Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION, JUDGMENT, DECLARATION, ORDER AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.1242 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR BENCH TRIALS, AND THE GRANTING OF PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.1245 A. Bench Trials.1245 B. Permanent Injunctive Relief..1245 III. DISCUSSION.'.‘.1246 A. Motion For Leave To Amend The Complaint.1246 B. Application Of Title VI..'.1247 1. The Department is a recipient of federal funds within the meaning of Title VI .1249 2. The regulations enacted pursuant to Title VI (§ 2000d-l) allow for a private right of action.1251 8. Plaintiffs have the requisite standing'to bring suit.1265 4. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiffs’ suit.1268 C. Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law.1277 1. Legal Framework.■.1277 2. Plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that they are members of a class protected by the statute and that Defendants have promulgated a facially neutral practice that has a disproportionate adverse effect.1278 a. Plaintiffs are members of a class protected by the statute.1278 b. The Defendants have promulgated a facially neutral practice that has a disproportionate adverse effect.1283 i. Implementation and review of the Department’s English-Only Policy.1284 ii. The Department’s accommodation of English speaking applicants.1287 iii. Impact of the Department’s English-Only Policy.1291 3. The Defendants have not proven that there exists a “substantial legitimate justification” for the English-Only Policy in order to avoid liability. Alternatively, if the Defendants have met this burden, the Plaintiffs have offered comparably effective alternative practices which result in less disproportionality.1298 a. The English-Only Policy is not required by Amendment 509_1298 b. The Defendants have offered no proof that resident non-English speakers are a greater safety risk on Alabama highways than English speakers.1300 c. The Defendants’ arguments regarding the administration and application of foreign language examinations are unpersuasive .1302 i. Examination administration .1303 ii. Examination integrity.1306 d. Congress has never declared English to be the official language of the United States, consequently the Department’s English-Only Policy is not a reflection of national policy, and, even if it were, does not justify the Policy.1308 e. The Defendants’ fiscal arguments fail.1311 IV. CONCLUSION, JUDGMENT, AND DECLARATION.1313 V. ORDER.1315 DE MENT, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Like forty-eight other states and the District of Columbia, the State of Alabama has historically administered the written portion of its Class D driver’s license examination in a multitude of foreign languages. From at least the 1970’s until 1991, Alabama’s Department of Public Safety (the “Department”) administered thousands of written examinations in at least fourteen languages other than English. Former Alabama State Trooper, Lieutenant Colonel Harold Hammond, Chief of the Department’s Driver’s License Division from 1978 to 1987 and second-in-command of the entire Department from 1987 to 1991, testified that there were no significant problems in administering the examination. There was no evidence that non-English speakers were more likely to cheat. Translations of the English examination were obtained at no cost to the Department. There was no evidence that non-English speakers posed a greater safety risk or had more accidents than other motorists. Although some examiners complained that foreign language examinations were time consuming, the Department provided, and still provides, special accommodations to handicapped applicants, to illiterate applicants by administering oral or audio-taped examinations, and to deaf applicants by administering Sign Language videotaped examinations. Colonel Hammond never considered curtailing or ending foreign language examinations and in fact expanded the program whenever demand was great enough. When asked if he knew of any reason why the State should not continue providing foreign language examinations, he answered “no.” In 1990, the Alabama legislature ratified Amendment 509 to the Alabama Constitution. The Amendment designates English as the “official language of the State of Alabama” and requires state officials to take “all steps necessary to ensure that the role of English as the common language of the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced.” Approximately one year later, because of Amendment 509, the Department adopted its “English-Only Policy,” requiring all portions of the examination process, including the written examination, to be administered in English only. Interpreters, translation dictionaries and other interpretive aids were officially forbidden. In practice, however, many of the Driver’s License Divisions’s branch offices still allow applicants to utilize interpreters for some portions of the examination process, and routinely allow the use of translation dictionaries for the written examination. In addition, the evidence before the court shows that Alabama provides special accommodations during the driver’s examination process for illiterate applicants, and handicapped applicants, including those that are deaf. Alabama also permits non-English speaking drivers from other states and foreign countries to drive in Alabama if they have a valid license, and,, upon moving to Alabama, allows these driver’s to exchange their out-of-state license for an Alabama license without requiring them to take the Department’s driving examination. Despite providing special accommodations for all of these categories of drivers, Alabama provides no accommodations for its non-English speaking residents. Eight months after the implementation of the Department’s English-only policy, the Department requested an' opinion from Alabama’s Attorney General regarding “whether Amendment No. 509 ... prohibits the Department from giving driver license tests in any language other than English.” Although the request was signed by the Director of the Department, it was actually written by Mr. Jack Curtis, the Department’s General Counsel and an Assistant Attorney General. When the Attorney General’s office received the request for an opinion, the project was assigned to Mr. Curtis. In other words, Mr. Curtis, in his capacities as an Assistant Attorney General and General Counsel of the Department, both drafted the request for an opinion and wrote the Opinion itself. The Attorney General concluded that Amendment 509 required all applicants for driver’s licenses to take the examination in English. Although the Attorney General’s Opinion acknowledged that the Department’s English-Only Policy “might be a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, consideration of safety and integrity of the licensing process would, [in the words of the Opinion], support a requirement that driver licensing examinations be given in English .” “Safety and integrity” were provided as rationales for the policy without there being any evidence that non-English speakers were a higher safety risk or that non-English speakers compromised examination integrity more than English speakers. High ranking officials within the Attorney General’s office disagreed with the Opinion, noting that Alabama utilizes “international highway signs and shapes. Therefore safety is not such an issue.... Some accommodation needs to be made.” Another high ranking official said of the policy — “it is dumb.” Nevertheless, the Attorney General signed the Opinion. This action was initiated on December 31, 1996, when the Plaintiff, Martha Sandoval, filed a class action Complaint seeking relief from Alabama’s practice of administering its driver’s license examination in English only. Both the Alabama Department Of Public Safety and L.N. Hagan, in his official capacity as the Director of the Department, were named as Defendants. Ms. Sandoval contends that “[t]he defendants’ refusal to administer the examination in languages other than English or to allow for the use of translators or interpretive aids discriminates against the plaintiff and others similarly situated on the basis of national origin.” (Pis.’ Compl. at 1.) Ms. Sandoval’s Complaint was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.), and its implementing regulations. She seeks a declaration that Alabama’s English-Only driver’s license rules are unconstitutional and unlawful, as well as a permanent injunction requiring the Defendants, and all those acting in concert with them',1 to cease their allegedly unconstitutional and unlawful practices. On May 6, 1997, Ms. Sandoval filed a Motion For Class Certification, which the Magistrate Judge recommended be granted on September 3,1997. No objections were filed to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation, and in an October 17, 1997 Order, the court adopted the Recommendation, and granted Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification. Ms. Sandoval was certified as the representative of “the class of all legal residents of the State of Alabama who are otherwise qualified to obtain a Class D private vehicle driver’s license but cannot do so because they are not sufficiently fluent in English.” On October 24, 1997, the Defendants filed a Motion For Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Mot.”) and a Memorandum In Support thereof (“Defs.’ Mem.”), Plaintiffs filed their Opposition To Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (“Pis.’ Opp’n”) on November 25, 1997, to which Defendants filed a Reply (“Defs.’ Reply”) on December 5, 1997. On December 24, 1997, Plaintiffs filed a Supplement to their Opposition to Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (“Pis.’ Supp.”), to which Defendants filed a Response (“Defs.’ Resp.”) on January 6, 1998. On February 9, 1998, the Plaintiffs filed their Supplemental Authority Concerning Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (“Pis.’ Supp.Auth.”). On February 11, 1998, the Parties filed joint Pretrial Stipulations (“Joint Stip.”). On February 12, 1998, the court issued its Order On Pretrial Hearing. On the same date, the court issued an Order denying Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment, but stressed that the denial was “not on the substantive merits of said motion; rather, the' court finds that the issues raised are more amenable to disposition after a full legal and factual exploration at trial.” Trial commenced on February 17, 1998. Plaintiffs filed a Supplement To The Record (“Pis.’ Supp. To Record”) and their Post-Trial Brief (“Pis.’ Post-Tr.Br.”) on February 24, 1998. Defendants filed a Supplement To The Record (“Defs.’ Supp. To Record”) and their Post-Trial Brief (“Defs.’ Post-Tr.Br.”) on February 27, 1998. On March 5, 1998, Plaintiffs filed their Supplemental Post-Trial Brief (“Pis.’ Supp. Post-Tr.Br.”), to which Defendants filed a Reply (“Defs.’ Reply To Pis.’ Supp. Post-Tr.Br.”-) on March 6, 1998. On March 13, 1998, the Defendants filed Additional Authority And Brief Argument Based Thereon (“Defs.- Add. Auth.”), to which Plaintiffs filed a Response (“Pis.’ Resp. To Defs.’ Add. Auth.”) on March 23, 1998. Finally, on March 5, 1998, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion For Leave To Amend The Complaint By Adding A Party (“Pis.’ Mot. For Leave To Amend”). Defendants’ March 6, 1998 Reply To Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Post-Trial Brief also addressed Plaintiffs’ Motion For Leave To Amend. Both at the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, and at the close of trial, the Defendants’ moved for a judgment as a matter of law. The court took these motions under advisement, and now issues this Memorandum Opinion. After a careful and thorough review of the arguments of counsel, relevant law, the trial of this matter, and the record as a whole, the court finds that for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion For Leave To Amend is due to be granted and that Plaintiffs should prevail on their Title VI disparate impact claim and are thus entitled to their requested relief. The court will enter the appropriate judgment and declaration, will permanently enjoin enforcement of the Department’s English-Only Policy, and will direct the Defendants, in conjunction with the Plaintiffs, to formulate revised policies and practices for foreign language examinations that comply with the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR BENCH TRIALS, AND THE GRANTING OF PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF A. Bench Trials The burden of proof in civil eases is the same regardless of whether the finder of fact is a judge in a bench trial or a jury. Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 380 (2d Cir.1994). That is, a plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the finder of fact that he or she has proven every element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when considered with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and demonstrates that what is sought to be proved “is more likely true than not true.” See Pattern Jury Instructions, Basie Instruction No. 6.1, U.S. Eleventh Circuit District Judges Association (Civil Cases) (1990). In bench trials, the judge serves as the sole fact-finder and, thus, assumes the role of the jury. In this capacity, the judge’s function includes weighing the evidence, evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and deciding questions of fact, as well as issues of law. Childrey v. Bennett, 997 F.2d 830, 834 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that “it is the exclusive province of the judge in non-jury trials to assess the credibility of witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony”). Moreover, “a trial judge sitting without a jury is entitled to even greater latitude concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence.” Goodman v. Highlands Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 665, 668 (5th Cir.1979) (citing Wright v. Southwest Bank, 554 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.1977)); see also Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 776 n. 5 (11th Cir.1982) (stating that the court has “broad discretion over the admission of evidence in a bench trial”). Of course, these criteria are applied in the legal context of Title VI. B. Permanent Injunctive Relief Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for injunctive relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). “Every order granting an injunction ... shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.” Id. In assessing whether permanent injunctive relief is warranted, the court must determine whether the Plaintiffs have satisfied the following three criteria: (1) violation of the applicable statute or regulatory authority by the Defendants; (2) continuing irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs in the absence of an injunction; and (3) lack of an adequate remedy at law. See Newman v. State of Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083, 103 S.Ct. 1773, 76 L.Ed.2d 346 (1983); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 935 F.Supp. 1556, 1571-72 (S.D.Ala.1996). If warranted, the scope of injunctive relief should be tailored to address the specific violations of law by the Defendants. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 762, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1995); cf. McKusick v. City of Melbourne, Fla., 96 F.3d 478, 484 n. 5 (11th Cir.1996). III. DISCUSSION A. Motion For Leave To Amend The Complaint Plaintiffs’ March 5,1998 Motion For Leave To Amend The Complaint By Adding A Third Party seeks to add Defendant Hagan, in his official capacity, as a Defendant for purposes of Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim. (Pis.’ Mot. For Leave To Amend at 1.) Plaintiffs’ argue that: In light of the Defendants’ assertion of an Eleventh Amendment defense — a defense that they raised for the first time at trial— Director Hagan should be added as a defendant in his official capacity for purposes of the Title VI claim as well. Because Director Hagan has always been a defendant in this case for purposes of the § 1983 and § 1981 claims, neither he nor the Department of Public Safety will suffer any prejudice from adding him as a defendant for purposes of the Title VI claim. Indeed, it would be inequitable to deny the Plaintiffs leave -to add him at this stage of the litigation. In their answer, the Defendants did not claim that the Eleventh Amendment barred an action seeking prospective relief under Title VI and its disparate impact regulations.... Nor did the Defendants raise the Eleventh Amendment issue they now seek to litigate in their statement of contentions in the Order on Pretrial Hearing.... Although the Defendants’ failure to raise the issue earlier does not bar them from doing so now ... it would be unjust to preclude the Plaintiffs from making what amounts to a technical change in the complaint in light of the Defendants’ delay. (Pis.’ Mot. For Leave to Amend at 1-2.) Defendants respond by asserting, essentially, that Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would be futile because the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ Title VI claims. (Defs.’ Reply To Pis.’ Post-Tr.Br. at 1-3.) Defendants argue that: the amendment is designed to cure a perceived jurisdictional defect, and, if allowed, will result in prejudice to the State. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the change is not merely “technical.” Rather, the Eleventh Amendment is and has been jurisdictional. It could have been invoked as a defense to the injunctive claims at any time, even on appeal. (Id. at 3, ¶ 4.) The decision to grant leave to amend a complaint is within the sole discretion of the district court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, limits the court’s discretion by mandating that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see also Halliburton & Associates v. Henderson, Few & Co., 774 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.1985). Therefore, there must be a substantial reason to deny a motion to amend. Id. Substantial reasons justifying a denial include “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive on the part of the movant, ... undue prejudice to the opposing party, by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 88 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). In this action, Plaintiffs’ seek to amend their Complaint to add Director Hagan, in his official capacity, for purposes of Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim. After a thorough review of the arguments of counsel and the record as a whole, the court finds that there has been no “undue delay, bad faith, [or] dilatory motive on the part of the movant.” Id. Plaintiffs’ Motion was filed in response to Defendants’ recently filed Eleventh Amendment assertions. Further, the court finds that by allowing the amendment, neither Director Hagan, nor the Department will be unduly prejudiced. Director Hagan is already a named Defendant for purposes of Plaintiffs’ § 1981 and § 1988 claims and has had ample notice of this action. The court also finds that although Defendants correctly assert that the Eleventh Amendment issue is jurisdictional, in this action, it does not operate to bar Plaintiffs’ Title VI claims. Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment only subjects Director Hagan to the possibility of injunctive relief in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Transportation. Finally, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ amendment will not be futile. It is clear that “[the] Eleventh Amendment does not insulate official capacity defendants from actions seeking prospective injunctive relief.” Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 3 F.3d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1993); see also Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1549-50 (11th Cir.1989), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied March 8, 1989 (“The eleventh amendment does not ... bar suits for equitable relief against state officers in their official capacity....”); see further Cross v. State of Alabama, State Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1503 (11th Cir.1995) (noting same). As fully addressed below, the well defined exception to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), (allowing federal courts to enjoin state officials from conduct violating federal law), applies in this action. Additionally, as Plaintiffs note, Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for any party to be “dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 21. Here, the court finds that adding Director Hagan in his official capacity meets the interests of justice by curing any perceived or actual jurisdictional defect, thus meeting the remedial goals of Plaintiffs’ suit. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint seeking to add Director Hagan, in his official capacity, as a Defendant for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim, is due to be granted. B. Application Of Title VI Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause power and prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color or national origin ... under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. As will be explored below, the statute has been amended twice. First, in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, Congress abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title VI. Then, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub.L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, broadening the coverage of the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI. Title VI itself bars only intentional discrimination. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985); Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 607-08, 612, 634, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983). However, federal Departments and Agencies have promulgated rules and regulations, pursuant to Title VI, prohibiting practices leading to an unjustified disparate impact. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l provides for the implementation of rules and regulations in furtherance of the express provisions and purposes of Title VI: Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract ... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. The Supreme Court has held that the regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI may validly proscribe actions having a disparate impact on protected groups even if those actions are not intentionally discriminatory. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94, 105 S.Ct. 712; see also Elston v. Talladega County Board of Education, 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir.1993); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State of Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir.1985). In other words, the promulgation of regulations incorporating a disparate impact standard is a valid exercise of agency authority. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94, 105 S.Ct. 712. As explained by Justice Marshall in Alexander: [Guardians ] held that actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regulations- designed to implement the purposes of Title VI.... In essence, then, we held [in Guardians] that Title VI had delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts. 469 U.S. at 293-94, 105 S.Ct. 712. See also New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir.1995) (“Title VI delegated to federal agencies the authority to promulgate regulations incorporating a disparate impact standard”). Plaintiffs’ claims in this lawsuit are brought solely pursuant to disparate impact regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l, and not the text of Title VI itself (§ 2000d). This suit raises many interesting questions of law and fact, including whether discrimination on the basis of language can lead to an unjustified disparate impact in violation of Title VI: Plaintiffs argue that in this case, discrimination based on language results in an unjustified disparate impact on the basis of national origin. Before addressing that question, however, the threshold issues for the court’s resolution are: (1) whether the Department is subject to the provisions of Title VI as a recipient of federal funds; (2) if so, whether the regulations enacted pursuant to Title VI (§ 2000d-l) allow for private rights of action; (3) if so, whether the Plaintiffs at bar have the requisite standing to bring this action; and finally (4) whether the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ suit. As discussed below, the court finds that: (1) the Department is a recipient of federal funds within the meaning of Title VI; (2) the regulations enacted pursuant to Title VI allow for private rights of action; (3) Plaintiffs have the requisite standing to bring suit; and (4) the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims. Having so found, the court then turns to the. consideration and analysis of the Department’s English-Only policy, ultimately concluding that it violates disparate impact regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l. 1. The Department is a recipient of federal funds within the meaning of Title VI Defendants concede that the Department receives millions of dollars in federal funds every year. Accordingly, the court finds — based on Defendants stipulation at trial and the evidence in the record — that the Alabama Department of Public Safety, which administers Alabama’s driver’s license examinations, is the recipient of federal funds within the meaning of Title VI. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(l)(A). While Defendants concede that the Department receives federal funds, they argue that “it is not appropriate to hold the Department and Hagan liable where none of the grant funds received are applied to Class D driver’s licenses.” (Defs.’ Post-Tr.Br. at 17; see also Defs.’ Mem. at 11-13; Defs.’ Reply at 14.) In other words, Defendants contend that because none of the federal funds go specifically to the Department’s Driver’s Licensing Division, the “program or activity” language of Title VI is not implicated. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a, defines “program or activity” and “program” as follows: For the purposes of this subchapter, the term “program or activity” and the term “program” mean all of the operations of— (1)(A) a department, agency ... or other instrumentality of a State ...; or (B) the entity of such State ... government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State ... government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State ... government; ... [or ] (4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (1) ...; any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (italics added, bold in original). It seems clear, based on the language of § 2000d~4a alone, that Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs cannot assert a viable Title VI claim because no federal money directly benefits applicants for Class D driver’s licenses is erroneous, as is Defendants’ contention that “if Congress or a federal agency wanted Alabama to establish a foreign-language examination program, Congress should ... make a specific grant.” (Defs.’ Reply at 15.) “Program or activity” means “all” of the operations of a state department or agency, not just the specific program or activity receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a. An examination of the legislative history behind § 2000d-4a bolsters this conclusion. Prior to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, the term “program or activity” was not defined by Congress. In 1984, the Supreme Court held in Grove City v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984), that Title VI liability was only established when the plaintiff could show discrimination in a particular program or activity that specifically received federal funds. Id. at 575-76, 104 S.Ct. 1211. Only those programs or activities receiving federal funds were subject to Title Vi’s prohibitions. So, for example, if a state Department of Public Safety restricted the use of federal funds to its Driver’s License Division’s “Problem Driver Pointer System,” only that program would be subject to Title Vi’s regulations. The other non-federally funded programs run by the Driver’s License Division would not be subject to Title VI. This, essentially, is Defendants’ argument. (Defs.’ Reply at 14; Defs.’ Mem. at 11.) Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s narrow construction of “program or activity” and amended Title VI, over President Reagan’s veto, by passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. (P.L. 100-259, codified in part as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988)). The purpose of the Act was to legislatively overturn Grove City and bring Title VI back into line with pre-Grove City “judicial and executive branch interpretations and enforcement practices which provide for broad coverage of the anti-discrimination provisions of [Title VI].” S.Rep. No. 100-64, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. Vol. 3 at 3. Accordingly, § 2000d-4a defines “program or activity” as “all” of the operations of a particular entity, not just the specific program receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a. The legislative history explains how the Act affects the coverage of state and local governments: The bill provides that when any part of a state or local government department or agency is extended federal financial assistance, the entire agency or department is covered. If a unit of a state or local government is extended federal aid and distributes such aid to another governmental entity, all of the operations of the entity which distributes the funds and all of the operations of the department or agency to which the funds are distributed are covered. Examples: If federal health assistance is extended to a part of a state health department, the entire health department would be covered in all of its operations. If the office of a mayor receives fedéral financial assistance and distributes it to local departments or agencies, all of the operations of the mayor’s office are covered along with the departments or agencies which actually get the aid. S.Rep. No. 100-64, at 16 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. Vol. 3 at 18; see also Id. at 6 (“the department or agency which receives the aid is covered”). See further Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 73, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (noting Amendment); Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 962 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that statute applied to department or agency but not entire state or local government); see further Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 271 (6th Cir.1994); Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District, et al., 917 F.2d 779, 783 (3rd Cir.1990); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., 911 F.2d 1377, 1384 (10th Cir.1990); Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 664-65 (11th Cir.1990); Knight v. State of Alabama, 787 F.Supp. 1030, 1364 (N.D.Ala.1991), affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and reversed in part on other grounds, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir.1994). Apparently, Defendants failed to determine the continuing validity of Grove City, or overlooked the plain language of § 2000d-4a. Based on the ’foregoing, the court finds that the relevant consideration is whether the Driver’s License Division is “part” of “the operations” of one of the entities listed in § 2000d-4a which “is extended ... federal financial assistance.” Because the Department is the recipient of federal funds, all of its agencies, divisions, and programs, including its Driver’s License Division, are subject to the requirements of Title VI, regardless of whether those funds are specifically directed toward its Driver’s License Division or programs therein. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (“ “program or activity” applies to all of the operations of ... a department, agency ... or other instrumentality of a State”); see also Schroeder, 927 F.2d at 962 (noting that statute applied to department or agency but not entire state or local government); Bentley v. Cleveland County Board of County Commissioners, 41 F.3d 600, 603 (10th Cir.1994) (distinguishing Schroeder by noting that plaintiff — as here — sued “the very parties he claims discriminated against him”); Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406 (11th Cir.1993) (noting that defendant received funds from the United States Department of Education and was therefore subject “not only to the duty of nondiscrimination mandated by Title VI, but also to the duties of nondiscrimination mandated by Department of Education regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI”). 2. The regulations enacted pursuant to Title VI (§ 2000d-l) allow for a private right of action Defendants next argue that even if the Department is subject to the requirements of Title VI as a recipient of federal funds, “plaintiffs lack ... a private right -of action.” (Defs.’ Reply at 14.) In support of their contention that “plaintiffs have no private right of action against the Department for alleged violations of any federal grant,” (Defs.’ Mem. at 12), Defendants rely on Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) and Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). (Defs.’ Mem. at 12.) Suter and Blessing, however, have no direct bearing on the issue of whether the regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l allow for private causes of action. To assert a non-constitutional federal claim, litigants must have a statutorily enforceable right. Suter and Blessing examined certain provisions of the Social Security Act to determine whether private litigants could enforce those provisions via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In contrast, here, Plaintiffs assert a private right of action in accordance with regulations enacted pursuant to a particular statute, namely, Title VI. Not only must “each statute ... be interpreted by its own terms,” Suter, 503 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 1360, but the analysis of whether regulations enacted pursuant to a statute allow for private causes of action differs from an analysis of whether statutory provisions are enforceable via § 1983. Accordingly, Defendants’ reliance on those cases is misplaced. Neither Title VI nor the regulations implemented pursuant to § 2000d-l, at issue here, expressly authorize a private right of action. It is clear, however, that Title VI itself (§ 2000d) authorizes “an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (“we have no doubt that Congress ... understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination”); Cone Corp., C.H. v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 921 F.2d 1190, 1201 n. 37 (11th Cir.1991) (finding that Title VI (§ 2000d) authorized private cause of action against the Florida Department of Transportation and its Secretary). As for Title VI regulations, in the Eleventh Circuit, two cases implicitly support the proposition that private causes of action may be brought pursuant to § 2000d-l regulations prohibiting policies or practices resulting in an unjustified disparate impact. In Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir.1985), a group of black schoolchildren challenged the policies and practices of the Georgia State Board of Education and a number of local school districts. Id. at 1407. The Eleventh Circuit noted that “[t]here is no doubt that the plaintiffs predicated this cause of action on the regulations. As a result, the district court correctly applied disparate impact analyses to their Title VI claims.” Id. at 1417 (footnote omitted). In Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir.1993), Plaintiffs represented a class of black children and their parents who brought