Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REED O’CONNOR, District Judge. Defendants Integrated Coast Guard Systems LLC (“ICGS”) and Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed”), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6), have each filed a motion to dismiss Relator Michael J. DeKort’s Fifth Amended Complaint, arguing that Relator has failed to plead a qui tam cause of action under § 3729(a) of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq. Defendant Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., formerly Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. (“Northrop Grumman”), has moved to dismiss Relator’s Fifth Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FCA’s public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), or, in the alternative, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6). On February 9, 2010, the Court converted Northrop Grumman’s Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge into a motion for summary judgment, and allowed further briefing and evidentiary submissions. (Doc. # 146). All motions are ripe for adjudication. Having considered the pleadings, motions, responses, replies, appendices thereto and applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court: denies in part and grants in part Defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Amended Complaint (doc. # 117); denies in part and grants in part Defendant Integrated Coast Guard Systems LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint (doc. # 114); denies Northrop Grumman’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), since converted to a motion for summary judgment (doc. # 116); and grants in part and denies in part Northrop Grumman’s alternative Motion to Dismiss under Rule 9(b) and 12(b)(6). I. Lockheed’s and ICGS’s Motions to Dismiss A. Relator’s Factual Allegations and Procedural History For purposes of deciding the pending motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of Relator Michael J. DeKort’s (“Dekort’s”) Fifth Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), and views all facts in the light most favorable to DeKort. See Sonnier v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir.2007). The background facts recounted below are therefore based on the well-pleaded factual allegations of De-Kort’s Complaint. The Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program and the Deepwater Contract Beginning in the late 1990s, the United States Coast Guard (“Coast Guard”) began evaluating ways to modernize or replace its fleet of ships, planes and helicopters, an effort which became known as the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System Program (“Deepwater”). (Compl., Exs. A, K and L). This modernization effort included conversion of forty-nine 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats. (Id.) In June 2002, following a lengthy proposal evaluation period, the Coast Guard awarded the Integrated Deepwater System Contract (“Deepwater Contract”) to ICGS, a limited liability company created under Delaware law. (Id. ¶¶8, 10). Pursuant to the Deepwater Contract, ICGS was to design, construct, deploy, support and integrate Deepwater assets to meet Coast Guard requirements. (Id., Ex. L at 3). Defendants Lockheed and Northrop Grumman are members of ICGS, as well as first-tier subcontractors to ICGS on Deepwater, responsible for different portions of the Deepwater program work. (Id. ¶ 10). Lockheed was responsible for modernizing the patrol boats’ “Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance” (“C4ISR”) systems. (Id., Ex. K at 1). Northrop Grumman, through its subcontractor Bollinger Shipyards, was primarily responsible for ship design, including propeller shaft alignment and hull construction necessary to convert the 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats. (Id. ¶¶ 126-137, and Ex. K at 1). Relator DeKort’s Involvement with Deepwater From July 2003 to February 2004, Lockheed employed DeKort as the Deepwater Lead Systems Engineer for the conversion of 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot patrol boats. (Id. ¶27). DeKort is a C4ISR systems expert, and although he wanted to remain on the Deepwater program, Lockheed removed him as Lead Systems Engineer in February 2004 “because of apparent friction arising from his complaints to his direct management about ICGS’s concealed defects and its improper and shoddy work.” (Id.). Since his termination, DeKort has been “seeking a remedy for ICGS’s corruption on the Integrated Deep-water System contract.” (Id.). During prior employment with Lockheed in or around 2001, DeKort was a member of ICGS’s proposal-planning group for the Deepwater Contract. {Id. ¶ 154). In proposal-planning meetings, ICGS, primarily through Lockheed, developed a strategy of persuading the Coast Guard to delete its standard “will” or “shall” language from much of the requirements of the Deepwater Contract. ICGS’s and Lockheed’s expressed intention was to persuade the Coast Guard to replace “requirements” language with “guidance” language, allowing the ICGS joint venture nearly unlimited latitude in developing the Deepwater “system of systems.” {Id.). “ICGS, by and through Lockheed, planned to promise the Coast Guard that ICGS, through both Lockheed and Northrop, would deliver superior design and products if the Coast Guard would ‘untie the contractors hands’ from inflexible requirements.” {Id.). In the summer of 2003, in his role as Lockheed’s Deepwater Lead Systems Engineer, DeKort “learned that ICGS, primarily through Lockheed, had succeeded with its ‘guidance’ pitch; the contractual project requirements included guidance language rather than firm ‘shall’ or ‘will’ requirements.” {Id. ¶ 155). Delivery of Flawed and Non-Compliant 123-Foot Patrol Boats to Coast Guard Between March 1, 2004 and January 13, 2006, ICGS delivered eight 123-foot patrol boats to the Coast Guard, specifically: the Matagorda; the Vashon; the Metompkin; the Padre; the Attu; the Nunivak; the Monhegan; and the Manitou. {Id., Exs. C-J). The 123-foot patrol boats ICGS delivered to the Coast Guard had numerous flaws relating to both the C4ISR systems, and the hull, mechanical and electrical (“HM & E”) work. With regard to the C4ISR systems, the following flaws rendered the eight vessels non-compliant: (1) externally mounted equipment was not compliant with military standards (MIL-STD-1399C) or Section 3 of the Performance Specifications for 123-foot patrol boats, resulting in equipment that would not survive the environmental requirements, and which could thereby render the vessel unable to communicate or navigate; (2) the FLIR video cable, required to be compliant with Section 3 of the Performance Specifications pertaining to the infrared sensory capabilities of the 123-foot patrol boats, was the incorrect type and not weatherproofed, which could lead to loss of system video and thereby render the navigation system inoperable; (3) the labeling of the cables on the vessels was not compliant with military specifications pertaining to the marking and designating of electrical equipment, cables and systems (namely, 1995 GEN SPEC 305 and 1995 GEN SPEC 400d), nor was