Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION T.S. ELLIS, III, District Judge. These five cases, consolidated for purposes of discovery and pretrial motions, present questions unresolved in this circuit concerning the scope and application of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Plaintiffs- — all Iraqi nationals or the estates of deceased Iraqi nationals — claim that defendants are liable for various injuries or deaths that occurred in Iraq. Defendants seek dismissal of the cases for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., and for failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. Defendants also argue for dismissal of the claims because they raise nonjusticiable political questions or, alternatively, on grounds of forum non conveniens. The motions have been fully briefed and argued, and are now ripe for disposition. I. In these consolidated cases, a total of sixty-four plaintiffs — forty-five Iraqi nationals and the estates of nineteen deceased Iraqi nationals — seek damages for deaths or serious injuries certain plaintiffs suffered when they were allegedly shot or beaten by defendants’ employees. All of the alleged shootings or beatings occurred in Iraq. Named as defendants are eleven business entities, collectively referred to as “Xe defendants,” and one individual, Erik Prince, who is alleged to be the owner and operator of the eleven Xe defendants. The complaints allege that Xe defendants were retained by the United States Department of State to perform security services under contract in Iraq. The complaints further allege that certain plaintiffs were shot or beaten by defendants’ employees. For purposes of ruling on the motions at bar, it is important to summarize briefly the facts alleged with regard to each of the consolidated cases. A. No. 1:09cv615 Plaintiffs in No. 1:09cv615 are the estate, widow, and two surviving sons of Raheem Khalaf Sa’adoon. Prior to his death, Sa’adoon worked as a security guard for Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi. On December 24, 2006, Andrew Moonen was allegedly an employee of Blackwater, as it was then known. On that day, Moonen attended a Christmas party allegedly attended by several of his Blackwater colleagues. He is said to have consumed an excessive amount of alcohol at the party and thereafter to have left in a state of visible intoxication, armed with his Blackwater-issued Glock handgun. Moonen allegedly became lost and eventually came upon Sa’adoon, who was on guard duty. According to the complaint, Moonen then pulled out his Glock handgun and shot and killed Sa’adoon for no reason. Plaintiffs allege that defendants are liable for Sa’adoon’s death. Plaintiffs also accuse Xe defendants of flying Moonen to the United States for the purposes of (i) evading prosecution by Iraqi authorities, and (ii) avoiding promised payments to Sa’adoon’s widow. B. No. 1:09cv616 In No. 1:09cv616, plaintiffs are the estates of Iraqi citizens Ali Hussamaldeen Ibrahim Albazzaz, Kadhum Kayiz Aziz, and Sa’ad Raheem Jarallah. Aziz worked as a security guard for the Iraqi government, while Jarallah was a schoolteacher. The complaint does not specify Albazzaz’s occupation. Plaintiffs allege that defendants are liable for Albazzaz’s, Aziz’s, and Jarallah’s deaths, which occurred on September 9, 2007, when unidentified Xe defendants’ employees allegedly fired without justification into a crowd near Baghdad’s A1 Watahba Square. C. No. 1:09cv617 In No. 1:09cv617, plaintiffs are twenty-two Baghdad residents and the estates of eight deceased former Baghdad residents. Plaintiffs’ claims stem from an incident that occurred on September 16, 2007 in Baghdad’s Nisoor Square. On that day, plaintiffs claim that Xe defendants’ employees repeatedly fired automatic weapons and detonated grenades into a crowd without justification, thereby causing (i) the deaths of the eight plaintiffs whose estates brought this suit and (ii) the injuries of the remaining twenty-two plaintiffs. D. No. 1:09cv618 In No. 1:09cv618, plaintiffs are nineteen Baghdad residents and the estates of six deceased former Baghdad residents. According to the complaint, the alleged deaths and injuries occurred in seven separate incidents between March 2005 and April 2008. In all seven incidents, plaintiffs allege that employees of Xe defendants shot or severely beat civilians without justification. Plaintiffs allege that defendants are liable for the deaths of the six decedents and the injuries of the other nineteen plaintiffs. In chronological order, plaintiffs allege: On March 22, 2005, A1 Qaysi, Hikmat Ali Husein A1 Rubae, and one other person were being driven to Baghdad from the Baghdad airport in Al Rubae’s BMW automobile when, these plaintiffs allege, A1 Qaysi was shot and killed for no reason by Xe defendants’ employees. A1 Rubae also alleges that Xe defendants’ employees shot at him, wounding him and causing damage to his vehicle. Husam Hasan Jaber was a Baghdad taxicab operator who, on July 18, 2005, was driving a minibus carrying three passengers. Jaber alleges that Xe defendants’ employees shot and wounded Jaber without justification. He further alleges that Xe defendants’ employees used exploding ammunition designed to maximize the extent of the injury inflicted and the amount of damage caused. He also claims that Xe defendants’ employees fled the scene despite knowing that he had been seriously wounded. Jaber further alleges that he suffered property damage to his minibus as a result of the incident. Maulood Mohammed Shathir Husein, a professor of veterinary medicine at the University of Baghdad, claims that in August 2005, he was being driven to the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad when his car approached a U.S. military checkpoint. He alleges that vehicles operated by Xe defendants’ employees approached the checkpoint at the same time, at which point the employees shot Husein in the leg. According to the complaint, the vehicles operated by Xe defendants’ employees left the scene while American military personnel came to Husein’s aid. Suhad Shakir Fadhil worked in media relations in Baghdad. Her estate alleges that on February 4, 2007, she was driving to her office located near the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs when Xe defendants’ employees shot and killed her without justification. Her estate also alleges that Xe defendants’ shooters severely damaged her car. On February 7, 2007, Xe defendants’ employees shot and killed, without justification, three men — Sabah Salman Hassoon, Azhar Abdullah Ali, and Ni-brass Mohammed Dawood — while the men were working as security guards at the Iraqi Media Network in Central Baghdad. Moreover, these plaintiffs claim that the incident was witnessed by twenty of Xe defendants’ employees, and that Xe defendants failed to report the shooting, refused to identify the shooters, and destroyed evidence relating to the incident. On July 1, 2007, Xe defendants’ employees shot at a minibus containing three families, including small children, for no reason. The shots killed a nine-year-old boy, and wounded a three-month-old baby and the children’s mother, father, uncle, and cousin. These plaintiffs allege that other family members in the minibus were also shot at and that they continue to