Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LEE H. ROSENTHAL, District Judge. This suit arises out of terrorist attacks in Israel between 2000 and 2003. Most were suicide bombings; some involved such acts as opening fire on civilians or remotely triggering explosives in crowded public places. The plaintiffs or their family members were wounded or killed in these attacks. Some of the victims were Americans. The defendants are companies and individuals involved in the oil business. The plaintiffs allege that these defendants purchased oil from Iraq'—either directly from Saddam Hussein’s government or from third parties who had purchased the oil from Hussein—and made payments that violated the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. The Oil-for-Food Program required anyone buying oil from Iraq to pay the purchase money into an escrow account monitored by the United Nations. Funds from this account could only be used for humanitarian purposes. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants were involved in buying Iraqi oil with payments that included illegal kickbacks to a secret bank account in Jordan controlled by Hussein. The plaintiffs allege that Hussein used funds from this account to make reward payments to the families of the suicide bombers and others killed in carrying out the terrorist attacks. According to the plaintiffs, such payments were important to recruiting terrorists. All 193 plaintiffs allege violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”). Most of the plaintiffs are aliens. They assert that this court has subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), which permits aliens to sue for some violations of customary international law. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated international law by financing terrorism and by aiding and abetting and conspiring to commit acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. The plaintiffs who are United States nationals and their estates, survivors, and heirs allege that the defendants violated the Antiterrorism Act (“ATA”) by providing material support to terrorist organizations and by engaging in illegal financial transactions with Iraq. (Docket Entry No. 3). The following motions are pending: • The El Paso Corporation has moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing, under Rule 12(b)(5) for improper service of process, and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on the merits of any of the plaintiffs’ causes of action. (Docket Entry No. 26). The plaintiffs have responded, (Docket Entry No. 42), and El Paso has replied, (Docket Entry No. 47). El Paso also filed a notice of supplemental authority, (Docket Entry No. 51). After the case was transferred to this court, El Paso filed a supplement with Fifth Circuit authority, (Docket Entry No. 78), to which the plaintiffs responded, (Docket Entry No. 81). • Oscar Wyatt has moved to dismiss for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry No. 72). The plaintiffs have responded, (Docket Entry No. 98), and Wyatt has replied, (Docket Entry No. 105). • NuCoastal Corporation has moved to dismiss on the same bases as Wyatt. (Docket Entry No. 74). The plaintiffs have responded, (Docket Entry No. 99), and Wyatt has replied, (Docket Entry No. 107). • Bayoil (USA), Inc. and David Chalmers have also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Docket Entry No. 76). The plaintiffs have responded, (Docket Entry No. 97), and Bayoil and Chalmers have replied, (Docket Entry No. 108). Based on the motions, responses, and replies; the allegations in the complaint; the record; the arguments of counsel; and the applicable law, this court grants the motions to dismiss for lack of standing except with respect to the ATA claims and grants all the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs may amend their complaint to replead only the ATA claims by April 23, 2010. The remaining allegations are dismissed with prejudice and leave to amend is denied as futile. The reasons for these rulings are explained in detail below. I. The Allegations in the Complaint A. The Iraq Oil-for-Food Program Less than a week after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 6, 1990, the United Nations issued economic sanctions precluding member states from buying Iraqi oil. (Docket Entry No. 3, ¶ 145). The U.N. did not lift the sanctions for five years. On March 3, 1995, the Houston Chronicle published a story under the headline “Not Yet; U.N. Sanctions Against Iraq Can’t be Safely Ended.” The article stated that Iraq “continues to aid and abet terrorists” by cheating the U.N. on the sanctions with the “connivance of Western oil traders that allow [Hussein] to get away with it, selling bargain-basement oil in order to rearm his troops and sustain the luxury that he and his supporters enjoy.” (Id., ¶ 66). On April 14, 1995, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 986, lifting the embargo but restricting Iraq’s ability to sell its oil. Iraq’s government and the U.N. negotiated the details of the restrictions, resulting in a written agreement sometime in May 1996. This agreement led to the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program (“OFP”). Under the OFP, a new U.N. office was created to oversee Iraq’s sale of oil and purchase of humanitarian goods. An escrow account was established at the New York branch of the Banque Nacionale de Paris (“BNP”). The proceeds of Iraqi oil sales were to be deposited into the escrow account, which the U.N. monitored. Iraq could use the funds only to purchase food and other humanitarian goods for the country. (Id., ¶¶ 152, 154). The United States government allowed American individuals and companies to enter into executory contracts with Iraq to purchase oil or sell humanitarian goods, including food and medical supplies. Before they could perform these contracts, the American entities were required to obtain a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). OFAC evaluated these license applications in conjunction with the State and Commerce Departments and the U.N. committee responsible for overseeing the PNB account. OFAC issued 1,050 licenses. (Id., ¶¶ 155-60). In December 1996, Iraq began selling oil through the OFP. Under the OFP, even though buyers sent the purchase money to the BNP account in New York, Saddam Hussein’s government retained the right to choose the buyers. Those selected had to purchase the oil at the Official Selling Price (“OSP”), which was determined by a U.N. committee made up of representatives of the Security Council member states. The plaintiffs alleged that the U.N. “sought to set a price for Iraqi oil at the highest rate bearable by the market in order to maximize the revenue generated,” which “would increase the amount of humanitarian goods that could be purchased” and “minimize the potential for illegal kickbacks” to Saddam Hussein. Presumably, buyers already paying full market price would be unable or unwilling to pay-more in kickbacks. (Id., ¶¶ 161-62). The plaintiffs allege that many of the companies and individuals Iraq chose to receive “allocations” of Iraqi oil “were not otherwise involved in the oil industry [and] were able to reap large profits by selling their allocations of Iraqi oil to brokers and/or companies capable of transporting the oil to a refinery.” (Id., ¶ 162). Beginning in 2000, the plaintiffs allege, Iraqi officials conditioned oil allocations on the buyer’s willingness