the labeling compliant with Section 3 of the Performance Specifications; (4) the video/camera surveillance system did not meet the patrol boats’ physical security requirements, leaving all eight 123-foot patrol boats with blind spots directly over the pilot house and bridge windows, which could result in loss of life and loss of the vessel; (5) communications systems failed to meet requirements for both secure voice systems (SIPRNET, the government-wide secret network) and security parameters (TEMPEST), resulting in corrupted communications systems exposed to unwanted eavesdropping on all governmental organizations; and (6) low smoke cable was not used, thereby endangering the crew’s safety in the event of a fire. {Id. ¶¶ 29-125). With regard to the hull, mechanical and electrical work performed by Northrop Grumman through its subcontractor Bollinger Shipyards, due to overall design flaws and poor workmanship, the hulls were buckling causing, among other problems, shaft misalignment. (Id. ¶¶ 126-137). Even though Defendants were aware of the flaws, Defendants continued to invoice for the work completed and certified that the delivered assets met all requirements. ICGS certified and signed conformance documents falsely representing that all eight of the 123-foot patrol boats met contractual requirements. More specifically, with regard to the lead vessel, the Matagorda, on or about March 1, 2004, ICGS submitted to the Coast Guard a Certificate of Compliance (sometimes referred to as, “COC”), signed on behalf of ICGS by or for its Domain Program Manager, Quality Assurance Manager, and Director of Contracts, which provided: Description: This [Delivery Task Order] provides the detailed design and construction for major modification of the 110-foot patrol boat Matagorda, including completion of all design, analyses, construction, and testing to deploy the lead vessel of the proposed 123-Ft Cutter Class, and to demonstrate compliance requirements. Included in the modifications was an extensive ultrasonic survey of the hull ... resulting in the replacement of over 800 square feet of wasted hull plate; a new deckhouse providing an enlarged, 360-degree bridge and berthing for a dual-gender crew; a stern extension with a stern ramp and door for launch and recovery of the Short-Range Prosecutor; and upgraded C4ISR suite to ensure interoperability with the IDS; and all related logistics and training. I certify that on 1 March 2004, the ICGS Deepwater Program furnished the supplies and/or services called for in accordance with all applicable requirements. I further certify that the supplies and/or services are of the quality specified and conform in all respects with the contract requirements, including specifications, drawings, preservation, packaging, packing, marking requirements, and physical item identification, and are in the quantity shown on the attached acceptance document. (Id., Ex. D at 2). ICGS submitted nearly identical Certificates of Compliance with: the March 9, 2004 delivery of the Yashon (id., Ex. C at 2); the May 13, 2004 delivery of the Metompkin (id., Ex. E at 2); the June 24, 2004 delivery of the Padre (id., Ex. F at 2); the August 2, 2004 delivery of the Attu (id., Ex. G at 2); the February 14, 2005 delivery of the Nunivak (id., Ex, H at 2); the October 3, 2005 delivery of the Monhegan (id., Ex, I at 2); and the January 13, 2006 delivery of the Manitou (id., Ex, J at 2). In addition to a Certificate of Compliance, each delivery was accompanied by a “Material Inspections and Receiving Report,” also knows as a “DD Form 250” (“DD-250”), signed by the Coast Guard’s contracting officer. (Id., Exs. C-J) (showing Contracting Officer’s signature next to attestation that “[quantities shown ... were received in apparent good condition except as noted”); (id., Exs. H-J) (showing additional government signature next to attestation that “acceptance of listed items has been made by me or under my supervision and they conform to contract, except as noted herein or on supporting documents.”). Further, ICGS, primarily through Lockheed, was contractually required to enter certain information into an Action Item Database System. (Id. ¶ 173). ICGS, primarily through Lockheed, fraudulently omitted information and data regarding: (1) the environmental survivability of externally mounted equipment; (2) the FLIR video cable defects; (3) the Physical Configuration Audit and mislabeled cables; (4) the video/eamera surveillance system defects; (5) the classified communications and SIPRNET/TEMPEST requirement defects; and (6) the low smoke cable defects. (Id.). In addition to the fraudulent omissions from the Action Item Database System, ICGS, primarily through Lockheed, never advised the Coast Guard of the falsely incomplete information. (Id.). ICGS, primarily through Northrop, fraudulently omitted information and data regarding the shaft alignment and hull damages from the contractually mandated Action Item Database System, and failed to advise the Coast Guard of the incomplete information. (Id. ¶ 174). When DeKort entered some of this information himself in January 2004, Lockheed’s Paul J. Messer removed the entries, stating that DeKort’s entries lacked detail. (Id. ¶ 175). After deleting DeKort’s entries, Defendants never re-entered any information regarding the above-listed defects, nor did they disclose the concealed facts. (Id.). The Coast Guard eventually decommissioned all eight 123-foot patrol boats due to problems with the vessels, primarily associated with the hull, mechanical and electrical issues. (Id. ¶ 131). The total loss of the patrol boats due to Defendants’ “shoddy and deceptive work” likely caused a loss of $11.75 million dollars per patrol boat, or $96 million dollars. (Id. ¶ 26). “Joint Venture” and “Alter-Ego” Allegations At various times, Lockheed and ICGS executives, as well as ICGS’s website, have referred to ICGS, which is a limited liability company, as a “joint venture” between Lockheed and Northrop, and used the term “partners” to describe Lockheed and Northrop. (Id. ¶¶ 7-11, 18, and Exs. K and L). Further, ICGS operated as an alter-ego of Lockheed and of Northrop, and “[f]or all the purposes of the Deepwater program ICGS, Lockheed and Northrop are all one and the same.” (Id. ¶ 11, and Ex. L). ICGS did not have any of its own employees, but was operated by Lockheed and Northrop employees, and its Board of Directors was dominated by members of Lockheed’s and Northrop’s Boards. (Id. ¶ 8). ICGS was funded by Lockheed and Northrop and ICGS had no business other than the Deepwater Contract, the tasks of which were carried out by Lockheed and Northrop employees using Lockheed and Northrop resources. (Id. ¶ 13). ICGS operated with grossly inadequate capital of its own, and the daily operations of ICGS were not kept separate and distinct from those of Lockheed and Northrop. (Id.). Lockheed and Northrop had common business departments and ICGS used Lockheed’s and Northrop’s engineering and development departments. (Id.). Lockheed and Northrop executed the actions that gave rise to the allegations of wrongdoing in this lawsuit. Because the controlling directors of ICGS are also the directors of Lockheed and Northrop, ICGS took orders from the participating Lockheed and Northrop directors, rather than the other way around. Lockheed’s and Northrop’s representatives were, simultaneously, duty-bound to act in Lockheed’s and Northrop’s best interests. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15). Count One of Complaint — Violations of False Claims Act Based on the foregoing allegations, De-Kort alleges in his eighty-eight page one-count Fifth Amended Complaint that Defendants violated the FCA, specifically 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1), (2), (3) and (7), which prohibit: (1) the presentment of false claims to the Government; (2) the use of a false record or statement to get a false claim paid by the Government; (3) conspiracies to get false claims paid by the Government; and (4) the making or using of a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government. (Compl., Count One ¶¶ 245-249). More specifically, he alleges that, based on the Certificates of Compliance and DD-250s (see id., Exs. C-J), as well as the alleged omissions from the Action Item Database System (id. ¶¶ 173-177), and the alleged deficiencies in the C4ISR systems and HM & E work (id. ¶¶ 29-137), Defendants: (i) knowingly or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth “falsely certified” equipment as compliant with relevant standards, Deep-water contractual requirements, and a laundry list of requirements in Section 3 of the 123-foot patrol boat “Performance Specifications”; and (ii) “submitted claims for payment to the United States Government on the 123’s while knowing or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth that the ships were not compliant with relevant standards, contractual requirements, and performance specifications.” (Id. ¶ 157) (original emphasis). DeKort also alleges that “[bjecause of the pervasive false statements and fraudulent conduct in obtaining the Deepwater contract, every claim or request for payment submitted to the Coast Guard by ICGS under the Deepwater contract constituted a false claim under the FCA.” (Id. ¶ 178). In addition, DeKort contends that Lockheed and Northrop, members of ICGS and first-tier contractors on the Deepwater Contract, were in fact joint venture partners in ICGS, and are therefore jointly and severally liable for each other’s actions, as well as ICGS’s. Finally, he contends that the Court should “pierce the corporate veil,” and hold ICGS accountable for the acts of Lockheed and Northrop, and hold Lockheed and Northrop liable for the acts of ICGS, since ICGS was the alter-ego of Northrop Grumman and Lockheed. (Id. ¶¶ 12-18). On October 15, 2009, Defendants Lockheed and ICGS filed separate motions to dismiss, both arguing that DeKort has failed to plead a qui tarn cause of action under § 3729(a) with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and that DeKort has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Prior to addressing the pending motions to dismiss, the Court sets forth the applicable legal standards. B. Applicable Legal Standards 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. - — , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir.2007). The Court is not bound to accept legal conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court assumes their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. In ruling on a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), the Court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir.1999). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir.2000). 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) Rule 9(b) applies to actions under the FCA. United States ex rel. Williams v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir.2005). A dismissal for failure to plead with particularity in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) is treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim. Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir.1996). Rule 9(b) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The amount of particularity required for pleading fraud differs from case to case. See Benchmark Elec., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 724 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 355 F.3d 356 (5th Cir.2003); see also Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that “courts have emphasized that Rule 9(b)’s ultimate meaning is context-specific”). In the Fifth Circuit, the Rule 9(b) standard requires “specificity as to the statements (or omissions) considered to be fraudulent, the speaker, when and why the statements were made, and an explanation of why they were fraudulent.” Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir.2005); see also Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir.2004). In a recent post-Twombly decision, the Fifth Circuit set forth the interplay of Twombly, Rule 9(b) and Rule 8(a) in the context of a FCA case: The particularity demanded by Rule 9(b) is supplemental to the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of Rule 8(a) requiring “enough facts [taken as true] to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” The Twombly standard replaces the lenient and long-standing rule that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” The new reading raises a hurdle in front of what courts had previously seen as a plaintiffs nigh immediate access to discovery — modest in its demands but wide in its scope. In cases of fraud, Rule 9(b) has long played that screening function, standing as a gatekeeper to discovery, a tool to weed out meritless fraud claims sooner than later. We apply Rule 9(b) with “bite” and without “apology,” but also aware that Rule 9(b) supplements but does not supplant Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading. Rule 9(b) does not “reflect a subscription to fact pleading” and requires only “simple, concise, and direct” allegations of the “circumstances constituting fraud,” which after Twombly must make relief plausible, not merely conceivable, when taken as true. United States ex rel. James H. Grubbs, M.D. v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185-86 (5th Cir.2009) (internal footnotes and citations omitted). After noting that Rule 9(b)’s “time, place, contents, and identity” standard originated in common law fraud and securities fraud cases where the “elements of reliance and damages are intertwined with the misrepresentation and heighten the need for attention to the misrepresentation itself[,]” the court contrasted the FCA: The False Claims Act, in contrast, lacks the elements of reliance and damages. Rather it protects the Treasury from monetary injury. Put plainly, the statute is remedial and exposes even unsuccessful claimants to liability. [...] It is adequate to allege that a false claim was knowingly presented regardless of its exact amount; the contents of the bill are less significant because a complaint need not allege that the Government relied on or was damaged by the false claim. Thus, a claim under the False Claims Act and a claim under common laiu and securities fraud are not on the same plane in meeting the requirements of“stat[ing] with particularity” the contents of the fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 189 (emphasis added). With respect to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), which makes it a civil violation to “knowingly present! ] or cause[ ] to be presented, [to the Government] a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” as to the express presentment requirement, the Fifth Circuit stated that: “[f]raudulent presentment requires proof only of the claim’s falsity, not of its exact contents.” Id. at 189. Further, “a plaintiff does not necessarily need the exact dollar amounts, billing numbers, or dates to prove to a preponderance that fraudulent bills were actually submitted.” Id. “To require these details at pleading is one small step shy of requiring production of the actual documentation with the complaint, a level of proof not demanded to win at trial and significantly more than any federal pleading rule contemplates.” Id. at 189-90. “[T]o plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud for a False Claims Act § 3729(a)(1) claim, a relator’s complaint, if it cannot allege the details of an actually submitted false claim, may nevertheless survive by alleging particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.” Id. at 190. With regard to a False Claims Act violation of section 3729(a)(2) (creating a civil violation for any person that “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”), the Grubbs court, noting the lack of an express presentment requirement, stated: “[f]or this section, the recording of a false record, when it is made with the requisite intent, is enough to satisfy the statute; we need not make the step of inferring that the record actually caused a claim to be presented to the Government.” Id. at 192-93. As to section 3729(a)(3), which subjects to civil liability any person who “conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid[,]” the court held that a plaintiff alleging eonspiracy to commit fraud must “plead with particularity the conspiracy as well as the overt acts ... taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. at 193. As with § 3792(a)(2), the Fifth Circuit concluded that “presentment of a false claim need not be proven or pled to prevail on a False Claims Act conspiracy charge.” Id. C. Discussion 1. Elements of Relator’s False Claims Act Causes of Action The False Claims Act allows private litigants to bring actions on behalf of the government against anyone who, in relevant part: (1) knowingly presents or causes to be presented, [to the Government] a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; (3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid; [or] (7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government[.] 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1), (2), (3) and (7) (repealed 2009). The terms “knowing” and “knowingly” in the False Claim Act context mean that a person, with respect to information: (1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, “and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). The Supreme Court has cautioned that the False Claims Act was not designed to punish every type of fraud committed upon the government. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599, 78 S.Ct. 950, 2 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1958). The FCA attaches liability, not to the underlying fraudulent activity or to the government’s wrongful payment, “but to the claim for payment,” which must be false or fraudulent. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir.1999). “Therefore, a central question in False Claims Act cases is whether the defendant ever presented a ‘false or fraudulent claim’ to the government.” Id. In addition to the archetypal qui tam action under the FCA, where the actual claim for payment is literally false or fraudulent (such as for services not performed or for an incorrect amount), courts have recognized two other doctrines that attach potential liability to claims for payment under the FCA, namely, the doctrines of false certification and fraud in the inducement, both of which DeKort is alleging here. See generally Harrison, 176 F.3d at 785-88 (and cases cited therein). As to the false certification cases, courts have found violations of the False Claims Act when a government contract or program requires compliance with certain conditions as prerequisites to a government benefit, payment or program. Where a defendant fails to comply with these conditions, but falsely certifies that it has complied in order to induce payment from the Government, courts have found a violation of the FCA. See id. at 786-87 (and cases cited therein); see also United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997), ajfg in part and vacating in part 938 F.Supp. 399 (S.D.Tex.1996). In the Fifth Circuit, liability for false certification will only lie if compliance with the statute or regulation was a prerequisite to gaining the benefit, and defendant affirmatively certified compliance. Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902 (“where the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant’s certification of compliance with ... a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation.”) In addition to imposing FCA liability in cases of false certification, “FCA liability has in certain cases been imposed when the contract under which payment is made was procured by fraud.” United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 384 (5th Cir.2003). The legislative history of the FCA supports claims based upon a fraud-in-the-inducement theory: When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, its legislative history recognized fraud-in-the-inducement liability under the Act. Specifically, Congress noted that, under FCA case law, “each and every claim submitted under a contract, loan guarantee, or other agreement that was originally obtained by means of false statements or other corrupt or fraudulent conduct, or in violation of any statute or applicable regulation, constitutes a false claim.” United States ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., Inc., 393 F.3d 1321, 1326 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-345, at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266 at 5274); see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (FCA liability triggered when contractors colluded to artificially inflate the bid price on a public-works project, thereby inducing the government to pay more than it otherwise would have, and each claim submitted under the contracts, although not literally false, constituted a separate false or fraudulent claim since “[t]his fraud did not spend itself with the execution of the contract. Its taint entered into every swollen estimate which was the basic cause for payment of every dollar paid be the [government].... ”), superseded in part by statute as stated in (United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecoms., 123 F.3d 935, 938 (6th Cir.1997)). In many cases brought under the fraud-in-the-indueement doctrine, the claims submitted were not in and of themselves false, but liability under the FCA attached “because of the fraud surrounding the efforts to obtain the contract or benefit status, or the payments thereunder.” Harrison, 176 F.3d at 788. DeKort seeks to impose FCA liability on Lockheed and ICGS based on both the “fraud-in-the-inducement” and “false certification” theories of liability for violations of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1), (2), (3) and (7). The Court now turns to Lockheed’s motion to dismiss. 