suit against various Talladega County, Alabama, educational entities challenging several actions undertaken in the restructuring of the Talladega County school system. Id. at 1400. Plaintiffs claimed that the actions violated Title VI and regulations enacted by the United States Department of Education pursuant to Title VI. Id. As quoted above,, the Elston court noted: “While Title VI itself, like the Fourteenth Amendment, bars only intentional, discrimination, the regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI may validly proscribe actions having a disparate impact on groups protected by the statute, even if those actions are not intentionally discriminatory.” Id. at 1406 (citations omitted). Like the instant action, Georgia State Conference and Elston involved private litigants bringing suit pursuant to § 2000d-l regulations alleging disparate impact. In neither case did the Eleventh Circuit address the propriety of private causes of action brought pursuant to § 2000d-l regulations and instead proceeded to address the merits of the respective plaintiffs’ allegations. Accordingly, both cases implicitly support the proposition that private causes of action may be brought under regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l. Additionally, two recent Eleventh Circuit cases support the proposition that federal rights may be created by valid regulations that merely “further define” or “flesh out” the content of a statutory right. In Harris, although addressing an action brought pursuant to § 1983, the Eleventh Circuit noted that: “Wright would seem to indicate that so long as the statute itself confers a specific right upon the plaintiff, and a valid regulation merely further defines or fleshes out the content of that right, then the statute — “in conjunction with the regulation” — may create a federal right as further defined by the regulation.” Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09 (emphasis added). Although the Harris court explicitly did not “define the precise role which a valid regulation may play in the ‘federal rights’ analysis,” Id. at 1008, in Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir.1998), the Eleventh Circuit cited Harris’ observation regarding Wright and utilized the “in conjunction” reasoning to find that the Medicaid regulations at issue there “further define[d] the contours of the statutory right.” Doe, 136 F.3d at 717. The court concluded that the statute “as further fleshed out by [the] regulations— creates a federal right.” Id. Doe and Harris indicate that a federal regulatory right may be established if it can be shown that: (1) the enabling statute conferred a specific right and (2) a valid regulation merely further defines or fleshes out the content of that right. Doe, 136 F.3d at 717; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09. If so, “then the statute — ‘in conjunction with the regulation’ — may create a federal right as further defined by the regulation.” Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009; Doe, 136 F.3d at 717 (quoting Harris). Here, it is clear that Title VI prohibits discrimination in programs that receive federal funds, and confers “an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.” Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703, 99 S.Ct. 1946; Cone, 921 F.2d at 1201 n. 37. Therefore, the question becomes whether the disparate impact regulations “merely define or flesh out” the content of Title Vi’s statutory right to be free from discrimination in federally funded programs such that the court may conclude that “the statute — in conjunction with the regulation — may create a federal right as further defined by the regulation.” The court concludes that they do, and, accordingly, that it can. Title VI itself prohibits discrimination based on race, color or national origin in programs or activities receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Although the statute is silent as to. the scienter required for statutory violations, the Supreme Court has held that the statute itself only prohibits intentional discrimination. . Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293, 105 S.Ct. 712. Nevertheless, section 2000d-l provides that agencies may enact regulations “to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d ... by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. Regulations that prohibit an unjustified disparate impact in federally funded programs are valid exercises of agency authority. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-294, 105 S.Ct. 712; Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406. It cannot be disputed that prohibiting actions having an unjustified disparate impact “effectuate[s] the provisions of section 2000d [and is] consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. The regulations merely define the contour of and flesh out the statutory right to be free from discrimination in federally funded programs. See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (where the Supreme Court based its reasoning on disparate impact regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l, but based its holding solely on the statute (§ 2000d)). Finally, Title VI itself authorizes “an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.” Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703, 99 S.Ct. 1946; Cone Corp., 921 F.2d at 1201 n. 37. Because disparate impact regulations are valid exercises of agency authority, Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-294, 105 S.Ct. 712; Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406, there is no principled reason to deny an implied private right of action under regulations effectuating the provisions of a statute containing an implied private right of action. Consequently, the court can conclude that “the statute — ‘in conjunction with the regulation’ — [] creates a federal right as further defined by the regulation.” Doe, 136 F.3d at 717 (citing Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09). Valid regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l that effectuate the purposes of Title VI, allow for private causes of action against entities operating federally funded programs or activities, (as expansively defined in § 2000d-4), that work an unjustified disparate impact against those protected by Title VI. Even if Elston and Georgia State Conference do not lead to the conclusion that § 2000&-1 regulations afford a private right of action, and even if Doe and Harris do not lead to the conclusion that the statute — in conjunction with the regulations — -create a privately enforceable federal right as further fleshed out by the regulations, the court still finds that under an analysis of the text, legislative history and purpose of Title VI, private causes of action may be brought pursuant to § 2000d-l regulations prohibiting an unjustified disparate impact. The court’s finding is supported by the findings of other federal courts. See Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed March 30, 1998 (No. 97-1620); Cureton v. NCAA, 1997 WL 634376, *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct.9, 1997) (finding private right of action in Title VI regulations); Association of Mexican-American Educators v. State of California, 836 F.Supp. 1534, 1548 (N.D.Cal.1993) (same); see also New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir.1995) (evaluating merits of disparate impact claim under regulations). The only Circuit Court of Appeals to explicitly' address the question of whether a private right of action exists under disparate impact regulations promulgated by a federal administrative agency pursuant to § 2000d-l is the Third Circuit. After an exhaustive review of applicable case law, the Third Circuit held that “private plaintiffs may maintain an -action under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602(§ 2000d-l) of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed March 30, 1998 (No. 97-1620).