to pay a “surcharge” to Hussein’s government. These surcharges, calculated as a percentage of the total contract price, were not permitted under OFP. The buyers paid these surcharges to “front companies” or bank accounts Hussein controlled. The plaintiffs also allege that Hussein charged “port fees” before allowing tankers to receive oil at Iraqi ports. Like the surcharges, the port fees were paid to Hussein instead of the OFP bank account. The plaintiffs allege that these surcharges and port fees were kickbacks made possible by lobbying efforts persuading the U.N. to select a below-market OSP. The plaintiffs also allege that at least some of the cost of these kickbacks was passed on by the direct purchasers to the next purchaser down the line. (Id., ¶¶ 163-77). B. The Defendants’ Actions Oscar Wyatt, a Texas oil trader, was the Chairman and sole shareholder of Coastal Corporation. Wyatt later formed NuCoastal Corporation, a Houston energy company, and NuCoastal Trading, S.A., a Panama corporation. Both NuCoastal entities are also defendants. The plaintiffs allege that on the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, Wyatt owed Iraq $90 million. After the U.N. sanctions froze Iraq’s bank accounts, Wyatt began repaying the money directly to the Hussein government and not to the U.N.-controlled accounts. The payments allegedly amounted to more than $50 million. Wyatt allegedly made the payments through dummy companies he controlled in Switzerland and Cyprus using two associates who are not named as defendants. (Id., ¶¶ 21-26, 146). According to the allegations, Wyatt maintained a close relationship with Hussein while the U.N. embargo was in place, hoping that he would be rewarded with Iraqi oil-purchase contracts once the sanctions were lifted. Wyatt directed efforts to lobby the U.N. to make Iraqi oil available for purchase. The plaintiffs allege that Wyatt used false information to lobby the U.N. to reduce the OSP to below market level, enabling Iraq to extract surcharges from Wyatt and other direct buyers while allowing those buyers to make a profit. (Id., ¶¶ 151, 169, 181). Wyatt also visited Hussein in Baghdad to secure oil-purchase rights for himself and his companies. In 1996, Wyatt was awarded the first allocation under the OFP and obtained a license from the U.S. government allowing him to complete the purchase. During 2001 meetings in Baghdad with Hussein, the Iraqi Oil Minister, and other Iraqi officials, Wyatt agreed to pay under-the-table surcharges in exchange for the right to future oil allocations. Wyatt was prosecuted for these acts and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud on October 1, 2007. (Id., ¶ 186). According to the complaint in this ease, Wyatt testified that he caused surcharge payments to be deposited in a bank account in Jordan controlled by Hussein. Wyatt acknowledged knowing that the payments violated OFP and stated that he had intended to defraud the U.N. (Id.). Similar allegations are made against David Chalmers; Bayoil (USA), Inc., a Delaware company based in Houston that Chalmers owned; and Bayoil Supply & Trading Limited, a Bahamas affiliate of Bayoil USA, of which Chalmers was the sole director and shareholder. (Id., ¶ 18). On August 17, 2007, Chalmers and the Bayoil Companies also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. According to the allegations in this suit, Chalmers admitted that he had made payments that he “both expected and intended” would go to Hussein, and that he had concealed those payments from the U.N. Chalmers stated that he knew the payments violated the OFP. (Id., ¶ 185). Chalmers and Bay-oil did not receive allocations of Iraqi oil but purchased the oil from third parties who did receive allocations. Bayoil transferred the purchase money through its Bahamas account to accounts in the Middle East and then paid it to the seller who had received the allocation. The seller then transferred a large portion of the money to accounts controlled by Hussein. Bayoil and Chalmers were allegedly closely involved in the payments to Hussein. The complaint alleges that a Bayoil representative delivered a letter to Iraqi officials in 2002 proposing “a payment plan for certain illegal surcharges owed by another Oil for Food participant.” (Id., ¶ 181). In January 2001, the El Paso Corporation acquired Coastal. El Paso is a large oil and gas company incorporated in Delaware and based in Houston. Wyatt was no longer Coastal’s Chairman when the acquisition occurred, and his contract as a consultant to Coastal was terminated when Coastal became an El Paso subsidiary. The plaintiffs allege that El Paso knew when it acquired Coastal that Wyatt had paid illegal surcharges in exchange for oil allocations and had other illegal dealings with Hussein. (Id., ¶ 4). The plaintiffs also allege that El Paso inherited two contracts used to make illegal payments to Hussein. One contract was an oil allocation for which “an El Paso consultant and former Coastal official,” likely a reference to Wyatt, paid $201,877 in kickbacks. The plaintiffs allege that these payments were made in two installments, one on December 19, 2001 and one on March 25, 2002. These dates were after El Paso acquired Coastal; the plaintiffs do not appear to allege that El Paso made the payments, but that El Paso “ultimately acquired 2,018,770 barrels of oil” under the contract. The plaintiffs allege that Wyatt sought reimbursement from El Paso for $200,000 he had paid to Iraq through one of his “front” companies but do not allege that El Paso ever reimbursed him. The second contract was for Coastal’s purchase of oil from a third party that agreed to pay an illegal surcharge to Iraq. This third party allegedly informed Coastal about the surcharge. The plaintiffs allege that El Paso continued to purchase oil under this contract after the Coastal acquisition and that the third party “passed this cost [for the surcharges] to El Paso in the form of a ‘premium.’ ” (Id., ¶ 181). The core of the plaintiffs’ allegations against El Paso consists of fourteen transactions between June 2001 and June 2002. In each of these transactions, El Paso purchased Iraqi oil from a third party, allegedly “knowing that the third parties were paying illegal surcharges and kickbacks for the oil and passing the cost to El Paso in the form of a ‘premium.’ ” (Id.). The plaintiffs allege that Hussein illegally received $5.5 million from these transactions. On February 7, 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil action against El Paso in the Southern District of New York, alleging that El Paso had knowingly and illegally paid $5.5 million to Iraq. The same day, El Paso entered into a nonprosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s office, agreeing to pay $5,482,363 to the United States. The money was to be paid to the people of Iraq as the OFP’s intended beneficiaries. One week later, on February 14, 2007, the district court entered a consent judgment in the S.E.C. lawsuit. The judgment incorporated the $5,482,363 payment arranged with the U.S. Attorney’s office and included a separate $2.25 million fine to the S.E.C. (Id., ¶¶ 182-84). The plaintiffs have not alleged that the consent judgment or nonprosecution agreement included any admission of wrongdoing by El Paso. C. Hussein’s Actions The complaint describes in gruesome detail atrocities committed by Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s reign. Many of these atrocities, including chemical