Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER SOTOMAYOR, Chief Judge. Defendant Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y. (“SNY”) moves under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment as a matter of law vacating a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Victoria Greenbaum on her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the equivalent provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Administrative Code. In the alternative, SNY moves to reduce the jury’s compensatory damage award of $320,000 by $181,303 because the jury awarded damages for activities that allegedly occurred outside the relevant statute of limitations. SNY also moves to vacate the $1.25 million punitive damage award granted by the jury as unsupported by the evidence or, alternatively, to remit a substantial portion of the award as excessive. Finally, SNY moves to vacate the entire jury verdict on the ground that Greenbaum’s counsel allegedly committed various prejudicial errors during the trial. For the reasons to be discussed, the Court denies all of SNY’s motions. BACKGROUND All of the events relevant to this case occurred in the period beginning in late 1987, when SNY first hired Greenbaum, and ending in April 1995, when SNY terminated her employment. The following facts are either undisputed or could have been found by a reasonable jury. A. SNY’s Corporate Culture and the Vice Presidential Position Defendant SNY is the New York branch of Svenska Handelsbanken, AB (“SHB”), an international banking corporation headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden. SHB has had more than 500 employees during all the times relevant to this action. In May 1987, SNY opened up as a startup branch with approximately fifteen employees, and by the end of 1994, the branch had approximately eighty employees. SNY was divided into departments, each of which was managed by a department head with the title of either vice president or senior vice president. Each department head managed a team of employees, some of whom supervised others in the department and some of whom also held the title of vice president. The branch as a whole was managed by a general manager (“GM”), who had a deputy general manager working under him. Together, the GM, the deputy GM and the department heads made up the management committee (the “GM committee”), which had the authority to make many of the major decisions for the branch, including all decisions concerning employees’ salary increases, bonuses and promotions. Throughout the period in question, all of the members of this committee were men, and the only person who was a member of the committee for the entire period was Harry Roberts, the deputy GM. In its corporate brochure, SHB described itself as a highly decentralized organization, consisting of a network of local branches, which had nearly complete autonomy to govern their internal affairs and client relations. The brochure stated that “[a] decentralized organisation [sic] ... requires a strong corporate culture” and a “clear set of instructions.” JT 41 at VG678. Part of SHB’s “strong corporate culture” was the ambition to “grow its own leaders,” and “[a]s far as possible, promotion [was] done internally.” Id. at VG682. Furthermore, according to SHB’s brochure: Our aim is to hire the best people and to keep them in the bank until they retire. Exceptions to this rule are usually signs of a failure.... We might have hired somebody who proved to be a disappointment. Or we might have failed to offer a good person a sufficiently challenging job. Id. From the beginning of 1987 and ending in 1994, Greenbaum consistently sought but was consistently denied the position of vice president. Throughout this time, SNY had a number of vice presidents, and Bengt Ragna, one of SNY’s key witnesses and its GM from 1991 to 1994, testified that there were no formal quotas on this number. See Tr. at 1235. In principle, employees could be promoted to vice president without any substantial changes in duties or responsibilities, and these promotions were thus largely changes in title and status. See id. at 1276. To obtain the title, an employee ordinarily needed a “strong recommendation from a senior person, [the candidate’s] superior.” Id. at 1217. Ragna articulated six criteria that he used to assess candidates. These criteria, which “were not written in stone” but instead derived from the “culture of the bank” and the “heritage that [he] ha[d learned] as a general manager coming from the Swedish part of the bank,” id. at 1203, included: (1) whether the bank would be comfortable having the individual represent the bank; (2) a strong performance record; (3) a good management record; (4) whether the person can be a good role model; (5) the importance of the job to SNY; and (6) dedication to the job. See id. at 1205-09. In practice, however, supervisors’ recommendations were given strong deference and were rarely rejected. See id. at 1044-46,1123-25. B. Greenbaum’s Employment and Her Attempts to Obtain the Title of Vice President 1. The Initial Interview and Employment In September 1987, John Pyron, senior vice president and head of SNY’s treasury department, see id. at 89-90, and John Amoroso, vice president in charge of the money market and corporate desks, see id. at 88, interviewed plaintiff Greenbaum for a senior money market trader position in the treasury department, see id. at 91-92, which was one of the branch’s main profit centers, see id. at 1202. During the interview, Pyron and Amoroso discussed job responsibilities, benefits, title and salary, and Greenbaum, who was then employed as an assistant vice president at another company, expressed interest in joining the bank with the title of vice president. See id. at 92-93. Pyron explained that although SNY was hiring for a vice-presidential level job, he would be unable to offer her that title from the start. See id. at 93. He indicated, however, that if she were to accept an offer of employment with SNY, she would be given the title after her first annual review in December. See id. Shortly after the interview, Pyron and Amoroso discussed Greenbaum’s candidacy, agreed that she was qualified for the position, and Pyron offered her a position as assistant vice president. See id. at 94-95. Greenbaum accepted and began work under Amoroso on September 28, 1987. See PX l. 2. The Early Attempts to Obtain Vice President Status as a Trader Three months later, in December 1987, the GM committee, which included Pyron, discussed Greenbaum’s promotion to vice president but decided that it would defer its decision until March 1988, when she could be reviewed on the basis of six months’ performance. See Tr. at 98-99. Amoroso was nevertheless asked to fill out a preliminary review for her. Greenbaum had already made money for SNY at the time, and Amoroso’s review stated that: Vicky in her short time with Svenska has contributed her expertise and excellent analytical skills in organizing and maximizing the potential of the deposit book. Vicky also has been instrumental in managing the short-date trading, both in training and in actual trading strategies. To be reviewed March 1988. PX 1; see also Tr. at 101. Pyron concurred in