Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER LORETTA A. PRESKA, Chief Judge. Plaintiffs M.H. and E.K. (collectively “Plaintiffs” or “the Parents”) bring this action against the New York City Department of Education (the “DOE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006) (the “IDEA”), challenging the DOE’S placement of their son as both procedurally and substantively inappropriate and seeking reimbursement of his private-school tuition. The parties have completed a state administrative hearing and an administrative appeal therefrom, and Plaintiffs now seek review of those proceedings in this Court. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment solely on the basis of the record produced in the state administrative proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED, and the DOE’S motion is DENIED. I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK The facts herein are analyzed in the context of the IDEA and the federal and New York State regulations that implement that statute. “Under the IDEA, states receiving federal funds are required to provide ‘all children with disabilities’ a ‘free appropriate public education [ (‘FAPE’) ].’ ” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)); (Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)). “To meet these requirements, a school district’s program must provide ‘special education and related services tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child, and be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.’ ” Id. (quoting Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Such services must be administered according to an [Individualized Education Plan (‘IEP’) ], which school districts must implement annually.” Id. The IEP is “[t]he centerpiece of the IDEA’S educational delivery system.” D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Ed., 465 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir.2006). It is “a written statement that ‘sets out the child’s present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives.’” Id. at 508 (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)). “The IEP must provide ‘special education and related services tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child, and be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.’ ” A.D. & M.D. ex rel. E.D. v. Bd. of Ed., 690 F.Supp.2d 193, 197 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (quoting Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 107). Substantively, the IEP must be “likely to produce progress, not regression, and [must] afford[] the student with an opportunity greater than mere trivial advancement.” T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir.2009). New York “has assigned responsibility for developing appropriate IEPs to local Committees on Special Education (‘CSE’), the members of which are appointed by school boards or the trustees of school districts.” Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 107 (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 123). “In developing a particular child’s IEP, a CSE is required to consider four factors: (1) academic achievement and learning characteristics, (2) social development, (3) physical development, and (4) managerial or behavioral needs.” Id. at 107-08. “[T]he CSE must also be mindful of the IDEA’S strong preference for ‘mainstreaming,’ or educating children with disabilities to the maximum extent appropriate alongside their non-disabled peers.” Id. at 108. “New York parents who disagree with their child’s IEP may challenge it in an ‘impartial due process hearing’ before an [impartial hearing officer (THO’) ] appointed by the local board of education.” Id. (citations omitted). The IHO’s decision may be appealed to a State Review Officer (“SRO”), “and the SRO’s decision in turn may be challenged in either state or federal court.” Id. The district court may “receive the records of the administrative proceedings” and also “hear additional evidence.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). It conducts a “modified de novo” review of the administrative proceedings, M.N. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 700 F.Supp.2d 356, at 363-64, No. 09 Civ. 20, 2010 WL 1244555, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010), and must base its determination “on the preponderance of the evidence,” § 1415(i)(2)(C). The court has “broad authority to grant ‘appropriate’ relief, including reimbursement for the cost of private special education when a school district fails to provide a FAPE.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2492, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009); see Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985) (holding that IDEA authorizes reimbursement). II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Introduction The following facts and allegations are drawn from the witness testimony and documentary evidence submitted to the IHO over eight days between January 30, 2008 and September 5, 2008. P.H., the son of M.H. anvd E.K., is a boy who was classified by the DOE’s CSE as having autism. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 1.) In the year prior to the events at issue, and pursuant to a mandate of the DOE’s Committee on Preschool Special Education (“CPSE”), P.H. received Special Education Itinerant Teacher (“SEIT”) services in a one-to-one (“1:1”) student-teacher ratio in addition to his mainstream preschool enrollment. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 2-3; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 2-3.) The CPSE mandated that P.H.’s SEITs be trained in and provide at least 35 hours per week of services using Applied Behavior Analysis (“ABA”) (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 2-3; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 2-3), an education methodology that “highlights the development and generalization of speech and language, social skills, functional academics, [and] prevocational and daily living kills,” A.B.A. Methodologies- — -Methodologies—N ew York City-Department of Education, http://schools.nyc.gov/Offices/District75/ Departments/Autism/Methodologies/ abamethodologies.htm (last visited May 3, 2010); (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶3; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 3). Pursuant to the mandate, P.H. also received several related services each week: five sixty-minute sessions of speech therapy; three sixty-minute sessions of occupational therapy; and two sixty-minute sessions of physical therapy. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4.) B. The CSE Meeting and the IEP On April 17, 2007, pursuant to the IDEA, the DOE’s CSE convened a team to formulate an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for P.H.’s 2007-08 school year. (See DOE’s 56.1. Stmt. ¶2; Pis’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 2.) The CSE team members included Giselle Jordan, who was a DOE representative, school psychologist, and the leader of the meeting; P.H.’s SEIT; a DOE social worker; a general-education teacher; a special-education teacher; P.H.’s parents; an additional parent member; and the director of P.H.’s preschool. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6.) As of the meeting, Jordan had been a school psychologist with the CSE for approximately three years and had worked as a psychologist for approximately twenty-one years before that. (Hr’g Tr. 26:9-27:16.) She had no training in either ABA or TEACCH, another special-education methodology. (Id. at 174:15-175:21.) As the DOE representative and CSE team leader, Jordan was ultimately responsible for preparing P.H.’s IEP. (See id. at 32:4-11; Finding of Fact and Decision, Case No. 113216, at 15 (Oct. 2, 2008) [hereinafter “IHO Decision”].) The parents provided the team with certain documents to consider in developing the IEP: a psycho-educational evaluation and addendum prepared by Dr. David Salsberg, the director of pediatric psychology and neuropsychology at New York University Medical Center (Hr’g Tr. 571:15-17); progress reports from P.H.’s speech therapist, occupational therapist, and physical therapist; an educational progress report from the SEIT; a social history update; a classroom observation report; and a teacher report. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 7; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 7.) Jordan stated that she had solicited and reviewed all of these documents for the purpose of creating P.H.’s IEP. (See Hr’g Tr. 30:3-31:22.) These documents generally support three conclusions: (1) the parents and P.H.’s SEIT were satisfied with P.H.’s preschool placement and wanted him to continue in substantially the same manner; (2) P.H.’s other evaluators, including the social worker from the DOE, were less optimistic about his performance in that setting; and (3) all agreed that P.H. needed more individualized educational support. In preschool, P.H. had been “reeeiv[ing] 12[-]month educational instruction [in a mainstream preschool class,] occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech/language therapy, and SEIT support.” (District Ex. 13 at 1.) The SEIT, who provided in-school support on a 1:1 basis (IHO Decision 13), reported that P.H. had made “substantial progress throughout the year” and recommended that P.H. “be continually exposed to typical peers.” (See District Ex. 11 at 1.) The parents similarly reported that they were pleased with P.H.’s educational program. (See District Ex. 14 at 2 (“[P.H.] is doing very well in his ... mainstream placement and is flourishing with typical peers. Parents would like to see [P.H.] continue in Kindergarten in a similar milieu.”).) M.H. emphasized in his testimony, however, that Plaintiffs did not think a mainstream placement would have been appropriate “without the [1:1 SEIT] support.” (Hr’g Tr. 650:2-6.) These statements conflict, at least in part, with the reports written by the other evaluators, who generally thought that P.H. needed more individual support. P.H.’s preschool teacher, who had long observed P.H.’s interactions with the SEIT and with the rest of his preschool class, indicated that P.H. could not function in a classroom without 1:1 support and could barely do so with that support. The preschool teacher’s answers to questions on her report included the following, for instance: We have not seen any academic progress. [P.H.] is unable to grasp many of the skills and concepts the other children his age are working on. We have not seen much in the way of social progress as far as voluntarily interacting with his classmates. His interactions are usually guided or modeled by his SEITs. Since September any small amount of progress that has been made was mainly facilitated by his SEITs. [P.H.] would benefit from a facility with a small class size that has teachers and support staff to aceom[m]odate his needs. From what we have observed in the classroomf, P.H.] is unable to follow simple directions and instructions. Therefore we feel he would not be ready for a Kindergarten curriculum. [P.H.J’s SEITs usually determine what works best for him and what will motivate him. Without prompts and reminders from his SEITs[, P.H.J is unable to interact verbally with his classmates. The classroom setting is not an appropriate place for [P.H]. His skills and attention span are not on the same level as the other children[’s]. He is totally dependent on his SEITs for guidance and direction. (District Ex. 4 at 1-4.) The classroom observation report from the DOE social worker confirms in extensive detail that P.H. was highly dependent on his 1:1 SEIT in class. (See District Ex. 7.) And Dr. Salsberg’s psychological addendum states, inter alia, that [P.H.J’s difficulties with language, attention and reciprocity impede his ability to function consistently without intense supports.... It is imperative that the intensity of [P.H.J’s therapy program not be reduced at this crucial time, as he is not only in need of these services to make gains, he is at significant risk for regression.... [HJe requires 1:1 intensive language-based behavioral interventions by an experienced SEIT throughout the day.... (District Ex. 13 at 1.) The IHO noted the conflict between these two groups of opinions, stating: the teacher report indicated [that P.H.J had not made any academic progress and that he needed a more structured setting to address his needs. The teacher report was different from what the parents reported in the social history. The parents thought he made progress in the mainstream setting and wanted to continue in that type of setting. (IHO Decision 4.) At the CSE meeting, Jordan not only was provided with these reports to consider but also had some of the evaluators available to discuss their reports in greater detail. (See District Ex. 8 at 1 (identifying the participants in the CSE meeting).) The meeting resulted in the creation of P.H.’s IEP. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶22; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 22.) The IEP recommended that P.H. be placed in a special class with a 6:1:1 student-teacher-paraprofessional ratio that met in a specialized school and could provide related services. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 22.) Related services each week were to include two thirty-minute sessions of physical therapy, three thirty-minute sessions of occupational therapy, and three thirty-minute sessions of speech and language therapy. (See District Ex. 15 at 26.) Based on the IEP, the DOE offered P.H. a seat in a class at the school P94 at 15 (“P.S.15”). (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 23; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 23.) The parties, however, dispute most other facts regarding this meeting. Plaintiffs, dissatisfied with the CSE’s recommendation, assert that Jordan largely disregarded both the documentation and the parents’ input, resulting in an IEP and a school placement that did not reflect the information the team purportedly considered. (See Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 8-22.) First, according to Plaintiffs, the documents stress that P.H. required an education using the ABA methodology in a 1:1 ratio. Three documents do expressly state that P.H. had been receiving ABA services. (See District Ex. 2 at 1; District Ex. 6 at 1; District Ex. 14 at 4.) Dr. Salsberg’s addendum, for example, states that P.H. requires continuation of a 12-month program to include ABA hours, and intensive speech and language therapy in addition to [occupational therapy. He] requires a minimum of 35-40 hours of services/week to make appropriate progress. ... [H]e requires 1:1 intensive language-based behavioral interventions by an experienced SEIT throughout the day. In addition, [P.H.] also requires continuation of his home-based ABA (District Ex. 13 at 1.) On his cross examination, Dr. Salsberg stated that he intended the 35^40 hours of ABA to include the after-school hours at home. (Hr’g Tr. 599:6-14.) Consistent with these documents, M.H. testified that P.H. had a “very