weapons attacks on Kurds living in .Northern Iraq, are well known. The plaintiffs also allege that Hussein was deeply and personally involved in terrorist activities, particularly attacks against Israel. The complaint describes the chronology of Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq and in international terrorism. After the Ba’ath Party came to power in Iraq in 1968, Hussein was named head of intelligence. In 1969, Hussein founded the Arab Liberation Front (“ALF”), an Iraqi army affiliate that carried out suicide bombings and other terrorists attacks in Israel, the Philippines, and elsewhere at least through the 1990s. He allegedly served as head of the ALF from 1969 until 1980. The plaintiffs allege that “[i]n 2001 the Saddam Regime trained a group of ALF terrorists for suicide missions.” (Id., ¶ 39). The plaintiffs also allege that Hussein “provided offices, training camps, safe haven, financing and operational and logistical support” for other organizations that have carried out terrorist attacks, including the Abu Nidal Organization (“ANO”), the Palestine Liberation Front (“PLF”), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (“AAMB”). (Id., ¶¶ 40-42). The plaintiffs focus on the ALF, Hamas, PIJ, and the AAMB, all designated by the United States as terrorist groups. Beginning in 1990, the State Department designated Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism. (Id., ¶ 46). After the Second Intifada broke out in September 2000, Hussein gave a speech supporting the Palestinian cause and announced that he would provide rewards to the families of Palestinians injured or killed during an attack on Israel. The plaintiffs allege that “[i]n order to encourage and incentivize suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilian targets, the Saddam Regime publicized the rewards program providing more than double the reward for suicide bombers’ families [as compared to the families of those who died by other means], and handed out checks to surviving family members at public ceremonies which were covered by Palestinian and Iraqi electronic and print media.” (Id., ¶ 48). Hussein gave $25,000 to families of suicide bombers and $10,000 to families of other Palestinians who died in the Intifada. (Id., ¶ 50). These payments were reported in the United States by the Associated Press on March 12, 2002 and by the Washington Post on August 4, 2002. The plaintiffs allege that the Washington Post report stated that Hussein had “earned over $6 billion from manipulating the Oil for Food program and used such funds to finance Palestinian terror and pay off the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.” (Id., ¶¶ 67, 68). During the Second Intifada, according to the complaint, Hussein “provided funding, weapons, training, and military equipment to the AAMB,” “provided Hamas with offices in Iraq, training camps and funding, and held high level meetings with Hamas military leaders,” and “provided PIJ with military instructors and held high level meetings with senior PIJ military commanders.” (Id., ¶¶ 76-78). The plaintiffs allege that documents found in Iraq by the American military show that Hussein provided over $100 million to Palestinian terrorist groups to support the Second Intifiada. (Id., ¶ 80). The plaintiffs allege that, “[w]hile separate organizations, the Saddam Regime, ALF, Hamas, PIJ, and AAMB have long and openly adhered to a shared mission: to topple and eradicate the State of Israel, murder or throw out the Jews, and liberate the area by replacing it with an Islamic and/or Palestinian state.” (Id., ¶ 118). According to the allegations, during the Second Intifada, Hussein allegedly cooperated with the terrorist organizations to obtain weapons and explosives, train potential terrorists, and plan and commit joint attacks. (Id., ¶ 120). The plaintiffs allege that the payments to terrorists, made by the Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan out of secret bank accounts in Jordan, were crucial to recruiting suicide bombers and other terrorist operatives. (Id., ¶¶ 121,124). D. The Plaintiffs’ Injuries and this Lawsuit This case arises out of 21 terrorist attacks in Israel during the Second Intifada. The plaintiffs are individuals who were wounded in the attacks, estates of individuals who were killed in the attacks, and family members of individuals wounded or killed. The plaintiffs allege that Hussein made reward payments to the families of the terrorists who carried out each of the 21 attacks. The details of each attack, including the identities of its victims and perpetrators, are described in the complaint. • On November 22, 2000, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated an explosive onboard a bus in Hadera, Israel. At least two people were killed, including plaintiff Shoshana Ris, the daughter of plaintiffs Tuvia Ris and Tzvia Ris and the sister of plaintiffs Sabine Ris and Anat Ris. Thirty-six people were injured, including plaintiff Hana Segal, the mother of plaintiff Pnina Alterovich; plaintiff Michal Ganon, the son of plaintiff Viviane Asraf Ganon; and plaintiff Getaun Azanu, the husband of plaintiff Habasta Azanu. Mahmoud al-Madani, a Hamas leader who was involved in the attack but was not himself the suicide bomber, was later killed by the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”). His family received a $10,000 check on behalf of Hussein on April 28, 2001. (Id., ¶ 209). • On January 1, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated a car bomb in Netanya, Israel. At least thirty-six people were injured, including plaintiff Perach Baruch, the daughter of plaintiff Naima Shimon and the mother of plaintiff Guy Baruch; Maayan Furman, the daughter of plaintiff Orit Furman; and plaintiffs Dor Hershkovitz, Sapir Hershkovitz, and Zehava Hershkovitz, the family members of plaintiff Shimon Hershkovitz. On, June 18, 2001, a woman who the plaintiffs allege was the suicide bomber’s mother received a $10,000 check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 208). • On March 4, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated a case full of explosives in Netanya, killing three people and wounding 65, including plaintiff B osmat Glam, the son of the plaintiffs David Glam and Rachel Glam; plaintiff Ariel Mahfud; and plaintiff Mazal Alevi. On March 19, 2001 the suicide bomber’s family received a check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 207). • On March 27, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives on a Jerusalem bus, wounding 28 people including plaintiff Shmuel Shfaim, the husband of plaintiff Iris Shfaim. The plaintiffs allege, upon information and belief, that “the suicide bomber’s beneficiary received a payment from Saddam Hussein.” (Id., ¶ 206). • On March 28, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives at “the Neveh Yamin/Kfar Saba Junction.” The attack killed two people, plaintiff Naftali Lanzkron, the son of plaintiffs Meir Lanzkron and Hava Lanzkron and the brother of plaintiffs Brakha Hershkovitz, Oria Lanzkron, Yekhiel Lanzkron, Eisheva Lanzkron, Nethanel Lanzkron, Yeddia Lanzkron, Yehuda Lanzkron, Shoshana Rotenberg, and Merav Shamir; and plaintiff Eliran Rozenberg, the son of plaintiff Michal Zayat Rosenberg and the brother of plaintiffs Hila Zayat, Shiran Zayat, Noam Zayat, Noga Zayat, and Zeev Zayat. Four people were wounded, including plaintiffs Rafael Sommer and Hannanel Touito. On May 29, 2001, the suicide bomber’s