Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER JAMES 0. BROWNING, District Judge. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, filed September 9, 2009 (Doc. 17). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on October 29, 2009. The primary issues are: (i) whether the police were justified, pursuant to the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, to enter Defendant Joseph Martinez’ home to check for individuals who might be injured or in need of assistance; (ii) whether the scope of the search conducted by the police officers was reasonable under the circumstances; (iii) whether, if the entry and/or search were unconstitutional, the Court should suppress the evidence seized in the house; (iv) whether the subsequently obtained search warrant was valid; and (v) whether the second, warrant-authorized search of the house eliminates the need to exclude the evidence seized in the house. The Court concludes that: (i) the police did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an immediate need to protect the life or safety of someone in the Martinez home; (ii) because the Court decides that the entry and search violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court need not decide whether the police executed the search in a manner that was reasonable under the circumstances; and (iii) the warrant affidavit, however, excluding any information garnered from the initial, warrantless search, established probable cause to search Martinez’ home. Based on the limited question that Martinez asks the Court to resolve in this motion, the Court will deny the motion and decline to suppress the challenged evidence at this time. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the Court to state its essential findings on the record when deciding a motion that involves factual issues. The findings of fact in this Memorandum Opinion and Order shall serve as the Court’s essential findings for purposes of rule 12(d). The Court makes these findings under the authority of rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a judge to decide preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence, including the legality of a search or seizure and the voluntariness of an individual’s confession or consent to search. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983). In deciding such preliminary questions, the other rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges, do not bind the Court. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d at 1269. 1. Martinez resides at 10 Dairy Lane, Tijeras, New Mexico. See Transcript of Hearing at 221:18-23 (taken October 29, 2009)(Rees, Hartsock)(“Tr.”); Transcript of Hearing at 27:21-24 (taken October 14, 2009)(Hartsock)(“Detention Tr.”). 2. Martinez’ residence is a two-story dwelling that sits off the road on a couple of acres of land. See Tr. at 54:11 (Lind); Detention Tr. at 34:25-35:4 (Hartsock); Government Exhibit 59. 3. The residence is approximately 3,000 to 4,000 square feet. See Tr. at 67:19-20 (Lind); id. at 181:20-21 (Torrez, Kmatz). 4. On Friday, April 14, 2009, at approximately 1:30 p.m., the Bernalillo County Emergency Communication Center (“911”) received a call from the residence at 10 Dairy Lane that was an “open line” — a call in which the dispatcher answers and there is nobody on the other end of the call. Id. at 47:24^18:3, 48:19-49:4 (Rees, Lind); Government Exhibit 2 (“MARTINEZ, JOSEPH ... 09/04/14 13:27 STATIC ...”). 5. No person initiated the 911 call from Martinez’ home. 6. According to Bernalillo County Emergency Communications Center Standard Operating Guidelines § 7.2.10: If a 9-1-1 call results in a hang-up or is disconnected before the ECO [Emergency Communications Operator] can determine the reason for the call, the ECO will obtain the caller’s number from the ANI display, dial that number to attempt to contact and inquire if an emergency exists. If a satisfactory answer is not received, or there is no answer, or if the line is busy, the ECO will dispatch the appropriate law enforcement agency to the location to check the welfare of the person(s) there and/or notify the appropriate agency. Response Exhibit A, at 5, filed September 21, 2009 (Doc. 23-2). 7. In the open-line call, the 911 dispatcher who received the call heard only static, and no one verbally responded to the dispatcher. See Tr. at 97:21-99:8 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 199:10-200:1 (Bregman, Kmatz); Government Exhibit 2, at 1. 8. The dispatcher disconnected the line and called back to the residence. See Tr. at 49:2-8 (Rees, Lind); id. at 199:10-200:1 (Bregman, Kmatz). 9. When the dispatcher returned the call, she heard only static and received no answer. See id. at 49:2-8 (Rees, Lind); id. at 199:10-200:1 (Bregman, Kmatz). 10. When no one answered, the dispatcher dispatched and sent, at approximately 1:36 p.m., Sergeant Robert Lind and Deputy Nathan Kmatz, both with the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Office, to Martinez’ residence at 10 Dairy Lane, from which the 911 call originated. See id. at 49:18-49:25 (Lind); id. at 172:24-176:4 (Torrez, Kmatz). 11. The dispatcher conveyed to the responding officers that the 911 call had consisted solely of static. See id. at 98:12-99:5 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 161:13-17 (Court, Lind); id. at 199:10-200:1 (Bregman, Kmatz). 12. Roughly half of the open-line or hang-up 911 calls to which Lind has been dispatched have turned out to involve no emergency. See id. at 165:17-23 (Court, Lind). 13. In responding to 911 calls, Bernalillo County Sheriffs Deputies do not distinguish between hang-up/mcomplete-information calls and open-line static calls. See id. at 160:24-161:12 (Court, Lind); id. at 163:4-8 (Lind); id. at 236:7-11 (Rees, Hartsock). 14. Lind knew that line problems or bad weather can sometimes cause static-only calls. See id. at 99:11-22 (Bregman, Lind). 15. Officers in the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Department were generally aware that bad weather or line problems sometimes cause static-only calls. See KOB.com: Phantom 911 Calls Blamed on Rain, http://www.kob.eom/article/stories/s 1239088.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 16. The responding officers went to Martinez’ home. See Tr. at 50:20-25 (Lind); id. at 99:24-100:1 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 174:7-176:9 (Torrez, Kmatz). 17. The 911 call was not a priority call. See id. at 176:14-16 (Kmatz). 18. Priority calls are ones that involve situations in which a person’s life may be in immediate danger, such as felonies in progress, or when the 911 dispatcher hears screams or gunshots during the 911 call. See id. at 205:22-206:7 (Kmatz). 19. The responding officers traveled to the Martinez home at the speed limit, obeying traffic laws, and without lights or sirens. See id. at 176:14-16 (Kmatz); id. at 205:16-206:7 (Court, Kmatz). 