Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER SEYBERT, District Judge: On March 19, 2007, pro se Plaintiff, Annselm Morpurgo (“Morpurgo”) commenced this action. By Order dated July 27, 2009, this Court referred the case in its entirety to Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlin-son for issuance of a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) on the then-pending motions. Judge Tomlinson issued her R & R on February 17, 2009, and it was served on Plaintiff two days later. On March 2, 2010, within the deadline for submitting objections, Plaintiff filed her objection with the Court. “When evaluating the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court may adopt those portions of the report to which no objections have been made and which are not facially erroneous.” Walker v. Vaughan, 216 F.Supp.2d 290, 291 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citation omitted). However, if a party serves and files specific, written objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation within ten days of receiving the recommended disposition, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the district “court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). When a party raises an objection to a magistrate judge’s report, “the court is required to conduct a de novo review of the contested sections.” See Pizarro v. Bartlett, 776 F.Supp. 815, 817 (S.D.N.Y.1991). However, “[w]hen a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” Barratt v. Joie, 2002 WL 385014, at *1, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3453, at *2 (citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs objections are conclusory at best. Such objections are insufficient to warrant this Court’s de novo review of the R & R. Thus, the Court reviews the R & R for clear error. Upon careful review and consideration, the Court ADOPTS the R & R in its entirety, finding no clear error in its recommendations. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety. Sag Harbor Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiffs in forma pauperis status is, therefore, moot. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mark this matter CLOSED and to mail a copy of this Order to the Plaintiff. SO ORDERED. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION A. KATHLEEN TOMLINSON, United States Magistrate Judge: I. Preliminary Statement Before the Court are various Defendants’ motions to dismiss which have been referred to me by Judge Seybert for a Report and Recommendation. The Motions to Dismiss and this ease as a whole are set against the backdrop of a related state court action, Helga Morpurgo a/k/a Christine Stanley v. Annselm Morpurgo, a/k/a Anna Selma Vinjie Morpurgo, individually and d/b/a Sag Habor Art Center, Sag Habor Savings Bank, Household Finance Corp., Discovery Bank and John C. Cochrane as the Treasurer of Suffolk County, Index No. 2003-5554 (N.Y. Supreme Ct., Suffolk County) (the “State Action”). Both the State Action and the instant case concern the respective rights of two sisters, Helga Morpurgo and Plaintiff Annselm Morpurgo, to a certain property located at 6 Union Street, Sag Harbor, New York (the “Property”), which Plaintiff alleges is her sole residence. Am. Compl. at 3. In the Amended Complaint [DE 4] filed in this action, Plaintiff alleges violations of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 by the following Defendants: The Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor; Sag Harbor Village Police; Sag Harbor Village Buildings Department; J. Doe # 1 through # N of the elected or acting Board of Trustees; Suffolk County Water Authority (“SCWA”); Caleca & Towner, P.C.; John Jermain Memorial Library; John Jermain Future Fund; Gail Slevin; J. Doe # 1 through # N as subscribers to the Fund; Christine Stanley (a.k.a. Helga Morpurgo); Michael A. Wolohojian; Peter Darrow; Andrew Towner, Esq.; and Albert Daniels (as material witness). Plaintiff also sues the following individuals in their official and individual capacities: Gregory N. Ferraris (as appointed Mayor of the Village, President of the Library Board of Trustees, and Gregory N. Ferraris, CPA, LLC as “Contact” of the Fund); Thomas Fabiano (Police Chief); Patrick Milazzo (Police Officer); Timothy Platt (Fire Marshal/Code Enforcer); Paul Greenwood (as Assistant Superintendent of the SCWA); and Ed Deyermond (as retiring elected Mayor of the Village). Based upon the documentary evidence, written submissions and the applicable case law, I respectfully recommend that the respective Defendants’ motions to dismiss be GRANTED. II. Background A. Factual Background The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint and are not findings of fact by the Court. Rather, they are assumed to be true for purposes of deciding these motions and are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. See LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Group, PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir.2009). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the Amended Complaint broadly and interprets it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir.2002). According to Plaintiff, this case arises out of “actions committed by Officials of The Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor, and the Sag Harbor Village Police and other persons acting under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in concert and/or conspiracy with, and in sympathy with, the private interests of neighbors and predatory real estate developers,” including Trustees of the John Jermain Memorial Library and subscribers to the John Jermain Memorial Fund, and by Plaintiffs sister, Defendant Helga Morpurgo and her attorneys, Caleca & Towner, “to violate Plaintiffs First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amended Rights and to deprive Plaintiff of all her civil rights and property without due process.” Am. Compl. at 3. In sum, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are conspiring to force her out of her home so that the Property can be used for the not-for-profit entity which is currently located next door. 1. The Property And The Savant Garde Institute Plaintiff is the landlord of and resides on the Property, which is a ten bedroom, eight-unit apartment house. Id. at 4, 10. The Property is “landmarkable, though still unlandmarked” and has been identified “as an authentic Federalist Italianate post-and-beam 10-bedroom townhouse or lodge built circa 1770.