suffer from emotional distress as a result of the incident. On April 26, 2008, Safeen Hameed Ahmed Qadir was a photographer covering the opening of a Ford automobile dealership in Iraq’s Arbil province. During the event, Qadir attempted to photograph a visiting American dignitary who was being guarded by Xe defendants’ employees. Qadir alleges that these employees severely beat him without justification. E. No. 1:09cv645 Finally, in No. 1:09cv645, plaintiffs are Ali Kareem Fakhri and the estate of Husain Salih Rabea. Rabea was a seventy-two year old man whose occupation is not specified in the complaint. Fakhri was a student at Babylon University College of Biology. These plaintiffs allege that on August 13, 2007, Xe defendants’ employees shot at Fakhri and Rabea for no reason, killing Rabea and causing severe emotional distress to Fakhri. They further allege that Xe defendants’ employees fled the scene without offering medical aid. The first four of these consolidated cases were filed on June 2, 2009, and No. 1:09cv645 was thereafter filed on June 10, 2009. On July 14, 2009, defendants moved to dismiss the cases, which were subsequently consolidated for purposes of discovery and pre-trial motions on July 17, 2009. Discovery was stayed pending resolution of defendants’ motions. See In re: Blackwater Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, Nos. 1:09cv615, 1:09cv616, 1:09cv617, 1:09cv618, 1:09cv645 (E.D.Va. July 17, 2009) (Order). Oral argument was heard on August 28, 2009. In all of the cases, plaintiffs accuse defendants of encouraging the killing of Iraqi civilians by fostering a corporate culture in which excessive use of deadly force is unpunished. Specifically, plaintiffs accuse defendants of employing and arming people whom they know to be alcoholics, drug users, or acting under the influence of chemical substances. Moreover, plaintiffs allege that defendants hire individuals known to have engaged in human rights abuses. They claim defendants captured illegal acts by their employees on videotape and subsequently destroyed those tapes. In addition, some plaintiffs claim that defendant Prince has engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities through the commission of illegal acts including murder, tax evasion, destruction of evidence, kidnaping, weapons smuggling, sexual exploitation of minors, and unlawful possession and distribution of controlled substances. These RICO plaintiffs claim they suffered property damage during the commission of the alleged predicate acts and through defendant Prince’s alleged control and operation of a RICO enterprise. More specifically, the RICO plaintiffs allege that their vehicles were damaged or destroyed during the course of the killings, which are alleged to be the predicate racketeering acts committed by defendant Prince. In all of the cases, plaintiffs seek recovery from defendants under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, for injuries resulting from the alleged commission of war crimes. In two of the cases, Nos. 1:09cv617 and 1:09cv618, plaintiffs also claim that defendants are liable under the ATS for committing summary executions. In those same two cases, plaintiffs also allege that defendants are civilly liable for RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Moreover, in all of the cases, plaintiffs assert that defendants are liable under nonfederal tort law for (i) assault and battery, (ii) wrongful death, (in) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (iv) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (v) negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and (vi) tortious spoliation of evidence. II. Defendants seek dismissal of all ATS claims on the grounds (i) that the ATS does not recognize claims of war crimes or summary executions, (ii) that ATS liability is limited to state actors, (iii) that the ATS does not recognize claims against corporations, (iv) that plaintiffs have not alleged facts in their complaints sufficient to create a plausible entitlement to relief under the ATS, and (v) that the ATS requires plaintiffs to exhaust their remedies in Iraqi courts before suing under the ATS in the United States. Defendants also argue that even assuming the claims are adequately stated, recovery of punitive damages is not allowed under the ATS. At issue, therefore, are the following questions: (i) Whether the ATS recognizes causes of action for war crimes and summary executions; (ii) Whether the ATS recognizes claims brought pursuant to these causes of action against private, non-state actors; (iii) Whether ATS claims may proceed against corporate defendants; (iv) Whether plaintiffs have validly stated claims alleging war crimes and summary executions upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the ATS; (v) Whether plaintiffs must exhaust their remedies in Iraqi courts before they may litigate their ATS claims here; and (vi) Whether punitive damages are available for ATS claims. Analysis of plaintiffs’ ATS claims properly begins with the statute itself, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Enacted in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act, § 1350’s brevity belies the magnitude of its implications. Specifically, the ATS states, in its entirety, that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Perhaps because the phrase “law of nations” was considered to be lacking in substance, the statute lay dormant for more than a century and a half. Indeed, so obscure was the import of the ATS, which has been called a “legal Lohengrin” and the “Rip Van Winkle of statutes,” that it formed the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction in only one case during its first 170 years of existence. Then, in the 1960s, this statutory Rip Van Winkle awoke, and plaintiffs began asserting ATS claims. These efforts met with varying success. Indeed, ATS jurisprudence during this period is best characterized by confusion and great uncertainty. Then, in 2004, the Supreme Court began to put this house in order when it decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). In Sosa, a Mexican national brought suit under the ATS after he was abducted in Mexico and brought to the United States for trial by a group of Mexican nationals hired by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration for that purpose. The plaintiff alleged that this conduct violated an international norm against arbitrary arrest and detention, and was thus actionable under the ATS. On these facts, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s award of damages to the plaintiff. The parties hotly disputed whether the ATS, in addition to conferring subject-matter jurisdiction over certain claims to federal courts, created a substantive cause of action for violations of the law of nations. The Supreme Court answered the question, somewhat ambiguously, in the affirmative. Specifically, Justice Souter’s majority opinion stated that while the ATS is “in its terms only jurisdictional,” it also “enable[s] federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.” 