Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER KATHLEEN McDONALD O’MALLEY, District Judge. In this patent action, Defendant Medical Device Technologies, Inc. (“MDTech”) has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment of Noninfringement (Doc. 164, “MSJ”). By way of its motion, MDTech argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact that MDTech does not infringe claim 7 of U.S. Patent No. 5,025,797 (the “'797 Patent”). Plaintiff Gregory W. Baran, M.D. (“Baran”) opposes the motion, which has been fully briefed and is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons articulated below, MDTech’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED. I. BACKGROUND This is a patent infringement lawsuit relating to a biopsy instrument manufactured, distributed, and sold by MDTech. The allegedly infringing biopsy instrument is known as the BioPince® Full Core Biopsy Instrument (“BioPince”). In his Complaint, Baran alleges that MDTech willfully infringed both U.S. Patent No. 5,400,798 (the “'798 Patent”) and the '797 Patent by manufacturing, distributing, and selling the BioPince. A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY After briefing and a hearing, the Court issued an Opinion & Order construing the disputed claim limitations of the patents at issue pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (“Markman Opinion”). Although his Complaint assert generally that MDTech has directly or indirectly infringed one or more claims of the '797 and '798 Patents, Baran narrowed the asserted claims to claim 7 of the '797 patent and claim 2 of the '798 Patent during the claim construction process. Further, after the Markman Opinion issued, the parties filed a joint stipulation stating that, in light of the Court’s construction of certain limitations in claim 2 of the '798 Patent, Baran “admits that he cannot prove that the ... BioPince, ... as made, used, offered for sale, or sold by [MDTech] is an infringement of claim 2 of the '798 patent.” (Doc. 145, Jt. Stipulation Re: '798 Patent.) Consequently, the only infringement allegations remaining after the Joint Stipulation are those relating to claim 7 of the '797 Patent. B. ISSUE The issue on summary judgment is whether, in view of the Court’s construction of the three debated limitations of claim 7 of the '797 Patent, MDTech is entitled to judgment of noninfringement as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to infringement as to at least one limitation of the claim. C. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION: THE '797 PATENT & THE BIOPINCE A basic understanding of the patent and allegedly infringing device the BioPince is necessary to understand and address this issue. 1. Biopsy Instruments & the '797 Patent In the Markman Opinion, the Court described biopsy instruments generally, and the '797 Patent specifically, in the “Overview of the Invention” section. In pertinent part, that section is set forth below. A. Overview of the Invention As mentioned at the outset, Baran’s patents are directed at an automated biopsy instrument. To give context to Baran’s invention and the problems it was intended to remedy, the Court first reviews biopsy instruments in general before addressing Baran’s specific invention. A biopsy instrument, generally, is a device for removing a sample of tissue from a human being or animal for diagnosis. Prior to the advent of biopsy instruments, tissue specimens primarily were obtained through invasive exploratory surgery. Biopsy instruments enabled medical professionals to obtain tissue samples with less risk of trauma and damage to a patient. Most contemporary biopsy instruments remove the tissue sample through the use of a two part needle set comprised of a stylet, which is a slender probe or wire, and a cannula, which is a hollow tube that surrounds the stylet and can be inserted into the body. The cannula, and sometimes the stylet, are sharp or pointed so that they are capable of cutting through or piercing tissue. There are two primary methods of obtaining a tissue specimen that the parties described in their briefs and at the Markman hearing. Each method involves the use of a different type of needle---- The ... method [used in the BioPince] involves a full-core needle, which, as the name implies, employs a stylet that does not contain a slot or gap. With this method, the cannula extends beyond the stylet and is inserted into the tissue. The tissue sample fills the hollow portion of the cannula. Once the needle is withdrawn from the patient, the stylet can then be advanced into the cannula to eject the sample from the cannula. Typically, this method requires some sort of negative pressure or suction to ensure that the specimen actually stays inside the cannula when it is withdrawn. Counsel for MDTech analogized this method to putting a straw in a cola bottle — a user needs to put his finger over the straw when it is removed in order to capture some cola in the straw. (Transcript from Markman Hearing (hereinafter, “Tr.”), at 76.) In different biopsy instruments, movement of the stylet and cannula can be manual, semi-automated, or automated. A manually operated biopsy device, of course, requires the user to move the cannula and the stylet by hand. The semi-automated and automated biopsy instruments, however, contain some sort of part or mechanism to move either the cannula, the stylet, or both.... The benefits of the semi-automated and automated devices over the manual devices are that the cutting motion is swifter, which causes a cleaner cut, does less damage to the surrounding tissue, and shortens the length of the procedure; the automated devices are more accurate; and there is less risk of inherent human error in operating the cannula and stylet. With that background, the Court now turns to the patents at issue in this case. The '797 patent was filed on March 29, 1989 and issued on June 25, 1991 .... As the prior art above shows, the invention disclosed in these patents was not the first for an automated biopsy instrument; it was an improvement on existing automated instruments/ In the Background of the Invention, the patent identifies certain problems with instruments known at the time, primarily related to the ease of use and risk of accident. Specifically, the patent explains that “the various automated biopsy instruments presently known tend to be heavy, difficult to manipulate, and incorporate biasing mechanisms which are either complicated in construction or require undue force to operate.” ('797 patent, col. 3, 1. 8-12.) In addition, the Background of the Invention identifies the possibility of “inadvertent movement or torque,” especially in the case of instruments that permit or require elements to be manually adjusted prior to advancement of the cannula. (IcL, col. 3, 1. 14-20). Likewise, some instruments contain a moveable stylet that extends beyond the rear of the instrument, leaving it vulnerable to accidental impact and inadvertent advancement into the body. (Id., col. 2,1. 