Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION STATING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ALAN B. JOHNSON, District Judge. This matter is before the Court following a nine-day bench trial. At trial, the Plaintiffs, five members of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes, were represented by Laughlin McDonald and Bryan Sells from the American Civil Liberties Union. The defendants, Fremont County, Wyoming, the Fremont County Commissioners, and the Fremont County Court Clerk were represented by J. Scott Detamore of the Mountain States Legal Foundation and Richard Rideout. Having carefully considered the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. Introduction The Plaintiffs in this matter are enrolled members of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe and the Northern Arapaho Tribe. The defendants are Fremont County, the members of the County Commission, and the County Clerk, who are sued in their official capapities. The plaintiffs all reside on the Wind River Indian Reservation (sometimes referred to as “WRIR”), and are all residents of Fremont County, Wyoming. Fremont County is the second largest county in Wyoming. Within its borders lie the towns of Riverton and Lander, as well as several smaller settlements including Ethete, Hudson, Arapahoe, Fort Washakie, Jeffrey City, Shoshoni, and Dubois. The Fremont County Commission consists of five members elected from the county at-large, with no ward residency requirement. Elections are partisan, and terms of office are staggered and for four years, with two members elected in presidential election years and three members elected in off-years. Election is by plurality vote. The plaintiffs challenge the elections for the County Commission on the basis that the elections dilute Indian voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs ask this Court to find that Fremont County’s at-large method for electing county commissioners violates the Voting Rights Act, and therefore ask this Court to set aside the County’s system. The defendants contend that Fremont County’s at-large method for county commission elections does not violate the Voting Rights Act. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has explained, in a broad sense, the underpinnings of a § 2 claim: The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [Indian] and white voters to elect their preferred representatives. [The Supreme Court] has long recognized that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may ‘operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial minorities in the voting population.’ The theoretical basis for this type of impairment is that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters. Multi-member districts and at-large election schemes, however, are not per se violative of minority voters’ rights. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) (internal citations omitted). In Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1322 (10th Cir.1996), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the role of the courts and the parties in Voting Rights Act cases. There the court explained: Plaintiffs are not required to rebut all the evidence of non-dilution to establish vote dilution. “Rather, the provision requires the court’s overall judgment, based on the totality of circumstances and guided by those relevant factors in the particular case, of whether the voting strength of minority voters is, in the language of Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965), ‘minimized or canceled out.’ ” 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 n. 118. “[T]he ultimate conclusions about equality or inequality of opportunity were intended by Congress to be judgments resting on comprehensive, not limited, canvassing of relevant facts.” De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011, 114 S.Ct. at 2657. Background A look at current demographics in Fremont County is a useful exercise, as it not only establishes the general background of this case but it also provides the data that underlies a crucial component of plaintiffs’ case. According to the 2000 census, Fremont County has a population of 35,804. The county seat is Lander. The most populous city is Riverton, with 9,310. Final Pretrial Order, p. 5; PI. Ex. 234, p. 2 (Report of William Cooper). The county has a single-race Indian population of 7,047 (19.68%). Counting persons who self-identified as more than one race and some part Indian (or “any part”), there are 7,497 Indians (20.94%). Final Pretrial Order, p. 5; PI. Ex. 234, p. 2 (Report of William Cooper). Latinos, who may be of any race, comprise the next largest minority category in the county, representing 4.37% of the population. Of the 1,566 Latinos in Fremont County, 213 are “any part” Indian. Final Pretrial Order, p. 5; PI. Ex. 234, p. 3 (Report of William Cooper). The minority population in Fremont County is 9,111 (25.45%), defined as all persons who are not single-race non-Hispanic white. Final Pretrial Order, p. 5; PI. Ex. 234, p. 3 (Report of William Cooper). Over half (55.8%) of the county’s Indian population is concentrated in the communities of Fort Washakie (1,379), Ethete (1,376), and Arapahoe (1,431). Final Pretrial Order, p. 5; PI. Ex. 234, p. 3 (Report of William Cooper). There are 25,977 persons of voting age and 4,164 single-race Indians over 18 in Fremont County (16.03%). Including persons who are “any part” Indian, there are 4,419 Indians over 18(17.01%). The minority voting age population is 5,464 (21.03%). Final Pretrial Order, p. 5; PI. Ex. 234, p. 4 (Report of William Cooper). In the 2000 census, 2,075 persons in Fremont County self-identified as Shoshone. A larger group of 4,102 persons are placed in the “all other tribes” category by the census tabulation. There was no specified category choice for the Arapaho tribe. The third largest tribal identification is Sioux — selected by 229 persons. Final Pretrial Order, pp. 5-6; PI. Ex. 234, p. 4 (Report of William Cooper). The Indian population in Fremont County grew between 1980 and 2000, even as the overall population declined from 38,992 in 1980 to 35,804 in 2000. Final Pretrial Order, p. 6; PL Ex. 234, p. 4 (Report of William Cooper). Most of the county’s population decline occurred during the 1980s and can be attributed to a decline in the non-Hispanic white population. Between 1980 and 1990, the non-Hispanic white population fell by 6,972 persons (-20.97%). By contrast, the Indian population grew in the 1980s, adding I,836 persons over the decade — for a net gain of 41.68%. Final Pretrial Order, p. 6; Pl. Ex. 234, pp. 4-5 (Report of William Cooper). According to the 1980 census, II.25% of the county’s population was single-race Indian. By 1990, the single-race Indian population represented 18.48% of the population. In 1980, non-Hispanic whites comprised 85.26% of the county’s population, but by 1990 the percentage had dropped to 78.05%. Final Pretrial Order, p. 6; Pl. Ex. 234, p. 5 (Report