father received a $10,000 check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 205). • On May 18, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives at a mall in Netanya, killing five people. The dead included plaintiff Vladislav Sorokin, the husband of Olesya Sorokin and the father of Alexander Sorokin, both of whom were injured. Eighty-six people were wounded, including the Sorokins; plaintiffs Hila Chen, Moran Rokaeh, and Liat Rokach, the daughters of plaintiffs Joseph Rokach and Yaffa Rokach; plaintiff Dikla Hadad; plaintiff Ina Segal, the mother of plaintiffs Diana, Christina, and Sharon Segal; plaintiff Ortal Alevi, the daughter of plaintiff Mazal Alevi; plaintiff Lillian Peretz; plaintiff Solange Azran; plaintiff Maxim Azulai; plaintiff Eli Sarusi; plaintiff Meital Maymony; and plaintiff Yuri Abramov. A woman the plaintiffs allege to be the suicide bomber’s mother received a $10,000 check on behalf of Hussein on May 29, 2001 and a $5,000 check on behalf of Hussein on June 19, 2001. (Id., ¶ 204). • On May 25, 2001, two PIJ suicide bombers drove a car rigged with explosives into a bus in Hadera. The explosion wounded 65 people, including plaintiff Carmela Litmanovie and plaintiffs Shay Amar, Tzachi Amar, and Shir Amar, the children of plaintiffs Negba Amar and Binyamin Amar. On June 18, 2001, one bomber’s father and a woman alleged to be the other bomber’s mother each received a $15,000 check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 203). • On June 1, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives at the entrance to a club in Tel Aviv. The attack killed 22 people and wounded 83 others. Many of the victims were the teenage children of Russian immigrants. Among those killed was plaintiff Simona Rudin, the daughter of plaintiffs Mark Rudin and Irina Tal. The 83 wounded included plaintiff Margarita Abramaov; plaintiff Katerina Peline, the daughter of plaintiffs Victor Peline and Galina Peline; plaintiff Alexandra Plotkin; and plaintiff Andrei Tailakov. The plaintiffs allege that the suicide bomber’s family “received a payment from Saddam Hussein.” (Id., ¶ 202). • On July 16, 2001, a PIJ suicide bomber detonated explosives at a bus stop in Binyamina, killing two people and wounding 11, including plaintiff Ben Tzion Avdaev, the son of plaintiffs Ovadia Avdaev and Avigail Avdaev. The suicide bomber’s father received a $15,000 check on behalf of Hussein on August 20, 2001. (Id., ¶ 201). • On August 9, 2001, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives at a restaurant in Jerusalem, killing 15 people and wounding 110, including plaintiffs Anat Amar, David Michael Amar, Eliad Amar, Chagai Amar, Noam Amar, and Gafnit Amar. On August 27, 2001, the suicide bomber’s father received a $15,000 check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 200). • On October 4, 2001, a terrorist claimed as a member by both Hamas and the AAMB opened fire at a bus station in Afula. He killed three people, including plaintiff Haim Ben Ezra, the husband of plaintiff Sol Ben Ezra and the father of plaintiffs Lea Ben Ezra, Yossef Ben Ezra, Mordechi Ben Ezra, and Amram Ben Ezra. On November 3, 2001, a woman who the plaintiffs allege was the terrorist’s mother received a $15,000 check on behalf of Hussein. {Id., ¶ 199). • On November 4, 2001, a PIJ terrorist opened fire with automatic weapons in a bus in Jerusalem. He killed two people, including plaintiff Menashe Regev, the son of plaintiff Gidon Regev. Forty people were injured, including plaintiffs Odelia Abecassis, Tzuria Amosi, Oshra Avitzur, Tzvi Yehuda Goldenberg, Miriam Izhaki, Naomi Kalfa, Ricky Klein-man, Yissachar Zvi Lebowitz, Tamar Levenson, Shifra Markowitz, Sarah Mordecai, Tamar Oziel, Moría Rabí, Ora Rubinoff, and Gila Schnall. The terrorist’s mother received a payment on behalf of Saddam Hussein. {Id., ¶ 198). • On November 27, 2001, a PIJ terrorist and an AAMB terrorist armed with assault weapons opened fire at the Afula bus station. Two people were killed and 50 were injured, including plaintiff Dimitry Gantovnik, the son of plaintiff Faina Gantovnik; plaintiff Shula Gaon; plaintiff Ezra Sharabi; and plaintiff Shoshana Simon. The families of both terrorists received payments on behalf of Hussein. {Id., ¶ 197). • On December 1, 2001, two Hamas suicide bombers detonated explosives on their persons and rigged to a car on Ben Yehudah Street in Jerusalem. Eleven were killed, including plaintiff Yossi Elezra, the son of plaintiffs Mordechai Elezra and Yael Elezra and the brother of plaintiffs Shirly Elezra and Omer Elezra; and plaintiff Golan Turgeman, the son of plaintiff Edna Turgeman and the brother of plaintiffs Ester Ifat Sultan, Amira Turgeman, Moshe Turgeman, Avi Turgeman, and Orly Turgeman Goldshmit. The attack wounded 170, including plaintiff Efraim Aroas, the son of plaintiffs Izak and Yaffa Aroas; plaintiff Baruch Yehuda Ziv Brill; plaintiff Omer Eliav; plaintiff Ortal Ganon, the daughter of plaintiff Robert Ganon; plaintiff Sharon Gili Hefetz; plaintiff Adi Hoja, the daughter of plaintiff Malka Nisim; plaintiff Hila Levi, the daughter of plaintiffs Shimon Levi and Aviva Levi; plaintiff Dana Mizrachi; plaintiff Lia Lihi Mizrachi; plaintiff Michael Ysaia; and plaintiff Avi Zino, the son of plaintiff Viki Zino. On January 22, 2002, the father of one attacker and the mother of the other each received a $15,000 check on behalf of Hussein. {Id., ¶ 196). • On March 2, 2002, an AAMB suicide bomber detonated explosives near a yeshiva, or religious school, in Jerusalem where people were gathered for a bar mitzvah celebration. Four people were killed and fifty-seven injured, including plaintiff Yehiel Bornstein. On June 14, 2002, the bomber’s father received a payment on behalf of Hussein. {Id., ¶ 195). • On March 5, 2002, a PIJ suicide bomber detonated explosives on a bus in Afula, killing one person and injuring 11, including plaintiff David Elisha-Sherf. On May 6, 2002, the bomber’s mother received a check on behalf of Hussein. {Id., ¶ 194). • On March 9, 2002, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives at a café in Jerusalem. Eleven people were killed, including plaintiff Nir Borocov, the son of plaintiffs Mordechai Borocov and Kochava Borocov and the brother of plaintiffs Iris Shfaim, Yochevet Borocov, Dorit Yadid Borocov, and Doron Borocov. Fifty-eight people were wounded, including plaintiff Maimón Amsalem; plaintiff Yoseff Cohen; plaintiff Asael Fridman; plaintiff Roy Gordon; plaintiff Assaf Myara, the son of Lisa Myara; and plaintiff Sinai Zaken. On June 23, 2002, the suicide bomber’s mother received a $25,000 check on behalf of Hussein. {Id., ¶ 193). • On March 20, 2002 a PIJ suicide bomber detonated explosives on a bus near Afula, killing seven people, including plaintiff Meir Fahima, the son of plaintiffs Shalom Fahima and Kokhava Fahima, the brother of plaintiffs Rachel Assraf, Ben-Israel Fahima, Gabi Fahima, Mazal Fahima, and Daniel Navon Fahima, the husband of plaintiff Ester Fahima, and the father of plaintiffs Lidor Fahima, Natali Fahima, and Ortal Fahima. The attack also injured thirty people, including plaintiff Yuis Zeid. On May 6, 2002, the suicide bomber’s father received a check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 192). • On March 31, 2002, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated explosives at a restaurant in Haifa, killing fifteen people and injuring over forty others, including plaintiffs Paul Drimmer, Rahel Drimmer, and