37-47.) Finally, the Background of the Invention notes that the known instruments have exposed triggers or releases that actuate the movement of the cannula or stylet, thus further creating the risk of accidental advancement of the cannula. (Id.) To address those perceived problems, the '797 patent provides an instrument with a stationary stylet that, once mounted to the instrument, cannot be moved inadvertently or otherwise. (Id,., col. 3, 1. 30-35.) It also describes a guide on which a cannula can be mounted that can be manually moved to the charged position against the urging of a biasing mechanism such as a coil spring, and can be released to the discharged position, advancing in the direction of the stylet by a manually actuable release means. (Id., col. 2, 1. 35-44.) To address the problem of an exposed trigger or release, the patent describes that, “[i]n the preferred embodiments of the invention, a shield means is provided which is disposed to block or prevent inadvertent actuation of the release means.” (Id., col. 2,1. 58-60.) ... There are two basic embodiments in the '797 and '798 patents. One embodiment, depicted in Fig. 1 of both patents, relates to a reusable configuration that permits needle sets to be used and replaced, so that the instrument can be used multiple times for multiple patients. The second embodiment, depicted in Fig. 5 of both patents, relates to a single use configuration that can be used on only one patient. An exploded view of the first embodiment, taken from Fig. 1, is shown [below]: The automated instrument 10 as shown in Fig. 1 includes the following primary components: an outer casing 12; a support rod 14; a coil spring 16; a biopsy spring guide 18; a safety cap 20; a release lever 22; and a needle 24. ('797 patent, col. 4, 1. 47-51.) A needle 24 is not shown in this illustration (it is shown in Figure 1A), but it comprises a stylet 60 and a cannula mount 58, which, in turn, comprises a cylindrical collar 62, a conical head 64, and a cutting cannula 66. (Id., col. 4,1. 37-40.) ... According to the Detailed Description of the Invention, the instrument is converted from the discharged mode to the charged-safety-on mode (meaning it is ready to fire, but there is a shield over the release) by retracting the safety cap 20 toward the rear end 28 of the tube 26. (Id., col. 7, 1. 4-7.) This action causes the guide pins 94 to engage the annular external shoulder 54 of the spring guide 18 to retract the spring guide toward the base 44 of the support rod 14 and compress the coil spring 16. (Id., col. 7, 1. 12-16.) In other words, according to that description, the charge is created when the safety cap is pulled backward and the guide pins on the inside of the safety cap structure catch the shoulder of the spring guide, which compresses the spring back toward the base. This action creates the charge that, once the release is pressed, causes the cannula to advance forward over the stylet. As between Fig. 1 (the reusable embodiment) and Fig. 5 (the single use embodiment), the most significant difference for purposes of the Court’s present analysis is the cannula mount, specifically the cannula mount’s interaction with the spring guide. The relevant portion of Fig. 5 is shown to the right. As depicted, rather than have a screw-on feature like the cannula mount in Fig. 1, this embodiment has a plug-in type feature, where the cannula mount 258 receives the cannula 266 on one end and plugs into the guide 218 by inserting the base 262 into a bore 255a in the guide. These descriptions of the invention are meant to provide some background to the claims at issue in this case. The remaining elements of the invention will be discussed below, where applicable (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 704-09.) The figure below from the front page of the patent provides an overview of one embodiment of the '797 Patent in its charged-ready mode. 2. The BioPince The BioPince is an automated biopsy instrument that uses a full-core needle. The figures below, Figure 1 from Baran’s Opp’n Br. and Figure 1 from MDTech’s MSJ, depicts one of the allegedly infringing models of the BioPince. BELOW: Fig. 1, Opp’n Br. at 3; Fig. 1, MSJ at 4. As illustrated by the figures above, the BioPince includes a white plastic casing housing the internal components of the device, and a needle, protruding from the casing on the left side of the figure. The needle consists of three components: (1) a solid stylet sharpened to a point at its distal end, inside (2) a hollow inner cannula (also referred to as a cutting cannula because the circumference of its distal end is sharpened for cutting through tissue), both of which are inside (3) a hollow outer tube. The stylet extends beyond the hollow outer tube and cannula in the direction opposite the distal end of the needle, and is attached to a plastic retaining block. The stylet extends through the center of the spring 26. The cannula and the outer tube are attached to interlocking guides by a patch of adhesive; the outer tube is glued to the front guide while the cannula is glued to the back guide. The interlocking guides are connected such that they move together as the BioPince is placed into a charged position and during the first part of the spring-propelled discharge. The BioPince includes a crank arm 28 pivotally connected to the end of the casing directly above the point at which the needle protrudes from the casing. Along with several other components, including, but not limited to, the connecting rod 30, crank arm fixer 34, and slider link 35, the crank arm forms a mechanism for charging the spring 26. To charge the spring, the user holds the casing in one hand and lifts the crank arm away from the casing with the other until the locking groove in the slider link engages with the latching protrusion on the front guide. The sound of a “click” indicates that the locking groove has engaged with the latching protrusion. Then, the user pushes the crank arm toward the casing, thus compressing the spring between the back guide and the end of the housing containing the trigger button 36. The BioPince is charged when a second click indicates that the crank arm locking tab positioned on top of the crank arm fixer inserts through the slot in the crank arm and engages the shoulder of the slot, thereby locking the crank arm to the crank arm fixer. The BioPince can now be fired by moving the safety to the “fire” position and pressing the trigger button 36. Pressing the trigger button pushes the distal end of the elongated release bar 38 toward the latching protrusion of the front guide. The distal end of the elongated release bar acts as an inclined plane inserted between the latching protrusion and slider link to release the cannula guides. Thus, pressing the trigger button releases the elastic potential energy from the compressed spring and propels the guides and cannula in the direction of the distal end of the needle, into the tissue to be sampled. To retrieve the sample, the user completely removes the BioPince needle from the subject and charges the device again, causing the stylet to advance through the cannula and expel the tissue sample retained therein. This leaves the BioPince in the charged position, ready to take another tissue sample from the same subject. Therefore, the BioPince will ultimately be in the charged position after all biopsy samples have been retrieved. D. THE COURT’S CONSTRUCTION