of William Cooper). Between 1990 and 2000, Fremont County reversed the sharp population loss of the 1980s and grew by 6.36%, or 2,142 persons. Final Pretrial Order, p. 6; PL Ex. 234, pp. 5-6 (Report of William Cooper). The Indian population continued to grow over the decade of the 1990s, but at a slower pace. Between 1990 and 2000, the single-race Indian population climbed by 825 persons (13.26%) to 7,047, representing 19.68% of the overall population at the time of the 2000 census. Final Pretrial Order, p. 6; PL Ex. 234, p. 6 (Report of William Cooper). Since 2000, Fremont County’s overall population count has been relatively stable. Census Bureau estimates for 2005 show a total population of 36,491, a 1.9% increase since 2000. The Indian population continues growing. The Census Bureau estimates that the “any part” Indian population in the county reached 7,934 in 2005, representing 21.7% of the countywide population. Final Pretrial Order, p. 7; PI. Ex. 234, p. 6 (Report of William Cooper). In short, the Indian population in Fremont County is a significant portion of the County’s total population. The historical and current experiences of Indians in Fremont County must also be addressed. The long history of discrimination against Indians in the United States, Wyoming, and Fremont County is undeniable. The evidence presented to this Court reveals that discrimination is ongoing, and that the effects of historical discrimination remain palpable. The Court rejects any attempt to characterize this discrimination as being politically, rather than racially, motivated. It is unnecessary at this point for the Court to draft a treatise on federal Indian policy or the historical experience of American Indians in the west. Suffice it to say that the record is replete with expressions of anti-Indian sentiment, both historical and current, and evidence of culturally-erosive policies such as allotment and compulsory boarding school enrollment. A more focused discussion of the effect of those practices and policies on the experience of members of the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes is, however, necessary. The history of discrimination against members of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes goes back to the settlement of the frontier, a time period that is marked by a series of treaties which gradually decreased tribal land holdings. Skirmishes, often violent, between whites and Indians during that time are well-documented. The needs of the two groups were clearly at odds — one driven by sovereignty, the other by manifest destiny, the two groups could not possibly share territory without conflict, even in a land as vast as the west. This was evidenced then by requests by the State Legislature to Congress to extinguish Indian title to the eastern portion of the reservation for the purpose of establishing a route between Montana and Wyoming; it is evidenced now by the ongoing dispute between the Tribe and the City of Riverton regarding jurisdiction over the land that comprises the City. (PI. Req. Jud. Not. 28 Council Resolution and Joint Memorial No. 15, Ch. 99,1879 Wyo. Sess. 166). The cultures of the two groups were also often at odds. Treaties required Indian children to attend school and to be given an English education. (PI. Ex. 330 (Treaty with the Cheyenne and Arapaho, Oct. 28, 1867), 15 Stat. 593, Art. 7); PI. Ex. 331 (Treaty with the Sioux and Arapaho, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, Art. 7); PL Ex. 332 (Treaty with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapaho, May 10, 1868, 15 Stat. 655, Art. 4); Pl. Ex. 333 (Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshoni and Bannock, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673, Art. 7). In 1884, the Indian Department issued rules that the “ ‘sun dance,’ the ‘scalp-dance,’ the ‘war-dance,’ and all other so-called feasts assimilating thereto, shall be considered ‘Indian offenses,’ ” punishable by withholding of rations and imprisonment. The rules also provided that the “usual practices of so-called ‘medicine men’ shall be considered ‘Indian offenses’ cognizable by the Court of Indian Offenses” and punished by imprisonment. PI. Ex. 340 (Indian Department Rule No. 497(4th) and (6th) (1884)). On several occasions the Wyoming Legislature acted on laws or resolutions that treated whites and Indians differently. State law made it a crime to sell Indians wine or liquor. PI. Req. Jud. Not. 26 (Act of December 11, 1873, Ch. VII, 1873 Wyo. Sess. 1680); PI. Req. Jud. Not. 52 (Act of 1897, 29 Stat. 506). In 1890 the legislature sent a resolution to Congress that “as the game has nearly all been killed, ... the only use to which arms are put by these savages on their excursions is the killing of the cattle of the settlers and menacing them and their families,” and requested Congressional legislation “as will result in the complete disarming of the Indians, and in keeping them on their reservations.” PI. Req. Jud. Not. 45 (Disarmament of the Indians, 1890 Wyo. Sess. 413). The ongoing hostility of white settlers to Indians was apparent in a 1890 memorial to Congress by the Wyoming legislature seeking reparations for “victims of Indian avarice, malevolence, robbery, murder and other crimes of the most hideous character committed by numerous bands of Indians inhabiting the country lying west of the Missouri River.” PI. Req. Jud. Not. 42. (Indian Depredation Claims, 1890 Wyo. Sess. 211). Another memorial from the Wyoming legislature requested Congress to adjudicate and pay claims of settlers and travelers who “sustained losses by reason of Indian outrages and deprivations committed without provocation.” PI. Req. Jud. Not. 46 (Claims Arising from Indian Depredation, 1890 Wyo. Sess. 419). As far as the federal government was concerned, the Indian residents of the country were different, as they were not citizens of the United States until 1924. Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act in 1924, declaring Indians to be citizens of the United States. PI. Req. Jud. Not. 70 (Pub.L. No. 175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924)). While citizenship presumably carried with it the right of franchise, literacy tests may have acted as a bar to an individual Indian’s ability to exercise that right. Wyoming had, since it was enacted in 1890, a literacy test in addition to its citizenship requirement for voting. PI. Req. Jud. Not. 44 (Wyo. Const., 1890 Wyo. Sess. 51). There is some evidence that this statute was seen by some reservation superintendents as an opportunity to impede the Indian vote. The Superintendent of the Crow Agency wrote to the Superintendent at Fort Washakie requesting a copy of the Wyoming law containing “an educational requirement for voters.” “I am inclined to think,” he said, “that this is a very good thing in this case, as there are certainly many Indians on your reservation and on my reservation who are utterly incapable of voting intelligently.” PI. Ex. 28 (C.H. Asbury, Supt. Crow Agency, to R.P. Haas, Supt. Ft. Washakie, June 9, 1924). The superintendent at Fort Washakie replied quoting sec. 9, art. 6, Wyoming Compiled Statutes (Annotated 1910), that: “No person shall have the right to vote who shall not be able to read the constitution of this state.” PI. Ex. 29 (R.P. Haas to C.H. Asbury, June 26, 1924.) As this statute was passed prior to the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, the plaintiffs do not assert that the provision was adopted with an intent to prevent Indians from voting. The literacy requirement was reenacted again in 1943, and once again in 1951. (PI. Req. Jud. Not. 85 (Act of Feb. 5, 1943, Ch. 27, 1943 Wyo. Sess. 25. 