20. The officers did not have a subjective belief that anyone at 10 Dairy Lane was in immediate need of protection. See id. 108:21-109:5 (Bregman, Lind)(“Q: So now ... do you actually come to the conclusion that because I see a TV box there’s an emergency? A: This whole time I have thought there is a possibility of emergency situation yes, sir. Q: A possibility. But at that time ... do you actually believe that there is an emergency? A: I believe there is a probability there is something going on; probably there’s a possible emergency at that point. Q: Probably there’s a possible emergency.”); id. at 167:19-23 (Court, Lind)(“THE COURT: Now, looking at ... the Bernalillo County Sheriffs policy, when did you believe, if you did, that you ... needed to enter to save a life? THE WITNESS: We needed to enter to check to make sure that nobody in that house was hurt ....”); id. at 167:22-168:4 (Lind)(“I didn’t have evidence that somebody was hurt, but I didn’t have any evidence to the contrary, either.”); id. at 168:5-9 (Court, Lind)(“THE COURT: So was it your belief that it could be either way at that point? It could be that you needed to safe a life or it may be something else? THE WITNESS: Yeah it could be we could also need to catch the individual that was burglarizing the residence.”); id. at 206:8-12 (Court, Kmatz)(“THE COURT: So just with the information ... that you had a static call, that wasn’t enough for you to believe that a life was in danger, correct? THE WITNESS: Correct.”). 21.Lind and Kmatz arrived at the residence at approximately 1:56 p.m. See id. at 50:8 (Lind); id. at 176:5-9 (Torrez, Kmatz); Government Exhibit 2. 22. Upon arrival at the residence, the officers found the gate to the property closed. See Tr. at 50:20-25(Lind); id. at 176:23-24 (Kmatz). 23. The officers found an opening onto the property, however, that any person could enter. See id. at 51:1-5 (Rees, Lind); id. at 176:23-177:3 (Kmatz). 24. The officers approached the front door, repeatedly knocked and announced their presence, but received no answer. See id. at 56:6-23 (Rees, Lind); id. at 104:6-105:15 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 177:4-178:9 (Kmatz). 25. When no one answered, the officers walked around the house’s perimeter and searched the outside of the house. See id. at 57:6-58:11 (Rees, Lind); id. at 178:10-23 (Torrez, Kmatz). 26. In walking the perimeter of the house, and looking in through windows, the officers found no signs of forced entry, and neither saw nor heard anybody inside. See id. 101:17-102:25 (Bregman, Lind). 27. Lind and Kmatz found an unlocked, sliding-glass door on the second-story balcony. See id. at 58:3-13 (Rees, Lind); id. at 86:11-12 (Rees, Lind); Government Exhibit 16. 28. Through the sliding-glass door on the second-story balcony, the officers saw that the house looked disheveled and that there were some electronics boxes near the door. See Tr. at 110:12-16 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 167:11-18 (Court, Lind); id. at 178:14-23 (Torrez, Kmatz). 29. While untidy, the house did not appear ransacked or as if a struggled had occurred. See Government Exhibits 16-58. 30. The unlocked back door raised the officers’ concern, because intruders tend to enter residences through back doors as opposed to front doors. See Tr. at 59:25-60:20 (Rees, Lind); id. at 178:14-179:10 (Rees, Lind). 31. The officers believed that the 911 call, with an unlocked door and a messy house, provided exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry. See id. at 109:15-24 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 198:11-199:8 (Bregman, Kmatz); id. at 202:4-14 (Bregman, Kmatz). 32. The officers would not have entered if all doors had been locked. See id. at 110:24-111:10 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 201:1-4 (Bregman, Kmatz). 33. If all of the doors — rather than only one — had been unlocked, the officers would still have entered the premises. See id. at 154:1-6 (Rees, Lind). 34. The officers opened the sliding-glass door on the second-story balcony and again announced their presence. See id. at 60:21-61:5 (Rees, Lind). 35. The officers continued to receive no response. See id. at 61:6-7 (Rees, Lind). 36. Once the door was opened, the officers again observed that the inside of the house was in disarray. See id. at 61:25-62:6 (Rees, Lind). 37. The standard procedure and training of the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Office regarding emergency searches/exigent circumstances permits deputies to: make a warrantless entry of anything, whether personal belongings, a vehicle, or building, anytime that Deputies have good reason to believe it is necessary to save a life or prevent injury (i.e., cries for help from inside of a building, assisting the Fire Department on a fire, to check on the welfare of the suspected abused child). However, once the emergency has passed, Deputies may not continue to search without obtaining a warrant. Response Exhibit B at 1, filed September 21, 2009 (Doc. 23-3). 38. The officers had developed their own guideline or categorical rule that any 911 call plus an unlocked door meant that the officers could enter to do an investigative sweep to look for persons in need of assistance. See Tr. at 109:12-110:4, 112:8-11 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 198:21-199:5 (Bregman, Kmatz); id. at 202:4-14 (Bregman, Kmatz). 39. Prior to the incident at Martinez’ residence, Lind had, on numerous occasions, entered a residence based only on a 911 static call and an unlocked door. See id. at 148:15-25 (Lind). 40. The officers did not believe an open-line 911 call, alone, justified entry into a residence. See id. at 45:4-46:4 (Rees, Lind). 41. The officers entered the house through the unlocked door that they had found on the second floor. See id. at 63:3-9 (Rees, Lind); id. at 180:19-181:3 (Torrez, Kmatz). 42. The officers then went inside the residence to ensure no one was injured, unconscious, or deceased pursuant to the emergency-aid/exigent-circumstance exception to the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirement. See id. at 64:17-65:3, 70:18-22 (Rees, Lind); id. at 82:20-22 (Lind). 43. The officers did not have a warrant. See id. at 82:20-22 (Lind). 44. The officers did not have a subjective belief that anyone was in the house; rather, the officers could not eliminate the possibility that someone was in the house. See id. at 46:24-47:3 (Rees, Lind)(“Q: Anything about the information you were given about the call, the fact that it was ... static, make you believe no emergency existed? A: No, ma'am. We have to assume that there is a person there.”); id. at 56:24-57:2 (Rees, Lind)(“Q: ... did you know if an emergency existed or not. A: No ma'am. We at that point have to continue checking the house and assume that someone might still need aid inside the house.”); id. at 61:8-9 (Rees, Lind)(“A: We did not hear anything. Q: Anything about that make you believe that an emergency doesn’t exist? A: No. We still assume that there is something.”); id. 69:3-8 (Rees, Lind)(“Q: Does the fact that you didn’t see a phone off the hook, did that mean based on your training and experience that an emergency doesn’t exist? A: No, ma’am there is still an opportunity for an emergency there.”). 