Full opinion text
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND, GRANTING THE UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO INTERVENE, AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS TO STRIKE THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge. On July 9, 2007, Plaintiff City of St. Louis filed a complaint in Gratiot County Circuit Court arising out of the contamination and threatened contamination of its drinking water system against Velsicol Chemical Corporation; NWI-1, Inc.; Lepetomane II, Inc., as Trustee of the Fruit of the Loom Successor Liquidation Trust; Lepetomane III, Inc., as Trustee of the Fruit of the Loom Custodial Trust; Edge-wood Farms, Inc., and John Does 1-300. On August 31, 2007, Lepetomane II and III and NWI-1 removed the case to this Court. Velsicol consented to the removal. Edgewood Farms has not yet appeared or answered the complaint. The notice of removal asserts that federal subject matter jurisdiction is premised on bankruptcy removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 1452(a), federal officer removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), and diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Now before the Court are Plaintiffs motion to remand [Dkt. # 16] filed on October 8, 2007; and the United States’ motion to intervene [Dkt. #30] filed on December 14, 2007. The Court held a hearing on the motions on January 23, 2008. Shortly thereafter, pursuant to the parties’ requests, the Court stayed the proceedings to allow the parties to devote full efforts to investigating settlement alternatives. Subsequently, on January 15, 2010, the Court lifted the stay, noting the extended period of time that the case had been stayed without coming to a negotiated resolution. The Court provided the parties with an opportunity to supplement the pri- or briefing, and held a second hearing on February 24, 2010. As further explained below, Plaintiffs motion to remand will be denied because the Court has bankruptcy removal jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 1334(b) and 1452(a) and federal officer removal jurisdiction pursuant to § 1442(a). In addition, the United States’ motion to intervene will be granted to allow the United States to protect its interests. I Plaintiff City of St. Louis is organized as a municipal corporation and owns and operates a public drinking water system that provides drinking water to residents and businesses in and around St. Louis, Michigan. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6 (Notice of Removal Ex. A). The water system includes production wells that draw drinking water from groundwater aquifers, and pumping, storage, and distribution facilities and equipment. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that it has “a significant property interest in the waters it appropriates and uses from its wells.” Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that from 1965 to 1978, Velsicol owned and operated a fifty-two acre DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane) manufacturing site (“plant site”) on the Pine River in St. Louis, Michigan, where it manufactured, stored, and handled DDT and various DDT related by-products and wastes, including p-CBSA (para-Chlorobenzene Sulfonic Acid). Id. ¶¶ 7, 26. DDT was used as a pesticide in agriculture, until it was prohibited by the federal government in 1972 due to the substantial risks it posed to human health and the environment. Id. ¶¶ 2, 18. Likewise, the byproduct p-CBSA negatively impacts human health and the environment. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Velsicol utilized poor waste management practices at the plant site and various locations in and around St. Louis, where it “injected, buried, discharged, disposed of, failed to contain and/or otherwise released into the environment p-CBSA and other harmful chemicals.” Id. ¶¶7, 29. Plaintiff refers to these locations as “Contaminated Sites.” Id. ¶ 3. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that from the 1930s to the 1970s, Velsicol and its predecessor in interest stored and disposed of p-CBSA and other hazardous wastes at a Contaminated Site known as the “burn pit” or “golf course site,” located across the Pine River from the main Velsicol site. Id. ¶28. Plaintiff also alleges that Velsicol discharged contaminants directly into the Pine River, making it unadvisable to eat fish from the Pine River to this day. Id. ¶ 27. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant to this action is a current or former operator or owner of the Contaminated Sites. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that Edgewood Farms, and possibly others, acquired the golf course site at some unidentified point in time. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that Northwest Industries (“NWI”) purchased Velsicol in 1965 and that NWI became the successor owner of the plant site in 1986. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that at some point NWI became a subsidiary of Fruit of the Loom, Inc. (“FTL”). Id. ¶ 8. Through a bankruptcy proceeding that began in December 1999, FTL and NWI were reorganized into NWI-1, Inc. Id. ¶ 8. Lepetomane III is the Trustee of the Custodial Trust, which was created through the bankruptcy proceeding to manage and address the environmental liabilities related to seven properties of which it became the owner, at least one of which is a Contaminated Site. Id. ¶ 9. Lepetomane II is the Trustee of the Successor Trust, which was created through the bankruptcy proceeding to hold financial assets on behalf of the Custodial Trust to be used for remediation of the seven properties owned by the Custodial Trust. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges that p-CBSA and other harmful chemicals from the Contaminated Sites have migrated and continue to migrate in the earth’s subsurface, contaminating and imminently threatening to contaminate Plaintiffs wells and water supply. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 21, 25, 29. Plaintiff alleges that p-CBSA has been detected at varying times and in varying amounts in water extracted from Plaintiffs wells, and further alleges that because p-CBSA is highly soluble in water and moves freely at approximately the rate of the groundwater’s flow, its presence is known to be a precursor to detection of other harmful chemicals from the same source. Id. ¶ 2, 20, 24, 33. Plaintiff alleges that in 1982, as part of a clean-up effort, Velsicol removed contamination at the golf course site and other Contaminated Sites, deposited those contaminated soils at the plant site, and attempted to contain the contamination there. Id. ¶ 30. Despite the effort, the containment system continues to leak various harmful chemicals into the Pine River and the drinking water aquifer, “all to Plaintiffs detriment and injury.” Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that its injuries constitute an “unreasonable interference with, and damage to, the limited subterranean supplies of fresh drinking water on which Plaintiffs wells depend and in which Plaintiff has a significant property interest.” Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff alleges that its “interest in protecting the quality of its limited drinking water supplies constitutes a reason personal for seeking damages sufficient to restore and/or replace such drinking water supplies to their pre-contamination condition.” Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff seeks an award of exemplary damages against Velsicol, in an amount that is “sufficient to compensate Plaintiff for the humiliation, outrage, and indignity it has suffered by Velsicol’s wanton acts.” Id. ¶ 32, 57, 66, 74. Plaintiff alleges that Velsicol knew or should have known of the “grave harm and threat to public health” that its poor waste management practices caused and knew or should have known that its actions were threatening widespread pollution of groundwater, contamination of public and private drinking water supplies, and increased costs to public water suppliers and their customers. Id. ¶ 2, 31. Plaintiff alleges that Velsicol “knew that it was substantially certain” that its acts and omissions would cause injury and damage, including contamination of water supplies by p-CBSA and other harmful chemicals. Id. ¶ 32. Count one of the complaint alleges violations of the Michigan Natural Resources Environmental Protection Act (“NRE-PA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.20126a(7), against each Defendant, except Edgewood Farms. Id. ¶¶ 36-46. Plaintiff alleges that Velsicol and NWI-1 are jointly and severally liable for Plaintiffs necessary response costs because each owned and operated one of more of the Contaminated Sites at the time of the disposal of the hazardous wastes, and was responsible for causing the release and threat of release of the hazardous substances. Id. ¶ 42. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that the Custodial and Successor Trusts are also jointly and severally liable because the Custodial Trust owns and operates one of the Contaminated Sites and the Successor Trust “is the trust of the Custodial Trust.” Id. ¶¶ 44-45. Plaintiff alleges that necessary-response costs include monitoring and investigation costs, studies, treatment and replacement of wells, and other remedial actions to remove p-CBSA from its drinking water supplies. Id. ¶ 46. Count two of the complaint alleges nuisance against all Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 47-57. Plaintiff states that it is “the owner of land, easements and water rights that permit it to extract groundwater for use in its Water System. Plaintiffs injury is separate and distinct from that of the public.” Id. ¶48. Plaintiff alleges that plumes of contamination originating from the Contaminated Sites have migrated and continue to migrate through the subsurface, contaminating and threatening to contaminate Plaintiffs water supplies, creating a nuisance. Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff alleges that Velsicol and NWI-1 caused, created, maintained, assisted, or participated in the nuisance. Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff alleges that the Trusts and Edgewood Farms, as owners and operators of Contaminated Sites, knew or should have known of the unreasonable risk of nuisance and failed to take reasonable steps to abate the condition. Id. ¶ 51, 52. Plaintiff alleges that the nuisance has caused “substantial injury and significant harm to Plaintiffs wells and water supply, in which Plaintiff has a significant property interest.” Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have substantially and unreasonably interfered with its right to appropriate, use and enjoy groundwater from its wells. Plaintiff is specially and adversely affected by the nuisance.” Id. ¶ 55. Plaintiff again alleges contamination by p-CBSA and threatened contamination by other chemicals. Id. ¶ 56. Count three alleges trespass against all Defendants. Id. ¶ 58-66. Plaintiff alleges that is the owner and actual possessor of its water system, including drinking water production wells that draw groundwater from one or more aquifers. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiff alleges that it owns, possesses and actively exercises property rights to appropriate and use groundwater drawn from drinking water production wells. Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiff alleges that Velsicol and NWI-1 failed to properly control, handle, contain, or dispose of p-CBSA, which has entered Plaintiffs property without authorization, and other harmful chemicals that threaten to enter Plaintiffs property without authorization. Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff alleges that the Trusts and Edgewood Farms knew or should have known of the trespass or unreasonable risk thereof and ratified the intrusion by failing to remove or take reasonable steps to remove the continuing trespass. Id. ¶ 63. Count four of the complaint alleges negligence against all Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 67-74. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to use due care in the storing, containment, handling, and disposal of p-CBSA and other harmful chemicals, and breached that duty. Id. ¶ 68. Plaintiff alleges that Velsicol and NWI-1 breached the duty by injecting, burying, disposing of and failing to contain p-CBSA and other harmful chemicals. Id. ¶ 69. Plaintiff alleges that the Trusts and Edge-wood Farms knew or should have known of the unreasonably dangerous conditions to persons and property and failed to take reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from it. Id. ¶ 71. Count five seeks declaratory relief against all Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 75-77. Finally, in its concluding request for relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, necessary response costs including enforcement costs, exemplary damages against Velsicol, and attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this action, including prejudgment interest. See also id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff also seeks to recover “the substantial costs necessary to protect the public and restore and/or replace its damaged drinking water supply wells.” Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiff seeks to recover “compensatory and all other damages, including all necessary funds to investigate and monitor any contamination of, or pollution to, Plaintiffs water supply; to reimburse Plaintiff for the costs of designing, constructing, installing, operating and maintaining the treatment facilities and equipment required to remove p-CBSA and other harmful chemicals from its drinking water supplies and finding an alternative water supply and constructing a new water system; and thereby ensuring that the responsible parties bear such expense, rather than Plaintiff and its ratepayers.” Id. ¶ 5. II Significant factual background information is found in the notice of removal and attached exhibits and the response to Plaintiffs motion to remand filed by Lepetomane II and III and NWI-1. The most pertinent documents include a “five-year report” prepared in 2007 by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) with respect to contamination in St. Louis; and certain documents from the bankruptcy proceeding, including the Third Amended Plan of Reorganization and Plan Supplement, the Confirmation Order, the Settlement Agreement (“S. Agmt.”), the United States’ motion for approval of the settlement agreement, the order approving the settlement agreement, the Successor Liquidation Trust Agreement (“SLT Agmt.”), and the Custodial Trust Agreement (“CT Agmt.”). Also important is a general understanding of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.: By the late 1970s, Congress concluded that existing cleanup programs were inadequate to the task of taking care of literally thousands of sites across the country posing a serious threat to public health and the environment. Consequently, in 