2. Lockheed’s Motion to Dismiss Lockheed moves to dismiss DeKort’s FCA allegations pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b). In analyzing this motion, in addition to the pleadings (§ I.A., supra), the Court has considered: • Defendant Lockheed’s Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint (“Lockheed Mot.”) (doc. # 117); • Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Lockheed’s Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint and Appendix thereto (“Lockheed Brief’) (doc. #118); • Relator’s Opposition to Defendant Lockheed’s Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint and Appendix thereto (“Relator Opp.”) (doc. # 128); and • Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Lockheed’s Motion to Dismiss Fifth Amended Complaint (“Lockheed Reply”) (doc. # 134) and Appendix thereto (doc. # 135). According to Lockheed: Two sets of claims under the [FCA] are discernable in Relator’s Fifth Amended Complaint. First, Relator asserts that Defendants committed “fraud in the inducement” of the Deepwater Contract by persuading the Coast Guard to “replace ‘requirements’ language with ‘guidance’ language.” Second, he argues that Defendants submitted COCs and DD-250s to the Coast Guard, and made entries in the Action Item Database System, without disclosing certain supposed failures to comply with contractual requirements. Both of these claims are without merit and should be dismissed. Lockheed Brief at (internal citations omitted).4 The Court will first address Lockheed’s arguments in support of its motion to dismiss Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement allegations, followed by Relator’s contractual non-compliance claims. a. Fraud-in-the-inducement Allegations As set forth in more detail above (§ I.A., supra), DeKort alleges that ICGS, primarily through Lockheed, violated the FCA by committing “fraud in the inducement” of the Deepwater Contract by persuading the Coast Guard to “replace ‘requirements’ language with ‘guidance’ language.” See Compl. ¶¶ 154-156, 159-61, 178. DeKort alleges that ICGS, primarily through Lockheed: did not intend or believe — as evidenced by discussions at proposal planning meetings attended by Relator — that guidance language rather than firm requirements language in the Deepwater contract would produce superior design or products. Rather, ICGS and Lockheed simply wanted the contract to give the joint venture maximum flexibility to conduct the work in whatever manner it saw fit and to circumvent fiscal or timing impediments that might be encountered in the course of the program. ICGS and Lockheed misled the Coast Guard into believing the less stringent “Guidance” language would yield superior ships and materials that would still satisfy the needs of the Coast Guard and be able to withstand the rigors of use on the sea better then boats and materials built under the less flexible, and more commonly used, “Requirements” language. The joint venture sold the Coast Guard the “free lunch theory.” Id. ¶ 156 (original emphasis). Based on these allegations, DeKort alleges that “every claim or request for payment submitted to the Coast Guard by ICGS under the Deepwater contract constituted a false claim under the FCA.” Id. ¶ 178. i. Rule 12(b)(6) In support of its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Lockheed argues that Relator complains about the nature of the Deepwater Contract, but does not actually assert any fraud. Lockheed Brief at 4. “Absent falsity or fraud, of course, no FCA action may proceed.” Id. at 6 (citations omitted). Lockheed contends: “First and most glaringly, Relator does not actually allege any falsity or fraud on the part of Lockheed Martin. Rather, to paraphrase his allegations, he asserts that ICGS persuaded the Coast Guard to include guidance language rather than ‘shall’ or ‘will’ requirements in the Deepwater Contract (even though ICGS did not believe guidance language would give rise to better design or products) because IGGS wanted to obtain greater flexibility, and, consequently, less responsibility for any potential problems.” Id. at 5-6. Lockheed posits that, “[ejven accepting these allegations as true, these statements do not (individually or collectively) constitute a claim that Defendants lied to the Coast Guard, made objectively false statements, or otherwise acted with reckless disregard to, or deliberate ignorance of, the truth or falsity of information, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 3729.” Id. at 6 (original emphasis). In further support of this argument, Lockheed explains: [Tjhere is nothing false or fraudulent about a contractor seeking to persuade a government agency to adopt guidance language instead of rigid requirements. Even if the contractor’s subjective motivations are to lower costs and increase its profits, the contractor has not set forth “expressions of fact which ‘(1) admití ] of being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits of empirical verification.’ ” Id. at 6-7 (quoting Harrison, 176 F.3d at 792) (in turn quoting Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distributing Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir.1986)) (Lockheed’s emphasis); id. at 7 (“[ijt is not impossible for guidance language to result in better products than rigid requirements.”) (original emphasis). In opposition, DeKort repeats the allegations in his Complaint, and offers no response to Lockheed’s central arguments, summarized directly above. See Relator Opp. at 11-12. Further, as Lockheed correctly asserts in its reply brief, Relator does not address any of the cases upon which Lockheed relies. See Lockheed Reply at 2 (“And Relator fails to rebut — or even mention — any of the case law cited by Lockheed Martin. See, e.g., Harrison, 176 F.3d at 782 (dismissing FCA claim based on analogous ‘scheme and plan’); United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 386 (5th Cir.2003) (party’s secret intentions do not give rise to FCA liability). Instead Relator seeks to wish away the defects in his latest pleading.”). In order to prove a fraudulent inducement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) “there was a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct; (2) made or carried out with the requisite scienter; (3) that was material; and (4) that caused the government to pay out money or to forfeit moneys due (i.e., that involved a ‘claim’).” Harrison, 176 F.3d at 782; see also Willard, 336 F.3d at 384 (“FCA liability has in certain cases been imposed when the contract under which payment is made was procured by fraud.”). The first deficiency in Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement claim is that persuading the Coast Guard to include guidance language rather than “shall” or “will” requirements in the Deepwater Contract, with an eye to Defendants