Full opinion text
AMENDED OPINION GREENAWAY, District Judge. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendants Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) and its German subsidiary, Ford Werke A.G. (“Ford Werke”) (collectively “Defendants”), seeking to dismiss plaintiff Elsa Iwanowa’s (“Iwanowa” or “Plaintiff’) Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Before this Court ruled on the above-mentioned motion, Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on the grounds of nonjusticiability and international comity. This Court shall consider each of Defendants’ motions. This action arises out of Iwanowa’s allegations that Ford Werke coerced her, and thousands of other persons, to perform forced labor under inhuman conditions during World War II without compensation. The Complaint asserts causes of action against Defendants (1) for restitution/unjust enrichment and quantum me-ruii/quasi-contract under Michigan and Delaware law; (2) for restitution/unjust enrichment under German law; and (3) for violations of the law of nations. Iwanowa seeks disgorgement of all economic benefits which have accrued to Defendants as a result of her forced labor, compensation for the reasonable value of her services and damages for the inhuman conditions Ford Werke inflicted upon her. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims under international law for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), is denied. Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of the claims, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is granted. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of nonjusticiability and international comity is also granted. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. BACKGROUND NAZI GERMANY Ford established its German subsidiary, Ford Werke, in 1925. (Compl.f 6.) In 1931, Ford Werke moved its headquarters and manufacturing plant to Cologne, Ger-many. (Id.) Ford Werke’s Cologne plant produced passenger vehicles until 1938, when it began manufacturing tracked vehicles for the German government to be used to transport troops and military equipment during World War II. (Comply 11.) By 1941, Ford Werke had ceased production of passenger vehicles and had begun to devote its entire production capacity to the manufacture of military trucks. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that Ford Werke produced approximately sixty percent (60%) of the three-ton tracked vehicles the German army used during World War II. (Id.) By December, 1941, the German National Socialist Party (the “Nazis”) had achieved domination over territories, in Europe and elsewhere, with an aggregate population of 350,000,000 people. (Compl.f 8.) The Nazi juggernaut required more labor than the voluntary labor the German people could provide. (Id.) In order to support its war effort, the Nazi regime turned to unpaid, forced labor. (Id.) Specifically, the Nazis used forced labor from the captive population, inmates of concentration camps and prisoners of war. (Id.) On March 21, 1942, the Nazi Party appointed Fritz Sauckel (“Sauckel”) as Nazi Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, with explicit authority over all available manpower, including workers recruited from abroad and prisoners of war. (Comply 9.) After Sauckel’s appointment, the Nazi regime obtained forced laborers by conducting manhunts in the streets, movie houses and churches. (Id.) The Nazi regime forcibly deported over 7,500,-000 persons from occupied territories to Germany to support its war effort. (Id.) Sauckel encouraged German industries to bid for forced laborers in order to meet production quotas and to increase their profits. (Id. f 10.) The Complaint alleges that Ford Werke began utilizing French prisoners of war as forced laborers in 1941 and continued utilizing thousands of forced laborers throughout World War II. (Id.) The Complaint further alleges that by 1942, unpaid, forced laborers comprised twenty-five percent (25%) of Ford Werke’s work force. (Id.) By 1943, that percentage had risen to fifty percent (50%), where it remained until the end of the war. (Id.) The forced laborers at Ford Werke’s Cologne plant included French prisoners of war; Russian, Ukrainian, Italian and Belgian civilians; and concentration camp inmates from Buchenwald. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that Ford Werke profited from the use of forced laborers because, although it paid the Nazi government for its use of the prisoners, it did not compensate the laborers for their work. (Comply 12.) Consequently, Ford Werke’s annual profits doubled between 1939 and 1943. (Id.) The Complaint further alleges that Ford Werke placed its wartime profits in a growing reserve account or reinvested them in the company through the building of additional production capacity. (Id.) In the years succeeding the war, as a result of its economic reserves and increased production capacity, Ford Werke continued producing trucks at a substantial profit, even though most of Europe, and specifically the German economy, was devastated. (Id. ¶ 14.) Iwanowa alleges that Ford Werke’s internal reserves and large production capacity resulted from the work of unpaid, forced laborers. (Id.) In addition to bringing suit against Ford Werke, Iwanowa has also named Ford, Ford Werke’s parent company, as a defendant. Ford is a party based on its ownership of between fifty-two percent (52%) to seventy-five percent (75%) of Ford Werke’s outstanding shares during World War II. (Id. ¶ 15.) Although the Nazi party nationalized or confiscated many American companies in Germany, the Nazis did not confiscate Ford Werke as enemy property; instead, the Nazis allowed Ford to continue its controlling ownership of Ford Werke. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Indeed, the Nazis named Robert H. Schmidt (“Schmidt”), Ford Werke’s CEO, Wehr-wirtschaftsfuehrer, meaning Military Economic Leader. (Id. ¶ 17.) In addition to his duties as Military Economic Leader, Schmidt continued to manage Ford Werke on Ford’s behalf until the end of the War. (Id.) IWANOWA Plaintiff Iwanowa was born in 1925, in Rostov, Russia. Starting in November, 1941, the Nazi army occupied Rostov. (Compl-¶ 24.) In June, 1942, the Nazi army began abducting adolescents as young as fourteen (14) years of age for transportation to Germany as forced laborers. (Id.) On October 6, 1942, Nazi troops abducted Iwanowa and transported her to Germany with approximately 2,000 other adolescents. (Id. f 25.) When Iwanowa arrived in Wuppertal, Germany, a representative of Ford Werke purchased her, along with thirty-eight (38) other adolescents from Rostov. (Id.) Ford Werke’s representative had Iwanowa, and the other adolescents, transported to Ford Werke’s plant in Cologne. (Id.) Once in Cologne, Ford Werke placed Iwanowa with approximately sixty-five Ukrainian deportees in a wooden hut, without heat, running water or sewage facilities. (Id.) They slept in three-tiered bunks without bedding and were locked in at night. (Id.) From 1942-1945, Ford Werke required Iwanowa to perform heavy labor at its Cologne plant. (Id. ¶ 26.) Iwanowa’s assignment consisted of drilling holes into the motor blocks of engines for military trucks. (Id.) Ford Werke security officials supervised the forced laborers, at times using rubber truncheons to beat those who failed to meet production quotas. (Id.) Iwanowa continued to perform forced labor for Ford Werke until 1945, when the victorious Allied Powers liberated her, and thousands of other slave laborers, in 1945. After the War, she became a citizen of Belgium, where she presently resides. Ford Werke’s forced laborers, including Iwanowa, have never received compensation for their years of forced labor. (Id. ¶ 27.) On March 8, 1998, Iwanowa filed the instant suit on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of thousands of persons who were compelled to perform forced labor for Ford Werke between 1941-1945. Iwanowa seeks compensation for the reasonable value of her services, restitution of unjust enrichment flowing to Defendants, as a consequence of her labor, and damages for the pain and suffering that Defendants’ imposition of inhuman working conditions caused her. Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims under the law of nations; (2) all of the claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (3) the Complaint fails to state a cognizable cause of action; (4) the claims are nonjusticiable; and (5) consideration of the instant claims would violate principles of international comity. This Court heard oral argument on Defendants’ motions on March 8,1999 and August 5,1999. DISCUSSION I. OVERVIEW OF GERMAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM In their submissions, the parties refer this Court to German cases and statutes; thus, a brief overview of the current German judicial system is essential. Foreign law questions are considered questions of law in the federal courts, and may be resolved by reference to any relevant information. Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1; see also Si-dali v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 107 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1997) (stating that “[t]he determination of foreign law in the federal courts is a question of law.”). The German court system creates a dichotomy between ordinary courts and special courts. See I Business Transactions in Germany § 4.04[2] (Campbell et al. eds., 1998) [“I Business Transactions ”]. Ordinary courts handle all civil and criminal cases not otherwise assigned by law to one of the six special courts: labor courts, administrative courts, social welfare courts, tax courts, constitutional courts and the Federal Patent Court. Id. Since its unification in 1991, Germany consists of sixteen states: eleven from the former Federal Republic of Germany (“F.R.G.” or “West Germany”), and five from the former German Democratic Republic (“G.D.R.” or “East Germany”). See Germany: Lato Digest of the Federal Republic of Germany, in MaHindale-Hub-bell International Law Digest GER-1, GER-1 [“Germany: Law Digest ”]. There are ordinary courts and special courts at both the federal and state level. So far as here material, German law is federal law and, thus, is identical in each of the States. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a]; Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1193, 1195-96 (1958). Further, although state court judges are appointed and paid by the state where the court sits, the state courts’ jurisdiction and procedure is established by federal law. See Kaplan, supra, at 1195. Consequently, although the first level of review is always before a state court, unlike the United States, there are no parallel federal and state courts in Germany. See id.; see also Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-10. As in most civil law jurisdictions, Ger-many does not follow the rule of stare decisis. See Randi Seltzer, The Erroneous Interpretation of the Foreign Compulsion Defense in the ADEAc Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 23 Brook. J. Int’l L. 655, 682 (1997) (stating that German courts do no more than apply the law when they make a decision, thus, “the decision itself can have no force as law beyond the very case in which it is rendered.”) (citing Norbert Horn et al., German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction 11 (Tony Weir, trans., 1982)); Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitutional Law, 1997 Utah L.Rev. 963, 970 n. 22 (citing Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 48 (1989)); see also (I Tr. at 17:22-25.) (stating that “German courts don’t abide by stare decisis. There’s no principle of stare decisis under German law. They [German courts], respectfully, look at past cases, but each case is supposed to do on its own from the civil code.”). In practice, however, German courts strive to adhere to precedent and generally follow the holdings of the German Supreme Court, the highest court for civil and criminal matters. See Eberle, supra, at 970 n. 22; see also David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtstaat, 61 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1795, 1847 (1988) (stating that “judge made law in Germany occupies large areas in the corpus of legal rules. In some ways German judges are just as bold and innovative as their common law colleagues.”); Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study 90, 97 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991) (stating that although precedents are not a formal source of German law, they play an important role in justifying judicial decisions, and the party wishing to depart from precedent carries the burden of argument). Moreover, decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court represent binding interpretations of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz. See Eberle, supra, at 970 n. 22. A. Ordinary Courts The lowest ordinary courts are the Amtsgerichte, the Municipal Courts (also known as Local Courts). See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-10. Municipal Courts have jurisdiction over cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed 10,000 deustchmark (“DM”), approximately $5,412.00 American dollars. Id. They also have exclusive jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes, family law, divorces, bankruptcy and nonlitigation proceedings such as probate and guardianship. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][I]. There is one Municipal Court per city or county and cases are heard by a single judge. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-10. Parties litigating in a Municipal Court may proceed pro se. See Astrid Stadler, The Law of Civil Procedure, in Introduction to German Law 357, 358 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin, eds., 1996). Parties may appeal decisions of the Municipal Courts to the Landgerichte (“LG”), the state District Courts (also known as Regional Courts). See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-10. The District Courts’ venue covers several Municipal Courts. See id. District Courts possess both appellate and original jurisdiction. See id.; I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][ii]. In addition to reviewing the judgments of the Municipal Courts for findings of fact and conclusions of law, the District Courts are also courts of first resort in matters where the amount in controversy exceeds DM 10,000, and in cases not specifically assigned to the Municipal Courts or special courts. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-10; I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][ii]. Specific District Court panels hear appeals from the Municipal Courts, while other panels handle cases in which the District Courts have original jurisdiction. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][ii]. Decisions of the District Courts rendered as appellate decisions reviewing the Municipal Courts’ judgments are final; no further appeal to another court exists. See id.; Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11; Stadler, supra, at 371. Although three judges sit on each District Court panel, a single judge hears each case, unless the case is unusually complex, or is of fundamental importance. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-10; I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][ii], Parties appearing before the District Court must be represented by counsel. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11; Stadler, supra, at 358. Insofar as a District Court acted as a court of first resort, appeals for reasons of fact and/or law are heard by the Oberlan-desgerichte (“OLG”), the Courts of Appeals (also known as Higher Regional Courts). See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11; I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][iii]; Stadler, supra, at 371. Like the Municipal and District Courts, the Courts of Appeals are also state courts. Three judge panels called Senates hear civil appeals and five judge panels hear criminal appeals. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][iii]. There are up to three Courts of Appeals in each state. See id. The highest ordinary court is the Bun-desgerichtshof (“BGH”), the Supreme Court (also known as the Federal Court of Justice). This is the highest court for criminal and civil cases. The Supreme Court reviews the decisions of the Courts of Appeals on points of law only. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11. The Supreme Court’s function, inter alia, is to ensure the uniform interpretation of the law. The Supreme Court hears cases only where (1) the sum involved exceeds DM 60,000 (approximately $32,471.00 U.S. dollars); (2) a Court of Appeals has granted leave to appeal because the case is of fundamental legal importance; or (3) a Court of Appeals wishes to depart from an existing ruling of the Supreme Court. See Stadler, supra, at 372. The Senates of the civil section of the Supreme Court are comprised of five judges. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][a][iv]. In order to assure uniformity of judicial decisions, however, the civil section and the criminal section each have nine judge panels, known as Great Senates, which rule on cases in which one Senate intends to depart from the rulings of another Senate. See id. B. Special Courts As stated supra, there are six special courts in Germany: (1) labor courts; (2) administrative courts; (3) social welfare courts; (4) tax courts; (5) constitutional courts; and (6) the Federal Patent Court. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2]. Labor courts have jurisdiction over disputes between employers and employees, collective bargaining agreements and the regulation of trade unions. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11; I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][e][I], Administrative courts have jurisdiction over matters involving zoning, immigration, state licenses, health, sanitation, transportation, regulation of the professions and the civil service. See Germany: Law Digest, supra at GER-11; I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][b]. Administrative courts also preside over claims against public authorities (federal, state or local) for violations of individual rights. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][b]. Social welfare courts hear cases involving social security, public mandatory health insurance and aid for the unemployed or disabled. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11; I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][e][iii]. The structure of the labor, administrative and social welfare courts contains three levels of review. The respective special District Courts and Courts of Appeals represent the first two levels of review. The respective Federal Court (e.g., the Federal Labor Court, the Federal Administrative Court or the Federal Social Welfare Court) entertains the final appeal. See I Business Transactions, supra §§ 4.04[2][b], [c]. Tax courts have jurisdiction over tax matters, including custom duties and taxes on international and foreign trade. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11. Constitutional courts preside over all constitutional matters. The tax courts and constitutional courts have only two levels of review. Only one tax court and one constitutional court exist in each state. The next and final level of review is at the federal level by the Federal Tax Court or the Federal Constitutional Court. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11. The Federal Constitutional Court (the “ Bundesverfassungsgericht ” or “BVerfG”) reviews the law and decisions of other courts, including other Federal Courts, when challenged on constitutional grounds. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[3][d]; Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-11. As stated in supra note 9, state courts lack jurisdiction over patent or trademark matters. Instead, parties may appeal decisions of the Federal Patent Office directly to the Federal Patent Court. Appeals from decisions of the Federal Patent Court are heard by the Supreme Court on points of law only. See I Business Transactions, supra § 4.04[2][c][ii]. II. CLAIMS UNDER THE LAW OF NATIONS Iwanowa asserts that “[b]y knowingly utilizing unpaid, forced labor under inhuman conditions, [Defendants] violated the law of nations, including the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention.” (Compl.f40.) Defendants have moved to dismiss Iwanowa’s claims under the law of nations based on (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to state a claim; and (3) expiration of the applicable limitations period. A. Motion to dismiss for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1. Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” Thus, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time. See id.; Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977). A defendant may attack a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction in one of two ways. See Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. First, a defendant may challenge subject matter jurisdiction by asserting that the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See id.; see also Cardio-Medical Assocs. Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir.1983). In assessing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on the pleadings, the court “must assume that the allegations contained in the complaint are true.” Cardio-Medical, 721 F.2d at 75; Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891; see also Sitkoff v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 846 F.Supp. 380, 383 (E.D.Pa. 1994), aff'd, 92 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir.1996). Under those circumstances, the court may dismiss the complaint only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff will not be able to assert a colorable claim of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891; Kronmuller v. West End Fire Co. No. 3 Fire Dep’t of Borough of Phoenixville, 123 F.R.D. 170, 172 (E.D.Pa. 1988). A defendant may also challenge a federal court’s jurisdiction by factually attacking the plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations as set forth in the complaint. See Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. In such circumstances, the “court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. Thus, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Id. The court may consider affidavits, depositions and testimony to resolve factual issues bearing on jurisdiction. See Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir.1997). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims in the complaint. See Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. Although Defendants have not stated whether they consider their Rule 12(b)(1) motion to be a facial or factual attack, they have attached the Declaration of Professor Gerhard Laule to their reply brief. Furthermore, Iwanowa submitted the Declaration of Dr. Ekkehard Schumann with her opposition brief. Therefore, this Court will evaluate the 12(b)(1) motion as a factual attack and consider the declarations that the parties have submitted. Upon consideration of the Complaint, the relevant case and statutory law and the declarations the parties have submitted to the Court, this Court finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims under the law of nations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without merit. As shown below, this Court has jurisdiction over the instant claims, pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 2. Alien Tort Claims Act Iwanowa claims that the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, grants this Court subject matter jurisdiction over her claims under customary international law. Originally promulgated as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATCA provides that [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Complaint alleges that Defendants’ use of forced labor violated both the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention. (Comply 40.) At oral argument, however, Iwanowa’s attorneys clarified that Iwanowa is not asserting a claim under either of those treaties. (I Tr. at 19:8-12.) Rather, she is asserting a claim under the law of nations and is merely relying on the Hague and the Geneva Conventions as evidence of an emerging norm of customary international law. Thus, this Court need only address Iwanowa’s claim under the law of nations. As stated above, Iwanowa contends that Defendants’ use of forced labor during World War II violates the law of nations. (Comply 40.) The ATCA confers federal subject matter jurisdiction when: “(1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law).” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238. The ATCA grants district courts subject matter jurisdiction to entertain “suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the law of nations.” Id. at 236. As a citizen and resident of Belgium, Iwanowa is an alien. She alleges that Defendants committed a tort by forcing her to perform unpaid, forced labor under inhuman conditions. Thus, she has satisfied the first and second requirements for jurisdiction under the ATCA. This Court must now determine whether Defendants’ use of forced labor constitutes a violation of the law of nations. a. Unpaid, Forced Labor Violates Law of Nations “Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102(2) (1987). In other words, customary international law is comprised of such widely held fundamental principles of civilized society that they constitute binding norms on the community of nations. The law of nations “may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.” United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; Jama, 22 F.Supp.2d at 362. Further, courts may rely upon treaties (such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions) as evidence of an emerging norm of customary international law. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238 & n. 1; Jama, 22 F.Supp.2d at 362. If this inquiry reveals that forced labor violates “well-established, universally recognized norms of international law, as opposed to idiosyncratic legal rules, then federal jurisdiction exists under the [ATCA].” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. The use of unpaid, forced labor during World War II violated clearly established norms of customary international law. The Complaint alleges that Iwanowa “was literally purchased, along with 38 other children from Rostock [sic], by a representative of [Ford Werke].” (Comply 25.) Such assertions suffice to support an allegation that Defendants participated in slave trading. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880, 892 (C.D.Cal. 1997); National Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 349 (C.D.Cal.1997) (allegations that defendants “knowingly accepted the benefit of and approved the use of forced labor” may be sufficient to state a claim for participation in slave trading). As shown below, all of the sources of international law expressly provide that the enslavement of civilians during war time violates the law of nations. First, the Nuremberg Tribunals held that the enslavement and deportation of civilian populations during World War II constitutes a crime against humanity in violation of customary international law. See R. Jackson, The Nuremberg Case xiv-xv (1971). The Nuremberg trials “for the first time made explicit and unambiguous what was theretofore, as the tribunal has declared, implicit in International Law, namely, that ... to exterminate, enslave or deport civilian populations, is an international crime.” Id. (citing The Final Report to the President by Justice Robert H. Jackson on the Nuremberg Trials (Oct. 6, 1946)). Further, Nuremberg Principle IV(b) provides that the “deportation to slave labor ... of civilian populations of or in occupied territory” constitutes both a “war crime” and a “crime against humanity”. Nuremberg Charter, annexed to the London Agreement on War Criminals, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998, art. 7 ¶ 1(c), (d). Second, courts have repeatedly held that “deportation to slave labor” violates the law of nations. See Handel, 601 F.Supp. at 1426 n. 2; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (holding that conduct related to slave trade violates the law of nations); Princz, 26 F.3d at 1180 (acknowledging that forced labor of civilians during World War II violated international law); Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715 (finding that “[t]he universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg—rights against genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane acts ... are the direct ancestors of the universal and fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens.”); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring) (reiterating that genocide and slavery are “heinous actions—each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms”); LG [District Court] Bremen, 1 O 2889/90, at 7 (1998) (F.R.G.) [“LG Bremen (1998)”] (‘Among these prevailing rules of international law is the law that prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territories may not be