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA, also known as “Superfund,” to ensure prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to place the costs of those cleanups on the PRPs [potentially responsible parties]. Throughout the 1980s, the Superfund hazardous waste cleanup program enjoyed centerstage prominence in environmental law. Nevertheless, the early years of CERCLA were difficult. CERCLA was a hastily-assembled bill which contained a number of technical flaws due to Congress’ limited understanding of the hazardous waste problem and its effects on the environment. Both Congress and EPA, for example, believed in the late 1970s that a site could be adequately cleaned up by “scraping a few inches of soil off the ground.” Congress also grossly underestimated the number of sites requiring cleanup and the monies necessary to remedy the problem. EPA, as the delegatee of the President’s authority under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9615, was criticized for the slow pace of cleanups, for failing to provide remedies that would protect public health and the environment, and for alleged “sweetheart” deals that reduced cleanup costs for industry at public expense. As a result, in 1986 Congress passed SARA, which reauthorized and amended CERCLA in several important ways. Congress sought to better define cleanup standards, to expand resources available to EPA for investigations and cleanups, to clarify EPA’s authority under Superfund law, and to expand and clarify the states’ role in any remedial action undertaken, or ordered, by EPA. CERCLA applies “primarily to the cleanup of leaking inactive or abandoned sites and to emergency responses to spills.” The Act directs EPA to develop a National Priorities List (“NPL”) for response priority purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). After a site is placed on the NPL, a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (“RI/FS”) is performed to define the nature and extent of the threat posed by the release and to evaluate proposed remedies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9622; 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(d). Once EPA determines under CERCLA that a response action is needed at a particular hazardous waste site, it must publish a proposed remedial action plan (“RAP”) and provide an opportunity for comment. 42 U.S.C. § 9617. EPA then issues a Record of Decision (“ROD”) setting forth the remedy selected for the site, including remedial technologies and cleanup standards. 42 U.S.C. § 9617. In implementing its RAP, EPA may pursue one of three possible courses of action. EPA may undertake a response measure on its own, which may include removal and/or remedial action, and then sue PRPs it can find for reimbursement. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607. In the interim, or in the event it cannot locate any PRPs or they cannot be made to pay the cleanup costs, the government-initiated cleanup may be financed by the “Superfund,” 42 U.S.C. § 9611, a trust fund derived from general federal revenues and an excise tax on specified chemicals. See 42 U.S.C. § 9631. Sec ondly, EPA may, independent of fund-financed response actions, issue an administrative order directing PRPs to implement removal or remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Alternatively, EPA may apply to the district court for an injunction to compel PRPs to clean up or abate an actual or threatened release of hazardous substances from a facility. Id. As a third option, EPA may enter into an agreement with PRPs to perform a response action, 42 U.S.C. § 9622. United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1416-18 (6th Cir.1991) (citations omitted; footnote in original). With specific attention to the history of the Velsicol Facility in St. Louis, the EPA five-year report provides as follows: Michigan Chemical Corporation (MCC) purchased the [St. Louis Velsicol] facility in 1935 and operated a chemical manufacturing business until 1977, when MCC merged with Velsicol Chemical Corporation (Velsicol). From 1936 through 1977, the plant manufactured a variety of organic and inorganic chemicals .... The plant was closed in 1977 and decommissioning activities were initiated in 1978. The plant site represented a threat to public health, welfare, and the environment because of widespread contamination caused by poor waste management practices and direct discharge of process wastes to the adjacent Pine River. The report affirms that St. Louis “draws its drinking water from six municipal water supply wells located within one mile of the site, and two of the wells (# 1 and # 4) are located within 1/4 mile of the easternmost edge of the main plant site.” The report indicates that studies from 1978 through 1980 revealed contamination in “site soils, groundwater, river sediments, and fish.” The five-year report provides a useful summary of the attempts to manage the site from 1978 through 2007: Based on those early studies, U.S. EPA and the State of Michigan negotiated and entered a [Consent Judgment (CJ) ] with Velsicol in 1982 for a remedy directed at stopping the migration of [hazardous chemicals] from the main plant site into the environment.... Under the CJ, Velsicol agreed to excavate contaminated soil from the former burn area and to place those materials on the main plant site, inside the containment system .... The CJ released Velsicol from liability for cleanup of the sediments that were contaminated at the time of entry of the CJ or sediments that became contaminated from migration or discharge from the main plant site prior to completion of the containment system. The 1982 CJ required Velsicol to construct a containment system for the main plant site comprised of a 2-foot thick, low permeability slurry wall around the facility and a 3-foot thick, low permeability clay cap on top. The CJ also required Velsicol to maintain groundwater levels within the containment system and to conduct long-term operation and maintenance (O & M) activities at the site. Velsicol began implementation of the CJ remedy in January 1983 and completed construction of the containment system in 1984. This work included excavating approximately 68,000 cubic yards of contaminated material from the former burn area (Golf Course site) and placing it on the main plant site under the clay cap. From 1993 to mid-1998, Velsicol had to pump water from the containment system and dispose of the water off-site in order to maintain the water levels within the containment system below the level established by the CJ. In late 1994 ... [t]he DDT concentrations in fish tissue coupled with the rising water levels inside the containment system caused concern that the containment system may have failed, increasing the loading of DDT into the Pine River. Following the events noted above, U.S. EPA and MDEQ [Michigan Department of Environmental Quality] asked Velsicol to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the containment system to ensure that it was not a source of DDT into the Pine River, and Velsicol agreed.... In 1996, Velsicol completed its assessment of the containment system.... U.S. EPA and MDEQ agreed with Velsicol’s containment assessment document, which stated that the clay cap was leaking. ... No obvious problems were documented with the slurry wall.... In December 1997, Velsicol submitted a work plan ... in which Velsicol proposed to conduct maintenance of the clay cap during the summer of 1998 by recompacting areas of the cap. Velsicol