Full opinion text
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, DENYING PETITIONER’S PETITIONER FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III, District Judge. In this action, pro se Plaintiff Tomas Kowalak has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He was convicted in state court for first degree murder in connection with the murder of his mother, and later sentenced to life in prison. In his habeas petition, Kowalak identifies ten separate issues he alleges support granting him a writ. The Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives for all pretrial proceedings. The matter now returns to the Court on the Report and Recommendation of Judge Komives. Docket no. 80. In his Report, Judge Komives recommends that the Court deny Kowalak’s petition because all ten substantive claims in the petition lack merit. Although Respondent argues that all but one of Kowalak’s claims are barred by Kowalak’s procedural default in state court, Judge Komives concludes that whether or not the claims are defaulted presents a more difficult question than whether the claims have any substantive merit. Accordingly, Judge Komives considers the substance of the claims and concludes that none has merit. See Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir.1999) (“Although the procedural bar issue should ordinarily be resolved first, judicial economy sometimes dictates reaching the merits of [a claim or claims] if the merits are easily resolvable against a petitioner while the procedural bar issues are complicated.”). Kowalak has filed objections to the Report. Docket no. 81. A District Court’s standard of review for a magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation depends upon whether a party files objections to the Report. With respect to portions of a Report that no party objects to, the Court need not undertake any review at all. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”). The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record and finds that Kowalak’s objections are without merit, as are his claims The Court agrees that the procedural default analysis in Kowalak’s petition is significantly more complicated than the analysis of his substantive claims for relief, and agrees that the more judicious and prudent approach lies considering the substance of the claims. Judge Komives’s reasoning and analysis in the Report with respect to the merits of the claims is sound and correct. He has fully considered Kowalak’s arguments and the responses thereto, and has correctly resolved the issues raised in the petition in favor of Respondent. In his objections to the Report, Kowalak only raises arguments he made in his brief supporting his petition, arguments that Judge Komives properly considered, ultimately found unpersuasive, and later rejected. Additionally, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability in this ease. A petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability in order to appeal the district court’s denial of a habeas petition for relief from a state conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(1). A court may issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold, a petitioner must show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of denial of a constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). Specifically, he must “demonstrat[e] that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). The Court concludes that jurists of reason would not find its assessment of Petitioner’s claims debatable. The Court thus declines to issue Petitioner a certificate of appealability. Petitioner may request a certificate of appealability from the court of appeals if he wishes. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioners objections to the Report and Recommendation (docket no. 81) are OVERRULED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (docket no. 80) is ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. SO ORDERED. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PAUL J. KOMIVES, United States Magistrate Judge. Table of Contents I. RECOMMENDATION.....................................................664 II. REPORT.................................................................664 A. Procedural History................................... 664 B. Factual Background Underlying Petitioner’s Conviction....................666 C. Procedural Default.....................................................675 D. Standard of Review....................................................677 E. Actual Innocence/Sufficiency of the Evidence (Claim I).....................678 1. Actual Innocence...................................................678 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence..........................................679 a. Clearly Established Law.........................................679 b. Analysis.......................................................680 F. Evidentiary Claims (Claims IV-VI)......................................681 1. Evidentiary Claims Generally.......................................681 2. Hearsay Evidence and Confrontation (Claim IV).......................682 a. Background Relating to Moore’s Testimony........................682 b. Admission of Hearsay Evidence ..................................683 c. Confrontation Clause............................................683 3. Scientific Evidence (Claim V)........................................687 4. Exclusion of Hearsay Evidence and Right to Present a Defense (Claim VI) ......................................................687 a. Clearly Established Law.........................................688 b. Analysis.......................................................688 G. Jury Claims (Claims VII & IX) .........................................689 1. Instructional Error (Claim VII) .....................................690 a. Clearly Established Law.........................................690 b. Analysis.......................................................690 2. Extraneous Influence (Claim IX).....................................691 a. Clearly Established Law.........................................691 b. Analysis.......................................................692 H. Suppression of Evidence (Claim VIII)....................................693 1. Clearly Established Law............................................693 2. Analysis..........................................................694 a. Witness Identity................................................694 b. Destruction of Evidence.........................................695 c. Discovery Material..............................................696 I. Speedy Trial (Claim X).................................................697 1. Clearly Established Law............................................697 2. Analysis..........................................................698 J. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Claims II & III).........................701 1. Clearly Established Law............................................701 2. Analysis..........................................................701 a. Trial Counsel ..................................................701 b. Appellate Counsel ..............................................703 K. Conclusion............................................................703 III. NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS .........................703 I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should deny petitioner’s application for the writ of habeas corpus. II. REPORT: A. Procedural History 1. Petitioner Tomas L. Kowalak is a state prisoner, currently confined at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan. 2. Petitioner was charged with first degree murder in connection with the murder of his mother. Prior to trial, petitioner filed an application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, raising the following claim: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO QUASH AND/OR SUPPRESS NANCY MOORE’S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THREATS DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY MADE TO THE HOMICIDE VICTIM. The court of appeals initially denied petitioner’s application for leave to appeal in a standard order. See People v. Kowalak, No. 186736 (Mich.Ct.App. July 17, 1995). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court which, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of petitioner’s claim as on leave granted. See People v. Kowalak, 449 Mich. 909, 538 N.W.2d 676 (1995). On remand, the court of appeals rejected petitioner’s claim, concluding that the victim’s hearsay statements to Nancy Moore were properly admissible as excited utterances under Mich. R. Evid. 803(2). See People v. Kowalak, 215 Mich.App. 554, 546 N.W.2d 681 (1996). Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal this decision to the Michigan Supreme Court, which denied the application in a standard order. See People v. Kowalak, 453 Mich. 947, 557 N.W.2d 308 (1996). 3. On March 21, 1997, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316, following a jury trial in the Oakland County Circuit Court. On April 29, 1997, he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 4. Petitioner appealed as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals raising, through counsel, a single claim: WHERE A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF FOUR YEARS ELAPSED BETWEEN THE DATE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ALLEGEDLY PERPETRATED THE OFFENSE HE WAS CHARGED WITH AND THE DATE HIS JURY TRIAL COMMENCED, WAS THE. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IMPERMISSIBLY DEPRIVED OF HIS STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A “SPEEDY” TRIAL ON THE CHARGE THAT HAD BEEN LEVIED AGAINST HIM? The court of appeals found no merit to petitioner’s claim, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. See People v. Kowalak, No. 203164, 1998 WL 1988815 (Mich.Ct. App. Nov. 20,1998) (per curiam). 5. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, sought leave to appeal this issue to the Michigan Supreme Court, as well as an additional claim that his appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court denied petitioner’s application for leave to appeal in a standard order. See People v. Kowalak, 461 Mich. 925, 604 N.W.2d 684 (1999). 6. On February 13, 2001, petitioner filed a pro se application for the writ of habeas corpus, raising the following grounds for relief: (1) actual innocence and insufficient evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (4) improper admission of hearsay evidence; (5) improper admission of unreliable scientific evidence; (6) denial of the right to present a defense by the exclusion of a defense witness’s hearsay testimony; (7) improper jury instruction on premeditation; (8) suppression and destruction of evidence; (9) denial of an impartial jury through an extraneous jury influence; and (10) denial of a speedy trial. Respondent moved for summary judgment on the ground that all but two of petitioner’s claims were unexhausted. On September 21, 2001, the Court entered an order dismissing the petition without prejudice based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state court remedies. 7. On November 9, 2001, petitioner mailed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mich. Ct. R. 6.500-.508 to the trial court. On November 20, 2001, the motion was returned to petitioner because the brief in support exceeded the page limit. Petitioner subsequently attempted to refile his motion, to no avail. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the claims asserted in his habeas petition as well a claim that the trial court had erred in rejecting his motion for relief from judgment. On May 5, 2003, the court of appeals denied petitioner’s application for leave to appeal in a standard order, “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Kowalak, No. 243592 (Mich.Ct.App. May 5, 2003). Petitioner thereafter filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which denied the application in a standard order. See People v. Kowalak, 469 Mich. 1044, 679 N.W.2d 69 (2004). 8. On May 5, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to reinstate his habeas petition, asserting that he had exhausted his state court remedies. Respondent again moved to dismiss the petition for lack of exhaustion. The Court granted the motion and dismissed the petition without prejudice on November 29, 2004. 9. Petitioner returned to state court, filing another motion for relief from judgment which relied on his earlier brief. The trial court affirmed its earlier conclusion that the brief exceeded the applicable page limit, and limited its consideration to the first 25 pages of petitioner’s brief. The trial court denied the motion because petitioner’s claims were either previously raised on appeal and decided against him, Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(2), or could have been raised on direct appeal and petitioner did not have good cause for his failure to do so, Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3). See People v. Kowalak, No. 93-123822-FC (Oakland County, Mich., Cir. Ct. July 27, 2005). Petitioner’s subsequent applications for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court were denied in standard orders, based on petitioner’s “failure to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under M.C.R. 6.508(D).” People v. Kowalak, 477 Mich. 943, 723 N.W.2d 859 (2007); People v. Kowalak, No. 267158 (Mich. Ct.App. June 22, 2006). 10. Petitioner returned to this Court on December 15, 2006, filing a motion to reinstate his case. On July 18, 2007, the Court granted the motion and reinstated petitioner’s action. 