OF THE LIMITATIONS OF CLAIM 7 In its Markman Opinion, the Court construed several limitations of claim 7 of the '797 Patent. Claim 7 of the '797 Patent provides as follows, with the terms the Court construed in bold. 7. A biopsy instrument comprising an elongate hollow casing, a needle extending outwardly from the casing and having a cannula and a stylet received within the cannula, a stationary support mounted within the casing in fixed relation thereto and having means affixing the stylet thereto, a cannula guide, a cannula mount affixing the cannula to the guide, the guide being completely enclosed by the casing for reciprocating movement therewithin relative to the stationary support between a charged position, wherein the cannula is retracted in a direction away from the distal end of the stylet, and a discharged position, wherein the cannula is displaced from the charged position in the direction of the distal end of the stylet, a coil spring engaged between the stationary support and the guide for urging the guide toward the discharged position, a manually operable charging member for moving the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring, and a release means for retaining the guide in the charged position. ('797 patent, col. 12, 1. 54-col. 13, 1. 5.) The Court construed the disputed terms in claim 7 of the '797 patent as follows: _TERM_CONSTRUCTION_ a cannula mount affixing the cannula to a structure or support which attaches or the guide_connects the cannula to the guide_ a manually operable charging member for a manually operable charging member that is moving the guide to the charged position used to create a charge or stored energy, the against the urging of the coil spring charging member configured to move the guide to the charged position against the _urging of the coil spring_ a release means for retaining the guide in Means-plus-function claim in which the functhe charged position tion is “retaining the guide in the charged position and releasing, or setting free, the guide from the charged position.” The structures corresponding to this function are: (1) for the reusable embodiment (Figs. 1-4A), the release lever 22, including the latching projection 102, the finger rest 96, mounting section 98, and connecting web 100, as well as the equivalents thereof; and (2) for the single use embodiment (Figs. 5-8A), the release lever 222, including the latching projection 302 and the mounting seetion 298, as well as the equivalents thereof (.Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 729.) Each of these claims is at issue on summary judgment and will be discussed further below. II. DISCUSSION A. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MDTech has moved for summary judgment of noninfringement under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 164.) Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (Fed.Cir.2009). This standard applies in patent cases just as it does in other areas of law. Nike, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 646 (Fed.Cir.1994).. In reviewing summary judgment motions, this Court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Adickes v. S.H Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed.Cir.2009); CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 412 (6th Cir.2008); Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2008). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir. 2008). Determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine” requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. Thus, in most civil cases, the Court will decide “whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Upon filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 & n. 12 (6th Cir.1989); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 570 F.3d 698, 719 (6th Cir.2009). The moving party, however, is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof, so long as the moving party relies upon the absence of the essential element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Curto v. Harper Woods, 954 F.2d 1237, 1241 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548); Ocean Innovations, Inc. v. Quarterberth, Inc., No. 1:03-CV-0913, 2009 WL 1850321, at *1-2, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54108, at *8-9 (N.D. Ohio June 26, 2009) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548). In response, if the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, to defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must — by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule — set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In this regard, “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment”; rather, “Rule 56 allocates that duty to the opponent of the motion, who is required to point out the evidence, albeit evidence that is already in the record, that creates an issue of fact.” Williamson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 379-80 (6th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Moreover, the non-moving party must show more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome summary judgment; it is not enough for the non-moving party to show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Vita-Mix, 581 F.3d at 1322-23; Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 574 (6th Cir.2008). Accordingly, the ultimate inquiry is whether the record, as a whole, and upon viewing it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87,106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict—whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-LA Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (Fed.Cir.2009). In the context of a patent infringement case, “whether a particular device infringes a properly construed claim[ ] is a question of fact.” Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed.Cir.1998). Consequently, summary judgment of noninfringement only is appropriate where “no reasonable fact finder could find infringement.” id. As stated by the Federal Circuit: “We affirm a district courts g-ant of summary ^ ment of non-infi%gement only if, viewing the alleged facts in the light mo*, favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue as to whether the accused device is encompassed by the claims.” Wavetronix LLC v. EIS Electronic Integrated Sys., 573 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2009) (quoting Combined Sys., Inc. v. Def. Tech. Corp. of Am., 350 F.3d 1207, 1210 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citation omitted)). B. STANDARDS FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT “Infringement analyáfe involves a two-step process: the count first determines the meaning of disputeffclaim terms and then compares the accuffid device to the claims as construed.” Wavetronix LLC, 573 F.3d at 1354 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996); see also Middleton, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1387 (Fed.Cir.2002)). Claim construction is matter of law. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. In this case, the Court has already comrued the limitations of the claim at issiM in an extensive Markman Opinion. Tlwefore, the first step of the infringemenlmnalysis is theoretically complete. The existence of the Markman Opinion does preclude the Court from re-visiting its IRtructions as its understanding of the iBgtiology at issue is informed by theinMnJSjjient analysis, however. See Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., 532 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed.Cir.2008) (“Indeed, a better undewSanding of the context of the claim construction as a case proceeds through an infringement determination can appropriately lead a district court to change its initial claim construction.”); Kenall Mfg. Co. v. Genlyte Thomas Group LLC, 439 F.Supp.2d 854, 862 (N.D.Ill.2006) (choosing to “clarify and elaborate on” initial claim construction “so as to eliminate further confusion-or manipulation-of its meaning by the parties.”). The second step in the infringement analysis — comparison of the claims to the accused device — is a question of fact. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1315. The “all elements rule” applies to the process of comparing the claims to the accused device: “an accused product or process is not infringing unless it contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.” PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., 525 F.3d 1159, 1168 (Fed.Cir.2008) (quoting Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2005)). In general, a patent may be infringed literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement occurs when each limitation or element of a claim of the patent at issue is present in the accused device. Id.; see also Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 532 (Fed.Cir.1996). Even if each limitation or element of a claim is not literally met by the accused device, infringement may be found under the doctrine of equivalents if the differences are insubstantial, See Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2003). “Infringement analysis under the doctrine of equivalents proceeds element-by-element; a generalized showing of equivalency between the claim as a whole and the allegedly infringing product or process is not sufficient to show infringement.” Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1296 (Fed.Cir.2009) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997), stating that “the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole”); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1996)) (“[G]eneralized testimony as to the overall similarity between the claims and the accused infringer’s product or process will not suffice.”). One way to determine whether each element in the patent has an equivalent in the accused device is to analyze whether the element in the accused device “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the corresponding claim limitation in the patent. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1296. This is known as the “function-way-result” or “triple identity” test. Id. To prove infringement under the funetion-way-result test, the plaintiff must produce “evidence to establish what the function, way, result of both the claimed device and the accused device are, and why those functions, ways and results are substantially the same[.]” Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1991) (emphasis in original). The function-way-result test is not the only method of proving infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, however, because “[d]ifferent linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases[.]” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40, 117 S.Ct. 1040. “Equivalency may also be proven where the differences between the invention as claimed and the accused product or process are insubstantial.” Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1297 (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-18 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997)). This is known as the insubstantial differences test. Id. C. ANALYSIS OF THE DISPUTED ASPECTS OF CLAIM 7 Baran contends that the BioPince contains each of the three limitations of claim 7 of the '797 Patent that the Court construed in its Markman Opinion. MDTech moves for summary judgment of noninfringement on the grounds that the BioPince does not contain any of these limitations as a matter of law. The Court will now address each of the disputed limitations in turn. 1. The Cannula Mount Limitation: “a cannula mount affixing the cannula to the guide” The first disputed term of claim 7 of the '797 Patent is “a cannula mount affixing the cannula to the guide.” a. The Court’s Construction of the Cannula Mount Limitation The Court construed “a cannula mount affixing the cannula to the guide” as “a structure or support which attaches or connects the cannula to the guide.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 729.) In so holding, the Court rejected Baran’s argument that the “cannula mount” can be “anything.” Specifically, the Court explained as follows: The Court agrees with MDTech that, based on the specification, prosecution history, and dictionary definition, “cannula mount” cannot simply mean “anything.” Rather, the Court concludes that this language contemplates and, thus, claims a piece or structure which is independent from the structures which are the guide and the cannula, and serves the function of connecting the two other structures. Thus, the Court construes “a cannula mount affixing the cannula to the guide” to mean “a structure or support which attaches or connects the cannula to the guide.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 712.) The Court notes several additional aspects of its construction of this limitation worthy of consideration for purposes of resolving this motion for summary judgment. First, the Court noted in the Mark-man Opinion that MDTech’s counsel agreed at the Markman hearing that the word “support” could be substituted for the word “structure” in its proposed construction (“a support which attaches the cutting cannula to the guide in a secured manner”). (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 710.) Second, the issue of whether a dab of adhesive alone satisfies this limitation was foreshadowed by the arguments at the Markman stage. In opposing Baran’s proposed construction that the cannula mount could be “anything” that joins the cannula and the guide together, MDTech specifically noted that “ ‘anything’ could include glue, velcro, or other materials that can attach or affix components and that are not themselves structures.” (Id. at 711.) Third, in spite of the fact that the issue of whether adhesive is a cannula mount was at least presaged at the Markman hearing, MDTech did not request, nor did the Court adopt, a negative construction that would unequivocally preclude adhesive from satisfying the cannula mount limitation. Fourth, the Court noted in the Markman Opinion that the cannula mount limitation of claim 7 of the '797 Patent was amended from “a guide having means affixing the cannula thereto” to its present form (“a cannula mount affixing the cannula to the guide”). (Id. at 712.) In the absence of an alternative explanation for this amendment, the Court concluded that the prosecution history favored a construction