decided to delay this work until U.S. EPA and MDEQ completed [a] sediment removal project. Both U.S. EPA and MDEQ agreed to the delay. However, in December 1999 ... Fruit of the Loom (FTL) and NWI Land Management, Inc. (NWI) filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. NWI Land Management became owner of the site in 1986 through a complicated management buyout of Velsicol Chemical Corporation. Velsicol had been a subsidiary of FTL, but in 1986 became a separate company, and title to the Velsicol St. Louis site was transferred to NWI. Velsicol Corporation continued to manage the site for NWI and FTL. When FTL filed for bankruptcy in 1999, it ceased payments to Velsicol for work at this site.... The MDEQ finalized and issued the RI [remedial investigation] Report for [the main plant site] in November 2006. The RI Report ... found that significant contamination ... exists in soil and groundwater at the main plant site, and that soil in three areas of the residential neighborhood adjacent to the main plant site contains concentrations of PBB above MDEQ’s Part 201 direct contact criteria.... Additionally, ... the RI report concluded that neither the clay cap nor the slurry wall meet the original design specifications, and neither are functioning as designed. Additionally the report concluded that the slurry wall is not preventing the migration of contaminated groundwater from the main plant site and that the containment system is therefore not protective of human health and the environment. The MDEQ is currently preparing an FS Report that will evaluate a range of potential remedial alternatives.... In conjunction with the State-lead RI fieldwork, U.S. EPA also conducted ... site investigation activities to supplement and support MDEQ’s work.... As part of [a Source Migration Investigation], U.S. EPA sampled the City of St. Louis water supply wells and some private residential wells. No contamination was detected in the residential wells. The chemical [pCBSA] ... was detected in some of the city wells, including wells # 1 and # 4 (the closest to the site). p-CBSA is highly soluble in groundwater and is resistant to natural degradation, making it very mobile in groundwater and a useful indicator of contaminant movement.... In February 2007, U.S. EPA completed installation of eight deep sentry monitoring wells screened in the same portion of the Lower Unit aquifer as the city wells to collect additional information about the geology and hydrology of the Lower Unit and to provide advance warning of potential impacts to the city wells from site-related contaminants. [ p-CBSA] has been detected in all six city wells and is routinely detected in five of the wells.... The levels of pCBSA detected in the city wells to date are well below the state drinking water standard. The report further explains that “[i]n order to ensure protectiveness, the Superfund remedy selection process needs to be completed and a protective remedy implemented .... Additionally, long-term protectiveness may require compliance with use restrictions that prohibit interference with remedy components, limit use of land and groundwater, and advise against fish consumption until standards are met.” As referenced in the EPA five-year report, on December 29, 1999, FTL and NWI Land Management Corporation (“NWI”), along with thirty affiliates, (collectively, “the Debtors”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The U.S. EPA and State of Michigan, among others, filed claims as creditors to protect their rights to recover funds for cleanup efforts. See, e.g., Resp. Br. Ex. D (U.S. proof of claim). On March 22, 2002, the bankruptcy court confirmed the Debtors’ Third Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (“the Plan”). Subsequent to the filing of a plan supplement on April 3, 2002, the Plan was amended by the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order of April 19, 2002. Generally, under the Plan, the Debtors are discharged “from all debts of, Claims against, Liens on the property of, and Equity Interests or any other interests in [the Debtors] and their assets and properties ... that arose at any time before the entry of the Confirmation Order (including ... all Claims that have been, may be, or could have been asserted against NWI and on which any other member of [FTL] or Reorganized [FTL] is or may be liable in any amount and for any reason) to the fullest extent permitted by law.” Plan § 13.2.1; see also Confirmation Order ¶¶ 26, 43(a). The discharge is deemed to be effective “regardless of whether a proof of Claim or Equity Interest therefore was filed....” Plan § 13.2.1. The Plan prohibits prosecution of discharged claims. Plan § 13.2.2; see also Confirmation Order ¶ 43(b). The Plan provides for the retention of jurisdiction to, inter alia, enforce the Plan’s discharge and injunction provisions. Plan § 15.1(w); see also Confirmation Order ¶ 76. The Plan does not provide for the continuation of FTL or NWI’s business operations. NWI-1 is a successor entity as to certain obligations and assets, but is essentially defunct and exists for very limited purposes. Consistent with § 16.5 of the Plan, a settlement agreement between the EPA, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Tennessee, FTL, NWI, Velsicol, and True Speciality Corporation (Velsicol’s parent corporation) was incorporated into the Plan by the Plan Supplement. See S. Agmt. ¶ 21. The United States’ motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement explains that “Congress expressed a strong preference that the United States settle with responsible parties in order to avoid spending resources on litigation rather than on cleanup,” citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a). The motion also advances the following rationale for the settlement agreement: The settlement provides a mechanism to marshal the limited related assets of FTL, NWI, and Velsicol towards the cleanup of the Seven Facilities. The Seven Properties will be held by a Trustee rather than abandoned through bankruptcy liquidation. The settlement avoids the need for protracted and expensive litigation and adjudication of the factual and legal issues. The Agreement obtains important benefits of administrative expense payments, insurance proceeds, and proceeds from the Preferred Shares that would have been subject of hotly contested litigation in the absence of the settlement. The Agreement is consistent with CERCLA because it is expected to result in significant recoveries to help clean up the Seven Facilities that might not otherwise be obtained and avoids the abandonment of the Seven Facilities through the liquidation of the Debtors, (citations and footnotes omitted). The Settlement Agreement was signed on dates ranging from March 12 to April 19, 2002. It resolves claims of the United States and the State parties against the settling parties and certain related entities or persons under CERCLA, Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6973, and the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. relating to the St. Louis Facility, and six other Facilities. It also requires the Plan to provide that “holders of claims against NWI/FTL other than the Parties to this Agreement shall have no rights against the NWI/FTL Successor, FTL, and the Custodial Trust other than the rights provided to holders of allowed claims as set forth specifically in Paragraph 7(b) or 8.” S. Agmt. ¶ 2(f); see also S. Agmt. ¶ 21. In introductory recitals, the Settlement Agreement explains that in 1986, “in