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff believes that “[bjecause of its fundraising value at a Charities Auction as a Trophy Collectible ... it’s Trophy value may be in the high multimillions.....” Id. Plaintiff identifies herself as a “celebrity owner and professional in the arts and sciences” (id.), as well as the “Founder and Manager” of a not-for-profit educational foundation, The Savant Garde Institute, which maintains offices on the Property. Id. at 3-4. The Property also serves as a “faculty residence under net lease” for the Savant Garde Institute. Id. The Savant Garde Institute “is attempting to raise funds to create a Cultural Center on the property that would also benefit the Library next door.” Id. at 4. Alternatively, Plaintiff states that the Savant Garde Institute “is seeking to create an Art Center and rehabilitated residence for Plaintiff, Founder and Tenant in Common.” Id. 2. The Library And The Fund The John Jermain Memorial Library (“Library”), which is supported by the John Jermain Future Fund (“Fund”), is located on property adjacent to Plaintiffs Property (id. at 3), and is a “rival not-for-profit foundation” with the Savant Garde Institute (id. at 4), according to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that members of the Library’s Board of Trustees and subscribers to the Fund, as well as residents of Sag Harbor, are conspiring with the other Defendants to force Plaintiff to sell her Property at a price below the fair market value so that the Library may be expanded onto the Property. Id. at 3-4, 7-8. 3. Investigations And Citations Of The Property On or about February 6, 2007, Police Officer Milazzo “was given limited access to the first floor commercial space” of [the Property] to investigate a reported theft ... and was permitted to photograph that limited area.” Id. at 4. Thereafter, Office Milazzo “used information supplied by Helga Morpurgo ... to file false complaints with the Health Department and the Adult Protective Services,” including that the Property had “no heat and multiple house violations.” Id. at 5. Based upon these allegedly false complaints, “investigators [came] to Plaintiffs door requesting access to the house to investigate conditions therein....” Id. According to Plaintiff, investigators from the Health Department and the Adult Protective Services, on frequent repeated visits, found “no stench or standing garbage or other reason to compel entry....” Id. The next day, Officer Milazzo “with Helga Morpurgo and/or her Attorney Andrew T. Towner, Esq., and/or Village Police Chief Thomas Fabiano and/or J. Doe of Sag Harbor Village Board of Trustees ... also acting on orders from Mayor Gregory N. Ferraris ... caused to be elicited a letter signed by Paul Greenwood, Assistant Superintendent of the Suffolk County Water Authority’s East Hampton Office, which professed having damaging and defamatory second-hand knowledge of numerous New York State Code violations on the premises in portions of the house to which unnamed employees allegedly had criminally trespassed to facilitate issue of a warrant to search the promises for illegal occupants[,]” (the “Greenwood Letter”). Id. Following receipt of the Greenwood Letter, either Officer Milazzo or another unnamed Police officer and/or an unnamed member of the Village Board “pressed the ... Buildings Department and Code Enforcement Fire Marshall to demand immediate access to Plaintiffs home, which Plaintiff denied, wherefore they went away seeking a warrant to enter the premises.” Id. at 6. Fire Marshall Platt, on February 15, 2007 in the presence of Sag Harbor Village Building Inspector Albert Daniel and accompanied by Village Police, presented Plaintiff with a warrant to inspect “the hallways and commercial portions of the building strictly for the purposes of determining whether the residential areas on the second floor had requisite safe dual access and smoke alarms.” Id. However, according to Plaintiff, Platt “proceeded to inspect all areas of the house except the second-floor residential area, knowing full well the house was closed and empty of tenants for winter except for the Owner/Caretaker’s quarters.” Id. Following this inspection, Fire Marshal Platt “eite[d] Plaintiff with numerous New York Code violations in the closed and uninhabited and commercial areas of the house that are not normally cited against seniors residing in grandfathered apartment houses known to be empty of commercial tenants with the Historical Landmarked District of Sag Harbor....” Id. Then, on or about February 16, 2007, Fire Marshal Platt “posted the entire premises as unfit for human occupancy.” Id. at 7. 4. Photographs Taken By Helga Morpurgo In and around December 26, 2006 (almost two months prior to Officer Milazzo’s inspection described above), Plaintiff claims that Defendant Helga Morpurgo impermissibly entered Plaintiffs private living quarters, at a time when Helga knew Plaintiff would not be at home, and to'ok staged photographs, which she later presented to Police Officer Milazzo. Id. at 9. Helga Morpurgo also presented these photographs to the court in the State Action “in a distorted supporting affidavit to a renewed Partition Action ... and further shared this same information with P.O. Patrick Milazzo of Sag Harbor Village Police .... ” Id. Subsequently, on February 26, 2007, Helga’s attorney in the State Action, Andrew Towner of Caleca & Town-er, included the same affidavit and photographs in another motion in the State Action “to renew an action for Partition at a reduced minimum price of $900,000 so as to intimidate Plaintiff in to an immediate sale” to Wolohojian and Darrow or Harmon Levine and Peter Darrow. Id. 5. Efforts To Force Or Intimidate Plaintiff To Sell The Property Plaintiff alleges that, at the time of the Amended Complaint, the “present realtor listed asking price” of the Property was $4.5 million. Id. at 9. However, according to Plaintiff, following Fire Marshal Platt’s posting the Property as “unfit for human occupancy,” several Defendants, including Helga Morpurgo and her attorneys, conspired with the Police Department and with “private real estate interests ... to constructively evict and force Plaintiff to sell her residence at a fraction” of its listed price. Id. at 8-9. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that these parties are demanding that she sell the Property to Wolohojian for $900,000 or that she agree to sign a reduced-contingency contract with Harmon Levine for $1.1 million. Plaintiff asserts that the offers from both Wolohojian and Levine include “the sub-contractural interests of adjoining neighbor Peter Darrow, an alleged founding contributor to [the Fund], an alleged corrupt organization.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that unnamed members of the Sag Harbor Village Architectural Preservation Board (not named as a Defendant) and the Library “have conspired through the years to suppress knowledge, in their care and possession, of the true history of Plaintiffs house, for the purpose of discouraging both Plaintiff and State and National Architectural Preservation Offices from properly identifying and producing funds to preserve or restore the site and structure as being a place of National Historical Interest.” Id. at 10. This suppression of information also serves to “favor a below-market sale to [the Library] prior to revealing its time worth for the Library’s own fundraising purposes.” Id. B. Procedural History Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint [DE 4] on April 3, 2007, alleging that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy “to deprive Plaintiff of her First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to dispose of her property as she chooses and at fair market [value]...Am. Compl. at 11. By Order dated May 2, 2007 [DE 5], Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed informa pauperis and the United States Marshal Service was directed to “serve