45. The officers did not have a subjective belief that anyone in the house was in immediate need of assistance; rather, the officers could not eliminate the possibility that someone was in the house who needed immediate assistance. See id. at 46:24-47:3 (Rees, Lind); id. at 56:24-57:2 (Rees, Lind); id. at 61:8-9 (Rees, Lind); id. 69:3-8 (Rees, Lind); id. at 167:19-23 (Court, Lind)(“THE COURT: Now, looking at ... the Bernalillo County Sheriffs policy, when did you believe, if you did, that you ... needed to enter to save a life? THE WITNESS: We needed to enter to check to make sure that nobody in that house was hurt ....”); id. at 167:22-168:4 (Lind)(“I didn’t have evidence that somebody was hurt, but I didn’t have any evidence to the contrary, either.”); id. at 168:5-9 (Court, Lind)(“THE COURT: So was it your belief that it could be either way at that point? It could be that you needed to safe a life or it may be something else? THE WITNESS: Yeah it could be we could also need to catch the individual that was burglarizing the residence.”); id. at 206:8-12 (Court, Kmatz)(“THE COURT: So just with the information ... that you had a static call, that wasn’t enough for you to believe that a life was in danger, correct? THE WITNESS: Correct.”). 46.The officers did not have a subjective belief that anyone in the house was in immediate need of protection of his or her life or safety; rather, the officers could not eliminate the possibility that someone in the house was in immediate need of protection of his or her life or safety. See id. at 46:24^17:3 (Rees, Lind); id. at 56:24-57:2 (Rees, Lind); id. at 61:8-9 (Rees, Lind); id. 69:3-8 (Rees, Lind); id. 108:21-109:5 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 167:19-23 (Court, Lind); id. at 167:22-168:4 (Lind); id. at 168:5-9 (Court, Lind); id. at 206:8-12 (Court, Kmatz). 47. The officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that there was an immediate emergency necessitating entry into Martinez’ residence. See Tr. at 167:22-168:4 (Lind)(“I didn’t have evidence that somebody was hurt, but I didn’t have any evidence to the contrary, either.”). 48. Upon entering the house, to ensure that no person inside was in peril, the deputies performed a detailed search. See id. at 69:23-80:6 (Rees, Lind). 49. The officers conducted a warrant-less search of Martinez’ home. See id. at 82:20-22 (Lind). 50. The officers immediately smelled marijuana. See id. at 69:9-12 (Lind). 51. As the officers looked in the upstairs portion of the residence for people needing emergency assistance, they saw pornography DVD cases in plain view on a pool table. See id. at 70:13-15, 71:20-72:7 (Rees, Lind); id. at 183:3-24 (Kmatz). 52. The officers also saw, in plain view, a camcorder on a tri-pod pointed toward the pool table and stacks of VHS tapes with handwritten labels. See id. at 70:2-15 (Lind); id. at 183:3-13 (Kmatz). 53. The officers examined a microwave oven and could see a clear bag containing a large quantity of marijuana inside. See id. at 73:19-25(Lind); id. at 87:19-24 (Lind); Government Exhibit 22. 54. The officers saw, in plain view, a plate containing a white powdery substance, which they believed to be cocaine, on the kitchen table. See Tr. at 73:9-14 (Lind); id. at 181:5-16 (Kmatz); Government Exhibit 25-29. 55. Next to the plate, they noticed a straw and residue baggy also in plain view. See Government Exhibit 28. 56. In the upstairs bedroom, while looking for persons, the officers saw marijuana on the bed and numerous glass pipes consistent with smoking illegal narcotics in plain view. See Tr. at 74:10-19 (Lind); id. at 90:16-20 (Lind); Government Exhibit 30. 57. The officers also saw, in plain view, a box on the bed that was filled with DVDs and a stack of Polaroid photographs. See Tr. at 75:3-14 (Lind); id. at 183:3-184:6 (Torrez, Kmatz); Government Exhibits 29-31, 33, 34. 58. The officers looked at the contents of a box that was on top of the bed. See Tr. at 75:7-22 (Lind); id. at 183:3-184:6 (Torrez, Kmatz). 59. The box was on the bottom, left-hand corner of the bed, near the foot of the bed. See id. at 206:13-16 (Court, Kmatz); Government Exhibits 29, 30. 60. The officers had to lean over to see the photograph at the bottom of the box. See Tr. at 142:16-20 (Lind). 61. The photograph inside the box is not a clear picture of child pornography; rather, it must be studied to discern what is going on in the picture. See Government Exhibits 30, 31. 62. The picture visible to the officers depicted a young teenage male under the age of eighteen receiving fellatio from an older Hispanic male. See Tr. at 75:15-20 (Lind); id. at 183:3-184:6 (Torrez, Kmatz); Government Exhibits 30, 31. 63. The officers did not observe the photographic evidence in plain view while looking for persons needing emergency assistance. See Tr. at 142:16-145:7 (Bregman, Lind); Government Exhibits 29, 33, 34. 64. In the upstairs bedroom, the officers found a closet large enough to conceal a person. See Tr. at 34:20-25 (Lind); Government Exhibits 39-40. 65. Inside the closet, the officers saw a scale and a bag containing marijuana in plain view. See Tr. at 34:20-25 (Lind); Government Exhibits 39-41. 66. In the residence’s downstairs portion, there was what appeared to be one sleeping area. See Tr. at 77:4-10, 78:4-8 (Lind). 67. In this room, while searching for persons needing emergency attention, the officers saw numerous children’s toys in plain view. See id. at 77:4-10, 78:4-8 (Lind). 65. While looking for persons, the officers saw numerous pornography videos throughout the residence in plain view, some of which had pictures on their covers of what appeared to be males under the age of eighteen. See id. at 71:20-72:7; 79:2-7 (Rees, Lind). 66. The deputies found no persons inside the Martinez residence. See id. at 124:22-25 (Lind); id. at 181:22-24 (Kmatz). 70. The deputies determined during their sweep of the house that no emergency existed. See id. at 124:22-125:1 (Lind); id. at 125:9-15 (Bregman, Lind). 71. Once the officers ensured no one inside the residence needed emergency attention, the officers promptly exited the residence and secured the house. See id. at 80:5-8 (Rees, Lind); id. at 124:22-125:1 (Lind). 72. The officers spent approximately five minutes clearing the house for persons needing emergency assistance. See id. at 68:10-11 (Lind); id. at 184:24-185:2 (Torrez, Kmatz). 73. The officers’ initial entry into the house was not made for the purpose of preserving evidence. 74. Lind then called Detective Kyle Hartsock with the Bernalillo County Sheriff s Office to prepare a search warrant for the controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and child pornography observed during the officers’ search for persons needing emergency help. See id. at 80:10-83:16 (Rees, Lind); id. at 212:11-23 (Rees, Hart-sock). 75. Hartsock arrived at the residence to take a physical description for purposes of the search-warrant application. See id. at 212:18-24 (Hartsock); id. at 226:7-11 (Hartsock). 