murdered or enslaved.”); Krakauer v. Federal Republic of Germany, LG [District Court] Bonn, 1 O 134/92, at 21 (1997) (F.R.G.) [“Krakauer I, LG Bonn (1997)”] (same), rev’d on other grounds, OLG [Court of Appeals] Cologne [“Krakauer II, OLG Cologne (1998)”], 7 U 222/97 (1998) (F.R.G.). Thus, the case law and statements of the Nuremberg Tribunals unequivocally establish that forced labor violates customary international law. Defendants assert that even if forced labor violates the law of nations, Iwanowa has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA because (1) no private right of action exists for violations of the law of nations and (2) the ATCA only applies to state actors. The Court shall address each of these arguments separately. b. Private Right of Action for Violations of the Law of Nations Defendants argue that the law of nations mimics treaties in that neither is self-executing and thus, neither is enforceable by private parties absent legislation. Defendants contend that the ATCA merely provides district courts with jurisdiction to address an alien’s claims under the law of nations in limited instances; namely, those in which Congress has enacted specific legislation authorizing a private right of action for such violations. The majority of courts addressing claims under the law of nations have rejected Defendants’ narrow interpretation of the ATCA. Instead, those courts have concluded that the ATCA provides both subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action for claims alleging violations of customary international law. See Jama, 22 F.Supp.2d at 362-63; Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.1996) (“we read the [ATCA] as requiring no more than an allegation of a violation of the law of nations in order to invoke section 1350.”); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236 (concluding that the ATCA “appears to provide a remedy for the appellants’ allegations of violations related to genocide, war crimes and official torture”); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.1994) ((iWe thus join the Second Circuit in concluding that the [ATCA], 28 U.S.C. § 1350, creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards,” and “nothing more than a violation of the law of nations is required to invoke section 1350.”); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 179 (D.Mass. 1995) (“ § 1350 yields both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for tor-tious violations of international law ... without recourse to other law as a source of the cause of action.”); Paul v. Avril, 812 F.Supp. 207, 212 (S.D.Fla.1993) (“The plain language of the [ATCA] and the use of the words ‘committed in violation’ strongly implies that a well pled tort[,] if committed in violation of the law of nations, would be sufficient [to give rise to a cause of action].”); But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810-20 (Bork, J., concurring). The only case in this Circuit addressing the issue, Jama, followed this line of cases in holding that the ATCA provides both subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of action for violations of the law of nations. See Jama, 22 F.Supp.2d at 363. The Jama Court noted that, after the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980); Congress could have amended the ATCA when it enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”) to reflect its disagreement with the courts’ interpretation of the ATCA. See Jama, 22 F.Supp.2d at 363. Indeed, the TVPA is codified as a statutory note to the ATCA. See supra note 22. Congress, however, did not address whether the ATCA provides a private cause of action for violations of international law although it enacted the TVPA to codify the cause of action (torture) recognized in Filartiga under the ATCA. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241. The Eleventh Circuit, persuaded by both Congress’ silent endorsement of Fi-lartiga and subsequent interpretations of the ATCA, also found that the ATCA provides a private right of action. See Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848. The Abebe-Jira Court noted that the legislative history indicated that Congress was aware that [t]he TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under an existing law, section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 [the ATCA], which permits Federal district courts to hear claims by aliens for torts committed in violation of the law of nations. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 367, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86). Based on this statement, the Abebe-Jira Court concluded that Congress recognized that courts viewed the ATCA as conferring both a forum and a private right of action to aliens alleging violations of international law. 72 F.3d at 848. This Court concludes that if Congress had disagreed with the courts’ finding of a private right of action under the ATCA, Congress could have, and likely would have, amended the ATCA to reflect its intent. Further, the “ ‘committed in violation’ language of the [ATCA] suggests that Congress did not intend to require an alien plaintiff to invoke a separate enabling statute as a precondition to relief under the [ATCA].” Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847; see also Paul, 812 F.Supp. at 212. Accordingly, this Court finds that the ATCA provides both subject matter jurisdiction and a private right of action for violations of the law of nations. See Jama, 22 F.Supp.2d at 362-63; Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847-48; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236. c. Does the Law of Nations Apply to Private Actors? Defendants contend that the Complaint does not allege violations of international law because such norms bind only states and its agents, not private corporations such as Defendants. While the Third Circuit has never addressed this issue, the Second Circuit recently held that [w]e do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (emphasis added). Similarly, in his often cited concurring opinion, Judge Edwards, although refusing to apply the ATCA to cover torture by non-state actors, stated that there are a “handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility”, such as piracy and slave-trading. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794-95 (Edwards, J., concurring); see also Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 891-92 (stating same); National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348 (noting that private company utilizing slave labor may be subject to liability under the ATCA); Jama, 22 F.Supp.2d at 362 (stating that “depending upon the nature of the offense, an ATCA claim may be brought against private individuals as well as state actors.”); Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F.Supp. at 8 (following Kadic and holding that murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, kidnaping, and summary executions constitute violations of international law whether committed by state or private actors); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F.Supp. 362, 371 (E.D.La.1997) (following Kadic and holding that genocide violates the law of nations whether undertaken by state or nonstate actor). In determining that private individuals who engage in slave trading violate the law of nations, the Kadic Court noted that “[i]ndividuals may be held liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240. As stated supra, deportation of civilian populations to slave labor is a war crime. See supra Part II.A.2.a; Nuremberg Charter, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The Kadic Court further noted that section 702 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law identifies violations that are actionable when committed by a state, whereas section 404 of the Restatement lists a more limited category of violations of universal concern. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240. The Kadic Court concluded that the inclusion of “slave trade” within both sections 702 and 404 of the Restatement demonstrates that this is an offense of “universal concern” for which non-state actors may be liable. See id. Several pre-Kadic decisions have stated that only state actors are liable for violations of international law. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 501-02 (9th Cir.1992); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C.Cir.1985). These cases are inapposite. First, both of these cases expressly relied on Judge Edward’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren and stating same. See Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206-07 (concluding that based on the reasons stated by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, the law of nations does not reach private, non-state conduct); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d at 502 (citing Judge Edwards’ concurring opinion in Tel-Oren). As indicated supra, however, although Judge Edwards refused to “extend the definition of the ‘law of nations’ absent direction from the Supreme Court”, to cover torture by non-state actors, he stated that there are a “handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility”, such as piracy and slave-trading. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792, 794-95 (Edwards, J., concurring); see also Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 891 (stating that after Tel-Oren, individual liability remained for a handful of private acts, including piracy and slave trading); Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F.Supp. at 8 (stating that “[t]he opinions in Teh-Oren did not hold that international law requires state action”). Second, Kadic was decided after Telr-Oren, Sanchez-Espinoza and In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos. Kadic’s recent interpretation of international law in 1995 carries greater weight than the conflicting interpretations of the three concurring opinions in Tel-Oren, which examined international law as it stood over fifteen years ago. See Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F.Supp. at 8. Customary international law is not static; thus, courts must interpret it as “it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.” Id. (quoting Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238); see also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777 (Edwards, J. concurring) (“[T]he ‘law of nations’ is not stagnant and should be construed as it exists today among the nations of the world.”). Third, the Ninth Circuit later distanced itself from its statement in In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos that only state actors are liable for violations of international law. In Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir.1995), the Ninth Circuit ignored its earlier comment in In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos and merely stated that it did “not need to reach the issue of whether the law of nations applied to private as opposed to governmental conduct.” Id. at 1417. Fourth, none of these cases—Sanchez-Espinoza, In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos or Tel-Oren —involved slave labor or slave trading. Sanchez-Espinoza involved allegations that, in violation of the law of nations, U.S. executive officials (including President Ronald Reagan) and organizations operating paramilitary training camps in the United States assisted and financed the Contra forces in their attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. 770 F.2d at 204-07. Both In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos and Tel-Oren involved allegations of torture committed by non-state actors. “Because this action involves allegations of forced labor and because slave trading is included in that ‘handful of crimes’ to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility, this action raises questions not addressed” in cases holding that private actors are not liable for violations of international law. National Coalition Gov’t, 176 F.R.D. at 348. No logical reason exists for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability for universally condemned violations of international law merely because they were not acting under color of law. This Court is inclined to agree with Kadic, and its progeny, and find that private entities using slave labor are liable under the law of nations. However, this Court need not make that determination. As shown, infra, Iwanowa has pled sufficient facts to allege that Defendants acted as agents of the state. d. Defendants Were De Facto State Actors Defendants concede that the ATCA applies to de facto state actors. (Def.’s Reply Br. at 22) (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884). Even assuming arguen-do that the ATCA only applies to state actors, the Complaint pleads sufficient facts to support a claim that from 1942-1945, Defendants were acting as de facto state actors. The Complaint alleges that the Nazi army abducted • adolescents in occupied territories, including Iwanowa, and transported them to Germany to work as slave laborers. (Compl.¶¶ 24-25.) The Complaint also asserts that Sauckel, the Nazi Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, encouraged German industries to bid for forced laborers in order to meet production quotas and to increase their profits. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) The Complaint further alleges that as a result of Sauckel’s solicitation, Ford Werke purchased forced laborers, including Iwanowa, from the Nazis. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 25.) Hence, the Complaint alleges that Defendants acted in close cooperation with Nazi officials in compelling civilians to perform forced labor. This constitutes an allegation that Defendants were de facto state actors and are therefore, liable under all possible interpretations of the ATCA. (See also I Tr. at 24:25-25:3) (Plaintiffs counsel’s assertion that Ford Werke acted under color of Nazi law when it utilized forced laborers). The allegation that Ford Werke pursued its own economic interests, or that its own employees (as opposed to Nazi officials), mistreated Iwanowa, does not preclude a determination that Ford Werke acted as an agent of, or in concert with, the German Reich. See BGH [Supreme Court], NJW 1973, 1549, at 9-10 (F.R.G.) [“BGH (1973)”]. Indeed, German courts have held that private companies using forced labor as a result of Nazi directives, acted as agents of the German Reich. See id.; Stancher v. I.G. Farben, BGH [Supreme Court], RzW 1963, 525, at 4-5 (F.R.G.) [“Stancher, BHG (1963)”]; LG [District Court] Frankfurt, NJW 1960, 1575, at 2-3 (F.R.G.) [“LG Frankfurt (1960)”] (stating that “[b]ecause of the course taken by the war, any and all German industrial companies, whether operated as public law or private law entities, were required to put to work the foreign laborers assigned to them” by the Nazi regime); see also Krakauer I, LG Bonn (1997), at 15 (stating that concentration camp prisoners remained under the Nazi’s official authority during their work deployment). Consequently, even if this Court were to find that no liability attaches to private actors for violations of international law, by showing that (1) she is an alien (2) suing for a tort (forced labor/slave trade) (3) committed by a de facto state actor (4) in violation of the law of nations, Iwanowa has established subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Iwanowa’s claims under international law for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied. B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Defendants have moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Iwanowa’s claims under the law of nations on three separate grounds: (1) the Paris Reparations Treaty subsumed all individual claims arising out of World War II into each nation’s reparations claims against Germany; (2) the claims are time-barred; and (3) the U.S.S.R. waived lwa-nowa’s claims. The Court shall address each argument separately. 1. Standard for Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim A motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief. See Nami, 82 F.3d at 65; Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.1993); Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.1986). The Court may not dismiss the complaint unless plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir.1997); Unger v. National Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1395 (3d Cir.1991); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.1985). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). In setting forth a valid claim, a party is required only to plead “a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a). To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff is not required to provide evidence of or prove the truthfulness of his complaint.” Quinones v. Szorc, 771 F.2d 289, 291 n. 3 (7th Cir.1985). The court, however, is not required to accept conclusory allegations. See Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). Thus, the complaint “must set forth sufficient information to suggest that there is some recognized legal theory upon which relief may be granted.” District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C.Cir.1984). A complete comprehension of the context of this litigation and the parties’ arguments cannot be attained without an overview of post-war Germany and four relevant treaties: (1) Agreement on Reparations From Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S. 1655 (“Paris Reparations Treaty”); (2) Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952 (“Transition Agreement”) (as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954), U.S.-Fr.-U.K.-F.R.G., 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 219; (3) Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3 (“London Debt Agreement”); and (4) Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R.-U.SU.S.S.R.-Fr.-U.K, 29 I.L.M. 1186 (“Two-Plus-Four Treaty”). 2. Post-War Germany On May 8, 1945, the Nazi army surrendered unconditionally. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-1. The Allied Powers’ immediate objective was to completely demilitarize, disarm and dismember Germany to the extent deemed necessary for future peace and security in Europe. See Protocol of Proceeding of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference, Sec. III, Feb. 11, 1945, 3 Bevans 1013 (‘Tai-ta Conference”). To implement this plan, the Allied Powers divided Germany into four occupation zones, American, British, French and Soviet, and assumed government control in their respective occupation zones. See Werner Maser, Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial 33 (1979); Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-1. The most senior military commanders for each of the Allied Powers, Eisenhower (U.S.), Zhukov (U.S.S.R.), Montgomery (U.K.) and De-Latttre de Tassigny (France), formed the Inter-Allied Control Council with legislative authority over Germany. See Maser, supra, at 33. Although Berlin was situated in the Soviet zone, all four Allied Powers occupied and governed Berlin by inter-allied authority. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-1. The occupying powers could not agree on Germany’s political and economic future. The U.S., France and the U.K. (‘Western Powers”) intended to create a democratic German state. In furtherance of this end, they (1) gave the Germans substantial administrative responsibility beginning in 1946, (2) set up state (Lander) governments with state parliaments in their zones of occupation (the “Western Zones”) and (3) helped the Germans draft a constitution, the Basic Law, in 1948. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-1. The Soviets objected to the Western Powers’ goals regarding the future political status of Germany, specifically, their efforts to create a fully sovereign Germany. See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 85 Am.J. Int’l L. 155, 164 (1991). As shown infra, the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers also disagreed on the issue of reparations. Consequently, in March, 1948, the U.S.S.R. left the Inter-Allied Control Council, thus initiating the division of Germany. See Germany: Law Digest, supra, at GER-1. On May 23, 1949, the Western Powers established the F.R.G. in the Western Zones. In response to the creation of the F.R.G., the Soviets formed the G.D.R. in the Soviet Zone that same year. See Ger-many: Law Digest, supra, at GER-1. In 1954, the Western Powers' ended the occupation regime in the F.R.G. See Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 219. However, the Western Powers explicitly reserved their rights with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole, and to participate in the conclusion of a final peace treaty. See id. a. Yalta and Potsdam In February, 1945, prior to Germany’s surrender, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, the heads of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., respectively, met in Yalta to decide post-war policies. See Seymour J. Rubin, The Washington Accord Fifty Years Later: Neutrality, Morality, and International Law, 14 Am.U. Int’l L.Rev. 61, 62 (1998). They agreed that “Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war.” Yalta Conference, Sec. V.l. The U.S. the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. agreed that the Allied nations which bore the main burden of the war, suffered the greatest losses and organized the victory over Ger-many, would receive reparations from Ger-many. Id. Shortly after the war, the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. met again, this time in Potsdam, and reiterated their Yalta understanding—to make Germany pay reparations. See Protocol of Proceedings Approved at Berlin (Potsdam), Sec. III, Aug. 2, 1945, 3 Bevans 1207 (“Potsdam Conference”). They decided to extract reparations from Germany in the form of machines, other industrial equipment and German external assets, rather