this review and explained to Greenbaum that her promotion would not occur until March. See Tr. at 102. In March 1988, Amoroso filled out a more extensive review of Greenbaum’s performance to date, which stated that “Vicki has proven that she can properly head the money market and corporate desks when her supervisor \i.e., Amoroso] is not in.” PX 2 at SNY000063A. The evaluation also recommended her for a promotion to vice president: Vicki has demonstrated an excellent knowledge of sophisticated markets, an expertise in trading them and the managerial style to motivate the desk. She also readily offers her technical skills to the other traders assisting in their positions. In light of the above it is recommended that Vicky be promoted to Vice President. Id. Pyron agreed with this recommendation, see Tr. at 110-11, and presented the evaluation to the GM committee. The committee decided not to promote Green-baum, however, and Pyron explained to her that the committee felt that a promotion was inappropriate at that time because Greenbaum did not have any staff reporting directly to her. See id. at 111. Following the March review, Amoroso and Pyron decided to give Greenbaum more responsibilities and make her a full-time rather than a part-time arbitrage trader. See id. at 113-14. In doing so, they hoped in part to “give her a higher profile in the bank” so that she could “show her contributions more clearly to management.” Id. at 114. Greenbaum was also given a staff that reported directly to her. See id. at 112. At the end of the year, Amoroso once again filled out a written evaluation for Greenbaum, which gave her an overall rating of five out of six: “Results consistently exceed job requirements.” PX 3 at SNY000061. The evaluation also stated that “Vicki is the senior person on the desk when the chief trader is out and she has proven her ability to properly run the desk.” Id. at SNY000060. The evaluation further noted that “[t]he bank could make better use of Vicki’s talents by having her manage the entire deposit book from overnight to one year” Id. at SNY000061. Although Pyron also endorsed this evaluation, the GM committee once again denied Greenbaum a promotion. See Tr. at 116-17. During the next year, 1989, Greenbaum expanded her trading activity at SNY and continued to express interest to her supervisor in becoming a vice president. At the end of the year, she was given the highest overall evaluation possible: “Results consistently far exceed job requirements.” PX 4 at SNY000067a. The written comments included the following statements: i. Vicki has taken a small, misguided short date desk and efficiently turned it into a profitable, high volume operation through the thorough training and close monitering of her staff. ii. Vicki was instrumental in insuring [sic] that the BA program has been a success in spite of the enormous increase in volume, keeping accurate records, properly managing lines, limiting compensation problems. She has also successfully managed the short-date desk to operate efficiently and profitably. iii. Vicki’s responsibility in managing the deposit book is of prime importance to the bank and she has successfully achieved profit targets in a difficult market. She has proven to be an excellent manager in training her staff and making the short date operation profitable. iv. Through Vicki’s market expertise and the respect she receives from the other traders, Vicki is able to manage the desk while I am out. In light of the above, I recommend Vicki be promoted to Vice President. PX 4 (emphasis added). Pyron agreed with this recommendation and again took it to the GM committee, which again decided not to promote Greenbaum. See Tr. at 119-121. Pyron explained that the committee had decided a promotion was inappropriate at that time because vice presidents could not report to other vice presidents at SNY, and because Amoroso, her direct supervisor, was a vice president. See id. at 121. Amoroso testified at trial that this explanation did not make sense in the context of SNY’s corporate culture, see id., and that there had been several examples of vice presidents reporting to other vice presidents at the bank. See id. at 121-22; see also id. at 499,1276. In the next year, 1990, Greenbaum continued trading in the treasury department, where she supervised at least three persons, Freddie Koveath, Russ Pidgeon and Chuck Munziata. Id. at 620. Amoroso testified that Greenbaum was “directly responsible for a large part of [the bank’s] profits in [1990].” See id. at 184. At the end of the year, Greenbaum thus received the highest possible overall evaluation once again. The evaluation stated, among other things that: i. Vicki has been very successful in substantially increasing the bank’s profitability in 1990 by good trading positions, active management of the short-term gap and also emphasis on the profitable (and relatively risk-less) over-night positions. ii. She is directly responsible for a large part of the Treasury’s profits this year. As the bank has grown, so have Vicki’s responsibilities and she has successfully managed the increased demands of a larger bal--anee sheet. In light of the above, 1 recommend Vicki be promoted to Vice President. PX 5 (emphasis added). Pyron agreed with Amoroso’s evaluation once again and took it to the GM committee, which once again decided not to promote Greenbaum. See Tr. at 187-88. Pyron told Greenbaum that she was not given the title this time because the GM committee felt her “desk wasn’t big enough, that [she] didn’t have a vice-presidential job.” Id. at 62 3. Move to the Systems Department In 1991, Greenbaum was taken off the money market desk and transferred to the position of assistant deputy treasurer under Stefan Tunguz, who was deputy treasurer at the time. See id. at 623-24. Greenbaum expressed an interest in continuing to trade for the bank and asked Pyron and Tunguz whether the new job would be merely administrative. Tunguz told her that although her new position was in the systems department and was partly administrative, she could continue to do some trading under him, and that someone with her experience was needed to get the systems department off the ground. See id. at 625-26. He also indicated that if she did a good job, she would still make vice president at the end of the year. See id. at 626. When December came, Tunguz gave Greenbaum an average evaluation, which stated that she “met all standards” at her new position. PX 6. During 1991 and for some time thereafter, Tunguz, together with two other male members of his department, Dominick Carollo, a vice-president, and Chris Pa-tronis, a trader, were reported frequenting strip and topless clubs and recounting their visits in graphic detail in the office. Greenbaum and other women in the department repeatedly complained about this activity. See, e.g., Tr. at 236-39, 688-91. Carollo also reported to Greenbaum that another woman trader, who had been interviewed by Tunguz and Carollo, was not to be hired in the department because “[y]ou know how they feel about women in the bank.” Id. at 693-94. After Tunguz’s evaluation of Green-baum, the GM committee gave many of the other employees at SNY nearly 100% bonuses but gave Greenbaum a bonus of