obtaining greater flexibility (and less responsibility), even assuming its truth, is not a “false statement or fraudulent course of conduct” for purposes of the FCA. Quite simply, these allegations do not amount to an expression of fact which admits “of being adjudged true or false in a way that [] admits of empirical verification.” Harrison, 176 F.3d at 792; see also United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, 525 F.3d 370, 377 (4th Cir.2008) (fraud-in-the-inducement allegations dismissed where the “representations at issue ... do not include objective falsehoods” but rather “involve several general and relatively vague maintenance provisions.”); United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 472 F.Supp.2d 787, 797 (E.D.Va.2007) (“It is well-established that the FCA requires proof of an objective falsehood.”). The Court contrasts Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement allegations with the type of allegations found actionable by the Fourth Circuit in Harrison, where the relator alleged that the defendant made several objectively misleading statements in an attempt to fraudulently induce the government to award it a Department of Energy contract. For example, the defendant allegedly represented that a particular project would take no more than 1.5 years to complete, even though it knew it would take significantly longer. Harrison, 176 F.3d at 781. In addition, the defendant purposefully underestimated specific overhead costs when submitting a bid, a practice commonly known as “low-balling.” Id. at 781-83, 791. The court found that such representations, if indeed untrue, constituted false statements under the FCA. Another example is Hess, where the Supreme Court found contractors liable under the FCA for claims submitted under government contracts which the defendants obtained by collusive bidding, and defendants had certified that their bids “were genuine and not sham or collusion.” Hess, 317 U.S. at 543, 63 S.Ct. 379. See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770, 772, 775 (2d Cir.1994) (defendant liable for submitting inflated cost estimates in subcontract submitted for approval to government). Unlike the allegations of objective falsehoods in those cases, the Court agrees with Lockheed that Relator has not set forth “expressions of fact which ‘(1) admit[ ] of being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits of empirical verification.’ ” See Lockheed Brief at 6-7 (original emphasis). The second deficiency in Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement claim is Relator’s failure to adequately allege materiality, that is, to allege how persuading the Coast Guard to include guidance language rather than “shall” or “will” requirements in the Deepwater Contract somehow influenced the Coast Guard’s action in awarding the Deepwater Contract to ICGS. See generally Harrison, 176 F.3d at 782 (materiality is essential element to fraud-in-the-inducement claim). “The accepted definition of materiality for civil FCA claims ... equates materiality with having a natural tendency to influence, or being capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.” United States v. Southland Management Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 679 (5th Cir.2003) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). According to Lockheed, “beyond the bald assertion that ICGS ‘succeeded with its guidance pitch’ [Compl. ¶ 155], Relator provides no evidence that the Coast Guard was in any way influenced by ICGS’s supposed misrepresentations. He does not contend the Coast Guard would not have awarded ICGS the Deepwater Contract had it known about the alleged fraud, nor would such a contention be plausible given that the actions described by Relator occurred after the contract had been awarded.” Lockheed Brief at 10 (original emphasis). Having considered the pleadings, the parties’ respective arguments, and applicable law, the Court agrees with Lockheed and concludes that Relator has failed to adequately allege materiality. Absent such allegations, Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement claim must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). In sum, Lockheed’s motion to dismiss Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted since Relator has failed to sufficiently allege (i) an objective falsehood by Relator in procuring the Deepwater Contract, or (ii) materiality.S. ii. Rule 9(b) Alternatively, Lockheed moves to dismiss Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement allegations pursuant to Rule 9(b), arguing: Here, even if the Complaint could somehow be read to allege falsity or fraud, Relator fails to specify the “who, what, when, and where” or the “time, place, and contents” of Defendants’ supposed false statements to the Coast Guard. Compl. ¶¶ 154-56, 159-61. For example: When did the contract negotiations between Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, ICGS, and the Coast Guard take place? Where did they take place? Who represented the parties at these negotiations? Who told the Coast Guard that guidance language was preferable to rigid requirements? What form did this communication take? What indication is there that whoever was responsible for this communication secretly believed that guidance language was not preferable? What indication is there that Defendants secretly intended to produce sub-standard designs and products? ... These are all crucial queries for Rule 9(b) purposes, but they all remain entirely unanswered. Lockheed Brief at 10; see also id. at 4 (Relator, “even after five amendments” fails to “provide nearly enough specificity to satisfy the explicit requirement of FRCP 9(b).”) (original emphasis). In opposition, Relator asserts, with no argument in support, that he “has stated a claim for fraudulent inducement, with particularity.” Relator Opp. at 11. Having considered the pleadings, parties’ arguments, and applicable law, the Court concludes that Relator has fallen short of pleading his fraud-in-the-inducement claim with the requisite particularity required by Rule 9(b). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 2005 WL 3591014, at *7 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 20, 2005) (dismissing fraudin-the-inducement claim under Rule 9(b) where complaint “does not allege who was involved in the contract negotiations, or where and when the negotiations took place” and “[t]here are no facts alleged as to what was said before, during, or after the contract negotiations.”); Willard, 336 F.3d at 385 (dismissing fraud-in-the-inducement claim under Rule 9(b) where complaint “does not allege who was involved in the negotiations, or where or when the negotiations took place, or ... what was said before, during, or after the contract negotiations.”). In sum, in addition to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court grants Lockheed’s motion to dismiss Relator’s fraud-in-the-inducement claim under Rule 9(b) for failure to allege fraud with the requisite particularity. b. False Certification Allegations Lockheed moves to dismiss Relator’s allegations of FCA violations based on false certifications pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and