the complaint upon defendant without prepayment of fees.” See DE 5. The Summons and Amended Complaint and Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt and Summons and Complaint by Mail (the “Notice and Acknowledgment”) were sent to Defendants via first class mail. Thereafter, each Defendant completed and returned the Notice and Acknowledgment to the Marshal Service. See DE 12-15, 17-26, 36-37, 49-50, 60. Several Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Before such motions to dismiss were decided, Plaintiff moved by Order to Show Cause seeking a preliminary injunction [DE 46] enjoining the public sale of the Property (at an auction to be held by the state court-appointed referee) until a final disposition of the federal litigation on the merits. In the Report and Recommendation dated October 11, 2007, 2007 WL 3375224 [DE 64], this Court recommended that Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction be denied because although Plaintiff had demonstrated irreparable harm, Plaintiff had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of her case. This Court further recommended that, under the Younger abstention doctrine, the harm shown by Plaintiff was not the type of harm that the federal court could or should properly address under the circumstances presented. See DE 64. By Order dated November 8, 2007, 2007 WL 3355582 [DE 71], Judge Seybert adopted the Report and Recommendation to the extent that it recommended that the Court refrain from exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to the Younger doctrine in light of the ongoing State Action. The Court did not reach the merits of Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. The Judgment, which stated that “Pltff Annselm Morpurgo take nothing of the Dfts; and that the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over this action[,]” was entered on the same date. The action was marked closed and all pending motions were terminated. See DE 71, 72. On November 28, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal as to the Judgment. See DE 73. By Summary Order dated May 15, 2009, 327 Fed.Appx. 284 (2d Cir.2009), the Second Circuit affirmed with respect to Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief, but vacated and remanded with respect to Plaintiffs claims for monetary damages, on the grounds that “application of the Younger doctrine is inappropriate where the litigant seeks money damages for an alleged violation of § 1983.... ” See DE 77 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit also stated that it “intimate[d] no view on the merits of these claims.” Id. Currently pending before the Court are six motions to dismiss referred by Judge Seybert. These motions are brought by (1) the Village, the Police Department, the Buildings Department, Gregory N. Ferraris, Thomas Fabiano and Patrick Milazzo (collectively, the “Sag Harbor Defendants”) [DE 10]; (2) Caleca & Towner, P.C. and Andrew Towner, Esq. [DE 27]; (3) the John Jermain Future Fund and Gail Slevin [DE 30]; (4) the SCWA and Paul Greenwood [DE 33]; (5) Christine Stanley [DE 39]; and (6) Peter Darrow [DE 56]. C. Plaintiffs Claims Plaintiff brings two causes of action in the Amended Complaint. In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ll of the above-named Defendants, and J. Doe # 1 through # N later to be named, who are elected or appointed Officials of Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor and Sag Harbor Village Police have repeatedly engaged in rogue abuse of discretion and selective enforcement, done under color of law, either voluntarily and in concert and/or conspiracy, to facilitate an extensive overt community conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of her First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amended rights to dispose of her property as she chooses and at fair market, in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, acting under color of law to favor and further private interests of next door neighbors John Jermain Memorial Library and Peter Darrow. Am. Compl. at 11. Thus, in the first cause of action, Plaintiff contends that Defendants conspired to violate and actually violated her constitutional right to dispose of her property in the manner of her choosing and for the market price. In the second cause of action, which is brought against “[a]ll of the above-named individual Defendants and J. Doe # 1 through # N later to be named,” Plaintiff alleges that such Defendants have engaged in an overt, extensive and predatory community conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of her First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amended rights to dispose of her property as she chooses and at fair market, and of all her civil rights as an impoverished senior standing alone against an organized, predatory and criminal faction of a closely-knit community, and further in overt or covert conspiracy with elected or appointed corrupt Officials of Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor and/or with Sag Harbor Village Police, acting under col- or of law, and/or with members of the Board of Trustees of John Jermain Memorial Library, and/or with next-door neighbor Peter Darrow, and/or with intending purchaser Michael A. Wolohojian and/or with J. Doe # 1 through # N as subscribers to John Jermain Future Fund. Id. Although Plaintiff does not specifically cite Section 1985, the Court construes this cause of action as alleging violations of Section 1985(3) because the bulk of the assertions pertain to a purported conspiracy by the individual Defendants. The Court interprets this Second Cause of Action as alleging that the individual Defendants conspired with the Village Defendants, the Library, the Fund, and potential purchasers Darrow and Wolohojian to violate Plaintiffs civil rights as an “impoverished senior citizen,” and to violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights by precluding her from disposing of her property in the manner of her choosing and for fair market value. III. Standard Of Review In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006). The plaintiff must satisfy “a flexible ‘plausibility standard.’ ” Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir.2007), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “[Ojnce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court, therefore, does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), setting forth a two-pronged approach for courts deciding a motion to dismiss. District courts are to first “identify[ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Though “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, if a complaint contains “well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (quoting and citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal citations omitted). In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process, the Court must determine whether the failure to properly effect service was excused due to good cause and, if not, whether the cause of action should be dismissed. See Morales v. New York State Dep’t of Labor Div. of Employee Servs., 06-CV-899, 2007 WL 2874570, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007). Generally, a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely upon the U.S. Marshals to effect service. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3); Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir.1986). The Second Circuit has stated that a plaintiffs in forma pauperis status “shift[s] the responsibility for serving the complaint from [the plaintiff] to the court.” Wright v. Lewis, 76 F.3d 57, 59 (2d Cir.1996); see also Kavazanjian v. Rice, No. 03-CV-1923, 2005 WL 1377946, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 6, 2005) (holding that “[f]or plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis ... the Marshal’s Office — not the plaintiff — is primarily responsible for effecting service.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process and perform all duties in [in forma pauperis ] cases.”)). Where a pro se litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis and Defendant was not properly served, the Court typically considers whether Defendant had actual notice of the lawsuit and whether Defendant was prejudiced by the U.S. Marshal’s failure to effect proper service. See Morales, 2007 WL 2874570, at *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72172, at *13 (holding that “good cause” existed for plaintiffs failure to properly effect service where, inter alia, Defendant “had actual notice of [the] complaint well within the 120 day service period, and therefore was not prejudiced by the failure to effect proper service”). In addition, where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the pleadings must be considered under a more lenient standard than that accorded to “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Bellamy v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 WL 1835939, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 26, 2009) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). The pleadings must be “interpreted to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Bellamy, 2009 WL 1835939, at *3 (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). However, “[c]laims alleging conspiracy to violate civil rights are held to a heightened pleading standard.” Brewster v. Nassau Cty., 349 F.Supp.2d 540, 547 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (addressing Section 1983 claims brought by pro se plaintiff) (citing Julian v. New York City Transit Auth., 857 F.Supp. 242, 252 (E.D.N.Y.1994)). “The Second Circuit has explained that these claims are so easily made and can precipitate such protracted proceedings with such disruption of governmental functions that detailed fact pleading is required to withstand a motion to dismiss them.” Brewster, 349 F.Supp.2d at 548 (quoting Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1981)) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “a[] complaint containing only conclusory, vague or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of constitutional rights cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.” Sommer v. Dixon, 709 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir.1983). IV. Discussion The Court construes Pro Se Plaintiffs Amended Complaint broadly and interprets it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir.2002). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive her of her property and/or her right to dispose of the Morpurgo House in the manner of her choosing and at the fair market value. Plaintiff further alleges that such a conspiracy violates her First, Fourth,.Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In construing Plaintiffs claims in the broadest manner possible, the Court understands Plaintiffs allegations to be that Defendants are conspiring to “constructively evict” Plaintiff and force her to sell the Property at a fraction of its fair market value. Plaintiff further alleges that these actions are being taken against her as an “impoverished senior citizen.” A. Plaintiffs Section 1983 Claims Section 1983 provides that: [e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.... 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege conduct attributable to a person acting under state law that deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) as a result of the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of his federal statutory rights, or his constitutional rights or privileges. See Quinn v. Nassau Cty. Police Dept., 53 F.Supp.2d 347, 353 (E.D.N.Y.1999). 1. The Sag Harbor Defendants The Sag Harbor Defendants move to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), asserting that the Amended Complaint “fail(s) to provide a statement of claims to which defendants can reasonably be expected to respond, (and) fails to state any discernible claims at all.” Sag Harbor Defs.’ Mem. at 8. The Sag Harbor Defendants maintain that the Amended Complaint lacks “any coherent facts in support of any viable legal claim against any of the named Defendants[,]” and “appears designed to harass and burden the defendants ... into abiding plaintiffs wishes with regard to her property.” Arntsen Aff. [DE 10], ¶ 17; see also Arntsen Reply Aff. [DE 29], ¶ 5. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) the Sag Harbor Defendants further move to dismiss on the grounds that they are “municipal corporations” and thus, under Rule 4(j), Plaintiff was required to serve them by (1) personally serving the “chief executive officer[s]” of the respective entities, or (2) in a manner prescribed by state law which, here, was to personally serve “the mayor, clerk or any trustee[,]” (N.Y. CPLR § 311(a)(6)), or by mail accompanied by the prescribed form (N.Y. CPLR § 312-a). Sag Harbor Defs.’ Mem. at 2-3 (citations omitted). However, the Sag Harbor Defendants contend, the only service attempted was a mailing by the U.S. Marshals (pursuant to Court Order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed informa pauper- is), sent via regular mail, with forms entitled “ ‘Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt and Summons and Complaint by Mail’ ... pursuant to [R]ule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 3; Arntsen Aff., Ex. D. Accordingly, the Sag Harbor Defendants maintain, such service is insufficient under Rule 4(j)(2) because it was not made upon the Village’s Chief Executive Officer or in compliance with New York State law. Sag Harbor Defs.’ Mem. at 3 (citation omitted). Plaintiff opposes the Sag Harbor Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the “First Amended Complaint states with sufficient clarity the issues and claims upon which relief may be granted, together with initial documentation as attachments, and does so in a manner that may be easily Answered by Defendants.” Pl.’s Opp’n [DE 16], ¶ 3. Plaintiff requests that, in the event the Court finds that the Amended Complaint does not “speak adequately toward the establishment of probable cause[,]” she be allowed “to file a Second Amended Complaint in the form of an Affidavit with consecutively numbered paragraphs together with even more allegations and identified Defendants for wrongful acts still continuing since the filing of the initial Complaints.” Id., ¶¶ 3, 4. In response to the Sag Harbor Defendants’ assertions regarding the purported insufficiency of service of the Summons and Complaint, Plaintiff argues that service was performed pursuant to the Marshal Service’s “standard procedures for the service of process over which Plaintiff has no direct control[,]” and that “[a]ny deficiences ... be corrected either directly through the Court or through the Pro Se Clerk’s Office.” Id., ¶ 2. From the face of the Amended Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging a conspiracy by the Sag Harbor Defendants to violate her rights under Section 1983. For example, Plaintiff contends that the Sag Harbor officials and government entities named as Defendants, acting under color of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in concert and/or conspiracy with, and in sympathy with, the private interests of neighbors and predatory real estate developers, including Trustees of John Jermain Memorial Library, and community subscribers to the John Jermain Future Fund, and by Plaintiffs sister Helga Morpurgo and her attorneys, Caleca & Towner, PC, to violate Plaintiffs First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights and to deprive Plaintiff of all of her civil rights and property without due process. Am. Compl. at 3. Thus, Plaintiff seeks to hold the municipal Defendants — The Village of Sag Harbor, the Sag Harbor Police Department and the Sag Harbor Buildings Department — liable under Section 1983. Plaintiff also brings Section 1983 claims against certain individuals employed by The Village of Sag Harbor — Gregory Ferraris as the appointed Mayor, Edward Deyermond as retiring elected Mayor, J. Doe # 1 through # N of the elected or acting Board of Trustees, Police Chief Thomas Fabiano, Police Officer Patrick Milazzo, Fire Marshal Timothy Platt and Building Inspector Albert Daniels (as material witness). As a threshold issue, the Court must address the first of the two elements of a Section 1983 claim, namely, whether the Sag Harbor Defendants acted “under color of state law.” The Court finds that the individual Sag Harbor Defendants are, in their personal capacities, amenable to suit under Section 1983, “inasmuch as they were conducting themselves as supervisors for a public employer and thus were acting under color of state law.” Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir.1994) (citation omitted). There is, however, a question regarding whether Plaintiff has a cognizable Section 1983 claim against the municipal Defendants because the statute does not provide a cause of action on the basis of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, a Section 1983 claim against a municipality such as The Village of Sag Harbor, or municipal agencies such as the Sag Harbor Police Department and Buildings Department, is cognizable only where the alleged constitutional violation by municipal employees resulted from a government custom, policy, pattern or practice. See Dean v. New York City Transit Auth., 297 F.Supp.2d 549, 554 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (citing, inter alia, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018). Importantly, [t]he policy or custom used to anchor liability need not be contained in an explicitly adopted rule or regulation.... So long as the discriminatory practices of city officials are persistent and widespread they could be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, and thereby generate municipal liability. Sorlucco v. New York Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir.1992). However, “an individual official’s acts can rise to the level of ‘policy’ when ‘senior personnel’ knowingly ‘acquiesce’ in their subordinates’ behavior.” Krulik v. Bd. of Edue. of New York City, 781 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir.1986) (citing Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 203 (2d Cir.1980)). Thus, a municipal entity can be held liable only if the plaintiff “can prove that the violation was committed pursuant to a ‘policy, statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officer.’ ” Rumala v. New York City Transit Autk, No. 02 CV 3828, 2005 WL 2076596, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2005) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018) (additional citations omitted). The Court is unable to ascertain from the Amended Complaint what policy, practice or custom, if any, Plaintiff is asserting or how such policy or practice is discriminatory. Under Second Circuit precedent, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing as a matter of law that the conduct of a given official represents an official policy. See Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57-58 (2d Cir.2000). In the instant case, the closest Plaintiff comes to alleging a municipal policy or practice is contained in the eighth paragraph under section III of the Amended Complaint: The instant complaint arises from a new wave of Police harassment in response to intensified community pressure widely reported and endorsed in the local Press from subscribers to John Jermain Future Fund who are anxious to keep the private Library from moving and from losing its funding from the School District for failure to provide requisite services therein, and who are seeking to purchase Plaintiffs property both for expansion, and for the extremely valuable Trophy historical structure that can be removed and used by them to raise funding for the privately owned Jermain Library. But these persons have never been willing and continue to be unwilling to pay a fair market price for the ten bedroom, eight-unit apartment house now occupied as a faculty residence under net lease to a rival not-for-profit foundation, The Savant Garde Institute, which is seeking to create an Art Center and rehabilitated residence for Plaintiff, Founder and Tenant in Common. Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff apparently wants the Court to infer that Defendant John Jermain Future Fund, a private entity, pressured the Sag Harbor Police Department and/or certain police officers to take actions which would ultimately enable the Fund to acquire Plaintiffs property and to use such property for an expansion of the private Library. Further, Plaintiff claims the Fund is purportedly unwilling to pay a fair market price for the Property. In Plaintiffs formulation, these generalized assumptions comprise a violation of her constitutional rights. With respect to the Police Department, Police Chief Thomas Fabiano and Police Officer Milazzo, Plaintiff alleges that (1) Officer Milazzo took advantage of the access he was given to the Property “to report on dilapidated conditions therein, allegedly in rogue abuse of official discretion,” and such conduct was a violation of “Plaintiffs privacy rights and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection” (Am. Compl. at 4-5); (2) Officer Milazzo and an unnamed police officer “opportunistically used information supplied by Helga Morpurgo,” in violation of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights, “to file false complaints with the Health Department and the Adult Protective Services.... ” (id. at 5); (3) Officer Milazzo and Police Chief Fabiano acted “in a gross abuse of power” and in violation of The Patriot Act in causing a letter from the Suffolk County Water Authority (the “Greenwood Letter”) to be elicited “to facilitate issue of a warrant to search the premises for illegal occupants” (id.); and (4) Officer Milazzo and J. Doe acted upon the Greenwood Letter, in violation of Plaintiffs Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, to press the Buildings Department and the Fire Marshall “to demand immediate access to Plaintiffs home, which Plaintiff denied.... ” (id. at 6). Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that the conduct of Officer Milazzo and “J. Doe” of the Sag Harbor Village Police was “committed in rogue retaliation against Plaintiff for the filing of many previous grievances against Sag Harbor Village Police and Police Chief Thomas Fabiano, also in violation of her First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.” Id. at 7. Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Police Department conspired with several other Defendants “to constructively evict and force Plaintiff to sell her residence at a fraction of its present realtor listed asking price of $4,500,000 for a long period of years----” Id. at 8-9. Regarding Fire Marshal Timothy Platt, Plaintiff alleges that (1) Fire Marshal Platt’s inspection on February 15, 2007 of “all areas of the house except the second-floor residential area [despite] knowing full well the house was closed and empty of tenants for winter except for the Owner/Caretaker’s quarters[,]” violated the warrant which permitted only access to “the hallways and commercial portions of the buildings strictly for the purpose of determining whether the residential areas on the second floor had requisite safe dual access and smoke alarms[,]” and constituted an “act of selective enforcement” which violated Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law” (Am. Compl. at 6); (2) in citing Plaintiff with “numerous New York State Code violations in the closed and uninhabited and commercial areas of her house that are not normally cited against seniors residing in grandfathered apartment houses known to be empty of commercial tenants within the Historic Landmarked District of Sag Harbor,” Fire Marshal Platt “exceeded his official authority by acting as health inspector and an electrical wiring inspector, neither of which he is officially qualified to be” (id); (3) Fire Marshal Platt’s “selective enforcement of the New York State Code [was] in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in order to place [Plaintiffs] grandfathered multifamily certificate of occupancy in jeopardy” (id at 7); and (4) Platt’s “malicious posting” of Plaintiffs Property “as unfit for human occupancy and without adequate notice to Plaintiff’ threatened Plaintiffs “health, safety and property rights ... to intimidate her into selling to Michael Wolohojian for only $900,000 or face the prospect of being removed from her home and put into an adult home....” Id. at 8. As to Albert Daniels (sued as a “material witness”), Plaintiff alleges that Daniels was present when Fire Marshal Platt (1) attempted to preclude entrance to the Property on February 15, 2007 (id at 6), and (2) wrongfully cited Plaintiff for violations of the New York State Code (id). Regarding Mayor Gregory Ferraris, Plaintiff claims that he (1) gave orders to Officer Milazzo in connection with Officer Milazzo’s eliciting the Greenwood letter (id at 5); (2) conspired with Fire Marshal Platt to designate the Property “as unfit for human occupancy and without adequate notice to Plaintiff’ for the purpose of intimidating Plaintiff to sell the Property to Wolohojian for a below-market price; and (3) conspired with the Police Department “to constructively evict and force Plaintiff to sell her residence at a fraction of its present realtor listed asking price....” Id. at 8-9. Turning to the Village of Sag Harbor, Plaintiff alleges that an unnamed representative of the Village, as well as others, gave “malicious instructions to Officer Milazzo concerning the inspection of the “dilapidated conditions” of the Property. Id. at 4-5. With regard to the Village and its former Mayor Edward Deyermond, past Boards of Trustees, and “other former Village Mayors and Boards of Trustees since 1987,” Plaintiff further asserts that “confusing and inequitable building permit application procedures” have been instituted for the purpose of “blocking] Plaintiffs repeated efforts to get building permits to bring the multifamily structure up to New York State Code----” Id. at 8. Finally, Plaintiff argues that former Mayor Deyermond instigated community pressures in support of the Fund and against the Property. Id. at 10. Here, even in light of the relaxed standards applied to pro se complaints, the Court finds that the incidents described in the Amended Complaint do not constitute “municipal policy, practice or custom” consistent with Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). See Dean, 297 F.Supp.2d at 555. In the context of a Section 1983 claim, a “plaintiff must make specific allegations of fact that indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient.” Spear v. Town of W. Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972)). After a careful review of the pleadings, the parties’ submissions and the applicable case law, I find that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that the Sag Harbor Defendants’ purported conduct resulted from any government custom, policy, pattern or practice which violated her rights. Additionally, “[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983.’ ” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir.1991)). The Supreme Court recently held that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... [Section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948 (emphasis added). In other words, “Iqbal’s ‘active conduct’ standard only imposes liability on a supervisor through section 1983 if that supervisor actively had a hand in the alleged constitutional violation.” Bellamy, 2009 WL 1835939, at *6. In the instant action, Plaintiffs allegations against several of the individual Sag Harbor Defendants are sparse at best and do not meet the viability standard under Iqbal. For example, the only allegations against Mayor Ferraris are that (1) “on information and belief,” he gave orders to Officer Milazzo to “cause[ ] to be elicited” the Greenwood Letter (Am. Compl. at 5); (2) he conspired with Fire Marshal Platt and others to designate Plaintiffs home as unfit for human occupancy on a three-day weekend in freezing temperatures (id. at 7); and (3) others acted on Ferraris’ behalf (id. at 8) in attempting “to constructively evict and force Plaintiff to sell her residence at a fraction of its present realtor listed asking price[,]” as evidenced by the fact that Ferraris “sits in brazen conflict of interest as both unelected Mayor of Sag Harbor and appointed President of the Board of Trustees of [the] ... Library” (id. at 9). The allegations against Edward Deyermond, who is sued as “retiring elected Mayor,” are that as a former Mayor of Sag Harbor, he bears responsibility for the Town’s (1) institution of “confusing and inequitable building permit applications procedures[,]” which, according to