Baruch Naim, the relatives of plaintiffs Hani Drimmer and Pnina Drimmer. On May 6, 2002, the suicide bomber’s father received a check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 191). • On April 10, 2002, a PIJ suicide bomber detonated explosives on a bus traveling from Haifa to Jerusalem. Seven people died, including plaintiff Zeev Hanik, the son of plaintiff Boris Hanik and the brother of plaintiffs Illana Vaknin and Lior Hanik. Twenty-two others were injured. On May 6, 2002, the bomber’s father received a check on behalf of Hussein. (Id., ¶ 190). • On April 12, 2002, an AAMB suicide bomber detonated explosives at a bus stop outside of the Mahane Yehuda open-air market in Jerusalem. Six peopie were killed and another 104 were injured, including plaintiffs Zila Cohen, Yaakov Shfaym, Naomi Shfaym, Rahmim Hason, and Kineret Rahamim. On June 14, 2002, the suicide bomber’s father received a payment from Hussein. (Id., ¶ 189). In this suit, the plaintiffs do not name Hussein, Iraq, the terrorist organizations, or the terrorists responsible for these attacks. The defendants are El Paso, Wyatt, the NuCoastal Companies, Chalmers, and the Bayoil Companies. Money allegedly links the bombings and these defendants. The plaintiffs allege that Hussein used money obtained from the defendants, either directly or through intermediaries, in violation of the OFP’s restrictions, to fund terrorism in Israel primarily by paying “rewards” to the families of the terrorists who killed and injured the plaintiffs and their family members. The first set of claims is advanced by the plaintiffs who are not American citizens or nationals. They invoke this court’s jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which allows aliens to bring claims in a district court for torts committed “in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” These plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the law of nations, now known as “customary international law,” by financing terrorism and by aiding and abetting and conspiring to commit acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. The plaintiffs who are United States nationals or citizens injured by the attacks (or their estates, survivors, or heirs) bring claims under the Antiterrorism Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, for providing material support to terrorist organizations and engaging in illegal business dealings with Iraq. All the plaintiffs allege that the defendants aided and abetted and conspired to commit violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub.L. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat. 73, reprinted as a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350. All plaintiffs also assert that the defendants are liable for “assisting and conspiring in the intentional injury of others by a third party.” The complaint asserts two final counts, one for successor liability against El Paso (for Coastal’s liability) and the other for alter ego liability against the NuCoastal Companies (for Wyatt’s and Coastal’s liabilities). This suit was filed on January 2, 2009 in the District Court for the District of Columbia. (Docket Entry No. 3). The defendants’ motion to transfer venue was granted and the case transferred to this court on December 3, 2009. (Docket Entry No. 60). This court held a hearing on January 21, 2010, during which the parties presented arguments on the pending motions to dismiss. All the defendants have moved to dismiss on two grounds. The first is that the defendants’ actions are too attenuated from the plaintiffs’ injuries to permit standing under Article III. The second is that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on the merits of any of their causes of action. Both grounds are addressed for each defendant. II. Standing to Sue A. The Legal Standard Article III restricts the federal judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. Ill, § 2. The standing doctrine ensures that courts do not step outside this authority so that the separation of powers is maintained. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Under Article III, “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. These elements are “(1) an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury.” Croft v. Governor of Texas, 562 F.3d 735, 745 (5th Cir.2009) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). As “the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” the plaintiffs “bear[ ] the burden of establishing these elements.” Lurjan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. They must meet this burden “ ‘with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation,’ ” which means that “on a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege facts that give rise to a plausible claim of [] standing.” Cornerstone Christian Schools v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 133-34 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130). The standard of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) depends on whether the motion is based on a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.2000). A facial challenge asserts that a court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims on their face. A factual challenge attacks the existence of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction apart from the pleadings. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977). When considering a factual challenge, “no presumption of] truthfulness attaches to a plaintiffs allegations.” Martinez v. U.S. Post Office, 875 F.Supp. 1067, 1070 (D.N.J.1995) (citing See Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). Whether the challenge is facial or factual, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. The dispute in this case centers on the second element of constitutional standing, causation. To satisfy this requirement, the plaintiffs must show that their injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotations and alterations removed). An injury is generally insufficient to “confer standing when the injury’s existence depends on the decisions of third parties not before the court.” Little v. KPMG LLP, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir.2009) (citing, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). That does not mean, however, that the defendant’s challenged action must be “the very last step in the chain of causation.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). An injury may, for example, be fairly traceable to the defendant if the injury was “produced by determinate or coercive effect [of the defendant’s challenged action] upon the action of someone else.” Id. at 169,117 S.Ct. 1154. B. Analysis: Standing to Assert the Non-ATA Claims The “causal connection” element of standing is analyzed first for the claims other than those brought under the Anti-terrorism Act, and second for the claims under that Act. Only United States nationals injured by terrorist activities—and their estates, survivors, and heirs—can bring ATA claims. 