connection with a management buyout of Velsicol ... FTL, NWI, and Velsicol entered into an A & I [Assumption Indemnity] Agreement and NWI agreed to take title to the Seven Properties, as defined herein,” and that “the A & I Agreement provided that under certain circumstances FTL and NWI may be contractually obligated to indemnify Velsicol for certain environmental liabilities with respect to the Seven Facilities and the A & I Facilities,” and that “on February 28, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order approving the rejection by FTL of the A & I Agreement.” In its motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement the United States explained that the Settlement Agreement was based in part on Velsieol’s limited ability to pay for the liabilities of the Seven Facilities after rejection of the A & I Agreement and the Debtors’ bankruptcy filing: The ability to pay settlement with Velsicol is an instrumental and necessary part of the overall settlement since Velsicol’s cooperation is essential to recovery of insurance proceeds and the value from a sale of the Preferred Shares.... The settlement also permits Velsieol to continue functioning as a productive component of the economy while contributing significant amounts towards the cleanup of the Seven Facilities and its other environmental liabilities. Velsieol is also providing significant consideration in its interest in insurance proceeds, cooperation to give value to the Preferred Shares, and agreement to make up any shortfall if these recover less than $30 million for the Seven Facilities .... In the absence of the settlement, Velsieol would be unlikely to remain a viable entity if it had to pay for the cleanup of the Seven Facilities that was previously being indemnified by Debtors under the A & I Agreement. The introductory recitals to the Settlement Agreement further explain that “on or about August 11, 2000, Velsieol filed proofs of claim against Debtors FTL and NWI, on its own behalf and on behalf of EPA and all State Environmental Agencies and Subdivisions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 3005, for liabilities under CERCLA, contract law, and other applicable laws for the Seven Facilities and the A & I Facilities.” The recitals further provide that “the Governmental Parties contend that Debtors FTL and NWI have liability under CERCLA and the Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. and regulations promulgated thereunder, for response action and/or response costs and Natural Resource Damage with respect to the Seven Facilities and the A & I Facilities and that they are entitled to administrative expense priority for some of the Debtors’ environmental liability under CERCLA.” The recitals also provide that “NWI is the owner of certain Preferred Shares of stock in True Speciality Corporation, the parent corporation of Velsieol.” As pertinent here, the Settlement Agreement created two trusts, the NWI/ FTL Successor Liquidating Trust (“Successor Trust” or “NWI/FTL Successor”) and the Custodial Trust (“Custodial Trust”). Both Trusts must provide the United States with an annual budget for their administrative costs, which must be approved by the United States. SLT Agmt. § 3.4; CT Agmt. § 3.2. The purpose of the Custodial Trust is: to own the Seven Properties, carry out administrative functions related to the Seven Properties as set forth herein, manage and/or fund implementation of response actions or natural resource damage assessment and restoration actions selected and approved by the relevant Governmental Parties with respect to the Seven Facilities in order to facilitate response action at the Seven Facilities and ultimately to sell the Seven Properties, if possible.... Contributions and accretions to the Custodial Trust shall include: (1) the Seven Properties and proceeds of any lease, sale or other disposition of the Seven Properties, (2) payments from the NWI/FTL Successor of amounts received by the NWI/FTL Successor and payable to the Custodial Trust under the terms hereof, and (3) any interest earned on funds held by the Custodial Trust. SA ¶ 2(b). See also Plan § 7.22.4. The beneficiaries of the Custodial Trust are the United States, the State parties, and the Successor Liquidation Trust. CT Agmt. § 5.1. The obligations of the Custodial Trust are described as follows: The Custodial Trust, to the extent of the Custodial Trust Assets, hereby assumes Consent Decree liabilities or work obligations for the Seven Facilities to be funded through the Trust Accounts as provided in Paragraph 17 of the Settlement Agreement. The Custodial Trust shall implement any institutional controls or deed restrictions requested by the Governmental Parties with respect to the Seven Properties. In the event that the Court finds that the Custodial Trust exacerbated conditions at any of the Seven Facilities or violated the provisions of this Agreement or Custodial Trust Documentation, the United States after consultation with the States, may direct that all remaining funds and future recoveries in the Custodial Trust ... be paid to EPA (or to the States, or the designated natural resource trustees, if applicable) for use consistent with the terms of this Agreement. In no event shall the Administrative Trust Account have any liability or responsibility for any reason whatsoever as a result of the provisions contained in this Section 2.3. CT Agmt. § 2.3. The United States or a State party “may at any time propose in writing to take title to any of the Seven Properties. Any such proposed transfer and the terms thereof are subject to approval in writing by ... EPA and Michigan for the St. Louis Facility....” S. Agmt. ¶ 13. The purpose of the Successor Trust is to “implement this Agreement by receiving and distributing the assets held by it as set forth herein to the Custodial Trust and Velsicol Environmental Trust Fund described herein and the payments to the credits of NWI and FTL described in Paragraphs 7(b) and 8 hereof.” S. Agmt. ¶ 2(a). The Settlement Agreement further provides that assets of the Successor Trust shall not be used for “any purpose other than as expressly provided in this Agreement.” Id. The United States, the State parties, the Custodial Trust, and the Velsicol Environmental Trust Fund hold beneficial interests in the Successor Trust. Id.; SLT Agmt. § 6.1“. In further detail, the Settlement Agreement describes the Successor Trust as: the legal successor in interest to certain rights under the PLL Policy and all of NWI’s and FTL’s rights under the insurance policies that are the subject of the Illinois Insurance Litigation to facilitate recoveries from such policies. Contributions and accretions to the NWI/ FTL Successor shall include: (1) payment of the Allowed Administrative Expense Claims, (2) proceeds from the Illinois Insurance Litigation, (3) proceeds related to the Seven Facilities and the A & I Facilities for claims made under the PLL Policy, (4) the recoveries under the Velsicol PLL Policy for the Seven Facilities, (5) proceeds in respect of the Velsicol Preferred Shares, and (6) interest earned upon funds held by the NWI/ FTL Successor. The NWI/FTL Successor shall not own or have any legal interest in the Seven Properties. Instead, the Parties will not oppose NWI’s proposed transfer of, and NWI shall transfer the Seven Properties to an independent Custodial Trust which will hold title to the Seven Properties. See also Plan § 7.22.3. Both the Successor Liquidation Trust Agreement and Custodial Trust Agreement provide that the