11.Respondent filed her answer on November 10, 2008. She contends that petitioner’s speedy trial claim is without merit, and that petitioner’s remaining claims are barred by petitioner’s procedural default in the state courts. B. Factual Background Underlying Petitioner’s Conviction Petitioner was convicted of murdering his mother, Jessie Kowalak. The evidence adduced at trial was accurately summarized in the prosecutor’s brief on petitioner’s direct appeal from his conviction: The first witness to testify on behalf of the People was Officer Steven Worton of the City of Madison Heights Police Department. (Transcript 3-13-97, hereinafter T, 153.) Officer Worton was on duty on February 24, 1993. (T, 154.) That evening, Officer Worton received a call to check “on the welfare of a woman.” (T, 154.) As he proceeded to the address given to him by his dispatcher, the call was upgraded to an “assist rescue” and “a woman down, not breathing.” (T, 154.) Officer Worton arrived at the address on Dartmouth in the City of Madison Heights at approximately 8:00. (T, 155, 174.) He was met out front of the residence by Nancy Moore who took him into the house and led him to a woman that was laying on the living room floor. (T, 155.) The woman (which he identified as Jessie Kowalak) was laying flat on her back in front of a chair and had a mark (what appeared to be a bruise) on the right jawline. (T, 155-156, 165.) The bruise on Jessie’s jaw made Officer Wortoin believed [sic] that something criminal may have occurred. (T, 166.) The fire department arrived at the scene and Jessie was turned over to them. (T, 166.) At that time, Officer Worton called his supervisor to request that some detectives come to the scene. (T, 166,168.) Officer Worton looked for signs of forced entry into the residence, but could find none. (T, 174.) He asked Nancy Moore if the front door of the residence had been locked. (T, 179.) Moore replied, ‘Tes, the door was locked.” (T, 179.) The next witness to take the stand on behalf of the People was Mark Ehrke, a firefighter with the City of Madison Heights. (T, 186.) Ehrke testified that he was an Emergency Medical Technician licensed by the State of Michigan and was certified in CPR and how to handle basic emergencies. (T, 186, 187.) During the evening hours of February 24, 1993, Ehrke responded to 25620 Dartmouth. (T, 197). He entered the home and found an elderly woman lying on the floor. (T, 188.) He found that the woman was not breathing and did not have a pulse. (T, 188-189.) The paramedics attached an automatic external difibulator [sic] to the woman, which indicated that she did not have a “shock-able rhythm.” (T, 189.) This indicated that the woman was dead. (T, 189.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Yvonne Kowalak. (T, 191.) Yvonne married Defendant on July 22, 1981, and divorced him in October of 1989. (T, 194.) Yvonne and Defendant had two (2) children, Eric and Brant. (T, 194.) Jessie Kowalak was Yvonne’s mother-in-law. (T, 194.) In 1993, Yvonne and Defendant’s children were five (5) and three (3) years old. (T, 196.) On February 24, 1993, a hearing was held in the Oakland County Circuit Court before the Honorable Barry Howard to determine where Defendant would have visitation rights with his children. (T, 197.) Yvonne asked Jessie Kowalak to testify against Defendant because she was concerned that Judge Howard was going to grant visitation rights to Defendant. (T, 198.) At approximately noon on that date, Yvonne picked Jessie up and drove to the courthouse. (T, 198, 222.) At the hearing, Jessie testified against Defendant. (T, 198, 208.) At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Howard denied Defendant the ability to have visitation with his children. (T, 208-209.) At approximately 3:00 p.m., the proceedings before Judge Howard concluded. (T, 209.) L At trial, a videotape of a portion of the proceedings from that date were played to the jury. It was transcribed as follows: THE COURT: Mrs. Kowalak, I’m going to put you under oath. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you? THE WITNESS: I do. THE COURT: Tell me what you want to tell me. THE WITNESS: Okay. I am Tom’s mother. I am the grandmother to these two little boys. Tom is an alcoholic, and I feel he should not be involved with those little boys. THE COURT: Is there anything else you want to say? THE WITNESS: Well, do you want to ask me anything? Now, at the present time, since November, he has been living with me. He had been living with his girlfriend in Hazel Park. He is now with me. Every weekend, that he has money, he spends on a drunk [sic]. (Transcript, 3-14-97, hereinafter T II, 28-29.) Yvonne and Jessie walked out of the courthouse together. (T, 209.) As they left the courthouse building, Defendant was standing outside the vestibule (the second set of doors) lighting a cigarette. (T, 209, 224-225.) Defendant leaned his head towards Jessie (who was to the right of Yvonne) and said something to her. (T, 210, 225-226.) Yvonne could not hear anything that was said. (T, 210, 226.) When Yvonne and Jessie got to the car, Jessie was crying. (T, 210.) Yvonne then took Jessie to her home on Dartmouth at approximately 3:30. (T, 210-211.) Yvonne asked Jessie if she wanted her to stay with her, but Jessie declined. (T, 211.) Yvonne then went home. (T, 211.) At approximately 6:40 p.m., Yvonne telephoned Jessie. (T, 211.) However, Jessie did not answer the phone. (T, 211.) Yvonne kept calling and got no answer. (T, 211.) She began to get worried, so she called the Madison Heights Police Department. (T, 212.) She asked them to check on Jessie because she was not answering the telephone. (T, 212.) Yvonne testified that she had never seen Defendant drive Jessie’s vehicle, unless Jessie was in the vehicle. (T, 215, 216.) On cross-examination, Yvonne testified that, at the time of the divorce, it was initially Defendant who had custody of the children. (T, 217.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Nancy Moore. (T II, 30.) Moore testified that she had lived with Rex Kowalak (Defendant’s brother) for ten (10) years. (T II, 31.) She called Jessie Kowalak her mother in law and knew her well. (T II, 32.) Moore spoke with Jessie by telephone on February 23, 1993, at 3:30, after Jessie come home from the court hearing. (T II, 34, 56.) Jessie was “petrified” and “scared to death.” (T II, 36, 38.) Moore immediately went over to Jessie’s house. (T II, 38.) Jessie let Moore into the house and immediately locked the door. (T II, 39.) Jessie told Moore that she was worried because, on the way out of the courthouse, Defendant had looked at her and said, “I’m going to kill you for what you’ve done to me.” (T II, 44, 52-53.) Moore stayed with Jessie for about a half an hour in order to try to calm her down. (T II, 44.) She then told Jesse that she had kids at home so she had to leave, but that she would be back in fifteen (15) or twenty (20) minutes. (T II, 44, 58.) Jessie did not want Moore