only $3,000. Greenbaum received no raise and no promotion to vice president. Id. at 627. At this point, Greenbaum met with Rag-na, who was the GM at the time, and asked him directly for an explanation as to why she was treated in this way. Ragna told her that the decision was not really his and that she should talk to Pyron and Tunguz. See id. at 632-33. Pyron, however, indicated that Ragna had the final say over these matters, and “that I [Greenbaum] [was] lucky even to get a $3,000 bonus” given that Ragna “had his own numbers” and initially wanted to give her no bonus at all. Id. at 634. In addition, although Greenbaum had been expecting to return to the trading desk shortly after this time, Pyron indicated that this probably would not happen at SNY and confided that he “th[ought] [she] should get [her] resume together.” Id. In 1992, Greenbaum continued her systems and administrative duties under Tun-guz. See id. She repeatedly told Tunguz that she would like to return to trading and become a vice president. See id. at 649. On October 6, 1992, Tunguz asked her to get involved in some of the bank’s swap trading by helping to supervise Meg Uyeno, who was then in control of the branch’s swap portfolio. See id. at 636-37. Carollo, who was present during Tunguz’s conversation with Greenbaum about the new assignment, expressed concern about two women working together. See id. at 639. At the end of the year, Tunguz reviewed her overall performance as “excellent,” but again Greenbaum received no promotion. PX 7. 4. Restoration to the Trading Desk In 1993, Greenbaum was finally restored to the trading desk. See Tr. at 210. Greenbaum was very successful during this year, earning almost $2 million in profits for the bank. Id. at 211. Tunguz and Amoroso reviewed her very highly, calling her performance “remarkable,” PX 8, and both agreed to recommend her for the title of vice president, see Tr. at 216-17. Tunguz even went so far as to tell Greenbaum, “I don’t see how they can say no to [your promotion] this year, Vicky, with profits like this.” Id. at 649. Nevertheless, Greenbaum was not promoted. Id. at 217-18. This time, no reason was given and Ragna, the GM at the time, apparently simply rejected the idea and brushed off Tunguz’s attempt to obtain an explanation with a dismissive hand gesture. Id. at 653-54. C. The Complaint and SNY’s Subsequent Employment Actions On January 6, 1994, shortly after learning that SNY was not going to promote her once again, Greenbaum filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”) charging SNY with employment practices that discriminated against her on the basis of her age and sex, both in violation of the New York State Human Rights Laws. See PX 65. The NYSDHR scheduled a conference with the parties to review the matter on April 19, 1994. See Tr. at 658. This conference, which was later rescheduled for May 9, 1994, was held at the NYSDHR’s offices at 125th Street in the Harlem section of Manhattan, with SNY officials present, including Ragna, Roberts and Kraig Klosson, senior vice president in charge of administration and systems. See id. at 659. SNY was accompanied by counsel at this meeting, and at trial. Ragna explained that SNY had contacted counsel to ensure that SNY complied with all of its legal obligations. See id. at 1156. Following Greenbaum’s complaint, Ragna also undertook to explain to various SNY officials both the seriousness of the retaliation laws and how the laws protected Green-baum. See, e.g., id. at 987-89. SNY’s policy handbook contained a section on equal employment opportunities, which explicitly prohibited “all forms of retaliation.” Id. at 980. Shortly after the conference, Tunguz left SNY, and Amoroso was promoted to Tun-guz’s position of treasurer, thereby leaving open the position of deputy treasurer. See id. at 218-19. In May 1994, Ragna, the then GM, and Roberts, the deputy GM, called Amoroso in to a meeting and informed him that they had decided to make the position of deputy treasurer available. See id. at 219-20. They also described the qualifications they were seeking. See id. at 220. Because Greenbaum had already been performing many of Amoroso’s prior duties when he was away, see id. at 748, and because he felt she was well qualified, Amoroso recommended Greenbaum, see id. at 220. Ragna and Roberts reacted “very negatively]” to this suggestion: Mr. Ragna said no immediately and Mr. Roberts started yelling and saying, do you know what she has done to us ... she has filed a complaint against the bank and she took us up to Harlem for some meeting and inconvenienced us and is trying to hurt the bank so how can you suggest someone like her. Id. at 220-21. When Amoroso asked what Roberts’s comment meant, Roberts “said that she had filed some complaint against the bank ... [and that] both he and Mr. Ragna were very upset about it, so they said absolutely not Mrs. Greenbaum, we wanted someone new or outside the bank.” Id. at 221. Amoroso was then instructed to talk to Joyce George, who was in charge of personnel, to draw up an official job posting for deputy treasurer. See id. at 222. During their conversation, George told Amoroso that “she admired [him] for recommending Mrs. Greenbaum and that ... it was admirable of [him] to suggest it because ... she knew that [Amoroso] knew it would hurt [him] eventually.” Id. at 223. Several other bank officials also discussed Greenbaum’s complaint with Amoroso and one official told Amoroso that he should not push Greenbaum for the deputy treasurer position. See id. at 224-230. That official explained that such an action would be “looked on very badly by Stockholm,” because “it was unheard of in Sweden” to “file a complaint against your employer.” Id. at 226. Although Amoroso testified that SNY officials never asked him to treat Green-baum any differently in the ensuing period, see id. at 285, they asked him to watch her very closely and repeatedly inquired about her performance and attitude, see, e.g., id. at 225, 228-30, 285. Amoroso repeatedly responded that she was working well and hard, id. at 226, 228, and told them that she “made money even in 1994,” id. at 229. In January 1994, Greenbaum made approximately $128,000 for the bank. See PX 80a. From December 1993 through the end of February 1994, she made approximately $658,540 for the bank. See PX 80b. There is no evidence suggesting that Greenbaum stopped making profits for SNY at any point while she worked at the bank as a trader. In or around October 1994, SNY underwent a reorganization, and the branch was divided into an “HMT” (treasury) and an “HMX” (fixed income) division. The former dealt primarily with investments with maturities of one year or less, and the latter dealt primarily with interest rate securities with maturities of greater than one year. See id. at 664, 666, 990; see also JT 1. Although Greenbaum had experience with both types of investments, see Tr. at 667, and although there was a vacancy in the money market desk in the HMT division, see PX 76 at 000824, SNY placed Greenbaum in the HMX division, see JT 1. That division was managed by the central treasury in Stockholm, see JT 13, and Greenbaum reported directly to Stephen Downes, who was the new head of the New York HMX