Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER HURLEY, Senior District Judge: Plaintiff Jacques Dorcely filed the present action against defendants Wyandanch Union Free School District, Board of Education Wyandanch Union Free School District (the “Board of Education”), Dr. Sherman Roberts, in his capacity as Interim Superintendent of Schools, Wyandanch Union Free School District and Individually, Dr. Frank Satchel, in his capacity as Superintendent of Schools and Individually, Samuel Burnett, as Trustee and Individually, James Crawford, as Trustee and Individually, Rev. Henry Bacon, as Trustee and Individually, Denise Baines, as Trustee and Individually, Shirley Baker, as Trustee and Individually, Sister Sakinah Kareem, as Trustee and Individually, Barry White, as Trustee and Individually, Rev. Michael Talbert, as Trustee and Individually, Norina Geter, as Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources, Wyandanch Union Free School District, and Individually, Darlene White, as Principal for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary School and Individually, Gina Talbert, as Principal for Milton L. Olive Middle School, Wyandanch Union Free School District and Individually, (collectively the “District Defendants”), and Larry J. McCord, as attorney for the Wyandanch Union Free School District and Individually (“Defendant McCord”), alleging violations of the equal protection and due process clauses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); violations of the First Amendment pursuant to Section 1983; and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 on the basis of his national origin and gender, and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The District Defendants and Defendant McCord (hereinafter “Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted. BACKGROUND The material facts, drawn from the Complaint and the parties’ Local 56.1 Statements, are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, unless otherwise noted. The Wyandanch Union Free School District (the “District”) is located in Suffolk County and administers, inter alia, the Milton L. Olive Middle School (the “Middle School”) and the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary School (the “Elementary School”). Jacques Dorcely (“Plaintiff’ or “Dorcely”) is a male of Haitian national origin and holds Master’s Degrees in education and in school psychology from Adelphi University. He was employed by the District as a full-time, probationary school psychologist from September 2, 2003 until September 18, 2004, the date of his termination. A. Plaintiff’s Employment in the Middle School Defendant Gina Talbert (“Talbert”), principal of the Middle School, interviewed Dorcely for the position of school psychologist, and in a memorandum dated August 19, 2003, recommended Plaintiff for that position to defendant Norina Geter (“Get-er”), Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources for the District. At a Board of Education meeting on September 2, 2003, Plaintiff was appointed to the position of school psychologist in the Middle School, effective September 2, 2003. Dorcely’s appointment had a three year probationary period. On September 18, 2003, Talbert assigned Dorcely to act as a scribe to provide testing modifications for a special education student in a sixth grade classroom. During that class, a female student had an emotional outburst and the classroom teacher, Ms. Popco, went to Talbert’s office to discuss the incident. Plaintiff was accused of unprofessionalism by Talbert for his response to the incident. Contrary to Talbert’s accusations, Plaintiff maintained that his response to that situation was appropriate. The following day, Talbert spoke with Plaintiff about a student who needed dyslexia testing and advised Dorcely to consult with Ms. Romagnano regarding a concern she had with the student. According to Plaintiff, Talbert had interrupted Dorcely’s testing of a different student and had raised her voice at him. Plaintiff asked Talbert if they could discuss the matter privately, and Talbert used Mrs. Batchelor’s office to continue their discussion. During the meeting, Talbert telephoned Vonnye Singleton (“Singleton”), the director of special education, and scheduled a meeting for the three of them for the following Monday. Following the telephone call, the meeting between Plaintiff and Talbert continued to digress. Dorcely raised issues with Talbert about the ineffective intervention measures that were in place in the building. Talbert allegedly told Dorcely that he did not know his job, that he did not fit into the culture of the school, that she did not want to see his face in the building and that he was being insubordinate. Talbert immediately telephoned the interim superintendent, defendant Sherman Roberts (“Roberts”), informed him of the September 18th and September 19th incidents, memorialized the two events in writing, and recommended that Plaintiff be terminated. The following day, in a letter dated September 19, 2003 that was hand delivered to Plaintiff, Roberts advised him that, effective immediately, he was reassigned to administrative leave at home which would remain in effect until further instruction. In addition, the letter directed that Dorcely was not permitted to be on any school property of the District and was prohibited from making contact with the administration or staff from the Middle School or the District in general. Further, the letter advised Plaintiff not to contact him, but to await his contact as to the date and time that he would meet with all parties concerned with the matter. Roberts made arrangements to send Dorcely’s personal belongings to his home by courier. While he was on administrative leave at home, Dorcely was replaced by an African-American female school psychologist. In a certified letter dated September 24, 2003, Geter informed Plaintiff that a recommendation for his termination would be presented to the Superintendent and the Board of Education, to be effective October 30, 2003, and that his reassignment to administrative leave at home would be continued. Plaintiff responded by requesting a statement of reasons for the proposed termination and a hearing before the Board of Education. Talbert prepared a memorandum outlining the reasons for her recommendation of Plaintiffs termination. By letter dated October 9, 2003, Roberts set forth the reasons for Dorcely’s termination, which included Plaintiffs failure to follow appropriate directions from the building principal; his failure to involve himself professionally in a classroom incident that he had witnessed; Plaintiffs intimidating, threatening, and inappropriate conduct towards school personnel; and Plaintiff’s failure to maintain effective, professional communication with the building principal. Dorcely denied the allegations and responded that the statement of reasons were totally subjective, vague, and amounted to malicious actions by Talbert to have him removed