542 U.S. at 713, 124 S.Ct. 2739. According to the Sosa majority, the ATS recognizes claims alleging violations of binding customary international norms with no “less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations” today than the historical paradigms of offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy had at the time of the ATS’s enactment in 1789. Id. at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Applying this principle to the facts presented, the Sosa majority consulted a variety of sources, concluding ultimately that the ATS did not confer jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 736-38, 124 S.Ct. 2739. In reaching this result, the majority found that while various international treatises and resolutions condemned arbitrary arrest and detention as contrary to universal human rights, such declarations did not create a specific norm with binding effect, but rather only stated broad, nonbinding principles at a “high level of generality.” Id. at 736 n. 27, 124 S.Ct. 2739; see also id. at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (citing United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 163-80, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820)) (emphasizing specificity with which piracy was defined by law of nations). In other words, the Sosa majority found that there was insufficient agreement among nations as to the precise conduct that would constitute a violation of an enforceable rule against arbitrary arrest and detention. Thus, while Sosa interprets the ATS to confer upon federal courts limited discretion to recognize new causes of action for violations of the law of nations, it also holds that arbitrary arrest and detention are not among the causes of action cognizable under the statute. Importantly, Sosa counsels the federal courts to engage in “vigilant doorkeeping” when determining whether to recognize a cause of action under the ATS for five reasons, each of which relates to the need for judicial restraint in importing international norms (if such exist) into American law in the absence of explicit legislative authorization or guidance. 542 U.S. at 729, 124 S.Ct. 2739. First, Sosa explains that the common law is no longer understood, as it was at the time of the ATS’s enactment, to be a “ ‘transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.’ ” Id. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (quoting Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533, 48 S.Ct. 404, 72 L.Ed. 681 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Instead, it is now recognized that “the law is not so much found or discovered as it is either made or created,” and that reliance on international norms for the generation of a new common law cause of action would require “a substantial element of discretionary judgment.” Id. at 725-26, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Accordingly, Sosa suggests that just as the understanding of the role of common law has changed, so should courts’ willingness to look to international norms to determine the content of that common law. Second, Sosa notes that the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), denied the existence of any federal “general” common law, thus emphasizing the importance of “looking] for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Third, Sosa teaches that recent Supreme Court decisions evince a reluctance to infer the existence of an implied federal cause of action where the statute does not explicitly create a cause of action. Id. at 727, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (citing Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001)). Fourth, Sosa suggests that courts should impose a “high bar” in creating new private causes of action for violations of international law norms because of the risk of “impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.” Id. Finally, Sosa notes that Congress has repeatedly declined to provide the courts with a “mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations.” Id. It is clear, then, that Sosa does not incorporate customary international law (“CIL”) into the body of federal common law in a wholesale manner. Indeed, Sosa directs the federal courts to consider carefully the “practical consequences of making [a] cause of action available to litigants in the federal courts.” 542 U.S. at 729, 732-33, 124 S.Ct. 2739. If, as some commentators suggest, federal common law automatically incorporates CIL, then such considerations would be entirely inapposite. See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L.Rev. 869, 892 (2007) (hereinafter Bradley, et al., 2007) (concluding that the analysis prescribed by Sosa is inconsistent with the view that CIL is an inherent part of federal common law); Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 Sup.Ct. Rev. 111, 130 (same). Put another way, if CIL were an inherent component of federal common law, there would be no occasion for the federal courts to exercise their “vigilant doorkeeping” duty as envisaged by the Sosa majority. Moreover, Sosa affirms the well-settled rule that when Congress defines the relevant norms of international law by legislative enactment, courts are bound by that determination. Specifically, Sosa quotes, with approval, the traditional pre-Erie formulation that where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. 542 U.S. at 734, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900)) (emphasis added). Moreover, as Sosa notes, Erie and cases since then have further reduced federal courts’ discretion to create new federal common law in the absence of legislative guidance. Id. at 726-27, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Accordingly, reference to secondary sources to define the “law of nations” is appropriate only insofar as Congress has not itself defined the relevant norms. Three cases decided by the Supreme Court since Sosa emphasize the power of Congress and the courts to declare, authoritatively, the content of international law for the United States. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625-35, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006), trial procedures for a Guantanamo Bay detainee were found to violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). The relevant provision of the UCMJ conditioned the military commission’s authority on compliance with the “law of war.” 10 U.S.C. § 821. Hamdan held that the petitioner had an enforceable right to challenge the trial procedures as contrary to the Geneva Conventions because Congress had implicitly incorporated the treaty’s provisions into the authorizing statute by referring to the law of war. 548 U.S. at 625-35, 126 S.Ct. 2749. In other words, when one act of Congress (the UCMJ) referred generically to a body of international law (the law of war), Hamdan incorporated the norms of international law provided by Congress in the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, it is clear that federal courts are to interpret international treaties ratified by Congress in much the same way they interpret any other act of Congress, namely by determining congressional intent through careful examination of the text of the enactment. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a case involving the scope of foreign nationals’ rights to consular communication under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”), the Supreme Court concluded that the International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”) interpretation of the VCCR deserved “respectful consideration,” but did not compel reconsideration of prior Supreme Court decisions interpreting the VCCR that contradicted the ICJ’s conclusion. 