desk, see Tr. at 989. By placing Greenbaum with the HMX division, SNY effectively separated her from the great bulk of its traders: excluding division heads, seventeen employees were placed in the HMT division and only three—Victoria Greenbaum, Meg Uyeno and Russ Pidgeon—were placed in the HMX. Uyeno was on maternity leave at the time. Like Greenbaum, she had a complaint pending with the NYSDHR, alleging sex and age discrimination against SNY. See Tr. at 990. On February 24, 1995, the NYSDHR determined that it had. jurisdiction over Greenbaum’s complaint and issued a finding of probable cause that SNY had engaged in or was engaging in unlawful discriminatory practices against Greenbaum. See PX 65. Four months after being placed in the HMX desk and less than two months after the NYSDHR’s determination of probable cause, Greenbaum received a letter from Downes, dated April 10, 1995, which informed her that she was being terminated as part of a general phase-out of New York’s HMX division. The letter stated: The Handlesbanken Markets division HMX has decided, after due consideration and consultation with local management, no longer to operate a trading desk in New York. Therefore, I am very sorry to inform you that the duties you currently perform for the Bank will no longer be required after April 28th 1995. This action is in no way critical of your personal performance and I wish to thank you for the hard work and professional ability you have given to the Bank. JT 11. At trial, Ragna, SNY’s GM from 1991 to 1994 and a long-time employee of SHB, testified that if a “person’s job was eliminated [at SNY], an effort was made to find a new position for that individual within the bank” and that the bank generally tried to “minimize any difficulty for the individual.” Tr. at 1241. He also stated that he could not recall any individuals who were asked to take a reduction in salary upon being assigned a new position under these circumstances. See id. at 1242. Greenbaum’s termination letter did indicate that a position would be posted in the near future to help manage a portfolio for the central treasury and that Green-baum would be welcome to apply. After receiving this letter, Greenbaum met with Downes and George to discuss her termination and the possibility of applying for this unposted job. See Tr. at 672. Downes described the new position as mainly administrative, see id. at 673, and Greenbaum, who was making $107,000 per year at the time, subsequently received a letter from George informing her that the position would be in the salary range of only $60,000 to $75,000 per year, see id. at 674-75. Greenbaum decided not to apply for the job, and her tenure with SNY ended on April 28, 1995. See id. at 676. Pidgeon, who was the only male in the recently phased-out HMX division and who had been making only $62,500 per year, applied for the position, obtained it and procured a salary increase of $5,000. See JT 31 at 003114. Uyeno, who was the other woman in the HMX division and who had also filed a discrimination complaint against SNY, was terminated on April 28, 1995. See Tr. at 679. D. The Prior Proceedings On May 26, 1995, Greenbaum brought this action against SNY claiming that SNY violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the equivalent provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Administrative Code. In particular, Greenbaum alleged that SNY engaged in a continuing violation of her civil rights by consistently refusing to promote her to vice president because of her sex and age in the years 1988 to 1994, and by refusing to increase her salary and benefits in a manner commensurate with this position. Greenbaum also claimed that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of her sex during this period. Finally, Greenbaum claimed that SNY retaliated against her by failing to promote her to deputy treasurer in 1994 and by terminating her in 1995, all because she filed an administrative complaint with the NYSDHR and participated in its subsequent investigations. The Court held a jury trial from April 28 to May 12, 1997. Because the appropriate burden of proof for establishing punitive damages was unclear under state law, the Court charged the jury under both a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which was applicable under Title VII, and a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, which some state courts had suggested was applicable under state law. On May 16, 1997, the jury rendered a verdict finding in favor of Greenbaum on her claims of sex discrimination between 1989 and 1994 (ie,, for six of the seven years alleged) and retaliation, but against her on her claims for sexual harassment and age discrimination. The jury awarded Greenbaum $320,-000 in back pay, refused her any front pay, and decided that punitive damages in the amount of $1,250,000 were warranted by a preponderance of the evidence but not by clear and convincing evidence. After receiving post-trial motions from the parties, the Court held that the preponderance-of-the evidence standard was appropriate for assessing punitive damages under New York state law. See Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y., 979 F.Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y.1997). The Court also held that the jury’s back pay award included prejudgment interest and that reinstatement and front pay were inappropriate remedies under the circumstances. See id. Finally, the Court awarded Greenbaum $336,778.88 in attorneys’ fees, see Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y., 998 F.Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.1998), and decided that the applicable cap on punitive damages awardable under Title VII in this case was $300,000, see Greenbaum v. Svenska Handlesbanken, N.Y., 26 F.Supp.2d 649 (S.D.N.Y.1998). Only SNY’s motions for judgment as a matter of law remain. This opinion addresses these motions. DISCUSSION The standards for reviewing Rule 50(b) motions are well settled. Courts may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if there is either “ ‘such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men could not arrive at a verdict against [the moving party].’ ” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 429 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Song v. Ives Labs., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir.1992) (internal quotes and alterations omitted)). In applying these standards, courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences ... that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence. The court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir.1988) (internal quotes omitted). Although courts must credit any genuinely uncontradicted evidence in support of a moving party’s position, see Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir.1990), they must focus on the evidence, and on the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence, in support of the jury’s findings. See 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2529, at 573 (1971). Before addressing SNY’s arguments, the Court notes that SNY’s briefs reveal a defect that pervades many, if not all, of its arguments. Rather than attending to the proper Rule 50(b) standards, SNY often cites only those isolated portions of the record that support its positions and claims that this evidence is undisputed when the record contains ample evidence to the contrary. SNY also tends to view the evidence in a light most favorable to its own positions and to assert that this evidence supports unique factual conclusions when opposing inferences could also be reasonably drawn. The Court calls attention to these facts only to highlight this potentially recurring problem and to underscore the importance of viewing the record in its proper Rule 50(b) light. I. Discrimination in Promotions and Compensation SNY’s first argument for judgment as a matter of law alleges that the jury’s findings of sex discrimination in this case should be vacated because the record contains insufficient evidence for a jury to have found an adverse employment decision that was motivated in part by Green-baum’s sex. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from “disceriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1998). This provision has been read to prohibit discriminatory failures to promote, see, e.g., Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1998), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y.Exec.Law § 296(1)(a), and New York City’s Administrative Code, N.Y.C.Admin.Code § 8-107(1)(a), also bar this kind of discrimination. SNY challenges the jury’s findings that SNY violated all three of these statutes, first, by failing to promote Green-baum to vice president in the period of 1989 to 1994, and, second, by failing to compensate her in an amount commensurate with what other similarly situated males received. Because the evidentiary burdens for establishing sex discrimination under city and state law are identical to those under Title VII, see Ferrante v. American Lung Assoc., 90 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 665 N.Y.S.2d 25, 687 N.E.2d 1308 (1997) (state law); Walsh v. Covenant House, 244 A.D.2d 214, 664 N.Y.S.2d 282, 283 (1st Dep’t 1997) (city law), the Court need only address the evidence under the relevant Title VII analysis. A. Fisher and the Standards for Reviewing Evidence of Title VII Violations Courts have traditionally analyzed Title VII claims under a three-step burden-shifting test, which the Supreme Court first formulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To prevail on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must establish, first, a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class (2) who was qualified for a position and (3) was denied the position (4) under circumstances giving at least minimal support to an inference of discrimination. See id.; see also Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 311-12 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 & n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Establishment of a prima facie case shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment decision. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). At the third stage, the plaintiff then bears the burden of showing “on the basis of all the evidence presented and without the benefit of any presumptions, that it is more likely than not that the employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by discrimination.” Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 879 (2d Cir.1997). Before the Second Circuit’s decision in Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir.1997) (in bane) (“Fisher II ”), the law was ambiguous as to how to interpret a defendant’s second-stage burden under this framework. If defendants in Title VII cases were viewed as bearing the burden of explaining their actions—i.e., by producing a legitimate and non-discriminatory ground, which actually motivated their adverse employment decision—then it would seem to follow that plaintiffs could establish discrimination at the third stage simply by showing that these proffered reasons were pretextual. This is because the fact-finder would then, in effect, be left with an unrefuted prima facie showing. If, on the other hand, defendants at the second stage were viewed as bearing only the burden of producing some legitimate and non-discriminatory explanation for their employment action—i.e., whether or not this explanation was true—then a finding of pretext would not necessarily be sufficient to infer discrimination at the third stage. In Fisher II, the Second Circuit adopted this latter view, holding that a finding of pretext will be sufficient to impose Title VII liability only if the circumstances and other evidence in the case suggest that the employer’s explanation was not only pretextual but was also a pretext for discrimination. See 114 F.3d at 1345. Fisher II signaled an important development in this Circuit’s Title VII jurisprudence, and one the meaning of which is still being elaborated. Specifically, Fisher II left open the question of how much probative value to accord a finding of pretext in determining whether discriminatory intent existed. Because that question bears directly on the resolution of this case, and because some courts have overstated Fisher II’s holding on this point, a brief discussion of these issues is appropriate before turning to the evidence in the present case. Fisher II involved a Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) challenge to Vassar college’s decision not to promote Fisher to a tenured position in its biology department after she had completed a three-year contract as an associate professor. The district court found that Vassar’s reasons for this decision — ie., that Fisher failed to meet the recognized and stated requirements for tenure in the biology department — were false, and that Fisher instead was denied tenure on the basis of her age and sex-plus-marital-status. On appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit rejected all of the plaintiffs evidence except for that supporting her prima facie case and the district court’s finding of pretext. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir.1995) (“Fisher I ”) (collectively, “Fisher ”). The court then reviewed the district court’s findings of discrimination and found them to be clearly erroneous. The full court finally reheard the case in banc on the limited question of whether review for clear error was even appropriate when the plaintiff had established both a prima facie case and pretext. See Fisher II, 114 F.3d at 1332. The court answered this question in the affirmative, relying heavily on the general proposition that “[individual decision-makers may intentionally dissemble in order to hide a reason that is non-discriminatory but unbecoming or small minded, such as back-scratching, log-rolling, horsetrading, institutional politics, envy, nepotism, spite, or personal hostility.” Id. at 1337. Although the court thus held that a finding of pretext does not always warrant a verdict in the plaintiffs favor, it did not—as SNY urges—hold that a finding of pretext is generally irrelevant to the ultimate question of discrimination. The court in Fisher II was in fact very careful to note that “a finding of pretext will in many circumstances powerfully support a finding of discrimination.” Id. at 1345; see