88); PI. Req. Jud. Not. 88 (Election Law Revision Act, ch. 127, 1951 Wyo. Sess. 197). The literacy requirement remained in effect until 1971, after passage of amendments to the Voting Rights Act in 1970 making the ban on literacy tests nationwide. PL Req. Jud. Not. 103 (Act of Feb. 27, 1971, ch. 178, 1971 Wyo. Sess. 236). One can only guess as to whether, or to what extent, the literacy test acted as an impediment to the exercise of the Indian vote in Fremont County. The conflict between the white settlers and the Indians was felt in Fremont County. The 1895 minutes of the Fremont County Commission noted “difficulties existing between the white settlers and the Indians arising from conflict between the Shoshone Indians Treaty and the Wyoming state laws governing hunting upon the unoccupied land,” and directed the county attorney to confer with the Indian Agent “for the adjustment of the matter.” PL Ex. 1 (Minutes of Meeting, Fremont County Commission, March 4, 1895). Two weeks later, the minutes reflected that white trappers in Fremont County had fired upon some Indians, who then undertook to retaliate. The confrontation ended up in court and was settled by an agreement that “in the future, no Indians should be permitted to leave the said Indian Reservation and go upon the said upper Big Wind River lands unless accompanied by one or more Indian Police.” Pl. Ex. 2 (Minutes of Meeting, Fremont County Commission, March 28,1895). Policies intended to stifle culture continued into the twentieth century. Several witnesses at trial testified to the effect of boarding schools on them families and their culture. Burton Hutchinson attended boarding school at St. Michael’s Mission in Ethete. He grew up speaking Arapaho, and did not know how to speak English. He was sent to boarding school where students were punished for speaking their native language. Hutchinson’s braids were cut, and religion and bible classes were mandated. Burton Hutchinson Depo., at 11-18. Patricia Bergie’s testimony demonstrated the pervasive effects of the boarding school experience. Bergie’s parents were forced to speak English and were not permitted to speak their native language. Bergie testified that as a result, her parents chose to teach her to speak English instead of Shoshone “because of their experiences with washing out their mouth and being hit and stuff like that.” She further testified that the result of her parents’ experience was that they were “very distrustful of the white people,” and that “it caused a lot of self-esteem problems, so just not being confident in that larger society.” Tr. Trans, at 650-51. At trial there was extensive testimony regarding racial tension and conflicts in the public schools. Burton Hutchinson testified about the effect that racial tension had on his public school education. He explained that he gave up after one year at the high school in Lander because of racial tension. “You weren’t really recognized because you were Indian, you know. I noticed that. A lot of us gave up the first year ... I felt that it wasn’t no good.” Burton Hutchinson Depo. at 23. Hutchinson’s experience was in the 1940s. Patricia Bergie also testified that her experience at school was intimidating, and that the low expectations that the white teachers had for the students resulted in the students developing esteem problems. Tr. Trans, at 652-53. Gary Collins testified that he witnessed “innuendos and slurs and racial actions” aimed at native students. Tr. Trans, at 576. Witnesses also testified to racial tension within the communities in Fremont County. Several witnesses testified to seeing signs on local businesses saying “No Dogs Or Indians Allowed.” Emma Lucille McAdams testified that her family was once refused service at a café in Riverton. Tr. Trans, at 996-997. While much of this testimony came from adults whose experiences occurred several decades ago, the Court also received evidence that racial tension is not a bygone. Michelle Hoffman is Superintendent of Fremont County School District No. 14, which includes Wyoming Indian High School. In her experiences traveling with Indian students in the non-Indian community, Hoffman has several times observed race-based conflicts, including taunting and racial slurs by both white students and adults. Tr. Trans, at 1085-1086. Sarah Wiles, Betty Friday, Keja Whiteman, Patricia Bergie, Ivan Posey, Michelle Hoffman, Helsha Acuna and Richard Brannan all testified to either personally experiencing or observing discrimination against Indians in businesses in towns in Fremont County, including Hudson, Lander, and Riverton. These experiences all occurred more recently, and some occurred within the last few years. The experiences included, inter alia, being ignored by sales people, being served only after whites had been served, being followed around in stores, being harassed by landlords, and receiving comments based on their race. Some witnesses testified that they had not personally experienced nor observed any instances of racism in Fremont County. Ms. McAdams testified that in the last 20 years, she had not personally experienced any racism directed at her. Tr. Trans, at 1026. Gary Collins testified that he had not experienced any racial discrimination in the last twenty years in Fremont County. Tr. Trans, at 635. Several witnesses also testified about observing discrimination in law enforcement and in the criminal justice system. Again, while some of these experiences date back to almost forty years ago, others are more recent. Valerie Thomas testified that during her work as public defender in Fremont County, she observed that bail is routinely denied to Indian defendants but granted to white defendants. She also noticed that in reviewing files of white defendants it is usual to find consent forms for the taking of blood samples or breathalyzer tests, but that it was not unusual for those forms to be missing from the files of Native Americans. Tr. Trans, at 1249-1250. John Vincent, who was elected may- or of Riverton in 2002, testified that he has gotten complaints of racial discrimination in law enforcement by the Riverton Police. Based on the complaints, he requested the FBI to conduct an investigation. Riverton has since adopted a new policy of “community policing,” and Vincent testified that he has observed that the situation is