76. Hartsock noticed a truck registered to “AccuStripe” parked in a dead-end culde-sac near the property and placed a telephone call to “AccuStripe” to learn who primarily drives the vehicle. See Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4 (dated April 16, 2009), filed September 21, 2009 (Doc. 23-4). 77. In the meantime, Martinez arrived home. See Tr. at 219:9-20 (Rees, Hart-sock); Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4. 78. Officers transported Martinez to the John Price Law Enforcement Center at 400 Roma NW, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for an interview with Hartsock. See Tr. at 219:9-20 (Rees, Hartsock); Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4. 79. After he was advised of his Miranda rights, Martinez indicated that he did not want an attorney and agreed to speak with Hartsock. See Tr. at 219:21-220:7 (Rees, Hartsock); Government Exhibit 3. 80. Martinez admitted the drugs in the house were for personal use, and that the officers would find approximately two ounces of marijuana and a small amount of cocaine. See Tr. at 220:18-221:6 (Rees, Hartsock); Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4. 81. Martinez also admitted he had dozens of pornographic videos and as many as four that involved him having oral sex with a sixteen-year-old male approximately twenty years ago. See Tr. at 221:7-21 (Rees, Hartsock); Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4. 82. Martinez provided a false name of the sixteen-year-old male. Compare Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4 (testifying that Martinez stated that the 16-year-old child’s name is Eric) with Detention Tr. at 46:20-23 (Loman, Hartsock)(testifying that the 16-year-old child’s name is Eddie). 83. Hartsock used the information that he had received, including the items seen in plain view and Martinez’ statements, to secure a search warrant from the Honorable Albert S. Murdoch, District Judge, Second Judicial District, Bernalillo County. See Tr. at 222:13-21 (Rees, Hartsock); Affidavit for Search Warrant; Search Warrant at 1 (dated April 16, 2009), filed September 21, 2009 (Doc. 24-3). 84. The evidence that the officers saw at the residence provided probable cause for the later acquired search warrant. See Tr. at 222:13-21 (Rees, Hartsock); Affidavit for Search Warrant at 1-5; Search Warrant at 1. 85. The authorized search warrant permitted seizure of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and videos and photographs containing child pornography from Martinez’ residence. See Tr. at 221:25-222:8 (Hartsock); Search Warrant; Affidavit for Search Warrant at 1-2; Detention Tr. at 26:25-27:6 (Rees, Hartsock). 86. The officers seized mini cassettes, VHS tapes, camcorders, Polaroid pictures, marijuana, pipes, and other drug paraphernalia pursuant to this warrant. See Tr. at 222:23-223:4 (Rees, Hartsock); Detention Tr. at 28:9-29:19 (Rees, Hartsock); Government Exhibit 4. 87. Hartsock reviewed the evidence and discovered ten VHS videos, twelve 8 mm videos, four mini DVDs, and twenty-nine Polaroid photographs depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. See Detention Tr. at 24:7-34:8 (Rees, Hartsock). 88. Hartsock later identified one of the photographed child victims and interviewed him regarding his sexual abuse that occurred for eleven years. See id. at 37:24-39:17 (Rees, Hartsock). 89. Hartsock’s search warrant affidavit included the following information that he acquired from Lind and which Lind learned from his initial sweep of the Martinez’ residence: At 1336 hours [Lind] and Deputy N. Kmatz were dispatched to 10 Dairy Ln, in Tijeras, NM, in reference to the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Department Communication Center receiving a 911 call that was an open line, where only static was heard on the line, and no one responded. The line was disconnected and called back by the dispatcher, and no one answered the telephone. Sergeant Lind and Deputy Kmatz arrived at the house at 1356 hours and found the gate closed to the property, with an opening they could walk around on the side and knocked on the door to the house. No one answered the door and they began to walk around the perimeter of the house and found a door on the second floor balcony that was not locked. They opened the door and made announcements inside of who they were, and no one answered. Due to the 911 call, and the standard procedure and training of the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Department they entered the residence at 1600 hours to see if anyone was inside that needed help. As they first searched the upstairs portion of the house, they found pornographic DVD cases on a pool table, with a camcorder on a tri-pod pointed at the pool table. They could immediately smell marijuana in the upstairs kitchen area, and could see in a microwave window a clear plastic ziplock bag containing a large amount of marijuana. On the kitchen counter was a red plate with a white powdery substance believed to be cocaine, and a straw and empty baggie next to it, with what appears to be residue on the baggie. They continued searching and in an upstairs bedroom found a plate on a bed containing a small amount of marijuana, and hundreds of glass pipes commonly used to inhale and consume illicit narcotics. On the bed there was also a box containing a large amount of DVD movie’s [sic], with a stack of Polaroid pictures in the middle of them facing up. The top picture was of a young teenage white male sitting in a chair receiving fellatio from an older Hispanic male. In the upstairs bathroom, there is a closet connected to it and there are shelves that are open to the door, and on one of the shelves was a medium sized beige scale with a clear plastic bag containing marijuana inside In the downstairs portion of the house on the kitchen counter was a black plate with a white powdery substance and a straw that had been cut to approximately 2-3" long, and the substance appeared to be cocaine. Sergeant Lind also stated that there were many pornographic DVD’s in the house, and of the few that were laying face up on the top of boxes, it looked to be that there were males under the age of eighteen on the covers. He also noted that the house appeared to have only one sleeping area, which was a large bed, and there were dozens, if not hundreds of kids toys around the house, ranging from small toys to play with to video game systems. There was also a stack of approximately twenty VHS tapes on a pool table near the door they entered that had labels on them, with hand written initials marked on the labels only. He noticed no rooms that children lived in. No one was found inside the residence and at that point Sergeant Lind secured the house and called me. Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4 (emphasis added). 