also id. at 1338 (“The sufficiency of [a] finding of pretext to support a finding of discrimination depends on the circumstances of the case.”). Unfortunately, the court provided little guidance as to which circumstances might warrant such an inference. The court suggested only that [generally speaking, the stronger the [independent] evidence that illegal discrimination is present, the greater the likelihood that discrimination is what the employer’s false statement seeks to conceal. And, conversely, the weaker the evidence of discrimination, the less reason there is to believe that the employer’s false statement concealed discrimination, as opposed to the numerous other reasons for which employers so frequently give false reasons for employment decisions. Id. at 1346-47. Apart from this general guideline, the Court stated that [t]o the extent that an actor in defendant’s position is unlikely to have proffered a false explanation except to conceal a discriminatory motive, then the false explanation will be powerful evidence of discrimination. On the other hand, if the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent. Id. at 1338 (emphasis added). In order to understand the factual applicability of these general pronouncements, a review of the circumstances leading up to the Fisher II decision is necessary. As noted above, the in banc panel in Fisher II limited its consideration to the purely legal question of whether review for clear error was even appropriate when the evidence supports a prima facie case and a finding of pretext. The answer to this question did not require applying the clear error test to the specific facts of the case. An examination of the facts underlying the original panel’s application of this test can, however, help illuminate the proper breadth of Fisher IPs otherwise abstract language. This examination reveals several unorthodox facts that affected the outcome of the case. As an initial matter Fisher involved a tenure decision. Because tenure generally involves the grant of nearly irrevocable rights to pay and continued employment, this sort of promotion is a rather extraordinary and uncommon practice from the employment perspective. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92-93 (2d Cir.1984) (discussing unique characteristics of tenure decisions). Even in the context of a college like Vassar, where tenure was the norm for full professors, the record suggested that less than half of the candidates considered at the expiration of their contracts as associate professors normally obtained tenured positions. See generally Fisher I, 70 F.3d at 1442-45. The record also suggested that grants of tenure were not always tied only to candidates’ qualifications in their fields of specialization. Rather, individual departments, which were often quite small,-had legitimate interests in maintaining a faculty that could cover a broad range of topics. This sometimes necessitated tenuring only periodically, in areas where a particular weakness had developed in the department’s tenured faculty. Fisher thus involved an adverse employment decision in a context where many qualified candidates could reasonably expect that they would more likely than not be denied tenure at the end of their contracts. ' Moreover, the statistics in Fisher called the likelihood of discrimination based on sex plus marital status into severe doubt. The record showed, for example, that four of six married women who were in tenure-track positions at the time Fisher was denied tenure—Janet K. Andrews, Debra Meloy Elmegreen, Janet M. Gray and Nancy M. Ide— received tenure in the natural sciences departments. See id. at 1445. Two other women — Pinina Norrod and Patricia Johnson—were married when hired or divorced when granted tenure in Vassar’s biology department. See id. One married woman—Gwen J. Broude—was tenured in the psychology department in 1983, and campus-wide, eighteen of the twenty-three married women considered for tenure between 1972 to 1984 succeeded. See id. at 1444,1445. Finally, and most importantly, the record suggested a plausible alternative reason, which Vassar may not have wanted to reveal in the litigation, for Vassar’s adverse employment decision. In particular, the record showed that Fisher left academia to work in the home for an eight-year period in the middle of her academic career. As the original panel noted, “evidence [in the record] support[ed] an inference that Fisher’s eight-year absence from acedemia hurt her chance for tenure” because many members of the tenure committee viewed biology as a rapidly developing field, which required more consistent devotion to stay abreast of its developments. See id. at 1448. Vassar may have been reluctant to proffer this explanation, however, given that Fisher was bringing a claim for age discrimination and that one of her theories of sex discrimination rested on the theory that “this hiatus [was only] a proxy for having children and family.” Id. at 1448. Proferring such an explanation thus carried the significant risk of exposing Vassar to liability on other grounds, and, in these circumstances, Vassar had highly plausible reasons to lie about its refusal to tenure Fisher. The evidence in support of this explanation was, moreover, sufficiently strong to have compelled the conclusion that this explanation was at least as probable as discrimination. Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192 (2d Cir.1999), decided after the close of briefing in this case, provides another example of how a finding of pretext may not ultimately prove discrimination. In Hollander, the Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment against the plaintiff on his age discrimination claim, finding that despite “some doubt” as to the veracity of the defendant’s nondiscriminatory justification, the record did not support the conclusion that Hollander was terminated because of his age. See id. at 200. The court noted that even if the defendant’s explanation was pretex-tual, it “may have been pretext for various nondiscriminatory reasons,” and cited evidence suggesting that friction between the plaintiff and his supervisor was the real motivating factor. Id. at 201-02 & n. 5. Hollander thus squarely applies Fisher's rule that a prima facie case plus a finding of pretext will not compel a finding of discrimination in circumstances where the record reveals not only “many possible reasons for the false explanation, stated or unstated,” but concrete facts and circumstances that make these alternative explanations plausible enough to compel the conclusion that the “illegal discrimination [was] no more likely [the motivating force] than [the alternatives.]” Fisher II, 114 F.3d at 1338 (emphasis added). In sum, although the in banc panel in Fisher II held that review for clear error is generally appropriate when discrimination is inferred from a plaintiffs prima facie case and a finding of pretext, the original panel’s reversal rested on extraordinary circumstances, where the record left a “definite” and “firm” conviction that “a mistake ha[d] been committed [in finding Title VII liability].” Id. at 1427. Nothing in Fisher II suggests that in many, much less most, other contexts, a fact-finder must