from the Middle School. On December 9, 2003, Plaintiff was afforded a hearing before the Board of Education and testified on his own behalf. At a Board of Education meeting held on January 21, 2004, the Board voted not to terminate Plaintiffs employment with the District. Roberts confirmed the vote to Plaintiff in a letter dated January 29, 2004, and notified Dorcely that he was reassigned to the Elementary School as a school psychologist, effective February 2, 2004 and would be under the direct supervision of the building principal defendant Darlene White (“White”). B. Plaintiff’s Employment in the Elementary School At the end of January 2004, Geter advised White that Plaintiff would be coming to the Elementary School as a school psychologist to help Dr. Ifalase (“Ifalase”) with his cases. White had not known Dorcely prior to his reassignment and was unaware that he had been the subject of a disciplinary action. White and Singleton had a discussion about Plaintiffs assignment to assist Ifalase with his caseload at the Elementary School. Dorcely was assigned an office in the “decontamination room” in the nurse’s office. He made requests for supplies and resource materials and when he was not satisfied with White’s responses, he tried to obtain equipment and other materials by asking other District employees for help. White spoke to one of the Board members about procuring a computer for Plaintiff, and the Board member told her that Dorcely had already made such a request and that he would give Plaintiff one of the computers that had been donated to the District. On March 19, 2004, White’s secretary asked Plaintiff to cover a class for Ms. Roth. Because he was testing a student, Plaintiff completed administering the test and then proceeded to the office to inquire about the assignment. It took Plaintiff approximately thirty minutes to meet with White, make copies of instructional materials for the students, and report to the classroom. Until Dorcely arrived to Ms. Roth’s classroom, it was covered by Mr. Valentine. White issued a written reprimand dated March 26, 2004 accusing Plaintiff of failing to cooperate to cover another teacher’s class which was placed in his personnel file and to which he responded with a written rebuttal dated March 29, 2004. On March 31, 2004, White directed Plaintiff to document his daily activities in fifteen minute intervals. On April 29, 2004, an emergency evacuation drill was conducted at the Elementary School. In preparation for the drill, White had held a meeting on the prior day with all of the staff to go over the procedure. Dorcely was absent from school on the day of the meeting. During the emergency evacuation drill, all of the students and staff, except Plaintiff, evacuated the building. Dorcely was in his office with the door closed and stated that he did not hear the drill. In a letter dated April 29, 2004, White issued a written reprimand accusing Plaintiff of failing to adhere to the policy she had gone over with staff the previous day regarding the evacuation drill. White stated in her letter that when she realized that everyone was accounted for except Plaintiff, she had sent Mr. Berger into the building to look for Dorcely and to ask him to evacuate the building. She reported that Plaintiff refused to evacuate and told Mr. Berger that he had thought it was just a drill. In her letter, White explained that the school and the District could have been issued a citation because she gave the “all clear” signal that the building was evacuated when it was not. Plaintiff issued a written rebuttal reminding White that he was absent the previous day and therefore was not present at the staff meeting or aware of any drill. At some point, Dorcely raised concerns to White about the lack of educational resources for the students and certain teachers’ treatment of students. By letter dated April 29, 2004, White stated that she had already addressed his complaints that certain teachers did not have appropriate materials to teach their students with the teachers in question, and she was assured by those teachers that they had adequate materials to provide quality instruction for their students. Additionally, White reported that she had received complaints from staff members that Dorcely was questioning teachers about students that were not part of his caseload. Finally, Wfliite reprimanded Dorcely for telling her that he expected her to address his complaints and for interrupting her when she was with co-workers or parents and directed him to refrain from that type of behavior. White stated that in the future she expected Plaintiff to give her the proper respect and adhere to the procedures she had established. After receiving the two April 29th letters, Plaintiff went to White’s office. Although White was in a meeting with one of her secretaries, Dorcely walked into her office and handed White a memo. Plaintiff maintains that he never met with White concerning her April 29, 2004 reprimands. White, however, asserts that she memorialized this incident in a letter to Plaintiff dated April 30, 2004, stating that Dorcely had insisted that she meet with him, that she had agreed to speak with him after her meeting with her secretary, that during the meeting Plaintiff had raised his voice and yelled at her, and that she would not tolerate this behavior and deemed his acts to be blatant insubordination. In her letter, White instructed Plaintiff to adhere to the Elementary School policies. White also memorialized this incident in an April 30, 2004 memorandum to Roberts and reported that Plaintiff had inquired of her why she was writing him up every chance she could. A few days later, in a May 3, 2004 memo to Roberts, White recommended that Dorcely be dismissed. In her memo, she made the following representations: the Plaintiff kept making a number of unreasonable requests and insisted that White honor them, such as a flat-screen computer when no one in the elementary school had one; the Plaintiff wanted a new desk when there were no desks available, and the desk he had belonged to a prior psychologist — and he even asked for the desk in the main office; the Plaintiff had difficulty implementing any tasks that White assigned to him; the Plaintiff did not adhere to school procedures and policies that White put in place, such as that all staff members were to see one of White’s secretaries to schedule appointments and meetings with her; instead he would walk past the secretaries and into White’s office, insisting that she meet with him; White had been in meetings when the Plaintiff would interrupt her to say he needed her; and after White would tell him she was in a meeting, the Plaintiff would lurk around the door and constantly peek in; the Plaintiff would tell White how to do her job in an inappropriate manner; he also did this with some of the teaching staff; if White denied one of Plaintiffs requests he immediately called Singleton to undermine White’s authority, when White was ultimately