than in monetary payments. See Henry A. Turner, Jr., The Two Germanies Since 1915, at 12 (1987). They further agreed that the U.S.S.R. would take reparations in the form of (1) industrial equipment from the Soviet Zone and (2) German external assets in Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Eastern Austria. See Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, First Report of the Secretary General for 1946 CIARA 1916 Report ”), at 8. In addition, since most of Germany’s production industry was located in the Western Zones, the U.S. and the U.K. agreed to give the U.S.S.R. twenty-five percent of the industrial equipment extracted from the Western Zones. See id. Since the Soviet Zone was mostly agricultural, the U.S.S.R. agreed to ship food and raw materials to the Western Zones as payment for fifteen percent of the industrial equipment it would receive. See id. Further, the U.S.S.R. agreed to satisfy Poland’s claims from its share of reparations. See id. In turn, the U.S. and the U.K. would satisfy the reparations claims of the rest of the Allies from the removal of industrial equipment in the Western Zones and from German external assets in countries other than those set aside for the U.S.S.R. See id. b. Paris Reparations Treaty In January, 1946, the U.K. and the U.S., along with the governments of sixteen other nations, met in Paris to decide upon the method of distributing reparations between those nations as to whom no decision had been reached at the Potsdam Conference. The Paris conference culminated in the enactment of the Paris Reparations Treaty, which provided that each signatory nation would receive a percentage of the total reparations the Western Powers collected based on their war related damages and contribution to the Allied war effort. See IARA 1916 Report, at 8; see also Paris Reparations Treaty, Part I, Art. 1. The signatory nations agreed that Germany would pay reparations in the form of industrial and capital equipment, merchants ships, German external assets and monetary gold. See Paris Reparations Treaty, Part I, Art. 1.A, Part III. Further, the Western Powers agreed to dismantle and transfer Germany’s industrial plants located in their respective zones, along with any other German assets, to the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency by the end of 1947, for redistribution as war reparations. See IARA 1946 Report, at 8. Pursuant to the Paris Reparations Treaty, each signatory nation’s share of reparations was supposed to satisfy any and all claims held by a nation, or its nationals, against the German government or German companies. Specifically, the Paris Reparations Treaty provided that: The Signatory Governments agree among themselves that their respective shares of reparation, as determined by the present Agreement, shall be regarded by each of them as covering all its claims and those of its nationals against the former German Government and its Agencies, of a governmental or private nature arising out of the war.... Paris Reparations Treaty, Part I, Art. 2.A (“Article 2.A” or “Art. 2.A”) (emphasis added). In sum, the Paris Reparations Treaty authorized the Western Powers to seize Germany’s assets for distribution to the signatory nations in accordance with the Treaty, thereby satisfying any claims the signatory nations, or their nationals, might have against the German government or its “Agencies”. The German Supreme Court has held that the term “Agencies” encompasses private corporations using forced laborers, such as Defendants. See BGH (1973), at 9; Stancher, BGH (1963), at 5. Thus, the parties agree that Article 2.A of the Paris Reparations Treaty subsumed the claims of the signatory nations, and their nationals, thereby precluding nationals of the signatory nations from bringing forced labor claims against the German government or German companies. (See II Tr. at 5:13-18.) As stated by Professor Neu-borne at oral argument, it would have been illogical to allow “private litigation against corporations all of whose assets were being seized, dismantled and taken and literally distributed to the people on whose behalf the litigation would have been brought.” (II Tr. at 10:3-8.) However, the Paris Reparations Treaty did not subsume all individual claims. The War had produced a class of persons categorized as “nonrepatriable victims of German action” who had no national government to protect their interests. Consequently, the reparations scheme set forth in the Paris Reparations Treaty could not satisfy their claims. In order to assist nonrepatriable victims, the signatories inserted a provision in the Paris Reparations Treaty establishing a fund to assist nonrepatriable persons. Article 8 titled Allocation of a Reparation Share to Nonrepatriable Victims of German Action provides in relevant part: In recognition of the fact that large numbers of persons have suffered heavily at the hands of the Nazis and now stand in dire need of aid to promote their rehabilitation but will be unable to claim the assistance of any Government receiving reparation from Germany, the Governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in consultation with the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, shall as soon as possible work out in common agreement a plan on the following general lines: A. A share of reparation consisting of all the non-monetary gold found by the Allied Armed Forces in Germany and in addition a sum not exceeding 25 million dollars shall be allocated for the rehabilitation and resettlement of nonrepatria-ble victims of German action. * * * * * * D. The persons eligible for aid under the plan in question shall be restricted to true victims of Nazi persecution and to their immediate families and dependents, in the following classes: % ¡¡t % * * (iii) Nationals of countries formerly occupied by the Germans who cannot be repatriated or are not in a position to be repatriated within a reasonable time.... Part I, Art. 8 (“Article 8” or “Art. 8”). This fund, however, would not be used to satisfy nonrepatriable victims’ individual claims. Section H provides that “[t]he fund shall be used, not for the compensation of individual victims, but to further the rehabilitation or resettlement of persons in the eligible classes.” Paris Reparations Treaty, Part I, Art. 8, § H. Furthermore, Article 8 preserved the right of nonrepatriable victims to press claims against a future German government. Specifically, section I provides that “[n]othing in this Article shall be considered to prejudice the claims which individual refugees may have against a future German Government, except to the amount of the benefits that such refugees may have received from the sources referred to ... above.” Paris Reparations Treaty, Part I, Art. 8, § I. Although Article 8 applies only to stateless refugees asserting war related claims against the government, Iwanowa asserts that Article 8, § I is evidence that the Paris Reparations Treaty contemplated that individuals like herself could, and would, assert such claims at a later date. This Court disagrees with Plaintiffs assertion. As shown in Part II.B.3.a, infra, when the terms of a treaty are unambiguous, courts must interpret the treaty’s terms according to their ordinary plain meaning. See Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40, 52 S.Ct. 81, 76 L.Ed. 151 (1931) (holding tha