijuana so that a search of persons would be permitted. See, e.g., Garcia v. Aguiar; 138 F.Supp.2d 298, 303 (N.D.N.Y.2001) (odor of marijuana emanating from car with four occupants gave officers probable cause to frisk driver); State v. Chambliss, 752 So.2d 114, 115 (Fla.App.2000). But see, e.g., People v. Harshbarger, 24 Ill.App.3d 335, 321 N.E.2d 138, 140-41 (1974) (applying Di Re to conclude that person’s presence in apartment that smelled of marijuana did not provide probable cause for arrest and search of person). The rule that the smell of marijuana emanating from a car combined with the presence of rolling papers on a floorboard does not give officers probable cause to believe that a search of each of the occupants will uncover contraband was clearly established on January 19, 2007. Di Re established in 1948 that probable cause to search a person cannot be established by association under closely analogous circumstances. At least one other circuit has adapted the rule to the precise situation presented in this case. Indiana courts have not addressed the question. The fact that some state courts have not adopted this principle cannot protect a police officer from section 1983 liability. It is also significant that the officers had information that localized the presence of marijuana to a different occupant — Lessley—and nonetheless chose to search Messer and Rhodehamel. Royce is not entitled to qualified immunity for the pat-down searches of Messer and Rhodehamel. 2. Strip-Searches Sergeant Royce can be liable for the strip-searches of Messer and Rhodehamel, like the pat-down searches, because there was no probable cause to support the searches. Additionally, even though Royce had probable cause to believe that a search of Lessley would reveal marijuana, as it later did, it was clearly established that all of the warrantless strip-searches not incident to arrest and not performed in a school or at a border were unconstitutional. While the plaintiffs cannot point to a case decided by the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit holding a strip-search to be unconstitutional in similar circumstances, a precedential case is not necessary. A plaintiff can defeat qualified immunity by showing “that the violation was so clear that a government official would have known that his actions violated the plaintiffs rights even in the absence of a factually similar case.” Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir.2008). In Gray, this court held that it was clearly established that warrantless strip-searches not incident to arrest are unconstitutional. Gray, 2000 WL 683394, at *10. For purposes of qualified immunity, the district court decision in Gray does not clearly establish law, of course. See Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that district court decisions do not clearly establish constitutional rights). But Gray accurately described the law in the Seventh Circuit back in 2000. Campbell, Mary Beth G., Renfrow, and other Seventh Circuit cases cited in Gray established the narrow circumstances where warrantless strip-searches may be permissible: incident to an arrest, at an international border, or at a school. None of those circumstances were present when Officer Jackson strip-searched these plaintiffs on Sergeant Royce’s orders. Cases with facts identical to this case are probably uncommon. One hopes that any reasonable police officer would know that a warrantless strip-search of three people who were not under arrest was unreasonable. Aside from Gray, the parties have identified no cases in this circuit (other than border or school cases) where individuals were strip-searched without a warrant or being placed under arrest. This lack of cases is telling. Officers likely refrain from such conduct because it is clear that the conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. Sergeant Royce is not entitled to qualified immunity for the strip-search claims. E. State Law Claims 1. State Constitutional Claims Plaintiffs have withdrawn their claims under the Indiana Constitution. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 123, 124; see Dkt. No. 121 at 9. 2. State Tort Immunity Sergeant Royce argues that the Indiana Tort Claims Act gives him personal immunity against plaintiffs’ state law claims. Plaintiffs appear to concede that they cannot assert their state law claims against Royce personally, though they can attempt to hold the City of Madison liable for Royce’s torts. Dkt. No. 151 at 23-24. This concession is called into doubt because plaintiffs argue that Royce is liable for assault, battery, sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful infliction of emotional distress under state and federal law. Dkt. No. 151 at 20-22. The court’s best reading of plaintiffs’ brief is that they believe they can recover for these five torts against the City of Madison, not against Royce directly. This interpretation is consistent with the Indiana Tort Claims Act prohibition of tort suits against government employees personally for conduct within the scope of employment. Indiana Code § 34-13-3-5(b) provides in part: “A lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the scope of the employee’s employment bars an action by the claimant against the employee personally.” Plaintiffs admit that the torts pled against Royce are based on acts that were within the scope of his employment. