Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge. Plaintiff Ellen Reyes, on behalf of herself and her infant daughter Joy Reyes (collectively, “plaintiffs”), brought this action against defendants Fairfield Properties, David Berger, David Ford, and David Nobile (collectively, “defendants”), alleging that defendants discriminated and retaliated against plaintiffs on the basis of disability and race in connection with the provision of housing, and asserting federal claims pursuant to the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (“FHAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(f)(2), 3602(f)(3)(B), 3617, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (“Section 1982”), as well as state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), breach of contract, breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, unlawful eviction, and violations of the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 296 (“NYSHRL”). Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants’ motion. Specifically, plaintiffs’ claims based on disability discrimination and retaliation under the FHAA and NYSHRL survive dismissal, in accordance with the limitations set forth in this Memorandum and Order. However, plaintiffs’ claim based on race discrimination pursuant to Section 1982 is dismissed with leave to replead. Plaintiffs’ state law claims also survive, with the exception of the IIED claim and unlawful eviction claim, the latter being dismissed without leave to re-plead. Plaintiffs are also granted leave by the Court to file a second amended complaint adding the fee owner of the subject premises, Fairfield 64 Gibson LLC, as an additional defendant, pursuant to Rules 15(a) and 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the second amended complaint, which shall be filed within thirty (30) days of this Memorandum and Order, plaintiffs may also supplement their allegations regarding discrimination and retaliation based on race and replead the Section 1982 and IIED claims. I. Background A. Facts The following facts are taken from the amended complaint (“Compl.”), which the Court assumes to be true for the purposes of deciding this motion and construes them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-moving party. In addition, the Court takes judicial notice of plaintiffs’ filings with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYDHR”), and other related court filings, which were attached as exhibits to the defendants’ moving papers. Plaintiff Ellen Reyes (hereinafter, “Reyes”) is an African-American female and parent and natural guardian of the infant plaintiff Joy Reyes. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Reyes is a resident of the State of New York, County of Nassau. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff Joy Reyes (hereinafter, “Joy”) is an African-American resident of the State of New York, County of Nassau, and a minor who suffers from cerebral palsy. (Compl. ¶8.) Joy is permanently bound to a wheelchair due to her inability to walk and support herself. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Defendant Fairfield Properties (hereinafter, “Fairfield”) is an agency located in Commack, New York that provides assistance with rentals, sales, and property management. (Compl. ¶ 9.) The property in question in this case is managed by Fairfield and located in Valley Stream, New York. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Defendant David Berger (hereinafter, “Berger”) was employed at all relevant times as the Director of Leasing for Fairfield, and possessed managerial responsibility over the subject premises, including leasing and renting thereof. (Compl. ¶ 10.) At all relevant times, defendant David Ford (hereinafter, “Ford”) was employed as the Property Manager for Fairfield, and possessed managerial responsibility over the subject premises, including leasing and renting thereof. (Compl. ¶ 11.) At all relevant times, defendant David Noble (hereinafter, “Noble”) was employed as the “Assistant Director Field” for Fairfield. (Compl. ¶ 12.) In or about 2005, plaintiffs moved into an apartment owned and operated by Fair-field, located in Valley Stream, New York. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs could not access the parking lot by traveling through the rear corridor of the building because the corridor was too narrow for Joy’s wheelchair. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Instead, Reyes had to push her daughter in her wheelchair around the front of the apartment complex down the driveway on the side of the building. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs further allege that the driveways and parking lot at the apartment complex were not properly illuminated at night and were scattered with potholes, subjecting Joy to discomfort whenever her wheelchair got caught in the potholes and dislodged her from a level position. (Compl. ¶ 16.) During the fall of 2006, plaintiffs allege that Ford told Reyes that Joy would get wheelchair access to her apartment. (Compl. ¶ 26.) However, when the walkways were reconstructed soon thereafter, plaintiffs claim that defendants failed to provide any wheelchair access for Joy. (Compl. ¶ 26.) By letter on or about July 20, 2007, the Long Island Housing Services (“LIHS”) sent Fairfield a reasonable accommodation specification, LIHS Nos. 07-016 and 07-133. (Compl. ¶ 17.) The following accommodations were requested by the LIHS: (1) accessible building entrance on an accessible route; (2) curb ramps or access aisles at the dwelling entrances; (3) designated accessible parking with appropriate signs; (4) widened bathroom doors to accommodate wheelchair access; and (5) elimination of level changes at the primary entry door to, inter alia, plaintiffs’ apartment. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs assert, however, that until the time of their allegedly unlawful, discriminatory, and retaliatory eviction on November 6, 2008, Fair-field made no changes to the apartment and/or apartment complex to accommodate Joy’s disability. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-22.) LIHS further provided Fairfield with two “proposal of costs” from a vendor for the accommodation requests. (Compl. ¶ 23.) The cost estimate for removal of steps and replacement with ramps at the dwelling entrance and building entrance was $5,975.00, and the estimate for widening two door openings was $1,770.00. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs also allege that the NYDHR conducted two field visits to Fairfield, the second of which was performed in the company of Berger, Noble, and Ford. (Compl. ¶ 25.) According to the amended complaint, the defendants informed the NYDHR that they would install lighting on both sides of the building at the driveways and fix the potholes, but had not done so by the time of plaintiffs’ eviction in November 2008. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs also allege that defendants had an opportunity to provide a ramp leading from Reyes’ doorway into the courtyard when the courtyard was being renovated, but failed to install such a ramp. (Compl. ¶ 27.) On August 6, 2007, plaintiffs filed a Charge of Discrimination with the NYDHR against defendant Fairfield, alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation based on plaintiff Joy Reyes’ disability and unlawful discriminatory practices in relation to housing because of the disability. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs cross-filed the complaint with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), Fair Housing Assistance Program. (Compl. ¶ 5.) On November 14, 2007, the NYDHR rendered a finding of “probable cause” to support the allegations in the Charge of Discrimination. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs claim that in retaliation for the filing of the complaints of discrimination, Fairfield initiated eviction proceedings, falsely stating that Reyes was a holdover tenant. (Compl. ¶ 29.) On October 9, 2007, plaintiffs claim that Fairfield filed a Notice of Petition/Holdover against Reyes under Index No. 005410/2007 in First District Court of the County of Nassau, Hempstead, New York. (Compl. ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs further claim that at that time, Fairfield was aware that Reyes’ lease period had not expired and a contract was in place for the period beginning July 1, 2007 and ending July 1, 2008, and Fairfield was in possession of plaintiffs’ rental payment for the period sought in state court. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33.) B. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed an original complaint in this action pro se on January 7, 2008. An amended complaint was filed on November 26, 2008, after plaintiffs retained counsel. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on February 9, 2009. Plaintiffs filed their opposition papers on March 30, 2009, and defendants replied on April 20, 2009. This matter is fully submitted. II. Standard of Review In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006); Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2005). The plaintiff must satisfy “a flexible ‘plausibility standard.’ ” Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir.2007), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “[0]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court, therefore, does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. See 129 S.Ct. at 1937. The Court instructed district courts to first “identify[] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Though “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, if a complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations!],] a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (quoting and citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955). III. Discussion A. Fair Housing Amendments Act 1. Reasonable Accommodations The Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988 to prohibit discrimination in housing against persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). “Prohibited handicap discrimination may take several forms, including (1) disparate treatment, i.e., intentional discrimination; (2) disparate impact, i.e., the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral practice or policy; (3) a refusal to permit ‘reasonable modifications of existing premises’; (4) a ‘refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services’; or (5) a failure to ‘design and construct’ handicap accessible buildings.” Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, Kan., 248 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (10th Cir.2001). Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants have failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Joy’s disability, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (hereinafter, the “reasonable accommodations provision”). This statutory provision makes unlawful “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). With respect to this claim, defendants argue that the statute imposes no duty upon landlords or building owners to construct new facilities, features or elements at a tenant’s request and renovations do not fall within the ambit of this provision. The Court agrees with defendants that wholly new construction or modifications of existing premises is not mandated by the reasonable accommodations provision of the FHAA, but because plaintiffs’ allegations are not limited to such, the Court cannot conclude that the entirety of plaintiffs’ claims under this provision are barred as a matter of law. Specifically, the Court agrees with defendants that, to the extent that plaintiffs claim that defendants were obligated to undertake wholly new construction or modify existing facilities by replacing steps with ramps or widening doors, plaintiffs’ claim fails under the plain language of section 3604(f)(3)(B). As defendants point out, Judge Rakoff addressed this precise question in Rodriguez v. 551 West 157th St. Owners Corp., 992 F.Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y.1998): Plaintiffs contend that defendant’s refusal to make the building entrance accessible to wheelchairs constitutes a failure to make a “reasonable accommodation” .... However, the plain language of the statute defines this requirement in terms of reasonable accommodations in “rules, policies, practices, or services,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) and, by contrast with § 3604(f)(2), notably fails to mention “facilities.” To undertake to construct an entirely new facility in an existing building does not, under these circumstances, qualify as an “accommodation” of a “rule, policy, practice or service,” when the term “construction” is nowhere to be found and the term “facility” is excluded. Indeed, plaintiffs cite no case, and the Court is aware of none, interpreting section 3604(f) to require a landlord to undertake wholly new construction. Id. at 387 (footnote and internal citation omitted). The handful of other courts that have since addressed this issue have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Fagundes v. Charter Builders, Inc., No. C07-1111, 2008 WL 268977, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2008) (“This Court agrees that a request for construction or repair is not actionable under subsection (B).”); Thompson v. Westboro Condominium Assoc., No. 05-1893JLR, 2006 WL 2473464, at *4 (W.D.Wash. Aug. 25, 2006) (“The plain language of § 3604(f)(3)(B) excludes construction or improvements as a ‘reasonable accommodation.’ ... Failing to construct a ramp is not a failure to accommodate in a rule, policy[,] practice, or service.”); cf. Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 336 (2d Cir.1995) (upholding preliminary injunction in case involving defendants’ policies regarding allocation of parking spaces); United States v. Tanski, No. 1:04 Civ. 714, 2007 WL 1017020, at *23 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (permitting claim to survive summary judgment where, inter alia, the alleged failure to make repairs to an existing ramp could result in liability for failure to reasonably accommodate). But see Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F.Supp. 450, 462 n. 25 (D.N.J.1992) (suggesting, by way of example, that where others are provided with “equal access” to a building in the form of a staircase, reasonable accommodation to those in wheelchairs may require the construction of a wheelchair ramp). This Court agrees with the majority of these other courts and holds, based upon the plain meaning of section 3604(f)(3)(B), that wholly new construction in or modifications of existing facilities is not required under this section. The Court is furthermore not persuaded to reach a different conclusion by plaintiffs’ argument that, in connection with the allegations that defendants failed to build ramps or otherwise accessible entrances in certain areas, defendants undertook independent renovation of those areas after they became aware of Joy’s disability and still failed to renovate in a manner that accommodated their disabled resident. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants renovated the courtyard and walkways, but chose not to install a ramp when they could have done so. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27.) However, plaintiffs do not point to any legal authority, and the Court is not aware of any, suggesting that renovations or reconstruction may constitute an accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services within the meaning of the FHAA and thereby fall within the ambit of the reasonable accommodations provision. As noted by the Second Circuit, “[t]he HUD regulations give two examples of when a reasonable accommodation would be required: the lifting of a no-pets rule to allow use of a seeing-eye dog; or the waiver of a first-come, first-serve policy on parking spots to accommodate the impaired mobility of a person suffering from multiple sclerosis.” Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 301 (2d Cir.1998) (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b)). In addition, those cases tangentially involving construction under this provision typically involve policies regarding zoning restrictions on construction and whether alterations of such policies are reasonable accommodations that are mandated by the statute, and not whether renovations or construction undertaken by private housing providers themselves constitute reasonable accommodations. See id. (“Many reported cases under § 3604(f)(3) involve developers’ requests for variances of zoning ordinances that would allow the building of housing for handicapped persons.”). The aforementioned cases are inapposite to this case, and thus the Court agrees with defendants that, to the extent that plaintiffs’ claim of disability discrimination hinges on defendants’ alleged failure to reconstruct or renovate certain areas in a fashion that accommodated Joy’s disability, such claims are not actionable under the reasonable accommodations provision of the FHAA. The Court’s interpretation is also consistent with a reading of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) as a whole. Subsection 3604(f)(3)(A) prohibits “a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises!.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (emphasis added). “Modifications” is defined by the regulations as “any change to the public or common use areas of a building or any change to a dwelling unit.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.201. Another subsection, § 3604(f)(3)(C), governs the design and construction requirements of covered multi-family dwellings for first occupancy after the date that is 30 months after September 13, 1988, a provision that is discussed in more detail infra and includes the requirements that “the public use and common use portions of such dwellings are readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons” and that “all the doors designed to allow passage into and within all premises within such dwellings are sufficiently wide to allow passage by handicapped persons in wheelchairs[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(i)-(ii). These subsections, read in conjunction with subsection 3604(f)(B), indicate that modifications of existing premises, which are governed by § 3604(f)(3)(A) if they are paid for by the disabled individual, are generally distinct from accommodations in a rule, policy, practice, or service as so stated in § 3604(f)(3)(B), which are also generally distinct from design and construction requirements for first occupancy buildings as governed by § 3604(f)(3)(C). Only such a reading is consistent with the canons of statutory construction that a statute be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be rendered inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and that when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court should assume that different meanings were intended. Although the analysis begins “with the text of the provision in question!,]” N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995), and the Court has already determined that the ordinary and plain meaning of the terms rule, policy, practice, or service do not encompass the installation of ramps or the widening of doorways, the Court finds that the text and structure of § 3604(f)(3) as a whole also supports the same conclusion. See Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”). However, plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations with respect to more than just the installation of ramps and the widening of doors. In particular, plaintiffs allege that the premises’ driveways and parking lot were kept in disrepair, causing difficulties for Joy in her wheelchair. (See Compl. ¶ 16.) A failure to repair potholes in the driveways is plainly a practice or service that is actionable under the reasonable accommodations provision of the statute. Similarly, plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants failed to provide accessible and properly designated parking spaces, (see Compl. ¶ 20), also support an actionable claim for reasonable accommodation under the FHA. See Shapiro, 51 F.3d at 335 (“[Wjithout a nearby parking space, [plaintiff] is subjected to a risk of injury, infection, and humiliation each time she leaves her dwelling and each time she returns home. We agree with the district court that, under these circumstances, nearby parking is a substantial factor in [plaintiffs] ‘use and enjoyment’ of her dwelling.”); Sporn v. Ocean Colony Condominium Ass’n, 173 F.Supp.2d 244, 249 (D.N.J.2001) (“It has been recognized on numerous occasions that the FHA may, in certain cases, entitle a handicapped tenant to a reserved parking space adjacent to the tenant’s dwelling.”) (collecting cases). Moreover, “if the reasonable accommodations provision is triggered, a defendant can be required to incur reasonable costs to accommodate a plaintiffs handicap, provided such accommodations do not pose an undue hardship or a substantial burden.” Salute, 136 F.3d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In other words, a defendant must incur reasonable costs and take modest, affirmative steps to accommodate the disabled individual, as long as the accommodations sought do not pose an undue hardship or a substantial burden. See Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 578 (2d Cir.2003) (citations omitted). Thus, whether or not defendants may have reasonably accommodated plaintiffs by repairing the driveway and parking lot areas, or by providing plaintiffs with an accessible and designated parking space, cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss under the circumstances of this case. See Dinapoli v. DPA Wallace Ave II, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 1409(PAC), 2009 WL 755354, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2009) (“Courts conduct a fact-specific analysis of whether an accommodation was required, balancing the benefits to the plaintiff against the burdens to the defendant.