requiring an independent entity — ie., a “structure or support” — as the cannula mount. Finally, although the Court agreed with MDTech that a cannula mount cannot be “anything” that joins the cannula and the guide together, and required a “structure or support” “independent from the structures which are the cannula and the guide,” it did not impose the condition that the “independent” cannula mount be “preformed.” b. Infringement Analysis The parties agree that the “cannula mount” in the BioPince consists entirely and exclusively of a dab of “adhesive,” and, more specifically, “epoxy.” It is undisputed, moreover, that the epoxy used in the BioPince affixes the cannula to the guide. For purposes of summary judgment, the debate is whether that epoxy is an independent “structure or support” such that it reads on the “cannula mount” limitation of the '797 Patent, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Specifically, the issue is whether the epoxy that affixes the cannula to the guide is a structure or support independent from the structures which are the cannula and the guide. In other words, would substituting “epoxy” for “cannula mount” change the meaning of this particular limitation of claim 7 of the '797 Patent? Based on the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that MDTech is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue because there is a material issue of fact with respect to whether the dab of epoxy is, in and of itself, a “support or structure” independent from the structures which are the cannula and the guide. MDTech argues that the BioPince does not have a “cannula mount” because adhesive, in and of itself, cannot be considered a “structure” or “support.” To support its argument, MDTech quotes the Court’s conclusion that this limitation of the '797 Patent “contemplates, and, thus, claims apiece or structure which is independent from the structures which are the guide and the cannula, and serves the function of connecting the two other structures” (.Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 712.) MDTech argues that “adhesive has no independent form, uniform geometry, shape, surface area, coverage, or strength as the adhesive will simply flow over the V-shaped trough where the Cannula rests ... [i]t cannot be independently fabricated.” (Opp’n Br. at 26.) MDTech further argues that the teachings of the '797 Patent preclude interpreting the “cannula mount” as a dab of adhesive because the specifications of the patent teach a cannula mount that “can be adhesively bonded to a bore of the guide .... ” (Id. at 27.) Consequently, MDTech contends that, if the cannula mount may be entirely made of adhesive, then the '797 Patent teaches adhesive bonded to adhesive. (Id.) In sum, MDTech contends that the specifications of the '797 Patent teach a pre-formed, independent structure playing the role of the cannula mount while, in the BioPince, adhesive affixes the cannula to the guide and there is no pre-formed, independent “structure” to satisfy the “cannula guide” limitation as construed by the Court. In addition, MDTech’s expert, Dr. Rashidi, testified that a dab of epoxy could never be an independent structure or support because it is merely an agent that “bonds” or “welds” the stainless steel cannula and the plastic guide together. (See MSJ at 26.) In other words, Rashidi asserts that the BioPince “simply does not have [a cannula mount], but instead relies on a physiochemical reaction to bond or weld the cannula to the Guide.” (Id. at 28.) He states that: the adhesive connects the cannula to the rear guide with a mechanism of adhesion and adhesion has a very well defined definition. And as I said, there is a physiochemical reaction and interaction among three items, one is solid A, which is the plastic [guide], solid B, which is the stainless steel [cannula], and adhesive agent and the way the adhesion works is creates two boundaries, one is between adhesive and solid A and between adhesive and solid B and they put it all together and that mechanism is very different than having a support structure to connect two pieces together. (Rashidi Dep. at 160.) Rashidi’s fundamental conclusion is that the epoxy cannot be a “structure or support” because it is a bonding agent without an independent structure unto itself. In response to MDTech’s arguments concerning this term, Baran first notes that MDTech argued at the Markman hearing that the adhesive connecting the cannula to the guide is not a “structure,” but did not argue that the adhesive is not a “support.” Accordingly, Baran’s first argument is that, since the Court defined a “cannula mount” as a “structure or support,” and MDTech does not dispute that the adhesive in the BioPince acts as a support, there is literal infringement. Further, Baran argues that, although the Court stated that the “cannula mount” is a “piece or structure ... independent from ... the guide or cannula,” the Court did not impose the limitations MDTech raises, ie., “independent form, uniform geometry, shape, surface area, coverage, or strength.” In fact, notes Baran, MDTech did not propose such requirements in its proposed constructions at the Markman stage, despite the fact that, at the time, MDTech knew Baran considered the adhesive to be the cannula mount. In sum, Baran argues that whether the adhesive is a structure or a support is a material issue of fact. He asserts that, for example, certain adhesives — such as the epoxy used in the BioPince — are polymer structures in their hardened form. Accordingly, he argues that whether epoxy in its hardened state is a “structure” or “support” for purposes of the '797 Patent is a jury question. In response to MDTech expert, Dr. Rashidi, Baran notes that the American Heritage Dictionary defines “epoxy” as “any of various usually thermosetting resins capable of forming tight cross-linked polymer structures characterized by toughness, strong adhesion, and low shrinkage, used especially in surface coatings and adhesives.” (Opp’n Br. at 20 (emphasis added).) Baran’s expert, Dr. Haaga, similarly testified that a hardened polymer such as epoxy is a structure. (Id.) He noted that the determinative factor with respect to whether something is a “structure” should not be its initial state of matter (ie., solid, liquid, or gas) because, if that were the case, the injection molded plastic used to fabricate, e.g., the guide, would not be a “structure.” (Doc. 172-7, Haaga Dep. at 122.) This evidence indicates that the parties, ultimately, do not dispute that the dab of epoxy has a physical presence and plays a role in establishing the connection between the cannula and the guide. It does not resolve the question of whether the epoxy is a structure or support independent of the cannula and guide, however. The Court finds that Baran has raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the dab of hardened adhesive that connects the cannula to the guide is the “cannula mount” as the term was construed by the Court. MDTech’s description of a dab of adhesive as an amorphous substance whose ultimate physical characteristics depend entirely upon its surroundings is compelling. In addition, MDTech’s argument that the specifications do not contemplate a structure consisting of adhesive attached to adhesive is persuasive. But Baran’s position has merit as well. Epoxy, like plastic, begins as a liquid but becomes a solid. It performs its function in its solid state. It forms a solid (admittedly, via the principles of adhesion Rashidi alludes to) that surrounds the cannula and the guide, affixing them to it, and, consequently, to each other. Characterizing this solid dab of epoxy as a “structure or support” is not entirely unreasonable. Furthermore, characterized as such, the concept of adhesive attached to adhesive is not so far-fetched. Accordingly, although this is a close question, especially given that, considered in their entirety, the specifications do not appear to contemplate Baran’s interpretation, the Court cannot conclude that no reasonable juror could find that the dab of epoxy is “a structure or support which attaches or connects the cannula to the guide.