intensive ABA program” at home while he was in preschool. (Id. at 644:20-645:2.) Despite these indications, Jordan asserted that she did not receive any indication that P.H. had been receiving home-based ABA (Hr’g Tr. 183:21-184:9), and P.H.’s IEP ultimately mandated neither ABA services nor 1:1 instruction (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12; see District Ex. 15). The IEP confirms that the CSE did not in fact consider either ABA services or 1:1 instruction. (See District Ex. 15 at 25 (stating that only general-education, 12:1, and 12:1:1 programs were considered and rejected).) Further, Nicklas opined that no methodology other than ABA is appropriate to treat autistic children because “ABA is the only program that uses data and has been clinically proven” to produce educational benefits. (Hr’g Tr. 477:21-24.) Specifically with respect to P.H., she stated that the DOE’s proposed 6:1:1 class, which would have employed the TEACCH methodology, would have been inappropriate because the ratio is 6-1-1 and [P.H.] needs a one to one instruction. He cannot learn in a small group setting. He struggled to learn in a dyad. ... [Additionally, the TEACCH methodology] was developed primarily for children who had slight learning disabilities and mental retardation, not specifically for children diagnosed with autism.... [T]here’s not data collected on a regular basis for each skill. From my understanding, there’s a lot of picture cues and it’s just a group learning environment. (Id. at 487:5-25.) She admitted, however, that she has not used other methods herself; she has only observed their use. (Id. at 478:5-479:2.) Further, Nicklas does not have a degree, certificate, or license in education (id. at 463:7-18), but she does have a Master of Science degree in Applied Behavior Analysis from one of only seven programs in the world accredited through the American Psychological Association. (Id. at 462:22-463:6.) Kay Cook, a District 75 autism coach, testified on behalf of the DOE that “the research, the literature, and [her] own experience” indicate that “[t]here is no one methodology” that works for educating autistic children. (Id. at 862:22-863:3.) Yet Cook acknowledged that the effectiveness of any particular method, and of a 1:1 ratio, would vary by student. (See id. at 876:17-877:21.) Dr. Salsberg testified about how different methodologies would apply specifically to P.H. He testified that an ABA program that includes less than 30-40 hours per week of ABA instruction is not considered effective for children P.H.’s age. (See id. at 579:17-19.) With respect to the potential effect of using other methods, including TEACCH, to educate P.H., Dr. Salsberg stated: [W]hen you have such [ ] strong behavioral self-direction and attention issues as [P.H.] did, any time I’ve seen a child in a TEAC[C]H classroom, it’s been a disaster. It’s always- needed more one-on-one and it was — -and almost every time I’ve seen it for children who are [sic] this behavior, we had to pull them out and develop a different kind of program .... (Id. at 601:2-9.) With respect to the potential effect of using a hybrid TEACCHABA method, Dr. Salsberg testified: Well what TEAC[C]H does is mostly focusing [sic] on the communication by using a lot of visuals. So you have a visual schedule. You have pictures. The main focus is on the language as opposed to the behavior. [P.H.] has the language. He can label all the pictures. He doesn’t need the pictures. And in fact, his attention is so impacted that if you put a visual schedule in front of him, he’s not going to use it unless you’re doing something behavioral with him to look at it. (Id. at 601:23-602:8.) In sum, he stated: I believe [other methods] are minimally effective with some children on the Spectrum. But in general, I don’t — do not feel — when I have a child who’s on the Autistic Spectrum who is so self directed and behavioral, I do not feel that any of the other modalities can effect change on those children. (Id. at 606:14-25.) Although Cook testified that the P94 program offered by the DOE would have sufficiently met P.H.’s needs (id. at 868:6-13), the IHO apparently did not credit her testimony because Cook had little or no personal knowledge of either P.H. or P.S. 15. (See IHO Decision 8.) The IHO noted that Cook had based her opinion solely on a review of P.H.’s records (see Hr’g Tr. 868:6-13); Cook had no teaching experience in New York City (see id. at 882:2-7); Cook did not know whether she had trained the P.S. 15 teachers in ABA (see id. at 871:16-872:13); and Cook did not work with P.S. 15 during the 2007-2008 school year, when P.H. would have attended (see id. at 873:7-10). (See IHO Decision 8.) Second, the documents Jordan purportedly considered indicate that P.H. required significant related services each week. The Occupational Therapy Progress Report recommends that P.H.’s “mandate for occupational therapy services continue at 3X60 minutes in a 1:1 ratio” each week. (District Ex. 3 at 2.) The Physical Therapy Progress Report recommends that P.H. “continue his physical therapy sessions at his current frequency, duration, and group size.” (District Ex. 6 at 3.) And although the Speech and Language Therapy Progress Report does not indicate a recommended duration or frequency (see District Ex. 2 at 4), Dr. Salsberg’s Psychological Addendum states the following: “It is imperative that the intensity of [P.H.’s] therapy program not be reduced at this crucial time, as he is not only in need of these services to make gains, he is at significant risk for regression” (District Ex. 13 at 1). Despite these reports, Jordan recommended that all three of P.H.’s therapy programs be reduced by half. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13.) She explained: We modified all of the related services because now [P.H.] was entering a school-age program and related services are supposed to support the program as instruction, plus he’s going to get a lot of what he would have been getting on [sic] a one-on-one when he wasn’t in a school-age program within the classroom. So he’ll get to learn ... what they’re working on; that concept or whatever they’re working on. And then he’s got to transfer those skills, which he needs a group to do, into the classroom across various people, materials, and different settings. (Id. at 68:13-24.) With respect to speech therapy in particular, Jordan testified that she reduced P.H.’s amount of therapy based on her impression that the Speech Therapy Progress Report “stresses the fact that [P.H.] needs a small peer group to practice his pragmatic skills.” (Hr’g Tr. 69:5-10.) In fact, the Report contains no mention of P.H.’s requiring a small peer group. (See District Ex. 2.) Miranda White, P.H.’s speech therapist, testified that although P.H. gets some benefit from the reduced speech therapy, his therapy consists mainly of maintaining his skills; there is not enough time to address all of the annual goals and short-term objectives set forth in the IEP. (See Hr’g Tr. 622:18-623:7.) Third, P.H.’s IEP states, on a page completed by Jordan (Hr’g Tr. 155:3-12), that “counselor will address social and emotional concerns through counseling sessions” (District Ex. 15 at 7). Jordan testified that counseling was a “support that [P.H.] needed ... in order to progress” in his “[s]oeial skills, for pragmatic language skills, functional language. To progress in taking turns, in sharing, in actual play skills.” (Hr’g Tr. 156:15-23.) Yet the IEP fails to mandate that P.H. receive counseling as a related service. (See District Ex. 15 at 26.) In addition, Jordan prepared her IEP recommendations for the CSE meeting based on her understanding that P.H. would be entering first grade. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14.) When informed at the CSE meeting that P.H. would in fact be entering kindergarten, Jordan did not review her recommendations to determine whether they were nevertheless appropriate (id); rather, she merely changed the IEP to read “Kindergarten” where it previously read “1st Grade.” (Id; District Ex. 15 at 19; Hr’g Tr. 136:20-25.) The IHO found it notable that on page 23 of the IEP, “the annual goal[s] for reading comprehension and math indieate[ ] the student must meet first grade standards.” (IHO Decision 15.) Although Jordan testified that this was just a clerical error (Hr’g Tr. 150:10-14), Nicklas testified that both the short-term goals and some of the annual goals, which Jordan did not change, were too advanced for P.H. (Hr’g Tr. 449:11-460:6). Nicklas identified numerous goals on P.H.’s IEP that she considered too advanced. She testified that the short-term goals “[P.H.] will make a single appropriate attempt to engage peers when prompted” and “[P.H.] will make more than one independent attempt to engage a peer” were inappropriate because, as of Nicklas’s testimony on May 1, 2008, P.H. was still “learning how to approach an adult,” and adults are easier for autistic children to approach than peers because they do not “give up very easily [like peers do] if he’s not gaining their attention.” (Id. at 449:11-450:19.) She stated that the annual goal “[P.H.] will engage in appropriate outdoor games and activities, for example tag; duck, duck goose[;] and shooting basketball” was inappropriate because, as of May 1, P.H. was only “learning to play independently right now and with a peer. He’s at the level of playing parallel .... [T]ag is a very complex activity for a child with autism to ... understand .... ” (Id. at 453:10-454:6.) She stated that the annual goal “[P.H.] will play interactively with others” was inappropriate because “he needs continual prompting to interact with another student and even just to look at that other student to get an exchange. [P.H.] can’t hold a conversation. You know, he can’t reciprocate a minor statement.” (Id. at 455:25^156:4.) The short-term goal “[P.H.] will engage in sociodramatic play using a character or activity for five minutes” was inappropriate because P.H. “doesn’t stay on task for five minutes.” (Id. at 457:10-13.) The most he had done with characters by May 1 was imitating things that teachers had done with puppets. (Id. at 457:14-18.) Although Nicklas testified that the annual goal “[P.H.] will improve reading comprehension skills to meet kindergarten grade English language performance standards” was appropriate, the underlying short-term objectives, on her view, were not. (Id. at 457:22-458:6.) The objectives are as follows: 1. He will distinguish between fact and fiction[.] 2. He will predict outcomes with 80% accuracy[J 3. He will identify the effect of a certain action [.] 4. He will predict the ending of a story[J 5. He will recognize the difference between fantasy and reality[.] (District Ex. 15 at 19.) Nicklas testified: [P.H.] at this moment is reading one word. I would like to start a comprehension program with him. But I mean, he couldn’t comprehend if he read a sentence .... So to be able to distinguish between fact and fiction, predict outcomes and identify the effect of a certain action, I just fee[l] that’s ... above where he is.” (Id. at 458:8-17.) The next annual goal states that P.H. “will improve reading skills by improving his phonic and word recognition skills to meet kindergarten grade expectancy.” (Id. at 459:7-9.) Nicklas testified that this goal is similarly too advanced. She testified: I believe that [P.H.] would first need to learn that A, the letter A means Ah (phonetic), the letter B makes the sound buh (phonetic). That is not in place yet. So in order for him to be able to recognize words with the same beginning sound, I think it’s a step ahead — prerequisites missing again. (Id. at 459:12-18.) The following goal states that P.H. “will improve mathematics skills to meet kindergarten performance standards.” (Id. at 459:19-21.) Nicklas opined: [T]his is something that he could do in the near future [as of May 1, 2008], but as I mentioned earlier, he’s just learning how to label numbers. So for him to grasp concepts like before, after, few, many, same as, equal, all, every — I think he needs to learn how to label numerals first[ — ]that’s more important — ]and count as well. (Id. at 459:24-460:6.) M.H. testified that although Plaintiffs cooperated with the CSE by providing all the requested documents regarding P.H.’s abilities and deficits (Hr’g Tr. 646:14-21), the CSE team ultimately disregarded the recommendations contained in those reports in favor of its own predetermined recommendations. (Id. at 652:22-653:14.) He stated: I think that the reports that were submitted appropriately describe my child, but I think that what is on the IEP does not.... [T]he goals that they say, you know, he’ll play basketball for, you know, 15 minutes at a time or whatever. God, I would love for him to be able to do that, you know. Would I like for him to meet those goals? Absolutely. But you know that is not my kid. The kid is reflected in the reports that my therapists submitted to the Board of Education. (Id. at 653:11-23.) Further, M.H. testified that when he voiced his objections to the DOE’s recommendations, “there was just a lot of pushback.” (Id. at 651:20-21.) In short, according to M.H., the CSE team rejected all of M.H.’s concerns, which conflicted with its own prepared recommendations. (Id. at 651:20-652:8.) Finally, according to Plaintiffs, the CSE team failed to conduct a functional behavior assessment (“FBA”), allegedly in violation of its statutory duty under the IDEA and its New York state regulations. The IDEA requires that “in the case of a child whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others, [the CSE team shall] consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). The New York State regulations implementing this provision define a functional behavior assessment as “the process of determining why a student engages in behaviors that impede learning and how the student’s behavior relates to the environment.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(r) (2010). The CSE must initiate an FBA if a student’s “behavior impedes his or her learning or that of others.” § 200.4(b)(v). P.H.’s IEP states that P.H. shows “attention seeking behaviors and will also become frustrated in particular circumstances by biting his hand and screaming. Gaps in his social and communication skills can be attributed to these behaviors emerging.” (District Ex. 15 at 6.) It further states that “difficulties were noted in sleeping, responsiveness, semantic and pragmatic components of language, social awareness, and flexibility that negatively impact his functioning.” (Id. at 7.) Despite these observations, the CSE did not initiate an FBA. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 16.) The DOE tells a different story. On its view of the facts, the CSE meeting produced an IEP and placement that accurately reflected the information provided to the team. (See DOE’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3-12.) All participants in the meeting had an opportunity to contribute to the process. (Id. ¶ 8.) First, according to the DOE, P.H. did not require an FBA because his behaviors did not interfere with his ability to learn. (Id. ¶ 7.) Jordan testified that “the behaviors he was manifesting was [sic] actually very passive, non-responsive, you know, laughing or giggling, but they weren’t interfering with his learning.... He wasn’t manifesting any maladaptive behaviors.” (Hr’g Tr. 81:7-15.) Yet Cruz’s testimony at least partially contradicted Jordan’s. When asked whether she “ha[d] experience implementing Functional Behavior Assessments,” Cruz answered, “Yes ... every child’s IEP must have an FBA.” (Id. at 258:14-18.) But she added that “if a student arrives without a Behavior Intervention Plan, ... the school [might] implement [its] own.” (Id. at 259:6-16.) Cruz further stated, upon reviewing P.H.’s IEP, “He has difficulties attending to some activities, and that’s where you have negative behaviors at times; and that’s, that’s a good clue for teachers to create an FBA ....” (Id. at 310:5-15.) Second, Jordan testified that the parents did not voice any concerns at the CSE meeting. She stated: “There was, I believe, a good amount of dialogue between all of the committee participants and everyone had an [sic] ample time to express their concerns and they were addressed at the meeting. And I believe that the parents were satisfied at that time.” (Id. at 80:1-6.) Third, Susan Cruz, the assistant principal of P.S. 15, testified that the teachers modify students’ goals as needed, based on their interactions in the classroom. (Id. at 275:16-276:12, 350:4-352:24.) The upshot of this testimony is that even if the goals set forth in the IEP were substantively inappropriate for P.H., the teachers at P.S. 15 could modify them to be substantively appropriate as P.H. progressed through the academic year; thus, any procedural defect caused by an improper determination of the goals by the CSE team could be remedied by P.H.’s teachers during the year. (See DOE’s Opp’n Mem. 10.) In any event, the parties agree that on July 11, 2007, the DOE sent Plaintiffs a final notice of recommendation (“FNR”) regarding P.H.’s proposed placement. (See District Ex. 16.) The DOE proposed to place P.H. at P.S. 15. (Id.) C. The Parents’ Investigation of P.H. ’s Placement and Unilateral Placement at the Brooklyn Autism Center Plaintiffs assert, and the DOE disputes, that the following series of events took place. For two weeks after P.H.’s proposed placement, M.H. attempted to contact the school and schedule a visit in order to confirm that the class was in fact appropriate for P.H. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 28.) During that time, M.H. never received an answer, and the school did not return his messages. (Id.) Finally, the DOE informed M.H. that Ronnie Schuster, the principal of a different school, P94 at 188 (“P.S.188”), would be the principal of P.H.’s program during the 2007-2008 school year. (See id. ¶ 29; Hr’g Tr. 656:7— 16.) M.H. had received no other relevant information from his attempts to contact the DOE. (See Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 28-29.) Therefore, M.H. contacted Schuster and scheduled an August 7, 2007 visit to P.S. 188. (See id. ¶ 29.) M.H. and E.K. visited as scheduled. (Hr’g Tr. 657:22.) They met Oliva Cebrian, a teacher who was to lead the site at P.S. 15, the location of P.H.’s placement. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 30.) Cebrian took M.H. to observe a 6:1:1 summer class similar to the one P.H. would be entering in the fall. (Id.; see Hr’g Tr. 660:23-661:6 (noting that “[a] 11 the kids were going to show up on the first day and then” be “sort[ed] out” “over the course of both sites” — ie., between P.S. 188 and P.S. 15).) M.H. observed that the teachers in the class “seemed like [they were] just babysitting.” (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 30 (quoting Hr’g Tr. 658:16-17).) Cebrian informed M.H. that the program has books, but “they’re a bit of a mess.” (Id. (quoting Hr’g Tr. 659:1-2).) She also stated that the mainstreamed children at P.S. 188 “were not particularly welcoming to the special ed. kids.” (Id. (quoting Hr’g Tr. 660:9-11).) All of this gave M.H. concerns about the appropriateness of P.H.’s placement. (Hr’g Tr. 659:2-20.) The next day, M.H. e-mailed Schuster requesting more information about the P.H.’s placement. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 31.) In response, Schuster stated that mainstream and non-mainstream students were intentionally separated. (Id.) She also stated that non-mainstream students were required to eat lunch on the 4th or 5th floor instead of in the school cafeteria, where the mainstream students ate. (Id.) Schuster suggested that M.H. speak with Sonia Royster at the CSE, whose work dealt with students’ placements, to obtain more information about the program. (Id.; see Hr’g Tr. 661:11-16.) M.H. attempted to contact Royster over the phone and also by letter to request information about the DOE’s placement of P.H. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 32.) She did not return any of his communications. (See id. ¶ 32; Hr’g Tr. 661:19-662:3.) In the meantime, Plaintiffs had begun to investigate their own placement options for P.H. (Hr’g Tr. 662:4-663:23.) They “called a program at Nest ... to see if [P.H. could] have a SEIT in the class with him there.” (Id. at 662:10-15.) They also explored whether a placement at the Brooklyn Autism Center (“BAC”) might be appropriate. (Id. at 662:16-663:23.) After touring the BAC and meeting with Jamie Nicklas, its educational director, Plaintiffs determined that the BAC would be an appropriate placement for P.H., at least until they found out more information on the DOE’s recommended placement. (See id. at 663:24-25.) M.H. “signed a[n enrollment] contract at BAC.” (Id. at 66 5:3-4.) He added: I ... only had to put down a small deposit. And if I could get placement for the start of the school year, then I wouldn’t be liable for the rest of the money. And that really made me kind of amp up. And it was probably like August 17th. It was probably August 17th, and that made me really ramp up trying to get an answer out of the CSE between now and then as far as like what his public school placement would be. (Id. at 665:4-13.) The contract indicated that P.H. would be enrolled at BAC for an annual tuition of $80,000, payable upon the beginning of P.H.’s term. (See id. at 500:15-22.) Plaintiffs had the right to withdraw P.H. before September 11 without being liable for the entire $80,000. (Id. at 501:17-502:9.) After signing the BAC contract, Plaintiffs continued to pursue the DOE’s recommended placement. On August 23, M.H. e-mailed Schuster to inform her that they were going to try to place P.H. at the BAC temporarily until the DOE gave them some concrete information on its recommended placement in the public schools. (Id. at 663:25-664:5.) The next day, August 24, M.H. visited the CSE office. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 33.) After waiting an hour and a half, he was finally able to meet with Royster to discuss P.H.’s placement. (Id.; Hr’g Tr. 664:5-14.) Although she worked in placement and although school was scheduled to begin in two weeks, Royster was unable to provide him with any information regarding P.H.’s recommended class placement. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 33; Hr’g Tr. 664:18-25.) M.H. also met with Martin Bassis, another placement officer, who similarly could not provide a class profile or any other information on P.H.’s placement. (See Hr’g Tr. 664:16-19.) Schuster told M.H. to contact her on September 10, the day when she would be putting together the classes. (Id. at 668:20-22.) On September 10, the first day of school, M.H. called Schuster as directed. (Id. at 668:24-669:1.) He left a message, but Schuster never returned his call. (Id. at 669:1-2.) On September 14, M.H. emailed Schuster. (Id. at 669:4-5.) She did not return his e-mail until September 19. (Id. at 669:5-6.) M.H. made an appointment to see the DOE’s recommended class placement the next day. (Id. at 669:9-11.) On September 20, M.H. visited P.S. 15, the DOE’s actual placement. (Id. at 669:12-15, 20-21.) He was greeted by Oliva Cebrian, who took him to the classroom of Elizabeth Washburn. (Id. at 669:18-22.) M.H. spent approximately half an hour observing Washburn’s class. (Id. at 669:18-23.) Washburn used primarily the TEACCH method of instruction. (Id. at 767:9-18.) She testified that she used discrete-trial ABA “with students with whom it’s appropriate.” (Id. at 767:9-18.) M.H.’s observation left him with two kinds of concerns about this class. First, he felt that P.H. was developmentally more advanced than the students in the class. For example, “[t]hree of the four kids were completely nonverbal” (id. at 671:3-4), whereas the documents the CSE considered- indicated that P.H was verbal {e.g., District Ex. 1 at 2-3; District Ex. 2); “two of the four were not toilet trained, were wearing diapers” (Hr’g Tr. 671:4-5), whereas P.H. was toilet trained {e.g., District Ex. 22 at 2; see also District Exs. 1-14 (not mentioning any problem with toilet training in documents provided to the CSE)); and “[t]here was not a lot of attending. One of the little kids in the class who was not toilet trained ... was slumped over, sucking his thumb.” (Hr’g Tr. 671:20-25.) Yet the documents offered to the CSE indicated that P.H. would “benefit from placement with better language and social models.... [H]e [also] requires 1:1 intensive language-based behavioral interventions by an experienced SEIT throughout the day.” {E.g., District Ex. 13 at 1; District Ex. 1 at 4-5.) Second, M.H. was concerned that P.H. would not benefit from the kind of instruction Washburn provided to her class. He explained: She was reading some sort of a, like a Dr. Seuss book and was focusing on the words lion and apple. And she had pictures of a lion and a picture of the apple, and all she was trying to do was to get the kids to identify the apple ..., and they were not even capable of that. (Hr’g Tr. 671:10-16.) The documents provided to the CSE, however, indicate that P.H. already possessed cognitive skills more advanced than those Washburn was trying to instill. For example, P.H.’s Speech and Language Progress Report states: [P.H.] demonstrated the following receptive language skills in a structure, one-on-one setting: recognizing action in pictures, understanding the use of objects, understanding part/whole relationships, understanding simple descriptive concepts such as “wet” and “little,” identifying colors, making inferences using pictures, and understanding some picture analogies.... Expressively, [P.H.] was able to name pictured objects, tell how an object is used, use quantity concepts, use possessives, complete some analogies[,] and name objects when the object is described. (District Ex. 2 at 2.) Following his observation, M.H. spent about fifteen minutes talking to Washburn about “things like where the kids were in the class, where [P.H.] was at, cognitively, expressively, a little bit of his history so that she knew where he was coming from as well.” (Hr’g Tr. 670:3-7.) M.H. stated that the school personnel indicated that Washburn’s class would also employ the PECS system for P.H., even though P.H. was verbal and even though PECS was used only for non-verbal students like the ones currently in Washburn’s class. {Id. at 710:14-712:5; see IHO Decision 14.) Washburn, however, “said that P.H. should be in Jackie’s class, another teacher at the school.” {Id. at 670:12-13.) She also stated that she only used PECS with her two nonverbal students, not her whole class. {Id. at 774:12-18.) But Oliva Cebrian told M.H. that Jackie’s class would not have been appropriate for P.H. because that class had students nearly twice P.H.’s age. {Id. at 670:13-19.) No one at the school indicated either that P.H. could have been placed in any other classroom or that anyone else might have been P.H.’s teacher. {Id. at 674:1-675:2.) M.H. stated: “So I left the school going what do I do?” {Id. at 670:19-20.) The DOE offers its own version of events. First, it asserts that P.H. would not have been placed in Washburn’s class. Instead, the DOE would have placed him in the classroom of Corrine Motta, another P.S. 15 instructor (Hr’g Tr. 252:8-12; see District Ex. 18 at 1), who did not meet with M.H. when he visited P.S: 15. Notably, M.H. gave undisputed testimony that when he visited P.S. 15 — after the incoming P94 students had been sorted into their permanent classes — no one either introduced him to Motta or suggested that her class would have been a potential placement for P.H. (See Hr’g Tr. 674:1-675:2.) Rather, the DOE identified the option of Motta’s class for the first time on April 2, 2008, at the Impartial Hearing (see id.) and, at the time M.H. visited, said that P.H. would have been placed in Wash-burn’s class (see id.). Although Washburn testified that she did not recall meeting M.H. (id. at 777:9-11), she admitted that M.H. may well have visited her classroom (see id. at 817:20-818:1). The DOE did not call Schuster or Cebrian to testify that M.H. never visited the school. M.H.’s testimony on this point therefore stands unrebutted. In any event, Motta’s kindergarten class consisted of three five-year-old children. (See District Ex. 18 at 2.) All of the students lacked expressive language skills (id. at 291:18-292:12; IHO Decision 6) and had below-average intellectual ability and social skills. (District Ex. 18 at 1-2.) Two of the three were not toilet trained. (Hr’g Tr. 319:19-320:1.) Motta used the TEACCH methodology and employed ABA “as needed.” (Id. at 384:2-3.) According to Cruz, ABA instruction is administered to Motta’s students by Motta and occasionally Cebrian, who pull P.S. 15 students out of class to perform as many hours of ABA instruction as each student requires. (Id. at 306:24-307:24, 313:7-314:11.) She testified that Motta and Cebrian administer ABA to children “within 10 to 30 [minutes each day] depending upon the child’s need.” (Id. at 382:18-383:7.) Similarly, Washburn testified that she administers about 30 minutes of 1:1 discrete-trial ABA to students of hers who require it. (Id. at 813:10-20.) Yet Nicklas and Dr. Salsberg both testified that discrete-trial ABA is not effective unless it is used for many hours each week, (see id. at 401:1-402:5 (describing supporting research), 579:17-19 (“30, 40 hours a week are sort of an industry minimum and really clinically what is needed for [children P.H.’s age].”).) Notably, Washburn agreed that she had heard 20-30 hours per week of 1:1 discrete-trial ABA was necessary for the student to receive an educational benefit (id. at 814:3-11), but she also testified that one nonverbal student had learned twenty new words under her own regimen (id. at 827:10-16). Further, Nicklas gave undisputed testimony that one needs “very intensive training” in order to utilize an ABA program. (Id. at 403:23-404:3.) Nicklas herself studied in an American Psychological Association-accredited program for seven years, “[a]nd even past that, [she] was still learning new things [ ] because it’s a complex[,] continually] changing field[;] you