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the reasonable accommodations provision of the FHAA, to the extent that they are based on the installation of new ramps or the widening of doors, fail as a matter of law. However, to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims are based on defendants’ alleged (1) practice of keeping the driveways and parking lot in a state of disrepair and (2) policy regarding parking spaces, such claims survive dismissal. 2. Construction and Design Although plaintiffs do not specifically allege that defendants have failed to design or construct the premises in compliance with the accessibility and adaptability features mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C), the Court has considered defendants’ possible liability under this statutory provision in an abundance of caution, particularly because defendants base substantial portions of their arguments with respect to § 3604(f)(3)(B) on an analysis of § 3604(f)(3)(C), which is a distinct subsection and, as the Court determines, does not apply to the case at hand. First, defendants correctly point out that by the terms of this subsection, only those multi-family dwellings constructed for first occupancy after March 13, 1991 are subject to its requirements. See Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 170 F.3d 381, 383 (3d Cir.1999) (“The FHAA contains general design requirements for all multi-family housing with four or more units constructed after March 13, 1991, regardless of whether the housing is federally funded.”); Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Properties, Inc., 522 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2007) (“The statute further defines ‘discrimination’ to include the ‘failure to design and construct covered multifamily dwellings’ built for first occupancy after March 13, 1991.”) Defendants claim that the premises here were constructed for first occupancy well before 1991, and plaintiffs do not allege otherwise. In addition, just as defendants’ alleged failure to reconstruct certain areas of the building to accommodate plaintiffs is not actionable under the reasonable accommodations provision, as determined supra, the Court also finds that these allegations are not actionable under § 3604(f)(3)(C). The Court’s own research has yielded no case suggesting that a failure to renovate or reconstruct a pre-1991 facility in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) constitutes grounds for liability under that subsection. Cf. Sporn, 173 F.Supp.2d at 249 (assuming that the subsection’s requirements relating to the design and construction of “covered multifamily dwellings for first occupancy” applied to the alleged renovations but acknowledging that there is no legal authority cited for that proposition). Such an interpretation of section 3604(f)(3)(C) is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and, thus, the Court holds that section 3604(f)(3)(C) is not made applicable by renovations undertaken in an older building that take place after March 1991. Therefore, any claim under section 3604(f)(3)(C) fails as a matter of law in this case. Despite this, plaintiffs further counter that, as an “exception to the 1991 requirement,” defendants are still liable under the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because Fairfield receives federal subsidies, namely, Section 8 housing vouchers. (Pl.’s Mem., at 5.) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act makes it unlawful to deny a disabled person the benefits of a program or activity receiving federal assistance by reason of his or her disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Defendants argue that Fairfield’s acceptance of Section 8 vouchers does not, by itself, constitute receipt of federal financial assistance. The Court agrees. As an initial matter, the amended complaint does not assert any claims for relief pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, and such a claim is only included in plaintiffs’ memorandum opposing defendants’ motion. “A party is not entitled to amend [their] complaint through [their] memoranda,” and, therefore, the Court may decline to consider plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claim on this basis alone. Butvin v. DoubleClick, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 4727(JFK), 2000 WL 827673, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2000) (citing Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.1998) (declining to address merits of claim that “does not appear anywhere in the amended complaint and did. not enter the case until [the plaintiff] mentioned it for the first time in her opposition memoranda to the motion to dismiss”)); see, e.g., Goplen v. 51job, Inc., 453 F.Supp.2d 759, 765 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“[Plaintiffs cannot amend their complaint through a legal memorandum.”); Reading Intern., Inc. v. Oaktree Cap. Mgmt. LLC, 317 F.Supp.2d 301, 318 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“Absent the filing of an amended complaint, that properly pleads the components of [the asserted claim], the Court will not consider this allegation.”); Hernandez v. Wells, No. 01 Civ. 4376(MBM), 2003 WL 22771982, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2003) (declining to consider claim not raised in complaint but argued in the parties’ moving papers); Farrell v. Child Welfare Admin., 77 F.Supp.2d 329, 331 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (same). Even assuming arguendo that such a claim had been pled, however, it would fail as a matter of law if its sole basis is that Fairfield accepts tenants with Section 8 housing vouchers. In this respect, the reasoning of Magistrate Judge Wall in another case is entirely on point and is persuasive: Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) has promulgated regulations to effectuate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. One such regulation provides that an entity or person who receives housing assistance payments under a housing assistance payments program or a voucher program is not a “recipient” of federal financial assistance by virtue of receipt of such payments. See 24 C.F.R. § 8.3. Plaintiffs do not address this regulation in their papers, but rather generally suggest that receipt of Section 8 vouchers should be considered federal financial assistance since that type of aid “is an integral part of the federal housing scheme.” Pis’ Mem. at 21. They do not refute the plain meaning of the regulation, nor do they provide any case support for their arguments. The court finds that defendants have not received federal financial assistance and as such, plaintiffs cannot establish a violation of § 504. Echeverria v. Krystie Manor, LP, No. 07 Civ. 1369(WDW), 2009 WL 857629, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (footnote omitted); see also 24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (“An entity or person receiving housing assistance payments from a recipient on behalf of eligible families under a housing assistance payments program or a voucher program is not a recipient or subrecipient merely by virtue of receipt of such payments.”). Accordingly, even assuming that the amended complaint is construed to assert a cause of action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, that claim would not survive dismissal. 