Full opinion text
ORDER MICHAEL M. MIHM, District Judge. On May 7, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint [# 1] against Defendants and in July 2009, Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss [# 15, 17, 20, 28]. Defendant Board of Education of the Community Unit School District No. 5, McLean and Woodford Counties (“School District”) contemporaneously filed a Motion to Strike [# 14] certain portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. On October 20, 2009, a Report & Recommendation [# 35] was filed by Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore in this case. All of the parties filed objections [# 36, 37, 38] to the Report & Recommendation within the time allowed. Plaintiffs were granted leave to file a Combined Response and Memorandum to Defendant’s Objections to the Report & Recommendation [# 41] on November 13, 2009. Defendants subsequently filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs Objection to the Report & Recommendation [# 43] on November 16, 2009. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.1988); and Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir.1986). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ respective Motions to Dismiss [# 15, 17, 20, 28] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The parties’ objections to the Report & Recommendation are denied. BACKGROUND The relevant procedural history is sufficiently set forth in the comprehensive Report & Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 20 and Jane Doe 21 (“Plaintiffs”) brought this suit against Defendants under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,1985 and 1986, and various Illinois state laws. Plaintiffs specifically allege that Defendants Braksick, Heidbreder, Heineman, and Pye (“School Administrators”) possessed actual knowledge of Defendant Jon White’s (“White”) alleged sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and sexual abuse of female students. Plaintiffs further allege that the School Administrators knew that White was using his position as a first grade teacher, and using the classroom and computers provided to him in his classroom at Colene Hoose Elementary School, to act out privately and publicly. DISCUSSION In its Motion to Dismiss, the School District argues that Plaintiffs fail to state Title IX claims because they have not alleged the School District’s actual knowledge of White’s misconduct nor the School District’s deliberate indifference. The Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth specific factual allegations attempting to show the School District’s knowledge that White sexually harassed students in the year 2003-04. The School District, however, contends that it could not have had actual notice for the 2004-05 year, during which time Plaintiffs were allegedly discriminated against, because there are no allegations that parents complained during that year. The Court concurs with the recommendation that Plaintiffs have stated a Title IX claim where a plausible inference arises that school officials knew that White had sexually harassed students in the 2003-04 school year, and that a plausible inference arises that White was engaging in sexual misconduct with his students and the School District took no action in the 2004-05 school year. Indeed, “a new school year does not wipe clean knowledge of sexual misconduct from the prior school year.” R & R p. 10. Additionally, the Court concurs with the Magistrate’s recommendation that Count Three (Title IX hostile educational environment) of Plaintiffs’ Complaint be stricken as duplicative of Count One (Title IX discrimination). In Count Two of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, they contend that they had rights to due process and to avoid the deprivation of their personal liberty which White’s conduct violated. They list White’s misconduct that was only “non-sexual in nature.” Complaint ¶ 200. The Court concurs with the recommendation that Plaintiffs’ allegations in Count Two do not state a claim for violations of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs object to this recommendation, stating that White’s non-sexual conduct directed towards Plaintiffs is truly conscience shocking and that Defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from detention, loss of privacy, and loss of bodily integrity were all violated constitutional rights. Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiffs’ objection is compelling. The case law cited by Defendants provides strong support for the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiffs’ allegations in Count II do not state a claim for the violations of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, and even if they did, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court concurs with the recommendation that Plaintiffs have stated a Fourth Amendment claim against White and against the School Administrators individually. Defendants object that it is not plausible to infer, given Plaintiffs’ allegations, that any one of the Unit 5 Defendants had actual knowledge that White was locking Plaintiffs in the classroom against their free will. Defendant Heidbreder specifically objects that the Magistrate has strained interpretations of case law in order to find Plaintiffs have alleged a Fourth Amendment violation and such straining is contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s obligation not to engage in speculation. However, as the Magistrate Judge noted, the allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint currently provide an inference that the Defendants knew of White’s constitutional violations and turned a blind eye to them, though a developed factual record may show otherwise. The Court further concurs with the recommendation that qualified immunity for the individual School Administrators on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim be denied at this point. Finally in regard to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, the Court concurs with the recommendation that the School District be dismissed from this claim. Plaintiffs object because they contend the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to support a plausible inference that the actions of the School Administrators constituted a policy or practice attributable to the School District. As Plaintiffs themselves alleged, the School District’s written policies prohibited harassment and required employees to report suspected child abuse. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the School Administrators’ actions did not constitute a policy or practice attributable to the District, as would be necessary to state a claim against the School District under Section 1983. See Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park Public School Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir.1998) (explaining that under Illinois law, the school board has final policy-making authority and that school officials must ultimately answer to the board of education). Also, the Court agrees with the recommendation that the amendment to their Complaint that the Plaintiffs seek would not help them. The individual defendants contend that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars the claim in Count Five which alleges conspiracy to deprive civil rights pursuant to Section 1985. The Court concurs with the recommendation that dismissal of Count Five would be premature at this point. Defendants School District, Braksick, Chapman, Pye, and Heineman object that dismissal of Count Five, based on the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, is clearly warranted because the parameters of the doctrine were clearly defined in Hartman v. Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508, 4 F.3d 465 (7th Cir.1993). Defendant Heidbreder additionally objects that Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the first element necessary under Section 1985(3) and they have failed to allege that an exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies here. Nevertheless, after having reviewed Defendants’ objections and Plaintiffs’ response to those objections, the Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that given the posture of the case and considering the murky parameters of the exceptions to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, dismissal of Count Five would be premature. The Court additionally concurs with the recommendation that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Count Six be denied. Defendants object that because a Section 1986 claim is derivative of Section 1985 claims, and because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ Section 1985 claim here, Count Six must be dismissed. But as explained above, Count Five remains and so Count Six dismissal is premature. In regard to Plaintiffs’ state claims, the Court concurs with the recommendation that Count Seven (Battery), Count Nine (Illinois Hate Crime), and Count Eleven (False Imprisonment) be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The parties do not object to these recommendations. In Counts Thirteen and Fourteen of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, they allege intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). The Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiffs’ have stated a claim against the school administrators for IIED, and that Plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim against the School District based on the Administrators’ IIED should remain at this point. Defendants object that Plaintiffs did not allege that any of the School Administrators specifically directed intentional outrageous acts toward the Plaintiffs, and did not allege that Defendants directed their conduct toward a third person. Plaintiffs respond that their Complaint clearly alleges that Defendants’ actions were directed at Plaintiffs with intent to harm each of them, or at the very least, states that the Administrators acted with reckless indifference toward the Plaintiffs. Ultimately, the Court concurs with the recommendation that at this stage, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an IIED claim against the School Administrators when the allegations are viewed as a whole. The Court further concurs with the recommendation that the Administrators are not protected by discretionary immunity at this point, and Plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim against the School District based on the Administrators’ IIED should remain at this point. The School District objects to the Magistrate’s recommendation that Plaintiffs’ Count Fifteen, negligent infliction of emotional distress, cannot be ruled out yet on the grounds asserted by Defendants. In their Motion to Dismiss, the School District argued that the alleged negligent acts of the School Administrators caused no contemporaneous physical injury or impact to Plaintiffs, and so the negligent infliction claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The School District objects that the Magistrate focused on a different issue, namely, the causal relationship required between the physical impact or injury and the emotional distress. In his Report, the Magistrate Judge cited a Seventh Circuit case which concluded that “contemporaneous” means “proximately related” to the impact or injury. See Kapoulas v. Williams Ins. Agency, Inc., 11 F.3d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir.1993). The distinction the School District attempts to make between the issue presented and the allegedly different one addressed by the Magistrate Judge is without merit. Though the Magistrate Judge did address the causal relationship between the emotional distress and physical impact or injury, he also discussed the impact rule at length, citing various Illinois and Seventh Circuit cases, and explained that cases discussing the impact rule are challenging to reconcile. Therefore, the Court concurs with the recommendation that Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim cannot be confidently ruled out on the grounds argued by the School District. As the Magistrate Judge stated, a more developed factual record and more thorough briefing about the scope of this tort is necessary. The Court concurs with the recommendation that Plaintiffs’ Counts Sixteen and Seventeen do state claims for negligent hiring, but the School District is immune from these claims under 745 ILCS Section 10/2-201. The parties do not specifically object to this recommendation. The Court further concurs with the recommendation that Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision claims (Counts Eighteen and Nineteen) should be dismissed to the extent they are based on negligent, rather than willful and wanton misconduct. Defendants do not specifically object to this recommendation. Plaintiffs are given leave to replead Counts XVIII and XIX. The Magistrate Judge recommends that Count Twenty, premises liability, be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court agrees with this recommendation. Finally, in its Motion to Strike, the School District seeks to strike the punitive damages sought against it in Counts Two, Three, Four, and Nine. The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the punitive damages sought against the School District be dismissed. Plaintiffs did not seek punitive damages under Title IX, and so that issue merits no further discussion. Accordingly, the Court now adopts the Report & Recommendation [# 35] of the Magistrate Judge in its entirety. Defendants respective Motions to Dismiss [# 15, 17, 20, 28] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 1) Count Three is DISMISSED as duplicative of Count One; 2) Count Two is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim; 3) Defendant Board of Education of the Community Unit School District No. 5, McLean and Woodford Counties is DISMISSED as a party from Count Four, for failure to state a claim; 4) Defendant Board of Education of the Community Unit School District No. 5 McLean and Woodford Counties is DISMISSED as a party from Count Seven for failure to state a claim; 5) Count Nine is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim; 6) Count Eleven is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim; 7) Counts Sixteen and Seventeen are DISMISSED because of 745 ILCS 10/2-201 immunity; 8) Counts Eighteen and Nineteen are DISMISSED on the grounds that negligent supervision claims are barred by 745 ILCS 10/3-108, and because the violation of the School District’s policies does not state a negligent supervision claim. Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave to replead Counts Eighteen and Nineteen; and 9) Count Twenty is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are DENIED in all other respects. Defendant Board of Education of the Community Unit School District No. 5, McLean and Woodford Counties’ Motion to Strike [# 14] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The punitive damages sought by Plaintiffs in Counts Two, Three, Four, and Nine are STRICKEN and DISMISSED. The remainder of Defendant Board of Education’s Motion to Strike is denied as MOOT. This matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION BYRON G. CUDMORE, United States Magistrate Judge: Plaintiffs pursue state and federal claims arising from former teacher Jon White’s alleged sexual abuse of them while they were first graders in his class during the 2004-05 school year. Before the Court are Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss (d/e’s 15, 17, 20, 28) and the School District’s motion to strike (d/e 14). For the reasons below, the Court recommends that the motions be granted in part and denied in part. Legal Standard Defendants have moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. To state a claim under federal notice pleading standards, all the Complaint must do is set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations are accepted as true and need only give “ ‘fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776-77 (7th Cir.2007), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (other citation omitted). However, the plaintiffs “ ‘... allegations, [must] show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief.’ ” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir.2008) (quoted and other citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.... Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged underlying facts, are not entitled to “the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1951. The application of this standard is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ ” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir.2009), quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Allegations and Background The School District hired White in August 2002, “despite having no current information concerning White’s criminal background.” (Complaint ¶ 28). A criminal background check performed the next months revealed a conviction for resisting arrest, which White had falsely downplayed. (Complaint ¶ 31). During the 2002-03 school year, Defendant White was employed at Brigham school and worked for the parks and recreation department of Normal, Illinois. (Complaint ¶ 35). During this time he allegedly used another teacher’s computer to access internet pornography, which the School District learned of at some point. (Complaint ¶¶ 35, 36). The District terminated and rehired White effective August 20, 2003, and transferred him to teach first grade at Colene Hoose Elementary School. (Complaint ¶ 37). No one within the District or at Colene Hoose reviewed White’s background before rehiring him and transferring him to Colene Hoose. (Complaint ¶ 38). During the 2003-04 school year, the parents of three female students in White’s first grade class alerted Defendants Braksick (the Principal) and Heidbreder (the Assistant Principal) of White’s suspected sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and sexual grooming of their children. The details of these allegations are set forth in a pending case in this District filed by two of those students, Jane Doe v. Jon White, 08-1287 (C.D. Ill., Judge Mihm). In concluding that a Title IX claim was stated in that case, this Court noted that: Both the Principal and Assistant Principal were told, by three different sets of parents, over the span of two months, of White’s misconduct. The parents’ complaints, taken as a whole and in context, do allow a plausible inference that Heidbreder and Braksick were notified that White was sexually harassing or abusing at least three female students. For example, Heidbreder and Braksick were told that White had a student give him massages underneath his clothes, that White regularly isolated female students outside of classroom instruction, that White held and bounced Jane Doe 11 on his lap in a strange manner, and that the children, just first graders, felt strongly enough to tell their parents that they did not like White’s touching. Defendants allegedly did nothing in response to these reports. (3/3/09 Report and Recommendation, d/e 49, adopted without objection by Judge Mihm, d/e 49). White was informed in March 2004 that he would not be rehired for the next school year, for reasons unrelated to the parents’ complaints. (Complaint ¶ 85). However, White was asked to re-apply, which he did. With no investigation and despite knowledge of the parents’ complaints, the District rehired White for the 2004-05 school year, again to teach first graders. (Complaint ¶ 88-90). From August, 2004 through at least October 12, 2004, White used school computers to access adult-oriented websites and downloaded pornographic material, including a video of younger women performing oral sex on an older man standing above them. (Complaint ¶ 102). White also used his school e-mail address to subscribe to “s.b. f— adventures and drunk s.b. girls ”, e-mailed adult content files to other District employees, and engaged in pornographic internet chats. (Complaint ¶¶ 102, 106). The District knew of White’s internet activities on or around October 12, 2004. On October 19, 2004, Defendants Pye (Assistant Superintendent, Human Resources) and Heineman (the new Principal) met with White and his union representative regarding White’s internet activities. White received a written letter of reprimand and was put on paid suspension until October 29, 2004, but nothing was put in White’s file disclosing the nature and extent of his internet conduct. (Complaint ¶¶ 114). White was also required to undergo continued counseling, which he did not do. Meanwhile, in late September, early October 2004, White chose Plaintiffs, who were female first graders in his class, as volunteers for a special project relating to the study of Helen Keller. (Complaint ¶ 113). During the course of 2004-05 school year, at least weekly, White groomed Plaintiffs for sexual interactions with him, which included taking Plaintiffs from recess and lunch, and locking Plaintiffs alone with him in his classroom, with the blinds drawn. (Complaint ¶ 147). While so isolated, White blindfolded Plaintiffs, silenced them, and engaged in physical contact with [Plaintiffs] for the purposes of his own sexual gratification, including but not limited to the massaging of his back and legs underneath his clothing ..., the insertion of food, his fingers, other objects and his penis into [their] mouths (occasionally doing so when Doe-20 was on her knees and Doe-21 was sitting or squatting on a low stool ... (Complaint ¶ 140(d)). In April 2005, Plaintiffs brought home a letter in their backpacks notifying parents that White would no longer be teaching, but did not give a reason. Plaintiffs later learned that the reason was that White had been caught “stalking” one of his prior students. (Complaint ¶ 165(a)). White resigned in April 2005, but Heineman gave him a letter of recommendation and a severance package. (Complaint ¶ 156). The District and the individual defendants allegedly swept White’s misconduct under the rug, concealing it to protect their own careers and reputations. White was able to obtain another teaching job, this time in Urbana, Illinois. On February 1, 2007, White was arrested and charged with aggravated criminal sexual activities with minors. (Complaint ¶ 164). He pled guilty and is now incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Analysis I. Federal Claims A. Counts 1 & 3: Plaintiffs state a Title IX claim, but Count 3 should be stricken because it is redundant of Count 1. Count 1 is a Title IX claim for discrimination, and Count 3 is a Title IX claim for a hostile educational environment. The School District contends that no Title IX claims are stated because Plaintiffs have not alleged actual knowledge of White’s misconduct or deliberate indifference. Title IX provides that “No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, ...” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005) (“... Title IX, ..., broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting any person to ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex.’ ”). “[A] teacher’s sexual harassment of a student may render a school district liable for sex discrimination under Title IX.” Hansen v. Bd. of Trustees of Hamilton Southeastern School Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 605 (2008). “[A] school district is subject to a private damages action only where it is deliberately indifferent to known acts of discrimination or harassment.” Id. (citations omitted). The harassment must be “so pervasive or severe that it altered the conditions of plaintiffs education”. Mary M. v. North Lawrence Community School Corp., 131 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir.1997). School officials with the authority to take action must have had actual knowledge of the misconduct and must have been deliberately indifferent to it. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). This Court already concluded in Doe v. White et al., 08-1287, that the plaintiffs in that case sufficiently alleged actual knowledge and deliberate indifference under Title IX. The School District, however, contends that knowledge of White’s sexual abuse in the 2003-04 school year cannot serve as knowledge for the 2004-05 year. The District concludes that it could not have had actual notice for the 2004-05 year, since there are no allegations that parents complained during that year. The School District cites Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.2004), but in that case the school officials had no notice of prior incidents of a university professor’s sexual harassment of female students. 367 F.3d at 670-71 (“It turns out that Stegall had made advances to three other woman students, but they had never filed complaints and his conduct hadn’t come to the attention of the university administration.”). Here, school officials did know of the parent complaints in the prior school year. The parents of the three students complained personally to Defendant Heidbreder (the assistant principal), who allegedly would have been required to relay the complaints to Defendants Braksick, Pye and Chapman. (Complaint para. 71). During the 2004-05 school year, Defendant Braksick (the principal) had been replaced by Heineman, but Heidbreder, Pye and Chapman remained. Thus, a plausible inference arises that school officials knew that White had sexually harassed students in the year 2003-04 and that he posed the same risk to students in the next school year. A new school year does not wipe clean knowledge of sexual misconduct from the prior school year. The School District also cites a Fourth Circuit case, Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 238 (4th Cir.2001), for the proposition that “the plaintiff must show ‘actual knowledge’ that the teacher ‘was currently abusing one of his students.’ ” (d/e 19, p. 2, citing 268 F.3d at 238 n. 9)(emphasis added by the School District). In Baynard, the Fourth Circuit upheld a jury verdict against an elementary school principal for deliberate indifference to the risk that a teacher was sexually abusing a student. The Court also, however, upheld judgment as a matter of law in favor of the school district on the Title IX claim. The court reasoned that the principal’s knowledge of the risk of abuse was not enough to prove actual knowledge of abuse as required by Title IX. 268 F.3d at 238 (“Although Malone certainly should have been aware of the potential for such abuse, and for this reason was properly held liable under § 1983, there is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that Malone was in fact aware that a student was being abused.”). The Court’s reference to “current abuse” of a student was given as an example of how actual knowledge might be proven, not as a holding that it was the only way to demonstrate actual knowledge. 268 F.3d n. 9. The School District cites no case that supports a holding that “actual knowledge” of a teacher’s abuse disappears at the end of the school year. The Court wonders whether the Seventh Circuit would agree would agree with Baynard’s understanding of “actual knowledge” under Title IX. See Hansen v. Board of Trustees of Hamilton Southeastern School Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir.2008) (to establish Title IX liability, plaintiffs “must establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether an appropriate official ... had (1) actual knowledge of misconduct by [the teacher] that created a serious risk to its students ... ,”). It does not matter at this point, though, because this case is at the notice pleading stage. Baynard was decided after both sides presented all their evidence at a jury trial. In this case, discovery has not yet begun. The court need only decide if a plausible inference of actual knowledge arises from the factual allegations; the court believes it does, as discussed above. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)(“knowledge, and other conditions of mind may be alleged generally”). The School District also argues that no inference of deliberate indifference arises because its response was reasonable. “Once school officials have actual notice of sexual harassment, Davis imposes a duty to act. But as long as the school’s response is not “clearly unreasonable,” it cannot have acted with the requisite deliberate indifference to incur Title IX liability.” Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, 315 F.3d 817, 824 (7th Cir.2003), quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 648-49, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999). The District points out that there were no more parental complaints after March 2004, and that White was suspended for one week after accessing adult, not child, pornography. These arguments belong at summary judgment or trial. At this stage, a plausible inference arises that the District knew White was engaging in sexual misconduct with his students and took no action. It necessarily follows that a plausible inference of deliberate indifference arises. Having determined that a Title IX claim is stated, the Court next addresses whether Count 3 (Title IX hostile educational environment) is duplicative of Count 1 (Title IX discrimination). Plaintiffs assert that Count 3 is not redundant of Count 1 because it “is premised not upon the sexual abuse itself, but, rather, the hostile educational environment that resulted from the sexual abuse.” (d/e 33, p. 20). The Court does not understand the distinction. Counts 1 and 3 seem to be identical theories of relief under Title IX, based on White’s misconduct and the School District’s indifference to it. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Count 3 be stricken as duplicative of Count 1. B. Count 2: Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim based on White’s “non-sexual” misconduct does not state a claim. Plaintiffs pursue their substantive due process claim against all the defendants, including the School District. The claim is based on “incidences of detention and the loss of privacy and bodily freedom possessed by any student, male or female, that are characterized as non-sexual in nature.” (Complaint ¶ 200). They assert that they possessed “rights to due process and to avoid the deprivation of their personal liberty” (Complaint, ¶ 201), and a right to “freedom of movement” and “bodily privacy” (Complaint ¶ 206). The misconduct listed includes primarily the misconduct that underlies the Title IX claim, but only to the extent that misconduct can be seen as non-sexual. Plaintiffs allege that they have “a vested right to receive said public education without suffering such restraints on their freedom of movement, loss of personal pride and personal privacy and detention without any cause or consent whatsoever.” (Complaint ¶ 219). White allegedly deprived them of these rights through his misconduct, and the other individual Defendants and the School District through their (its) deliberate indifference to it. The School Administrators and White argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because no constitutional violation is alleged. Government officials performing discretionary functions are not liable unless they “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights then known to a reasonable officer.” Saffell v. Crews, 183 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has identified two key inquiries for qualified immunity assertions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show that the defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson v. Callahan, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Pearson held that the court may decide these questions in whatever order is best suited to the case at hand. Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir.2009). The analysis is a “fact-specific question which depends upon the clearly established law at the time.” Hin nen v. Kelly, 992 F.2d 140, 142-43 (7th Cir.1993). “Substantive due process involves the exercise of governmental power without reasonable justification.... It is most often described as an abuse of government power which ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899 (7th Cir.2005); Brown v. Plainfield Community Consolidated Dist. 202, 522 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1076 (N.D.Ill.2007)(“To violate substantive due process, a defendant’s conduct must “shock the conscience” and be “unjustifiable by any governmental interest.” ”). As to Defendant White, the allegations of his sexual abuse and sexual grooming clearly shock the conscience and state a substantive due process claim. Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1062-64 (7th Cir.1997) (superintendent’s alleged sexual assault of teacher stated substantive due process claim); Sandra v. Sperlik, 639 F.Supp.2d 912, 921 (N.D.Ill.2009) (“It goes without saying that the sexual molestation of a student violates that student’s substantive due process rights.”). The claim is based on the violation of one’s substantive due process right to bodily integrity. Id. And, while the School Administrators generally have no affirmative duty under the Constitution to prevent a teacher’s sexual abuse of students, J.O. et al. v. Alton Community Unit, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir.1990), there is support in case law that a substantive due process claim can be stated against them if they “turned a blind eye to constitutional violations thereby allowing a climate to flourish where innocent students are victimized.” Sperlik, 639 F.Supp.2d 912, 920-24 (N.D.Ill.2009), citing J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 271-72 (7 th Cir.1990), Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3rd Cir.1989), and other district court cases in the Seventh Circuit that have recognized the “Stoneking” theory of liability; see also discussion beloiv regarding Count A Here, though, Plaintiffs stress that their substantive due process claim is not based on White’s sexual misconduct, but based only on his misconduct to the extent it is considered non-sexual. They appear to pursue their substantive due process claim as an alternative to their Title IX claim, not in addition to their Title IX claim. Plaintiffs’ framing of this count significantly alters the analysis. In the substantive due process claim as framed by Plaintiffs, White’s actions must be viewed as non-sexual in nature. That is, White did not take his actions in order to sexually groom or sexually harass Plaintiffs. White’s specific conduct listed in the substantive due process claim is: • isolating Plaintiffs [in his school room with the door closed and the blind’s drawn] “for projects of a non-sexual nature that included blindfolds and restraints on or prohibitions on communication” • “proddfing] female students to engage in ridiculous acts such as acting as his servants and providing saliva ...” • “forcing] Doe-20 to sit on his upper foot around his ankles in a compromising, physically uncomfortable position (if this position is not viewed as obviously sexual), forcing] Doe-20 and Doe-21 to provide saliva ... coerc[ing] Doe-20 and Doe-21 to act as virtual slaves in cleaning his classroom and to otherwise abandon their freedom of movement to him as he blindfolded them and ran taste, tough and other tests on them in what he conveyed to Doe-20 and Doe-21 was part of the Helen Keller curriculum ...” • “isolating ... [Plaintiffs] as described above, intimidating them, touching them inappropriately (through hugs and other acts that the McLean County School District and its officials denied were sexual in nature).” • asking Plaintiffs to “scratch[ ] his upper thighs on the inside of his plant [sic] leg and massag[e] his back on the inside of his shirt • conditioning Plaintiffs’ “right to a public education” on “accepting] his physical advances and contacts of a nonsexual nature and unless they acquiesced in his control over their persons to the point of embarrassing them in a classroom .... while they spit in a cup against their will or cleaned on multiple occasions. (Complaint, ¶¶202, 203, 205, 211, 217, 225)(bracketed material added). Viewing many of these actions as nonsexual is quite a strain, given Plaintiffs’ other allegations. But the Court will try to view them as non-sexual — i.e., motivated by no purpose to sexually harass, groom or abuse Plaintiffs. Viewing the allegations in this strained light, the Court does not see conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Sequestering Plaintiffs alone in a closed classroom with the blinds drawn, blindfolding them, instructing them to remain silent, and inserting objects into their mouths as part of a Hellen Keller project (other than White’s penis) may be improper and strange, but are not so outside the bounds of decency to shock the conscience. (Complaint ¶¶ 256-257). Similarly, the unwanted physical contact, forcing the plaintiffs to spit into a cup, and treating Plaintiffs like servants (apparently, with regard to cleaning the classroom) may be wrong, but does not shock