to leave. (T II, 58.) Jessie locked the door after Moore walked out. (T II, 44.) It was approximately 4:00 p.m. when Moore left Jessie’s home. (T II, 44, 57.) The shades were open at that time. (T II, 45.) Moore was unable to return to Jessie’s home because Rex did not come home from work until 5:00. (T II, 59.) Moore became concerned after she received a telephone call from Yvonne Kowalak between 6:30 and 7:00 and Yvonne told her that Jessie was not answering her telephone. (T II, 45^16, 60, 62.) She told Rex that, “I’m going to check on mom (Jessie Kowalak), and I’ll be back.” (T II, 46.) Five (5) minutes later she arrived at Jessie’s home. (T II, 46.) Jessie’s car was not in the driveway. (T II, 46, 47-48.) Moore knocked on the door, but Jessie did not answer. (T II, 48.) She tried to open the door, but it was locked. (T II, 48.) Moore noticed “a flickering form the T.V. being on ...” and that there were no lights on in the home. (T II, 48.) Moore knew that Jessie did not watch television with the lights off. (T II, 48.) Moore then went around the house trying to look through the windows. (T II, 48.) However, all of the shades were pulled down except for one that was up about half an inch up on the south side of the house. (T II, 48-49.) By looking through the window, Moore could see that Jessie was laying on the floor. (T II, 49.) Moore, who wanted to get into the house to help Jessie, could not open any of the windows or doors, so she went to a neighbor’s (Jeff Roop’s) and called Rex to see if he had the key to get into Jessie’s home. (T II, 49-50.) Rex indicated that he did have a key. (T II, 50.) Moore and Roop then went back to the home and kept trying to open the windows. (T II, 50.) Finally, they were able to open the back south door of the home, which Jessie had “always locked” (but which was not locked at that time) and went into the home. (T II, 50-51, 56.) Moore saw Jessie lying on her left side and it appeared that “there was no life to her.” (T II, 51, 67.) Moore called 9-1-1. (T II, 51, 67.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Jeffrey Roop. (T II, 74-75.) Roop testified that he lived next door to Jessie Kowalak. (T II, 75.) On the evening of February 24, 1993, Nancy Moore came over to his house and indicated that she was worried about Jessie because she would not answer the telephone or the door. (T II, 77, 81.) Eventually, Roop and Moore got into the house through a side door and went into the living room area of the home. (T II, 78.) Jessie “was kind of slumped out of a chair that she had apparently been sitting in, partially on the floor.” (T II, 78, 82, 89.) Moore was markedly upset by what she saw. (T II, 78.) Roop and Moore laid Jessie on the floor on her back and checked her vital signs. (T II, 79, 83.) However, Roop could find no vital signs. (T II, 79.) In the meantime, Moore made contact with a 9-1-1 operator, but had a difficult time answering the questions posed to her. (T II, 79.) As such, Roop ended up talking to the 9-1-1 operator and told them that he was not getting any vital signs. (T II, 79). The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Jamie Krieger. (T II, 95-96.) Krieger lived across the street from Jessie Kowalak. (T II, 97.) Krieger testified that, between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on February 23, 1993, he saw Defendant go up to the front porch of the home wearing a snow cap. (T II, 98-99.) At that time, Jessie’s car was parked in the driveway. (T II, 100.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Robert Omans. (T II, 100-102.) Omans worked with Defendant at the time of Jessie Kowalak’s death. (T II, 102.) On February 23, 1993, around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., Defendant came over to Omans’ home. Defendant was driving Jessie Kowalak’s car (which he identified in People’s Exhibit 7), which Omans had never seen Defendant drive previously. (T II, 103-104, 106.) Defendant had backed the car into Omans’ driveway. (T II, 104.) Omans let Defendant into the house. (T II, 104.) Omans and Defendant began talking and Defendant said, “Let’s go get some beer.” (T II, 104.) Omans and Defendant then got into the car and bought some beer at a party store. (T II, 104.) Defendant gave Omans $3.00 for the beer. (T II, 110.) They then returned to Omans’ home. (T II, 105.) Defendant again backed into Omans’ driveway. (T II, 108.) Defendant asked Omans’ girlfriend if she knew how to cut hair and trim beards. (T II, 107.) Eventually, Defendant stated, “Well, I’m going to get out of here.” (T II, 107.) Omans testified that Defendant’s hands had been scratched by his kitten five (5) or six (6) days prior. (T II, 108.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Rex Kowalak, Defendant’s brother. (T II, 121.) Rex testified that he was a certified master mechanic in the State of Michigan and that he often worked on his mother’s car. (T II, 123.) Rex testified that, on occasion, Jessie would allow Defendant to drive her car. (T II, 128.) On February 24, 1993, Rex got home from work between 5:00 and 5:30. (T II, 125.) After he got home, Yvonne called the home and talked with Nancy Moore. (T II, 125-126.) Moore then left for Jessie’s home. (T II, 126.) Shortly thereafter, Rex got a telephone call from Moore and left for his mother’s home. (T II, 126.) He arrived at the home at the same time as a police vehicle and he and the officer went into the home together. (T II, 127.) Jessie was lying on the floor. (T II, 127.) Rex saw no signs of forced entry, sexual assault, or robbery in the house. (T II, 131.) He did notice that Jessie’s car was missing from the driveway. (T II, 132.) On cross-examination, Rex indicated that he very rarely spoke with Defendant and that it had been years since he had spoke with Defendant. (T II, 143.) On redirect examination, Rex stated that he and Defendant did not like each other and never had. (T II, 135.