Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART TRANS UNION’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING TRW’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. BAIRD, District Judge. I. Introduction Plaintiff Adelaide Andrews has sued Defendants, two credit reporting agencies, over the way they handled her credit information. Each Defendant filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. These Motions came on regularly for hearing on May 18, 1998. Having reviewed all pertinent papers on file and considered the oral argument of counsel, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will rule as follows: Defendant Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: Defendant Trans Union’s Motion on Plaintiff’s improper disclosure (§ 1681e(a)) claim is GRANTED. Defendant Trans Union’s Motion on Plaintiffs accuracy (§ 1681e(b)) claim, reinvestigation (§ 1681i(a)) claim, state law (§ 17200) claim, request for punitive damages, and request for injunctive relief is DENIED. Defendant TRWs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED in all respects, including Plaintiffs improper disclosure (§ 1681e(a)) claim, request for punitive damages, and request for injunctive relief. Additionally, Defendant TRW’s Motion for Summary Adjudication that Plaintiff did not incur any economic damages in the form of higher interest expenses relating to TRW’s furnishing her credit report to Chase is likewise GRANTED. II. Procedural Background Plaintiff Adelaide Andrews (“Plaintiff’) filed this Complaint against Trans Union Corporation, Inc. and TRW, Inc. (“Defendants”) on October 21, 1996 alleging four causes of action for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and state law: (1) Both Defendants wrongfully disclosed Plaintiff’s consumer reports in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b and 1681e(a); (2) Both Defendants failed to employ reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of Plaintiffs consumer reports in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); (3) Defendant Trans Union failed to reasonably reinvestigate and promptly delete misinformation in Plaintiffs consumer reports in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a); (4) Both Defendants, by the acts and omissions entailed in the above federal allegations, have also violated California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, actual and punitive damages in amounts to be determined at trial, disgorgement of any profits resulting from the state law violation, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiff alleges that when she sought a residential mortgage on or about May 31, 1995, the bank indicated delinquent information existed in Plaintiffs credit report. Plaintiff alleges that this negative information was a result of identity fraud because, although the social security number, last name, and first initial were hers, the other information (first name, date of birth, and address) belonged to an imposter. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants, credit reporting companies, violated their duties under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1681, et seq., by releasing her credit report without sufficient identification, thereby allowing the imposter to open the fraudulent accounts, and by not promptly rectifying the misinformation after Plaintiff advised them of the dispute and investigation. ■ Although Defendants both subsequently removed the delinquent misinformation, Trans Union retained the inquiries on Plaintiffs consumer report. Further, Plaintiff alleges sustained distress, commercial impairment, and loss of time and money. Plaintiff also alleges that the emotional distress caused a flare-up of her preexisting Lupus condition. Plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on October 21, 1996. On October 20, 1997, this Court denied Defendant Trans Union’s Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, which sought to implead the imposter as a third-party defendant. The Court held that Defendant Trans Union had no right of contribution or indemnity against the alleged imposter, and thus, impleader was improper. On March 24, 1998, Defendant Trans Union filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer. Since this Motion was noticed to be heard after the Motions Cut>Off date, it also sought to amend the scheduling order. By Order filed on April 15, 1998, The Court granted this Motion. On February 23, 1998, each Defendant filed their own Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment.. On March 2,1998, Plaintiff filed her Oppositions. On March 9, 1998,. Defendants filed their Replies. A hearing was held on May 18, 1998. III. Detailed Factual Background The following facts are undisputed, at least for the purposes of these Motions, unless otherwise noted: A.' How the Consumer Reporting Agencies Operate and are Regulated Defendants were both consumer reporting agencies governed by the FCRA during the time period relevant to this case. (Pl.’s Stmt. Genuine Issues in Opp. to Trans -Union’s Mot. [hereinafter TU Genuine Issues] ¶ 1; TRW Genuine Issues If 1.) Each Defendant maintained a computer system which stored credit information about hundreds of millions of consumers — Trans Union’s system is named CRONUS and TRW’s system was named the Legacy System. (TU Genuine Issues ¶ 7; TRW’s Reply to Genuine Issues ¶ 3.) Defendants’ computers have two main functions. The first is to receive information from large creditors, such as department stores, credit card issuers, banks, etc. This information consists of things like repayment history, credit limits, balances, etc., on individual consumers. Thus, Defendants’ computers are repositories of huge amounts of consumer credit information. (See generally, TRW’s Reply to Genuine Issues ¶ 3; TU Genuine Issues ¶ 7 at 3, ¶ 2 at 25.) The second function of Defendants’ computers is the key to this ease. Their computers allow Defendants’ “subscribers” to access the data in real-time for various purposes, such as to facilitate credit transactions. For example, when a subscribing credit grantor is contemplating extending credit to a consumer, the credit grantor obtains a report from Defendants describing the consumer’s past use of credit. Based on the contents of that report, the credit grantor can make an informed decision whether to grant or deny credit. Defendants’ computers are programmed to analyze a subscriber’s request for a report and compare the identifying information (i.e., the name, address, social security number, etc.) with the data in the computer. Based on a proprietary scheme, Defendants’ computers release information that is “sufficiently” similar to the identifying information in the request. In other words, a subscriber’s request for a report on Steve Smith may return information listed under Steve Smith, Steven Smith, S. Smith, etc., depending on how closely the other identifying information matches. In the instant ease, as will be described in more detail below, both Defendants’ computers released Plaintiffs information based on an exact match of her social security number, last name, and first