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 729.) Summary judgment of noninfringement is, thus, not appropriate with respect to this limitation of claim 70. 2. The Charging Member Limitation: “a manually operable charging member for moving the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring” The second disputed term of claim 7 of the '797 Patent is “a manually operable charging member for moving the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring.” a. The Court’s Construction of the Charging Member Limitation The Court construed “a manually operable charging member for moving the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring” as “a manually operable charging member that is used to create a charge or stored energy, the charging member configured to move the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 729.) In so construing this limitation, the Court specifically chose not to adopt Baran’s proposed construction in which a “mechanism” would be synonymous with a “member.” (Id. at 713.) Instead, the Court found that “the term ‘mechanism’ is inconsistent with the common and ordinary meaning of ‘member’ to someone skilled in the art, as well as with what is disclosed in the patent specification.” (Id.) The Court described the ordinary meaning of the terms “mechanism” and “member” as follows: Indeed, “mechanism” is defined as “1 a: apiece of machinery: a structure of working parts functioning together to produce an effect.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1401 (1993); see also Mirriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.m-w.com (defining “mechanism” as “l:a: a piece of machinery.”). On the other hand, “member” is defined as “4: a constituent part of a whole, as ... d(2): an essential part of a framed structure, a machine, or a device.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1408 (1993); see also Mirriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.mw.com, (defining “member” as “4: a part of a whole.”). A mechanism, therefore, is not commonly understood to be simply a single part that has multiple components; a mechanism itself has multiple parts. Nor can “member” and “mechanism” be treated as synonymous, as Plaintiff seemingly attempts to do. (Id. at 714.) In addition, the Court found that the specifications did not support Bar-an’s argument that “member” and “mechanism” are synonymous. Indeed, as MDTech argues, the specification actually counsels that, in defining “member,” the Court should err on the side of simplicity rather than on the side of complexity. The only references to “mechanism” in the specification relate to prior art, are accompanied by the term “complicated,” and are the very types of elements that Baran asserts he was attempting to remedy by making his invention more simple. Given that, and absent any other source to expand the meaning of “member” as it is used in claim 7, the Court cannot define “member” as including the alternate term “mechanism.” (Id. at 714.) Ultimately, the Court did circumscribe the scope of its construction, however, explaining as follows: The Court notes, however, that, in finding that “member” does not encompass “mechanism,” it only determines what “member” is not; it does not determine how it should be defined. For their part, the parties offer little guidance and, indeed, do not even attempt to de- fine member. Given that the parties do not seek to define “member,” and that their sole dispute over this term is whether it could be defined to include “mechanism,” the Court sees no need to further define this term. Accordingly, the Court construes “a manually operable charging member for moving the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring” pursuant to Plaintiffs proposed construction, absent the term “mechanism,” as follows: “a manually operable charging member that is used to create a charge or stored energy, the charging member configured to move the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 715.) On summary judgment, the question is now whether the BioPince “mechanism,” which undisputedly includes a “member,” may, as a matter of law, infringe the “charging member limitation” of the '797 Patent, which teaches a “member configured to move the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring.” b. Infringement Analysis: The BioPince Does Not Literally Infringe the Charging Member Limitation of Claim 7 of the '797 Patent Again, “literal infringement occurs when ‘every limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused device[.]’ ” Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C. v. Cabela's, Inc., 485 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2007) (quoting Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed.Cir.1996)). Accordingly, in order to prove that the BioPince literally infringes the charging member limitation of the '797 Patent, Baran must demonstrate that the BioPinee has (as the limitation was construed by the Court), “a manually operable charging member that is used to create a charge or stored energy, the charging member configured to move the guide to the charged position against the urging of the coil spring.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 729 (emphasis in original).) MDTeeh concedes that a “mechanism” is made up of component “members.” It also concedes that a “member” need not be a single component structure — it could be more than one component moving in unison, as long as the structure does not constitute a group of independent parts mechanized to work together. (Markman Hrg. 89.) In addition, Baran identifies the long blue or green “crank arm” as the “member” of the BioPinee that reads on the charging member limitation of the '797 Patent. MDTeeh does not dispute that the “crank arm” is “manually operable,” and is a component member of the slider-crank mechanism. Accordingly, the issue is whether the crank arm, considered independently of the remaining component members of the slider-crank mechanism, reads on the charging member limitation in the '797 Patent. MDTeeh argues that the Court already determined that a mechanism is not a member, nor is it equivalent to a member. MDTech’s central contention is that the BioPince’s slider-crank mechanism charges the spring by virtue of the concerted