pursuant to Rule 9(b) for failure to plead fraud with particularity. As set forth in more detail above (§ I.A., supra), DeKort alleges Defendants violated the FCA by way of presentment of false claims to the government and using false records to get claims paid by the government (in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(l)(2)), in connection with alleged flaws in the C4ISR systems (which was Lockheed’s responsibility under the Deepwater Contract), including: (1) environmental survivability of externally mounted equipment; (2) FLIR video cable; (3) mislabeled cables; (4) video/camera surveillance systems; (5) communications systems; and (6) low smoke cable defects, as well as deficiencies in the hull, mechanical and electrical work (which was Northrop Grumman’s responsibility under the Deepwater Contract). Compl. ¶¶ 29-137. Specifically, based on the Certificates of Compliance and DD-250s {id., Exs. C-J), and alleged omissions from the Action Item Database system {id. ¶¶ 173-177), DeKort alleges that Defendants: (i) knowingly or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth “falsely certified” equipment as compliant with relevant standards, Deepwater contractual requirements, and a laundry list of requirements in Section 3 of the 123-foot patrol boat “Performance Specifications”; and (ii) “submitted claims for payment to the United States Government on the 123’s while knowing or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth that the ships were not compliant with relevant standards, contractual requirements, and performance specifications.” Id. ¶ 157 (original emphasis). The Court first turns to Lockheed’s motion to dismiss Relator’s false certification claims under Rule 12(b)(6). i. Rule 12(b)(6) In support of dismissal for failure to state a claim, Lockheed argues: (1) Relator does not properly allege, as he must, that payment from the government was conditioned on any certification of compliance by the contractor; (2) DD-250s cannot support FCA liability as a matter of law because they are signed by the government, not the contractor; (3) several of the instances of supposed contractual noncompliance relied upon by Relator were not actually contract violations at all (as proven by the February 2007 IG Report that Relator attaches as Exhibit A); (4) all of these instances were contemporaneously known to (and acquiesced in) by the government; and (5) Lockheed Martin had no involvement with the alleged hull, mechanical and electrical problems. Lockheed Brief at 4-5. The Court will examine Lockheed’s five arguments in support of dismissal in turn. Lockheed first contends that dismissal is required since Relator “does not properly allege, as he must, that payment from the government was conditioned on any certification of compliance by the contractor.” Id. at 4. When a government contract or program requires compliance with certain conditions as prerequisites to a government benefit, payment or program, a defendant violates the FCA where it fails to comply with these conditions, but falsely certifies that it has complied in order to induce payment from the Government. See Harrison, 176 F.3d at 786-88; Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902. In the Fifth Circuit, liability for false certification will only lie if compliance with the statute or regulation was a prerequisite to gaining the benefit, and defendant affirmatively certified compliance. Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902 (“where the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant’s certification of compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regulation.”); Southland Management, 326 F.3d at 680 (Jones, J., concurring) (“to create liability under the FCA, a false certification of compliance must be a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit.”). DeKort alleges that “[e]aeh of the false Certificates of Compliance referred to in this Complaint, and others submitted in connection with requests for progress payments were a precondition for payment.” Compl ¶ 157. He further attaches to his Complaint copies of the eight COCs submitted to the Coast Guard upon delivery of the 123-foot patrol boats, as well as the accompanying DD-250s. Id., Exs. C-J. In his opposition, DeKort states that he is “not in possession of all of the contract documents.” Relator Opp. at 15 n. 50. In support of dismissal, Lockheed counters that these allegations “merely restate the FCA’s conditionality requirement and so cannot possibly meet the applicable standard.” Lockheed Brief at 14 n. 10. At the motion to dismiss stage, the question before this Court is whether, with regard to the Fifth Circuit’s conditionality requirement, Relator has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Court is mindful that the plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Based on Relator’s allegations, the Court agrees with Relator that, “[i]t can reasonably be inferred from the allegations of the Complaint that fulfilling intrinsic factual contract requirements, such as a requirement that topside equipment on Coast Guard water craft be weather resistant, [was] a condition of payment upon delivery of the cutters.” Relator Opp. at 17 (original emphasis). Otherwise stated, while the Court does not herein make any determination that certification of compliance with contractual terms in connection with delivery of the eight 123-foot patrol boats was a sine qua non to payment by the Coast Guard, the Court, cognizant that Relator is “not in possession of all of the contract documents! ]” (Relator Opp. at 15 n. 50), is satisfied that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that it was. Accordingly, the Court rejects Lockheed’s first argument in support of its motion to dismiss Relator’s false certification allegations. Second, Lockheed contends that “DD-250s cannot support FCA liability as a matter of law because they are signed by the government, not the contractor.” Lockheed Brief at 4-5. Relator, in opposition, argues that, although DD-250s standing alone “do not comprise ... express certification^] of compliance!,]” in this instance, “the DD-250s are not standing alone but are accompanied by express certificates of compliance and/or performance.” Relator Opp. at 19. A “DD-250 is a form supplied by the government which the contractor fills in, identifying the contract by number and providing a description of the item; the government then signs the form. The form has a variety of uses, and can be used as an invoice.” United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes Helicopters, 71 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir.1995). In Butler, cited by Lockheed in support of its argument that the DD-250s, as a matter of law, lend no support to a claim that contractor engaged in fraud (see Lockheed Reply at 6), the appellate court affirmed a directed verdict against the relator because the DD-250s were not used as invoices containing misrepresentations and the Relator did not “introduce into evidence any proof of misrepresentation in the supporting documents accompanying the DD-250s.” Id. By contrast, as Relator correctly argues in his opposition brief, “Relator