responsible for the day-to-day operations of the elementary school; because Plaintiff was not able to take directions from White, in her professional opinion the Plaintiff should be terminated; the Plaintiff did not possess the qualities White looked for in a psychologist; the Plaintiff was not a “team player” and had shown difficulty communicating with teachers; the Plaintiff displayed more concern over material things than the needs of the students; the students in the District had numerous challenges, and they needed supportive and reliable individuals helping them, and must feel comfortable in trusting the psychologist; however White did not feel comfortable working with the Plaintiff and in having the Plaintiff work with her students; as a result of their April 29, 2004 confrontation, White, as an adult, felt “scared” by the Plaintiff; White said “she could only imagine how one of her precious little children would feel if this incident had occurred with one of them as opposed to her”; the District should be proactive and prevent any future harm from occurring by terminating Plaintiff; the long-term effects of the Plaintiffs behavior and actions on children could be detrimental and could cause “severe damage” to the children that he was hired to help. On May 3, 2004, Plaintiff also sent a memo to Roberts regarding his complaints of harassment by White, including that he was being harassed by having to document his time in fifteen minute intervals; that he was being undermined by other teachers monitoring him at the direction of White; that he was being punished for having complained about the fact that children in the building could not read, that they did not have adequate instructional materials and resources to help them, and that some students were being subjected to inappropriate disciplinary actions; and that White has commenced a practice and pattern of issuing written and verbal reprimands on almost a daily basis which were replete with mischaracterizations of his conduct. White prepared end-of-the-year performance evaluation for Plaintiff, which was signed by both White and Dorcely on June 7, 2004. Because Plaintiff requested that White not evaluate him when he was formally interacting with students due to confidentiality concerns, White based her evaluation on his informal work with students, what he did with his time, her correspondence with him, her conversations with him, and her overall assessment of his job performance in the Elementary School. White noted in Plaintiffs performance evaluation that he “meets criteria” in such areas as effective planning skills; uses appropriate techniques to motivate the students; communicates effectively with students; provides students with specific evaluative feedback; displays a thorough knowledge of the subject matter; provides opportunities for individual differences; ensures students’ time on tasks; sets high expectations for student achievement; demonstrates evidence of personal organization; demonstrates effective interpersonal relationships with others; demonstrates awareness of the needs of students; provides positive self-concept; and promotes self-discipline and responsibility. White also noted that Plaintiff “needed improvement” in such areas as planning for and making effective use of time, materials and resources; in setting high standards for student behavior; demonstrating sensitivity in relating to students; demonstrating employee responsibility; supporting school regulations and policies; and in assuming responsibilities outside the classroom as they relate to school. Plaintiff submitted a rebuttal to the performance evaluation and addressed each of the areas in which he was assessed by White as “needed improvement.” In a letter dated June 15, 2004, Geter advised Plaintiff that a recommendation for his termination would be presented to the Superintendent and then to the Board of Education. On June 21, 2004, Doreely telephoned Geter to request an opportunity to review and copy material in his personnel file. Plaintiff followed up this request in a June 22, 2004 memo to Geter, and also requested that Geter send all copies of correspondence to his attorney, whom he had hired to represent him in connection with the proposed termination. By letter dated June 25, 2004, Geter informed Plaintiff that the District was in receipt of his June 22, 2004 request, but that because he retained counsel, he needed to have his attorney make such requests to the District’s counsel. When he received no response from his request, counsel for Plaintiff intervened by contacting McCord, the attorney for the District, to request that arrangements be made for Doreely to review his personnel file. In addition, Plaintiff requested from Roberts a statement of reasons for the recommendation for his termination and further requested a hearing before the Board of Education. Plaintiffs counsel also contacted McCord requesting the statement of reasons for the termination. According to Plaintiff, McCord responded that Plaintiff need not be provided a statement of reasons or access to his personnel file because the issue involved Plaintiff’s inability to get along with his boss and that issue could form the basis for the termination. On July 7, 2004, defendant Dr. Frank Satchel (“Satchel”) replaced Roberts as Superintendent of Schools for the District. In a July 27, 2004 letter, Plaintiff’s counsel requested a statement of reasons for the recommendation of termination. In a letter dated July 28, 2004, which Plaintiff received on August 5, 2004, Satchel set forth a statement of reasons, including that there was: [a] continued lack of due diligence in the performance of his job-related duties as exemplified by the following: a) Plaintiff’s failure to follow up appropriate direction from the building principal; b) Plaintiffs failure to maintain appropriate discipline in a professional manner in a classroom incident; c) Plaintiffs inappropriate and unprofessional conduct toward school personnel and the building principal; d) Plaintiffs failure to maintain appropriate, effective and professional communications with the building principal; e) Plaintiff failure to maintain appropriate, professional and required records in a timely manner, as directed by the building principal; f) Plaintiffs failure to plan for and make effective use of time; g) Plaintiffs failure to set high standards for student behavior; h) Plaintiffs failure to demonstrate sensitivity in relating to students. Plaintiff and his counsel renewed their requests to review his personnel file. Geter contacted Plaintiff on August 16, 2004 to inform him that he could review his file the following day. Upon review, Plaintiff discovered, inter alia, (i) a notation to White to come up with reasons for his termination, (ii) a May 3, 2004 memo from White to Roberts calling for his termination that Plaintiff was not copied on, (iii) the absence of certain rebuttals he had made to White’s reprimands, and (iv) documents in his personnel