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Marjorie Bowman. (T II, 137.) Bowman testified that she had known Defendant for approximately thirty (30) years. (T II, 137.) She indicated that she had dated Defendant. (T II, 138.) On February 24, 1993, Bowman lived in Hazel Park. (T II, 138-139.) At approximately 10:30 p.m., Bowman got a telephone call from Defendant. (T II, 139.) Defendant asked Bowman if he could come over to her house because he had some things he wanted to discuss with her. (T II, 139.) Defendant came over to Bowman’s house and told her that his mother had testified in court that day. (T II, 140.) He told her that his mother had testified against him saying that he was alcoholic and that she did not feel that he would be responsible to take care of his children. (T II, 140.) Defendant then told Bowman that, when he got home, he found his mother laying on the floor. (T II, 140.) He told her that he “kind of freaked and left” the house with the car keys. (T II, 141.) Defendant then borrowed a few dollars from Bowman and went to the store and bought a half a pint of whiskey and some cigarettes. (T II, 141.) After he returned from the store, Defendant stated that, when he found his mother, he did not know whether she was dead or alive. (T II, 141.) He indicated that, if she was dead, they would most likely accuse him of her murder. (T II, 141.) When the police came to the door of Bowman’s house at approximately 11:30 p.m., Defendant stated, “If that’s the police, let them in.” (T II, 142, 147.) On cross-examination, Bowman stated that Defendant had scratches on his hands “[a]ll the time” whenever he was “at his mother’s house or anybody’s house who had cats.” (T II, 150.) The next witness to testify.on behalf of the People was Lieutenant Robert Blickensdorf of the Madison Heights Police Department. (T II, 154.) On February 24, 1993, Lt. Blickensdorf went to Oakland General Hospital to begin investigating an “unattended death” in which foul play was suspected. (T II, 155.) He then proceeded to the victim’s home at 26520 Dartmouth. (T II, 156.) Lt. Blickensdorf examined the home and found no signs of forced entry. (T II, 158.) He could also find no signs that the home had been ransacked, that there had been a struggle, or that the victim had been sexually assaulted. (T II, 158-159, 170-171.) He did notice that the victim’s vehicle was missing. (T II, 160.) At approximately 11:30 p.m., the officers, assisted by officers from the Hazel Park Police Department, went to Marjorie Bowman’s house in Hazel Park. (T II, 11-162.) Lt. Blickensdorf saw the victim’s vehicle parked on the street, one house east of Bowman’s home. (T II, 161.) They knocked on the door of the home and Bowman answered. (T II, 162.) Defendant was arrested in the residence just prior to midnight. (T II, 162,173.) Defendant was taken to the police station. (T II, 162.) At the station, Lt. Blickensdorf noticed numerous scratches on the outside of Defendant’s hands. (T II, 163.) Lt. Blickensdorf attended the autopsy on Jessie Kowalak on February 25,1993: (T II, 167.) He was present when Jessie’s fingernails were removed (clipped) and packaged. (T II, 168, 169.) They were given to Lt. Blickensdorf who transported them to the Michigan State Crime Laboratory in the City of Sterling Heights and gave them to laboratory specialist David Woodford. (T II, 168.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was David Woodford, a laboratory scientist with the Michigan State Crime Laboratory in the City of Sterling Heights. (T II, 175.) He testified that his specialty was forensic serology (analysis of body fluids). (T II, 175.) Woodford was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic serology without objection. (T II, 177.) On February 26, 1993, Woodford tested the fingernail clippings from Jessie Kowalak and found that two (2) clippings (one from each hand) had a minute amount of blood on them. (T II, 179 — 180, 186.) Woodford then tried to determine if the blood was human. (T II, 180-181.) However, there was not enough blood to be able to determine whether or not it was human in nature. (T II, 181, 188.) The next witness to testify on behalf of the People was Dr. Kanu Virani, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner of Oakland County. (Transcript 3-18-97, hereinafter T III, 6.) Dr. Virani was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology without objection. (T III, 9.) On February 25, 1993, Dr. Virani performed an autopsy on the body of Jessie Kowalak. (T III, 11, 65, 80.) Jessie was eighty-two (82) years old. (T' III, 11.) Dr. Virani began with an external examination. (T III, 12.) He found that Jessie had injuries on her nose, around the lip and mouth area, and under the chin. (T III, 13.) Abrasions were present on the nose, lips, inside of the lip, on the tongue, and under the chin. (T III, 13.) Dr. Virani testified that abrasions occur when there is a scraping of the skin. (T III, 17-18, 60.) Dr. Virani also testified that there were pinpoint hemorrhages in Jessie’s eyelids and upper eyelids. (T III, 19.) He indicated that “[wjith the combination of those pinpoint hemorrhages, the injury on the nose and the lips, under the chin, that all becomes a combination of an — what is known as ‘asphyxia;’ particular one is the smothering.” (T III, 20.) He defined “smothering” as “keeping the nose and mouth closed so that [a] person cannot breath.” (T III, 20.) Dr. Virani testified that, based on what he saw, it was “obvious” that Jessie Kowalak had been smothered. (T III, 20.) - Dr. Virani noted on cross-examination that pinpoint hemorrhages can be caused by means other than smothering. (T III, 74.) Dr. Virani testified that he also performed an internal examination of Jessie Kowalak’s body. (T III, 21-22.) He did not find any internal injuries and noted that her heart was “in better shape than her 82-year-old age.” (T III, 22, 69-70.) Dr. Virani noted that “[h]er lungs were slightly filled with fluid which is known as edema of the lungs, or swelling of the lungs, which is common in a smothering or any asphyxia.” (T III, 22,103.) Dr. Virani testified that it was his expert opinion that the cause of Jessie Kowalak’s death was smothering. (T III, 23.) He stated that “it was probably a human hand that was kept on the nose, mouth and chin area so that she cannot open her mouth-and the nose was broke-so that she cannot breathe.” (T III, 24.) Dr. Virani testified that it would take about two (2) or three (3) minutes for someone subjected to suffocation to become unconscious and die. (T III, 25.) He testified that he believed the manner of death to be homicide. (T III, 26.) When shown photographs of the scratches on Defendant’s hands, Dr. Vi-rani testified that the abrasions “are more likely from a human nails [sic] than anything otherwise” because of the curvature of the nail. (T III, 28, 82.) He noted that the scratches in the photographs appeared to be twenty-four (24) hours old and could not be more than approximately forty-eight hours old. (T III, 84; Transcript 3-20-97, hereinafter T IV, 10-11.) With Dr. Virani’s testimony, the People rested. (T IV, 11.) The first witness called to the stand by the defense was Gaylen Curtis. (T IV, 12.) Curtis testified that she represented Yvonne Kowalak in various courts from 1989 to 1993. (T IV, 13.) Curtis stated that she was representing Yvonne during the hearing that took place on February 24, 1993, before Judge Howard. (T IV, 13.) During that hearing, Jessie Kowalak briefly testified. (T IV, 13-14.) Curtis testified that, when the hearing was over, she, Yvonne, and Jessie left the courtroom and paused outside the courtroom in the hallway. (T IV, 13.) Eventually, they walked to the elevators at the end of the hallway. (T IV, 14.) Curtis testified that, it was at this point that they “passed” Defendant. (T IV, 14.) Curtis testified that she “segregated” Yvonne and Jessie and suggested that they wait for