548 U.S. 331, 333, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006). In other words, the final determination of the content of the international treaty belonged to U.S. courts, not an international tribunal. Id. at 353, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (quoting Marburg v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). Finally, in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1360, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008), at issue was the state’s failure to inform Mexican nationals on death row of their consular notification rights under the VCCR. The ICJ ruled that this failure constituted a violation of the VCCR. Yet, the Supreme Court held that the ICJ’s determination was not “automatically enforceable federal law.” Id. In so holding, the Supreme Court emphasized that whether treaties are self-executing is a question of U.S. law for the courts of the United States to decide, and the analysis proceeds, as usual, through determination of congressional intent through examination of the treaty’s text. Id. at 1364-65. In summary, these cases support the proposition that when Congress has defined the relevant international legal norms, federal courts must follow Congress’s lead. And, where Congress has not spoken on the content of international law, U.S. courts must define the applicable legal norms independently of the determinations of international tribunals and foreign bodies, but they may accord those determinations an appropriate level of “respectful consideration.” Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 333, 126 S.Ct. 2669. Thus, although Sosa permits the assertion of claims for violations of the “law of nations,” the case sets a high bar for causes of action to clear in order to be cognizable under the ATS. To constitute an actionable violation of the “law of nations” within the meaning of the ATS, plaintiffs must allege violations of international law norms that (i) are universally recognized, (ii) have specific definition and content, and (iii) are binding and enforceable, rather than merely aspirational. Moreover, federal courts must examine whether Congress has itself defined the relevant international law norm by legislative enactment; if so, federal courts are bound by that determination. Only in cases where Congress has not spoken on the content of the law of nations is it appropriate for federal courts to consider the conclusions contained in the decisions of international tribunals and in widely-accepted treatises of international law. Yet, even then they must do so carefully because of (i) the potentially serious practical consequences of recognizing such a cause of action, and (ii) the modern understanding of the limited discretion of federal courts to create new federal common law causes of action in the absence of clear legislative guidance. These principles and Sosa’s norm-specific analysis govern plaintiffs’ war crimes and summary execution claims. A. War Crimes Claims Claims for violations of the international norm proscribing war crimes are cognizable under the ATS. By ratifying the Geneva Conventions, Congress has adopted a precise, universally accepted definition of war crimes. Moreover, through enactment of a separate federal statute, Congress has incorporated this precise definition into the federal criminal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2441. Thus, Congress has clearly defined the law of nations to include a binding prohibition on the commission of war crimes. Given this, and given Sosa’s teachings, it follows that an allegation of a war crime states a cause of action under the ATS. Specifically, it is a “grave breach” of the Fourth Geneva Convention intentionally to kill or inflict serious bodily injury upon innocent civilians during the course of an armed conflict. The treaty has been ratified by the United States and every other nation in the world. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force 435-37 (2009). Thus, every country in the world, including the United States, has agreed to precisely the same definition of war crimes. Moreover, this specific universal norm is binding on nationals of the vast majority of nations in the world. Indeed, nationals of 110 states — including Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, and all of Western Europe — are criminally punishable in the International Criminal Court (ICC) for precisely these grave breaches as defined in the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, many of the countries that have not ratified the treaty establishing the ICC have nonetheless passed laws criminally punishing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in their own courts. Importantly, the United States is among this group of countries, having incorporated the Geneva Conventions into its domestic criminal law through the War Crimes Act of 1996, which criminalizes grave breaches of the Conventions committed by or against a national of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2441. Thus, Congress has directly and explicitly stated that the Geneva Conventions contain the binding international norms that govern the definition of war crimes in federal courts. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 642, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that by ratifying the Geneva Conventions and enacting the War Crimes Act of 1996 Congress has with “no doubt” defined the law of war by the content of the Geneva Conventions). Accordingly, applying the principles of Sosa, the ATS confers subject-matter jurisdiction over properly stated claims of war crimes. Defendants argue that even assuming that war crimes claims are cognizable under the ATS, such claims are not cognizable against defendants. In this regard, defendants first contend that as a general rule, the ATS only recognizes claims against state actors. Yet, it is quite clear that the language of the ATS is not self-limiting to claims against state actors. Thus, defendants’ argument may have merit only insofar as it is supported by Sosa or by recognized norms of international law. It is supported by neither. Indeed, Sosa explicitly acknowledges the existence of a developing consensus that non-state actors may violate certain norms as defined by the law of nations. Because Sosa clearly indicates that the reach of ATS liability to non-state actors should be determined with regard to the specific norm alleged to have been violated, it is clear that there is no per se rule that the ATS does not reach private actors. In particular, footnote 20 of Sosa, which defendants cite in support of their argument, comments that [a] related consideration [to the determination of whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support an ATS cause of action] is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual. Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates international law), with Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir.1995) (sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private actors violates international law). Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to defendants’ argument, this language makes clear that the analysis for non-state actor liability is norm-specific. Moreover, the parenthetical explanations of the citations to Tel-Oren and Kadic, emphasizing the eleven-year gap between the two decisions and the distinct claims alleged — torture in Tel-Oren and genocide in Kadic — suggest that a consensus may now exist that at least some ATS claims reach non-state actors. Thus, there is no support for defendants’ argument that ATS claims, as a general matter, are cognizable only against state actors. Nevertheless, the question remains whether war crimes claims, in particular, are cognizable against private actors. They clearly are. The relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions and their incorporating federal criminal statute, the War Crimes Act, clearly do not, by their terms, limit them applicability to state actors. While other prohibitions contained within the Geneva Conventions, such as the ban on summary executions, discussed infra, require that the conduct be committed by a party to the armed conflict, there is no such requirement for grave breaches such as the murder of protected persons. Instead, the grave breach is defined in terms of the status of the victim, not the status of the perpetrator. See Fourth Geneva Convention art. 146 (“Grave breaches ... shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention.”). Indeed, the War Crimes Act, in codifying the Geneva Conventions’ “grave breach” provisions into federal criminal law, subjects all United States nationals to liability with no reference to color of law or status as a party to the armed conflict. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b). Accordingly, the courts of appeals to consider the question since Kadic have recognized that ATS war crimes claims are cognizable against non-state actors. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 06-15851, 2009 WL 2431463, at *10 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009) (“[W]ar crimes ... negate the need for state action.”); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir.2009) (“ATS claims may sometimes be brought against private actors ... when the tortious activities violate norms of universal concern that are recognized to extend to the conduct of private parties — for example, slavery, genocide, and war crimes” (internal quotation marks omitted).); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945-46 (9th Cir.2002) (“[C]rimes like slave trading, genocide or war crimes ... by themselves do not require state action for [ATS] liability to attach.”). Thus, defendants offer no basis to conclude that war crimes claims under the ATS are cognizable only against state actors. Defendants further argue that conduct constitutes a war crime only if it is perpetrated in furtherance of a “military objective” rather than for economic or ideological reasons. Although this argument sweeps too broadly, it is true, as defendants suggest, that plaintiffs must allege a nexus to the armed conflict in order to state a valid claim for war crimes under the ATS. Accordingly, in order to state a valid claim for war crimes, plaintiffs must allege that the conduct constituting war crimes occurred in the context of and in association with an ongoing armed conflict. No doubt, a more substantial relationship must exist between the armed conflict and the alleged conduct than the mere fact that the conduct occurred while an armed conflict was ongoing. Otherwise, the ATS would create a cause of action in federal court for any murder committed anywhere in the world as long as (i) there was an armed conflict happening in the country at the time and (ii) the murder victim was not a national of the United States. Allowing all such claims would swing open U.S. courthouse doors to plaintiffs alleging conduct far short of being one of a “ ‘handful of heinous acts — each of which violates definable, universal, and obligatory norms.’ ” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781). Thus, the duty of “vigilant doorkeeping” that Sosa assigns federal courts requires that there exist a substantial nexus between the armed conflict and the alleged conduct constituting war crimes. Id. at 729, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Indeed, courts have generally required such a nexus. The Second Circuit in Kadic required that acts be “committed in the course of hostilities” in order to constitute a war crime. 70 F.3d at 242. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, citing Kadic, recently-held that alleged war crimes must occur “during the course” of the armed conflict, clarifying that such a showing would require that the conduct occurred “because of’ or “in the course of’ the conflict. Sinaltminal, 578 F.3d at 1267. In Sinaltrainal, Colombian nationals alleged that the defendant corporations hired paramilitaries to torture and murder leaders of a trade union in order to eliminate the union’s presence at the corporations. A civil war was raging in Colombia at the time, and plaintiffs argued that defendants were able to resort to such openly violent means precisely because of the ongoing armed conflict. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this relationship between the conflict and the alleged conduct was insufficient. Indeed, a rule allowing those claims would have allowed war crimes claims whenever an ongoing armed conflict contributed substantially to the alleged perpetrator’s ability to carry out the unlawful acts, and because armed conflicts, by their nature, increase the degree of disorder in a country, this requirement would normally be met. Nor are these decisions the only support for a nexus requirement. Congress and the Executive Branch have also adopted a nexus requirement in defining war crimes in related contexts. Specifically, for conduct committed during a non-international armed conflict to constitute a war crime punishable pursuant to federal criminal law, Congress requires that the conduct occur “in the context of and in association with” the armed conflict. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3), amended by Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2633 (2006). Similarly, the Secretary of Defense requires that the willful murder of protected persons by enemy combatants “took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict” in order to constitute violations of the law of war triable before military commissions. 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(a)(1)(i)(2009). Thus, the Legislative and Executive Branches have defined the law of nations to require a nexus of context and association to the armed conflict in order for conduct to constitute a war crime. Moreover, adopting the nexus requirement here serves to limit the scope of the ATS consistent with Sosa’s concern for the “possible collateral consequences of making international rules privately actionable.” 542 U.S. at 727, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Instead of the context and association requirement adopted here, plaintiffs propose a rule that the conduct must be “ ‘shaped by or dependent upon the environment — the armed conflict — in which it is committed.’ ” Pl.’s Mem. in Resp. at 36 n. 12 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Nos. IT-96-23 ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002)). This argument is unpersuasive. Adopting this amorphous standard would keep few — if any — ATS claims from coming through federal courthouse doors. Indeed, interpreting the ATS to recognize any war crimes claim for conduct that was “shaped” by the environment of the armed conflict would have the consequence of allowing nearly any claim alleging murder when the perpetrator, for reasons unrelated to the conflict, merely takes advantage of the civil disorder that invariably accompanies an armed conflict. While plaintiffs’ proposed rule is over-broad, defendants’ is too narrow. Defendants would require that the conduct allegedly constituting a war crime be committed in direct furtherance of a “military objective.” Under this standard, an ATS action would not lie where defendants were motivated by ideology or the prospect of financial gain, as plaintiffs allege here. Indeed, under defendants’ proposed rale, it is arguable that nobody who receives a paycheck would ever be liable for war crimes. Moreover, so narrow is the scope of this standard that it would exclude murders of civilians committed by soldiers where there was no legitimate “military objective” for committing the murders. It is true that acting with a purpose related to the objectives of the armed conflict is evidence of the alleged conduct’s association with the armed conflict. But purpose cannot be the only factor to consider, nor can it be defined as narrowly as defendants propose. Other factors such as temporal and geographic proximity to the armed conflict, the nature of the conduct, and the identity of the victims must also be considered. Thus, some nexus must be shown between the conduct and the armed conflict. Accordingly, to state a valid ATS claim for murder or infliction of bodily injury as a war crime, plaintiffs must plead that the alleged conduct was perpetrated in the context of, and in association with, the armed conflict. Defendants next argue that the ATS does not permit a claim to proceed on a theory of vicarious liability against a corporation. Plaintiffs respond that they do not allege a theory of vicarious liability for their ATS claims. Rather, they allege that Xe defendants, acting as “alter egos” of defendant Prince, are directly liable for the commission of war crimes. Pl.’s Mem. in Resp. at 44-45; Hearing on Deft.’ Mots, to Dism. Tr. at 40-41. Accordingly, there is no need here to reach the question whether a corporation may be held vicariously liable for the war crimes of its employees. Defendants also argue that corporations can never be held liable under the ATS. This argument is unavailing. Nothing in the ATS or Sosa may plausibly be read to distinguish between private individuals and corporations; indeed, Sosa simply refers to both individuals and entities as “private actors.” 542 U.S. at 782 n. 20, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Moreover, there is no identifiable principle of civil liability which would distinguish between individual and corporate defendants in these circumstances. While it is true, as defendants note, that criminal liability for war crimes is generally limited to private individuals, it is also true that a “private corporation is a juridical person and has no per se immunity under U.S. domestic or international law.” Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y.2003). Accordingly, all courts to have considered the question have concluded that “the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the [ATS is] indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may be.” Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir.2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring with per curiam opinion, joined by Hall, J.); see Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1314-16 (11th Cir.2008); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F.Supp.2d 331, 336 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (“[T]here is no principled basis for contending that acts such as genocide are of mutual and not merely several concern to states when the acts are performed by some private actors, like individuals, but not by other private actors, like corporations” (citations omitted).); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F.Supp.2d 7, 58-59 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (“Limiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation directing the individual’s action through its complex operations and changing personnel makes little sense in today’s world.”). Accordingly, claims alleging direct corporate liability for war crimes are cognizable under the ATS. In sum, Congress, by ratifying the Geneva Conventions and by enacting the War Crimes Act, has defined the international law norm governing war crimes. This norm is binding, universal, and precisely defined. Accordingly, the ATS recognizes a cause of action alleging war crimes, and claims arising under this cause of action are cognizable against non-state actor defendants, including corporations. This cause of action requires plaintiffs to show that defendants (i) intentionally (ii) killed or inflicted serious bodily harm (Hi) upon innocent civilians (iv) during an armed conflict and (v) in the context of and in association with that armed conflict. The analysis next turns to whether plaintiffs have properly stated a claim for relief under this cause of action. For ATS claims alleging a cause of action for violations of the law of nations, the analysis pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., is merged with that of whether plaintiffs have properly stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. In other words, if plaintiffs have failed to state a claim validly alleging a violation of the law of nations within the meaning of the ATS, then federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS is lacking. See Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1270 (dismissing ATS claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to failure to allege facts creating plausible entitlement to relief). The Supreme Court recently declared that threshold dismissal for failure to state a valid claim must be granted unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). It follows that a complaint must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 1949. And in this respect, it is also true that “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., quoted in Walker v. Prince George’s County, Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir.2009) (O’Connor, J.). Justice Kennedy succinctly summarized these principles by noting that a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Moreover, Iqbal reinforced the axiom that in ruling on threshold motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts should consider only the factual allegations made in the complaint itself. See, e.g., id. at 1949-54 (emphasizing repeatedly that factual content of the complaint controls the 12(b)(6) ruling). Accordingly, plaintiffs must allege facts in their complaints that give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief for claims alleging war crimes pursuant to the ATS. In other words, the facts alleged in the complaint, assumed to be true, must create a plausible inference that each of the elements required to state a claim for war crimes under the ATS is met. See id. at 1937. Thus, in order to prevail on defendants’ motions, the complaints must state facts that would allow a trier of fact plausibly to infer that defendant Prince (i) intentionally (ii) killed or inflicted serious bodily harm (iii) on innocent civilians (iv) during an armed conflict and (v) in the context of and in association with that armed conflict. Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden as to the ATS war crimes claims in each of the five cases. In this respect it must be noted at the outset that the content of all the complaints contained within the sections entitled “Count One — War Crimes” is not entitied to the presumption of truth normally afforded a complaint’s factual allegations on a motion to dismiss. Those sections do not contain factual allegations, but instead offer only “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Specifically, this portion of the complaints merely asserts that defendants engaged in acts that were “deliberate, willful, intentional, wanton, malicious and oppressive and constitute war crimes,” that the acts occurred “during a period of armed conflict,” that the war crimes were committed against the decedents “and others,” that defendants are liable for the war crimes, and that the misconduct caused “grave and foreseeable” injuries to the plaintiffs. Compl., No. 1:09cv615, ¶ 37-42; Compl., No. 1:09cv616, ¶¶ 32-37; First Am. Compl., No. 1:09cv617, ¶¶ 75-81; First Am. Compl., No. 1:09cv618, ¶¶ 89-94; Compl., No. 1:09cv645, ¶¶ 22-27. These sections allege no facts, but merely recite the elements, as plaintiffs understood them, for claims of war crimes under the ATS. Accordingly, the “conclusory nature of [the] allegations ... disentitles them to the presumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951 (rejecting as conclusory, in a Bivens action, allegation that defendants “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” plaintiff to harsh conditions “solely on account of his religion, race, and/or national origin”). Whether plaintiffs have validly stated claims therefore depends on the factual content of the complaints, and not these conclusory statements. The complaint in the first case, No. 1:09cv615, fails to allege any facts that create a plausible entitlement to relief on the war crimes claim against any of the defendants. As discussed supra, in No. 1:09cv615, Andrew Moonen, then a guard employed by Xe defendants, allegedly became severely intoxicated at a Christmas party, became lost, and, “stumbling drunkenly around Little Venice,” shot and killed the decedent. Compl., No. 1:09cv615, ¶ 22. Plaintiffs allege that Xe defendants’ employees were present at the Christmas Eve party and failed to prevent Moonen from leaving despite his visibly intoxicated state. This assertion does not support the war crimes claim for three reasons. First, plaintiffs have stated that they are not proceeding under the ATS on a theory of vicarious liability. Thus, the conduct of Xe defendants’ employees is not pertinent to the question of the liability of Prince or Xe defendants. Second, failure to restrain an intoxicated person from leaving a party may support a plausible inference of negligence or recklessness, but it does not support an inference of intentional killing. Finally, these factual allegations do not support a plausible inference that the nexus requirement is met with respect to this claim. Plaintiffs further allege that Prince, acting through Xe defendants, knowingly armed people he knew to be alcoholics. This factual allegation also does not support a plausible inference that Prince intentionally killed the decedent in No. 1:09cv615. First, plaintiffs do not allege that Moonen himself is such an alcoholic. Thus, the factual allegation that Prince armed alcoholics does not tend to support the conclusion that Prince caused the decedent’s death in this case. Second, even if Moonen were an alcoholic and Prince was aware of it, these facts do not give rise to a plausible inference that by arming Moonen, Prince intentionally caused the decedent’s death. Instead, such facts would at most support a conclusion that Prince was negligent or reckless in entrusting Moonen with a weapon. Thus, while the conduct alleged in No. 1:09cv615, if true, is reprehensible, it does not give rise to a plausible inference that any of the defendants committed a war crime. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of war crimes that is cognizable under the ATS. The federal claims in No. 1:09cv615 should therefore be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The four remaining cases, Nos. 1:09cv616, 1:09cv617, 1:09cv618, and 1:09cv645, allege similar factual bases. In all of these complaints, innocent Iraqi civilians are alleged to have been shot or severely beaten without reason by guards who, at the time of the alleged incidents, were working for Xe defendants. As in No. I:09cv615, the complaints in the other four cases support a plausible inference of recklessness or negligence by defendants, but not of intentional killing or infliction of serious bodily harm. Indeed, the complaints accuse defendants of “a pattern and practice of recklessness in the use of deadly force.” Compl., No. 1:09cv616, ¶ 18; First Am. Compl., No. 1:09cv617, ¶ 49, First Am. Compl., No. 1:09cv618, ¶ 81; Compl., No. 1:09cv645, ¶ 14. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew that some of their guards were working while under the influence of chemical substances, that they hired known mercenaries, that they “created and fostered a culture of lawlessness,” and that they refused to discipline guards who used excessive force. Compl., No. 1:09cv616, ¶¶ 18-24; First Am. Compl., No. 1:09cv617, ¶¶ 49-57; First Am. Compl., No. 1:09cv618, ¶¶ 81-86; Compl., No. 1:09cv645, ¶¶ 13-21. Even assuming that these allegations are sufficiently noneonclusory under Iqbal and Twombly to be entitled to the presumption of truth, they do not give rise to a plausible inference that defendant Prince intentionally killed or severely harmed innocent Iraqi civilians. Specifically, plaintiffs do not allege any facts which would create a plausible inference that Prince possessed the requisite intent to kill or inflict serious bodily injury. At most, the factual allegations presently contained within the complaints would allow for a plausible inference that Prince was negligent or reckless. Finally, plaintiffs have not alleged facts creating an inference that the alleged conduct was committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not stated valid claims of war crimes cognizable under the ATS in these four cases. The claims should therefore be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In their responses to defendants’ motions to dismiss, and at oral argument, plaintiffs represent that they have a sufficient factual basis to plead, consistent with Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., that Prince ordered or otherwise directed the killings of innocent Iraqi civilians. During the course of the hearing held on August 28, 2009, plaintiffs, by oral motion of counsel, requested leave to amend the complaints as necessary to cure defects and provide additional detail. Such leave should be denied as futile as to No. 1:09cv615, but granted as to the other four cases. Prior to trial, leave to amend is “freely given” in accordance with Rule 15(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. In this circuit, such leave is denied “‘only when the amendment would have been prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile.’ ” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir.2006) (en banc) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir.1986)); see also Sciolino v. City of Newport News, 480 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir.2007) (applying Oroweat Foods standard to post-dismissal context). There is no indication, at this early stage in these proceedings, that allowing plaintiffs leave to amend would cause any significant likelihood of prejudice to defendants. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that plaintiffs acted in bad faith by failing to plead factual allegations which meet the standard of Iqbal and Twombly. Thus, leave to amend may only be denied if amending the complaint would be futile. In other words, if the complaints as amended would nonetheless fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, then leave to amend may properly be denied. See Steinburg v. Chesterfield County Planning Comm’n, 527 F.3d 377, 390-91 (4th Cir.2008) (upholding denial of leave to amend because plaintiff “has pointed to no material in his proposed amended complaint that would have changed the analysis conducted by the district court”). In No. 1:09cv615, it is pellueidly clear that plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would not cure the present defect in the complaint. During the course of the hearing held on August 28, 2009, plaintiffs suggested that the Christmas party at which Moonen became intoxicated was a “Blackwater party,” that it may have been “part of his employment” to attend, and that management in some way “played a role in encouraging him ... to continue to carry his weapon after he was visibly intoxicated.” Hearing on Defs.’ Mots, to Dism. Tr. at 13-14. The addition of these vague factual allegations to the complaint would not remedy the defects or alter the analysis of the claims in this case. The mere fact that the party was sponsored by his employer or that attendance was within the scope of his employment is inapposite to the question whether defendants intended to kill the decedent. As amended, the complaint in No. I:09cv615 would fail to allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that Prince engaged in any conduct with an intent to kill, let alone that this conduct proximately caused the decedent’s death. Moreover, the allegation that Xe defendants allowed or encouraged Moonen to continue to carry his weapon after he became intoxicated does not create a plausible inference that defendants intentionally caused the decedent’s death in this case. Indeed, the lengthy chain of inferences that would be required to trace such conduct back to Prince’s alleged directive to his employees to kill Iraqi civilians is so tenuous that it does not even approach the plausibility standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ oral motion for leave to amend the complaint in No. 1:09cv615 must be denied on grounds of futility. See Steinburg, 527 F.3d at 391. In the other four cases, it is at least possible that plaintiffs will be able to cure the defects in their complaints. More specifically, it seems possible that the complaints in Nos. 1:09cv616, 1:09cv617, 1:09cv618, and 1:09cv645 could be amended to add factual allegations that would permit plausible inferences that Prince and Xe defendants ordered killings of innocent Iraqi civilians, during an armed conflict, in the context of and in association with that armed conflict, and that defendants’ conduct proximately caused the injuries or deaths to plaintiffs. Thus, leave is appropriately granted to plaintiffs to amend their complaints in these four cases. The onus remains on plaintiffs to plead facts, rather than conclusory statements, establishing a plausible inference that each of these required elements is met. Of course, if plaintiffs choose to amend their complaints in these four cases, defendants will be free to renew their Rule 12 motions to dismiss as to any or all of the re-pleaded claims. B. Summary Execution Claims In two of the cases, Nos. 1:09cv617 and 1:09cv618, plaintiffs also claim that defendants directed summary executions in violation of the law of nations. To be sure, there is support for the existence of an international norm prohibiting official summary executions. Indeed, Congress has confirmed that such a norm exists. In creating a federal civil cause of action for extrajudicial killing in the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Congress required that the individual alleged to have violated the TVPA acted “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.” Pub.L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992). Moreover, it is clear that by enacting the TVPA, Congress codified its understanding, of the international law norm governing the commission of summary executions. The TVPA’s definition of extrajudicial killing closely tracks the language employed in the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, the TVPA’s definition expressly exempts “any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.” Finally, the report that accompanied the TVPA to the Senate floor unambiguously states that “the TVPA incorporates into U.S. law the definition of extrajudicial killing found in customary international law.” As noted above, Sosa reaffirmed the rule that when Congress defines the international law norms at issue, courts are bound by its determination. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Because Congress has, by legislative enactment, expressed its understanding of the international law governing extrajudicial killings, judicial resort to the customs and usages of other nations is not appropriate. Moreover, even assuming that the TVPA does not directly address the issue, plaintiffs would not find support in universally accepted international laws for the proposition that extrajudicial killings by non-state actors violates the law of nations, as the Geneva Conventions only prohibit executions without judicial process when they are committed by a party to an armed conflict. Yet, plaintiffs themselves assert that the alleged executions “were not carried out under the authority of any country or court.” Compls., Nos. 1:09cv6171 ¶ 83, 1:09cv618 ¶ 96. Instead, they argue that in addition to being liable for war crimes, non-state actors are liable for summary executions committed during the course of war crimes. In making this argument, plaintiffs misread Kadic to create an exception to the normal rule requiring state actors for a cognizable claim for summary executions. In fact, Kadic merely acknowledges that the conduct alleged in a claim for summary executions, which would require state actors, could also be sufficient to state a claim of war crimes, which is cognizable against non-state actors. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244. Thus, because summary ex