refrain from inferring discrimination from an employer’s inability to explain its actions credibly—especially when the employer is responding to a charge of discrimination. See, e.g., St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (holding that the “factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that “the [.McDonnell Douglas] prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination ... because we [ordinarily] presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (holding that in some circumstances, “rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination, ... and no additional proof of discrimination is required.”). Although this presumption, which operates as a matter of law at the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, may not apply in every circumstance at the third stage of the inquiry, it certainly has common sense appeal in the ordinary case. Fact-finders must, moreover, generally rely on common sense propositions like these, gleaned from their everyday experience, to perform their fact-finding functions. See Fisher II, 114 F.3d at 1338 ("What is at issue is the drawing of inferences from human behavior.”). The above discussion is limited to the probative value of a finding of pretext in discrimination cases. It bears repeating that either the original evidence in support of a plaintiffs prima facie case or the independent evidence of discrimination can sometimes be strong enough to support a finding of discrimination as well. With these considerations in mind, the Court turns to the evidence in this case. B. Failures to Promote Given the framework discussed, there is undoubtedly enough evidence in this case for a reasonable juror to have inferred that Greenbaum’s gender played a role in SNY’s decision not to promote her between 1989 and 1994. First, the plaintiff met all the elements of her prima facie case. As a woman, the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, and a reasonable juror could have concluded that Greenbaum was qualified for a promotion from her supervisor’s testimony that she was initially hired for a vice presidential job in terms of responsibilities, from the fact that her responsibilities only grew during most of this period, and from the fact that she often filled in for Amoro-so, who was a vice president, when he was away. Greenbaum’s qualifications were also supported by the consistently excellent evaluations she received during all but one of the years in question, when she was transferred out of her area of expertise and received an average evaluation from Tunguz—an alleged sexual harasser—in the systems department. SNY concedes the next element of Greenbaum’s prima facie case—i.e., that she was consistently denied the title of vice president—but argues that the denials did not occur under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination because no man ever received a promotion instead of her. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (noting that it is probative of discrimination when position sought is ultimately granted to person who is not a member of plaintiffs protected class). This last fact does not impair Greenbaum’s prima facie case, however, because Green-baum established that competition for the title of vice president title was not a zero-sum game at SNY: rather than competing for a position that opened only intermittently and could be filled by only one person at a time, she was competing for a title that could be given out at any time and to any number of people. See, e.g., Tr. at 498-99. In this factual context, Green-baum produced evidence suggesting that SNY’s failure to promote her occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination by showing that she was consistently recommended and consistently rejected at a firm where men who received this type of support from a supervisor were routinely granted the title. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (noting that the type of proof needed to establish a prima facie case is not inflexible and will depend on the circumstances of the case); Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that the “inference of discriminatory element” of a prima facie case “may be proven by showing that a man similarly situated was treated differently”). Moreover, although SNY proffered several legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Greenbaum during this period, a reasonable jury could have found these reasons pretextual. The explanation Greenbaum received after her annual review, in 1989—that vice presidents could not report to other vice presidents at SNY, and that her direct supervisor, Amoroso, already had this title—was affirmatively called into doubt by evidence of several examples to the contrary and by Amoroso’s testimony that the explanation “didn’t make sense” in the context of SNY’s corporate culture. The explanation Greenbaum received after her next annual review, in 1990—that her “desk wasn’t big enough, that [she] didn’t have a vice-presidential job”—likewise was contradicted by Amoroso’s testimony that she was hired for a vice-presidential job in the first place, that she performed many of Amoro-so’s duties when he was away, and that her desk was a very profitable part of one of the branch’s main profit centers. After her annual reviews in the remaining period from 1991 to 1994, Greenbaum was not given any explanation for the failure to promote her but was told that Ragna, the GM at the time, had essentially vetoed the idea. At trial, Ragna testified that he did not promote Greenbaum between 1991 and 1994 because he never received a recommendation for her promotion from her supervisors. See Tr. at 1215, 1217 (testimony of Ragna) (explaining that the organization’s way of “dealing with promotions [was] that you have a strong recommendation from a senior person, that person’s superior, and I did not have that [for Greenbaum] at that time”); see also id. at 1049 (testimony of Zell, GM in 1989) (claiming that Pyron had not recommended Greenbaum for promotion). As noted, however, both Amoroso and Pyron testified that Greenbaum’s evaluations and recommendations had been presented to the GM and the GM committee on many occasions, and that they, Amoroso and Pyron, advanced her candidacy consistently and strenuously. See, e.g., Tr. at 97-122, 181-88, 491-98. A reasonable jury could have credited this testimony and found Ragna’s explanations (and Zell’s) pretextual. Finally, under the specific circumstances of this case, a finding of pretext could have been probative of discriminatory intent. As an initial matter, the decisions not to promote Greenbaum occurred in a corporate setting where there was apparently no limit to the number of vice presidents in the company, where no vacancy was required for a promotion, where traders could be promoted to vice president without any substantial changes in duties or responsibilities that might require additional experience, and where promotion led to no new limitations on SNY’s right to terminate the employment. See, e.g., Tr. at 498-99. Thus, at SNY, unlike in the employment context examined in Fisher, employees had a reasonable expectation of promotion upon recommendation by their department heads, and