another elevator. (T IV, 15, 22.) She recalled no discussion between the individuals. (T IV, 15.) Curtis testified that they got off the elevator on the first floor. (T IV, 16.) When asked if she saw defendant again, either on the first floor or outside, Curtis responded, “I don’t recall. He may have passed us again. He may not have. I do not recall.” (T IV, 16-17.) She did not recall where she ultimately left Yvonne and Jessie. (T IV, 27, 29.) The defense then recalled Lt. Blickensdorf to the stand. (T IV, 31.) Lt. Blickensdorf testified that the photographs of Defendant’s hands that had been shown to Dr. Virani were taken on February 28,1993. (T IV, 31-32). The next witness called to the stand by the defense was Officer Glen Fearn, formerly of the Madison Heights Police Department. (T IV, 33-34.) Fearn testified that he tried calling Jessie Kowalak’s home on February 24 and got a busy signal. (T IV, 36-37, 38.) A few minutes later, Fearn tried to call the home again and no one answered. (T IV, 37, 39.) The defense then recalled David Woodford to the stand. (T IV, 43.) Woodford testified that the blood found on the fingernails was on the inside of the nails. (T IV, 44-45, 51.) After recalling Majorie Bowman to the stand (T IV, 63-64), Defendant took the stand on his own behalf. (T IV, 68-69.) Defendant testified that he and Yvonne were married on July 22, 1981, and were divorced in October of 1989. (T IV, 69.) Defendant testified that he was in court on February 24, 1993, for a visitation review hearing and had gotten to court by bus. (T IV, 78-80.) He indicated that he was representing himself because he could not afford an attorney. (T IV, 79). Defendant testified that, at the conclusion of the hearing, he left the courtroom through a different door than Yvonne, her attorney, and his mother had used. (T IV, 82.) Defendant stated that he always made a point of avoiding Yvonne “[b]ecause she was in the habit of creating incidents, and I didn’t want to have to deal with that.” (T IV, 83.) Defendant stated that he left the courtroom and went down the “private hallway” and then waited for an elevator. (T IV, 83.) Defendant indicated that, as' he was waiting for an elevator, he saw Yvonne, her attorney, and his mother, pass him and go down the stairs. (T IV, 84, 138-139.) According to Defendant, no communication occurred. (T IV, 84.) Defendant testified that he then took an elevator to the first floor. (T IV, 84) At that point, according to Defendant, he realized that he was on the wrong floor to catch the bus. (T IV, 85.) Defendant testified that, because he had around half an hour wait for the bus, he decided to go outside on the first floor to smoke a cigarette. (T IV, 85.) Defendant testified that, just as he was finishing his cigarette, he looked into the lobby area and saw his mother, Yvonne, and her attorney, speaking to two (2) deputy sheriffs in the lobby. (T IV, 86.) Defendant indicated that they were looking at him and he assumed that Yvonne was going to try to create another incident. (T IV, 86.) Defendant testified that, as his mother, Yvonne, and her attorney, walked out of the building, he turned his back to them. (T IV, 87.) According to Defendant, when he turned around again, he could not see his mother or Yvonne, but could see Gaylen Curtis walking through the parking lot. (T IV, 87.) Defendant denied that he had said anything to any of them as they walked past him. (T IV, 87.) Defendant testified that he went back into the building, went to the ground floor, and exited the courthouse where he caught a bus that took him to downtown Pontiac. (T IV, 88.) He further testified that he transferred to another bus which took him to Royal Oak by approximately 4:20. (T IV, 88-89.) Defendant stated that he took another bus to Eleven Mile Road and Campbell and had to walk to his mother’s house from there. (T IV, 89.) Defendant testified that he arrived at his mother’s home at approximately 5:15. (T IV, 89, 139.) He indicated that he went in the home through the front door which was unlocked because “[m]y mother always left the front door unlocked for me.” (T IV, 90.) Defendant stated that, when he walked in, he saw that his mother “was on the floor in front of her chair that she normally sits in.” (T IV, 90.) Defendant testified that he crossed over his mother and knelt down and “it was obvious to me at that point that my mother was dead.” (T IV, 93.) Defendant stated that he assumed that his mother had died from a heart attack or possibly a stroke. (T IV, 95, 141.) He admitted that he did not check her vital signs, or call 9-1-1 or the police. (T IV, MO-141.) Defendant testified that he did not call the police because of animosity between himself and the Madison Heights Police Department. (T IV, 95.) He felt that they would accuse him of something because “I’ve been accused of everything you can think of by the Madison Heights Police.” (TIV, 95.) Defendant testified that he took his mother’s keys and left the house through the back door. (T IV, 94, 142.) He further testified that he took his mother’s car and drove, eventually ending up at a Hardee’s restaurant at Eleven Mile Road and 1-75, where he stayed for at least an hour. (T IV, 94.) / Defendant testified that he left Hardee’s and went past the house of his friend, John McMann. (T IV, 98.) According to Defendant, McMann was not home so he started to drive back to Hardee’s, when he recalled that Brenda Holmes lived on the same street as McMann. (T IV, 99, 143.) As such, he drove to see Bob Omans, who lived with Holmes. (T IV, 99, 100.) Defendant stated that, when got to the home, he backed into the driveway, which was his customary manner of parking. (T IV, 100.) Omans answered the door. (T IV, 143.) Defendant stated that he talked with Omans and Holmes for two (2) or three (3) hours. (T IV, 99.) Defendant testified that he did not tell them about his mother because he was not that “familiar” with them. (T IV, 100.) Defendant testified that he had been to the home four (4) or five (5) days earlier, at which time he had been repeatedly scratched by a kitten. (T IV, 101.) He added that he was also scratched by the kitten when he was at the home on February 24, 1993, “but it wasn’t anything like the time previous.” (T IV, 101.) Defendant testified that, while at the home, he and Omans left to get some beer. (T IV, 146.) Defendant stated that, when he got back to the house, he drank one (1) beer. (T IV, 146.) Defendant denied that he had asked Holmes that evening to cut his hair that night. (T IV, 147.) Defendant testified that, when he left the home (at approximately 10:00 p.m.), he went to Marjorie Bowman’s house, which was about a mile away. (T IV, 103, 147.) According to Defendant, he knocked on her door, but no one answered. (T IV, 103.) Defendant testified that he drove to a nearby pay phone and called Bowman. (T IV, 103.) Bowman answered the phone and told Defendant that she had been