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Dkt. No. 151 at 23-24. Royce is not liable personally for state law torts, no matter how egregious they might have been. See Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471-73 (Ind.2003) (employees are not liable for acts performed within the scope of their employment even if acts were criminal). Plaintiffs cannot sue Royce personally for state torts, but they may be able to hold the City of Madison liable for any state torts that Royce committed. F. New Federal Causes of Action Plaintiffs suggest in their response brief that they can pursue federal claims of assault, battery, sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution against Royce personally. Dkt. No. 151 at 20-22. As Royce points out, plaintiffs did not include these claims in their complaint as federal claims (they included them as state law claims), and they may not amend their complaint through a summary judgment brief. Plaintiffs argue that they pled these torts as federal claims because the complaint “reallege[s] and incorporate^] by reference all previous paragraphs,” which include their state claims, at the beginning of the section listing the federal causes of action. First Am. Compl. ¶ 126. This paragraph cannot be interpreted to include every previous cause of action (including, for instance, causes of action under the Indiana Constitution) as federal causes of action. Plaintiffs may allege that conduct that gave rise to these causes of action is relevant in determining whether the searches were lawful and in determining damages, but they cannot bring these new claims as separate claims. There is no general federal law of torts that plaintiffs can rely upon here. Plaintiffs’ federal claims are limited to alleged violations of their federal constitutional rights. G. Conclusion Sergeant Royce’s motion for summary judgment is granted on the federal Fourth Amendment seizure claims, the search of the car, the pat-down search of Lessley, and individual liability for state law torts. His motion is denied on the federal claims of unreasonable search for the pat-downs of Messer and Rhodehamel and the strip-searches of all plaintiffs. III. Other Police Officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment Officers Jackson, Simpson, Strouse, and Watterson have moved for summary judgment on several claims. Their motion raises many of the same arguments as Royce’s motion. Like Royce, the officers are not individually liable for plaintiffs’ state law claims. Only the City of Madison may be liable for the officers’ alleged torts. Unless otherwise noted, the court addresses the federal claims. A. Seizures As discussed above, the traffic stop was permissible and the subsequent seizure of the plaintiffs was permissible. The officers are entitled to summary judgment on the seizure claims. B. Searches The search of Rhodehamel’s car and its contents was reasonable. The pat-down search of Lessley was also reasonable. The other searches were unreasonable. 1. “Search Incident to Probable Cause to Arrest” The officers argue that the searches of the plaintiffs were reasonable because they were searches “incident to probable cause to arrest.” That is, the officers argue that they could search the plaintiffs because there was probable cause to arrest them, regardless of whether there was probable cause that a search would reveal evidence, and regardless of whether they actually arrested the plaintiffs. The officers do not specify whether they are referring to the pat-down searches or the strip-searches. The court construes the officers’ argument broadly and assumes that they seek summary judgment for both the pat-downs and the strip-searches. The court declines defendants’ invitation to create a new justification for warrantless searches. Warrantless searches performed incident to probable cause to arrest, when there is no arrest or when the only arrest is justified later by the fruits of the search, are not presumptively reasonable. A search incident to arrest may precede an arrest, but the arrest must follow the search quickly. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 318 (7th Cir.1994) (“A search incident to arrest must be contemporaneous with that arrest to be valid.”). A search cannot be justified as “incident to arrest” when the results of the search are used to justify a later arrest. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). The circumstances of this case show that the officers’ justification for the arrest of Lessley was the marijuana discovered during the strip-search. The searches of her cannot be justified as incident to her later arrest. Though the court does not adopt the point, there is some support for the proposition that officers may pat-down an individual based on probable cause to arrest if the officers have a reasonable belief that the search will reveal evidence and that the individual will destroy the evidence. See Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 5.4(b) at 194-96 (4th ed.2004); United States v. Banshee, 91 F.3d 99 (11th Cir.1996); State v. Smith, 593 A.2d 210 (Me.1991). This proposition does not apply to much more invasive strip-searches. It is also based on the assumption that the individual was ultimately arrested. In this case, two of the plaintiffs (the two whose pat-down claims survive) were never arrested, and the officers had no probable cause to search them. The court is aware of no case approving a search where a person who was never arrested was searched just because he could have been arrested. The court also is aware of no case upholding a search as incident to an arrest where the fruits of the search were the sole basis for the arrest. Finally, the court is aware of no case upholding a strip-search of a person because officers had probable cause to arrest, but not search, the person. Absent such authority, Rawlings and Sibron control this case. At a minimum, the officers needed probable cause that the searches would reveal evidence, not just probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs. Neither the pat-down searches of Messer and Rhodehamel nor the strip-searches were justified as searches “incident to probable cause to arrest.” 2. Reasonableness of the Strip-Searches The officers argue that any searches supported by probable cause were not performed in an unreasonable manner. The argument has no effect on the warrantless strip-searches that were not supported by probable cause. No matter how cautiously the officers might have performed the searches, they needed probable cause. Plaintiffs do not argue that the searches that were supported by probable cause (search of the- car and contents and pat-down of Lessley) were performed in an unreasonable manner. C. Qualified Immunity Simpson, Strouse, and Watterson are not entitled to qualified immunity for the pat-downs of Messer and Rhodehamel and the strip-searches. The court’s discussion of Royce’s qualified immunity arguments applies to these officers. One additional point merits discussion. It is clearly established that a search incident to arrest requires an actual arrest. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 318 (7th Cir.1994) (“A search incident to arrest must be contemporaneous with that arrest to be valid.”). Officer Jackson argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity for the unreasonable strip-search claim because Sergeant Royce told her that the plaintiffs consented to a search. In her incident report, Jackson stated that Royce had told her that the plaintiffs agreed to a “further search of their person.” Dkt. No. 130, Tab 8, Ex. 45. Jackson testified that Royce told her that the plaintiffs had agreed to “the search.” Jackson Dep. 44. Royce testified that he told Jackson that the plaintiffs had consented to “a more thorough search.” Royce Dep. 109. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Royce told Jackson that they consented to a more thorough search, but they argue that she had a duty to obtain consent personally. A warrantless search performed without probable cause is reasonable if the person searched provides valid consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Neither side has directed the court to a case where an officer relied on another officer’s claim of consent and was held hable for a search, and the court has found no such authority. Courts are faced with a similar situation when officers apply for search warrants based on information from other officers. In that situation, an officer is entitled to rely on information from another officer. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). That principle applies to this situation. In any event, absent any cases even suggesting that an officer cannot rely on another officer’s report of consent, Jackson did not violate a clearly established right. She is entitled to summary judgment on the strip-search claims against her. D. State Laio Claims Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the officers must be made against the City of Madison. The officers’ arguments that Indiana’s law enforcement immunity and the existence of probable cause to seize the plaintiffs bar all state law claims are moot. E. Conclusion The officers’ motion for summary judgment is granted on the federal Fourth Amendment seizure claims for all plaintiffs, the claims for the search of the car, the unreasonable pat-down of Lessley, and individual liability for state law claims. Jackson is entitled to summary judgment on the unreasonable strip-search claims. The motion is denied on the federal claims of unreasonable search for the pat-downs of Messer and Rhodehamel and the strip-searches of all plaintiffs (for all moving defendants except Jackson). IV. Madison and Supervisory City Officials’ Motion for Summary Judgment Former Madison mayor Albert Huntington, councilman Jim Lee, former city attorney Robert Barlow, former Madison Police Chief Robert Wolf (the supervisory defendants) and the City of Madison have moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs bring several claims against these defendants. They claim that Madison is liable as a municipality for having a policy or custom that caused the officers to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. They claim that Madison is liable for the officers’ state law torts. They claim that the supervisory defendants caused their constitutional rights to be violated and defamed them. Summary judgment is granted on any claim against the supervisory defendants personally, on the defamation claim, and on some state claims. Summary judgment is denied on the municipal liability claim and some state claims. A. Supplemental Facts The facts designated above are still operative. Some additional facts concerning Madison are necessary. 1. Madison Procedures The Madison Police Department had several relevant policies in effect at the time of the search. None of the written policies concerned warrantless searches. Madison provided its officers with “Consent to Search” forms. Standard Operating Procedure 17 concerned the transporting of prisoners. It provided that same-sex officers may perform a “full search” after an arrest and opposite-sex officers may perform a more limited pat-down. Dkt. No. 112, Tab 14. It prohibited communication with a prisoner during her transportation unless the prisoner had signed a waiver of rights form. After the events of this case, Madison adopted a new procedure for warrantless searches, Standard Operating Procedure 35. Id. At the time of the searches, Madison did have an unwritten, understood policy for strip-searches that prohibited officers from strip-searching individuals of the opposite sex. Wolf Dep. 10-11. Madison provided officers with no training specific to strip-searches. Wolf Dep. 11. 2. Similar Incidents Officer Jackson has conducted three other pre-arrest strip-searches. Jackson conducted the first search in the restroom of a local restaurant. Jackson Dep. 16-17. She was working for another local police department at the time. Jackson Dep. 17. She conducted the search of a female after Sergeant Royce and Officer Simpson pulled the female over. Jackson Dep. 17-18. Simpson had patted-down the female and was pricked by a needle. Simpson Dep. 20. Royce or Simpson then called the county dispatch for a female officer to perform the strip-search. Jackson found a spoon with cocaine residue. Jackson Dep. 16. Jackson performed another strip-search at a restaurant in Madison. Jackson and Strouse, who was also involved with that search, disagree on whether the search occurred before or after January 2007. See Jackson Dep. 19 (after February 2007); Strouse Dep. 15 (probably before January 2007). Jackson performed the search after an Indiana State Police trooper called her to the scene of a traffic stop. Jackson Dep. 20. She performed the search in a locked bathr