file that should not have been there, to wit, McCord’s billing statements in connection with Plaintiff and McCord’s notes in his file regarding the investigation of charges against him. In mid-August 2004, Satchel contacted White to inquire about Plaintiffs job performance. This was the first time White became aware that Dorcely was being considered for termination. In response to Satchel’s call, White sent him a copy of her May 3, 2004 letter to Roberts. On August 18, 2005, the Board of Education afforded Plaintiff a hearing. Following the hearing, all of the Board members voted to terminate Plaintiffs employment. C. Plaintiff’s Complaint On March 20, 2006, Plaintiff commenced the instant action. Plaintiffs Complaint asserts fourteen remaining causes of action: (1) violation of equal protection pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Gina Talbert; (2) violation of the First Amendment pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Gina Talbert; (3) violation of the First Amendment pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Roberts; (4) discrimination on the basis of national origin and in retaliation for having engaged in protected activity in violation of Section 1983 as to Defendant Roberts; (5) violation of equal protection pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Darlene White; (6) violation of the First Amendment pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Darlene White; (7) violation of due process pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Geter; (8) violation of due process pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant McCord; (9) violation of equal protection pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Satchel; (10) discrimination on the basis of national origin and in retaliation for having engaged in protected activity in violation of Title VII as against Defendant Board of Education; (11) violation of equal protection pursuant to Section 1983 as to Defendant Board of Education; (12) discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VI as against Defendant District, Defendant Gina Talbert, Defendant Sherman Roberts, Defendant Darlene White, Defendant Frank Satchel, and Defendant Michael Talbert; (13) retaliation for engaging in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment as against Defendant Board of Education; and (14) violation of equal protection, due process and freedom of expression pursuant to Title VI and Section 1983 as against Defendant Burnett, Defendant Crawford, Defendant Bacon, Defendant Baines, Defendant Baker, Defendant Kareem and Defendant Barry White. Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. DISCUSSION I. Applicable Law and Legal Standards A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other documentation demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and one party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir.2008); Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. ofN. Am., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir.1994). The relevant governing law in each case determines which facts are material; “only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.2009); Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir.2007). No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant, that no rational jury could find in the non-movant’s favor. See SCR Joint Venture, 559 F.3d at 137; Chertkova v. Conn. Gen’l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). To defeat a summary judgment motion properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or other documentation, the non-movant must offer similar materials setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.1996). The non-movant must present more than a “scintilla of evidence,” Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505), or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), and cannot rely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, conclusory statements, or on “mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted). Affidavits submitted in opposition to summary judgment must be based on personal knowledge, must “set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,” and must show “ ‘that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein’.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “Rule 56(e)’s requirement that the affiant have personal knowledge and be competent to testify to the matters asserted in the affidavit also means that an affidavit’s hearsay assertions that would not be admissible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.” Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (citing Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999)). The district court, in considering a summary judgment motion, must also be “mindful ... of the underlying standards and burdens of proof,” Pickett v. RTS Helicopter, 128 F.3d 925, 928 (5th Cir.1997) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505), because the evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will bear at trial guide district courts in their determination of summary judgment motions. Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir.1988). Where the non-moving party will bear the ultimate burden of proof on an issue at trial, the moving party’s burden under Rule 56 will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-movant’s claim. Id. at 210-11. Where a movant without the underlying burden of proof offers evidence that the non-movant has failed to establish her claim, the burden shifts to the non-movant to offer “persuasive evidence that [her] claim is not ‘implausible.’ ” Brady, 863 F.2d at 211 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348). In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must resolve all factual ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987). Summary judgment is generally inappropriate where questions of the defendant’s state of mind are at issue, Gelb v. Board of Elections of the City of New York, 224 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir.2000), and should thus be granted with caution in employment discrimination cases. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); see Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2000). Nonetheless, “summary judgment remains available to reject discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact.” Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 40 (2d Cir.1994). “The summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile ... if the mere incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid motion.” Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985). “[T]he salutary purposes of summary judgment— avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation.” Id. “When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. B. McDonnell-Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework In an employment discrimination case such as this, where there is no direct evidence of discriminatory conduct, Plaintiffs discrimination claims brought under Section 1983, Title VII, Title VI and the New York State Executive Law are analyzed under the now familiar burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2006) (Section 1983 claims), overruled on other grounds, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 582 F.Supp.2d 326, 339 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (Title VII and Section 1983 claims); Solomon v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 03-CV-2415 (SJF)(ETB), 2007 WL 608137, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2007) (Title VII, Title VI, Section 1983 and New York Executive Law). Under McDonnell Douglas and its innumerable progeny, (1) a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; if the employer does so, the McDonnell Douglas framework and its presumptions and burdens disappear, leaving the sole remaining issue of “discrimination vel non;” and, thus, (3) the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason is merely pretextual and that race discrimination was an actual reason for the adverse employment action. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. A plaintiff sets forth a “prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: 1) he belonged to a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position; 3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (Title VII claims); see Augustin v. Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of Newburgh, 616 F.Supp.2d 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (Section 1983 claims). The burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination has been described as “modest,” Viola, 42 F.3d at 716, or even “minimal.” Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir.2001). It is a burden of production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessments. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Likewise, the employer’s burden of showing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions is not a particularly steep hurdle. It is not a court’s role to second-guess an employer’s personnel decisions, even if foolish, so long as they are nondiscriminatory. See Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 192 F.Supp.2d 100, 111 (W.D.N.Y.2002) (citing, inter alia, Meiri, 759 F.2d at 995 (2d Cir.1985)), aff'd, 99 Fed.Appx. 350 (2d Cir.2004). Federal courts do not have a “roving commission to review business judgments,” Mont. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100, 106 (2d Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and “may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits — or even the rationality- — of employers’ nondiscriminatory business decisions.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir.1991). Thus, “[ejvidence that an employer made a poor business judgment ... generally is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons.” Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir.1988). In order to demonstrate that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory action are pretextual, “[a] plaintiff is not required to show that the employer’s proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the motivating factors.” Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir.1995). A discrimination claimant “may show pretext by demonstrating such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons.” Bombero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 142 F.Supp.2d 196, 203 n. 7 (D.Conn.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd 9 Fed.Appx. 38 (2d Cir.2001).. However, to rebut an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory rationale for its actions and withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff must present more than allegations that are “conclusory and unsupported by evidence of any weight.” Smith v. Am. Exp. Co., 853 F.2d 151, 154-55 (2d Cir.1988). “To allow a party to defeat a motion for summary judgment by offering purely eonclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars, would necessitate a trial in all [discrimination] cases.” Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998. As a preliminary matter, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff, who is Haitian, belongs to a protected class. Nor do the parties dispute that Plaintiff was qualified for his position. Defendants do, however, dispute whether certain conduct could be considered “adverse employment actions,” and whether the “adverse employment actions” gave rise to an inference of discrimination based on national origin and/or gender. The Court will address each of Plaintiffs claims of discrimination as they relate to the respective Defendants in the relevant discussion section below. II. Section 1983 Claims Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That is, Section 1983 “furnishes a cause of action for the violation of federal rights created by the Constitution.” Brierly v. Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 359 F.Supp.2d 275, 290 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir.2004). In addition, “[i]n this Circuit personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Back, 365 F.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff asserts violations of his rights to equal protection of the law, free speech, and due process of law, which the Court will address in turn. A. Equal Protection Claims The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees “ ‘[the] right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity’.” Bernheim, 79 F.3d at 323 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980)). “The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat all similarly situated people alike.” Harten Assocs. v. Inc. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir.2001). Thus, “[a]n equal protection claim has two essential elements: (1) the plaintiff was treated differently than others similarly situated, and (2) this differential treatment was motivated by an intent to discriminate on the basis of impermissible considerations, such as race or religion, to punish or inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or by a malicious or bad faith intent to injure the person.” Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist, 214 F.Supp.2d 319, 321-22 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.2000)); see Humphrey v. County of Nassau, No. 06-CV-3682 (JFB)(AKT), 2009 WL 875534, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (“To state a claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege that a government actor intentionally discriminated against [him] on the basis of [his] membership in a protected class.”). “Whether two employees are similarly situated ordinarily presents a question of fact for the jury.” Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000). “To be ‘similarly situated,’ the individuals with whom [plaintiff] attempts to compare [himself] must be similarly situated in all material respects.” Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992)). In order to satisfy Shumway’s “all material respects” standard, a plaintiff must show “co-employees were subject to the same performance evaluation and discipline standards.” Graham, 230 F.3d at 40 (citing Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir.1999)). In addition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the similarly situated employees engaged in comparable conduct. Id. 1. Equal Protection Claim Against Defendant Gina Talbert As a threshold matter for purposes of individual liability under Section 1983, it is clear that Gina Talbert was “personally involved” in the purported deprivation and acted under color of state law, when as Principal of the Middle School, she recommended that Dorcely be terminated from his position as school psychologist. The question, then, is whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Talbert acted to deprive Plaintiff of his right to be free from discrimination based on his Haitian national origin and/or his gender. Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework as set forth below, the Court answers this question in the negative and holds that Dorcely has failed to produce sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment as to Talbert on his equal protection claim. (a) Prima Facie Case Plaintiff maintains that based on his national origin (Haitian) and gender (male), Gina Talbert treated him differently than other similarly situated employees in the Middle School by mounting false accusations against him concerning his behavior; subjecting him to heightened scrutiny with regard to his work performance; stating in an incident report that he did not “fit in with the culture” of the building; stating that she did not want to see his face in the building; and ultimately recommending his termination. Plaintiffs claim is based on the two incidents that occurred on September 18, 2003 (when Talbert accused Dorcely of inappropriately handling an emotional outburst of a student in a special education classroom) and September 19, 2003 (when Talbert accused Doreely of threatening her during a meeting in the guidance office). As a result of Talbert’s actions, Dorcely asserts that the interim superintendent placed Plaintiff on administrative leave at home, and directed him to stay away from the District and to refrain from contacting anyone in the District or he would be subject to arrest. Defendant Talbert disputes that she discriminated against Plaintiff or treated him differently than the other Middle School employees, and disagrees with Dorcely’s account of the September 18, 2003 and September 19, 2003 incidents. With respect to the September 18, 2003 incident, Talbert proffered evidence that the special education teacher reported that when her student had the emotional outburst, other teachers intervened to prevent the student from hurting herself, but Plaintiff turned his back to the class and looked out the window. Plaintiff stated in his deposition testimony that he did not ignore the situation but rather pursuant to his professional judgment, he had removed all objects from the student’s reach and cleared the area to insure the safety of her classmates. With respect to the September 19, 2003 incident, in her deposition testimony, Talbert stated that when she tried to discuss the needs of a dyslexic student, Plaintiff kept interrupting her, elevated his voice, and refused to listen. She reported that she then walked to the door to leave the room but that when she turned to speak to Plaintiff, he was “physically in her personal space.” Talbert asked Dorcely to back up, and when he did not move, she felt “threatened and intimidated.” Later that same day, Talbert asserts that as she was leaving the building, Plaintiff brushed against her arm. Talbert testified that she then recommended to the acting superintendent that Plaintiff be immediately terminated based on his display of unpredictable, intimidating, insubordinate, and threatening behaviors which she perceived “exemplified great potential of unsafe and harmful actions.” (Curry Aff., dated Aug. 22, 2008, Ex. E.) Plaintiff maintains that Talbert’s account of the incident is factually inaccurate and mischaracterizes his actions. Although the parties dispute the facts relevant to the two aforementioned incidents, there is no dispute that Plaintiff has met the first three requirements of his prima facie case, namely that Plaintiff was in a protected class, was qualified for the position, and suffered an adverse employment action when Talbert made her recommendation that Plaintiff be discharged, and Plaintiff was placed on administrative home leave. Defendant argues, however, that Dorcely has failed to establish that the circumstances surrounding Talbert’s recommendation for his termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination based on his Haitian national origin or his gender. Despite Defendant’s argument to the contrary, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. The Plaintiffs burden for establishing a prima facie case is minimal. The fact that Dorcely, a Haitian male, was replaced by an African-American woman when he was on administrative leave at home is sufficient to give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See Weichman v. Chubb & Son, 552 F.Supp.2d 271, 283 (D.Conn.2008). (b) Legitimate, Nondiseriminatory Reason Defendant has advanced a legitimate, nondiseriminatory basis for her recommendation that the Plaintiff be immediately terminated, namely Plaintiffs lack of professionalism, negligence in meeting student needs, insubordination, failure to follow administrative procedures, inappropriate workplace behavior and threatening conduct toward school personnel. See, e.g., Jones v. Yonkers Public Sch., 326 F.Supp.2d 536, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (concluding that misconduct, poor performance, and violation of employer’s rules and procedures are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination). In her Incident Report # 1, Talbert stated, inter alia, with respect to the September 18, 2003 event: Mr. Dorcely has not demonstrated receptiveness and compliance to administrative directives, which is a blatant act of insubordination. I deem this preferred lack of professional intervention and assistance in the classroom when the student was having a tantrum, as an act of negligence. Of the four adults in the classroom, Mr. Dorcely was the most qualified and trained personnel and he refused to act in a professional manner when the ‘emotionally disturbed’ child exhibited behaviors that were an endangerment to herself and others. It is further my recommendation, that Mr. Dorcely has not exemplified the professional expectations of a School Psychologist in a high needs school and district, such as ours. Our students need personnel who demonstrate a caring, nurturing, and giving disposition when they need it