doing the laundry. (T IV, 104.) According to Defendant, he told Bowman, “Well, listen, I need to come over. I know it’s late, but I need to talk to you.” (T IV, 104.) Defendant testified that he then went back to Bowman’s house. (T IV, 104.) He borrowed $2.00 from her and went to the store to buy half a pint of whiskey because his “nerves were shot.” (T IV, 105,148.) Defendant testified that he returned from the store and “immediately” drank some of the whiskey. (T IV, 105.) According to Defendant, he then talked to Bowman about the court hearing. (T IV, 105.) Defendant testified that he then told Bowman about finding his mother and that she reacted by saying, ‘You are going to jail. You know you have to call the police, and as soon as you do, you will go to jail.” (T IV, 106.) Defendant testified that he did not have the opportunity to call the police because the police arrived at Bowman’s house. (TIV, 106.) On cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred regarding a statement made by Defendant to the Madison Heights Police: Q Does that (indicating) refresh your memory as to what you told the Madison Heights Police? A Yes. Q What did you say? A You’re asking me to quote that (indicating) statement? Q Yeah. A Are you asking me to quote this (indicating)? Q Yes. A I think what — I’ll try to get it exactly right. “Okay, you’re looking for a motive. It’s been there since I was eight years old.” Something like that. (T IV, 153.) With Defendant’s testimony, the defense rested. (T IV, 157.) The People called Rex Kowalak as a rebuttal witness. (T IV, 157.) Rex testified that there was no animosity between Nancy Moore and his mother. (T IV, 158.) With Rex Kowalak’s testimony, the People again rested. (T IV, 160.) Appellee’s Br., in People v. Kowalak, No. 203164 (Mich.Ct.App.), at 9-27. C. Procedural Default Respondent first contends that all but petitioner’s speedy trial claim are barred by petitioner’s procedural default in the state courts, because petitioner failed to raise these claims on direct appeal. Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal habeas court will not review a question of federal law if the state court’s decision rests on a substantive or procedural state law ground that is independent of the federal question and is adequate to support the judgment. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). However, “a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on the procedural bar.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038. Furthermore, “only a ‘firmly established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim.” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51, 104 S.Ct. 1830, 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)); see also, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal., 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.1996) (internal quotation omitted) •(“For the procedural default doctrine to apply, a state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner’s purported default.”). While the procedural default doctrine precludes habeas relief on a defaulted claim, the procedural default doctrine is not jurisdictional. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89, 118 S.Ct. 478, 139 L.Ed.2d 444 (1997). Thus, while the procedural default issue should ordinarily be resolved first, “judicial economy sometimes dictates reaching the merits of [a claim or claims] if the merits are easily resolvable against a petitioner while the procedural bar issues are complicated.” Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir.1999) (internal citations omitted); see also, Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (noting that procedural default issue should ordinarily be resolved first, but denying habeas relief on a different basis because resolution of the default issue would require remand and further judicial proceedings); Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1360 n. 6 (9th Cir.1995). Here, several factors counsel in favor of considering petitioner’s claims on the merits rather than relying on the procedural default doctrine. Petitioner first presented his purportedly defaulted habeas claims in his motion for relief from judgment. Michigan Court Rule 6.508, governing motions for relief from judgment, provides that the movant “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to relief.” Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D). The rule goes on to provide, in three separately numbered paragraphs, procedural situations in which relief will not be granted: (1) where an appeal relating to the conviction is pending; (2) where the claim has already been ruled upon in a prior appeal or postconviction motion; and (3) where the claim could have been raised in a prior appeal or postconviction motion but was not. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(l)-(3). The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court both rejected petitioner’s appeal based on his “failure to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).” However, the Sixth Circuit has issued somewhat conflicting decisions regarding the extent to which this language, standing alone, is sufficient to invoke the procedural bar of Rule 6.508(D)(3). Compare Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir.2000) (language alone sufficient to constitute invocation of procedural bar), with Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 923-24 (6th Cir.2004) (language insufficient where lower court opinion rejected claims on the merits). Second, in rejecting petitioner’s appeals on the first motion for relief from judgment-the one which the trial court did not permit petitioner to file' — neither the Michigan Court of Appeals nor the Michigan Supreme Court purported to rely on a procedural bar. On the contrary, the Michigan Court of Appeals expressly denied leave to appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Kowalak, No. 243592 (Mich.Ct.App. May 5, 2003). Petitioner’s appeal raised not only the claim that the trial court had erred in rejecting his motion for relief from judgment, but also the substantive claims for relief. Thus, it is not clear that these claims should properly be considered defaulted. Further, when the matter was again presented to the trial court in petitioner’s second motion for relief from judgment, the court rejected all but one of the claims on the grounds that they had been previously presented on appeal and thus were barred by Rule 6.508(D)(2). See People v. Kowalak, No. 93-123822-FC, at 3 (Oakland County, Mich., Cir. Ct. July 27, 2005). Rule 6.508(D)(2) is a collateral estoppel rule which prohibits a trial court from reconsidering a claim already decided against a defendant on direct appeal. Application of this collateral estoppel rule does not bar federal habeas review. As this Court has explained: “Rule 6.508(D)(2) is simply a res judicata rule barring a defendant