90. Excluding any information that Hartsock received from Lind, Hartsock’s search warrant affidavit included sufficient information to establish probable cause to search Martinez’ home for child pornography, based on the following paragraph: Joseph was brought to the John Price Law Enforcement Center at 400 Roma Rd NW and affiant spoke with him. He stated the drugs in the house are for personal use, and that we would find approximately one to two ounces of marijuana, and a very small amount of cocaine that he had just purchased on Easter Sunday (two days ago). He stated that he has dozens of pornographic VHS tapes that he dubbed from rentals for his personal use, and owns at least two VHS tapes, and as many as four, that involve him having oral sex with a sixteen year old boy approximately twenty years ago (his age at that time would be approximately thirty). He stated he also has approximately four photographs of the same sixteen year old boy doing sexual acts with him. He states that he has showed one of the tapes to a friend named “Ed” that he associates with at a local bar, Sidewinders, in Albuquerque. He stated one of the tapes is labeled “STE”, which stands for “Show to Ed,” and the second tape is marked “ENI”, which stands for “Eric and I.” He stated Eric was the name of the sixteen year old. Affidavit for Search Warrant at 4 (emphasis added). 91. The materials that the deputies seized during their comprehensive search of the home form the basis for the charges against Martinez. 92. After the April 14, 2009 static 911 call, 911 dispatch received at least 8 more static 911 calls from 10 Dairy Lane. They occurred on June 12, 2009, July 26, 2009, July 28, 2009, July 29, 2009, August 3, 2009, August 4, 2009, August 30, 2009, and September 18, 2009. See Defendant’s Exhibits H, I. 93. The April 14, 2009 call was the first 911 call to originate from 10 Dairy Lane since the year 2000. See Tr. at 223:5-20 (Rees, Hartsock). 94. Since April 14, 2009, 911 calls from 10 Dairy Lane have become a chronic problem. See Rees Letter at 4. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A federal Grand Jury indicted Martinez with two counts of Production of a Visual Depiction of a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2256. See Indictment at 1-2, filed August 25, 2009 (Doc. 1). Martinez moves the Court to suppress all evidence seized inside his home, contending that Lind and Kmatz executed the search of his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Motion at 1. In the Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Martinez again asks the Court to suppress all evidence seized inside his home. See Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 1, filed September 9, 2009 (Doc. 18)(“Martinez’ Brief’). On September 21, 2009, the United States responded to Martinez’ motion, alleging: (i) the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry into Martinez’ residence; and (ii) the search in which the police seized its evidence was made in good-faith reliance on a warrant that appeared to be based on probable cause. See United States’ Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Docs. 17 and 18) at 6-19, filed September 21, 2009 (Doc. 23)(“Response”). The United States requests that the Court deny Martinez’ motion to suppress. See Response at 19. In his Reply, Martinez reiterates his request that the Court suppress all evidence seized as a result of the allegedly unlawful search. See Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 4, filed September 29, 2009 (Doc. 25). The Court held a hearing on October 29, 2009. During the hearing, three witnesses testified for the United States: Lind and Kmatz, who performed the initial sweep of Martinez’ house, and Hartsock, who sought the search warrant and performed the second search of the house. Lind and Kmatz both testified as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the static 911 call from Martinez’ telephone and the initial sweep of his home. See Tr. at 46:5-93:25 (Rees, Lind); id. at 173:11-188:25 (Torrez, Kmatz). They testified generally that they were responding to a 911 call and that the call, the lack of an answer when they knocked and announced their presence, the disheveled condition of the house’s interior, and the presence of an unlocked back door were the factors that they believed created exigent circumstances and warranted a warrantless search of the home. See id. at 100:5-109:24 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 188:10-19 (Torrez, Kmatz). Both officers conceded that (i) if there had been no unlocked door, they would not have entered the home; and (ii) that officers are trained that, any time a 911 call is accompanied by an unlocked door, the officers may enter the home to ensure the safety of anyone inside. See id. at 109:15-110:4 (Bregman, Lind); id. at 197:6-199:8 (Bregman, Kmatz); id. at 202:4-14 (Bregman, Kmatz). Lind also conceded that they treated all 911 calls, including hang-up and static 911 calls, equally, see id. at 161:8-12 (Lind), so no matter what type of 911 call they receive, if they also find an unlocked door in the home, they believe they are authorized to enter the home. Hartsock first testified about what Lind and Kmatz had done, based on what Lind and Kmatz told him they had done. See id. at 212:17-218:4 (Rees, Hartsock). Next, he testified about the conversation that he had with Martinez wherein Martinez waived his Miranda rights, and confessed to the presence of marijuana, cocaine, and child pornography inside his home. See id. at 218:5-221:24 (Rees, Hartsock). He then testified about the process of obtaining the search warrant and executing the warrant-authorized search of Martinez’ house. See id. at 221:22-223:4 (Rees, Hartsock). Finally, he testified that, after doing independent research, he discovered that the April 14, 2009 call was the first 911 call to originate from 10 Dairy Lane since the year 2000. See id. at 223:5-23 (Rees, Hartsock). During the hearing, counsel for Martinez objected to testimony from Hartsock about his involvement in the whole incident. See id. at 208:10-23 (Bregman). Martinez appears to ask this Court to make its decision based solely on whether the initial sweep of Martinez’ home was constitutional. Moreover, Brad Hall, attorney for Martinez, insisted that the Court should not pass upon the propriety of Martinez’ conversation with Hartsock. See id. at 218:12-15 (Hall). Mr. Hall told the Court that he expected to file another series of motions seeking to exclude that conversation. See id. at 218:23-219:2 (Hall). For that reason, the Court will, for the purposes of this motion only, assume that there is no concern as to the legality of Martinez’ conversation with Hartsock. After the hearing, the parties submitted a series of letters. The first, dated November 2, 2009, was from Ms. Rees. It directed the Court’s attention to the recently decided case of Herring v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), and suggests that this case changes the standard by which the Court should review the United States’ argument that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to this case. See Letter from Charlyn Rees to the Court (dated November 2, 2009), filed November 2, 2009 (Doc. 38). Next are a series of letters regarding static 911 calls originating from the Martinez residence after the initial April 14, 2009 call. See Defendant’s Exhibit H; Letter from Charlyn Rees to the Court (dated November 3, 2009), filed November 3, 2009 (Doc. 39); Rees Letter at 1. Finally and most recently, Eric Loman, attorney for Martinez, submitted a letter brief and a recent news report regarding the prevalence of “phantom 911 calls” originating from homes in the East Mountains, where Martinez’ house is located. Loman Letter at 1. RELEVANT LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. It also commands that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id. “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police — which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment — is basic to a free society.