initial. Consumer reporting agencies are regulated by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The FCRA imposes a number .of specific requirements on consumer reporting agencies, several of which Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated. These will be discussed in detail below. In enacting the FCRA, Congress made several findings, and enunciated a statement of purpose. These are as follows:' The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system .... (2) An elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers. (3) Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers. (4) There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy. It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter. 15 U.S.C. § 1681. Having described the general functioning of consumer reporting agencies such as Defendants and the purpose of the FCRA, the Court next turns to a description of the relevant transactions in this case. B. Plaintiff and the Imposter There is little dispute about the underlying factual events which transpired in this ease. The differences between the parties are in their interpretation of the legal effect of those events. Plaintiffs name is Adelaide Andrews. At the relevant time period she lived in Santa Monica, CA. On June 17,1993, Plaintiff went to a radiological medical office in Santa Monica, Lebovic, Schwimer & Goldberg, for a procedure. (Lussier Decl.Ex. F (Andrews Depo.) at 5; Ex. G (Lebovic Depo.) at 14.) This visit was her first to Lebovic. (Lussier Decl.Ex. G at 14.) Plaintiff completed a “Patient Information” form, listing her name, birthdate, home address, home phone number, driver’s license number, and employment. (Id. at 52 (copy of the form).) After Plaintiff completed this form, she handed it to Lubovic’s receptionist — one Andrea Andrews (the “Imposter”). (Id. at 18.) The Imposter had complete access to this form and the information contained thereon. It is undisputed that this is the way the Imposter received the identifying information about Plaintiff — from Plaintiff herself, not from Defendants. (TU Genuine Issues ¶ 5; TRW Genuine Issues ¶ 12.) The Imposter subsequently moved to Las Vegas, and began impersonating Plaintiff. On August 5,1994, the Imposter entered into an apartment lease at 4201 South Decatur Blvd. in Las Vegas, using the name “Adelaide (Andrea) Andrews” as well as Plaintiffs social security number and driver’s license number. (Lussier Decl.Ex. H (copy of lease).) The Imposter also obtained telephone and electric service, apparently in Plaintiffs name. Apparently no credit reports were obtained for these three transactions. In addition to these transactions, the Imposter made -five other attempts to obtain credit using Plaintiffs identity. It is these five attempts that form the bulk of Plaintiffs suit. One of these attempts involved Trans Union — On October 22, 1994, the Imposter applied for credit at Dillard’s, a department store in Las Vegas. (TU Genuine "Issues ¶ 20.) Dillard’s furnished to Trans Union the name “Andrea Andrews,” her Las Vegas Address, and Plaintiffs social security number. (Id.) At that time, Trans Union had a file on Andrea Andrews with the Las Vegas Address and no social security number. (Id. ¶ 21.) Trans Union also had two files on Plaintiff, both under the name “Adelaide E. Andrews” with Plaintiffs social security number. (Id. ¶ 22.) One of these listed Plaintiffs Santa Monica Address, and one listed a Texas address, apparently a former address of Plaintiff. (Id.) Trans Union passed all three files on to Dillard’s. Plaintiffs files were passed on because of the exact match on the social security number, last name, and first initial. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs files carried a “Trans Alert” warning to Dillard’s that the addresses in Trans Union’s file did not match the address supplied by Dillard’s. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Imposter’s file was passed on because of the match on the name and address. (Id. ¶ 26.) After receiving the reports, Dillard’s granted the Imposter credit; this account later went delinquent. The Imposter’s other four attempts to gain credit involved TRW credit reports. On July 25, 1994, TRW provided a credit report to FCNB Preferred Charge. (TRW Genuine Issues ¶ 4.) On September 27, 1994, TRW provided a credit report to Prime Cable of Las Vegas. (Id. ¶ 5.) On October 28, 1994, TRW provided a credit report to Express. (Id. ¶ 13.) Finally, on January 3,1995, TRW provided a credit report to Commercial Credit. (Id. 15.) As with Trans Union’s Dillard’s report, Plaintiffs credit report was provided because the Imposter used Plaintiffs exact social security number, last name, and first initial, although different addresses, birthdates, etc. (Lussier Decl.Ex. J (FCNB requested report on “Andrea A. Andrews” with Plaintiffs social security number); Ex. K (Express requested report on “Andrea Andrews” with Plaintiffs social security number); Ex. L (Commercial requested report on “Adelia de Andrews” with Plaintiffs social security number).) It is undisputed that the Imposter’s credit applications to FCNB, Express, and Commercial Credit were all denied. (See Lussier Decl.Ex. M (Pl.’s 2d. Supp.Resp. to Interrog.); TRW Genuine Issues ¶¶ 14,17.) C. Plaintiffs Discovery of the Imposter’s Activities On May 31, 1995, Plaintiff went to the Santa Monica - office of Home Savings of America to inquire about refinancing the mortgage on her home. (Lussier Decl.Ex. F (Andrews Depo.) at 104-05.) In connection with this inquiry, Home Savings obtained a credit report on Plaintiff from Chase Credit Research, a nonparty credit reporting agency. (TU Genuine Issues 1128.) Chase prepared this credit report by obtaining credit reports on Plaintiff from Defendants Trans Union and TRW, and non-party credit reporting agency Equifax. (Id. ¶ 29.) Chase combined the information from these three individual credit reports into a composite report which it furnished to Home Savings. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) The Chase report listed the Imposter’s Dillard’s account as being delinquent. (Cohan Depo.Ex. 151 (the Chase Report) at 3.) This information was attributed to Trans Union and/or TRW. (Id. (noted on the Chase report as “TRW/TU”).) After seeing this derogatory information on the Chase report, Plaintiff did not apply for the loan with Home Savings, allegedly believing that it would not be approved. Instead, she obtained a second trust deed equity line with Merrill Lynch, allegedly at a higher interest rate. D. Defendants’ Response to the Plaintiffs Problem After becoming aware of the problems caused by the Imposter, Plaintiff contacted both Defendants to resolve the problems. Plaintiff does not allege any claim against TRW for an inadequate reinvestigation of her credit file. Plaintiff’s inadequate reinvestigation claim is asserted only against Trans Union. (Complaint at 9.) Plaintiff first contacted Trans Union regarding the problems on June 5, 1995. (TU Genuine Issues ¶ 35.) On that same day, Trans Union placed a “fraud notice” on Plaintiffs credit report, stating: “FRAUD VICTIM; DO NOT EXTEND CREDIT WITHOUT FIRST