3. Retaliation under the FHAA Plaintiffs second cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [42 U.S.C. §§ 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606]. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The statute “safeguards members of the protected class from coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference in the exercise or enjoyment of their Fair Housing Act rights.” Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir.1994). Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed based on the stipulation of settlement reached in the state court eviction proceedings. Specifically, defendants assert that, even accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, plaintiffs cannot establish a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action as a matter of law because the stipulation of settlement in the holdover proceeding, in which plaintiff Reyes purportedly agreed to a judgment of possession in favor of the owner with a stay of the warrant of eviction through June 30, 2008, “completely resolved all factual issues with regard to her status as a holdover tenant.” (Def.’s Mem., at 10-11.) The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting rules apply to claims of retaliation pursuant to this provision; however, no pleading of a prima facie case is required to withstand a motion to dismiss, since McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard and not a pleading requirement. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). Thus, despite defendants’ argument to the contrary, plaintiffs do not need to allege specific evidence that satisfies the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation at this stage of the proceedings. See id. at 511, 122 S.Ct. 992 (“under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case.”). Instead, all that is relevant on a motion to dismiss in a discrimination case is whether plaintiffs have provided adequate notice of the claim under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with some factual allegations that satisfy the “plausibility” standard set forth by Twombly and Iqbal. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953. Plaintiffs have certainly satisfied that standard with respect to the discrimination and retaliation claims based on Joy’s disability. Even if allegations specifically supporting the causal connection were required at this stage, however, the Court would find the amended complaint’s allegations sufficient. “ ‘The causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action.’ ” RECAP, 294 F.3d at 54 (quotation omitted). The adverse action need not occur immediately following the protected activity, and there is no bright line outer limit to the time; the inquiry is whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the action was taken because of the protected activity. See id. (quotation omitted). Here, plaintiffs allege that LIHS sent its letter to defendants regarding the reasonable accommodations on July 20, 2007, Reyes filed her fair housing complaint on August 6, 2007, the NYSDHR conducted a second field visit on September 17, 2009, and on October 9, 2007, defendants initiated the eviction proceedings. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 15-17, 25, 31.) Such allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on the issue of causation. Moreover, defendants’ argument that the stipulation executed in the eviction proceedings in state court necessarily defeats the allegation that defendants initiated the eviction proceedings as a retaliatory measure is misplaced. The Court finds that even considering the terms of the stipulation of settlement and assuming that Reyes did admit to her status as a holdover tenant, and even if res judicata, collateral estoppel, and/or Rooker-Feldman bar review by this Court of the warrant of eviction issued pursuant to the state court judgment, as discussed infra, Reyes’ purported concession to being a holdover tenant does not mean that plaintiffs cannot establish as a matter of law that a retaliatory motive played a part in the holdover proceeding. Indeed, whether or not there was a valid basis for the eviction proceeding, while relevant to the issue of discriminatory or retaliatory intent, is not determinative. Consequently, on a motion for summary judgment at a later stage of the proceedings in this case, defendants may argue that they had a valid, nonretaliatory motive for instituting the eviction proceedings. See, e.g., RECAP, 294 F.3d at 54 (stating that if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden to produce a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its action). Even then, however, plaintiffs have the opportunity to show that the defendants’ proffered reason is mere pretext for a retaliatory action. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). In any event, these are not proper considerations on a motion to dismiss and should be left for a later stage of the proceedings. B. Section 1982 “To state a claim under [§ 1982], plaintiff must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) [she is a] member of a racial minority; (2) defendant’s intent to discriminate on the basis of [her] race, (3) the discrimination concerned one or more activities enumerated in [section 1982], such as ... the purchase and lease of property.” Puglisi v. Underhill Park Taxpayer Ass’n, 947 F.Supp. 673, 700 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Defendants argue here that the amended complaint’s “ ‘naked assertion’ of racial discrimination without any facts whatsoever is insufficient to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff has not alleged even one instance of fact which would give rise even to a question of racial discriminatory intent.” (Def.’s Mem., at 19.) The Court agrees, but grants plaintiffs the opportunity to replead, based on the factual allegations set forth in plaintiffs’ original complaint. As an initial matter, it is well settled that there is no heightened pleading requirement for civil rights complaints alleging racial animus. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510, 122 S.Ct. 992 (rejecting the concept that there is a heightened pleading standard and holding that the survival of a complaint in an employment discrimination case does not rest on whether it contains specific facts establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas); see also Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir.2008) (applying Swierkiewicz to FHA claims); Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 71-72 (2d Cir.2006) (applying Swierkiewicz holding to retaliation claims); Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 591 (2d Cir.2006) (applying Swierkiewicz holding to discrimination claims under Title VII and ADEA claims). The Second Circuit “has found such claims sufficiently pleaded when the complaint stated simply that plaintiffs ‘are African-Americans, describe[d] defendants’ actions in detail, and allege[d] that defendants selected [plaintiffs] for maltreatment ‘solely because of their color.’ We have upheld the vitality of this principle since Twombly.” Boykin, 521 F.3d at 215 (citing Phillip v. University of Rochester, 316 F.3d 291, 298 (2d Cir.2003)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphasized that the Federal Rules “set forth a pleading standard under which a plaintiff is required only to give a defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Leibowitz, 445 F.3d at 591. Such a pleading “will enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata, and identify the nature of the case so it may be assigned the proper form of trial.” Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation omitted). “A clear statement from the plaintiff alleging discrimination by the defendant is sufficient to achieve these goals.” Sanchez v. Thompson, 252 F.R.D. 136, 140 (E.D.N.Y.2008); see also Boykin, 521 F.3d at 213 (“Boykin’s complaint need only satisfy Rule 8(a)’s standard of a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.’ ”) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir.1961) (holding that a complaint stating “that defendants have in a willful and malicious manner discriminated against plaintiff’ provided sufficient notice of the discrimination claim). The Supreme Court has recently clarified, however, that even against this liberal pleading standard, conclusory assertions are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and factual allegations must plausibly support the reasonable inference that plaintiffs are entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. Indeed, “the Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.” Id. at 1954. “[Wjhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged' — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original). Here, the conclusory race-based allegations contained in the amended complaint, taken as true, do not establish plausibility on its face and are insufficient to satisfy even the liberal pleading standards under Rule 8(a) and Iqbal. The amended complaint’s factual allegations make no mention of plaintiffs’ race (other than stating that plaintiffs are African-American) and repeatedly emphasize that defendants denied them certain accommodations based on Joy’s disability and then retaliated against plaintiffs because of Reyes’ NYDHR / HUD complaint — also based only on disability discrimination — and the NYDHR’s resultant investigation. Even liberally construed, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege any facts relating to race, other than a eonclusory statement that defendants retaliated and discriminated against plaintiffs based on their being African-American, which is insufficient under Iqbal. No identification of particular events or facts underlying the race-based discrimination claims is set forth in the amended complaint, and thus the claim is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 713-14 (2d Cir.1994) (dismissing claims based on plaintiffs eonclusory assertions of race and gender discrimination); see also Wei Hong Zheng v. Wong, No. 07 Civ. 4768(FB)(JO), 2009 WL 2601313, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009) (“Under the standard recently articulated by the Supreme Court, a plaintiff must plead sufficient ‘factual content [to allow] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ Chan fails to satisfy that standard with respect to her sex discrimination claim, which, accordingly, must be dismissed.”) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949); Ercole v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., No. 07 Civ. 2049(JFB), 2008 WL 4190799, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008) (finding pro se complaint did not meet Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards where complaint had no factual allegations to support vague and eonclusory assertion that plaintiff was subject to unlawful discrimination); Timmons v. City of Hartford, 283 F.Supp.2d 712, 717-18 (D.Conn.2003) (dismissing complaint based in part on the fact that no factual allegations were provided in support of discrimination claim). Plaintiffs attempt to remedy their pleading defect by pointing to various allegations contained in the original, and not amended, complaint. In particular, plaintiffs allege that an on-site maintenance employee named Richie, who was an alleged agent of defendants and given key access to plaintiffs’ apartment, called plaintiff Reyes a n § and began a campaign of racial harassment beginning on January 4, 2008. (See PL’s Mem., at 12.) However, the original complaint has been superseded by the amended complaint, and those factual allegations cannot be considered by the Court on this motion. See Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel, 162 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1998) (“[I]t is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect.”) (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.1994)). In an abundance of caution, however, the Court grants plaintiffs leave to submit a second amended complaint to address this pleading defect. See, e.g., Ercole, 2008 WL 4190799, at *7. C. State Law Claims 1. NYSHRL The language of NYSHRL, Executive Law § 296(18) parallels that of the FHAA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims under the NYSHRL survive dismissal to the extent that the FHAA claim does, as set forth supra. See Barkley v. Olympia Mortgage Co., No. 04 Civ. 875, 2007 WL 2437810, at *17-18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61940, at *56-57 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007) (“the standards relevant to [the NYSHRL] claims parallel those applicable under the Fair Housing Act”). The same standard as the FHAA is also applied to retaliation complaints under the NYSHRL, and thus, that claim is also permitted to proceed. See Elmowitz v. Executive Towers at Lido, LLC, 571 F.Supp.2d 370, 376 (E.D.N.Y.2008); Okolie v. Paikoff, 589 F.Supp.2d 204, 211 (E.D.N.Y.2008). 2. IIED In order to assert a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Bender v. City of N.Y., 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y.1993)). “New York sets a high threshold for conduct that is ‘extreme and outrageous’ enough to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. (citation omitted). The conduct alleged must be “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.’ ” Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 220 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (1978)). “New York courts do not allow IIED claims where ‘the conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability.’ ” McGrath v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 217 F.Supp.2d 319, 335 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (quoting Lian v. Sedgwick James, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 644, 651 (S.D.N.Y.1998)). As a result, “IIED claims that are duplicative of other tort claims should therefore be dismissed.” Id. (citing Lian, 992 F.Supp. at 651). Moreover, “New York courts have been very strict in applying these principles.” Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 220 (2d Cir.1985); see also Elmowitz, 571 F.Supp.2d at 378 (“Very few claims satisfy the extreme and outrageous requirement of a IIED claim. In fact, none of the IIED claims considered by the New York Court of Appeals have survived because the conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.”) (citation omitted). Even construing the facts most favorably to plaintiffs, based upon defendants’ alleged conduct in failing to provide the requested accommodations and bringing retaliatory eviction proceedings, the Court concludes that the IIED claim must be dismissed based upon the current complaint for failure to allege any specific conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. See, e.g., Martin, 762 F.2d at 220 (holding that allegations of being polygraphed on the basis of race is not outrageous per se “despite the unacceptability of racial discrimination in civilized society”); Elmowitz, 571 F.Supp.2d at 378 (dismissing IIED claim in lawsuit alleging housing discrimination based on disability, where plaintiff alleged that while defendant inspected his apartment and took multiple pictures of the unit, refusing to leave when asked to do so by plaintiff, defendant took photographs of his person, at times placing the camera “in very close proximity to [his] face,” taunted him in public by shouting derogatory remarks, and “hit [him] multiple times with her office telephone[,]” and, where after plaintiff had filed a complaint with HUD, defendants then refused to extend plaintiffs lease); Murphy v. Am. Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y.1983) (affirming dismissal of a claim as “fallfing] far short of [IIED’s] strict standard” that alleged that plaintiff was transferred and demoted for reporting fraud at his company, discharged and ordered to leave immediately, forcibly and publicly escorted from the building by guards when he returned the next day to pick up his belongings, and ordered out of the building two weeks later when he came back, as instructed, to pick up his possessions, which were then dumped in the street.); Ruggiero v. Contemporary Shells, Inc., 160 A.D.2d 986, 987, 554 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y.App.Div.1990) (dismissing claim where the defendant allegedly “harassed and ultimately discharged the plaintiff due to her pregnancy”). Again, to counter this, plaintiffs point to several allegations that were only contained in the original complaint. (See Pl.’s Mem., at 15.) Specifically, plaintiffs argue that these factual allegations, taken as true, establish that defendants intentionally turned off the heat and power to plaintiffs’ unit, refused to make habitability repairs to the unit, allowed sewage to back up through the unit, stalked plaintiffs in the parking lot, and screamed racial epithets at Reyes in front of Joy and called them other epithets. (See PL’s Mem., at 15.) Because the Court cannot determine, at this early juncture, that an amendment of the pleadings to contain those allegations would be futile, see, e.g., Bunker v. Testa, 234 A.D.2d 1004, 1004, 652 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y.App.Div.1996) (refusing to dismiss claim where the defendant allegedly yelled and gestured obscenely at plaintiff, followed her home, refused to leave the premises, followed her children and family around, and told her that he knew where the children went to school and when they got out of school), the Court grants plaintiffs leave to include these allegations in a second amended complaint. 3. Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Unlawful Eviction Defendants next argue that the doctrines of Rooker-Feldman, collateral estoppel, and res judicata bar plaintiffs’ claims of retaliation, unlawful eviction, breach of contract, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, as a result of the state court judgment authorizing plaintiffs’ eviction from the premises, which was based on a stipulation of settlement signed between Reyes and the fee owner of the premises. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds, at this stage of the proceedings, that only the unlawful eviction claim is barred by Rook-er-Feldman, collateral estoppel, and res judicata. a. Rooker-Feldman The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arises from two decisions issued by the United States Supreme Court, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), and stands for the proposition that “lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.” Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970); accord Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elecs., 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (“[F]ederal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.”). Though this doctrine was once improperly equated with that of res judicata, see Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir.1996), the Supreme Court has clarified that Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional in nature, whereas res judicata deals with preclusion. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 293, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (“Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c) (listing res judicata as an affirmative defense).”). In Hoblock, the Second Circuit rigorously re-examined the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 83. The Second Circuit noted that Exxon Mobil had reduced the expanse of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “holding that it ‘is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’ ” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517). Thus, the Second Circuit delineated four requirements for the application of Rooker-Feldman: (1) “the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court”; (2) “the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment”; (3) “the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment”; and (4) “the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Id. at 85 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiffs’ unlawful eviction claim pursuant to New York R.P.A.P.L § 853 invites this Court to “review and reject[ ]” a state court judgment and runs afoul of the jurisdictional limits set by the United States Supreme Court under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Therefore, the unlawful eviction claim is barred by Rook-er-Feldman. Specifically, the Court determines that the requirements for the application of Rooker-Feldman are met with respect to that claim, as set forth below. As previously stated, the two substantive requirements of Rooker-Feldman are: (1) the federal plaintiff must complain of injury from a state-court judgment; and (2) the federal plaintiff must seek federal court review and rejection of the state court judgment. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. These substantive requirements support the principle, expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, that within the federal judicial system, only the United States Supreme Court may review state court decisions. See id. “[A] federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears to complain only of a third party’s actions, when the third party’s actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88. Here, in the unlawful eviction claim, plaintiffs complain of injuries caused by the state court judgment, namely, the plaintiffs’ eviction from their apartment unit. As a result, it is also apparent that the unlawful eviction claim seeks federal court review and rejection of the state court judgment entered on June 11, 2008, which granted a judgment of possession in favor of the owner and a temporary stay of the warrant of eviction. Accordingly, the substantive requirements of the doctrine are satisfied. With respect to the “procedural” requirements of Hoblock, plaintiffs first contend that they were not state court losers because the action was not adjudicated on the merits, but instead concluded as a result of the settlement agreement. However, as an initial matter, a settlement agreement may constitute a state court judgment for purposes of Rooker-Feldman. See Green v. City of New York, 438 F.Supp.2d 111, 119 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (“[C]ourts have treated settlement agreements as final judgments for the purpose of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”) (citing Allianz Ins. Co. v. Cavagnuolo, No. 03 Civ. 1636(HB), 2004 WL 1048243, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2004)); see also Lombard v. Lombard, No. 00 Civ. 6703, 2001 WL 548725, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001) (applying Rooker-Feldman to a challenge to a stipulation of settlement executed in probate proceeding in surrogate’s court). Furthermore, in order to satisfy the first prong of the doctrine, “rather than putting the court in the position of evaluating subjectively whether a settlement should be considered a loss, it seems sufficient for plaintiffs to allege that the court-approved settlement ] somehow violated their rights.” Green v. City of N.Y., 438 F.Supp.2d 111, 119 (E.D.N.Y.2006); accord Wittich v. Wittich, No. 06 Civ. 1635(JFB)(WDW), 2006 WL 3437407, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2006). Thus, for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, because plaintiffs now seek to effectively set aside the judgment authorizing the warrant of eviction, based upon the stipulation of settlement, on the basis that such violated plaintiffs’ rights, the Court deems plaintiffs a losing party in a state court action for purposes of this procedural requirement of Rooker-Feldman. The separate issue here is whether the state court judgment was rendered prior to the initiation of this action. The stipulation of settlement in the state court case was signed on January 30, 2008. The judgment was entered on June 11, 2008. The original complaint in this federal action was filed on January 7, 2008, and the amended complaint was filed on November 26, 2008. Regardless of whether the state court judgment for purposes of this analysis is considered to be January 30, 2008 or June 11, 2008, the original complaint was filed prior to either date, and the amended complaint was filed subsequent to either date. Even though the filing of the original complaint commenced this proceeding prior to the judgment in state court, it is clear from a review of the original complaint and the amended complaint that the unlawful eviction claim was only brought in the amended complaint, which was subsequent to the state court judgment. Thus, this claim is nonetheless barred by the doctrine. Instructive here is the Second Circuit’s guidance in Hoblock: Where a state-court judgment causes the challenged third-party action, any challenge to that third-party action is necessarily the kind of challenge to the state judgment that only the Supreme Court can hear. This formula dovetails with the Rooker-Feldman requirement about timing that we have termed “procedural,” ie., the requirement that the federal suit be initiated after the challenged state judgment. If federal suit cannot be barred by Rooker-Feldman unless they complain of injuries produced by state-court judgments, it follows that no federal suit that precedes a state-court judgment will be barred; the injury such federal suit seeks to remedy cannot have been produced by a state-court judgment that did not exist at the federal suit’s inception. 422 F.3d at 88. The language of Hoblock suggests that, under the circumstances of this case, because plaintiffs did not complain of the injuries stemming from the allegedly illegal eviction until after the state court’s issuance of the warrant of eviction (and the court’s subsequent refusal to vacate that judgment), the unlawful eviction claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman. Accordingly, the last requirement, that plaintiff commenced the proceedings in the instant action after the state court judgment was rendered, is also met here despite the fact that the original complaint was filed in this case prior to the stipulation of settlement. See Lomnicki v. Cardinal McCloskey Servs., No. 04 Civ. 4548(KMK), 2007 WL 2176059, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2007) (“Because the filing of the Second Amended Complaint makes the initial complaint a nullity, the operative complaint, Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, followed the state court judgment.”) (citing Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir.1977)). However, as stated below, even assuming arguendo that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs’ unlawful eviction claim, it must still be dismissed, because the Court finds that it is barred under ordinary preclusion principles. The same is not true, however, of plaintiffs’ retaliation claim, as discussed supra, and plaintiffs’ breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claims (hereinafter, the “breach claims”). Although it appears that a portion of plaintiffs’ amended complaint complains of injuries caused by the state court’s issuance of the warrant of eviction, namely, the unlawful eviction claim, the breach claims rely on the factual allegations of discrimination and retaliation based on disability that also support the FHAA and NYSHRL claims. Contrary to defendants’ contention, the breach claims do not allege that in seeking to evict plaintiff on the basis of her holdover status, defendants acted illegally; rather, the amended complaint makes clear that such alleged breaches occurred as the result of defendants’ alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions. Again, whether the eviction proceedings were based on a retaliatory or non-retaliatory motive is unresolvable on a motion to dismiss, and the purported validity of Reyes’ status as a holdover tenant is not dispositive