improved. Tr. Trans, at 1746-1747. Culture-based conflicts also persist. One such conflict is evidenced by the former exhibits (and the effort to update them) in the Fremont County Pioneer Museum. Todd Guenther, former director of the Fremont County Pioneer Museum, testified regarding the conflict caused by the exhibits. Mr. Guenther was hired by the Fremont County Museums Board to oversee the operations at the Museum, which included the duty of caring for and interpreting the collections. The Museums Board is appointed by the County Commissioners. According to Mr. Guenther, in the early days a number of Indians were members and officers in the Pioneer Association, whose mission centers around historic preservation. Beginning in the 1940s, Native Americans stopped participating in the Pioneer Association. Tr. Trans, at 1206-1207. Mr. Guenther testified that the reason for the decline in participation was because Indians found the exhibits at the museum “to be very insulting and didn’t want to participate or visit that museum because of the ethnographic exhibits that had been in place probably since the '50s.” Tr. Trans, at 1207. Mr. Guenther applied for and received a grant to update the exhibits, and the County Museum Board was very supportive, although the project was met with some resistance. According to Mr. Guenther, when he announced the grant award at a meeting, Crosby Allen, who was an officer of the Board and later became a County Commissioner, asked him more about the project. When Guenther explained it to him, “he terminated the meeting by slamming his notebook shut and saying, T hate the goddamn Indians, and I won’t have anything to do with this.’ ” Mr. Guenther explained that Mr. Allen’s opposition became an impediment to progress at the museum: “When he became a member of the Fremont County Commission, he was considered by everyone involved with the museum that I spoke with as being very hostile to our efforts to get the museum building either repaired or replaced and became a major obstacle to our making progress in the first few years of that undertaking.” Tr. Trans, at 1210. Opposition has been expressed by others in the community. Mr. Guenther testified that after he makes a public presentation, such as a slideshow or lecture, oftentimes people will come up afterwards to comment or ask questions. Mr. Guenther stated that “I have had people come up to me and say, well, I’ll support that museum if you don’t spend much time, you know, if you don’t emphasize those prairie niggers.” Tr. Trans, at 1219. Mr. Guenther explained that that term “is a slur that’s heard around the area referring to Native Americans.” Tr. Trans, at 1219. It is notable that these events occurred within the past ten years. Further evidence of a continuing cultural divide between the people of Fremont County is found in Lander’s annual “One-Shot Antelope Hunt,” which is seen by some as derogatory in its portrayal of Indian women, discussed by numerous witnesses during the trial. The Court finds that these instances of racial discrimination cannot be dismissed as a few bad experiences caused by a few “bad apples.” Rather the testimony evidenced a more extensive problem, that while of course is not reflective of the attitudes and behaviors of all citizens of Fremont County, is nevertheless relevant in the Court’s inquiry. Legal Framework At issue here is whether Fremont County’s at-large method of voting for the county commission violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. “The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles at 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Section 2, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973, provides: (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. The Supreme Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) provides the framework within which this Court must conduct its analysis of the plaintiffs’ claim. In order to establish a vote dilution claim, a plaintiff must establish three preconditions which were set forth by the Gingles Court. The presence of those three factors “creates the inference the challenged practice is discriminatory,” Sanchez v. State of Colo., 97 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir.1996), and while “these three conditions are necessary to establish a vote dilution claim, they are not sufficient.” Id. (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994)). The factors are as follows: First, minority plaintiffs must prove their group is ‘sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.’ Second, plaintiffs must show the minority group is “politically cohesive.” Third, they must demonstrate ‘the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed- — -usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. Sanchez, 97 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752). In addition to the three so-called “Gingles preconditions,” a court “must assess the impact of the contested election practice on minority electoral opportunities by assessing certain objective factors.” Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir.1989). Those factors are the factors set forth in the Senate Report which accompanied the amendment which was made to § 2 in 1982. The factors include: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political *1492 subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence to establish a violation are: Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group. Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 177, 206-07.) There has been no shortage of discussion and decision on the level of proof required to succeed on a § 2 claim. After the Supreme Court interpreted § 2 to require proof that the challenged electoral practice had been intentionally adopted or maintained by a jurisdiction for a discriminatory purpose, Congress amended § 2 to incorporate the “results test.” See 82 U.S.C.C.A.N. 205. This means that the court is to “assess the impact of the challenged structure or practice on the basis of objective factors, rather than making a determination about the motivations which lay behind its adoption or maintenance.” Id. “[T]he specific intent of this amendment is that the plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 205-206. In short, “Section 2 protects the right of minority voters to be free from election practices, procedures or methods, that deny them the same opportunity to participate in the political process as other citizens enjoy. If as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of them choice, there is a violation of this section.” Id. at 206. By virtue of the amendment, the Supreme Court decision in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973) enjoyed a resurrection of sorts. It is that decision, in addition to the Gingles decision, that will act as this Court’s compass in its determination of whether Fremont County’s at-large electoral system for the County Commission violates § 2. It cannot be overemphasized that plaintiffs