the conscience. Plaintiffs argue that the alleged nature of these acts, “sexual vs. non-sexual, is irrelevant.” (d/e 33). Yet, that distinction is crucial. The Court does not see how these actions “shock the conscience” without the underlying sexual motive. Certainly many of the actions are highly inappropriate and bizarre, but the Court does not believe they rise to the level shocking the conscience if characterized as non-sexual. The actions are shocking because of the sexual connotations they carry. Sperlik, the case cited by Plaintiffs, was about a teacher’s sexual gratification of his bondage fantasies through sexually grooming and abusing his students. The plaintiffs in Sperlik did not characterize the teacher’s misconduct as non-sexual. See Sperlik, 639 F.Supp.2d at 915-16 (teacher allegedly rubbed students’ private parts, pressed his penis into their backs, duct taped them to chairs, rubbed their thighs, touched their breasts). Here, Plaintiffs insist that “the allegations in Count II pertain solely to the non-sexual acts committed by White which deprived the plaintiffs of their personal liberty.” (d/e 33). The Court accordingly concludes that Plaintiffs allegations in Count II, as fmmed, do not state a claim for the violations of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal of Count 2 for failure to state a claim. C. Count 4: Plaintiffs state a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant White for unreasonable seizure. A Fourth Amendment claim is arguably also stated against the School Administrators for turning a blind eye to White’s constitutional violations. A Fourth Amendment claim is not stated against the School District because there is no plausible inference of an unconstitutional policy, practice or custom. Plaintiffs’ Count 4 is for “Unlawful Seizure/Abuse in Custody.” (Complaint p. 49). They allege that they “were deprived of their constitutional liberty of movement and right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.” (Complaint ¶ 255). Specifically, they allege that: White was one of many teachers with explicit and implied authority to control, direct and restrain the movement of children under his control but he exceeded this authority when he unlawfully seized and detained Doe-20 and Doe-21, deprived of [sic] them liberty of movement and blindfolded them under a forced commitment to silence. As White had the children blindfolded, he used illegal and unreasonable force when, without consent, he inserted his fingers, objects and other items in ... [Plaintiffs’] mouths and otherwise came into contact with them in commanding them to obey only him while isolated in his classroom. (Complaint ¶¶ 256-57). Though they make no specific reference to the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiffs appear to be pursuing a Fourth Amendment claim in this count, based on their references to “searches and seizures” and “illegal and unreasonable force.” The reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment seizure of a public school student by a teacher must be evaluated in the context of the school environment, where restricting the liberty of students is a sine qua non of the educational process. Deprivations of liberty in schools serve the end of compulsory education and do not inherently pose constitutional problems. Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia School Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir.1995). “[I]n the context of a public school, a teacher or administrator who seizes a student does so in violation of the Fourth Amendment only when the restriction of liberty is unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and apparent.” Id. at 1014; see also Daniel S. v. Board of Educ. of York Community High School, 152 F.Supp.2d 949, 953 (N.D.Ill.2001) (unreasonable seizure claim stated where student forced to stand naked in front of other students in locker room, as punishment for ripping shorts). Unlike the substantive due process claim, Plaintiffs do not appear to limit their Fourth Amendment claim to White’s “non-sexual conduct.” Thus, White allegedly isolated Plaintiffs in his classroom for the purpose of sexually grooming/abusing them. Plaintiffs, being first grade students, were certainly not free to leave the classroom nor to disobey his commands. Defendants do not assert that this is not seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The restriction of Plaintiffs’ liberty was obviously objectively unreasonable, since it was for the purpose of sexually grooming/abusing them. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a Fourth Amendment claim is stated against White. The harder question is whether a Fourth Amendment claim is stated against the School Administrators individually. Defendants assert that the Seventh Circuit rejected a similar Fourth Amendment claim in J.O. v. Alton Community Unit School District 11, 909 F.2d 267, 273 (7th Cir.1990). In Alton, a teacher allegedly sexually molested students. The parents pursued a Fourteenth Amendment claim against the school administrators and the school board for deprivation of a liberty interest arising from the alleged special relationship between the defendants and the minor children, which the plaintiffs argued created an “affirmative duty to provide for their safety and to prevent the child abuse....” 909 F.2d at 272. The Court rejected that theory, holding that “the government, acting through local school administrations, has not rendered its schoolchildren so helpless that an affirmative constitutional duty to protect arises.” Id. The court was careful to note, though, that the plaintiffs did not allege that the school defendants had “promoted school policies that ‘eneourag[ed] a climate to flourish where innocent [children] were victimized.’ ” Id., quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3d Cir.1989). The plaintiffs in Alton pressed a Fourth Amendment claim in addition to their Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The Seventh Circuit declined to “express any opinion on the merits of the plaintiffs’ alternative characterization of their rights except to say that it adds little to their case.” Id. at 273. However, the Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion because the plaintiffs had not alleged that the defendants personally violated their rights, not because a Fourth Amendment (or Fourteenth Amendment) claim could never be stated. Id. (plaintiffs need to show “some action by the defendants that would justify the imposition of liability”). The court rejected only the legal theory that “the school defendants, simply by virtue of their relationship to the plaintiffs, are liable for their failure to prevent the child abuse.” Id. at 274. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case, directing the district court to allow the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint based on a different legal theory. Defendants also cite Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir.1996), in which school administrators ignored a homosexual student’s pleas to stop other students from harassing and assaulting him. Upholding summary judgment for the defendants on the substantive due process claim, Nabozny reiterated Alton’s holding that the defendants had no constitutional duty to act. 92 F.3d at 460. The Court, however, took pains to point out that the plaintiffs had not challenged Alton’s holding nor tried to distinguish it. Id. at 459 n. 13. The Seventh Circuit remarked that Alton was arguably distinguishable because the school officials in Nabozny had allegedly been aware of the abuse for years, unlike the officials in Alton, but the Court stressed that the plaintiffs had not pursued that argument. Id. The Court in Nabozny also noted that “[t]he extent of a school’s control over a student also might vary with the student’s age; schools control kindergarten students more than high school students.” Id. Nabozny explicitly left these possibilities open for future litigation. Id. Alton and Nabozny, therefore, do not unequivocally preclude a Fourteenth or Fourth Amendment claim against school administrators based on a teacher’s sexual abuse of students. Both cases stand essentially for the proposition that school officials must be personally responsible for that abuse to be held liable under § 1983, just like all § 1983 defendants. Nor do Alton and Nabozny reject the Third Circuit’s “Stoneking ” theory of liability' — -that school officials can be liable for “ ‘encouraging] a climate where innocent [children] were victimized.’ ” 909 F.2d at 272, quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3rd Cir.1989); Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia School Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1016 n. 4 (7th Cir.1995) (expressing no opinion on Stoneking theory); Sperlik, 639 F.Supp.2d 912, 920-21 (N.D.Ill.2009) (joining other district courts in concluding that Alton “tacitly approved” the Stoneking theory, and that “a substantive due process claim can stand where the plaintiff puts forth enough evidence to demonstrate that an individual defendant turned a blind eye to constitutional violations thereby allowing a climate to flourish where innocent students are victimized.”). The debate over the Stoneking theory is somewhat of a red herring at present in any event, since the Stoneking theory seems to be discussed under a substantive due process analysis. As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not stated a substantive due process claim as framed. Under § 1983, the School Administrators can be liable if they were personally responsible for the alleged constitutional injuries of the students, just like any other § 1983 defendant. The School Administrators argue that no plausible inference of personal responsibility arises against them. The Administrators cannot be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior basis. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). “Supervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not liable .... the supervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must in other words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). Taking the allegations as true and construing plausible inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Administrators were notified of White’s suspected sexual behavior with three different female students during the 2003-04 school year. Additionally, White locked Plaintiffs in his classroom with the door closed and the blinds drawn at least weekly over a six month period. Given the frequency and duration of this practice, a plausible inference arises that at least some of the Administrators knew about this practice. And, the School Administrators allegedly knew, as of October 2004, that White used his classroom computer to access pornographic websites. The Court believes that these allegations give rise a plausible inference of personal responsibility arises against the School Administrators on the Fourth Amendment claim, enough at least to survive a motion to dismiss. In the Court’s opinion, an inference arises that the Defendants knew of White’s constitutional violations and turned a blind eye to them. A developed factual record may show otherwise. The Court must next address whether the School Administrators are entitled to qualified immunity on this Fourth Amendment claim. The right must have been “ ‘clearly established in’ a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense” than general propositions of law. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). Plaintiffs bear this burden, which can be met by “showing that there is ‘a clearly analogous case establishing a right to be free from the specific conduct at issue’ or that ‘the conduct is so egregious that no reasonable person could have believed that it would not violate clearly established rights.’ ” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d at 540, quoting Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir.2001). Defendants’ qualified immunity arguments are based on a narrow view of Plaintiffs’ claim. Defendants argue that no constitutional violation is alleged because there is no constitutional right to a safe school environment or affirmative constitutional duty to protect students. As discussed above, however, Plaintiffs allegations are broader than that. Plaintiffs allege that the School Administrators were personally aware of and turned a blind eye to a known, obvious and substantial risk of sexual abuse that White posed to his first grade female students. Alton and Nabozny were not based on such personal knowledge, as expressly acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit in those opinions. Defendants have not addressed qualified immunity in light of this view of the allegations. For that reason alone, qualified immunity on this claim should be denied at this point. Alternatively, the Court believes, as discussed above, that these allegations do state a Fourth Amendment violation. The Court further believes that the right violated was clearly established. See Sperlik, 639 F.Supp.2d at 927 (“The law imposing liability on supervisors who condone constitutional violations by turning a blind eye was clearly established .... ”). The next question is whether a claim is stated against the School District. The Court does not believe so. To state a § 1983 claim against the School District, Plaintiffs must allege facts that plausibly suggest that their constitutional violations were attributable to a School District policy, custom or practice. Fitzgerald, 129 S.Ct. at 797. Here, an express District policy clearly did not cause Plaintiffs’ injuries. To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege that the District’s written policies prohibit harassment and require District employees to report suspected child abuse. (Complaint ¶¶ 50-51). Allegations that the School Administrators violated those express policies does not make out a claim against the School District. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir.2007) (“Misbehaving employees are responsible for their own conduct, ‘units of local government are responsible only for their policies rather than misconduct by their workers.’ ’’Xquoted cite omitted). Plaintiffs seem to argue that, despite the District’s express policies, the School District, through the actions of the School Administrators individually, established a de facto custom and practice of ignoring and concealing teachers’ sexual abuse of students, (d/e 33, p. 18)(Plaintiffs “have adequately alleged actions by the individual defendants which permitted a discriminatory climate to flourish such that it became the policy of the district.”). The District can be liable under § 1983 for “(1) ... a permanent and well-settled municipal custom or practice that, although not authorized by official law or policy, was the moving force behind the plaintiffs constitutional injury; or (2) an individual with final policy-making authority for the municipality (on the subject in question) caused the constitutional deprivation.” Valentino v. Village of South Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir.2009). The parties argue about whether the Seventh Circuit has adopted the Stoneking theory of liability. As discussed above, the Seventh Circuit has expressly not addressed the merits of that theory. In the Court’s view, however, the Stoneking debate has little relevance to determining whether an unconstitutional District policy is alleged. In Stoneking, the Third Circuit held that a principal and assistant principal, in their individual capacities, were not entitled to qualified immunity where they, individually, maintained a practice of “reckless indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual abuse of students by teachers,____” 882 F.2d at 724-25. The Stoneking Court did discuss Monell, but in the context of a municipal policymaker’s individual liability for maintaining a policy of deliberate indifference to teachers’ sexual abuse of students. There was no discussion of the school district’s liability. Here, the Court has already concluded that a claim is stated against the School Administrators in their individual capacities and that they are not entitled to qualified immunity. They can be individually liable for implementing their own unconstitutional policies. The question is whether their actions constituted a policy or practice attributable to the District. The Court does not believe that any plausible inference arises that the School Administrators’ actions and inactions reflected “a permanent and well-settled ... custom or practice” of the School District. Plaintiffs assert that the School Administrators had “final policymaking authority,” but they do not address the School District’s argument that, under Illinois law, only the School Board has final policy-making authority. Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park Public School Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir.1998). That the School Administrators “had the authority to institute corrective measures” on the School District’s behalf (Complaint ¶ 209) does not make them final policymakers. Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to add the words “final policymakers,” but the addition of these bare conclusory allegations would not help, given Duda and the fact that the School Administrators were contravening the School District’s policies, not establishing them. Accordingly, the Court concludes that no inference arises that Plaintiffs’ injuries were attributable to a School District policy or practice. The Court will recommend that the School District be dismissed from this claim. D. Count 5: Dismissing Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claims because of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would be premature. Count 5 alleges that the School Administrators conspired with White to conceal White’s misconduct by, among other actions, not reporting the complaints against him, failing to document the nature and extent of his misconduct in his personnel file, and keeping the nature and extent of White’s misconduct a secret. Through this agreement, White was allegedly able to continue his misconduct and the School Administrators were able to protect their reputations and careers and the reputation of the school. (See Complaint ¶¶ 264, 266-67). The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) a purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to his person or property or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Keri v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University, 458 F.3d 620 (7th Cir.2006) (quoted cites omitted). “[T]he conspiracy must be motivated by racial, or other class-based discriminatory animus.” Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir.2008). Plaintiffs do not specifically allege in this count that Defendants were motivated by a class-based animus, but it is evident from their other allegations that they are asserting their gender as the discriminatory animus. Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir.1988) (§ 1985 covers conspiracies to discriminate based on sex). The individual Defendants argue that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars this claim against them. Under that doctrine, members of the same entity acting within the scope of their employment cannot be considered to be acting in “conspiracy” with each other. Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 632-33 (7th Cir.1999). The Seventh Circuit has discussed exceptions to this doctrine for employees “motivated solely by personal bias” or where an “extensive discriminatory conspiracy” is involved rather than “ ‘essentially a single act of discrimination’ ”. Hartman v. Bd. of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508, 4 F.3d 465, 470-71 (7th Cir.1993) (emphasis addedXquoted cite omitted); Keri v. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 642 (7th Cir.2006) (“In a corporate conspiracy, co-conspirators must be outside of the corporation.”; but also discussing the exception for solely personal bias); Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 184 F.3d 623, 632-33 (7th Cir.1999) (§ 1985 conspiracy cannot exist among members of same entity except in “ ‘egregious circumstances’ ”) (citation omitted). Defendants cite Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Hononegah Community High School Dist. # 207, 833 F.Supp. 1366, 1381 (N.D.Ill.1993), in which the district court dismissed a similar § 1985 claim as barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The court in Hononegah reasoned that the doctrine applied because the school administrators’ concealment of the abuse could have only occurred because of their positions. The Court wonders how Hononegah squares with the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of the exceptions to the doctrine in Hartman. If an employee is “solely motivated by personal bias”, Hartman at least contemplates liability regardless of whether that employee used his position to effectuate that personal bias. Similarly, if employees were abusing their positions to further an “extensive discriminatory conspiracy,” the Court does not see how the doctrine would protect them. On the other hand, Plaintiffs certainly have an uphill battle. The Seventh Circuit is clear that only in “egregious circumstances” would the exception apply; otherwise the exception would swallow the rule. See Hartman, 4 F.3d at 470. Defendants may have acted in part out of illegitimate personal motives, but that is not enough. See Keri, 458 F.3d at 642 (plaintiffs failed to show that defendant’s “interested in maintaining a quality education program played no interest at all in their decisions.”). This is a close call, in the Court’s opinion. However, given the posture of the case and the considering the murky parameters of the exceptions to the doctrine, the Court believes that dismissal would be premature. Hononegah, the district court case cited by Defendants, was decided at the motion to dismiss stage, but other cases have waited until summary judgment. See Keri, 458 F.3d 620, 642 (7th Cir.2006) (upholding summary judgment to board members — no evide