really need to ... follow the research to see what’s most effective and what best practices are.” (Id. at 404:3-11.) Motta, however, has no training in ABA other than in-school instruction by Cebrian. (Id. at 313:7-19 (“Currently, she is being trained in school ....”), 314:12-22.) Washburn’s only formal training in discrete-trial ABA consisted of a thirty-hour, video-based class, as well as some amount of on-the-job experience. (Id. at 803:19-805:11.) Second, Cruz testified that P.H. “would have been a good fit for [Motta’s] class academically and socially ... [b]ecause some of the kids ... presented ... the same type of stuff [sic] that [P.H.] right now is showing ... in his IEP.” (Id. at 282:14-21.) Specifically, “the reading readiness level, the math levels, [and] the functioning level [were] similar.” (Id. at 283:6-8.) Yet Cruz’s example of achieving positive results with a similar child involved using a picture-based system to develop the child’s expressive language skills. (Id. at 284:4-5.) Not only does this example lack sufficient detail to make a meaningful comparison to P.H., but this is also the same system the school uses only for non-verbal students, (see id. at 265:17-24, 266:8-9 (“It’s who could verbalize do not use the Picture Exchange System.”).) P.H. iS' not non-verbal (see District Ex. 2 at 2); thus, there is no reason to believe that Cruz’s comparison is valid and no reason to expect that P.H. would have experienced positive results from the same treatment. With respect to opportunities to interact with P.H.’s peers, Cruz testified that P.S. 15 facilitates “mainstreaming” by having its principal encourage disabled and non-disabled students to meet one another in the hallways, primarily at the beginning and the end of the day. (see id. at 340:22-343:1.) Cruz did not identify any other mainstreaming opportunities P.S. 15 would have offered P.H. (see id.) She also stated that the school was not academically mainstreaming any of the students in September, and as of April 2, 2008 had only been mainstreaming one new student. (Id. at 337:2-13, 339:5-11.) In any event, the parties agree that shortly after M.H. visited P.S. 15, Plaintiffs paid the remaining balance of P.H.’s BAC tuition (Parent Ex. E) and, on October 30, requested an impartial hearing from the DOE pursuant to the IDEA (Parent Ex. A). D. P.H.’s Program at the Brooklyn Autism Center The BAC is a private school that accepts only children diagnosed with autism. (Hr’g Tr. 410:4-6, 414:4-6.) The school uses an intensive ABA program with a 1:1 student-teacher ratio. (Id. at 405:17-406:13, 410:4-8.) The BAC does not admit a child unless its staff members determine, after meeting with the family and observing the prospective student, that he or she requires an intensive ABA program. (See id. at 413:23-414:25 (“[A] strict ABA program is not appropriate for every single child.... It’s not going to do them any justice to be in a more restrictive environment ... if they can communicate and ... learn in a large group setting.”).) The BAC has five teachers and five students, including P.H. (Id. at 410:19-24.) Physically, the school consists of one classroom and one playroom located in (and rented from) the International School of Brooklyn, a private general-education school. (Id. at 410:12-15.) Each BAC student has a cubicle with a desk, chairs for the student and teacher, and all the necessary program materials. (Id. at 411:13-19.) The student is responsible for keeping track of his or her own daily schedule and putting the class materials away at the end of each day. (Id. at 411:20-412:6.) All of this is meant to “promote as much independence as possible.” (Id. at 412:5-6.) The students also spend time learning in dyads as they prepare to learn in small-group settings. (Id. at 442:4-443:8.) With respect to mainstreaming opportunities, the BAC students have an African drumming class and an art class with typically developing students. (Id. at 412:19-413:6.) They also share the hallways and have recess and some social activities together. (Id. at 445:18-446:15.) Nicklas testified, however, that none of the BAC students is prepared for mainstream academic classes. (Id. at 413:19-22.) During his first year at the BAC, P.H. made friends with a typieally developing boy at the Brooklyn International Academy, (see id. at 695:15-20.) With respect to academics, the teachers use discrete-trial ABA and keep extensive data on each student’s progress. (See Parent Ex. F.) They review that data to determine whether their current programs are working or need to be modified. (See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 425:21-426:4 (“[W]e have to constantly see if we’re not making progress we need to make some changes [sic].”).) The teachers also rotate every 30 minutes to ensure that students’ skills are consistent in them interactions with different people; this process is called “generalization.” (Id. at 423:4-8.) The BAC evaluated and admitted P.H. in accordance with its standard admission procedure, (see id. at 415:8-418:4.) Nicklas observed P.H. at his home. (Id. at 416:2-3.) P.H. displayed a lot of maladaptive behaviors, a lot of screaming [and] hand biting.... [S]omeone was trying to do an activity with him and he swiped all the materials onto the floor. He couldn’t sit appropriately at his desk, at his table. He had to keep being redirected. He had little to no eye contact. He had some spontaneous speech, but it was limited to labeling things or stating things that weren’t really relevant to the present environment. (Id. at 416:3-13.) Nicklas “observed in the data ... that his behaviors were as [sic] a lack of being able to communicate effectively. And his way of communicating was screaming and biting his hand because he didn’t understand that [he could just ask for help in order to get someone’s attention].” (Id. at 417:3-6.) Based on these observations, Nicklas “fe[lt] strongly that [P.H.] needed to have a strict ABA program in order to ... teach him to look at somebody when you’re talking to them and to ... shape his behaviors.” (Id. at 416:22-417:1.) P.H. initially maintained these behaviors upon his enrollment at the BAC. (Id. at 418:8-419:6.) Thus, Nicklas “developed a program based on the most significant behaviors that we needed to address ... because ... we have to get the behaviors under control first.” (Id. at 420:7-11.) Nicklas testified that P.H. couldn’t take a couple steps without ... walking in this very awkward motion and engaging in all of those vocalizations .... So, our main focus of the program at the beginning was getting attending behaviors in place so that he could learn.... If he can’t make eye contact, if he’s not looking at you ... how do we know he’s even hearing us? And if he’s non-responsive — we have to get all this stuff under control because all these behaviors interfere with his learning. (Id. at 420:12-421:2.) Further, P.H. had no protein in his diet when he entered the BAC; he had not grown for one full year. (Id. at 421:25-422:8.) By the time Nicklas and M.H. testified at the hearing, P.H. had made significant progress. For example, through a program called “eating novel foods,” the BAC had introduced protein and other foods into his diet: P.H. had begun eating fish sticks, chicken, peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches, vegetables, and cereal. (Id. at 424:12-425:16.) Nicklas went to P.H.’s home to ensure that his food desensitization program became generalized to environments outside of school. (Id. at 426:15-19.) P.H. also learned to walk quietly and