1. El Paso El Paso argues that the plaintiffs’ injuries are not fairly traceable to its purchases of Iraqi oil because the injuries resulted from the independent acts of third parties not before the court. Those third parties include the direct purchasers that sold the Iraqi oil to El Paso (and paid the illegal kickbacks placed in the Jordanian bank accounts); Hussein; the terrorist organizations; and the terrorists themselves. (Docket Entry Nos. 26 at 16-20; 47 at 12-15). The plaintiffs respond that, because they have alleged that El Paso is an accessory rather than a direct tortfeasor, they need not allege that El Paso’s acts were a “but for” cause of their injuries. Instead, they need only allege that El Paso provided substantial assistance to the direct tortfeasors, the terrorists. (Docket Entry No. 42 at 33-35). The plaintiffs rely heavily on Mastafa v. Australian Wheat Bd. Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 7955(GEL), 2008 WL 4378443 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008), another case involving the OFP. In Mastafa, the plaintiffs were Iraqi citizens whose family members had been tortured or killed by Hussein’s government. The plaintiffs alleged that the Australian Wheat Board (“AWB”), a major supplier of wheat purchased for Iraq with the oil-sales revenue in the OFP escrow account, paid kickbacks to Hussein as part of the wheat transactions. The plaintiffs alleged that the AWB and BNP, the bank the U.N. retained to administer the OFP account, had aided and abetted the Hussein government in causing the plaintiffs’ injuries “by providing substantial assistance through the form of kickbacks and/or financial assistance.” Id. at *2 (quotations and alterations removed). The court held this facially sufficient for Article III standing. The Mastafa court based its decision on the nature of aiding and abetting liability. “If plaintiffs aided and abetted the Hussein regime in the commission of human rights abuses that injured plaintiffs, then defendants are responsible for those acts, not because they caused them, but because the law ‘hold[s] the person who aids and abets liable for the tort itself.’ ” Id. (quoting Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir.2006) (alteration in original)). “The injuries resulting from the Hussein regime’s acts are thus ‘fairly traceable’ to any who aided and abetted their commission.” Id. The court distinguished prior cases finding no standing for the injuries from “independent acts of third parties” on the ground that “the acts of the Hussein regime are not ‘independent’ of steps taken to aid and abet those acts.” Id. While “but for” causation might be required when there are allegations of direct liability, such a causation standard in aiding and abetting cases would “significantly undermine aiding and abetting liability in the federal courts, since it is often the case that an accessorial defendant is not the ‘but for’ cause of the principal tortfeasor’s tortious acts.” Id. at *3. El Paso cites a later case from the same district, Rothstein v. UBS AG, 647 F.Supp.2d 292 (S.D.N.Y.2009), reaching a different result. In Rothstein, victims and families of victims of Hamasand Hezbollah-sponsored suicide bombings in Israel sued UBS, a bank, for aiding and abetting the terrorist attacks. The plaintiffs alleged that UBS had transferred money to Iran’s government in violation of a U.S. regulation against doing so, for which UBS had paid a $100 million civil penalty. The plaintiffs alleged that: Iran was a known sponsor of Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah; these organizations required cash to operate; “UBS’s involvement in banknote transactions with Iranian counterparties had the effect of providing U.S. cash dollars to the Iranian government”; and Iran supplied this cash to the terrorist organizations, which used it to carry out the attacks. Id. at 293-94. The court concluded that “[tjhis extended chain of inferences” was “far too attenuated to provide plaintiffs with sufficient standing to bring this action under federal law.” Id. at 294. The plaintiffs’ allegations did not meet the causation element of standing. “Among many other deficiencies in the causal chain,” the complaint did “not allege that UBS is a primary or even relatively significant source of U.S. banknotes for the Iranian government,” “cash dollars have multiple legitimate uses besides funding terrorism,” and there were “no specific allegations showing that the terrorist groups here in question raise their funds from monies transferred from Iran.” Id. As a result, “the plaintiffs’ allegations [were] far too speculative to provide the plausible indication of proximate causation necessary to establish plaintiffs’ standing.” Id. Finally, the court distinguished the alleged facts in Rothstein from cases in which the allegations are of “direct involvement between the defendant banks and the terrorist organizations or ‘fronts’ those organizations directly controlled.” Id. The Rothstein plaintiffs did not allege a direct relationship between UBS and terrorist organizations that carried out bombings; the relationship was between UBS and the government of Iran, which supplied the cash to the terrorists. Id. Rothstein did not cite Mastafa, but in that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the Hussein government injured them directly, not by funneling money to a terrorist organization. The Mastafa plaintiffs alleged that the AWB had a direct relationship with the Hussein government, which arranged to purchase wheat from the AWB and instructed it to pay kickbacks. In Rothstein, the plaintiffs alleged that UBS provided cash to Iran, but they did not allege that Iran carried out the terrorist attacks. Instead, they alleged that Iran supplied terrorist organizations with money. As to AWB, the cases are clearly distinguishable. Mastafa’s holding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue BNP, the bank managing the escrow account, is harder to reconcile with Rothstein. The Mastafa plaintiffs alleged that BNP aided and abetted the terrorism by disbursing OFP funds to AWB, some of which AWB used to pay the kickbacks to Iraq. Although the plaintiffs apparently alleged that AWB paid some of the kickbacks to BNP, which then paid the Hussein regime, the court found, in analyzing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, that those general allegations were superceded by more specific allegations that the AWB paid the kickbacks directly to the Hussein regime without BNP’s involvement. See Mastafa, No. 07 Civ. 7955(GEL), 2008 WL 4378443, at *4 & n. 5. The presence of even these general allegations of BNP’s involvement in the kickback scheme sets Mastafa apart from Rothstein. In Rothstein, the plaintiffs alleged that Iran was the intermediary between UBS and the terrorist organizations. Moreover, there were allegations in Mastafa of a direct banking relationship between BNP and the Hussein government that committed the atrocities; in Rothstein, UBS’s relationship was with Iran, not with Hamas and Hezbollah, the organizations responsible for the attacks. In responding to the other defendants’ motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs cited to a decision issued in the Eastern District of New York a month after Rothstein. In that case, Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F.Supp.2d 410 (2009), the plaintiffs, U.S.Israeli joint citizens, were the widow and children of a man killed by a Hamas suicide bomber on a Jerusalem bus in 2004. They sued UBS for providing banking services to a group called ASP, allegedly a member of the Union of Good. This group of “charities” was the principal source for funds Hamas used to finance terrorist activities. ASP had been designated a terrorist group by the United States government. The plaintiffs alleged that UBS nonetheless continued to provide banking services to