most. A school psychologist should always act in the best interest of the student and advocate for the welfare of the student at all times. Mr. Dorcely has not demonstrated this expectation. It is my recommendation that his services are terminated due to acts of insubordination to administration and negligence in adequately meeting the needs of students as outlined above. (Curry Aff., dated Aug. 22, 2008, Ex. D.) In her Incident Report #2, Talbert stated, inter alia, with regard to the September 19, 2003 event: It is evident that Mr. Dorcely does not fit into the culture of this building or the vision and framework of the District. He has displayed unpredictable, intimidating, insubordinate, and threatening behaviors that exemplify great potential of unsafe and harmful actions. It is my sincere recommendation that Mr. Dorcely is immediately terminated and not allowed in the presence of Wyandanch children, parents and faculty. (Curry Aff., dated Aug. 22, 2008, Ex. E.) Thus, Defendant has articulated “clear and specific” reasons for recommending that Dorcely be terminated, supported by evidence “ ‘which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action’.” Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (emphasis omitted)). (c) Pretext Because Defendant has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the action taken against Plaintiff, under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Dorcely must show that these reasons are a pretext for wrongful discrimination. That is to say, Plaintiff must now come forward with evidence that gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact that discrimination, based on his Haitian national origin and/or the fact that he was a male employee, was at least one of the motivating reasons for Talbert’s recommendation to terminate Dorcely’s employment. Plaintiff fails to meet this burden. In an effort to establish pretext, Plaintiff points to Talbert’s statements that (i) Dorcely did not “fit in with the culture” of the building, and (ii) that she did not want to see his face in the building concomitant with the fact that Dorcely was replaced by an African-American female. Plaintiff claims that Talbert’s two statements were directed at Haitian nationals in the workplace, and specifically at him. There is no evidence, however, that these statements support such an inference or demonstrate Talbert’s discriminatory state of mind. Plaintiffs chief evidence on point is his own letter to Dr. Roberts and the Board of Education dated November 3, 2003, wherein he responds to Talbert’s two Incident Reports and registers his concern “about the subjective nature of the accusations leveled against [him].” (Gilliam Decl., dated October 3, 2008, Ex. M.) In his rebuttal, Plaintiff recounted his version of facts surrounding the two events, acknowledged that he had become “somewhat flustered” and unable to “respond to Ms. Taibertas] inquiry,” and reported that (i) “Ms. Talbert continued to raise her voice, now attacking my integrity as a school psychologist,” (ii) “Ms. Talbert was verbally abusive, telling me she did not want me in her building since I did not know my job,” and (iii) “[a]t some point, [he] did make an apology just to calm her down in those words: T am sorry if I did anything wrong.’ ” (Id.) Further, his letter concluded, “In closing, the accusations leveled against me are factually incorrect and replete with subjective statements which are best summed up by Ms. Talbert’s own words that she feels I do not fit into ‘the culture of the building’.” (Id.) Assuming the veracity of these statements, at best, the statements tend to support a picture of a principal who may have been controlling, unpleasant, and unfair, but not ethnically or sexually biased. Indeed, as gleaned from Plaintiffs own rebuttal submission to Defendant’s Incident Reports, there is no indication that Dorcely interpreted Talbert’s “fit into the culture comment” as being predicated on his ethnic origin or gender. Notably, in her affidavit and deposition testimony, Talbert explained that by the “culture” of the building she meant that the culture of the Middle School was one of professional and controlled behavior, of respecting authority, of caring for the students and of putting the students’ interests first. The context of the sentence, the paragraph the statement came from, and the overall recitation set forth in her Incident Report as well as the recitation in Plaintiffs rebuttal to the report, fail to dispute Talbert’s explanation for the alleged adverse action or establish pretext. Moreover, Plaintiff has set forth no other indicia that Talbert (or any other employee at the Middle School) subjected him to any ethnic or gender related comments or criticisms. Finally, the fact that Talbert made the decision to recommend Dorcely’s termination barely four weeks from the time she interviewed and personally recommended that Plaintiff be hired “strongly suggest[s] that invidious discrimination was unlikely.” Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir.1997) (holding “when the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to impute to her an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire. This is especially so when the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring”). Although Plaintiff maintains that the same actor inference should not be applied here because only the Board of Education had the authority to hire or fire Dorcely, the same actor inference “may be applied even when the supervisor at issue ... is not the only person with input into the hiring and firing decision. The inference ‘is applicable so long as one management-level employee played a substantial role in both the hiring and firing of the plaintiff.” Jones, 326 F.Supp.2d at 546 (quotation omitted). Here, the evidence indicates that as principal of the Middle School, Talbert played a substantial role in both the hiring (she interviewed Plaintiff and recommended him for the position) and the recommendation of firing (she recommended the Plaintiffs termination to the Superintendent and the Board of Education) of Dorcely. In sum, considering the record as a whole, and construing all ambiguities in Plaintiffs favor, Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Talbert’s proffered neutral explanation was pretextual and that animus to his national origin or gender was a motivating factor in her recommendation for Dorcely’s termination of employment at the Middle School. See King v. Bratton, No. 96 CV 1131(RJD), 2004 WL 3090605, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2004); see also Johnson v. National Mar. Union Pension and Welfare Plans, No. 95-4112, 1998 WL 32759, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1998). Accordingly, the summary judgment motion as to Plaintiffs equal protection claim against Defendant Gina Talbert is granted. 