from relitigating claims in a motion for relief from judgment which were decided adversely to him in a prior state court decision. Because Petitioner’s ... claims were considered on the merits in Petitioner’s [direct appeal], there is no bar to habeas review of these claims.” Morse v. Trippett, 102 F.Supp.2d 392, 402 (E.D.Mich.2000) (Tarnow, J.) (citing Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1253 (9th Cir.1996); Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 368 (2d Cir.1983)); accord Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1289 n. 8 (4th Cir.1995). In light of the somewhat conflicting analyses set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Simpson and Abela, and the difficulty in this case determining upon exactly what bases the Michigan courts rejected petitioner’s claims, the procedural default analysis is significantly more complicated than the analysis of petitioner’s substantive claims for relief. Because, as explained below, those claims are without merit, the Court should deny the petition on that basis rather than on the basis of an purported procedural default. D. Standard ofRevieiv Because petitioner’s application was filed after April 24, 1996, his petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Amongst other amendments, the AEDPA amended the substantive standards for granting habeas relief by providing: (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[T]he ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses [have] independent meaning.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also, Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). “A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ ... clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’ ” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495); see also, Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843. “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong. of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495); see also, Bell, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843. However, “[i]n order for a federal court to find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’ ” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (citations omitted); see also, Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. By its terms, § 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of whether the state court’s decision comports with “clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” Thus, “ § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Further, the “phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’ In other words, ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495). Although “clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court” is the benchmark for habeas review of a state court decision, the standard set forth in § 2254(d) “does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases — indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 362; see also, Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16, 124 S.Ct. 7. Further, although the requirements of “clearly established law” are to be determined solely by the holdings of the Supreme Court, the decisions of lower federal courts are useful in assessing the reasonableness of the state court’s resolution of an issue. See Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir.2003); Phoenix v. Matesanz, 233 F.3d 77, 83 n. 3 (1st Cir.2000); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F.Supp.2d 354, 359 (E.D.Mich.2002) (Tarnow, J.). E. Actual Innocence/Sufficiency of the Evidence (Claim I) In his first claim, petitioner contends that he is actually innocent of the crime and that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence of his guilt. The Court should conclude that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on these claims. 1. Actual Innocence To the extent that petitioner is asserting an independent claim that he is actually innocent, the claim is not cognizable on habeas review. A writ of habeas corpus may be granted “only on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Thus, the existence of new evidence, standing alone, is not a basis for granting the writ. As the Supreme Court has explained: “Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993); see also, id. at 404, 113 S.Ct. 853 (claim of actual innocence is “not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise [procedurally] barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”) (emphasis added); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-16, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (distinguishing, in part, Herrera because in this case the petitioner “accompanie[d] his claim of innocence with an assertion of constitutional error at trial.”); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) (“Of course, such evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention; the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.”), overruled in paid on other grounds, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). Thus petitioner’s claim of innocence, standing alone, provides no basis for habeas relief. Further, even if such a claim were cognizable on habeas review, petitioner has presented no evidence of actual innocence. To establish actual innocence as an exception to a procedural bar, a petitioner must present “new and reliable evidence that was not presented at trial” that “show[s] that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 299, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). “To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 (internal citation and quotation omitted). It is not sufficient to show merely that the evidence raises a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist. See id. at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851 (“The meaning of actual innocence ... does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty.”). “Examples of evidence which may establish factual innocence include credible declarations of guilt by another, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, and exculpatory scientific evidence.” Pitts v. Norris, 85 F.3d 348, 350-51 (8th Cir.1996) (citations omitted); accord Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851 (referring to “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence”); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (same). Here, as explained below, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction, and he has presented no new evidence, much less new reliable evidence, tending to demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. Accordingly, the Court should conclude that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence Petitioner also contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court should conclude that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. a. Clearly Established La