are not required to prove (and indeed, here do not allege), that the at-large voting system at issue was adopted with an intent to discriminate. By removing this requirement when it amended § 2, Congress undoubtedly preserved the peace by allowing plaintiffs in this country to bring this kind of claim without having to lob accusations at past officials who may have supported the challenged voting mechanism. That said, the Court recognizes that this type of case inevitably involves the airing of dirty laundry, some amount of finger pointing, repeating of racial slurs, and a meticulous examination of a record that chronicles a shameful chapter in American history that resonates and in this case, a view into present-day race relations in Wyoming. First Gingles Factor: Size and Geographical Compactness of the Minoritg Group The plaintiffs must prove that their group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this factor in its decision in Sanchez, 97 F.3d at 1311. There, the Court explained: The first question, whether the minority group is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” simply asks whether any remedy is possible in the first instance. As Gingles noted: The reason that a minority group making such a challenge must show, as a threshold matter, that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district is this: Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice. 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 17 (emphasis in original). As a corollary, if the minority group is small and dispersed, no single member district could be created to remedy its grievance. Hence, the first prerequisite asks about ‘the existence of a legally cognizable injury.’ As such, this element of proof assists a court in finding ‘a reasonable alternative practice as a benchmark against which to measure the existing voting practice.’ ‘The inquiries into remedy and liability, therefore, cannot be separated: A district court must determine as part of the Gingles threshold inquiry whether it can fashion a permissible remedy in the particular context of the challenged system.’ Sanchez, 97 F.3d at 1311 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). It is clear that the population is sufficiently large. As already noted, according to the 2000 census, the population of Fremont County is 35,804. PI. Ex. 234, p. 2. The county has a single-race Indian population of 7,047, which equals 19.68% of the population. Including persons who identified themselves as “any part” Indian, there are 7,497 Indians, which equals 20.94% of Fremont County’s population. There are 25,977 persons of voting age and 4,164 single-race Indians over 18 in Fremont County (16.03%). Including persons who are “any part” Indian, there are 4,419 Indians over 18 (17.01%). The minority voting age population is 5,464 (21.03%). The population is also sufficiently compact. The Reservation covers 3,525 square miles. Approximately 90% of the reservation is in Fremont County, with the remainder extending into Hot Springs County. Tr. Trans, at 22. Fremont County itself covers approximately 9,250 square miles. Tr. Trans, at 22. The vast majority of the Indian population in Fremont County resides on the Reservation. Tr. Trans, at 18. Over half (55.8%) of the county’s Indian population is concentrated in the communities of Fort Washakie (1,379), Ethete (1, 376), and Arapahoe (1, 431). Tr. Trans, at 18. The parties did not quibble much over this factor. The Court heard testimony from and reviewed the reports of plaintiffs’ expert William Cooper. Mr. Cooper drew two illustrative plans containing five single member districts, one of which was majority Indian. PI. Ex. 234. The plans were drawn using, to the extent possible, borders of existing precinct boundary lines, and Mr. Cooper testified that they complied with traditional redistricting criteria. Mr. Cooper presented two plans, each containing the same majority Indian district. In drawing his plans, Cooper treated all Indians as a single demographic group. Tr. Trans, at 19. The average population for a proposed county commission district is about 7,160. Tr. Trans, at 24 (William Cooper). The majority Indian district, District 1, is the same in both plans. The district is almost entirely within the boundaries of the Wind River Reservation, with the exception of an unpopulated area in the northwest. The district encompasses 1,530 square miles — about 17% of the overall land area of the county. All six of the communities with significant Indian populations are located in District 1. Over three-fourths of Fremont County’s Native American population lives in the district. District 1 has a population of 7,147 and is within 14 persons of the ideal district size of 7,161 for a five-district plan. The district population is 75.14% single-race Indian and 70.34% single-race Indian voting age. The voting age population in the district is 71.37% “any part” Indian. PI. Ex. 234, Exs. 3a & 4a; Tr. Trans, at 23-24 (William Cooper). Districts 2 and 3 are the same under both plans. Riverton is split between Districts 3 and 4 in an identical fashion under both plans. PI. Ex. 234, Exs. 3d & 4d. Riverton must be divided because it has a population of 9,300 — well above the ideal district population size. The key difference between the two illustrative plans is that Plan A splits Lander into Districts 4 and 5, while Plan B places Lander entirely within District 5. PL Ex. 234, Exs. 3e & 4e. The Court finds that the American Indian population in Fremont County is sufficiently compact and numerous to allow for the drawing of a single-member Indian majority voting district, and therefore that the plaintiffs have satisfied the first Gingles factor. Second Gingles Factor: Political Cohesiveness of the Minority Group This factor requires a plaintiff minority group to show that it is politically cohesive, because “if the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has discussed this factor in both of its Sanchez decisions. In Sanchez v. State of Colorado, the court defined the inquiry established by Gingles: The inquiry is essentially whether the minority group has expressed clear political preferences that are distinct from those of the majority.’ Thus, we judge political cohesiveness by looking at the ‘voting preferences expressed in actual elections.’ Necessarily, when we examine the evidence of political cohesiveness as voting preferences, we look to the same statistical evidence plaintiffs must offer to establish vote polarization. Indeed, political cohesiveness is implicit in racially polarized voting. Sanchez, 97 F.3d at 1312 (citing Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir.1988)). The Tenth Circuit has also instructed that the inquiry at this stage is limited in that a court should not consider the reasons underlying a vote. It is clear from Gingles that a showing that a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates can establish the requisite political cohesiveness under § 2. Furthermore, we agree with appellants that a court may not explain away evidence of racial bloc voting by finding that such voting is caused by underlying differences between the minority and white population. The reasons why minority voters may vote alike is unimportant in determining whether in fact the minority group votes as a bloc. Racially polarized voting, which indicates political cohesion, exists when there is a consistent relationship between the race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes or, in other words, where minority voters and white voters vote differently. Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d at 1493 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53, 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752). In this case, the parties agree that American Indians in Fremont County tend to vote cohesively. Defendants’ Proposed Findings and Conclusions at 131; Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings and Conclusions at 77. This is based on the fact that the experts for both sides agreed that the minority group here usually votes cohesively. Specifically, statistical evidence offered by both parties demonstrates that Native Americans in Fremont County are politically cohesive. PI. Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole); Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber). In conducting their analyses, plaintiffs’ statistical expert, Dr. Steven P. Cole, and the defendants’ expert, Dr. Ronald E. Weber, used bivariate ecological regression analysis (BERA) and homogeneous precinct analysis (HPA), both of which have been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-53, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Pl. Ex. 239; Def. Ex. B; Tr. Trans, at 108 (Steven P. Cole), 361-66 (Ronald E. Weber). The two experts also used the more recent ecological inference (El) method developed by Dr. Gary King. PI. Ex. 239; Def. Ex. B; Tr. Trans, at 108 (Steven P. Cole), 361-66 (Ronald E. Weber). Dr. Cole relied primarily on his BERA estimates, Tr. Trans, at 116 (Steven P. Cole), and Dr. Weber relied primarily on his El estimates, Tr. Trans, at 361-66 (Ronald E. Weber), but statistics produced by all three methods tell the same basic story in this case. Indeed, both parties concede that the Court need not choose between statistical methods because the results of each are so similar. Tr. Trans, at 120, 153 (Steven P. Cole), 366 (Ronald E. Weber), 460 (J. Scott Detamore). In conducting their analysis, both experts used precinct population data prepared and provided them by Mr. Cooper. PI. Exs. 235 (Report of William Cooper), 239 (Report of Steven P. Cole); Def. Ex. B (Report of Ronald E. Weber); Tr. Trans, at 30-1 (William Cooper), 107 (Steven P. Cole), 330 (Ronald E. Weber) (“I’m using exactly the same precinct voting age population data that Dr. Cole used in his analysis”). Mr. Cooper determined precinct population using precinct maps provided by the County and overlaying them on 1990 and 2000 census block maps. PI. Ex. 235;Tr. Trans, at 32 (William Cooper). The experts also relied on official precinct level election returns provided by Fremont County. PI. Ex. 239 (Report of Steven P. Cole); Def. Ex. B (Report of Ronald E. Weber); Tr. Trans, at 107 (Steven P. Cole), 330-31 (Ronald E. Weber). There is no. dispute over the data used by the experts in this case. Both experts analyzed each general election for the County Commission between 1986, when the county first adopted the current five member election system, and 2006. PI. Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole); Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber); Tr. Trans, at 122-23 (Steven P. Cole). Because these are the elections “on which plaintiffs premise their vote dilution claim,” Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d at 1317, the Court finds that they are the “endogenous” elections in this case. Both experts also analyzed all of the contested Democratic primary elections for each endogenous County Commission contest. PL Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole); Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber); Tr. Trans, at 122 (Steven P. Cole). Both experts also analyzed a number of “exogenous” elections involving some part of Fremont County. Pl. Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole); Def. Exs. BM (Reports of Ronald E. Weber); Tr. Trans, at 122-23 (Steven P. Cole), 326-27 (Ronald E. Weber). Dr. Cole analyzed 11 exogenous general elections between 1986 and 2006: the 2006 general election in Senate District 25; the 2006, 2004, 1998 and 1992 general elections in House District 33; the 1996 and 1994 general elections in House District 34; the 1990, 1988 and 1986 general elections for the state house from Fremont County at large; and the 1986 “special” general election for a two year term on the Fremont County Commission. PI. Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole); Tr. Trans, at 122-24 (Steven P. Cole). Dr. Cole also analyzed four exogenous primary elections: the 2004 and 2002 Democratic primaries in House District 33; the 1992 Democratic primary in House District 34; and the 1986 Democratic primary election for a two year term on the Fremont County Commission. PL Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole); Tr. Trans, at 122-24 (Steven P. Cole). Dr. Weber analyzed all of those primary and general elections plus six others between 1982 and 1984: the 1984 and 1982 general elections for the state house from Fremont County at-large; the 1982 Democratic primary election for the state house from Fremont County at-large; the 1984 and 1982 general elections for County Commission under Fremont County’s former election system; and the 1982 Democratic primary election for County Commission under Fremont County’s former election system. Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber); Tr. Trans, at 326-27 (Ronald E. Weber). While they differed somewhat on how they defined cohesion, both experts concluded that Native Americans in Fremont County are politically cohesive. Tr. Trans, at 133 (Steven P. Cole). According to defendants’ expert Dr. Weber, “I’ve found cohesion on the part of the Native American group, which is the second prong of Gingles, in the County Commissioner elections and in the exogenous elections as well.” Tr. Trans, at 434 (Ronald E. Weber). See also Tr. Trans, at 378 (Ronald Weber) (“the usual pattern in the general election is cohesive behavior by the Native American voter”). Dr. Weber also found that Indian voters were usually cohesive in the Democratic primary election. Tr. Trans, at 378-379. Specifically, in County Commission elections from 1982 to 2006, Dr. Weber found four instances of strong cohesion and fourteen instances of moderate cohesion, for a total of eighteen cohesive elections. Ex. B, Table 4 (Revised). According to his calculations, there was cohesion in eighteen out of 32 elections, which is a rate of 56.3%. Tr. Trans, at 378. Three of the four instances