Plaintiff, are intended “to block [her] repeated efforts to get building permits to bring the multifamily structure up to New York State Code[,]” and (2) removal “of procedural barriers to favor every effort of the ... Fund to obtain variances and concessions from joint meetings of all the Village Boards for permission to demolish Plaintiffs home, without her consent, in order to make room for [the] ... Library expansion ....” Id. at 8. According to Plaintiff, former Mayor Deyermond “instigated” community pressures in support of the Fund, and such pressures caused “a state of panic and desperation” to Plaintiffs sister Helga Morpurgo (a.k.a. Christine Stanley). Id. at 10. The sole allegation against Police Chief Fabiano is that he conspired with Fire Marshal Platt and others to designate Plaintiffs home as unfit for human occupancy. Id. at 7. Plaintiff further maintains that the actions of Officer Milazzo and unnamed police officers were “committed in rogue retaliation against Plaintiff for the filing of many pervious grievances against Sag Harbor Village Police and Police Chief Thomas Fabiano.” Id. However, Plaintiff does not claim that Fabiano ordered such actions. Finally, the only allegations against Albert Daniels, who is sued as a “material witness,” is that he was present when Fire Marshal Platt designated Plaintiffs home as unfit for human occupancy. Id. at 6. Assuming Plaintiffs allegations against Defendants Ferraris, Deyermond, Fabiano and Daniels to be true, Plaintiff has, at most, alleged that these Defendants knew of and possibly acquiesced in the constitutional violations committed by their subordinates (namely, Officer Milazzo and Fire Marshal Platt). However, Plaintiff has not stated that any of these Defendants participated directly in the alleged illegal conduct (ie., the inspections of the Property and the posting of the sign indicating Plaintiffs home was unfit for human occupancy). Based upon the lack of particularized allegations against these four individuals, and in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Iqbal eliminating supervisory liability in situations where supervisors knew of and acquiesced in a constitutional violation committed by a subordinate, Plaintiffs 1983 claims against Ferraris, Deyermond, Fabiano and Daniels cannot survive the motion to dismiss. Although Plaintiff has shown that the Sag Harbor Defendants can be construed as acting under color of state law, she has not set forth specific facts to meet the second element of a Section 1983 claim, namely, that the “incidents” described in the Amended Complaint constitute a deprivation of her constitutional rights. Her broad, suggestive, and conclusory statements are insufficient. For these reasons, I respectfully recommend to Judge Seybert that Plaintiffs claims against the Sag Harbor Defendants be dismissed. 2. SCWA Defendants Defendants Suffolk County Water Authority (“SCWA”) and Paul Greenwood (“Greenwood”) move to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), arguing that the Amended Complaint “fails to state any viable claim for relief against the SCWA and Greenwood and contains allegations that are so vague and conclusory that Defendants SCWA and Greenwood cannot formulate a response.” Shea Aff. [DE 33], ¶ 2; see also SCWA Mem. [DE 34] at 8. In addition, the SCWA moves to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (5), on the grounds that, as a “public authority,” it is treated as an agency and instrumentality of the state. SCWA Mem. at 12. Thus, according to the SCWA, Plaintiff was obligated to serve the SCWA by (1) personally serving the “chief executive officer” of the SCWA under Rule 4(j) (discussed above), or (2) “personal delivery to an officer, director, managing or general agent or other agent authorized by appoint or by law to receive service” under CPLR § 311(a)(1). Id. at 12-13 (citation omitted). The SCWA asserts that in the instant case, delivery of the Summons and Complaint by mail with the Notice and Acknowledgment form (Shea Aff., Ex. C, D), was insufficient to establish proper service. Id. at 12-13. Defendant Greenwood further asserts that, as a government official being sued for monetary damages in connection with performing a discretionary task as part of his responsibilities as Assistant Superintendent of the SCWA, he is entitled to qualified immunity. SCWA Mem. at 13-14. Plaintiff opposes the SCWA Defendants’ motion to dismiss, arguing that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are sufficient to' establish viable claims against these Defendants. Pl.’s SCWA Opp’n [DE 40], ¶¶ 3-4, 7-8. Plaintiff again requests that, in the event the Court finds that the Amended Complaint does not “speak adequately toward the establishment of probable cause,” she be allowed to file a Second Amended Complaint in the manner previously noted. Id., ¶ 5. In response to the SCWA Defendants’ assertions of insufficient service of the Summons and Complaint, Plaintiff again requests that the Court directed the U.S. Marshals Service to re-serve the SCWA Defendants. Id., ¶ 2. In connection with the SCWA Defendants, Plaintiff states that on or about February 9, 2007, Patrick Milazzo with Helga Morpurgo and/or her Attorney, Andrew Towner, Esq., and/or Village Police Chief Thomas Fabiano and/or J. Doe of Sag Harbor Village Board of Trustees, on information and belief also acting on orders from Mayor Gregory N. Ferraris ... caused to be elicited a letter signed by Paul Greenwood, Assistant Superintendent of the [SCWA’s] East Hampton Office, which professed to have damaging and defamatory second-hand knowledge of numerous New York State Code violations on the premises in portions of the house to which unnamed employees had criminally trespassed, to facilitate issue of a warrant to search the premises for illegal occupants. Am. Compl. at 5. Thus, from the face of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is alleging that the February 9, 2007 letter sent by Paul Greenwood to the Sag Harbor Police Department (the “Greenwood Letter”) (Am. Compl., Ex. 1; Shea Aff., Ex. E), purportedly caused the Village Police to issue a warrant to search Plaintiffs Property for illegal occupants. Plaintiff further asserts that [t]he Greenwood Letter was later shown to be completely uncorroborated when meter readings produced by John C. Milazzo of Suffolk County Water Authority’s Legal Department disproved excessive water usage and presented no corroborating record of past Health Department violations of standing raw sewage or garbage was produced. Further, despite Paul Greenwood’s insistence to the contrary, [SCWA’s] Legal Department by John C. Milazzo, Esq., denied any knowledge of such a letter ever having been seen, authorized or sent, and further to be in violation of all Company policy. Nevertheless, the SCWA is held liable for the letter signed by employee Paul Greenwood in that it failed to issue a public disclaimer to Southampton Town Justice Court as demanded by Plaintiff or to confirm its position in writing. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs opposition papers maintain that the SCWA and Greenwood conspired with the other Defendants to “illegally deprive [her] of [her] right to develop and dispose of [her] property at fair market value[,]” in violation of Section 1983. PL’s Opp’n, ¶¶ 4, 8. In support of their motion to dismiss, the SCWA Defendants provide the following information regarding the Greenwood Letter. The SCWA is responsible for providing water to Suffolk County residents and, as such, services Plaintiff at her address in Sag Harbor and operates a meter on the premises for the purpose of assessing fees for Plaintiffs water usage. SCWA Mem. at 3. On January 13, 2005, April 12, 2005 and July 27, 2006. Plaintiff requested that the SCWA send a customer service representative to the Property to read her water meter which, at that time, was located in her basement. During these visits, the SCWA representative apparently noticed “several unusual conditions” which were recorded in the SCWA file regarding Plaintiffs property. Then, “the SCWA, in the normal course of its operations, determined that it was unsafe and hazardous for its workers to enter plaintiffs house to read her meter[,]” and so moved the reading device to the outside of Plaintiffs home. Id. at 3-4. On February 9, 2007, Paul Greenwood “wrote a letter to the Sag Harbor Police Department, advising it of the past conditions of plaintiffs property.” Id. at 4. The SCWA Defendants maintain that the letter was written at the request of the Sag Harbor Village Police and that it “was a recitation of the facts, as observed by SCWA.” Id. Concerning these observations, the Greenwood Letter states as follows: The pipes were broken and there was no running water. The homeowner filled a bucket with water from a nozzle in the basement. There was standing water in the basement, at least knee-deep, that had copious amounts of raw sewage floating in it. What appear to be many years of garbage was accumulated and stacked up throughout the residence, in the hallways, rooms and basement, making it very difficult to maneuver inside the residence. All of our personnel reported an overwhelming stench of raw sewage permeating the house. Shea Aff., Ex. E. In construing the Amended Complaint to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests, Plaintiff appears to be alleging (1) that by sending the February 9, 2007 letter to the Sag Harbor Police Department, Greenwood and, by extension, the SCWA, were conspiring with the other Defendants “to facilitate issue of a warrant to search the premises for illegal occupants” (Am. Compl. at 5), and (2) that the search conducted by the Police pursuant to that warrant was part of a plan to constructively evict Plaintiff from her home to allow for the expansion of the Library onto the Property. To sustain a claim for conspiracy under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant “acted in a willful manner, culminating in an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds, that violated the plaintiffs rights ... secured by the constitution or the federal courts.” Malsh v. Corr. Officer Austin, 901 F.Supp. 757, 765 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead a conspiracy because she has not alleged any facts showing that Greenwood and/or the SCWA entered into any type of agreement with the other Defendants. Rather, as the SCWA Defendants have explained, the letter was written at the request of the Police and was strictly “a recitation of the facts, as observed by SCWA[,]” during readings of Plaintiffs water meter which were conducted as part of the SCWA’s normal course of business and at Plaintiffs multiple requests. SCWA Mem. at 3-4. Moreover, as the SCWA Defendants point out, the conditions of the Property which are described in the letter were observed by SCWA employees long before the Village Police ever requested information from the SCWA, and before the issuance of the alleged warrant to search Plaintiffs home for illegal occupants. Id. at 11. In connection with Plaintiffs earlier motion for a preliminary injunction, this Court held oral argument and counsel for the SCWA Defendants stated as follows: Although we’ve not put in papers with regard to this motion, primarily because the Suffolk County Water Authority really could care less as to who owns this property or what the division of interest with respect to the property is. But just very briefly, due to the fact that plaintiff has referenced this letter from the Suffolk County Water Authority today that was authored by Paul Greenwood as supposed evidence of a conspiracy, although the plaintiff may disagree with the accuracy of the letter which I think she has made clear today, obviously this letter doesn’t equate to any evidence of a conspiracy. There’s nothing alleged in the complaint that Suffolk County Water Authority or Mr. Greenwood had any connection whatsoever to the other defendants. The letter is what it is. It was merely a letter to the police in response to her request to detail what they saw on visits to check the water meter. Transcript of Aug. 31, 2007 hearing at 17-18; see also DE 64 at 21-22. The Court finds the argument of the SCWA’s counsel persuasive. Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, the Greenwood Letter does not contain any statement that could reasonably be construed as “second-hand knowledge of numerous New York State code violations on the premises” (Am. Compl. at 5). In fact, the letter makes no mention of any health code violation, and further, does not say anything about illegal occupants. In effect, Plaintiff is asking the Court to infer the existence of a conspiracy based upon the Greenwood letter because Plaintiff disputes its contents. See DE 64 at 21. However, “[c]onclusory, vague and general allegations of conspiracy!,]” such as those set forth by Plaintiff with respect to the SCWA Defendants, are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Malsh, 901 F.Supp. at 763 (citations omitted). Plaintiff has presented no evidence to support her theory of a conspiracy with regard to the SCWA Defendants and what she describes here is not the equivalent of a conspiracy for Section 1983 purposes. Furthermore, as discussed above, for the SCWA, as a municipal entity, to be held liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff must establish as a matter of law that the alleged violation “was committed pursuant to a ‘policy, statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officer.’ ” Rumala, 2005 WL 2076596, at *9 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018). As the SCWA Defendants point out, Plaintiff has not alleged that the Greenwood Letter was issued pursuant to an SCWA policy or regulation or was otherwise officially adopted and promulgated by the SCWA. SCWA Mem. at 10 (citing Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 57). In fact, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the SCWA’s legal department “denied any knowledge of such a letter even having been seen, authorized or sent, and further to be in violation of all Company policy.” Am. Compl. at 6. This allegation actually undermines Plaintiffs 1983 claim with respect to the SCWA Defendants because, if true, it would show that the letter was not written pursuant to SCWA policy. In any event, because the Court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a conspiracy under Section 1983 with respect to the SCWA Defendants, it is not