CONTACTING ME PERSONALLY AND VERIFYING ALL APPLICANT INFORMATION.” (Id. ¶ 41.) On or about June 22, 1995, Trans Union contacted Dillard’s and determined that the Dillard’s account was obtained fraudulently and did not belong to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 51.) On or about June 22, 1995, Trans Union manually suppressed the Dillard’s delinquency from being disclosed in response to inquiries about Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 52.) However, Plaintiffs credit report continued to show an “inquiry” by Dillard’s, indicating that Plaintiffs credit report had been disclosed to Dillard’s on October 22, 1994 (the day the Imposter applied for credit). (Id. ¶ 54.) IV. Standard for Summary Judgment Summary judgment must be entered against a party who, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party would bear the burden of proof at trial. Fed .R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment may carry its initial burden by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the non-mov-ant must set forth specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, then summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50,106 S.Ct. 2505. V. Analysis As described above, Plaintiffs Complaint asserts four causes of action: 1) improper disclosure of her credit report; 2) inadequate procedures for assuring “maximum possible accuracy” of her credit file; 3) improper reinvestigation of her file by Defendant Trans Union only; and 4) violation of California’s Unfair Trade Practices Act. Defendants have each separately moved for summary judgment or partial summary judgment on various aspects of Plaintiffs Complaint: Both Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs “improper disclosure” count. Only Defendant Trans Union moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs “accuracy” count; TRW chose not to so move. Trans Union is the only defendant against whom the “reinvestigation” count is alleged, and Trans Union moves for summary judgment on this count. Defendant TRW moved for summary adjudication that Plaintiff did not incur any economic damages in the form of higher interest expenses relating to TRWs furnishing her credit report to Chase. Only Trans Union moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs state law claim. Both Defendants moved for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs request for punitive damages. Both Defendants also moved for summary adjudication on Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief, although for different reasons. These issues will each be addressed in turn. A. Plaintiff's “Improper Disclosure” Claim This claim is made under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a), which provided that: Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to ... limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under section 1681b of this title. These procedures shall require that prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no other purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall make a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior to furnishing such user a consumer report. No consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any person -if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in section 1681b of this title. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). The permissible purposes for which a consumer reporting agency may furnish reports are enumerated in section 1681b of the FCRA, as follows: A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other: (3) To a person which it has ,reason to believe— (A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or (E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. Plaintiffs improper disclosure claim is asserted against Trans Union based on its furnishing Plaintiffs report to Dillard’s, and against TRW based on its furnishing Plaintiffs report to FCNB, Prime Cable, Express, and Commercial, in response to the Imposter’s applications for credit. Plaintiff argues that these, disclosures were not made for a permissible purpose, because Plaintiffs file was disclosed based on a credit application by the Imposter. Before addressing this issue, the Court must first address a threshold inquiry — the statute of limitations. 1. The Effect of the Statute of Limitations Section 1681p of the FCRA provided that: An action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within two years from the date on which the liability arises, except that where a defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this subchapter to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is material to the establishment of the defendant’s liability to that individual under this subchapter, the action may be brought at any time within two years after discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation. ■ 15 U.S.C. § 1681p. This section clearly establishes a two year statute of limitations, within which time an action must be brought. It is undisputed that the FCNB and Prime Cable disclosures were made more than two years before the filing of the Complaint in this case. Consequently, TRW argues that these two disclosures cannot form the basis of any liability. In contrast, Plaintiff argues that the limitations period does not begun to run until she knew or should have known of TRW’s violation — the “discovery” rule. It is undisputed that if the discovery rule applies, then all the disclosures were made "within the limitations period. Thus, the question for the Court, is the purely legal question of whether § 1681p includes an implied discovery rule. An initial examination of the plain language of the statute suggests that there is no general discovery rule. The statute provides a two year limitations period, and a specific exception. When this exception applies, the limitations period is two years after discovery of the misrepresentation; however, this exception does not apply in this case, since there was no information required to be disclosed — Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. ‘Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980); In re McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 683 (9th Cir.1984). Thus, although Plaintiff argues that the discovery rule is normally read into statutes of limitations unless Congress has provided otherwise, see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1945), this appears to be such a case where Congress provided otherwise. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue in a published decision. However, numerous other Circuits have. The Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have all held that § 1681p is not a discovery statute, except in the enumerated circumstance. See Houghton v. Insurance Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F.2d 322, 325 (3d Cir.1986); Rylewicz v. Beaton Serv., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir.1989); Clark v. State Farm, Fire & Cas., 54 F.3d 669 (10th Cir.1995). Additionally, district courts in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have also held the same way. See Allen v. Equifax Credit Co., Inc., 1993 WL 483036 (D.Or.1993); Wilson v. Porter, 921 F.Supp. 758 (S.D.Fla.1995). Only the Fifth Circuit has partially gone the other way. See Hyde v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 861 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.1988). In Hyde, the Fifth Circuit created a two-tiered system, whereby negligent violations were not subject to the discovery rule, while intentional violations were. However, Hyde failed to discuss the effect of the enumerated exception in § 1681p on the inquiry-under Andrus. For this reason, Hyde is not persuasive. See Clark, 54 F.3d at 672 (criticizing Hyde on this basis). Plaintiff argues that this Court should look to a Ninth Circuit case finding that a “similar” statute to the FCRA, the Privacy Act, had a discovery statute of limitations. However, the Privacy Act and the FCRA are not the same, and do not share the same purposes. The FCRA’s purpose is to balance the needs of commerce and the rights of consumers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (quoted above). The Privacy Act’s “main purpose” is to “forbid disclosure [of certain information] unless such disclosure is required by the [Freedom of Information Act].” Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 431 n. 12 (5th Cir.1980). See also Miller v. United States, 630 F.Supp. 347, 348 (E.D.N.Y.1986) (“the purpose of-[the Privacy Act] is to give individuals greater control over the gathering, dissemination, and accuracy of agency information about themselves”). For these reasons, the Court agrees with the great weight of authority and holds that the discovery rule does not apply to the FCRA except in the one enumerated circumstance which does not apply to this ease. Consequently,.any claim for liability based on the FCNB and Prime Cable disclosures is barred by § 1681p. 2. Were the Three Remaining Disclosures Made in Violation of § 1681e(a)? Having concluded that the discovery rule does not apply to this ease, the three potentially actionable disclosures of Plaintiffs credit file were Trans Union’s disclosure to Dillard’s and TRW’s disclosures to Express and Commercial. -The Court will now consider whether these disclosures were lawful. The full text of the applicable statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a), has been quoted above. Stripped to its essence, this section of the FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to maintain “reasonable procedures” designed to limit disclosures of consumer credit reports to the permissible purposes enumerated in 15 U.S.C. § ■ 1681b. The pertinent permissible purposes of § 1681b were also quoted above. These permissible purposes are disclosures to users who the consumer reporting agency has reason to believe intend to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer, or otherwise have a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(A), (E). Although there is a surprising paucity of cases interpreting the § 1681e(a) standard, a few general principles can be discerned. Initially, the analysis of a § 1681e(a) claim can be divided into1 two prongs. First, the Court must decide whether the consumer reporting agency made the disclosure to a person it had reason to believe had a statutorily authorized purpose for obtaining the report. If in fact the disclosure was made for a permissible purpose, then, the inquiry ends, and no investigation of the reasonableness of the consumer reporting agency’s procedures are necessary. Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F.Supp. 1013, 1016 (N.D.Ga.1976); see also Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F.Supp. 948, 954 (D.Haw.1982). Although these cases are not controlling, being only district court eases, this Court finds the analysis of Middlebrooks persuasive. It makes no sense for a consumer whose file was disclosed only for permissible purposes to nevertheless be able to challenge the reasonableness of the consumer reporting agency’s procedures, Rather, only a consumer whose file was disclosed for an impermissible purpose may challenge the reasonableness of the reporting agency’s procedures. Once the consumer has shown that their file was disclosed for an impermissible purpose, that does not end the inquiry. The FCRA does not provide for strict liability; liability is imposed only when the consumer reporting agency either willfully .or negligently fails to maintain reasonable procedures to avoid improper disclosures. Dobson v. Holloway, 828 F.Supp. 975, 977, (M.D.Ga.1993); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n & 1681o. Thus, in the context of this case, the Court must first determine whether Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the disclosures were improper. If so, the Court must make the same inquiry as to whether defendants have maintained reasonable procedures. • a. Were the Disclosures Permissible? Plaintiff argues that the disclosures were not reasonable, because they were not furnished for a legitimate, statutorily authorized purpose, since Plaintiffs report was disclosed in response to the Imposter’s applications for credit. As noted above, § 1681b(3) permits disclosures to a person which [the reporting agency] has reason to believe: (A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or (E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(A), (E). Essentially, Plaintiff argues that the creditors obtaining her report were not intending to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving her, but rather, in a transaction involving the Imposter. Although this argument is creative, the Court does not agree with it. Initially, Plaintiff has pointed to no- authority adopting this argument. More importantly, it places too heavy a burden on consumer reporting agencies. Under Plaintiffs theory, any time an imposter adopted a consumer’s identity, the disclosure of the consumer’s information in response to a credit application by the imposter would be per se impermissible. Then the inquiry about the reasonableness of the reporting agency’s procedures would always need to be conducted. Additionally, a common sense reading of § 1681b is contrary to Plaintiffs position. In an imposter situation such as the case at bar, the recipient of the consumer’s report (i.e., the potential creditor to the imposter) “intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer.” The consumer is “involved” in the transaction, because the imposter is purporting to be the consumer. Although in a strictly technical sense the transaction does not involve the “extension of credit to ... the consumer,” § 1681b(3)(A), the Court finds this not to be dispositive. Moreover, § 1681b(3)(E) plainly appears applicable to these situations — a planned creditor of an imposter has a “legitimate business need” for the credit report of the person the imposter is impersonating. By obtaining this information, the potential creditor may learn information making them suspicious of the imposter, leading them to deny credit. For example, TRW has trained its subscribers that an effective method to prevent occurrences of identity theft is for the credit grantor to carefully scrutinize