qualifications were intimately tied to this recommendation. Many of the considerations that were at play in Fisher and that may have contributed to the department’s failure to promote the plaintiff in that case, including the scarcity of positions, the need for a different type of non-fungible specialist, and the irreversibility of the decision, are thus absent from this case. More importantly, although in principle, SNY might have acted on all sorts of reasons that it did not reveal in this litigation, the record is devoid of credible evidence that would make any particular explanation as likely as discrimination. There is, moreover, evidence in the record suggesting that SNY was attempting to explain not just an ordinary adverse employment decision but one that deviated significantly from its ordinary promotional practices. Cf. Stratton, 132 F.3d at 879 n. 6 (holding that “[a]ctions taken by an employer that disadvantage an employee for no logical reason constitute strong evidence of an intent to discriminate” and that an employer’s decision “ ‘may have been so unusual or idiosyncratic as to shed light upon [its] motivation’” in taking the adverse employment action) (quoting In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 633 (6th Cir.1988)). In this case, testimony indicated that the GM committees gave SNY’s department heads great deference in terms of their hiring and promotion decisions. See e.g., Tr. at 1044-46, 1123-24, 1217. Although the GM had the final say with regard to these decisions, the recommendations of department heads apparently were routinely rubber-stamped and the GM committee’s approval was considered a pro forma step in the promotional process. See, e.g., Tr. at 540. Thus, the evidence that Greenbaum was consistently recommended by her department head but was consistently rejected by the GM and GM committee would, if credited, strongly suggest that SNY departed from its ordinary practices in her particular case. Absent some explanation, this kind of departure strongly supports an ultimate finding of discrimination. Cf. Stratton, 132 F.3d at 879 n. 6. Greenbaum was also given not one reason but a series of different ones, each of which was found to be pretextual by the jury, and the consistency and repetition of these shifting pretextual explanations lends further credibility to the contention that they served to mask an impermissible consideration. See EEOC v. Ethan Allen, 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir.1994) (noting that shifting explanations can be probative of discrimination); Schmitz v. St. Regis Paper Co., 811 F.2d 131, 132 (2d Cir.1987) (finding inconsistencies as evidence undermining credibility of employers’s motives). Finally, all of the allegedly illicit actions in this case occurred at a bank where only one member of Greenbaum’s protected class, Debra Orlando, had been hired as a vice president in the treasury department in the relevant time period. Orlando was also forced out of her position within a month after Roberts, the deputy GM, described her as “too aggressive.” Tr. at 506. She was also the only one in her otherwise all-male group who was not retained at the bank after her group’s work was eliminated. Id. at 507. Consequently, none of the statistical facts that called a finding of discrimination into doubt in Fisher are present in this case. In these circumstances, a finding of pretext presents powerful evidence of discriminatory intent, and a reasonable juror could have found a Title VII violation on the basis of Greenbaum’s prima facie case along with a finding of pretext. The record also contains, however, ample independent evidence that would support a finding of discrimination. As the Second Circuit has said: Evidence of sexual stereotyping may provide proof that an employment decision ... was based on gender. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court considered an employer’s decision not to promote a female employee in reliance on partners’ evaluations that the plaintiff was too “aggressive.” The Court upheld the trial court’s finding that that characterization “showed sex stereotyping” in operation. It stated that “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman” cannot properly have a certain characteristic “has acted on the basis of gender.” Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for [i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by 1991 Civil Rights Act. In this case, several GMs stated at trial that two of the six principal criteria for promotion to vice president were whether someone could be a proper “role model” for the bank and whether the bank would be “comfortable” with the individual representing the bank. Tr. at 1143, 1131-32. With regai-d to the criteria that SNY used to identify these appropriate role models and representatives, other evidence suggested that the word “aggressive” was used by SNY officials to describe a form of excellence when describing male traders, see e.g. Tr. at 502, but was viewed as a ground for disqualification when considering a woman like Greenbaum, see, e.g., id. at 521-22; see also id. at 506. Indeed, Pyron testified that members of the GM committee described Greenbaum negatively as an “aggressive woman,” Id. at 521-23, and this evidence reasonably could suggest that Greenbaum’s “aggressiveness” was a reason for SNY’s refusal to promote her. This evidence is particularly probative when viewed against Greenbaum’s evaluations and performance record, which indicated that she consistently met each of the other four criteria for vice president (ie., a strong performance record, a good management record, an important position and dedication to the job). A reasonable juror could have inferred from this evidence that Greenbaum was denied the title of vice president in part because SNY applied standards for promotion that were inappropriately stereotypical and gender-biased. Finally, the record indicates that Roberts, a high level official who was the number-two person at the bank and the only manager who was present during Greenbaum’s entire time of employment, stated at one point that he “was against [hiring a particular female candidate for deputy treasurer] on the grounds that he didn’t think a woman could control the treasury, the trading people,” because the treasury “wouldn’t listen to a woman.” Tr. at 501-02. Although this sort of comments might suggest that Roberts would have preferred a woman with the aggressive qualities needed to “control the treasury,” the opposite inference is more plausible given that Roberts also referred to another women negatively as a “tough broad,” and stated publicly that he did not want a “tough broad” working at SNY. Id. at 247, 109 S.Ct. 1775. While Roberts did not have the sole authority to decide whether Greenbaum should be promoted, he was a senior member of the committee that had this authority, and was the only person who was a member of this committee for the entire time period in which the jury found sex discrimination. Roberts also shared an office with the GM, who was the most senior member of the committee, and Roberts was often called upon to perform many of the GM’s duties. Other courts have held that comments by high-ranking officials such as Robe