appropriately without making “non-contextual vocalizations.” (Id. at 430:11-431:10.) With respect to social mainstreaming, Nicklas testified that although the BAC students benefit from it only “[t]o a very low level” (id. at 446:19-447:3), P.H., who came in not “really knowing] how to play,” had progressed to engaging in parallel play (id. at 447:4-6). M.H. testified that [t]here is more spontaneous language. He stays on task longer. I mean I [previously] couldn’t get him to ... sit for ten minutest[, but t]wo weeks ago I actually brought him to his first Broadway show. And he sat for two and a half hours . ?.. Last night, he knows [sic] his bedtime’s 8:00. He literally looked at the digital clock ... and he said time is it [sic]? I said you know what time it is [P.H.] He look[ed] at the clock and said it’s 8-0-0, time to go to bed. He went right into his bedroom. That is ... a first.... [E]very day there are milestones. (Id. at 678:5-679:4.) Dr. Salsberg, who observed P.H. at the BAC, testified that P.H. was “[absolutely” receptive to his instruction there. (Id. at 585:6-8.) He stated: [P.H.] was engaged, reciprocal, you know. He would still pull his, you know, trying to go off task, but they were right on him and they were usually a step ahead of him. So he was atte[n]tive and stayed through every single lesson we observed in the dyad and in the one-to-one with an ABA person, or sometimes two ABA people .... (Id. at 585:8-15.) He concluded that the BAC is “[absolutely conferring an educational benefit on P.H. (Id. at 585:17-21.)” As the IHO found, the student has made significant progress as reflected in the data maintained .... He has learned to identify objects he wants, to ask for help, to walk appropriately and quietly. The student is more engaged [;] he is able to identify basic numbers and words, count by rote to ten[, and] respond to social questions. He can state his birthday, the names of family members and his address. (IHO Decision 9-10.) In short, P.H.’s program at the BAC proved to be significantly beneficial for him. Dr. Salsberg also testified that P.H.’s 1:1 program at the BAC is not overly restrictive. He stated: Unfortunately I don’t think that there is a less restrictive environment [in which] we could make appropriate progress. Again, the literature is pretty clear and clinically knowing [P.H.], it’s pretty clear that he needs the one-to-one ... to make progress.... [I]f there were typically developing peers there during the day, they would be distracting to him. He would not be using those models in the appropriate way. It’s nice that his school has the opportunity to expose him to typically developing models, but it’s certainly not a necessary factor that’s going to promote his improvement right now. Right now he needs more importantly the one-to-one to make appropriate progress. (Id. at 586:2-18.) He concluded that P.H. was not ready for a less restrictive educational environment. (Id. at 587:21-588:1.) White’s testimony on cross-examination was consistent with Dr. Salsberg’s assessment. She stated: [P.H.] does tend to get distracted when — especially if there are, you know, other children or other people around. So there are certain — I guess what I’m saying is he functions really well on a one-to-one basis. But even on a one-to-one basis, sometimes he has trouble when he’s given prompts. He needs— his focus really needs to be directed on the verbal information. It’s hard for him. So I think a special education teacher definitely would be able to provide that level of prompt, but it might be difficult in a group setting, depending on ... what kind[s] of skills they’re working on. {Id. at 632:23-633:11.) P.H.’s program, however, was not without its flaws. The BAC does not provide related services — such as speech therapy, physical therapy, and occupational therapy — on site because it is “a strict ABA school.” {Id. at 447:12-18.) M.H. testified that he and E.K. pay for P.H. to receive the following services at home each week: one hour of physical therapy, two forty-five-minute sessions of occupational therapy, and three thirty-minute sessions of speech therapy. {Id. at 675:13-676:2.) The parents meet once every one or two months with Nicklas and the related service providers to discuss P.H.’s progress. {Id. at 447:20-448:5, 676:3-24.) This regimen, however, does not implement the recommendations given to the CSE team that created P.H.’s IEP. {See District Exs. 1-14 (setting forth the relevant information that was before the CSE team).) M.H. testified that although he did not feel it was appropriate to meet all of P.H.’s needs {id. at 676:25-677:3), Plaintiffs could not afford to pay for any more related services for P.H. {id. at 677:4-14). Yet M.H. also stated, with respect to P.H.’s related services, that “he’s making less progress [than previously] but steady progress.” {Id. at 706:10-20.) E. The Neiv York State Administrative Hearings On October 30, 2007, Plaintiffs requested a due process hearing, alleging that the DOE denied P.H. a FAPE and seeking reimbursement for P.H.’s BAC tuition. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 51; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 51.) Over the course of eight days between January 30, 2008 and September 5, 2008, the IHO heard testimony and accepted evidence from both parties. (Pis’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 52; DOE’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 52.) On October 2, 2008, the IHO rendered a decision finding (1) that the DOE failed to offer P.H. a FAPE; (2) that the parents’ placement of P.H. at the BAC was appropriate; and (3) that the parents were equitably entitled to reimbursement of P.H.’s $80,000 BAC tuition. {See Findings of Fact and Decision, Case No. 113216, at 15-17 (Oct. 2, 2008).) On November 10, 2008, the DOE appealed the IHO’s decision to the State Review Officer (“SRO”). Upon review, the SRO reversed the IHO’s decision, finding that the DOE had in fact offered P.H. a FAPE. {See Decision, No. 08-131, at 14-15 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter “SRO Decision”].) The Parents then filed suit in this Court on April 9, 2009 seeking review of the SRO’s decision. [See dkt. no. 1.] III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction over claims arising under the IDEA pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). IV. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment In an IDEA case, summary judgment “often triggers more than an inquiry into possible disputed issues of fact. Rather, the motion serves as a ‘pragmatic procedural mechanism’ for reviewing” an administrative determination. Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 83 n. 3 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir.1995) (“Though the parties [in an IDEA action] may call the procedure ‘a motion for summary judgment’ ..., the procedure is in substance an appeal from an administrative determination, not a summary judgment.”)); see also T.Y., K.Y. ex rel. T.Y. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir.2009) (“The court’s inquiry is a results-based standard in many respects, concerned more with a just outcome for a disabled student than with judicial efficiency.”). As such, the district court’s role is “circumscribed.” T.P. & S.P., 554 F.3d at 252. “While the district court must base its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, it ‘must give due weight to [the administrative] proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally lack[s] the specialized knowledge and experience nec