ASP, including making three alleged money transfers to the Tulkarem Zakat Committee, a West Bank organization allegedly controlled by Hamas and designated as an “unlawful organization” by the Israeli government. Id. at 415-16. UBS moved to dismiss on standing grounds, arguing that the plaintiffs’ injuries were not fairly traceable to the bank’s actions. The court disagreed. It held that the plaintiffs had “alleged a coherent and plausible causal nexus linking UBS’s alleged wire transfers for ASP to the bombing of Bus 19.” The plaintiffs alleged that UBS provided a bank account for ASP and knowingly transferred money to Hamascontrolled entities, that “Hamas’s terrorist activities are fueled by the funds the flow into the organization,” and that Hamas was responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. at 416-18. The court rejected UBS’s argument that there was no standing because the plaintiffs had not shown “but for” causation, noting that such a causation requirement would exceed the showing required on the merits of an aiding and abetting claim and would deprive federal courts of jurisdiction whenever “several acts each independently would have sufficed to cause the harm.” Id. at 418. It was sufficient for the plaintiffs to “allege facts ‘from which it could be reasonably inferred that, absent Defendant’s unlawful acts, there is a substantial probability’ that plaintiffs wouldn’t have suffered harm,” Id. (quoting Greenberg v. Bush, 150 F.Supp.2d 447, 455 (E.D.N.Y.2001)). In other words, it was sufficient to allege facts “from which it may be inferred that cessation of the defendant’s allegedly illegal activity would ‘make an appreciable difference’ in bringing about the harm.” Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). The court found that this standard was met because the plaintiffs had alleged facts showing that ASP was “ ‘a pivotal part of Hamas’s fund-raising structure and a significant source of Hamas’s financing, and that terrorist activity, including the act that killed Stuart Scott Goldberg, depends on financing of a type similar to the three monetary transfers from ASP to the Tulkarem Zakar Committee, allegedly effected by UBS.” Id. at 418-19 (internal citations omitted). The allegations against El Paso in this case are significantly more attenuated than those against any defendant in Goldberg, Rothstein, or Mastafa. In fourteen of the sixteen transactions apparently at issue, El Paso bought Iraqi oil from third parties. In the fifteenth transaction, El Paso assumed a contract under which Coastal had purchased Iraqi oil from a third-party direct purchaser. In all fifteen transactions, these third parties allegedly paid kickbacks to Hussein, which he used to support terrorist activities in Israel primarily by making reward payments to suicide bombers’ families. These third-party sellers and the Hussein government stood between El Paso and the terrorists. In the remaining alleged transaction, El Paso assumed a contract under which Coastal bought oil directly from the Iraqi government, for which Wyatt allegedly paid a kickback. There is no allegation that El Paso reimbursed Wyatt for the kickbacks. Again, the Hussein regime stood between these defendants and the terrorist organizations. The lack of any allegation of a direct connection between El Paso and the terrorist organizations (or the terrorists’ families receiving the payments) distinguishes this case from Mastafa, in which the defendants themselves paid Hussein and Hussein’s operatives carried out the attacks on Iraqi citizens, and from Goldberg, in which UBS itself paid a Ha-mas entity and Hamas carried out the attacks. The allegations in this case are much closer to the allegations in Rothstein that UBS provided cash to Iran, which then paid cash to Hamas and Hezbollah. In that case, it was not enough to allege that the defendants’ business dealings generally increased funds available to Iran. Here, it is similarly not enough to allege that the defendant’s business dealings increased funds available to the Hussein regime and that Hussein paid money to reward terrorist acts. The insufficiency is even more acute when there is no allegation that the defendant was a substantial source of money for the Hussein regime. And, as to fifteen of the sixteen transactions, the third-party seller added an additional layer was not present in Rothstein, in which the court nonetheless found standing. The clearest distinction between this case and the New York cases is at the other end of the alleged causation chain. In Mastafa, the plaintiffs alleged that Hussein’s government directly carried out the atrocities on their family members. In Goldberg, the plaintiffs alleged that UBS transferred funds to an organization controlled by Hamas and that Hamas used the funds to carry out the attack that killed the plaintiffs’ husband and father. In Rothstein (in which the court found no standing), the plaintiffs alleged that Iran gave cash to Hamas and Hezbollah, which carried out attacks on the plaintiffs’ family members. Here, the primary allegation is that the Hussein government gave money to the families of suicide bombers who had previously carried out attacks to provide an incentive for prospective suicide bombers to carry out future attacks. This is the type of situation in which the Supreme Court has found that a plaintiffs injury is attributable to the independent acts of third parties. In Allen, 468 U.S. at 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315 (1984), for example, parents of black public school students sued the Treasury Secretary and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. They alleged that the IRS was failing to enforce a statutory denial of tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated on the basis of race. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had suffered an injury-in-fact because the availability of segregated public schools kept white students out of public schools and led to all-black public schools, depriving the black students of equal educational opportunities. Id. at 756-57, 104 S.Ct. 3315. The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. Racial segregation in public schools was not fairly traceable to IRS policy. Id. at 757-59, 104 S.Ct. 3315. First, the Court noted that there was no allegation that the number of racially discriminatory private schools in the plaintiffs’ communities receiving tax exemptions was sufficiently high that withdrawing the exemptions would change meaningfully the racial makeup of the public schools. More importantly, it was entirely speculative “whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its policies” and “just as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a private school would decide to transfer the child to public school” once the school lost tax-exempt status. Id. at 758, 104 S.Ct. 3315. Even in the absence of the IRS policy, what ultimately would matter would be the actions of the private schools and white parents. Neither the schools nor the parents which were parties to the suit. See id. The Supreme Court had reached a similar result several years earlier in Simon, 426 U.S. at 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, another case in which the plaintiffs challenged an IRS policy. The plaintiffs alleged that the Treasury Secretary and IRS commissioner had violated their statutory rights by reducing the amount of free medical care hospitals were required to offer to maintain favorable tax status. Id. at 28-32, 96 S.Ct. 1917. Assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiffs had been injured by the denial of free medical care, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show causation. Id. at 40-41, 96 S.Ct. 1917. The plaintiffs had alleged only that the IRS’s decision “had ‘encouraged’ hospitals to deny services to indigents.” Id. at 42, 96 S.Ct. 1917. According to the Court, it was “purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly [could] be traced to [the IRS’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead resulted] from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.” Id. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 1917. Two earlier cases are similar. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973), the Court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a Texas state court’s interpretation of a child support statute as applying only to fathers of marital children. The plaintiff, who was the mother of a nonmarital child, sought an injunction ordering the State to enforce the statute against her child’s father. The Supreme Court held that, although the plaintiff had alleged an injury, she had “made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State’s criminal laws.” Id. at 618-19, 93 S.Ct. 1146. The relationship between the State’s decision not to prosecute and the father’s decision not to pay could “at best, be termed only speculative.” Id. at 618, 93 S.Ct. 1146. While the Linda R.S. Court directly addressed redressability and couched its decision in the special context of State enforcement of criminal laws, its analysis is consistent with Allen and Simon. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), the Court held that low-income plaintiffs lacked standing to raise an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a town zoning ordinance restricting the availability of low-income housing. The plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the ordinance caused their inability to obtain affordable housing in the town because they had failed to “allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the respondents’ restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they would have been able to purchase or lease in [the town].” Id. at 504, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Whether the plaintiffs could move into the town depended on third parties building housing (only two had tried) and on the plaintiffs’ ability to afford such housing if it were built. The Court found nothing in the record showing that any such housing projects would have met the plaintiffs’ needs at prices they could have afforded. Id. at 505-07, 95 S.Ct. 2197. This made the plaintiffs’ claims too speculative for standing. Rather than alleging concrete effects of the zoning ordinance, the plaintiffs “rel[ied] on little more than the remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that their situation might have been better had [the town government] acted otherwise.” Id. at 507, 95 S.Ct. 2197. The plaintiffs here allege that the Hussein government caused their injuries by making payments to suicide bombers’ families, which encouraged future suicide bombings. It is speculative whether the bombings that injured the plaintiffs and their family members are fairly traceable to Hussein’s prior payments to families of other suicide bombers. It was the suicide bombers and the terrorist organizations that decided to carry out the specific attacks, not the Hussein government, not the third party that bought Iraqi oil, and not El Paso. The suicide bombers were independent of El Paso. The injuries caused by these bombers are not fairly traceable to El Paso. This conclusion triggers the concerns expressed in Mastafa about aiding and abetting liability. As the court in Mastafa stated, a defendant is not independent of the principal tortfeasor whom it aids and abets. See Mastafa, No. 07 Civ. 7955(GEL), 2008 WL 4378443, at *2-3. This point is both a logical and important caveat to the “independent third party” rule and it changed the outcome of the standing analysis in Mastafa. But the caveat has its own limits. An injury is not always “fairly traceable” to any party accused of “aiding and abetting” a principal tortfeasor, no matter how remote that party’s position on the causal chain. If the Mastafa plaintiffs had also alleged that individual Australian wheat farmers had aided and abetted Hussein’s attacks on the plaintiffs by supplying the AWB with wheat, or if they had alleged that Australian fertilizer manufacturers, or the Australian irrigation company, or individual wheat consumers had aided and abetted Hussein, it would have been difficult to conclude that the plaintiffs injuries were fairly traceable to these defendants’ acts. Again, the facts here are distinguishable from Mastafa. The plaintiffs here have not alleged a direct relationship between El Paso and the principal tortfeasors, the suicide bombers. There were independent third parties between Iraq and the plaintiffs (and, in 15 of the 16 alleged transactions, between El Paso and Iraq as well). Even if El Paso was not independent of Hussein because of the aiding and abetting allegations, it was the third-party oil sellers’ decision to mark up the oil price to pay the kickbacks and it was the terrorists’ decisions to carry out the attacks. What these actors would have done without El Paso’s involvement is speculative. The causation prong of the standing test is not met. El Paso’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing is granted on the non-ATA claims. 2. Wyatt and NuCoastal Standing is a closer question for Wyatt and NuCoastal because the plaintiffs allege that they purchased oil directly from Iraq and paid kickbacks in exchange for receiving oil allocations. The plaintiffs also allege that Wyatt was instrumental in helping Hussein manipulate the OFP so that he could extract kickbacks. The plaintiffs also allege that Wyatt made other illegal payments to Hussein and that he supplied Hussein with electronic equipment while the UN sanctions were in place in the early- to mid-1990s. While these allegations make the claims against Wyatt and NuCoastal less attenuated than those against El Paso, they nonetheless are insufficient for standing. In Mastafa> the plaintiffs alleged that Hussein carried out the terrorist attacks. Such allegations are not present here. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the Hussein government made payments to reward the families of terrorists who committed attacks and gave general financial and logistical support to the Palestinian terrorist organizations to which these terrorists belonged. The gap between the financial payments by Hussein and the plaintiffs’ injuries is too great, and the inferences too speculative, for standing. Just as the schools in Allen were responsible for their own racially discriminatory policies and the hospitals in Simon were responsible for their decisions to deny free care, the AAMB, Hamas, PIJ, and the individual terrorists made the ultimate decisions to carry out the attacks. Hussein made the payments only after they did so. As in Rothstein, there is no factual allegation that the cash Wyatt and Nu-Coastal illegally gave Hussein was in turn paid to the terrorists’ families. The cash paid in kickbacks could have had multiple uses, even if illegal, other than funding the attacks on the plaintiffs. Indeed, o