of strongly cohesive voting in County Commission elections were those three elections with Indian candidates. Dr. Weber found that Indian voters were 87% cohesive behind Candidate McAdams in 1996, 85% cohesive behind Candidate Ratliff in 2000, and 82% cohesive behind Whiteman in 2006. Ex. E, Ex. J. Dr. Cole testified that in operationalizing this second Gingles factor, endogenous elections are most probative, and that within endogenous elections, he relies most heavily on contests involving Indian candidates, because “it’s in these kinds of contests that voters have a choice to vote for an Indian or not.” Tr. Trans, at 132-33. Dr. Cole also found that Indian voters were strongly cohesive behind Indian candidates. Tr. Trans, at 135. For the County Commission elections, he found that 90% of Indian voters voted for McAdams, 85% for Ratliff, and 84% for Whiteman. Tr. Trans, at 135, Ex. 365. These combine to an unweighted average of 86%. When Dr. Cole assessed Indian cohesion for Indian candidates in exogenous general elections from 1986 to 2006, the unweighted average of cohesion that he found was 83%. Ex. 365 Tab. A2. He also found Indian cohesion for non-Indian Indian-preferred candidates at an average level of 64%. Ex. 365, Tab. A3. In exogenous general elections, the parties’ statistical analyses likewise show a pattern of strong support for Indian candidates. Pl. Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole); Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber). Dr. Cole found Indian cohesion for Indian candidates ranging from 64% to 99%, with an unweighted average cohesion of 83%. Pl. Ex. 365, Table A2, Pl. Ex. 239, Pl. Ex. 240, Table 6 (Reports of Steven P. Cole). In those same contests, Dr. Weber’s analyses reveal Indian cohesion for Indian candidates ranging from 64% to 90%, with an unweighted average cohesion of 80%. Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber). Including exogenous contests from 1984 and 1982, Dr. Weber’s analyses reveal an unweighted Indian cohesion for Indian candidates of 79%. Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber). The plaintiffs have identified 19 non-Indian candidates who were Indian preferred candidates in endogenous general elections. Pl. Ex. 366, Summary Table B4. According to Dr. Cole’s regression analyses, Indian cohesion for these candidates ranged from 51% to 85%, with an unweighted average cohesion of 64%. Pl. Exs. 239, 240 (Reports of Steven P. Cole). Dr. Weber’s ecological inference analyses reveals Indian cohesion for those candidates ranging from 39% to 82%, with an unweighted average cohesion of 62%. Def. Exs. B-M (Reports of Ronald E. Weber). The County argues that the American Indians in Fremont County are not a politically cohesive group, despite the fact that they tend to vote cohesively, because “for any group to be cohesive politically, it must possess political interests about which its members coalesce that are distinctive and unique compared to political interests of the majority ... the question presented is whether the members of these two distinct nations are one political group, that is, whether they share the same issues, the priority of those issues, and the solution for those issues. If they do not, they are not one cohesive political group, despite that they may vote together ... In this case, for Plaintiffs to prevail requires that they demonstrate that all American Indians share distinct and unique substantive political interests in the Fremont County Commission that are thwarted by majority bloc voting.” Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 132. In Gingles, the Court explained that “[i]f the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests.” 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. This statement forms the basis for defendants’ argument, which is that the minority group here must have distinct minority interests. The defendants also point to Whitcomb v. Chavis, which stated: The first requirement [is that] Negro residents of the Center Township Ghetto [] residents have interests in those areas of substantive law such as housing regulations, sanitation, welfare programs ... garnishment statutes, and unemployment compensation, among others, which diverge significantly from the interests of nonresidents of the Ghetto. 403 U.S. 124, 135 n. 12, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1864 n. 12, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971) (quoting Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F.Supp. 1364, 1386 (D.Ind.1969)). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has had occasion to find that a minority group was not cohesive. This was based on the district court’s finding that the minority group was actually comprised of several politically distinct groups. In that case, Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1493 (10th Cir.1989), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s finding that the minority group was not politically cohesive. The district court’s finding was based on lay testimony that the minority group in question “consisted of several politically distinct groups which often support different candidates.” Id. at 1493. One of the defendants, an Anglo county commissioner, testified that he had received substantial Hispanic support during his election. Id. at 1491. The Court of Appeals found that it was permissible for a court to consider lay testimony in deciding whether a minority group is politically cohesive and that testimony of individuals involved in the political process is necessary “if the court is to identify the presence or absence of distinctive minority group interests.” Sanchez, 875 F.2d at 1494. “The experiences and observations of individuals involved in the political process are clearly relevant to the question of whether the minority group is politically cohesive.” Id. Dr. Weber testified that in the five Democratic primaries for County Commissioner, he found evidence of more disagreement than agreement. Tr. Trans, at 423, and ultimately concluded that there was “some level of disagreement on the part of the two tribal groups” in the seven Democratic primaries that he analyzed. Tr. Trans, at 435. This finding, he testified, militates against a finding of political cohesion. He noted that the Eastern Shoshone are primarily in the Fort Washakie area, and the Northern Arapaho are primarily in the Ethete and Arapahoe area. Tr. Trans, at 421. He conducted a homogeneous precinct analysis, because there was a high percentage of Native Americans residing in those areas, to determine whether there is agreement or disagreement in the Democratic primary. Tr. Trans, at 421. Using the information contained in Table 14, it is apparent that in the 2006 Democratic primary for Fremont County, in the Fort Washakie precinct, Twitchell, a non-Indian, finished first, Whiteman finished second, and Goggles finished third. In Ethete, Goggles finished first, Whiteman finished second, and Twitchell finished third. In