2. Equal Protection Claim Against Defendant Darlene White Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Darlene White treated him differently than other similarly situated school psychologists in the Elementary School in terms of work assignments, office accommodations and resources, training, observations and evaluations, and unjust disciplinary actions, as a result of (i) his having engaged in the protected activity of challenging the prior disciplinary action, (ii) on account of his national origin, and (iii) on account of his gender. (a) Retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause As an initial matter, to the extent that Dorcely argues that he may assert a Section 1983 claim for retaliation (as a result of having engaged in protected activity) in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he is incorrect. There is no recognized claim for retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause. See Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (“Although claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII, ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of [ ] discrimination”); see also Parker v. New York State Office of Mental Health, No. 07-CV-28 (FB)(MLO), 2009 WL 2317840, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (same). Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs equal protection claim for retaliation is insufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment. (b) Equal Protection Based on National Origin and Gender “Despite the elaborate process set up in McDonnell Douglas, Second Circuit case law makes clear that a court may simply assume that a plaintiff has established a prima facie case and skip to the final step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis, as long as the employer has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Idrees v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 2197(LAK)(GWG), 2009 WL 142107, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2009) (citing cases); see, e.g., Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 188 (2d Cir.2006); accord Morris v. Ales Group USA, Inc., 2007 WL 1893729, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2007) (“Rather than apply the McDonnell Douglas test formalistieally, the Court will assume that [plaintiff] has made out a prima facie case of discrimination on this claim.”); Mathews v. Huntington, 499 F.Supp.2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y.2007). Here, the Court assumes that Dorcely has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendant White has demonstrated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her recommendation that Plaintiff be terminated, specifically: (i) his difficulty implementing any tasks she assigned him; (ii) his failure to adhere to school procedures and policies; (iii) his inappropriate workplace behavior; (iv) his inability to follow her directions; (v) his difficulty communicating with fellow teachers; (vi) his inappropriate and unprofessional conduct toward school personnel; and (vii) his intimidating and threatening conduct. See, e.g., Jones, 326 F.Supp.2d at 543-44 (concluding that poor performance both in carrying out of duties and in relationships with supervisors and co-workers is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination and observing that “[g]etting along with one’s co-workers is an essential component of satisfactory job performance, especially in a setting like an elementary school”); Ramos v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 134 F.Supp.2d 328, 343 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (holding that the “failure of an employee to get along with co-workers rebuts the employee’s prima facie case even if the employee’s performance ratings were high in other respects”). In addition, White articulated that Dorcely’s behavior constituted a threat to the safety and well being of the children in the Elementary School. See Brown v. Scarsdale Vill. Hall, No. 95 CIV. 4488 DLC, 1996 WL 445360, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1996) (concluding employer fired plaintiff for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons where plaintiffs “behavior constituted a threat to the safety of [the] employees and presented a serious management problem”), aff'd 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir.1997). Thus, Dorcely has the burden of marshaling evidence that would permit a reasonable juror to find that a motivating factor for White’s recommendation for his termination was based on his membership in a protected class. Dorcely has not presented sufficient evidence to create such an issue of fact. Plaintiff points to the following evidence to support his allegation that White treated him less favorably than others similarly situated in the Elementary School based on his Haitian national origin and because he was a male: (i) he was the only Haitian national school psychologist in the Elementary School in a District that had a growing population of Haitian national students; (ii) every teacher received a school handbook except him; (iii) he reported directly to White for his assignments and supervision, while the other school psychologists reported to Singleton for their caseloads and assignments; (iv) the other school psychologists had an assigned caseload of students, while he was never assigned a full and regular assignment of students, but rather was assigned to monitor lunch and cover classes for absent teachers; (v) the other school psychologists had an office and resource materials for their students, but he was placed in the decontamination room in the nurse’s office and was not given resource materials or a computer; (vi) White demanded that Plaintiff document his daily time schedule in fifteen minute intervals, while not requiring the other psychologists to submit their time schedules to her on a regular basis; (vii) White did not meet with Plaintiff and provide him with a summary of her evaluations of his work performance as she did with other school employees; and (viii) White placed unwarranted disciplinary actions in his personnel file, including two documents placed in his file without his knowledge, to wit, a memorandum, dated May 3, 2003, that recommended his termination, and a letter, dated April 30, 2004 to Roberts, that stated Dorcely had threatened her. In response, Defendant proffers evidence that with respect to Dorcely’s assertions regarding his office and supplies, the prior school psychologists had used the same “decontamination room” as an office, and that White herself had requested and Plaintiff had received a computer and other resource materials. With regard to his assignment at the Elementary School, there is record evidence that when Plaintiff was transferred he was told that he would report directly to White, that Plaintiff was assigned to the Elementary School to assist Dr. Ifalase with his caseload, and that the other teachers also had lunch duty and at times would substitute for classes when needed. While Plaintiff states that Dr. Ifalase, Dr. Atien and one other psychologist