has alleged that the Certificates of Compliance and/or Conformance accompanying the DD-250s contained misrepresentations, and that as a result of the misrepresentations, the claims identified by invoice numbers in the DD~250s were false. Relator identifies false statements, and false claims associated with the DD-250s by invoice number and the amounts thereof!.]” Relator Opp. at 19-20. In this case, as Relator correctly points out, the DD-250s were not “standing alone,” but rather were accompanied by the Certificates of Compliance and/or Conformance which Relator asserts contained the misrepresentations at issue. Under these circumstances, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court rejects Lockheed’s argument that Relator’s claims automatically fail to the extent they are based on the DD-250s. See Butler, supra. Third, Lockheed argues that the instances of noncompliance alleged by Relator do not support FCA liability. Lockheed Brief at 17-21. To reiterate, the six instances of noncompliance are, as related to C4ISR systems (for which Lockheed was responsible under the Deepwater Contract): (1) environmental survivability of externally mounted equipment; (2) FLIR video cable; (3) mislabeled cables; (4) video/camera surveillance systems that failed to provide a 360 degree view; (5) communications systems (SIPRNET and TEMPEST) left vulnerable due to installation of unshielded cable; and (6) low smoke cable defects, as well as deficiencies in the hull, mechanical and electrical work (for which Northrop Grumman was responsible under the Deepwater Contract). Compl. ¶¶ 29-137. Specifically, based on the Certificates of Compliance and DD-250s (id., Exs. CJ), as well as the alleged omissions from the Action Item Database system (id. ¶¶ 173-177), and the alleged deficiencies in the C4ISR systems and HM & E work (id. ¶¶ 29-137), Relator alleges FCA violations under 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(l)-(2). Under this third heading, Lockheed seeks dismissal of Relator’s allegations pertaining to deficiencies in the type of cabling used as part of the Coast Guard’s upgrade to 123-foot vessels, as well as deficiencies in the video suxweillance system installed. As set forth in more detail above (§ I.A., supra), Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ installation of non-shielded cables (where shielded cables should have been used) created deficiencies in the classified communication certification system (SIPRNET and TEMPEST). Compl. ¶¶ 98-125. As to the video surveillance system installed on the 123-foot vessels, Relator alleges that this system was deficient because it failed to provide a 360 degree view, and therefore did not meet the patrol boats’ physical security requirements, leaving all eight 123-foot patrol boats with blind spots directly over the pilot house and bridge windows, which could result in loss of life and loss of the vessel. See id. ¶¶ 71-97. Specifically, in support of its motion to dismiss these particular allegations, Lockheed contends that a 2007 report from the Inspector General attached to Relator’s Complaint as Exhibit A (“IG Report”) establishes that these two claims (which Lockheed refers to as the “TEMPEST” and “video camera” allegations) are without merit. Lockheed Brief at 21-22; Lockheed Reply at 9. In the Report, the Inspector General concluded that: Aspects of the C4ISR equipment installed aboard the 123' cutters do not meet the design standards set forth in the Deepwater contract. Specifically, two of the four areas of concern identified by the complainant were substantiated and are a result of the contractor not complying with the design standards identified in the Deepwater contract. For example, the contractor did not install low smoke cabling aboard the 123' cutter, despite a Deepwater contract requirement that stated “all shipboard cable added as a result of the modification of the vessel shall be low smoke.” [... ] Additionally, the contractor installed C4ISR equipment aboard both the 123' cutters and prosecutors, which either did not comply or was not tested to ensure compliance with specific environmental performance requirements outlined in the Deepwater contract. Compl., Ex. A at 2. With regard to the type of cabling and the video suiweillance system installed, however, the Inspector General concluded that minimum contract requirements were met: The remaining two areas of concern identified by the complainant were in technical compliance with the Deepwater contract and deemed acceptable by the Coast Guard. Specifically, while the type of cabling installed during the C4ISR system upgrade to the 123' cutter was not high-grade braided cable, the type of cable used met the Coast Guard’s minimum-security standards as required by the Deepwater contract. Concerning the installation of the video surveillance system, while the system did not provide 360 degrees of coverage, it met minimum contractual requirements. Id. at 2-3. Based on the IG Report, Lockheed argues that “Relator’s TEMPEST and video camera allegations must be dismissed.” Lockheed Reply at 9. In opposition to Lockheed’s motion to dismiss these allegations based on the IG Report, Relator states that the “IG Report and other documents attached to Relator’s Complaint are provided as background information; Relator does not necessarily agree with every statement or conclusion therein, and the documents do not constitute ‘written instruments’ pursuant to Rule 10(c).” Relator Opp. at 21-22 n. 68. Having considered the parties’ positions, the pleadings and the IG Report, the Court rejects Lockheed’s suggestion that, based on the IG Report, the Court should dismiss Relator’s FCA claims stemming from the deficient installation of non-shielded cables on the upgraded vessels (and the associated threat to the classified communication certification system) (CompLIffl 98-125), or the installation of a video surveillance system which failed to provide a 360 degree view, leaving the upgraded vessels with dangerous blind spots. See id. ¶¶ 71-97. Rather, whether the type of cabling and the video surveillance system installed met minimum contract requirements is more appropriately resolved on the full record, and not on a report that Relator asserts he attached as background material on the investigation. Also, under this third heading, Lockheed argues that Relator has failed to state actionable claims based on database omissions, since: “[t]o state a claim under the FCA, subsection (a)(1), a relator must allege that the defendant ‘knowingly’ made a ‘false or fraudulent claim’ to the United States Government.” Lockheed Brief at 18 (citation omitted). According to Lockheed, Relator has failed to state a claim for a FCA violation under section 3729(a)(1), because he fails to allege a false statement to the government concerning the database omissions. See id. Lockheed also contends that “even if the alleged Database System omissions somehow constitute a ‘false record,’ FCA liability would still be possible only if they were used ‘to get a false or fraudulent claim paid.’ ” Lockheed Reply at 6 n. 10. According to Lockheed, “Relator has alleged no such ‘nexus’ between the supposed Database System omission