action of three component members of the mechanism as a whole, not because of the action of any single component member or even the in-unison operation of multiple component members bonded together. According to MDTeeh, a mechanism must be treated as an entity unto itself; dividing it into its component parts (i.e., “members”) undermines its essential nature. Therefore, MDTeeh fundamentally disagrees with the proposition that the crank arm (or, for that matter, any other member of the slide-crank mechanism) could read on the charging member limitation of the '797 Patent. MDTeeh asserts that the theoretical distinction between a member and a mechanism is readily apparent in the difference between the way the BioPinee charges the spring and the '795 Patent’s teachings for charging the spring. Whereas the '797 Patent teaches a single member working directly against the urging of the spring to compress it — without the benefit of any mechanical advantage, the BioPinee uses a slider-crank mechanism consisting of a lever (the “crank arm”), which moves the “crank arm fixer,” which moves the “slider link” to compress the spring with a significant mechanical advantage. For his part, Baran points out that, although the Court stated in the Markman Opinion that “ ‘member’ does not encompass ‘mechanism,’ ” it did not address the converse — whether a mechanism could include a member. Further, Baran notes that the Court expressly stated that, because the parties did not ask for a definition of “member,” its construction of the charging member limitation was not intended to define “member,” except to conclude that it was not synonymous with “mechanism.” Baran also contends that MDTeeh is now attempting to read into the Court’s construction a limitation that the member must act “directly” against the guide, a requirement that does not appear in the Court’s Markman Opinion. Accordingly, Baran argues that the crank arm of the BioPince satisfies the charging member limitation of the '797 Patent because it is: (1) manually operable; (2) a member; (3) used to create a charge; and (4) configured to move the guide to the charged position against the urging of the spring (albeit in conjunction with the other members of the slider-crank mechanism). In reply, MDTech contends that Baran’s argument is inconsistent with the Court’s construction of “member” to exclude a “mechanism.” MDTech argues that the Court’s conclusion that “member” is not synonymous with “mechanism” would be meaningless if Baran were allowed to compare a single component of the slider-crank mechanism to the charging member in the '797 Patent for purposes of proving infringement. As stated by MDTech: Every manually operated mechanism necessarily includes at least one member. According to Baran’s interpretation, every use of the word “member” would subsume the term “mechanism,” because, in Baran’s world, one cannot distinguish a mechanism from a member. (Reply Br. at 20.) In addition, MDTech notes that the requirement that the charging member operates directly on the guide is “inherent” in the Court’s construction, which requires the manually operable charging member to be “configured to move the guide.” (Reply Br. at 19 (emphasis added).) MDTech notes that the crank arm — Baran’s proposed “charging member” in the BioPince — is not configured to move the guide because it is separated from the guide by two other component members of the slider-crank mechanism. In other words, MDTech asserts that under no circumstances is the crank arm “configured” to move the guide because the crank arm itself is not adjacent to the guide at any point and is multiple components removed from the guide within the slider-crank mechanism. The Court finds MDTech’s arguments with respect to the charging member limitation persuasive, and, accordingly finds that MDTech is entitled to summary judgment of noninfringement. See Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.Cir.1998) (noting that summary judgment of noninfringement is required if just one limitation is not present). There is no genuine issue of material fact that the charging member limitation of claim 7 of the '797 Patent is not present in the BioPince. First, the Court’s Markman Opinion recognizes the fundamental distinction between a mechanism and a member. The Court stated that a member is a “single part,” while “a mechanism itself has multiple parts.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 714.) The Court also specifically noted that the specifications of the '797 Patent itself distinguished members and mechanisms by referring pejoratively to prior art using “complicated biasing mechanisms,” “upon which the patent sought to improve” by using a simple charging member. (Id. at 713.) Therefore, both Baran and the Court have previously recognized that the terms “member” and “mechanism” express fundamentally different concepts. In addition, both Bar-an and the Court have already concluded that Baran’s stated purpose in designing his biopsy instrument was to improve on prior art by simplifying the device used to compress the spring. By distinguishing these terms and refusing to treat them as synonymous, the Court implicitly determined that each is an entity unto itself, with independent validity. Baran’s argument requires the Court to dissect the slider-crank mechanism and treat each component “member” of the mechanism as functioning individually (i.e., separate and apart from the other components), despite the fact that the Court discussed the definition of “mechanism” in the Markman Order and specifically noted that a mechanism is “a structure of working parts functioning together to produce an effect.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 714 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1401 (1993)).) Indeed, whether a member can have multiple components is not a new issue. The Court considered the question of whether individual components of a mechanism read on a member during the Mark-man stage of this litigation. The Court described MDTech’s position as follows: As an initial matter, the defendant does not seek to limit the term member to a single component structure. At the hearing, counsel for MDTech said: “I’m not saying it has to be a single part. I mean, if it were two things welded together that moved in unison, I would consider that still a member.” (Tr. at 89.) Rather, MDTech simply argues that Plaintiffs effort to expand “member” to include the far more complicated concept of a “mechanism” reaches too broadly, and effectively rewrites the claim. (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 714-15.) In the Markman Opinion, the Court analyzed CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359 (Fed.Cir.2002) in connection with this issue. (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 713-14.) In CCS Fitness, the Federal Circuit held that a “member” could encompass a multicomponent structure. (Id. at 713.) As noted in the Markman Opinion, the multi-component “member” in CCS Fitness was a single structure with multiple components. See CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367. CCS Fitness was a patent infringement lawsuit involving elliptical trainers. The “reciprocating