respective Trustee’s “powers are exercisable solely in a fiduciary capacity consistent with, and in furtherance of, the purposes of the [respective] Trust and Settlement Agreement and not otherwise.” SLT Agmt. § 4.2; CT Agmt. § 4.2. Each trust is “authorized to perform any and all acts necessary and desirable to accomplish the purposes of the [respective] Trust.” SLT Agmt. § 4.3; CT Agmt. § 4.3. The Trust Agreements each provide for exculpation and indemnification of the Trustees, NWI, and FTL against “holders of claims and other parties in interest, of and from any and all claims, causes of action and other assertions of liability arising out of ownership of the [respective] Trust Assets and the discharge of powers and duties conferred upon the [respective] Trust and the [respective] Trustee by the Plan, the Settlement Agreement, this Agreement or any order of the Court entered pursuant to or in furtherance of [those], other than actions or omissions to act to the extent determined by a final order of the Court to be due to their own willful misconduct or fraud....” SLT Agmt. § 4.10; CT Agmt. § 4.10. The Trust Accounts were to receive initial funding in the amount of the Allowed Administrative Expense Claims, which was $4,292,808, subject to certain reductions. S. Agmt. ¶¶ 3(b), 4(a). After the initial funding, proceeds received from certain insurance litigation and proceeds from the Velsicol Preferred Shares were to be allocated among the Seven Facilities, including “28% for response action or costs for the St. Louis Facility.” S. Agmt. ¶ 4(a). The United States reserved the right to notify the parties and Trustees that its estimates have changed and to revise the percentage allocation. Id. The Settlement Agreement particularly noted: “With respect to the St. Louis facility, after additional response action is selected for this Facility, EPA and Michigan shall notify the Parties, NWI/FTL Successor, and the Custodial Trust as to how the percentage allocation/funding for the Facility will be equitably allocated between operation and maintenance and other response aetion/costs....” Id. Under the Settlement Agreement, the United States on behalf of EPA is entitled to “an Allowed General Unsecured Claim against NWI in the total amount of $61,552,537 ... [including] $60 million for unreimbursed past and future response costs for [the Pine River site] of the St. Louis Facility.” S. Agmt. ¶ 4(b). The agreement provides that “Allowed General Unsecured Claims under this Agreement shall not be discriminated against or subordinated to other allowed general unsecured claims against NWI and shall receive the distribution afforded such claims against NWI in accordance with the Plan of Reorganization.” Id. The Settlement Agreement provides that the Trusts will not “be held liable to any third parties for any liability, action, or inaction of any other Party, including each other.” S. Agmt. ¶ 10(b). It further provides that if an action is filed against either Trust “by third parties seeking to hold either responsible for any liability, action, or inaction”: the United States, after consultation with the States, may direct that some or all of the remaining funds and assets in the Custodial Trust and the NWI/FTL Successor ... be transferred to EPA (or to the States, or the designated natural resources trustees, if applicable) for use consistent with the terms of this Agreement. Id. The Trusts are “deemed to have resolved their civil liability under CERCLA to the United States and the States and have contribution protection against any claims for contribution for existing contamination at the Seven Facilities.” S. Agmt. ¶ 10(c); CT Agmt. § 2.9. The Settlement Agreement required FTL to seek a confirmation order that provides, inter alia, that “except as expressly permitted under the Settlement Agreement, all persons and entities shall be enjoined from making any claim against the NWI/FTL Successor, the Custodial Trust, or the Velsicol Environmental Trust Fund or the assets held therein or thereby that arose prior to the effective date of the Plan of Reorganization.” S. Agmt. ¶ 21. The Settlement Agreement was published in the Federal Register at 67 Fed. Reg. 22, 108, on May 2, 2002. The public comment period was open until July 9, 2002, and the United States held a public meeting in St. Louis on June 19, 2002, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d). On June 28, 2002, St. Louis Mayor George Kubin wrote a letter to the United States, expressing concern that “the local community was never allowed to comment on or be a part of the consent agreement,” although he acknowledged that a public meeting took place in St. Louis. See Defs. Resp. Br. Ex. A. He indicated that it was his impression that it had been announced at the meeting “that none of the funds that might be collected from the settlement will be for redevelopment of the property in St. Louis, Michigan.” Id. Similarly, on July 1, 2002, St. Louis City Manager Dennis Collison wrote a letter to the United States expressing concern. Id. His letter criticized the 1982 consent judgment entered into by Velsicol, Michigan, and the U.S. EPA whereby Velsicol agreed to construct a slurry wall and clay cap at the main plant site. Id. He was critical of the fact that the Pine River was not required to be remediated by the 1982 consent judgment. Id. On July 25, 2002, the United States sent Plaintiff, through Mayor Kubin, notice of the United States’ motion for approval of the proposed settlement pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and under CERCLA, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 50.7. The United States’ motion describes the city officials as “seeking a guarantee of cooperation from the Trustee, funding for needed operation and maintenance of the remedial action, cleanup of areas with low contamination and a high potential for reuse, and governmental funding for all cleanup and operations and maintenance.” The United States’ motion asserts that nothing in the Settlement Agreement prevents the Custodial Trustee from providing cooperation to St. Louis, that the Settlement Agreement does not make any decisions about the response action to be implemented at the St. Louis Facility, and that nothing restricts St. Louis’ ability to comment during the response selection process. The motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement also memorializes the fact that the United States received three public comments from citizen groups or committees relating to the St. Louis Facility in St. Louis, Michigan (the Pine River Superfund Citizen Task Force, the Technical Advisory Committee for the Pine River Superfund Citizen Task Force, and the Sierra Club’s Water Sentinels Project). The motion notes the following: The commenters ... request that priority be given for use of funding for the St. Louis Facility for natural resource damages restoration. There is currently an investigation being conducted to determine if the previously installed containment system, a slurry wall, is leaking or if contaminants are escaping underneath the barriers that were installed. At this time, highest priority must be given to investigate and address the source of the ongoing releases and to ongoing operation and maintenance (“0 & M”) to prevent further releases. If there is not sufficient funding to address the ongoing releases an 0 & M, further natural resource damage will occur, the effectiveness of EPA’s expenditure of $60 million on the Pine River cleanup that benefits natural resources would