inconsistencies between information provided by a [credit applicant] and information included in a TRW credit report provided to the subscriber and to pose questions to the applicant that only the genuine consumer would be able to correctly answer. (TRW Genuine Issues ¶ 10.) For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds as a matter of law that disclosing a consumer’s credit report in response to a credit application by an imposter impersonating the consumer by use of the consumer’s identifying information is a disclosure for a permissible purpose under the FCRA, and accordingly, is not actionable under § 1681e(a). Therefore, no inquiry about the reasonableness of Defendants’ procedures need be conducted, and Defendants’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs disclosure claim (count I) are GRANTED. Nevertheless, the Court will briefly address the reasonableness of Defendants’ procedures as further support for its decision. b. Were Defendants’ Procedures Reasonable? As discussed above, even when a consumer reporting agency makes an improper disclosure, liability attaches only upon a showing that the reporting agency willfully or negligently failed to maintain “reasonable procedures” designed to limit disclosures to those made for permissible purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). Initially, the statute enumerates several requirements for those “reasonable procedures.” “These procedures shall require that prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no other purpose.” Id. Additionally, “every consumer reporting agency shall make a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior to furnishing such user a consumer report.” Id. Further, “no consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in § 1681b of this title.” Id. There is no dispute that Defendants fully complied with these enumerated requirements. Trans Union has obtained a certification from Dillard’s that it will request credit reports only for permissible purposes, and Trans Union has investigated the nature of Dillard’s business (it is a retailer of goods which extends consumer credit) to confirm that Dillard’s has a legitimate need for consumer' credit reports. (See TU Genuine Issues ¶¶ 18, 19.) TRW has obtained similar certifications from Express and Commercial, and has conducted similar investigations of filóse businesses to determine that they have a legitimate need for consumer credit reports. (See TRW Genuine Issues ¶¶ 6, 7.) Plaintiff argues that compliance with these enumerated requirements is necessary, but not sufficient, to maintain “reasonable procedures” as required by § 1681e(a). This is true. It is apparent that despite having these blanket certifications from its subscribers, if Defendants released credit reports based on only a last name for instance, so that a subscriber’s request for credit reports on everyone named “Smith” disclosed all such reports, this would not be reasonable. This, however, is not the situation presented in this case. Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is rarely, if ever, appropriate, because the mere fact of an improper disclosure permits a jury to infer that the reporting agency’s procedures were unreasonable. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. to TRW’s Motion at 15-17.) This argument erroneously conflates the “disclosure” analysis of § 1681e(a) with the “accuracy” analysis of § 1681e(b). As will be discussed below, the standard under § 1681e(b) is much higher than it is under § 1681(e)(a). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (“every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to ... limit [disclosures to those for permissible purposes]”) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (“[consumer reporting agencies] shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy ”). Thus, Plaintiff’s citation of cases applying § 1681e(b) is not persuasive in the § 1681e(a) arena. Moreover, several cases have granted summary judgment to reporting agencies facing disclosure claims. The most illuminative of these cases is Dobson v. Holloway, 828 F.Supp. 975 (M.D.Ga.1993). In Dobson, June Dobson and her husband Kenneth D. Dobson were negotiating to buy an automobile. The automobile dealer entered into its computer the name Kenneth D. Dobson, his address at 301 Willow, and social security number of [ XXX-XX-XXXX ]. The Defendant credit bureau used a “weighted value” system’ much like Defendants’ computers in the instant case, to determine which consumer reports should be disclosed. Three files were disclosed: ' I. Kenneth D. Dobson at 210 Southland St., social security number 26(M7-6068. II. Kenneth V. Dobson at 210 Southland St., different social security number. III. Dennis Dobson at 301 Willow, social security number [ XXX-XX-XXXX ]. Id. at 977. Thus, the first report had the correct name and social security number, but a different address. The second report had a different middle initial, a different social security number, and a different address, although the address matched the address in the first report. The third report had a different first name, but the correct address and social security number. As it turned out, the first and third reports actually belonged to the consumer. The second report belonged to the consumer’s father, who sued the reporting agency for an impermissible disclosure under § 1681e(a). The Dobson district court assumed arguen-do that the plaintiffs credit file was disclosed for an improper purpose, but nevertheless it granted the reporting agency’s motion for summary judgment, finding that as a matter of law the agency’s procedures were reasonable. Id. at 977-78. The court noted that the agency had a certification from the dealership that it would only request reports for permissible purposes, and that the agency knew that an automobile dealership had an obvious need for credit reports. The court then considered the weighted value system for determining which reports were sufficiently similar to the request to be disclosed, and concluded that the agency’s procedures were reasonable as a matter of law. The court considered and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the agency should have required a better match, or at least a matching social security number, before disclosing his file. Id. at 977. The court noted that if an exact social security number, or an exact name, was required for a file to be displayed, important relevant information would not be disclosed. For example, in Dobson, the third report indicated credit that the actual consumer had previously obtained under the name Dennis Dobson, rather than his actual name of Kenneth D. Dobson , Id. Requiring a more exact match would have deprived the credit grantor of this relevant information. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (“the banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting”; accuracy includes completeness). In the instant case, the disclosures were made on a better match than in Dobson. There, the social security number and address did not match, nor did the middle initial. In the instant case, the social security number matched exactly, along with the last name aild first initial. This match, in conjunction with the certifications by, and investigations of, Defendants’ subscribers, constitutes a reasonable procedure designed to limit .disclosures to those permissible under § 1681b. Thus, this constitutes an independent grounds for GRANTING Defendants’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs disclosure claim. B. Plaintiffs “Accuracy” Claim Plaintiffs “accuracy” claim is made under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), which provided that: Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Although Plaintiff asserts an accuracy claim against both Defendants, only Trans Union has moved for summary judgment on this claim. As noted above, this section imposes a higher standard on consumer reporting agencies than § 1681e(a) does, due to the “assure maximum possible accuracy” language. A fairly recent Ninth Circuit case, Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Information Co., 45 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir.1995), explains the analysis to be followed in “accuracy” cases brought under § 1681e(b). In Gui-mond, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the consumer reporting agency on a § 1681e(b) claim. Initially, the Ninth Circuit held that liability under 1681e(b) did not require the plaintiff to have suffered any pecuniary loss as a result of the inaccuracy in order to recover, nor is there any requirement that the plaintiff had been denied credit; the mere compilation and/or retention of erroneous information can be sufficient, if this caused the plaintiff some damage, such as emotional distress. Id. at 1333. A consumer can establish a prima facie case under § 1681e(b) by presenting evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information. Id. Once the consumer does so, because the FCRA does not provide for strict liability, the consumer reporting agency can escape liability if it establishes that the inaccurate report was generated despite the agency’s following reasonable procedures. Id. “The reasonableness of the procedures and whether the agency followed them will be jury questions in the overwhelming majority of cases.” Id. Applying this analysis to the instant case, the burden is first on Plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Trans Union prepared a report on her containing inaccurate information. If she does so, then Trans Union has an opportunity to show that it followed procedures which were reasonable as a matter of law; however, as the above quote from Guimond demonstrates, such proof of reasonableness is a question of fact for a jury in the “overwhelming majority” of cases. Plaintiff points to two things in her report which she contends are inaccurate: 1) the information Trans Union furnished to Chase Credit Research and 2) the Dillard’s inquiry. These will be addressed in turn. 1. The Information Provided to Chase As described above, Plaintiff went to Home Savings to inquire about refinancing the mortgage on her home. In connection with this inquiry, Home Savings obtained a credit report on Plaintiff from Chase Credit Research, a non-party credit reporting agency. Chase prepared this credit report by obtaining credit reports on Plaintiff from Defendants Trans Union and TRW, and non-party credit reporting agency Equifax. Chase combined the information from these three individual credit reports into a composite report which it furnished to Home Savings. The Chase report listed the Imposter’s Dillard’s account as being delinquent. (Cohan Depo.Ex. 151 (the Chase Report) at 3.) This information was attributed to Trans Union and/or TRW. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this attribution of the delinquent Dillard’s account to Plaintiff was an inaccuracy on her report, establishing her prima facie case of a violation of § 1681e(b). Moreover, Plaintiff argues another inaccuracy, in that Trans Union reported a Capitol One account as being hers, even though it was not hers. a. The Capitol One Account Turning first to the Capitol One account, the Chase report does indeed list such an account as belonging to Plaintiff. (See TU May DecLEx. C. (the Chase report).) Moreover, the Chase report clearly indicates that this information was provided only by Trans Union, unlike most of the other information, which was provided by several consumer reporting agencies. (Id.) Although the Capitol One account was listed as “current,” if this account did not belong to Plaintiff, that would nevertheless be an inaccuracy meeting Plaintiffs burden and establishing her prima facie case. Plaintiff argues in her Opposition that Trans Union reported that Plaintiff had an account with Capitol One, although she did not. (PL’s Opp. to TU’s Mot. at 9:14-15.) As support, Plaintiff cites to the TU May Declaration Exhibits C and E. However, these exhibits do not show that the Capitol One account did not in fact belong to Plaintiff. Exhibit C is merely a copy of the Chase report; while it lists the Capitol One account as being reported by Trans Union, it does not indicate that the account did not actually belong to Plaintiff as she argues. Exhibit E is a June 6, 1995 letter from Plaintiff to a variety of people stating that he had just discovered that several things on her credit report were not hers, and that she was a victim of identity fraud. This letter lists five accounts as not belonging to Plaintiff: 1) Dillard’s; 2) Prime Cable; 3) FCNB; 4) Express; and 5) Commercial. Notably absent from this list is Capitol One. Moreover, this letter indicates that it was sent to eleven recipients, including the five creditors listed above, Trans Union, TRW, Equifax, Chase, a collection agency, and the Reno Police; but not Capitol One. This suggests that perhaps the Capitol One account really is Plaintiffs, and that its listing was thus not an error. Plaintiffs Statement of Genuine Issues in Opposition to Trans Union’s Motion also states that “Plaintiff, however, has never applied for or maintained a consumer credit account with Dillard’s or Capitol One.” (TU Genuine Issues ¶ 13.) However,, as support for this assertion, Plaintiff cites only to the TU May Declaration Exhibit B at 78:10-12, and 134:1-6, and Exhibit E. This evidence does not support Plaintiffs assertion either. Exhibit B consists of excerpts from Plaintiffs deposition. Page 78 addresses only the Dillard’s account, not the Capitol One account. Page 134 mentions Capitol One, but only states that “an inquiry” was fraudulent. (TU May Decl.Ex. B at 134:1-6.) Moreover, Plaintiff went on to say that she believed that the Imposter was denied credit by Capitol One. (Id. at 134:7-10.) However, the Chase report lists the Capitol One account as being “current” with a balance of $605, indicating that it was an existing account. (TU May Decl.Ex. C.) Thus, again it appears that the Capitol One account may have belonged to Plaintiff, making Trans Union’s report not inaccurate. At any rate, Plaintiff has failed to present admissible evidence, see Fed. R.Civ.Proc. 56(e), that the Capitol One account was not properly attributed to her. Consequently, the Capitol One