member” in the patent at issue in that case was a straight metal beam connecting the pedals to a shaft and crank system. The accused device used a u-shaped structure having multiple components to accomplish the same motion. The components of the u-shaped structure in the accused device were connected such that they moved in unison, as opposed to in a series where the movement or action of one component causes the movement or action of the next. In construing the limitation “reciprocating member,” the Federal Circuit found “that the term ‘member’ denotes a beam-like structure that is “a single unit in a larger whole.” It is not limited to a straight-bar structure comprising a single component only.” Id. In analyzing CCS Fitness for purposes of construing the “member” limitation in this case, this Court noted that the Federal Circuit “consistently referred to the beam, lever, or structure [of the patent-in-suit] in the singular, i.e., a single structure that has multiple components.” (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 714 (emphasis in original).) By comparison, this Court noted, “the term ‘mechanism’ connotes a group of independent parts working together.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) Accordingly, this Court found that the Federal Circuit’s construction of “reciprocating member” in CCS Fitness does not require a construction of “charging member” that treats “member” and “mechanism” as synonymous. (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 714.) The Court’s analysis of CCS Fitness in the Markman Opinion is particularly useful now that the parties are debating the very issue the Court addressed there. The Court distinguished the “reciprocating member” in CCS Fitness from the ordinary meaning of “mechanism” on the grounds that the multi-component reciprocating member there was a single, unified structure that operated and moved in unison. (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 713-14.) In other words, the Court concluded that the “reciprocating member” in the accused elliptical trainer was a “member” despite having multiple components because those components operated as a single, unitary piece of the elliptical trainer. Here, the components of the slider crank mechanism, including the crank arm, do not operate in unison, but in series, such that each component acts upon the next in a chain of events (leading to the compression of the spring). Accordingly, the parties’ debate regarding the operation of the member in the '797 Patent and the slider-crank mechanism in the BioPince illustrates the distinction the Court explained in its Markman Opinion when discussing CCS Fitness. More importantly, the Court’s analysis of CCS Fitness plainly supports MDTech’s position— i.e., that the Court’s claim construction precludes a reasonable jury from finding that the crank arm is the “charging member.” Baran’s comparison between the charging member in the '797 Patent and the crank arm component, i.e., member, of the BioPince’s slider-crank mechanism is, thus, inconsistent with the fundamental characteristics of a mechanism described in the Court’s Markman Opinion. An examination of the mechanical differences between the charging member in the '797 Patent and the slider-crank mechanism in the BioPince provide further support for this distinction between the two structures, moreover. (MSJ at 24.) As Dr. Rashidi explained, there is a measurable difference between the force necessary to compress the spring, and the manner in which that force is applied in the BioPince and the patented device. (Id. (citing Rashidi Dep. at 185-186).) In the '797 Patent, the force necessary to compress the spring increases as the spring reaches maximum compression. (Id.) In contrast, the force necessary to compress the spring via the slider-crank mechanism in the BioPince is always less because the mechanism exhibits a mechanical advantage, and although the force necessary to compress the spring increases with compression to a point, by virtue of the scientific characteristics of a slider-crank mechanism, the necessary compression force then decreases to zero at full compression. (Id.) Dr. Rashidi’s diagram at right provides a succinct graphic illustration of this comparison. It is undisputed, moreover, that the slider-crank mechanism changes the direction of the force used to charge the BioPince, while the force used to charge the '797 device is applied in the same direction as the compression of the spring. (Id. at 25.) This fact is particularly meaningful in light of the discussion above regarding CCS Fitness. The slider-crank mechanism can charge the spring using force applied in a direction other than the direction of the compression because the multiple components of the mechanism, acting in a series, change the direction of the force until the last component, the guide, acts against the urging of the spring in the direction of the compression. Again, this illustrates that, unlike the “reciprocating member” in CCS Fitness, the component parts of the BioPince’s slider-crank mechanism do not act in unison. The BioPince’s slider-crank mechanism is a vivid example of the type of mechanism the Court described in the Markman Opinion — ie., independent components working together. (Markman Opinion, 519 F.Supp.2d at 713-14.) Viewed in this light, Baran’s argument that the crank arm is the charging member is necessarily inconsistent with the Court’s analysis of this limitation in the Markman Opinion. In addition, the Court notes that Baran cannot satisfy the requirement that the member be “configured to move the guide.” MDTech explains: There is no question that the Crank Arm is not “configured” to move the Guide; its shape or configuration would never allow it to operate on the Guide. Instead, the Crank Arm moves the Connecting Rod (30), which moves the Crank Arm Fixer (34), which moves the Slider Link (35), but it does not, and cannot move the Guide. (Reply Br. at 19-20.) Thus, as both experts testified, the crank arm only participates in moving the guide by virtue of the concerted, sequential action of the other component members in the slider-crank mechanism, such that each component acts upon the next in a chain of events leading to the compression of the spring. Baran does not deny this reality. Baran argues though that the crank arm — the only “manually operable” component member of the slider-crank mechanism — is “configured to move the guide” because the guide cannot move without it — ie., unless the crank arm is manually operated, the other component parts will not engage. Thus, while Baran concedes that the crank arm never touches the guide, or directly engages it, he asserts that there is a “but for” element to its presence: but for operation of the crank arm, the guide would not move. Baran’s reasoning is inconsistent, however, with his own contention that each component member of the slider-crank mechanism can be analyzed independently for purposes of literal infringement, Baran cannot have it both ways. If the crank arm is “configured to move the guide,” it is only by virtue of the concerted, sequential action of the slider-crank mechanism. Therefore, it is the action of the slider-crank mec