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” and the Supreme Court has vigorously asserted that the proper analysis under the Fourth Amendment is not whether the particular place searched is a “constitutionally protected area.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507. Rather, the inquiry is whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the place searched and whether that expectation was objectively reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”); id. at 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting)(“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”). There is no doubt, however, that a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and a particularly strong one, in his own home. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (“ ‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ”)(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (“[Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.2009); United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 713-14 (10th Cir.2006). 1. Timing of the Warrant Requirement: Before the Search. In most cases, the Fourth Amendment’s core requirement of reasonableness is a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate, and the issuance of a warrant “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s warrant guarantee is not absolute, but a warrant is generally required to enter a house unless police reasonably believe an emergency exists that makes it infeasible to obtain a warrant. See United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir.2008). In other words, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recently put it, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is to “buffer[ ] investigatory zeal with judicial oversight.” United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 714 (10th Cir.2006). It is only in very particular circumstances that a search without a warrant is deemed reasonable. Furthermore, where a warrant is necessary — which is, again, in most cases — the police must obtain it before the challenged search, not afterwards: Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause, for the Constitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the citizen and the police. Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 356-57, 88 S.Ct. 507. The Supreme Court has commented that allowing an after-the-fact analysis of the facts and circumstances to determine whether there was probable cause supporting a warrantless search or seizure “bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (“The arrest warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause.”). The Supreme Court has instructed that, when assessing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, a court must begin “with the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Arizona v. Gant, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1716, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (“Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”). 2. The Exigent-Circumstances/Emergency-Aid Exception to the Warrant Requirement. Over time, courts have recognized the changing role of law enforcement. Law enforcement is no longer tasked with the sole function of conducting criminal investigations. Police are now also “expected to reduce the opportunities for the commission of some crimes through preventive patrol and other measures, and individuals who are in danger of physical harm, assist those who cannot care for themselves, resolve conflict, create and maintain a feeling of security in the community, and provide other services on an emergency basis.” W. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth Amendment § 6.6, at 451 (4th ed.2004). As then-judge and later Chief Justice Warren Burger recognized, police officers must be given the authority and flexibility to act quickly when performing their duties, even on limited information, when human life is at stake: [A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an injured person. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. Fires or dead bodies are reported to police by cranks where no fires or bodies are to be found. Acting in response to reports of ‘dead bodies,’ the police may find the ‘bodies’ to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or distressed cardiac patients. But the business of policemen and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether the report is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently dead often are saved by swift police response. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963). That no victims are found, or that the information ultimately proves to be false or inaccurate, should not render police action any less lawful in these circumstances. See id. at 212. To lawfully enter a home, police officers need either a warrant or some exception to the warrant requirement. One important exception to the warrant requirement is the presence of exigent circumstances, such as the presence of evanescent evidence or an emergency requiring the officer’s aid. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002) (holding that, to enter a home, “police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances, in order to make lawful entry into a home.”); Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d at 1142-43 (10th Cir.2009) (“[E]ven when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within a home, police may not enter without a warrant absent exigent circumstances.”)(citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004))(internal quotes omitted). The government generally bears the burden of proving the court should apply the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d at 717 (citing United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 970 (10th Cir.1993)). “That burden is especially heavy when the exception must justify the warrantless entry of a home.” United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d at 717 (citing United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir.1992)). Furthermore, what constitutes an exigent circumstance is “highly circumscribed.” Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d at 1142-43 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 117 n. 6, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006)). In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the Supreme Court instructed: “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Najar, set forth a two-part test for determining whether there are exigent circumstances present in an emergency-aid situation: “[0]ur test is now two-fold, whether (1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there is an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner and scope of the search is reasonable.” 451 F.3d at 718. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (1978); United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir.2004). In the limited circumstances where the risk of danger to the officers or others gives rise to the exigent circumstance, the court does not require a separate showing of probable cause. See United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d at 718. Application of the exigent-circumstances exception, which justifies an officer’s entry, should be judged on a ease-by-case basis. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (commenting that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the reasonableness of an officer’s belief must be assessed in the particular circumstances confronting the officer at the time); Brigham, City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (“An action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’ ”)(quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)). The standard for determining whether entry was justified is one of objective reasonableness — the officers’ subjective intent is not controlling. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943 For instance, in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, officers observed an altercation breaking out through a closed screen door. See 547 U.S. at 400, 126 S.Ct. 1943. The officers saw two adults attempting to restrain a juvenile. See id. When the juvenile broke free, he punched one of the adults in the face, causing the adult to spit blood into a nearby sink. See id. At that time, one officer opened the screen door and announced his presence. Nobody noticed, so the officer stepped inside and again, more loudly, announced his presence. See id. At that time the altercation slowed and eventually ceased. See id. The Supreme Court of the United States held that, “regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ... the officers’ entry here was plainly reasonable under the circumstances,” because “the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning.” Id. at 405-06, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Furthermore, the officer’s “manner of ... entry was ... reasonable.” Id. at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943. In making this determination, the Supreme Court considered the officers’ primary motivation, which was a desire to save lives and property. See id. at 404, 126 S.Ct. 1943. The Supreme Court also determined the officers’ manner of entry was reasonable because they announced their presence through the screen door, which the Court found equivalent to knocking to alert the occupants of their presence. See id. at 406-07, 126 S.Ct. 1943. 3. 911 Calls as an Exigent Circumstance Demonstrating that Someone Needs Emergency Aid. Many courts recognize the unique importance of 911 calls when assessing whether law enforcement was authorized to enter a residence under the exigenteircumstances/emergency-aid exception. As the Untied States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Court has noted: “911 calls are the predominant means of communicating emergency situations.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (2002) (citing United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir.2000) (“A 911 call is one of the most common and universally recognized means through which police and other emergency personnel learn that there is someone in a dangerous situation who urgently needs help.”)). “Such calls are distinctive in that they concern contemporaneous emergency events, not general criminal behavior.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1339. a. Non-binding cases. Some courts have held that a hang-up or open-line 911 call is a legitimate justification for entry into a residence under the emergency-aid exception. The parties directed the Court to two cases that the Court has found to be particularly analogous and worthy of individual treatment. Hanson v. Dane County, 599 F.Supp.2d 1046 (W.D.Wis.2009), provides the most liberal example. There, the Honorable Barbara B. Crabb, United States District Judge for the Western District of Wisconsin, recognized that, “[b]y itself, a 911 call may be enough to support a warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception.” Id. at 1053. Hanson v. Dane County involved a hang-up call to a 911 dispatcher in Dane County, Wisconsin. See id. at 1051. The dispatcher tried to call the number back, but nobody answered. See id. At that point, the dispatcher sent officers to the address from which the call came to investigate. See id. When the officers arrived, the garage was open, and the officers entered the garage and spoke with the plaintiff, who said that he had an argument with his wife and that she dialed 911. See id. When the officers talked with the wife, she admitted to calling 911 but stated that she could not remember what the fight with her husband was about. See id. The officers testified that the wife appeared nervous and upset. See id. When the wife mentioned that there were two children in the house, the officers insisted on checking on them. See id. at 1051. After about an hour of questioning, the plaintiff told the officers that his wife might have called 911 because he “bumped” her in the kitchen during their argument. Id. at 1051-52. At that point, the officers arrested the plaintiff for domestic violence. See id. at 1052. The plaintiff, Mr. Hanson, sued Dane County and the deputy sheriffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting various constitutional violations, including unlawful entry into his home. Hanson v. Dane County, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1049-50. Judge Crabb agreed with Dane County that the totality of the circumstances would “lead a reasonable and experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the premises required immediate assistance,” and that “the undisputed facts show that exigent circumstances existed to allow a warrantless entry into plaintiffs home.” Id. at 1053. Judge Crabb reasoned: In this case[,] defendants did not have specific information about the call, but that did not dimmish their need to investigate further. If anything, a 911 hangup call with an unanswered return call from the 911 dispatcher may present even more reason to believe that someone inside the residence is in immediate need of assistance. An unanswered 911 return call suggests that someone in the residence is injured or