account does not support Plaintiffs accuracy claim under § 1651e(b). b. The Dillard’s Delinquency Plaintiff next argues that the Dillard’s delinquency reported to Chase was an inaccuracy establishing her prima facie case under § 1681e(b). The Chase report does indeed list the Dillard’s account as being delinquent and as belonging to Plaintiff. (See TU May Decl.Ex. C.) Additionally, it is undisputed that the Dillard’s account did not belong to Plaintiff. (See TU Genuine Issues ¶ 51 (“Trans Union determined that the Dillard’s account was obtained fraudulently and did not belong to plaintiff’).) However, there are two other hurdles for Plaintiff to meet in using the Dillard’s account to establish inaccuracy under § 1681e(b): that it was Trans Union who reported the Dillard’s account to Chase, and that Trans Union reported the delinquent Dillard’s account as belonging to Plaintiff. Unlike the Capitol One account which the Chase report indicates was reported only by Trans Union, the Dillard’s account was reported by Trans Union and/or TRW. However, as will be discussed separately in Section V.D. below, TRW has provided evidence that its computer records showed the Dillard’s account as being current as of the date'of the Chase report.- Consequently, there is at least a genuine issue of material fact that the delinquent status of the Dillard’s account was reported to Chase by Trans Union. A thornier issue is presented by whether Trans Union actually reported any inaccurate information at all. Plaintiffs theory is straightforward — Trans Union attributed the delinquent Dillard’s account to Plaintiff in its report to Chase, which is an inaccuracy. In reply, Trans Union argues that it did no such thing; rather, according to Trans Union, it disclosed two separate accurate credit reports in response tq the Chase inquiry— Plaintiffs report not containing the Dillard’s account and the Imposter’s report, accurately including the Dillard’s account which the Imposter actually had. Under this theory, it is the non-party Chase which erroneously commingled these two reports, thereby attributing the Imposter’s Dillard’s account to Plaintiff. There are two problems with Trans Union’s theory: First, the evidence is equivocal that this is actually what happened. As will be discussed below in section V.C., Trans Union vigorously argues that the FCRA requires that a consumer’s credit report list all the subscribers that it was disclosed to. (See, e.g., TU’s Motion at 11:13-19.) A copy of Trans Unions records, located as TU May Declaration Exhibit P, while difficult to fully interpret, suggests that Trans Union’s disclosure to Chase was of Plaintiffs file, not the Imposter’s file. In this exhibit, Plaintiff is identified as “01A” while the Imposter is identified as “01B”. (See TU May Decl.Ex. P at 204, 204A.) Consistent with this identification, numerous credit accounts that belong to Plaintiff are identified with the “01A” code. (Id. at 204B-204E.) The Dillard’s account is identified with the “01B” code. (Id. at 204E.) However, the Chase inquiry is identified only with the “01A” code. (Id. at 204F.) Although subject to different interpretations, this suggests that Trans Union considered the Chase disclosure to be of Plaintiffs file, not the Imposter’s file.. Plaintiff advanced this argument and pointed to this evidence in her Opposition, yet Trans Union failed to address it in its Reply. In the face of this evidence and argument, a jury could reasonably conclude that Trans Union did not disclose both Plaintiffs and the Imposter’s file, but rather, only disclosed Plaintiff’s file, which contained the Dillard’s account. Thus, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment for Trans Union on Plaintiffs accuracy claim. However, as further grounds for this decision, the Court will also address several other issues relating to the accuracy claim. Even if the Court were to accept Trans Union’s argument that it disclosed two separate reports in response to the Chase inquiry, an accurate one on Plaintiff, and an accurate one on the imposter containing the Dillard’s account, that does not end the inquiry. Plaintiff argues that this procedure, supplying the Imposter’s credit report in response to an inquiry about Plaintiff, is itself an inaccuracy. Under this argument, by disclosing two reports in response to one inquiry, Trans Union essentially creates an inaccurate report on Plaintiff containing the information both from Plaintiff and the Imposter. Although Trans Union considers the two reports to be separate, Plaintiff argues that it is foreseeable that the recipient of the reports may consider them to be one report. Plaintiffs argument has merit. Section 1681e(b) targets not only “strictly” inaccurate information, but also information that is “technically accurate” but nevertheless misleading. See Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (5th Cir.1986); Koropoulos v. The Credit Bureau, 734 F.2d 37, 40-42 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Congress did not limit the Act’s mandate to reasonable procedures to assure only technical accuracy; to the contrary, the Act requires reasonable procedures to assure ‘maximum accuracy.’ [Reports containing factually correct information that nonetheless mislead their readers are neither maximally accurate nor fair to the consumer who is the subject of the reports.”); Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F.Supp. 948, 952 (D.Haw.1982) (stating that consumer reporting agency cannot accurately report thát a consumer was “involved” in a credit card scam without reporting that the consumer was actually one of the victims of the scam, not a perpetrator). This Court finds that the return of separate files on Plaintiff and the Imposter in response to an inquiry about Plaintiff, may well be “technically accurate yet misleading.” Although Trans Union argues that the files were “clearly presented” as separate files, (TU Reply at 4:7-12), including a “Trans Alert” message telling the subscriber that the file address did not match the inquiry address, and a message stating “possible other file to follow,” (see TU Genuine Issues ¶¶ 21-24), Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this presentation, taken as a whole, was misleading. The Court notes that a jury may well conclude that Trans Union’s response to the Chase inquiry was not misleading. Or, a jury may conclude that even if it was misleading, Trans Union’s procedures were nevertheless reasonable to “assure maximum possible accuracy.” However, these are inquiries for a jury, not for this Court on a motion for summary judgment. See Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (“[t]he reasonableness of the procedures and whether the agency followed them [in § 1681e(b) cases] will be jury questions in the overwhelming majority of cases”). 