Arapahoe, Whiteman finished first, Goggles finished second, and Bebout finished third. His conclusion from this is that after adding the “Arapaho” precincts together, the Arapahos preferred Goggles, while the Shoshone preferred Twitchell. The plaintiffs extensively cross-examined Dr. Weber on this point. The Court finds it significant that Dr. Weber did not know the Shoshone composition of the Fort Washakie precinct, did not know the Arapaho composition of the Ethete precinct, did not know the Arapaho composition of the Arapahoe precinct, did not know how many Shoshone live in the Ethete and Arapahoe precincts, but presumed that there “probably are” some, did not know how many Arapaho lived in the Fort Washakie precinct, but presumed that there “probably are” some, and did not know how many Sho-Raps there are in any of those three precincts. Tr. Trans, at 477. This seriously undermines the weight of his conclusion that the two Tribes tend to disagree on candidates in the primaries, for if he was unsure of the percentages of tribal representation in each precinct, it is not clear how he reached a conclusion that the Tribes tend to support different candidates. Further, Dr. Weber testified that 90 percent is the cutoff for using homogeneous precinct analysis. However, Dr. Weber testified that he did not know whether Fort Washakie, which is the most homogeneous of the three precincts, was above or below that 90 percent cutoff. (Tr. Trans, at 478). The Court finds the following testimony especially telling: Q. Well, you’ve got a, on the other end of the spectrum, a 74 percent Native American precinct in Arapahoe; correct? A. I think that’s correct. Q. And of that you don’t know what percentage is Shoshone and what percentage is Arapahoe, correct? A. That’s correct. Q. And you didn’t alert the Court that there might be some error introduced into the analysis by the large presence of not only non-Native Americans in that precinct but also Shoshone in that precinct; correct? A. Correct. Q. In fact, your entire analysis of these so-called tribal differences could be entirely skewed by either non-Native Americans who were voting in that primary or Native Americans of the other tribe who were voting in that primary, isn’t that right? A. Those are alternative theories, yes. Q. And you have no way of disproving that alternative theory, do you? A. No. Tr. Trans, at 479. Dr. Weber’s lack of knowledge of the percentage of Tribe representation in each precinct, coupled with the application of an analysis which he admitted he does not normally apply below 90 percent, was further weakened when plaintiffs’ counsel walked Dr. Weber through the last five primary elections for the endogenous election. The end result was that he found agreement in three out of the five primary elections for the County Commission, the endogenous election here, and that his conclusion that there was more disagreement than agreement was based upon his inclusion of two primaries for the State House, which is the exogenous election here. Tr. Trans, at 484. Further, he testified that for the two primary elections where he found disagreement, he thought the disagreement was “meaningful,” but could not say that it was “statistically meaningful,” because it would be inappropriate to run a test of statistical significance under the circumstances. Tr. Trans, at 485. Further, Dr. Weber testified that he did not do any analysis of whether the differences between the two Arapaho precincts were greater or smaller than the differences between the Arapaho precincts and the Shoshone precinct. Tr. Trans, at 485-486. The Court finds that without any framework in which to weigh the actual meaning of these differences, the analysis is of little value, especially when coupled with the Court’s questions regarding this whole line of analysis, as explained above. As such, the Court cannot find that Dr. Weber’s findings regarding differences between the Tribe’s voting preferences can undermine a finding of cohesion, which both experts agreed was present. The defendants’ argument is that “by definition, the two Tribes on the Reservation are distinct political groups.” In support of this argument, the defendant first points to the fact that the two Tribes are culturally distinct, as evidenced by their different languages, different historical territories, and different historical alliances. The defendant also notes that the two Tribes traditionally were enemies, and that the two Tribes do not voluntarily share the Reservation. In addition, the defendant points out that the Tribes have not chosen to form a single government, unlike other Tribes who have been placed together on reservations. As a result, the Tribes maintain some separate governmental functions, such as health, human services, housing, transportation, economic development, utilities, and domestic water supply. In addition, the Arapaho outnumber the Shoshone by approximately three to one. Several witnesses at trial testified about the relationship between the two Tribes. Representative Goggles testified that the Tribes differ in their needs and the way to meet those needs. For example, a Tribal Liaison was created as part of the Governor’s office to facilitate communication among the governor, legislature, and Tribes; Ivan Posey, currently the Chairman of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe, was appointed to that position. Subsequently, two Tribal Liaisons were appointed, one from each Tribe, because neither Tribe would accept a Liaison from the other Tribe: Q: Do you have any opinion as to why two tribal liaisons as opposed to one was necessary? A: Two separate nations. Q: Do you think they have different views, different needs, et cetera? A: Absolutely. Q: To put before the legislature? A: Sure. Representative Goggles believes that the Tribes have fundamental differences in terms of their economic agenda and needs, comparing the Arapaho focus on Social Services with the Shoshone focus on economic development: Q: Could you describe ... the differences in what the two tribes seek [from the legislature]? A: [An] obvious difference ... is population. ... The Arapahos, in terms of populations, are about a 3 to 1 ratio.... That population difference has a huge impact on the funding for programs. So obviously you would see ... a more acute need with the Arapaho than with the Shoshone. Q: Are you saying that the needs for various Social Services of the Arapaho are greater than that for the Shoshone? A: In most respects, yes. Q: Do you see any other differences between the tribes insofar as they related to the legislature? A: Sui'e. I do. Q: Could you tell me what those might be? A: The Shoshone have a different economic agenda than the Arapaho, and that’s largely based on population.... The Arapaho have a huge unmet need in Social Services, in housing, in employment. The Eastern Shoshone ... have established an economic agenda. They went into the health care area. [They] established a manor. [They] have established a dialysis cent