otherwise incapacitated so as to be unable to answer the return call. Hanson v. Dane County, 599 F.Supp.2d at 1053. She therefore concluded that the “defendants were justified in entering plaintiffs home, even before they learned that plaintiff had an argument with his wife and that his wife had dialed 911.” Id. In United States v. Jenkins, 329 F.3d 579 (2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that a warrantless entry and protective sweep was authorized because of a 911 call. See 329 F.3d at 582. United States v. Jenkins, however, included additional factors. First of all, the 911 call was ambiguous whether the emergency was an assault that had already occurred or was an assault in progress; the officer thus reasonably treated the situation as an assault in progress. See id. at 580. Furthermore, when the officer arrived at Jenkins’ home, the door was open about eight inches and the officer heard a noise coming from inside “like a person standing up and falling down.” Id. The Seventh Circuit found that “exigent circumstances justified the entry.” Id. at 581. “Police received a 911 emergency call of an assault, possibly in progress. Such calls, by themselves, can be enough to support warrantless searches under the exigent circumstances exception, particularly where the caller identified himself.” Id. It therefore appears that, in the Seventh Circuit, a 911 call notifying the police of an assault in progress might be sufficient to justify application of the exigent-circumstances exception, but an assault in progress call plus an open door and a mysterious sound definitely is. b. The Tenth Circuit — United States v. Najar. The most recent decision from the Tenth Circuit on 911 calls and the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is United States v. Najar. In United States v. Najar, a police dispatcher received a hang-up 911 call. See 451 F.3d at 712. The dispatcher made several attempts to call back, but, each time, the call was answered and then hung up again without a word. See id. Officers were dispatched to the address and, when they arrived, they knocked and announced their presence. See id. Nobody answered. See id. One oí the officers, however, could see that there was a person moving around inside that would walk to the door, see who was outside, but not answer. See id. Eventually, the officers convinced that person — the homeowner, Richard Najar — to open the door. See id. He denied making the 911 call and said that nobody else was in the home. See id. at 712. Concerned that Najar was lying and that somebody inside the home needed their assistance, the officers entered the home over Najar’s objection. See id. While inside, the officers found an unharmed woman on the bedroom floor and a shotgun leaning against the wall. See id. The United States charged Najar with being a felon in possession of a firearm. He sought to suppress the evidence based on the officers’ illegal entry. See id. The district court denied the motion, and Najar appealed. See id. The Tenth Circuit set down a two-part test for determining when police officers can enter a home, without probable cause or a warrant, based on the exigent circumstance that someone inside is in need of emergency assistance. In analyzing “whether the risk of personal danger created exigent circumstances,” a court should ask “whether (1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner and scope of the search is reasonable.” Id. at 718. In determining whether the officers were faced with an “immediate need” for their assistance, a court is to be “ ‘guided by the realities of the situation presented by the record’ from the viewpoint of ‘prudent, cautious, and trained officers.’ ” Id. at 718-19 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998)). The Tenth Circuit then implied that a search is reasonable in manner and scope if the officers “d[o] not attempt to search any place beyond the locations where a victim might likely be found” and “confine[ ] the search to only those places inside the home where an emergency would reasonably by associated.” United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d at 720. The Tenth Circuit found that the officers in United States v. Najar had the necessary reasonable basis to believe someone inside needed their help, and that they executed a search that was reasonable in manner and scope. See id. at 720. Also noteworthy is that, generally, a warrantless entry under the exigent-circumstances exception requires probable cause and exigent circumstances. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. at 638, 122 S.Ct. 2458; Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d at 1142-43. The Tenth Circuit, how ever, appears to have recognized a subset of exigent-circumstances cases — what the Court refers to as “emergency-aid” cases — that do not require probable cause. See United States v. Najar, No. CR 03-0735, 2004 WL 3426123, at *6 (D.N.M. Sept. 3, 2004) (Browning, J.) ajfd 451 F.3d 710 (10th Cir.2006) (“For probable cause in the usual [evidenee-of-crime] sense not to be needed, the police must be responding to a true emergency rather than a crime, and the police must reasonably believe a person inside needs immediate assistance, and entry is needed to protect or preserve life, or to avoid serious injury.”)(emphasis in original). In the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Najar, the Tenth Circuit held that the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement authorized a warrantless police entry in an emergency-aid situation without a showing of probable cause. In so doing, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, which was determining “whether the risk of personal danger created exigent circumstances,” did not “require probable cause in this type of exigent circumstances.” United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d at 718 (emphasis added). The following year, the Tenth Circuit again expressed that the general rule is that an officer needs exigent circumstances plus probable cause to make a warrantless entry into a private home, unless the exigent circumstance is the need for emergency aid: [T]he sole question in this case is, viewing the record testimony without the affidavit, whether the officers had both probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying not only their warrantless entry but also their seizure. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that police may enter a home without a warrant where they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. West v. Keef, 479 F.3d 757, 758 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis added). In other words, if the officers are able to establish an objectively reasonable basis to believe that someone inside the home is in need of their assistance, the officers need not also have probable cause to justify entry. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE If the police acquire evidence in the process of violating one’s constitutional rights, they are forbidden from using that evidence in