be jeopardized, and natural resource damage restoration would be threatened by the ongoing releases .... In addition, as part of the investigation/response action and 0 & M for the Facility, the Governments expect to include natural resource damage monitoring of the Facility that will also benefit natural resources. The United States agrees that if funding remains after the releases are addressed, the United States and States should be permitted to agree that such funding be used for natural resource damage assessment or restoration without formally amending the Agreement. On August 9, 2002, the bankruptcy court entered an order approving the EPA Settlement Agreement, with a few clarifications. In part, the order provides that: any distributions received by the United States with respect to its Allowed Class 4B Claim under the Plan for the St. Louis Facility shall be deposited in the Velsicol Chemical/St. Louis, Michigan Site Special Account within the EPA Hazardous Substance Superfund to be retained and used to conduct or finance response actions at or in connection with the Site.... It further provides that: with respect to the St. Louis Facility, if there is any amount remaining of the funding under the Environmental Settlement Agreement which is dedicated to the St. Louis Facility after (i) response action relating to ongoing releases and (ii) ongoing operation and maintenance are each addressed or provided for, then the United States and the State of Michigan may make an appropriate allocation of the remaining funding for Natural Resource Damages with respect to the St. Louis Facility .... The approval order also provides that “each and every proof of claim” against NWI, FTL, or other debtor, whether filed by the United States, its agencies, the states, their agencies, Defendant Velsicol individually, or Defendant Velsicol on behalf of another entity, was “withdrawn with prejudice and expunged, except for the Allowed Governmental Claims .... ” ¶ 10 (emphasis in original). The bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction “to hear and determine all matters including, without limitation, disputes arising under the Environmental Settlement Agreement ... or this Order.” ¶ 18. On March 19, 2007, the bankruptcy court closed the case but again retained jurisdiction “to hear and determine all matters arising under the Environmental Settlement Agreement and this Court’s August 9, 2002 Order.” Similarly, the Settlement Agreement provides for the bankruptcy court to: ... retain jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Agreement, the Parties hereto, the NWI/FTL Successor, the Custodial Trustee, and the Velsicol Fund Trustee for the duration of the performance of the terms and provisions of this Agreement for the purpose of enabling any of the Parties, the NWI/ FTL Successor, the Custodial Trustee, the Velsicol Fund Trustee, and the third party beneficiaries to apply to the Court for such further order, direction, and relief as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or interpretation of this Agreement or to effectual [sic] or enforce compliance with its terms. S. Agmt. ¶ 26. Plaintiff advances a declaration of St. Louis City Manager Robert McConkie, in which he states that “[t]he City of St. Louis first learned of the contamination of the City’s wells with ... (pCBSA) on Friday September 23, 2005, during a meeting with [EPA representatives].” McConkie Decl. ¶ 2, Oct. 5, 2007; Mot. to Remand Ex. A. McConkie further states that “[t]he City tests its drinking water pursuant to Safe Drinking Water Act requirements, and it has relied on the expertise of the EPA and [MDEQ] to test drinking water and monitoring wells for contaminants related to the Velsicol plant site. Id. ¶ 3. Finally, Plaintiff advances the declaration of the director of the Environmental Studies Program at Alma College, Murray Borrello, who states that the golf course owned by Defendant Edgewood Farms contains p-CBSA contamination. Borrello Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Oct. 8, 2007; Mot. to Remand Ex. B-l. Ill A party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.1999). In their notice of removal, the Trustees and NWI-1 (in this section, “Defendants”) cite the following bases for removal: (1) bankruptcy removal jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 1334(b) and 1452(a); (2) federal officer removal jurisdiction pursuant to § 1442(a); and (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332. Plaintiff contends that not one of the three bases for federal jurisdiction support removal to this Court. A Plaintiff contends that bankruptcy jurisdiction does not exist because Plaintiffs claims do not arise under, arise in, or relate to any bankruptcy case, as necessary to establish bankruptcy jurisdiction pursuant to § 1334(b). Assuming Plaintiffs claims fall within the scope of § 1334(b), Plaintiff contends that removal of its claims is barred by § 1452(a), because Plaintiff is a governmental entity seeking to enforce its police or regulatory power. Finally, Plaintiff contends that this Court must or should abstain from exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction pursuant to § 1334(c) based on the state-law nature of Plaintiffs claims. 1 Section 1334(b) provides that “the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” The Sixth Circuit has recognized that “Congress intended to grant to the district courts broad jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.” In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). When claims brought in a civil proceeding do not “arise under” Title 11, but may be “related to” a bankruptcy proceeding, the pertinent test is “whether the outcome of that [civil] proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Id. In other words, “there must be some nexus between the ‘related’ proceeding and the title 11 case.” Id. More specifically, “[a]n action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). See, e.g., Robinson v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579, 583-84 (6th Cir.1990) (concluding that the action was “related to” a bankruptcy proceeding when the plaintiffs sued the bankruptcy trustee in his official capacity and sought recovery from the estate because “the litigation could conceivably affect the size of the ... estate”). However, an “extremely tenuous connection” does not suffice for “related to” jurisdiction. Sanders Confectionery Prods. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 482 (6th Cir.1992) (quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff advances three primary arguments to support the proposition that this action is not “related to” a bankruptcy proceeding. First, Plaintiff contends that its claims are not related to the FTL bankruptcy because Plaintiffs claims cannot affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate when the estate has ceased to exist. Plaintiff relies primarily on Falise v. American Tobacco Co., 241 B.R. 63 (E.D.N.Y.1999), wherein the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that “[t]he mere fact that the property from a debtor’s estate is transferred to a trust following the confirmation of a bankruptcy plan does not mean the bankruptcy estate itself continues to exist.” Id. at 65. Rather, “[t]he bankruptcy estate ceases to exist upon confirmation and substantial consummation of the plan in a Chapter 11 reorganization.” Id. Thus, the court found that bankruptcy jurisdiction did not exist because the action was not “related to” a bankruptcy action when it could not “impact!] upon the handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, Plaintiff contends that its claims are not “related to” the bankruptcy proceeding because they were not discharged by the FTL bankruptcy proceedings when Plaintiff was not a creditor in 2002 when the bankruptcy plan was confirmed. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (“[T]he confirmation of a plan ... discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation .... ”). Plaintiff relies on Michigan law for the proposition that a toxic tort cause of action “accrues” when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury, citing Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., 473 Mich. 63, 701 N.W.2d 684, 702 n. 29 (2005). Plaintiff asserts that it did not know that contaminants had reached its drinking water wells until September 2005. See McConkie Decl. ¶ 2. However, Plaintiff does not address whether it “should have known” of the contamination. The correspondence of the City Manager and Mayor in June and July 2002 reflects concerns regarding environmental damage, and knowledge of the bankruptcy litigation and Settlement Agreement. Third, and related, Plaintiff contends that its claims are not “related to” the bankruptcy proceeding because the bankruptcy plan does not bind Plaintiff when it was not a creditor of FTL. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (“[T]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor ... and any creditor .... ”). Plaintiff also contends that it is not bound by the EPA settlement agreement because the only parties to the agreement are the United States, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Tennessee, FTL, NWI, Velsicol, and True Specialty Corporation. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (“It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”). Plaintiff further contends that the EPA settlement agreement is not even “relevant” to this action because it “relates only the cleanup of Velsicol’s contaminated properties and EPA’s and the State’s rights of reimbursement under the federal [CERCLA] ... [and] rests on a CERCLA order entered into decades before the City discovered the contamination to its water.” Plaintiff contends that this is in contrast to Plaintiffs complaint, which is “about treatment or replacement of its contaminated drinking water system, which has never been included in any cleanup plans.” In response, Defendants contend that the exhaustive nature of the Settlement Agreement and Plan “makes clear” that Plaintiffs claims are at least “related to” the FTL bankruptcy proceeding. Defendants specifically contend that the Settlement Agreement bars Plaintiffs claims, limits the use of Trust proceeds to approved claim holders in the FTL bankruptcy, limits Defendants’ liability, enjoins parties from making claims against Defendants that arose prior to the plan’s effective date, and provides that the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over the subject matter of the agreement. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lawsuit is essentially a collateral attack on the confirmed Plan and Settlement Agreement incorporated therein, quoting Pratt v. Ventas, Inc., 365 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir.2004) (“A ‘collateral attack’ is a tactic whereby a party seeks to circumvent an earlier ruling of one court by filing a subsequent action in another court.”) (citations omitted). See also Sanders Confectionery Prods., 973 F.2d at 481 (noting that “collateral attacks on confirmed plans ... undermin[e] the necessary ability of bankruptcy courts to settle all of the claims against the debtor”). Plaintiffs claims are “related to” the FTL bankruptcy proceedings because the proceedings here could alter “rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action” and could “impact! ] upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.” Robinson, 918 F.2d at 583-84. Regardless of the notion that the estate ceased to exist upon confirmation of the Plan, Plaintiff has sued the Trustees (Lepetomane II and III) of the Successor and Custodial Trusts, which were created pursuant to the Plan, solely for the purpose of holding estate property and distributing estate assets. Lepetomane II and III are not entities that have emerged from bankruptcy to resume business operations, but creations of the bankruptcy proceedings to resolve particular creditor claims. The resources of the Custodial and Successor Trusts, of which Lepetomane II and III are the Trustees, are subject exclusively to the terms and administration of the bankruptcy court orders and the incorporated Settlement Agreement. Thus, any recovery from the funds of the Trusts would necessarily impact the administration of the bankrupt estate, and “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction exists under § 1334(b). 2 The bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), limits the civil actions that can be removed to federal court when the only basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction is § 1334. Section 1452(a) provides: A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action other than ... a civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power ... if [the] district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title. The parties agree that this Coxirt should look to the “automatic stay” provision of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, to help interpret § 1452(a). See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liability Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 132 (2d Cir.2007) (“As the language of the police and regulatory power exceptions in the automatic stay context and in the removal context is virtually identical, and the purpose behind each exception is the same, we think it proper to look to judicial interpretations of section 362 for guidance.”) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff contends that this action is “a civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power.” Plaintiff relies generally on In re Javens, 107 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir.1997), wherein the Sixth Circuit clarified that under the police and regulatory power exception, the automatic stay does not operate when “a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law.” Javens, 107 F.3d at 363 (quoting S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5838). Plaintiff also relies on MTBE, 488 F.3d 112, which it contends is “indistinguishable” from the case now before the Court. In MTBE, the Second Circuit addressed “lawsuits originally filed by the States of California and New Hampshire in their respective state courts against corporations that manufactured, refined, marketed, or distributed gasoline containing ... [MTBE].” 488 F.3d at 114. The complaints alleged that “MTBE contaminated public drinking water supplies through discharges, leaks, overfills, and spills from gasoline delivery facilities, as well as from the release of gasoline in certain consumer and commercial activities.” Id. The court found that § 1452 prevented the removal of the plaintiffs’ claims, and rejected the defendants’ argument that it was significant that “the government action directed against the debtor relates mainly to the protection of a pecuniary interest rather than the enforcement of regulatox*y police powers for the protection of the general public.” Id. at 132-34. The court noted that any money damages “will not inure, strictly speaking,