2. The Dillard’s Inquiry Plaintiff also argues that the presence of the Dillard’s inquiry on her credit report constitutes an inaccuracy. Trans Union makes two arguments in response: a) that the Dillard’s inquiry is accurate, and b) that reporting it is required by the FCRA. These will be addressed in turn. a. Was the Dillard’s Inquiry Inaccurate? Trans Union argues that it really did disclose Plaintiffs report to Dillard’s in response to the Imposter’s credit application there; accordingly, reporting this inquiry on Plaintiffs file is completely accurate. In a strictly technical sense, of course, this is true; it is undisputed that Plaintiffs report was disclosed to Dillard’s. However, the presence of the inquiry on Plaintiffs report would seem to suggest that Plaintiff applied for credit with Dillard’s. Yet, that was not the case. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether listing the Dillard’s inquiry on Plaintiffs report was misleading. b. Was the Dillard’s Inquiry Required by the FCRA? Trans Union also argues that the FCRA required it to list the Dillard’s inquiry. (See TU Motion at 11:13-19.) As support, Trans Union cites to 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3), which assertedly “requires consumer reporting agencies to disclose the ‘recipients of any consumer report on the consumer which it has furnished.’” (TU Motion at 11:15-17 (emphasis in original).) Although this quotation is “technically accurate” it is misleading; by its express terms, section 1681g(a)(3) actually required the consumer reporting agency to make the above disclosure to the consumer. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (“Every consumer reporting agency shall, upon request and proper identification of any consumer, clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer ... (3) the recipients of any consumer report on the consumer....”) This section says nothing about requiring such disclosures to be made to creditors of the consumer. Moreover, Trans Union’s asserted compulsion to disclose rings hollow considering that it. has recently changed its policy and, in cases of true name fraud such as involved here, now removes all inquiries relating to the fraudulent accounts. (See TU May Decl. Ex. A (Reger Depo.) at 189:24-190:7.) For the above reasons, the Court finds that Trans Union was under no duty to report to its subscribers the fact that Plaintiffs report was disclosed to Dillard’s, especially since such disclosure was made as a result of the Imposter’s credit application. Consequently, Trans Union’s argument that it only -reported what it was required by the FCRA to report is without merit. 3. Plaintiffs Social Security Number in the Imposter’s File Although the parties do not discuss this next point, there is one additional possible inaccuracy making summary judgment inappropriate. In its Statement of Uncontrovert-ed facts, Trans Union states that “[o]n June 5, 1995, Trans Union maintained in its computerized files a file relating to ‘Andrea Andrews,’ which contained the same social security number as plaintiff and the Dillard’s account referenced in the Chase Credit report.” (TU Stmt. Uncontroverted Facts ¶ 38.) In other words, Trans Union’s file on the Imposter contained Plaintiff’s social security number. In Lowry v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 444 F.Supp. 541 (N.D.Ga.1978), the credit agency’s motion for summary judgment on a § 1681e(b) claim was denied, because of the presence of that plaintiffs (James Francis Lowery’s) social security number in the file of one James Frank Lowery. See id. at 544. It is true that Lowry arose in a different •context, as that case did not involve identity fraud. In Lowry, the plaintiffs social security number was included in the other person’s file as a result of one of the agency’s subscriber’s actions. Id. The court found that this inaccuracy might have arisen from a failure to have reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy. Id. In the instant case, Plaintiffs social security ■number was included in the Imposter’s file presumably as a result of the Imposter’s intentional misrepresentation of herself as Plaintiff. Nevertheless, this distinction goes to the reasonableness of the agency’s procedures, and not to whether the inclusion of a consumer’s social security number in someone else’s file is an inaccuracy. It may well be that Plaintiffs social security number wound up in the Imposter’s file despite Trans Union’s reasonable prócédures. But, as Guimond teaches, this is a question for the jury in the “overwhelming majority of cases.” See Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333. It is for all of the above reasons that Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs accuracy claim under § 1681e(b) is DENIED. ' ' C. Plaintiffs “Reinvestigation” Claim Plaintiffs third cause of action, her “reinvestigation” claim, asserted only against Defendant Trans Union, is made under § 1681i(a). This section provided that: If the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in his file is disputed by a consumer, and such dispute is directly conveyed to the consumer reporting agency by the consumer, the consumer reporting agency shall within a reasonable period of time reinvestigate and record the current status of that information unless it has reasonable grounds to believe that the dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant. If after-such reinvestigation such information is found to be inaccurate or can no longer be verified, the consumer reporting agency shall promptly delete such information. The presence of contradictory information in the consumer’s file does not in and of itself constitute reasonable grounds for believing the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a). Although Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Trans Union failed to remove the Dillard’s account in a timely manner and that Trans Union tried to shift the reinvestigation burden onto Plaintiff, (Complaint ¶ 17), Plaintiff appears to have abandoned these arguments, as she fails to argue them in her Opposition. Instead, Plaintiffs reinvestigation claim now appears to be based only on the Dillard’s inquiry appearing in her report as late as September 1996. Much as she argues in her accuracy claim as described above in section V.B.2., Plaintiff argues that Trans Unions’ reporting of the Dillard’s inquiry constitutes inaccurate information which she disputed and which she conveyed that dispute about to Trans Union. Under this argument, Trans Union violated § 1681i(a) when it failed tó remove the inquiry from Plaintiffs report following its reinvestigation. In contrast, Trans Union argues, much as it did on Plaintiffs accuracy claim, that the Dillard’s inquiry was accurate and its presence on Plaintiffs report was mandated by 1681g(a)(3). These arguments have been addressed above. A jury could reasonably conclude that listing the Dillard’s inquiry, especially after Trans Union knew that it was generated as a result of the Imposter’s credit application, is inaccurate. Further, as discussed above, the FCRA did not require such disclosures to be made to creditors; only to the consumer herself. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a). Trans Union also argues that even if Plaintiff was not subjectively content with Trans Union’s reinvestigation, the issue- is whether their reinvestigation was reasonable, taking into account that the standard under § 16811 is less stringe