- In so finding, the Third-Circuit noted that the decisions of eight-other Courts of Appeals supported its finding. Id. at 936. Among those eases cited were the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in Elston and Georgia State Conference. Seif, 132 F.3d at 936. In its meticulous opinion, the Third Circuit first examined applicable Supreme Court precedent: Alexander, 469 U.S. at 287, 105 S.Ct. 712, and Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221. See Seif, 132 F.3d at 931-932. The Third Circuit found in Guardians “an implicit approval by five Justices of the existence of a private right of action under discriminatory effect regulations implementing section 602 of Title VI.” Seif, 132 F.3d at 930. The court “hesitate[d], however, to hold .that Guardians is dispositive of [whether regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l afford a private cause of action] because the Court did not directly address the’ issue now before us.” Seif, 132 F.3d at 930. The court then examined Alexander, and noted that although there was some merit to the argument that: Alexander ... implicitly confirms that Guardians recognized the existence of a private right of action.... The Court-in Alexander spoke in the passive voice— “could make actionable” — -and did not indicate whether Guardians stood for the proposition that a private plaintiff, or the .relevant agency, could proceed under a disparate impact standard.... [This argument] requires the inference that because Alexander was a suit brought by private plaintiffs, and because Guardians was also brought by private plaintiffs, the Alexander Court must have been speaking of private plaintiffs when it used the passive voice. This inference from Guardians may be justified, but we find no direct authority in Alexander that either confirms or denies the existence of a private right of action. Seif, 132 F.3d at 931. Consequently, the court declined to hold that “a private right of action exists based on Guardians and Alexander alone.” Id. The court then turned to relevant Third Circuit precedent to determine whether regulations enacted pursuant to § 2000d-l allowed for a private cause of action, and determined that “our own precedent does not resolve the matter.” Id. at 933. Finally, the Third Circuit utilized a three-prong test to determine whether the court could imply a private right of action from the § 2000d-l regulations. Id. The test required the court to inquire: (1) whether the agency rule is properly within the scope of the enabling statute; (2) whether the statute under which the rule was promulgated properly permits the implication of a private right of action; and (3) whether implying a private right of action will further the purpose of the enabling statute. Seif, 132 F.3d at 933 (quotations and citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically articulated the proper analysis for determining whether a private right of action may be inferred from regulations enacted by a federal department or agency pursuant to an express grant of authority to do so by Congress. The Eleventh Circuit has, however, articulated the test for whether a private right of action may be inferred from a statute. Bok v. Mutual Assur., Inc., 119 F.3d 927, 928 (11th Cir.1997); Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir.1997); Dime Coal Co., Inc. v. Combs, 796 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1986). That test is derived from the Supreme Court’s formulation in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). In Cort, the following factors were relevant in determining whether to imply a right of action in a statute: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose “especial benefit” the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one; (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff; and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based on federal law. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080. The Supreme Court has since held that these factors are not entitled to equal weight, and that the central inquiry must focus on the question of legislative intent. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179-80, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). In this action, the fourth factor is irrelevant because Title VI is federal law. See Lowrey v. Texas A & M University System, 117 F.3d 242, 250, n. 11 (5th Cir.1997). The court finds that for the purpose of evaluating whether regulations enacted pursuant to a statute afford a private right of action, the Third Circuit’s three-prong test for evaluating regulations, articulated above, comports with the sum and substance of the Eleventh Circuit’s statutory test. See Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 250 n. 10 (noting different analysis for whether private rights of action may be implied from a statute as opposed to regulations enacted pursuant to a statute). Accordingly, the court will utilize the Third Circuit’s three-prong test in analyzing whether the § 2000d-l regulations allow for a private cause of action, and, in fact, expressly adopts, and hereby, incorporates by reference, the reasoning and findings of the Third Circuit in Seif: In Seif, a non-profit residents organization sued, among others, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and its Secretary, alleging that the Department’s issuance of a permit authorizing the operation of a waste facility in a predominantly black community violated disparate impact regulations enacted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to Title VI. Seif 1B2 F.3d at 927. The Third Circuit noted that: There is no question that the EPA’s discriminatory effect regulation satisfies the first prong. The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Alexander makes clear that “actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities [can] be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Title VI.” 469 U.S. at 293, 105 S.Ct. at 716 (footnote omitted). ii. The second and third prongs are the crux of this case. In addressing the second, a court will consider the factors set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), and its progeny. See Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 947. The factors relevant here are: (1) whether there is “any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one”; and (2) whether it is “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff.” Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088 (citations omitted). The United States, as amicus, contends that the implication of a private right of action is consistent with legislative intent because Congress acknowledged the existence of the right when it amended Title VI. The purpose of the amendment was to broaden the scope of coverage of Title VI in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984), where the Court narrowly construed the terms “program or activity.” The United States cites various items of legislative history which it claims indicates an “understanding ... [of] the existence of the discriminatory effects regulations and the fact that they could be enforced in federal court by private parties.” Amicus Br. at 21. First, the United States relies on a House Report on an early version of the relevant bill, which states that the “private right of action which allows a private individual or entity to sue to enforce Title IX would continue to provide the vehicle to test [certain] regulations in Title IX and their expanded meaning to their outermost limits.” H.R.REP. NO. 968, Pt. 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986). Second, the United States relies on several legislators’ comments in the Congressional Record, where the legislators appear to recognize the existence of a private right of action. Third, the United States also relies on the following compilations of testimony at congressional hearings: Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Sub-comm. on the Const, of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24,153-54, 200 (1984); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985: Joint Hearings on H.R. 700 Before the House Comm, on Educ. Labor and the Subeomm. on Civil & Const. Rights of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 734, 1095, 1099 (1985). The first-compilation contains, inter aha, a memorandum by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) which states OMB’s opinion that “every licensed attorney would be empowered to file suit to enforce the ‘effects test’ regulations of agencies, challenging practices in every aspect of every institution that receives any Federal assistance.” Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Sub-comm. on the Const, of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 527 (1984). PADEP presents two responses. First, PADEP emphasizes that the purpose of the amendment of Title VI was to address the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City, not to confirm or announce the existence of a private right of action. Second, PADEP reminds the court that many of the above-cited comments may only reflect the views of individual members of Congress. PADEP does not, however, cite to any statements in the Congressional Record or elsewhere that would undermine those cited by the United States. We therefore find that there is some indication in the legislative history, here uncontro-verted, of an intent to create a private right of action, in satisfaction of the Cort factors. This finding, however, does not end our inquiry. The Cort factors also require a court to determine whether it is “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff[.]” 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. ' Relevant to this inquiry is PA-DEP’s argument that section 602 and the regulations situate the EPA as, in essence, a gatekeeper to enforcement, and that the implication of a private right of action would be inconsistent with this legislative scheme. According to PADEP, section 602 imposes what PADEP terms as “strict preconditions” on the use of that section’s enforcement apparatus. Specifically, section 602 provides: [N]o such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. EPA enforcement action can occur only after the agency has negotiated these procedural requirements. Should we find that it is appropriate to imply a private right of action, PADEP emphasizes that private plaintiffs would not have to negotiate these requirements. In addition, PADEP emphasizes that the EPA’s regulations expressly provide private parties with an administrative mechanism through which they can raise allegations of unintentional discrimination. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.120-7.130. These regulations provide, in relevant part: A person who believes that he or she or a specific class of persons has been discriminated against in violation of this Part may file a complaint. The complaint may be filed by an authorized representative. A complaint alleging employment discrimination must identify at least one individual aggrieved by such discrimination. Complaints solely alleging employment discrimination against an individual on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex or religion shall be processed under the procedures for complaints of employment discrimination filed against recipients of federal assistance. Complainants are encouraged but not required to make use of any grievance procedure established under § 7.90 before filing a complaint. Filing a complaint through a grievance procedure does not extend the 180 day calendar requirement of paragraph (b)(2) of this section. 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(a) (citation omitted). In PADEP’s estimation, section 602 and the regulations situate the EPA as a gatekeeper to enforcement, with private parties submitting their allegations to the agency and its discretion. PADEP contends that a private right of action is inconsistent with this legislative scheme. We recognize that PADEP’s argument has some force. There is, however, a more convincing counter-argument. The procedural requirements in section 602 provide a fund recipient with a form of notice that the agency has begun an investigation which may culminate in the termination of its funding. We note that a private lawsuit also affords a fund recipient similar notice. If the purpose of the requirements is to provide bare notice, private lawsuits are consistent with the legislative scheme of Title VI. Furthermore, unlike the EPA, private plaintiffs do not have the authority to terminate funding. As a result, the purpose that the requirements serve is not as significant in private lawsuits, where the potential remedy does not include the result (i.e., termination of funding) at which Congress directed the requirements. Stated differently, the requirements were designed to cushion the blow of a result that private plaintiffs cannot effectuate. Based on the foregoing, we find that the implication of a private right of action would be consistent with the legislative scheme of Title VI. In sum, we find that there is some indication in the legislative history of an intent to create a private right of action and that the implication of a private right of action would be consistent with the legislative scheme of Title VI, in accordance with the relevant Cort factors. Accordingly, we find that ‘“the statute under which the rule was promulgated properly permits the implication of a private right of action,’” Polaroid Corp., 862 F.2d at 994 (quoting Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 947), and that the second prong of the test is satisfied. iii. The third prong of the test requires the court to inquire “ ‘whether implying a private right of action will further the purpose of the en